

The Harper Years

Lecture 11: POL 312Y Canadian Foreign Policy
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Introduction

On **January 23, 2006**, Canadians elected Stephen Harper's Conservatives with a minority government of 124 seats, compared to 103 for Paul Martin's Liberals, 51 for the separatist Bloc Québécois, and 29 for the New Democratic Party (NDP). The 46-year-old Torontonian-turned-Albertan was formally sworn in as Canada's 22nd prime minister on **February 6**. A **debate immediately** arose about what Canadian foreign policy would now be (Kirton 2006, 2007). After Harper won a second, stronger minority government of 143 seats on **October 14, 2008** and then a majority government of 166 seats on **May 8, 2011**, the debate continued, among six major competing schools of thought.

The Debate

The first school pointed, in authentic peripheral dependent (PD) fashion, to "**restrained Americanism.**" It predicted that Harper would seek a cooperative relationship with the U.S., limited only by Harper's fragile minority position and absence of ideological partners in Parliament. Janice Stein forecast "greater affinity with U.S. positions internationally," including a pro-American tilt on relations with the Middle East and the United Nations (McCarthy 2006). Joseph Jockel, Christopher Sands, David Biette, and Dwight Mason thought the tone and ease of the Canada-U.S. relationship would improve, as Harper made good on his defence promises. But they also felt that the Shamrock Summit-like closeness of Brian Mulroney and Ronald Reagan would be avoided, given Harper's minority position at home (Koring 2006). Others worried that behind the scenes, a tilt to America on ballistic missile defence (BMD) would come (Crosby 2006).

A second school, similarly PD in substance, saw "**ignorant isolationism.**" It predicted that Harper's government would have little involvement, influence, or instinct for activism anywhere abroad. This was due to the new prime minister's lack of knowledge or interest in international affairs, and the failure of Canadian society to force him to address foreign policy during the election campaign. Jeffrey Simpson (2006) concluded that Canada would

be a “small, parochial, even self-absorbed country” without views on the rise of India and China or crises in Iraq and Iran. This was due to the paltry foreign affairs platform of the Conservatives and their deliberate silence on international affairs during the campaign, a prime minister “with no experience or apparent interest in the world, and a party in power without a single frontbencher qualified by experience or interest to become foreign affairs minister.” Almost four years later, the *Economist* (2009) agreed.

A third school, still PD in content saw **global incompetence**. John Ibbitson cried inexperienced incompetence when Harper started by affirming Canada’s Arctic sovereignty claims and later wondered whether Harper would even show up for the Group of Eight (G8) summit in Germany in 2007 (Ibbitson 2006). Lawrence Martin added Europe and AIDS to the foreign policy failures produced by “amateur hour on the Rideau.” Robert Wolfe highlighted the lack of a comprehensive foreign policy review, and Harper’s scolding of China on human rights but not the U.S. over Guantanamo Bay (Maclean’s 2007). Another ex-diplomat, Paul Heinbecker, argued that Harper launched himself into the Middle East and China to win votes at home but to no benefit abroad (Maclean’s 2007). The *Economist* saw Harper doing well on domestic policy but being less assured on foreign policy, where he repaired relations with the U.S. but extended Canada’s Afghanistan mission to 2009 and criticized China for abusing human rights.

A fourth school, with the usual liberal-internationalist (LI) instinct for continuity, saw **nothing different**. Thus Jack Granatstein (2007: 223) concluded “The Conservative government genuinely might wish to improve the condition and fighting abilities of the Canadian Forces, but wishes are worthless without political will and the funding to implement them.” Jeffrey Simpson claimed that Harper, trolling for domestic votes and trusting no-one, achieved nothing new (Simpson 2007). Gains on softwood lumber and defence spending were offset by a lack on progress on many other fronts.¹

A fifth school, still LI in logic, saw competent **pragmatic compromise**. Paul Evans portrayed Harper as a reincarnation of John Diefenbaker, who came from the opposition, and was driven by values, but compromised once in office. John Ibbitson now saw competence, when the Canadian forces in Afghanistan were given the needed equipment and moral support, the

¹ These include: Maher Arar, America’s International Trade in Arms Registry System (ITARS), American agricultural protectionism, climate change, development assistance, diplomatic cutbacks, China, Doha, bilateral trade deals, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Turkey, Africa and Latin America.

softwood lumber deal was reached, and immigration levels remained high, even if the Tories botched the Clean Air Act in 2006 (Ibbitson 2007).

A sixth school saw **principled decisiveness**, flowing from Harper's penchant for rational policy analysis, the constraint of minority government, and his concern with the next election campaign (Martin 2006; Campbell 2006; McDougall 2006; *Globe and Mail* 2006, Galloway, 2006; Corcoran, 2006).). Such complex neo-realist (CNR) suggestions were fuelled by Harper's fast, firm declaration of Canada's Arctic sovereignty and his apparent about face in keeping Canada in the Kyoto Protocol on climate change. As Harper reached his first 100 days in office, Andrew Coyne (2006) concluded: "The most striking departures have been in the area of foreign affairs: the Prime Minister's bold visit to Afghanistan, with that stirring call to Canadian 'leadership'; the groundbreaking decision to withdraw funding from the Hamas regime in Palestine; the long-overdue designation of the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist group. And capping them all, the softwood lumber deal: evidence, perhaps, that better relations with the United States pays dividends." By the end of Harper's first year, this principled foreign policy was declared to be the government's most important achievement. Don Martin (2006) heralded the unwavering support for the Afghanistan mission, unflinching friendship with democratic Israel, support for human rights in China and a military rearmed.

Puzzles

The initial doubts about Harper's foreign policy were understandable. For Harper had arrived in the immediate wake of the very internationally experienced and oriented **Paul Martin**. In sharp contrast, the 2006 election had brought a replay of Joe Clark in 1979 — another young Albertan prime minister with little previous interest or involvement in international affairs, no ministerial record, and heading a new Conservative party, a minority government, and a cabinet with virtually no foreign policy experience at all. Yet most schools ignored the external determinants of Canadian foreign policy, the major systemic changes underway since, or assumed that Canada would continue to be a middlepower in this rapidly changing world. They were thus unable to account for the many surprises and changes that Harper's government brought.

Global Democratic Leadership

After almost nine years, the Harper government foreign policy at least showed **disaster avoided**. Harper outperformed Clark, whose government had lasted only nine months before being defeated in the House and on the hustings as a result of his biggest foreign policy decision — to implement a G8 strategy for energy security by imposing a tax on carbon-producing gas. Second, Harper's record also shows **fears unfounded**. For there arose nothing to confirm the suspicions that Harper had a secret agenda that would put Canadian troops into Iraq, immediately remove Canada's ratification of the Kyoto protocol, and join George Bush's BMD.

Instead the Harper government's foreign policy showed **global democratic leadership** (Kirton 2006, 2007). Harper delivered a foreign policy that went beyond inherited LI impulses, to emphasize interest and value based initiatives in democratization, defence, and development around the world. Despite his initial inexperience and minority government he increasingly produced a foreign policy promoting Canada's national interests (NI) and distinctive national values (DNV), and exerting effective global leadership to shape world order as a whole.

This performance was caused *at the individual and governmental levels* by a prime minister that took **policy analysis** seriously, and took tight control of international affairs. It was driven at the societal level by a prime minister and party that had fully absorbed the **Progressive Conservative** tradition on which they depended to govern. It was driven at the external level by a Canada that had emerged as a full strength principal power and an **energy superpower** juxtaposed against an ever more shocked, **vulnerable and potentially vanquished America** unable to cope on its own in a more dangerous, diffuse world.

The Meta-Theory Applied

The meta-theory of hegemonic transition helps **explains** Canada's CNR rise to global democratic leadership. America's dollar initially declined against the rising currencies of Japan, Europe, Britain and the surging economies of China, India and Brazil. World oil prices, which had been at US\$68.10 a barrel when Harper began, rose to a new high above US\$140 a barrel in 2008. Then came the American-turned-global financial crisis in September 2008, a deep recession, an unusually slow recovery and the prospect of American military defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not surprisingly Bush's

approval ratings plunged to a new low of 35 percent. In the mid-term elections on November 7th, 2006, Bush's Republicans lost control of both houses of Congress. In November 2008 they lost the Presidency and Congress to Barack Obama's Democrats. But America's decline continued as China, India, Brazil, Russia and other emerging economies saw their growth in gross domestic product (GDP) lead the world.

Amidst America's acute decline, possible defeat and systemic diffusion into emerging economies, Canada's relative capabilities rose. Its dollar, which had stood at US\$0.87 when Harper started, leapt to US\$1.10 by late 2007. In an increasingly resource-short world, Canada—along with its other superpower neighbour, Russia—stood as the only first-tier, full-strength surplus energy power and commodity supplier in the globe (Kirton 2006c). Canada was the only G7 country before the financial crisis with a fiscal surplus and rapidly declining national debt, and was projected to lead the G8 in GDP growth in 2010 as recovery returned. Amidst the glow of this growing global power, Harper secured a stronger minority government on October 14, 2008 and then a majority on May 8, 2011.

So strong were these trends in deepening American vulnerability, major power rise, broadening systemic diffusion and rising Canadian capability that even the most internationally ignorant, uninterested, domestically-constrained Canadian leader would very probably have been pulled into global leadership in this rapidly changing world. And Harper as a rational calculator and quick learner was. The advent of a new G20 summit in November 2008, its institutionalization as the premier body for global economic governance at Pittsburgh in September 2009, and its choice of Canada to host to its fourth summit in Ontario on June 26-27, 2010 indicated how much the world and Canada's place had changed (Kirton 2013). Canada's hosting of the G8 in Muskoka and delivery of the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) the same weekend, its war to liberate Libya in 2011, and its achievement of a full free trade and economic partnership with the European Union on October 18, 2013 showed Canada shaping world order in the social, security and economic spheres (Kirton 2011, Kirton et al 2014).

Then things changed. In 2014 the US dollar and growth rate surged, those of all other systemically significant states dropped, capability became concentrated in the US and by November 4, Canada's dollar bought only US 88 cents and WTI crude oil plunged to \$77.30 a barrel from its \$100.87 peak

in June. Canada's vulnerability soared with radicalized home grown terrorists killing two Canadian soldiers in Quebec and Ottawa in October. Yet Canada's global leadership continued, as it invoked sanctions against Russia over its invasion and annexation in Ukraine and then went to war in Syria against the terrorist Islamic State. These decisions showed the salience of determinants at the societal, governmental and individual levels, notably a majority government, supportive public opinion and experienced and determined Prime Minister.

Doctrine

The Harper government's global democratic leadership was seen in its foreign policy doctrines from the very start.

The Campaign Platform

Harper's immediate promise as a new Prime Minister to "deliver on our commitments" placed a premium on the many pledges on international affairs that he had made in his party platform, *Stand Up for Canada*, and on the campaign trail (Conservative Party 2005). The platform had opened with the central CNR national interest (NI) imperative to "strengthen **national unity** and advance our interests on the world stage." It recognized "increased competition from around the world" and the need to protect Canada against the many assaults from an American adversary, notably on softwood lumber, imported crime, the Canadian Wheat Board, and the Byrd Amendment giving the US government's antidumping and countervailing duties to complaining American firms.

Economically, the platform highlighted Canada's distinctive national values (DNV) of global openness through trade. It pledged to chart a course for the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), reassert Canadian leadership in the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, and "explore the possibility of free trade negotiations with Canada's democratic ... partners in the Asia-Pacific, Japan and India." **Environmentally**, it featured CNR's concert, with a promise to control greenhouse gas emissions "in coordination with other major industrial countries." It again highlighted the DNV of environmentalism, and now the NI of territory, by pledging to extend Canada's custodial management in the North Atlantic to the edge of the Continental Shelf, the nose and tail of the Grand Banks, and the Flemish Cap. **Educationally**, it offered openness, international institutionalism and national unity, declaring it would facilitate

recognition of the credentials of immigrants, and “invite the Government of Quebec to play a role at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) along the lines of its participation in la Francophonie.” In **security** it recognized the new vulnerability by promising to act against terrorist attacks, natural disasters, and “outbreaks of disease world-wide.”

Beyond the United States, which received a largely negative portrayal, there were four countries that received recognition, largely in positive terms. These were major power Britain, India, and Japan, and middle power Australia. The most frequently noted international institutions were the entirely democratic, plurilateral G8, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and NAFTA. Also mentioned were La Francophonie, the FTAA, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and UNESCO. Beyond UNESCO, the UN did not appear.

The Campaign Promises

During the campaign stating on November 29, 2005, Harper, in his “promise a day” electoral strategy, said much about foreign policy. He issued 23 news releases devoted to international affairs. Of these, 13 were devoted to **security**, with nine on strengthening the military, and two each on Arctic sovereignty and Afghanistan. Three highlighted democratization — those celebrating Ukraine’s “orange revolution,” condemning Iran’s pledge to destroy Israel, and mourning the death of the leader of the United Arab Emirates. Three dealt with **development**, headed by a pledge to add \$425 million in overseas development assistance, as well as commemorating the Asian tsunami and World AIDS Day. Three were on **immigration and multiculturalism** with the emphasis on acting against Canada’s protectionist “head tax.” Only one was on **trade**, on the Pacific Gateway Initiative. Together these promises embraced all regions of the world, save for the United States, North America, and the Americas. They highlighted greater resources for both defence and development, including the use of force.

The Victory Address, January 23, 2006

In his election-night victory address on January 23, 2006, Harper surprisingly said much about international affairs. Two messages stood at the core. The first was the enduring Canadian value of **democracy**, for which Canadians had and still fought and “for which too many in our world

still yearn.” He promised: “We will continue to help defend our values and democratic ideals around the world—as so courageously demonstrated by those young Canadian soldiers who are serving and who have sacrificed in **Afghanistan**.” The second message was about the value of **immigrants** and new Canadians. Operationally, Harper pledged to “work cooperatively with our friends and allies, and constructively with all nations of the world.”²

The address contained no reference to the U.S., let alone any PD imperial focus on it. The dominant elements were the LI themes of continuity, the shared value of democracy, and constructive cooperation with friends and allies. Yet there was a prominent place for the CNR DNVs of multiculturalism, openness, and globalism, and the willingness to use force in Canada’s increasingly costly Afghanistan war.

The First Throne Speech, April 4, 2006

In the government’s first Speech from the Throne, delivered on April 4, 2006, foreign policy took a robust **one third** of the speech and **one fourth** of its priorities, under the label “our role in the world.”. The speech opened with a theme of “Building a Stronger Canada” with foreign policy as an integral part. It ended with a foreign policy section entitled “Canada — Strong, United, Independent, Free.”

The speech offered an **exceptionally ambitious** conception of Canada’s international cadence, relative capability, commitment to **leadership**, and capacity to make a difference in the world. Due to the unique “diversity of its people,” their “vast country” had become “one of the most successful the world has ever seen.” It was now at the “leading edge of science, business, the arts and sport,” with Canadians from Italy through Afghanistan to Asia demonstrating “time and time again that they are leaders.” The government had confidence in “the capacity of Canadians to ... build an even stronger Canada, striving for excellence, anchored by enduring values, and infused with growing confidence that they can make a difference at home and in the world” (Government of Canada 2006: 3).

This international vision was driven by both material reality and the DNVs of demographic openness, multiculturalism, and globalism. Yet national **unity** also mattered, for in “...the international community, Canada is stronger when we speak with one voice, but that voice must belong to all of

² The phraseology was reminiscent of the “constructive internationalism” of the Mulroney years.

us.” Importantly, it was the “special cultural responsibilities of the government of Québec” alone that would lead the Harper government to invite Québec to play an undefined “role” in UNESCO (Ibid: 9).

The speech embraced most major regions, with a focus on **Afghanistan** and the **world** as a whole. Most other regions and countries were dealt with equally. The two references to the **U.S.** were evenly balanced. The first unfavourable CNR reference to “improving the security of our borders” was offset by the subsequent favourable LI and PD reference to building “stronger multilateral and bilateral relationships, starting with Canada’s relationship with the United States, our best friend and largest trading partner” (Ibid: 9).

The Fifth Throne Speech, 2013

Over seven year’s later, Harper’s fifth Speech from the Throne, delivered on October 16, 2013, was entitled *Seizing Canada’s Moment: Prosperity and Opportunity in an Uncertain World*. It began by noting Canada’s use of **military power** and its rare opportunity “to **lead** the world in security and prosperity. One of its three sections dealt entirely with foreign policy, a subject which arose in the other two.. The first section, “Creating Jobs and Opportunities for Canadians”, started with the global financial crisis and noted “our Government is **leading** the world by example in fiscal sustainability” and “Canada now leads the G-7 – in job creation; in income growth; and in keeping debt levels low.” It added “In less than seven years, Canada has concluded new free-trade agreements with nine countries and our Government in negotiating further agreements involving more than 60 others,” starting with the EU, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), Japan, South Korea and India. It further noted “Canada now leads G-7 countries in post-secondary research investment.” The second section on “Supporting and protecting Canadian Families” noted that Canadians “are among the most digitally connected in the world” and that Harper’s was “the first government to achieve an absolute reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by working with provinces to reduce emissions from the oil and gas sectors.”

The third section, ‘Putting Canada First,’ started with the armed forces, defining Canadian defence priorities as 1. defending Canada and its borders; 2. maintaining sovereignty over Northern lands and waters; 3. fighting alongside allies to defend our interests; and 4. responding to emergencies in Canada and around the world. It then dealt with Canada’s

Northern Sovereignty, Promoting Canada's values including Israel and freedom of religion and partnering with the private sector for development. It stated: "Canada has taken a leadership role in addressing the health challenges facing women, infants and children in the world's poorest countries."

The Foreign Policy Speeches

In his first few years in office, Prime Minister Harper gave many speeches at home and abroad to substitute for the formal policy review that his government consciously chose not to conduct. Rather it sought, in common law fashion, to set clear principles and precedents, and follow them in similar cases over time and space. The consistent fundamental mantra was the **quartet** of democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law.

The speeches increasingly emphasized Canada's global leadership and its position as an **emerging energy superpower** (Kirton 2006c). In 2006, in speeches in London on July 14 and in New York on September 30, Harper introduced the novel concept of Canada as an emerging energy superpower. In 2007 in Australia and in May 2008 in London he moved its foundation from the specialized capability of energy to the DNV of environmentalism, proclaiming Canada to be a **clean energy superpower** in the world.

At his concluding news conference at the Pittsburgh G20 summit on September 25, 2009, Harper spoke extensively and spontaneously about Canada being one of the world's oldest democracies uninterrupted by revolution, occupation or civil war.³ He advanced the concept of "**enlightened sovereignty**" as a guide to Canada's and other countries' behaviour in the twenty-first century world.

Resource Distributions

This doctrine of global democratic leadership was largely reinforced by the Harper governments' resource distributions.

³ In 2007, a clear set of **three geographic priorities** emerged. The first was Afghanistan. The second was North America and the Americas. The third were emerging powers around the world. Absent was America in its own right.

The First Budget, May 2, 2006

In the budgetary allocation of the substantial fiscal surplus in both 2006 and 2007, the big winner was defence, then development, with diplomacy far behind.

For **defence**, on the campaign trail on December 12, 2005, Harper had promised to “significantly increase spending as part of his ‘Canada First’ defence strategy” to strengthen Canadian sovereignty. He would acquire “at least three **strategic lift aircraft... a 650-person airborne battalion ...** and double the Disaster Assistance Response Team (**DART**)” (Conservative Party, 2005). This would give a global deployment capability, independent of American or Russian airlift resources, to deliver international humanitarian relief. Harper would also strengthen Canada’s military presence in the **Arctic**, through sovereignty patrols in the air and on the sea, and by acquiring **three new heavy icebreakers**, operated by the uniformed military rather than the civilian Coast Guard.

In its first budget on May 2, 2006, the government boosted international affairs spending by a substantial amount. The **defence** budget rose from \$14.6 billion in 2005-6 to \$16.5 billion in 2007-8. To the \$12.8 billion increase over several years that the Liberals had promised in 2005, the Conservatives added \$5.3 billion over five years. Of this, \$400 million would come in 2006-7, and \$725 million in 2007-8. They also promised to speed up the hiring of 13,000 full time and 10,000 reserve **soldiers**, as Harper had pledged.

For **development**, on January 13, 2006, Harper had promised to “boost overseas development assistance by **C\$425 million** over five years beyond the currently projected level ... to move toward the average level among OECD members.” The new money increased the inherited commitment to an eight percent annual growth in official development assistance (ODA) until 2010. The goal was to “articulate Canada’s core values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, human rights, free markets, and free trade — and compassion for the less fortunate — on the world stage” (Conservative Party, 2006b). The pledge departed from a UN demand for ODA to reach 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI), in favour of a robust down-payment on Canada’s G8 Gleneagles commitment to double aid globally by 2010 and to Africa by 2008-2009.

In Harper's first budget development spending increased to \$3.8 billion in 2006-7 and to \$4.1 billion in 2007-8. Moreover, if the 2005-6 budget surplus exceeded \$2 billion, as seemed likely and soon proved true, an additional \$320 million would flow to ODA, primarily for **global health**. A robust \$250 million of it would go to the **Global Fund** to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and \$45 million to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. The budget also allocated \$101 million to arm **border guards**, and a further \$25 million to boost **border security**. The big loser was Canadians' DNV of **environmentalism**. The \$10 billion promised by the Liberals to implement Canada's Kyoto commitment was replaced by a \$2 billion promise to back the unspecified purposes in Harper's "made in Canada" climate change plan when it appeared.

The Second Budget, March 19, 2007

In the second budget, on March 19, 2007, finance minister Jim Flaherty called Canada an "emerging energy superpower" and, importantly the "only member of the G7 with both ongoing budget surpluses and a falling debt burden." The big winner was now the **environment**, led by \$1.5 billion for the Canada ecoTrust for Clean Air and Climate Change. **Development** followed that fall. On November 26, 2007, on a trip to democratic Tanzania, Harper announced \$105 million for **African health**. He reiterated that, in accordance with his campaign promise, he would double Canada's ODA to Africa from 2003-4 levels by 2008-9. This commitment he kept. He also promised to reach the average level of the OECD, even though Canada's above-forecast GDP growth and his partners' greater giving had made this more difficult to do.

The Third Budget, February 26, 2008

The third budget, in the spring of 2008, made provision for a new Arctic icebreaker. It was to be controlled by the civilian Coast Guard now.

The Fourth Budget, January 27, 2009

Diplomatic Posts and Programs

In regard to diplomatic programs and posts **frugality** reigned. Harper's Treasury Board Secretary, John Baird, began by slashing **public diplomacy** and **academic relations** programs. The government then closed all of Canada's consulates general in the G8 powers of **Japan, Italy and Russia**.

The next year it moved to sell the residences of Canada's high commissioner and ambassador in Britain and Ireland. These PD cuts, with no redeployment of resources elsewhere, came amidst Ottawa's soaring fiscal surplus and from a prime minister who had wanted to be a career foreign service officer as a young man (Johnson 2006). After four years, Harper had increased Canada's posts abroad by a net gain of only one.

Bilateral Institutions

In the domain of bilateral institution building, **global involvement** again arose as America did not dominate. Harper's government participated in, revived and initiated a broad array of such institutions with partners around the world. One was the new Canada-China Joint Committee on Health, launched by health minister Tony Clement on his visit to China in late November 2007.

Summitry

In summit diplomacy, expansive, **global involvement** arose from the start. Harper made his first visit abroad in mid-March 2006, only five weeks after he was sworn in. He took a surprise trip to distant **Afghanistan** to see the Canadian troops there. He thus became only the second Canadian prime minister to visit the country, following Jean Chrétien's much briefer stopover a few years before. The trip made Afghan president Hamid Karzai the partner for Harper's first summit visit abroad.

Harper's second summit visit abroad was again not to the United States for a bilateral encounter, but to Mexico for a **trilateral** one. When Mexico's Vicente Fox, (fast approaching the end of his term as Mexico's president) extended the invitation for the second annual Security and Prosperity Partnership (**SPP**) summit, it was unclear whether President Bush would accept. When he did, it was Harper who proved reluctant. Harper felt it might be too soon for his new government to go, especially to deal with a Liberal designed agenda with few deliverables inside. But on March 30-31 Harper was in Cancùn, Mexico, for the third stand-alone North American trilateral summit since 1956. Here Harper followed in Paul Martin's 2005 footsteps, both in the visit and its institutionalizing boost for the new SPP.⁴

⁴ During his second summer Harper took his first discretionary summit tour, with the Americas as his destination of choice. As he approached the two year anniversary of his election, his summit diplomacy was replete with visits reaching across the globe (See Appendix C). His most frequent partners were Mexico in first, the U.S. in second, and France, Japan, Russia, and China tied in third. Then came

After almost **four full years**, Harper's summitry had become both global and **intense** (see Appendix C). His favorite partners were the **U.S.** in first with 25 visits, **France** and **Mexico** second with 18 each, and then Japan, Britain, China, Germany, Russia, Italy, Australia and the EU close behind. Institutionally, his favourite non-bilateral forums were the **G8**, APEC, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the now-renamed trilateral North American Leaders Summit (NALS) with four encounters each, followed by the **G20** summit with three.⁵ The **top 15** country spots were all occupied by Canada's systemically significant partners in the **G20**. The UN was far behind.

Military Deployments

Military deployment was another instrument of foreign policy that Harper increased, by assuming three combat missions and one military support mission in nine years. He first quadrupled Canada's troops in Afghanistan in 2006. He went to war in the air in Libya in 2011, assumed a military support mission in Mali in 2013 and fought in the air in Iraq in October 2014. In all four cases France fought alongside Canada. The US did so in a combat role in only two. Once again, for Canada, France came first.

Free Trade Agreements

Global involvement and now autonomous bilateral involvement arose in the bilateral free trade agreements partners also expanded (Kirton 2011 Indonesia). Harper pursued his promised ones with Japan and India, and added a South Korean one from 2004 which he secured in 2014. By early 2008 he had completed deals with Peru and with the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) partners of Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein. He added Columbia in 2011. In 2009, he opened negotiations

Australia in fourth, followed by Britain, Germany Chile and Vietnam tied for fifth. The configuration showed Canada's relevance and reach. The U.S. was not alone in first. Between Canada's mother countries France stood ahead of Britain. The pattern revealed the pull of geography drawing Harper to Canada's neighbours of the U.S., Russia and France. It also showed the institutional summit ties of the G8, la Francophonie, APEC and North America's new SPP. At the top, the rational geopolitical pull of global relative capability was clear, with a declining number one America now in second and a rebounding number two Japan and rapidly rising Russia and China in third.

⁵ In "direct dial diplomacy" the United States again did not stand out. While Bush phoned quickly to congratulate Harper on his election, so did many other leaders. They included Russia's President Vladimir Putin, who invited Harper to attend the G8 summit in St. Petersburg in July. Harper's visitors to Ottawa further expanded his global vision and francophone awareness. One visitor was the newly elected president of Haiti. Another was John Howard, becoming the first Australian prime minister to address parliament since 1944.

for a full “FTA plus” with the EU, the largest market in the world and secured it five years later on October 18, 2013 (see below).

In November 2010 Harper began negotiations with India for an FTA. In November 2011 he joined the negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the US, Japan, Mexico, Australia and other states. No deeper integration with the US alone arose, despite finance minister Flaherty’s desire for a free trade in securities deal. And amidst the eglobal financial crisis of 2008-09, Harper **unilaterally** liberalized trade by slashing import duties in his budget of January 27, 2009, in the summer once again and then for a third time. Multilaterally he did little to get the LI’s WTO’s badly overdue Doha Development Agenda done.

Decisions: The First Year

Most of Harper’s 10 major decisions during his first year also showed a largely CNR thrust toward global democratic leadership.

1. Afghanistan, January 23, 2006–

Harper’s first major decision came on distant and demanding Afghanistan, where Canada was now fighting a full-scale war (Piggott, 2007; Lang and Stein, 2007; Kirton 2007). On his first evening as prime minister-elect on January 23, 2006, Harper promised: “We will continue to help defend our values and democratic ideals around the world—as so courageously demonstrated by those young Canadian soldiers who are serving and who have sacrificed in Afghanistan.”

In development, in early February 2006, the international community gathered in London to mobilize money for a second Afghanistan Compact. Prime minister designate Harper sent a message through Peter Harder, deputy minister of foreign affairs, that Canada would “stay the course.” Canada’s aid to Afghanistan — Canada’s largest recipient by far — had been \$100 million in 2004-05, and was slated to remain at \$100 million in 2005-06, but then drop to \$60 million in 2006-07, \$50 million in 2007-08, and \$40 million in 2008-09. Once sworn into office on February 6, Harper raised ODA to Afghanistan to a billion dollars over ten years — an average of \$200 million a year or double the previous high. He later raised it even more.

In defence, Harper increased Canada's commitment from 700 troops to the long scheduled level of 2,200 by March 2006. He had Canada assume command of the allied forces in dangerous Kandahar.

In diplomacy, Harper visited Afghanistan on March 11, touching down in Kandahar, to be welcomed by the Canadian troops there. Here Harper set forth his vision for Canadian foreign policy as a whole. It featured Canadian leadership in defence of Canada's national interests and Canadian values. Harper declared that Afghanistan was the most important place in the world for Canada's exercise of leadership. He added, "Canada is not an island. We live in a dangerous world. And we have to show leadership in that world." He identified Afghanistan as the best example in decades of "Canada really standing up, going to the front line, articulating our values, not just our opposition to terror, our advancement of democracy, but basic humanitarian values, in terms of development, women's rights, education" (Harper, 2006). Two days later, Harper told the troops: "We don't make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don't and we will not, as long as I'm leading this country."⁶ Harper's commitment to global democratic leadership, now with development added, was clear.

On May 15, Harper's minority government introduced into the House of Commons a motion calling for Canada's Afghan **mission to be extended** to February 2009.⁷ On May 17, members narrowly agreed, in a very close 149-145 vote.⁸ Harper's move was motivated by his overall strategy, evident in Canada's ODA increase, of changing expectations so all would assume that the allied forces would remain in Afghanistan for a long time, regardless of the cost. Harper stuck with the commitment during the deadly battle for Panjawai that summer. He sent **tanks in September** to help in the fight.

In the autumn Harper joined with the Dutch, with support from the U.S., to get Canada's NATO allies to **relax the caveats** so their troops could come to Canada's aid. He encouraged them to **provide the additional 2,500 troops** the allied commander said were required. Poland produced 1,000 first-line combat forces. Harper continued to press the others, led by the Germans, at the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, in late November 2006. By the summer

⁶ CBC (March 13, 2006), "Canada committed to Afghan mission, Harper tells troops," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/03/13/harper_afghanistan060313.html.

⁷ CTV (May 17, 2006) "MPs narrowly vote to extend Afghanistan mission," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato_afghan_060517/20060517/.

⁸ CTV (May 17, 2006) "MPs narrowly vote to extend Afghanistan mission," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato_afghan_060517/20060517/.

of 2007 France, under its new president Nicolas Sarkozy also responded, moving its Mirage fighter jets to Canada's base at Kandahar to fly ground support and reconnaissance missions for Canadian forces from there.

That summer, Harper signalled he might pull back from making a military commitment beyond 2009. But in the October 17, 2007 Throne Speech he announced an extension for two years beyond. Half a year later a confidence vote on a compromise motion in the Commons on March 13, 2008, Harper and the Liberals agreed to extend the mission to 2011, shift it to training the Afghan army, and end it then — if other allies would produce the badly needed 1,000 reinforcements, helicopters and drones. Harper maintained the 2011 pullout pledge ever since.

These decisions confirmed the government's commitment to promoting global democracy, and Canada's CNR willingness to lead in the defence, development and diplomatic realm in distant, dangerous theatres overseas. With Poland's and France's contributions, other countries of consequence found it easier to follow Canada's lead and help bear the burden, even if Europe's principal powers of Germany and Italy remained reluctant to fight.

2. Arctic Sovereignty, January 26, 2006—

Harper's second major initial decision was on Arctic sovereignty. On December 22, 2006 while campaigning, Harper had declared that "As Prime Minister, I will make it clear to foreign governments — including the United States — that naval vessels travelling in Canadian territorial waters will require the consent of the Government of Canada."⁹ Harper further announced that his government would increase Canada's military presence in the Arctic, including underwater and aerial surveillance.¹⁰

Immediately after Harper was elected, the issue arose due to public comments by the U.S. ambassador to Canada, David Wilkins, that the U.S. did not recognize Canada's claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage. Wilkins also criticized Harper's campaign promise to boost Canada's military presence by building new arctic icebreakers. At the end of a news conference the next day, on January 26, 2006, Harper said sternly:

⁹ Conservative Party of Canada, (December 22, 2006) "Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.conservative.ca/EN/1091/36512

¹⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, (December 22, 2006) "Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.conservative.ca/EN/1091/36512

“The Canadian government will defend our sovereignty. It is the Canadian people we get our mandate from, not the ambassador of the United States.”

Following Operation Glacial Gunner in January, the Harper government in February mounted the largest ever military exercise, sending five armed patrols by various routes toward the North Pole. On August 12, 2006 Harper launched a 12-day military exercise in the Arctic, Operation Lancaster. In 2007, Harper, with his “use it or lose it” approach, followed with three more exercises. He announced new Arctic Patrol Ships on July 9, a training centre and port on August 10, and a polar research program on October 16. Canadian surveillance capability strengthened significantly when Radarsat-2 was successfully launched on December 14. In the spring 2008 budget, Harper promised a new Arctic icebreaker, under civilian Coast Guard command.

These Arctic decisions showed clearly that Harper would put the CNR national interests of sovereignty and territory, if not yet the DNV of environmentalism in first place. The PD preoccupation of good relations with the United States was absent. The expensive investments in the Arctic slowly started to flow, among competing military demands for badly needed equipment in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

3. Hamas Funding, March 29, 2006

Harper’s third major decision came in response to the surprising victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority’s election on January 25, 2006. Jean Chretien’s government had designated Hamas as a terrorist organization in November 2002. As prime minister designate Harper reaffirmed his support for a secure Israel and democratic Palestine, but suggested that democratic governments could not support terrorism.¹¹ He signalled that he would not recognize the new Hamas government as long as it supported terrorism and called for the destruction of Israel.¹² His remarks put on hold a \$50 million aid package for Palestine assembled by the Liberals in response to a G8 commitment at the Gleneagles Summit in July 2005.

¹¹ Scott Wilson (January 27, 2006), “Hamas Sweeps Palestinian Elections, Complicating Peace Efforts in Mideast,” *Washington Post*, Accessed November 28, 2006, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/26/AR2006012600372.html.

¹² Canadian Press (January 26, 2006), “Harper suggests Canada won’t recognize new Palestinian government,” Accessed November 28, 2006, www.canada.com/edmontonjournal/story.html?id=2c9cc317-02c8-4fa2-a159-67545fd03556.

On March 29, 2006, Hamas formally took control of the Palestinian government. Foreign minister Peter McKay immediately announced that “until such time as we see a change in position from the Hamas government and the Palestinian Authority, there will be no direct contact, and there will certainly be no aid flowing through that government.”¹³ Canada was the first country other than Israel to cut off diplomatic relations and development aid.¹⁴ Other consequential countries followed Canada’s lead.

Here Canada supported American-affiliated Israel in PD fashion, due to LI’s shared values of anti-terrorism, but did so in a CNR, unilateral lead. Canada had earlier acted in LI fashion, deferring to the likeminded members of the Middle East Quartet — the U.S., the UN, the EU, and Russia. Now it was leading by unilaterally moving ahead of the pack.

4. Softwood Lumber, April 28, 2006

Harper’s fourth major decision concerned softwood lumber (Zhang 2007). On April 28, 2006, Harper announced that “the United States has accepted Canada's key conditions for the resolution of the softwood lumber dispute. Canada's bargaining position was strong, our position was clear, and this agreement delivers.”¹⁵

The announcement followed many years of legal wrangling, and a WTO panel in April rejecting Canadian complaints about the U.S. “zeroing” practice. On July 1, 2006, Canada and the U.S. finalized the legal text of their long awaited deal.¹⁶ On August 4, Harper threatened to abandon the deal if the Canadian industry did not support it. On August 15 the WTO’s Appellate Body backed Canada on the “zeroing” practice, arming the critics who argued that Canada should stick with this legalized LI route for redress.

¹³ CTV, (March 29, 2006), “Canada cuts relations with Palestinian Authority,” Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060328/abbas_hamas_ap_060329/20060329?hub=CTVNewsAt11.

¹⁴ CTV, (March 29, 2006), “Canada cuts relations with Palestinian Authority,” Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060328/abbas_hamas_ap_060329/20060329?hub=CTVNewsAt11.

¹⁵ CTV (April 28, 2006), “PM strikes deal with U.S. to end lumber dispute,” Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060426/softwood_folo_060427/20060427?hub=TopStories

¹⁶ Prime Minister of Canada News (July 1, 2006), “Backgrounder—The Canada-U.S. softwood lumber agreement,” Accessed November 28, 2006, pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1234

Harper refused. On September 12, Canada and the United States signed the Softwood Lumber Agreement.¹⁷ In response to complaints that the U.S. could abandon the deal very soon, United States trade representative Susan Schwab said on September 13 that the U.S. wanted a decade of peace. On September 13 trade minister David Emerson put pressure on the Canadian side, promising to impose a 19% tax on these Canadian producers not signing the deal. The industry gave in.

Thus the Harper government succeeded where its predecessors had failed in ending this long running, costly dispute. In the final settlement the Americans got to keep one fifth of the money they had collected in import duties from Canadian companies over the years. Canada thus largely won in its CNR approach to dealing with the US.

5. UNESCO Participation, May 5, 2006

Harper's fifth major decision gave the province of Quebec a greater role in UNESCO (Michaud, 2006). On December 19, 2005, Harper and Quebec's Liberal premier Jean Charest had met in Quebec City, where Harper announced that if he was elected Quebec would be invited to participate at UNESCO.¹⁸ This was a UN agency headquartered in Paris that dealt with subjects over which Quebec claimed constitutional jurisdiction at home. Once elected Harper signalled that this was a priority. The Conservatives sought to use the Mulroney-Johnson formula, devised in 1985 to permit Quebec's direct participation in the new francophone summit. This required an agreement with the Quebec government, then the support of France and others to change UNESCO's rule that only sovereign states could participate. On March 8, 2006, Harper and Charest again met in Québec City, where they asked their ministers to work out a formal agreement.¹⁹ On May 5, Canada and Quebec agreed that Quebec would be represented as part of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO, rather than directly at UNESCO itself.

¹⁷ Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Softwood Lumber Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America – 2006," Accessed November 28, 2006, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/eicb/softwood/SLA-main-en.asp

¹⁸ Prime Minister of Canada News (March 8, 2006) "Prime Minister Harper announced progress in talks with Québec on UNESCO," Accessed November 28, 2006, pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1051.

¹⁹ Prime Minister of Canada News (March 8, 2006) "Prime Minister Harper announced progress in talks with Québec on UNESCO," Accessed November 28, 2006, pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1051.

In this initiative, Harper was motivated by the NI of survival through national unity, and the DNV of multiculturalism through strengthening the place of the French language in the world. Canada secured the support of principal power France. Success in the way initially envisaged would have required Canada, as with Paul Martin's responsibility to protect (R2P), to change a core principle of the legalized UN system and the Westphalian order, by allowing sub-federal governments to participate directly in the UN. As the Westphalian UN would not budge, Canada had to secure its goal in another, sovereignty-enhancing way. Canada was able to secure its national unity and multiculturalism objectives, if not much modification of world order here.

6. G8 Summitry: St. Petersburg July 2006

The sixth decisions, at the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, Russia in July 2006 showed Canada's global leadership successfully modifying the world order of old. The Summit was Harper's first outing on the full world stage and his first encounter with Russian president Vladimir Putin. Despite the domestic pressures of minority government and the need for his new inexperienced ministers to settle into their new portfolios, Harper immediately sent them to Moscow for G8 ministerial meetings: Jim Flaherty for finance on February 10-11 and again on June 9-10 and on April 21 in Washington; Gary Lunn for energy on March 15-16; Tony Clement for health on April 28; Stockwell Day for public safety on February 6; and Peter MacKay for foreign affairs on June 29.

Harper had inherited his Liberal predecessors' positions on the initial Russian concept papers on their priority themes of energy, health and education. On energy, Canada sought to make the Russian concept of energy security much more market friendly. On education, Canada had no federal education department, provinces jealous of their constitutional responsibility for this subject, and a new government seeking to accommodate Quebec over all and in the education field. Canada thus sought to reframe this priority as "human capital and innovation." It secured support from the Americans, who advanced the concept of a "knowledge economy" as a substitute.

To broaden his perspectives on the summit, forge personal relationships with the leaders of the G8 and the participating "plus five" partners of India, China, Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, Harper conducted several bilateral

summit meetings in the lead-up to St. Petersburg. He met with Bush of the U.S. and Fox of Mexico in Cancun on March 30-31, Koizumi of Japan in Ottawa on July 6, Bush again in Washington July 13-14 and Blair of the UK in Britain on July 15, on the way to St. Petersburg itself. At St. Petersburg he held a bilateral with Putin of Russia and a Canada-EU trilateral with Vanhanen of Finland and Barroso of the EC. He thus met with six of the fellow eight G8 leaders all but Germany's Angela Merkel and France's Jacques Chirac.

In the summit deliberations, Harper participated substantially, speaking French half the time. He intervened on several issues, helping the summit set new directions on energy security in market friendly and environmentally sensitive ways. Harper and Canada did well. On energy, Canada's successful stress on the core principle of open markets, shared by the U.S. and Britain was accepted by the summit as a whole, and framed and permeated the final communiqué. This emphasis was a vast change from the initial text the Russians had circulated in November, and with Russia's acceptance helped to deepen democracy there. Canada's DNV of environmentalism similarly went from nearly non-existent to central, although there is no evidence that Canada pushed strongly for this result. On education, Canada's national unity NI effort to reframe the priority as human capital and innovation was successful in avoiding any separatist blowback in Quebec, even if some areas of provincial jurisdiction remained in the G8 text.

The centerpiece of Harper's contribution came over the Middle East, where Canada was far from being a superpower of any sort. When attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel just before the summit made the issue prominent, Canada acted to ensure that the G8's recently forged consensus over Iran's nuclear program was extended to the war against terrorists in Palestine and Lebanon as well. At the summit the Russians, as host, drafted a four paragraph statement on the Middle East that reflected their and the UN's standard approach. Canada, setting aside summit protocol, immediately drafted and circulated an alternative, two and a half page text. This infuriated the Russians but secured the support of the US. Harper emphasized to his G8 colleagues that the Group had to keep in mind how this crisis started, with attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel. The leaders decided the three outstanding components in the way the Russian hosts wanted, then largely accepted the Canadian draft as their own.

In the outreach session the following day, the UN's Kofi Annan said he would ask for a UN resolution based on the G8 text. The balance and substance of the G8 statement was well reflected in Resolution 1701 that the UN Security Council (UNSC) produced on August 12th. Due to the presence of Kofi Anan, of China as a veto power in the UNSC's Permanent Five (P5) and of the other members of the G8's Plus Five, the G8 directions and decisions were directly accepted by the much broader UN in the following days. They were also accepted, thanks to Harper's leadership, by the Francophonie Summit in the fall. Canada thus led the G8, and the G8 led the UN and the world.

Harper's initiative and the Canadian draft flowed from Harper's own commitment to democracy and anti-terrorism. To be sure, Canada worked closely with U.S. political director Nick Burns in producing the successful statement. Moreover, America's weight as well as Canada's initiative was responsible for the success. But the sequence saw Canada's draft and approach leading the G8, which served as the de facto security council that defined a new approach soon legally confirmed by the UN itself and the Francophonie Summit beyond. Harper's summit performance was well regarded at home, by a public that might be led to the polls again for a general election at any time.

7. The Lebanon Rescue, June 2006

Harper's seventh major decision was to rescue the many Canadian citizens fleeing the new conflict in Lebanon. On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah militants in Lebanon had raided Israel, killing seven soldiers, wounding eight, and capturing two.²⁰ On July 16, 2006, seven Canadians were killed. In response, foreign minister Peter MacKay announced plans to evacuate Canadian citizens.²¹ These "boat people" were 15,000 of the estimated 30,000 Canadian citizens living in Lebanon. They were one of the largest groups of dual nationals trapped by the war. Despite its minimal military capability in the region, Canada swiftly mounted a successful rescue, evacuating almost 15,000 of its citizens at Canadian government expense from July 19 to August 15, 2006. Harper himself helped directly by diverting the plane

²⁰ CBC (July 17, 2006), "CBC News Indepth: Middle East," Accessed November 28, 2006, www.cbc.ca/news/background/middleeast/timeline_recent.html

²¹ CBC (July 31, 2006), "In Depth: Middle East in Crisis: Evacuation timeline: the biggest rescue in Canadian history," Accessed November 28, 2006, www.cbc.ca/news/background/middleeast-crisis/evac_timeline.html

flying him home from the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, through France, to Cyprus, to take some of the evacuated Canadians safely home.

A few Canadians complained about the slowness and austere conditions of the rescue, and subsequently about the cost to the Canadian taxpayers and the ease with which Canada granted dual citizenship to so called “Canadians of convenience” living abroad. But Harper’s actions showed Canada’s considerable non-military deployment capabilities and its Dunkirk-like adaptive resilience, the prime minister’s personal attachment to ensuring the safety of his fellow Canadians, his respect for the DNV of openness and multiculturalism that were embedded in dual citizens, and his desire to promote national unity by rescuing Canadians who disproportionately might speak French.

8. Climate Change

Harper’s eighth decision concerned **climate change** (Simpson et al. 2007). In his campaign platform, Harper had promised to find a **solution in concert** with the advanced industrial states, a category that included all G8 partners that had ratified the Kyoto Protocol, and the U.S. that had not.

After meeting with Harper during the week ending February 18, Quebec premier Jean Charest declared that the Harper government supported the Kyoto Protocol. Environment minister Ambrose then succeeded Stéphane Dion in Canada’s presidency of the UN’s Conference of the Parties (COP). She said the government would unveil a “made-in-Canada” policy for effective greenhouse gas reductions very soon, increasingly hinting a move from purchasing carbon credits abroad to investing in clean technology in Canada, regulating its large final emitters and creating a domestic emissions trading regime. There were also hints that Canada would consider joining the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP) pioneered by the U.S. and Australia.

The long promised made-in-Canada plan arrived in the autumn. The replaced Ambrose with John Baird as environment minister, and a new stronger plan backed by much greater funding.

At the G8 Heiligendamm Summit in the summer of 2007, Canada advanced the “50% reduction by 2050” target and timetable, and the consensus that a “beyond Kyoto” regime would be negotiated through the UN. It expanded the consensus to other critical developed and developing partners at the

autumn APEC leaders meeting in Australia, and sought to do so again at the Commonwealth Heads of Governance Meeting (CHOGM) in November 2007. It joined the APP as another forum where the unconstrained U.S., China, India and Australia, as well as incoming G8 host Japan were present to advance the cause.

9. Francophone Summit, September 2006

Harper's ninth decision dealt with **la Francophonie**. At the Francophonie Summit in Europe in September 2006 Harper skillfully used Canada's position as the co-founder, second ranked power and second largest contributor of this global institution, to secure the support of France and Switzerland to condemn the harm done to all civilians in the conflict in **Lebanon**. He thus reinforced the G8's and now the UN's new approach to bringing peace there.

He also joined the effort to protect the **French** language and culture amidst the onslaught of American led globalization. Harper was selected to host the next Francophone summit in **2008** — the third time Canada would host the 49-member body since it had been co-founded by François Mitterrand, Brian Mulroney and Pierre Marc Johnson in 1986. Canada would host the summit in **Quebec City** on the 400 anniversary of the founding of Canada in 1608 with the first permanent settlement there. This would afford a further opportunity to promote the NI of national unity at home, and the DNV of multiculturalism and bilingualism abroad.

10. Human Rights

The tenth set of decisions promoted **human rights**, around the world. The human rights that Harper had identified as a Canadian value while in Afghanistan were forwarded in principled moves in several other global locales.

In the Middle East, Harper declared that the 1915 massacre of the **Armenians** by Turkey had been a case of genocide. In doing so Harper acted prior to a prospective French government move to do the same thing. This led Turkey, a key NATO ally near Afghanistan, to withdraw its ambassador and threaten economic sanctions in response.

In Asia, on April 8, 2006, Canada declared Sri Lanka's **Tamil Tigers** a terrorist organization, as the U.S. and Britain had done. In the autumn of

2007, Canada, inspired by the memory of John Diefenbaker's actions against apartheid in South Africa, imposed severe sanctions on **Myanmar**, in response to that regime's massacre of its dissenting monks. In November 2007 at the CHOGM, Harper supported the suspension of **Pakistan** from the Commonwealth for its repression of human rights. In November 2013 he boycotted the CHOGM in **Sri Lanka** to protest the host regime's continuing abuse of human rights. Soon after, India followed Canada's lead.

In Africa in mid-May 2006 Harper signalled Canada's willingness, in response to a request from the U.S. and UN, to contribute militarily to a ceasefire in **Darfur** designed to stop the ongoing genocide there.

In regard to America, Harper vigorously defended Canadian citizen **Maher Arar** against an American government that was claiming with no apparent evidence that he was a terrorist with no right to freely travel there.

China was a major target of Harper's human rights promotion. Canada's behind the scenes diplomacy induced Thailand to release a Chinese human rights activist in April.

Major Decisions, 2007-2014

This first year thrust toward global democratic leadership intensified through the ten major decisions the Harper government took from 2007 to 2014.

1. Creating North American Community: Montebello, August 2007

The first decision was to create the North American summit as a permanent institution, by hosting it at Montebello, Quebec in August 2007. It was at this third encounter in as many years that this new event became a regular occurrence. Harper became a founding father of a plurilateral summit-level institution, with a defined frequency and hosting order. Here the three North American leaders could meet as equals to promote the growing web of trilateral cooperation below. As the "restrained retreat to America" school had predicted, Harper had not brought back Brian Mulroney's institutionalized "Shamrock Summitry" with the U.S. alone. Rather he had helped bring to life a new, more expansive summit institution with Mexico equally and integrally involved.

2. Turning the Corner on Climate Change, April 26, 2007

The second decision was to turn the corner on climate change. On April 26, 2007 when John Baird, Minister of the Environment produced *Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution*. For the first time it forced industry, which accounted for half of Canada's emissions, to reduce greenhouse gases and air pollution by imposing mandatory targets for a 150 megatonne reduction by 2020. Firms could choose the best way to meet their targets, from in-house reductions, contributions to a technology fund, domestic emissions trading on offsets from the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism. The plan also promised to regulate for the first time the fuel efficiency of cars and light trucks starting with the 2011 model year, and to improve energy efficiency in products such as light bulbs.

In March 2008 the government promised to set up a carbon emissions trading market, create a price for carbon and end the construction of new dirty coal-fired electricity plants in 2012. On December 11, 2011 Canada formally withdrew from the ineffective Kyoto Protocol.

3. Expanding Arctic Jurisdiction, August 27, 2008

The third decision, taken on August 27, 2008, was extending Canada's Arctic territory by doubling from 100 to 200 nautical miles Canada's claimed jurisdiction for environmental and shipping purposes. Harper promised to introduce changes to the 1970 Arctic Waters Protection Prevention Act (AWPPA) for this purpose, as part of the fall legislative agenda. The changes would also establish new regulations under the Canada Shipping Act of 2001, to require mandatory reporting from all ships destined for Arctic waters within the same 325-kilometre limit. Environmental custodianship was the basis for the territorial claim, which advanced a key DNV and NI together.

4. Advancing Maternal Newborn and Child Health at the G8 and UN, 2010

The fourth decision, coming in 2010, was Canada's G8 and UN initiative on maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) (Kirton and Koch 2010, Kirton 2012, Kirton, Guebert and Kulik 2014) (Appendix X). On January 26, 2010, as Canada's year as G8 host began, Harper announced that Canada would feature MNCH at the Muskoka G8 Summit. He thus targeted the two of the

eight UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), numbers four and five, that were furthest from meeting their goal by their fast approaching due date of 2015. At the Muskoka summit on June 26, in the immediate aftermath of the greatest recession since the Great Depression of Canada's G8 mobilized \$7.3 billion in new money for MNCH, to be delivered over the next three years. The sum was led by a new \$1 billion contribution from Canada, followed by contributions from all G8 members and countries such as Korea, the Gates Foundation and the UN Foundation. In September Harper at a UN summit in New York to revitalize progress toward the MDGs, helped raise the total to \$40 billion. With UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon he created a Commission on information and accountability on MNCH and co-chaired it with President Kikwete of Tanzania.

5. Preventing Financial Crisis at the Toronto G20 Summit, June 2010

The fifth decision was to host the new G20 Summit in Toronto on June 26-27, 2010 and use it to achieve hard targets and timetables for deficit and debt reduction (Kirton 2012, 2013). When the global financial crisis had erupted in the autumn of 2008, Canada had helped ensure that it was addressed by a new G20 summit rather than a new one that might leave Canada out. At G20 summits in Washington in November 2008, London in April 2009 and Pittsburgh in September 2009, Canada secured its priorities of having the G20 fix the banks first, build exit strategies into members' fiscal stimulus, and choose the G20 as the permanent premier forum for members' international economic co-operation and select Canada to host the fourth summit in June 2010, the first country beyond the US and the UK to be chosen for this institutional leadership role.

Harper declared that his summit would focus on the economy and on following up on G20 commitments. As it approached, a new financial crisis erupted in Europe, due to the escalating sovereign debt of Greece. Harper sent his G20 colleagues a carefully worded letter calling for **fiscal consolidation** to be the key issue at the summit and proposing a precise set of targets and timetables for deficit and debt reduction from the advancing economy members. At Toronto, over president Obama's reluctance, the G20 agreed. The Euro-crisis was thus contained in its European home.

6. Liberating Libya through NATO and the UN, 2011

The sixth decision was to go to war in 2011 to liberate Libya's civilians from a slaughter that was highly likely to happen at the hands of its 42 year

long dictator, of Muamar Ghadaffi (Kirton 2012). Canada stood with France and Britain as the first ranking NATO allies to call for diplomatic sanctions, to authorize UN Security Council Resolution to invoke the principle of an international responsibility to protect (R2P) and to deploy and employ air forces in combat to protect endangered Libyan civilians in Benghazi and elsewhere. As the US participated only in non-combat roles, Canada fought with France and Britain but without the US.

In late February Canada evacuated its citizens from Libya and imposed sanctions, beyond those authorized by the UNSC. In March, Ottawa planned to participate in an international effort to airlift aid to opposition-held areas of Libya and announced CAN\$5 million in humanitarian aid. Canada also sent a frigate and special forces, for evacuation, aid insertions into rebel held areas or even a blockade. It welcomed the decision by the Arab League calling for a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 17, the UNSC imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and approved all necessary measures to enforce the no-fly zone. Canada immediately prepared to send six fighter jets to enforce the zone.

On March 18 US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with French president Nicholas Sarkozy and U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron lunched with the leaders of Canada, Germany, Qatar, the Arab League, and the U.N. Led by Britain, the US and Canada, NATO organized the needed military force.

On March 21 four CF-18 fighters and two CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refueling tankers took off from an Italian base to patrol Libya's coast. Defence minister Peter MacKay announced that Canadian warplanes would conduct high-level strategic strikes over Libya. On March 25, MacKay announced that Lt.-Gen. Charles Bouchard of Canada would assume command of the NATO mission in Libya. On June 15 the House of Commons voted to extend Canada's participation in *Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR* to the end of September.

Canada thus led along with **France and Britain** in militarily liberating Libya and supporting the replacement of the Ghaddafi regime by a democratic one. Canada compensated for a politically constrained, inherently isolationist America that could not politically fly manned air combat missions over Libya, but that provided the critical specialized intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources need to win. It also

provided the critical diplomatic initiative at the UN to authorize the use of all necessary means to implement the international R2P. This was a role reversal from the distant days when Canada had concentrated on the diplomacy of constraint and left front line military combat to the US. It successfully advanced the doctrine of “enlightened sovereignty” in R2P form in the military and political realm.

7. Combating Terrorism in Mali, January 2013

The seventh decision, in January 2013, was to provide non-combat military support to France to fight Al Qaeda linked insurgents seizing control of Mali. On January 13, immediately after France launched its surprise offensive, Canada supplied a C-17 Globemaster military transport aircraft and 40 CAF personnel for one week. Britain sent two military transport planes. The US provided satellite information and logistical support. Harper refused to assume a military combat role despite demands from African leaders and Francois Hollande. On January 14, 2013. Canadian special forces landed in neighbouring Niger to train its soldiers, who were fighting against Mali’s rebels. On January 24, 2014. Canada extended its military mission for 30 days to February 15. On March 14, 2013. Harper ruled out supplying troops to the mission in Mali, even as France tried to replace its mission with a UN peacekeeping force. Even the UN could not lure Canadian combat troops in.

8. Securing Economic Partnership with the EU, October 18, 2013

The eighth decision was to accept the Canada-EU Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) on October 18, 2013. CEPA would take formal force once ratified by all legislatures in Europe and in Canada. Among Canada’s privileged trade and economic partnerships, this marked a major move toward CNRs diversification. The EU was the largest marketplace in the world, ahead of the US. Canada secured its deal with the EU before the Americans, who were still negotiating with the EU according to the Canadian model as 2014 drew to a close. Canada also concluded a free trade agreement with South Korea in the autumn of 2014, and negotiated bilaterally and plurilaterally for one with Japan.

9. Defending Ukraine, 2014

The ninth decision was defending Ukraine from Russian president Vladimir Putin increasing invasion and annexation of Ukrainian territory in 2014. Harper was the strongest opponent within the G8 and NATO.

On March 1 Harper began with diplomatic sanctions, suspending Canada's preparations for the G8 Sochi Summit, recalling Canada's ambassador to Russia, supporting the deployment of UN and OSCE monitors, and discussing a financial package for Ukraine. A day later Canada and the G7 condemned Russia and suspended "participation in activities associated with the preparation of the scheduled G-8 Summit in Sochi in June, until the environment comes back to where the G-8 is able to have a meaningful discussion."

On March 3 Harper cancelled government participation at the Paralympic games and instructed officials to review all planned bilateral interaction with Russia. In the following days he suspended all planned bilateral activities between the Canadian Armed Forces and Russian military, Canada froze assets of members of the Yanukovich regime, suspended the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission, and sent two military observers to an OSCE military observer mission to report on military activities in Ukraine

On March 13, Harper announced more than \$220 million to help Ukraine stabilize its economy, as a loan or loan guarantee, conditional on IMF support. Canada will also help IMF deliver technical assistance in economic transition and financial sector reforms. He later gave \$775,000. to an OSCE-led political and security monitoring mission to Ukraine

Later in March announced further economic sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Act (SEMA) and more travel bans against Ukrainian and Russian officials. Additional sanctions came on April 28, May 4 and July 11.

In April Canada sent six CF-18's to Europe and 20 personnel to NATO headquarters in Mons, and then to Romania, bordering Ukraine. They went with one heavy lift plane, two Airbus transports and about 250 military personnel. They left Bagotville on Tuesday, April 29th, through Iceland. Canada also deployed the HMCS Regina, from the Arabian Sea to the NATO Standing Maritime Forces "as part of NATO's reassurance package." The CAF members took command of an OSCE international military observation team in Ukraine. On May 2 Canada sent 50 soldiers to participate in NATO training manouvres in Poland.

On June 4-5 at the G7 Summit in Brussels, Canada joined with its G7 partners to agree on a comprehensive set of measures against Russia.

On November 15, at the G20 Summit in Brisbane, Australia, Harper led in demanding that Putin remove his forces from Ukraine. Harper said to the approaching Putin: “I guess I’ll shake your hand but I have only one thing to say to you – get out of Ukraine.”

10. Combating ISIL in Iraq, September 5, 2014

In the autumn of 2014, Canada went to war again, this time against ISIL or the Islamic State in Iraq. On September 5, 2014 Canada decided to send up to 70 special forces to train Kurdish forces in their fight against ISIL in Iraq for 30 days. By September 10 some were already on the ground. The goal was to stop the Islamic State from advancing and to support forces in Iraq. They would remain under Canadian Command in Iraq. On October 2, Harper decided to send six CF-18’s into combat to strike ISIL in Iraq, along with one C-150 refueling tanker and two CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft. On October 7 the House of Commons approved the combat mission mandate for airstrikes, by a 157 to 134 vote, with most Liberals and the NDP voting against. On October 9 Canada agreed with Kuwait to use it as a base for CF-18 strikes on Iraq. On October 30 the CF-18’s made their first strike in a four hour mission involving Canada’s C-150 Polaris aircraft.

Conclusion

From this review of Canada’s foreign policy doctrines, distribution of resources and major decisions during the Harper years, six conclusions stand out.

First, Canada increasingly expressed and effectively advanced its **national interests and distinctive national values**. He focused first on survival through national unity in his foreign policy doctrine, focused on France in his summit diplomacy, gave Quebec a role in UNESCO, rescued francophone Canadian citizens from Lebanon, and confirmed his commitment to remain a ratified party to Kyoto at the behest of Quebec premier Jean Charest. Security was enhanced by Canada’s major military role in Afghanistan. And territory was protected and promoted by Harper’s firm policy on Arctic sovereignty and fisheries jurisdiction off the Atlantic coast.

In the realm of values, the emphasis from the start was strongly on those LI ones shared in common with the like-minded, above all democracy, human rights and the rule of law. But also central from the start was the distinctive national value of multiculturalism, as seen in his recognition of the Armenian genocide, defence of Canada's dual citizenship policy, and highlighting the slaughter in Darfur. His support for openness was evident in his effort to speed up the recognition of immigrant's professional credentials, his choice of high immigration levels, rescuing Canadian citizens from Lebanon, apologizing for the Chinese head tax, and his successful emphasis on open markets as a means to energy security at the St. Petersburg G8. His support for environmentalism was weaker, but evident in his decisions to remain within Kyoto, his growing concern of the need for Arctic sovereignty to protect its fragile ecosystem and his leadership with Harper in setting 50-2050 as a key referent for the beyond Kyoto climate regime.

Second, the patterns predicted by **all three theories** appeared. Complex neo-realist patterns predominated, but LI ones were present and PD ones occasionally appeared. CNY captures the central thrust of global leadership, while LI accounts for its core substantive content of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. And PD points to the importance of the striking support for Israel as part of several of the key decisions Harper took.

Third, Harper's **Canada won** much of what it sought, from expanding Canada's Arctic territorial jurisdiction and economic partnership with the EU, if not yet it Keystone pipeline through the US, a terrorist-free, democratic Afghanistan, Libya, Mali and Syria, and a Crimea returned to Ukraine.

Fourth, Harper's Canada **shaped global order** successfully in both the ideational and institutional realms. Ideationally it forcefully made R2P a regular practice, in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2014. Institutionally, it helped create, institutionalize and render effective the G20 Summit, and led the return to an effective G7 one without Russia in 2014.

Fifth, the meta-theory of hegemonic transition accounts well for Canada's growing global leadership from 2006 to 2013. But to account for its continuation amidst a revived US in 2014, we need to look more closely at the external, societal, governmental and individual determinants that lay behind, notably how Harpers' majority government, experience and

determination propelled Canada into global democratic leadership amidst this more difficult and dangerous world.

Sixth, Canada remains an established principal power in an ever changing world.

Most ambitiously, Harper showed signs of succeeding in global leadership. His defence of open democracy helped shaped outcomes at the G8 and Francophonie summits. His hosting of the SPP summit in 2007 made him a founding father of a plurilateral summit institution of potentially considerable consequence. And his heavy first tier military investment in Afghanistan could make America and its allies freer from deadly terrorism of global reach, if Harper's Canada succeeds in helping change the expectations and then the behaviour of those on the ground in that still very troubled land. But as his first two years in office approached their end he had delivered his promises of global democratic leadership and started to shape global order on this basis through his leadership at the G8, la Francophonie, APEC, the SPP and CHOGM.

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Appendix A: Harper Doctrines

Doctrine

Campaign Platform	
Policy Priority:	Strengthen national unity, advance our interests
Issue Priorities	Economics, environment, education
Country Priorities	Adversary = U.S., Allies = Australia, UK, India, Japan
Institutional Priorities	G8, OECD, NATO
Campaign Promises	
Policy Priorities	
Issue Priorities	Military, Arctic, Afghanistan, Immigration, democratization, development
Country Priorities	All but U.S., NAFTA, Americas
Institutional Priorities	
Victory Address	
Policy Priorities	Democracy, Immigration
Issue Priorities	
Country Priorities	Afghanistan
Institutional Priorities	
Throne Speech	
First	Second
From Start throughout	
One Third	
One Fourth	
Policy Priorities	
Issue Priorities	
Country Priorities	Afghanistan, Italy, Asia, all regions, America
Institutional Priorities	
Foreign Policy Speeches	

Appendix A-1: Harper's Speeches from the Thrones

The Second Throne Speech, October 17, 2007

Harper's second Speech from the Throne, delivered on October 17, 2007 **expanded this doctrine** on all fronts. Foreign policy now took **60%** of the speech and appeared throughout. The five stated priorities put **foreign policy first**, with "Strengthening Canada's sovereignty and place in the world." Foreign policy also arose within the second priority of "building a stronger federation," the third one of "providing effective economic leadership," the fourth of "continuing to tackle crime," and the fifth of "improving our environment."

The speech began by unabashedly declaring that "Canada is **the greatest country** in the world." It ended by portraying Canada as the "**North Star**" — a "guide to other nations." Throughout it promised "strong leadership ... in the world," "through concrete actions that bring results." It would be guided by "our shared values of democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law." It also featured Canada's sovereignty, unity, and national security and its multiculturalism, openness, globalism and environmentalism.

The speech offered a **global vision**. It made explicit reference to Britain, the Arctic, North America, Burma, Afghanistan, the Americas, Haiti, Europe, France, the U.S., the Atlantic, the Pacific, and India. Among international institutions it now noted the UN, allies, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, as well as the familiar G8.

The Speech announced several ambitious decisions. On **Afghanistan** it extended the Canadian combat mission from 2009 to 2011, with a shift in roles to training the Afghanistan army and police. On **climate change** it called for "binding targets that apply to all major emitters, including Canada" On the **Arctic** it announced a research station, new patrol ships, more aerial surveillance and an expansion of the Arctic Rangers on the ground.

The Third Throne Speech, November 19, 2008

The Fourth Throne Speech, January 26, 2009

Appendix B: Harper Distributions

Advisory Appointments

Diplomatic Personnel

Departmental Re-organization

Budget One

Defence	2005-6 = 14.6b	2006-7 =	2007-8 = 16.5b
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Development	2005-6 =	1006-7 = 3.8b	2007-8 = 4.1b
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Diplomacy

Budget Two

Budget Three

Diplomatic Posts

Summitry

Ministerial Visits

Bilateral Institutions

Free Trade Agreements

Appendix B-1: Organizing the Foreign Policymaking System

Advisory Appointments

In his advisory appointments, the prime minister designate on January 24 chose **Derek Burney** to head his overall transition team. Described by Harper as a “former Canadian ambassador,” Burney had served as Canada’s Ambassador to Washington from 1990 to 1993, had played a key role in negotiating the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988 and had fostered many other Mulroney-era continental and international gains (Burney, 2005; Mulroney, 2007). He brought the professionalism of the Foreign Service, diplomatic experience in Asia, experience in Ottawa as Chief of Staff to Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, and experience abroad as Mulroney’s personal representative, or “sherpa,” for the G7 summits in 1990 and 1991.

Joining Burney on the transition team was **Michael Wilson**, another senior Mulroney-era Progressive Conservative with extensive experience in international affairs. As Brian Mulroney’s Finance Minister, Wilson had helped craft Canada’s continental free trade agreement with the United States in 1988, secured Canada’s admission to the new G7 finance ministers’ forum in 1986, helped host the 1988 G7 Summit in Wilson’s hometown of Toronto, and helped win a second Progressive Conservative majority mandate in the general election that fall.

Cabinet Appointments

To the major international affairs portfolios in his first cabinet, Harper appointed former Progressive Conservative Party leader Peter **MacKay** as Foreign Minister, and former Liberal cabinet minister David **Emerson** as trade minister. General Gordon **O’Connor** went to national defence and former Ontario finance minister Jim **Flaherty** to finance. All had considerable policy experience in the particular portfolios they assumed.

In his second year Harper took a step toward economic-political integration and French-English equalization by moving industry minister Maxime **Bernier** to the foreign affairs portfolio. MacKay, following the career path of former Liberal foreign minister Bill Graham, move to defence. Subsequently fellow Quebecer Lawrence **Cannon** replaced Bernier in foreign affairs, serving there until his defeat in the election of May 8, 2011. Former Ontario government cabinet minister **John Baird** took over foreign affairs.

The first eight years thus showed considerable ministerial change, with four ministers for foreign affairs and four for international trade, if only one for finance until Flaherty resigned to be replaced by Joe Oliver on March 17, 2014.

For his majority mandate, Harper relied heavily on former Progressive Conservative cabinet ministers in Mike Harris’ Ontario government Jim Flaherty in Finance, John Baird in foreign affairs, party loyalist Peter Van Loan in international trade and Tony Clement in the Treasury Board .

Departmental Machinery and Management

In organizing his government, one of Harper's first decisions was to reintegrate Foreign Affairs Canada with the Department of International Trade. This undid the divorce instigated by Paul Martin on his first day as prime minister. The decision was consistent with Burney's declared views on the issue, and with the Conservatives' successful opposition to the divorce in Parliament the previous year. After his majority was won, on March 21, 2013, Harper added to CIDA to an integrated department of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Development.

At the senior official level, Harper retained foreign service professional Peter Harder as his foreign affair deputy and personal representative for the G8. When Harder resigned a year later, Harper appointed experienced foreign service officer and G8 veteran Len Edwards as deputy minister. Harper moved David Mulroney, also an experienced foreign service officer, from foreign policy advisor in the Privy Council Office (PCO) to associate deputy minister of foreign affairs and G8 sherpa with government-wide responsibility for Afghanistan. In 2008 Edwards became G8 sherpa and Mulroney became coordinator for Afghanistan full time.

Diplomatic Personnel

In the domain of diplomacy, in mid-February 2006, Harper appointed Michael Wilson as ambassador to the United States, replacing Liberal political appointee Frank McKenna who had resigned. Wilson was well known and liked in Washington, especially among the Republicans who were close to President George H. Bush. Wilson's first major achievement as ambassador was to help produce a deal to end the long-standing softwood lumber dispute. In early 2008, however, he became embroiled in a dispute over a leaked memo on U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama's real views on revising NAFTA, as Obama had publicly pledged to do on the campaign trail. In 2009 Wilson was replaced as ambassador by former NDP Manitoba premier Gary Doer.

Outside Washington a premium was also placed on experience and now **professionalism**. A career foreign service officer, John McNee, was named permanent representative to the UN in New York, to replace the departing Liberal political appointee Allan Rock. Foreign service officer Jim Wright went as high commissioner to London, often a patronage post. This desire to professionalize rather than politicize Canada's diplomatic corps was reinforced by Canada's mediation of a peace agreement in Darfur in May 2006. Here Rock, flying in from New York, worked with career diplomat David Angel who had served with distinction in the U.S., at the Kananaskis Summit and in the G8 on the African file.

Appendix C-1: Harper's Summit Diplomacy to October 23, 2006

Partner	Total	Given	Received	Occasion*
U.S.	3	3	-	SPP-1, G8-1
France	3	3	-	1G8, 1B, 1Franc
Japan	2	1	1	G8-1
Britain	2	2	-	1G8, B
Russia	2	2	-	2G8
European Union	2	2	-	2G8
Finland	2	2	-	2G8
Mexico	2	2	-	SPP-1, G8-1
Afghanistan	2	1	1	
United Nations	2	1	2	G8, UNGA
Pakistan	1	1	-	
Australia	1	-	1	
Germany	1	1	-	G8-1
China	1	1	-	G8-1
India	1	1	-	G8-1
South Africa	1	1	-	G8-1
Brazil	1	1	-	G8-1
Latvia	1	-	1	
Other Francophonie	1 each			Franc

*Unless otherwise noted, the occasion is a leader's visit to another leader's country; the number indicates the total of meetings on that occasion. SPP = Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America; G8 = Group of Eight Summit.

- 060314: Harper visits Karzai (Afghanistan) in Kabul
- 060314: Harper visits Aziz (Pakistan) in Islamabad
- 060330-31: Harper meets Bush (USA) and Fox (Mexico) in Cancun
- 060518: Howard (Australia) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060628: Koizumi (Japan) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060706: Harper visits Bush (USA) in Washington
- 060713-14: Harper visits Blair (UK) in Britain
- 060715-17: Harper at G8 Summit (bilateral with Putin (Russia)
Trilateral with Vanhanen (Finland) and Barroso (EC))
- 060718-19: Harper visits Chirac (France) in Paris
- 060921: Harper at Opening of UN General Assembly in New York (bilateral with Annan
(UN Secretary General))
- 060921-22: President Karzai (Afghanistan) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060925: President Vīķe-Freiberga (Latvia) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060928: Harper attends Francophone Summit in Bucharest

Appendix C-2: Harper's Summit Diplomacy to November 23, 2009

Totals by country and multilateral organization of top 25 partners (up to November 23, 2009)

Partner	Total	Given	Received	Occasion ^a
1. United States	25	22	3	SPP-4 G8-4, G20-3, APEC-4, NATO-4, B-4 SPPB-1, UNSS-1
2. Mexico	18	16	2	SPP-4 G8-4, G20-3 B-1, APEC-4, APECB-1, C-1
2. France	18	15	3	G8-4, G20-3, B-4, FS-2, NATO-4, EU-1
4. Japan	16	15	1	G8-4, G20-3, APEC-4, APECB-1, B-3, UNSS-1
5. Britain	15	15	-	G8-4, G20-3, B-3, NATO-4, UNSS-1
6. China	14	14	-	G8-3, G20-3, APEC-4,, APECB-1 G8B-2, UNSS-1
6. Germany	14	14	-	G8-4, G20-3, NATO-4, EU-1, B-1, UNSS-1
8. Russia	13	13	-	G8-4, G20-3, APEC-4, G8B-2
8. Italy	13	12	1	G8-4, G20-3, NATO-4, B-1, UNSS-1
8. Australia	13	12	1	APEC-4, APECB-1 G20-3, B-2, G8-2, UNSS-1
11. European Union	12	11	1	G8-4, G20-3, G8B-1, EU-3, UNSS-1
12. Korea	10	10	-	APEC-4, APECB-1, G20-3, G8-2
13. Indonesia	9	9	-	APEC-4, G8-2, G20-3
13. Brazil	9	9	-	G8-4, G20-3, G8B-2
13. India	9	9	-	G8-4, G20-3, G8B-1, B-1
13. Czech Republic	9	7	2	FS-2, G20-1, NATO-4, B-1, EU-1
13. Turkey	9	9	-	NATO-4, G20-3, G8-1, UNSS-1
13. United Nations SG	9	9	-	G8-3, UNGA-1, G20-3, UNSS=2
19. Spain	8	8	-	NATO-4, G20-3, G8-1
19. South Africa	8	8	-	G8-4, G20-3, G8B-1
21. Hungary	7	5	2	FS-2, NATO-4, B-1
21. Chile	7	5	2	APEC-4, APECB-1, B-2
21. Netherlands	7	7	-	NATO-4, G20-2, G8-1
24. Vietnam	7	6	1	APEC-4, APECB-1 FS-2
TOTAL				

Notes: APEC = APEC Leaders' Summit; APECB=bilateral at APEC Leaders' Summit; B = bilateral; C = ceremonial event; CARICOM=Carribbean Community; CHOGM = Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting; EU = Canada-EU Summit; FS = Francophonie Summit; G8 = Group of Eight Summit; G8B = bilateral at G8 Summit; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization Leaders' Summit; SPP = Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America ; UNGA = United Nations General Assembly; UNSS = United Nations Special Summit.

^a Unless otherwise noted, the occasion is a leader's visit to another leader's country; the number indicates the total of meetings on that occasion. Includes leaders elect but not constitutional monarchs. All bilateral or multilateral meetings at a summit are counted as "given."

Appendix C-3: Ministerial Diplomacy

At the ministerial level, a global approach prevailed as well. While foreign minister Peter Mackay spoke by phone with his American counterpart Condoleezza Rice on February 7, 2006, his first trip was across the Atlantic to Britain and Europe, to meet his counterparts from Canada's mother countries and the head of the Commonwealth. Environment minister Rona Ambrose followed, with her first visit to Europe, for a meeting of the climate change convention at its secretariat in Bonn. She returned there in May. Natural Resources minister Gary Lunn did go to Washington in May but for a trilateral encounter with his two North American counterparts there. He and agriculture minister Chuck Strahl visited China in the autumn to promote Canadian economic interests there.

The most revealing ministerial visit was the one U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice paid to Canada in September 2006, on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. By visiting Nova Scotia on that symbolically significant date for all Americans, to thank the Canadians who rescued 33,000 Americans on their diverted aircraft that day, she acknowledged how directly dependent America had become on Canada to save endangered Americans' lives.

Appendix D: Canada's Use of Force

Date	War	Region	Form	Allies	International Organization	Outcome
1899-1902	Boer War	Africa	Land	UK	N/A	Victory
1914-1918	World War I	Europe	Air, Land and Sea	UK, France, US (1917)	N/A	Victory
1939-1945	World War II	Europe, Asia	Air, Land and Sea	UK, France, US (1941)	N/A	Victory
1950-53	Korean War	Asia	Air, Land, Sea	UK, France, US	UN	Truce
1990-91	Persian Gulf	Middle East	Air and Sea	UK, France, US	UN, G7	Victory
1993	Medak Pocket	Europe	Land	France	UN, G7	Victory
1994	Haiti	Americas				Victory
1995	Turbot War	Atlantic				Victory
1996	Zaire	Africa				Victory
1999	Kosovo	Europe				Victory
2001-2014	Afghanistan	Asia				Victory
2003-	Iraq	Middle East				
2011	Libya	Middle East	Air, Sea			Victory
2012-2014	Mali	Africa	Air			Ongoing
2014	Iraq	Middle East	Land, Air			Ongoing

Note: Harper government military missions are in bold. Compiled by Julia Kulik, October 22, 2014.

Appendix E: Canada's Bilateral and Plurilateral Free Trade Agreements

Partner	Canadian Decision	Negotiations Start	End
USA	1985	1986	1987
Mexico (NAFTA)	1990	1994	
Chile	1994	1996	1997
Israel	1997	1997	
Honduras	September 28, 2000	2001	2011
Costa Rica	December 18, 2001	2001	2002
Singapore	June 5, 2000	2001	pending
Korea	November 19, 2004	2004	2014
Harper Years:			
Colombia	June 7, 2007	2007	2011
Peru	June 7, 2007	2008 Jan 27	2008
EFTA	October 9, 1998	2008 Jan	2008
Panama	October 2008	2008	2009
Caribbean	July 19, 2007	2009	pending
European Union	May 5, 2009	2009 Oct 19	2014
India	November 16, 2010	2011	pending
Trans-Pacific Partnership	2012	2005	pending

Appendix F: Harper's Major Decisions

2006

Afghanistan, January 23	Victory Address, Visit, Extension to 2009
Arctic sovereignty, January 26	Reaffirmed rhetorically & summer tour
Hamas funding cutoff, March 29	First outside Israel to cut off
Softwood lumber, April 28	Deal with U.S. announced
UNESCO participation, May 5	Quebec role negotiated
G8 St. Petersburg Summit, July 15-17	Leads in Middle East, energy principles
Lebanon rescue, July	Canadians rescued from Lebanon
Climate change, Autumn	Remains in Kyoto, Made-in-Canada plan
Francophone Summit, September 28	Israel's rights, French language reaffirmed
Human rights, November	Human Rights Promoted

2007

North American summitry, August
Turning the Corner on Climate Change

2008

Expanding Arctic jurisdiction, August 27

2010

Advancing Maternal, Newborn and Child Health Initiative at the G8 Muskoka Summit, June
Preventing Financial Crisis at the G20 Toronto Summit

2011

Liberating Libya, March

2013

Economic partnership with the European Union
Combating Terrorism in Mali

2014

Defending Ukraine
Combating ISIL in Iraq

Appendix F-1. Afghanistan, January 23, 2006–

Harper's first major decision came on distant and demanding Afghanistan, where Canada was now fighting a full-scale war (Piggott, 2007; Lang and Stein, 2007; Kirton 2007). In the realm of doctrine, on his first evening as prime minister-elect on January 23, 2006, Harper promised: "We will continue to help defend our values and democratic ideals around the world—as so courageously demonstrated by those young Canadian soldiers who are serving and who have sacrificed in Afghanistan."

In development, in early February 2006, the international community gathered in London to mobilize money for an Afghanistan Compact to replace the package that had been assembled in Bonn in 2001 in the immediate wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Prime minister designate Harper sent a message through Peter Harder, deputy minister of foreign affairs, that Canada would "stay the course." Canada aid to Afghanistan — Canada's largest recipient by far — had been \$100 million in 2004-05, and was slated to remain at \$100 million in 2005-06, but then drop to \$60 million in 2006-07, \$50 million in 2007-08, and \$40 million in 2008-09. Once sworn into office on February 6, Harper raised ODA to Afghanistan to a billion dollars over ten years — an average of \$200 million a year or double the previous high — to show Canada was in for the long haul. He later raised it even more.

In defence, Harper allowed Canada's military presence to grow from 700 troops to the long scheduled level of 2,200 by March 2006. He had Canada assume command of the allied forces in dangerous Kandahar.

In diplomacy, Harper visited Afghanistan on March 11, touching down in Kandahar, to be welcomed by Chief of the Defence Staff General Rick Hillier and the Canadian troops there. Here Harper set forth his vision for Canadian foreign policy as a whole. It featured Canadian leadership in defence of Canada's national interests and Canadian values. Harper declared that Afghanistan was the most important place in the world for Canada's exercise of leadership. He added, "Canada is not an island. We live in a dangerous world. And we have to show leadership in that world." He identified Afghanistan as the best example in decades of "Canada really standing up, going to the front line, articulating our values, not just our opposition to terror, our advancement of democracy, but basic humanitarian values, in terms of development, women's rights, education" (Harper, 2006). Two days later, Harper told the troops: "We don't make a commitment and then run away at the first sign of trouble. We don't and we will not, as long as I'm leading this country."²² Harper's commitment to global democratic leadership, now with development added, was clear.

On May 15, Harper introduced into the House of Commons a motion calling for Canada's Afghan mission to be extended to February 2009.²³ On May 17, members

²² CBC (March 13, 2006), "Canada committed to Afghan mission, Harper tells troops," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/03/13/harper_afghanistan060313.html.

²³ CTV (May 17, 2006) "MPs narrowly vote to extend Afghanistan mission," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato_afghan_060517/20060517/.

narrowly agreed in a 149-145 vote.²⁴ Harper's move was motivated by his overall strategy, evident in Canada's ODA increase, of changing expectations so all would assume that the allied forces would remain in Afghanistan for a long time, regardless of the cost. Harper stuck with the commitment during the deadly battle for Panjawai that summer. He sent tanks in September to help in the fight.

In the autumn Harper joined with the Dutch, with support from the U.S., to get Canada's NATO allies to relax the caveats so their troops could come to Canada's aid. He encouraged them to provide the additional 2,500 troops the allied commander said were required. Poland produced 1,000 first-line combat forces. Harper continued to press the others, led by the Germans, at the NATO summit in Riga, Latvia, in late November 2006.

By the summer of 2007 France, under its new president Nicolas Sarkozy responded, moving its Mirage fighter jets to Canada's base at Kandahar to fly ground support and reconnaissance missions for Canadian forces from there. That summer, Harper signalled he might pull back from making a military commitment beyond 2009. But in the October 17, 2007 Throne Speech he announced an extension for two years beyond. In a confidence vote on a compromise motion in the Commons on March 13, 2008, Harper and the Liberals agreed to extend the mission to 2011, shift it to training the Afghan army, and end it then — if other allies would produce the badly needed 1,000 reinforcements, helicopters and drones. Harper maintained the 2011 pullout pledge ever since.

These decisions confirmed the government's commitment to promoting global democracy, and Canada's CNR willingness to take global leadership in the defence and diplomatic realm in distant, dangerous theatres overseas. With Poland's and France's contributions, other countries of consequence found it easier to follow Canada's lead and help bear the burden, even if Europe's principal powers of Germany and Italy remained reluctant to fight.

²⁴ CTV (May 17, 2006) "MPs narrowly vote to extend Afghanistan mission," Accessed November 27, 2006, www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20060517/nato_afghan_060517/20060517/.

Appendix F-2: Advancing Maternal Newborn and Child Health through the G8 and UN, 2010

The thirteenth key decision, in the realm of development, was Canada's 2010 initiative on maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH), taken through the G8 and the UN (Kirton and Koch 2010, Kirton, Guebert and Kulik 2014). It shows Canada's foreign policy shift to "giving global leadership,"

On January 26, 2010, just as Canada's year as G8 host and chair began, Harper announced in an editorial in the *Toronto Star* that Canada would feature MNCH on an already crowded agenda for an unusually short G8 Summit. He did so when the Muskoka G8 summit ended on June 26. The choice moved the G8's focus beyond the familiar infectious disease of HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria into the more chronic diseases of MNCH, and into directly contributing to the two of the eight UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), numbers four and five, that were furthest from meeting their fast approaching target date of 2015. In the immediate aftermath of the greatest recession since the Great Depression of the 1930's, Canada's G8 mobilized \$7.3 billion in new money for MNCH, to be delivered over the next three years from 2010 to 2013. The sum was led by a new \$1 billion contribution from Canada, followed by those from all G8 members and from outside the G8 from the countries such as Korea, and from the Gates Foundation and UN Foundation.

Preparations for the Canadian Summit had begun in November of 2007 when Canadian officials met to discuss what the priority themes would be. Among the proposed topics were democratization, Africa, compliance, architecture, energy and the Arctic. MNCH was not on the list. In the summer of 2008, Harper announced that the summit would be held in Huntsville, Ontario and that the priority themes would be: economic growth and trade, climate change, and, in the security sphere, Canada's doctrinal foundation favourites of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. However, in the summer of 2009 Harper added as the fourth pillar development, with a clear emphasis on health and above all "the critical areas of maternal and childhood well being" (Harper 2009: 19).

On January 26, 2010 Harper identified his choice of a major initiative on MNCH, as the signature achievement of the summit. He again outlined his agenda at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, indicating his agenda and aspirations for both his G8 and G20 Summits (Harper 2010). When he came to the passage in his speech on MNCH, he received his only spontaneous round of applause.

Among the external determinants, of the Muskoka MNCH Initiative the US was not in the lead. Prior to Harper's G8 summit and MNCH achievement, leadership on global health had come largely from the US, with its focus on preventing the spread of the infectious disease of HIV/AIDS in developing countries. The Clinton administration had been central at the G8 summit and UN summits in 2001 in launching the Global Fund against AIDS, TB and Malaria. President Bush had followed with his more unilateral President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Yet the new Obama

administration gave less attention to global health, retained its bias for infectious disease, and was late in mobilizing new money for the cause. When Secretary of State Clinton announced the new administration's Global Health Initiative on May 5, 2009, its focus was "programs to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and TB, and other preventable disease, save millions of lives, reduce maternal and child mortality, and reflect our nation's leadership as a positive force for progress around the world" (US Department of State 2009). At the G8's L'Aquila summit that summer, President Obama's priority was food security, helping mobilize a total of \$22 billion for the cause, led by a major contribution from the US. This choice was made at the time that Canada was choosing MNCH as the priority for its G8 summit the next year.

Canada's G8 MNCH initiative was driven and sustained largely by social determinants above all. Canadian children-focused NGO's, led by World Vision, Plan, and Save the Children. They were active at an early stage in urging the Canadian government to adopt this priority for the Muskoka G8. To be sure they worked closely with their sister organizations in the US and Britain. But in all cases this transnational civil society coalition appears to have been acting autonomously, rather than responding to actual or anticipated reaction or suggestions from the US government. Indeed, it was the Canadian component of World Vision that was the most eager to move into public policy advocacy from its more traditional service delivery role.

At the government level, the key determinant were individuals working directly on the G8 file, supported by CIDA and its minister and ultimately by Prime Minister Harper. Yet global health, development, and MNCH were not a priority part of Stephen Harper's personal belief system before or after he became PM.

Canada's G8 achievement was mobilizing at Muskoka \$7.3 billion in new money from the same leaders who knew that the next day they would be travelling to Toronto to pledge at their G20 summit to cut their fiscal deficits in half as a percent of GDP by 2013. The Muskoka money was also mobilized simultaneously with the Canadian's G8's second named signature achievement, the Muskoka Accountability Report to monitor and publicly report on members' compliance with their G8 commitment on development and health. Evidence suggests that the latter had a deterrent effect on the former, with some members pledging less money, knowing that they would be held accountable for delivering the promised sums. In a G8 context, the emphasis on accountability was above all Harper's in 2010, although this cause had been shared with the US in earlier years.

A few months after the G8 Muskoka Summit Harper travelled to a UN summit in New York in September to review and revitalize progress toward the MDGs at the two third temporal mark. There he and the full global community raised the new money mobilized for MNCH to an announced total of \$40 billion. To ensure that the promised money was actually delivered, deployed and produced results in the intended way. Harper worked with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon to create a Commission on information and accountability on MNCH that Harper co-chaired with President Kikwete of Tanzania.

Appendix F-3. Generating G20 Summit Governance, 2008-2013

The fourth decision was Canada's successful hosting of the new G20 Summit in Toronto in on June 26-27, 2010 (Kirton 2013).

After the Harper government took office, finance minister Flaherty was an active participant in the ministerial level of finance G20 after the global financial crisis erupted in September 2008, Flaherty was one of the few G7 finance ministers to attend the annual G20 meeting in Sao Paolo in November 2008.

When Nicolas Sarkozy first suggested in September 2008 that there be a summit to respond to the financial crisis, Harper endorsed the concept. He then worked with the French to help them come to an agreement with the Americans that it should be a G20 one. Canada was driven by a calculation of what countries were needed to respond to the crisis, although its emphasis on "fix the banks first" suggested a preference for a summit of the G7 plus a few others' rather than a full G20 one. However Canada's support for a G20 summit was driven in part by a defensive positionalist calculation that it was better off with an established forum where it was a key member rather than a new ad hoc gathering from which it might be left out.

On November 14-15, 2008 at the first G20 leaders' summit at Washington, Canada's strong message remained "fix the banks first." Harper stood out as being focused and informed about the international economy. He was recognized as providing thoughtful interventions, especially on fiscal policy, his call to start thinking now about exit strategies, and on the banking and financials system, as no Canadian institutions had failed. While Harper encouraged countries to adopt significant stimulus measures, he advised against more 'red-tape' regulation. He aligned himself with George Bush's defence of free market capitalism, rather than the European and Australian argument that the root of the crisis lay in deregulation and unchecked speculation. Canada adopted its traditional role as an honest broker, urging leaders to find a middle ground between domestic and international regulation. Canada also became known for its strong contributions on trade and for coming to summit meetings with positive statements on the need for G20 countries to resist the lure of protectionism.

In the lead up to the second G20 summit at London on April 1-2, 2009, independent analysts reported how effective Canada's banks were on a global scale. Canada's credibility was enhanced by its delivery of a large fiscal stimulus in its January 2009 budget. Canada's priorities for the Summit focused on fixing the banks and delivering the fiscal stimulus of 4% of members' GDP that the G20 had promised at Washington. Canada spoke against a proposed global bank tax from the beginning, feeling it was a bad idea driven by a political desire to punish "bad banks" of which Canada and most G20 members had none. Canada felt that the issues of money laundering and hedge funds were red herrings rather than core issues. Canada was comfortable with addressing the first through the adoption of OECD standards and agreements for sharing tax information. It regarded this as a successful approach.

At London it was agreed that restoring domestic lending was essential for fiscal and monetary stimulus to restore growth. In addition to providing liquidity, recapitalization and addressing impaired assets, G20 governments would take “all necessary action to restore the normal flow of credit through the financial systems and ensure the soundness of systemically important institutions.” This blank check for credit flows was an affirmation of the central message of Canadian finance minister Jim Flaherty. It was an encouragement to a slow-moving America, which had put stimulus first, to get on with core banking reforms. On tax havens, a core demand of the continental Europeans, the G20 boldly declared: “the era of banking secrecy is over.” But all the G20 promised was to “stand ready to deploy sanctions” rather than actually unleashing any against recalcitrant jurisdictions. The winner here was China and the other G20 members, such as Britain and Canada, with tax havens in the Caribbean and elsewhere to protect. Canada regarded climate change as driven by Brown’s domestic political concerns, but not being a fundamental economic issue at that time.

At the third summit at Pittsburg on September 24-25, 2009 at Pittsburgh, Canada pledged CA\$10 billion, its traditional 10 percent of America’s contribution as part of the leaders’ G20 London’s headline of a US\$1.1 trillion pledge to the IMF. Only Canada clearly said it would consider giving more if the IMF asked.

On the eve of the summit, Canada announced a donation of \$2.6 billion in callable capital to the African Development Bank, making Canada the only member to offer new money on such a scale. At the summit, Harper continued to press, to success, on his core priorities of a sensible exit strategy and trade liberalization. The Canadians were interested in climate finance as long as the result did not eliminate the role of the private sector and did not focus unduly on public sources of finance. The summit decided to institutionalize the G20 summit as the primary forum for global economic governance. They chose Canada to host the first institutionalized G20 summit in Ontario in June 2010.

For the G20’s fourth summit, ultimately held at Toronto on June 26-27, 2010, Canada was chosen as the host and chair. It was the first country beyond the old Anglo-American countries to be chosen for this institutional leadership role. For Toronto, Harper declared that his summit should focus on the economy and on following up on G20 commitments. This meant addressing the financial system, stimulus and exit strategies, trade liberalization, IFI reform and the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. More generally, Canada wanted to work with Korea to ensure that the two summits were complementary. One idea was that there should be a different thematic emphasis for each. In determining its agenda, Canada began with two key concepts. First, Canada wanted to recognize that the G20 was a different forum than the G8 and have the agenda reflect that fact. Russia supported this approach. Second, Canada emphasized accountability as it was doing for its G8. It felt delivering on past promises was particularly important for the new G20 Summit. Canada thus wanted to keep the agenda focused on the economy and on the commitments of members to implement the Pittsburgh framework and the other promises made there. Canada opposed a uniform, global bank tax. It argued that a one size bank tax did not fit all and that they should not have to pay as none of their banks had failed at home. At the four Sherpa meetings in the

lead-up to the summit, held as the European financial crisis erupted in its first instalment in Greece Canada's objective was to keep the Europeans' feet to the fire but not to cause panic, to give them space to fix their own problems. Their new steps for stabilization and the allocation of more money with the help of the IMF were seen as useful steps. Several weeks before Toronto, Canada's team had a discussion with Harper in reaction to the crisis in Europe, given his role as G20 chair. At that time Harper sent his G20 colleagues a carefully worded letter calling for fiscal consolidation to be the key issue at the summit. He proposed a precise set of targets and timetables for deficit and debt reduction. At Toronto this was agreed. The media portrait of the summit's substance was generally favourable for its host. Most Canadian commentators felt that Harper's summit had got the macroeconomic approach and message right.

At the fifth summit at Seoul November 11-12, 2010 host Korea proved that an emerging economy from Asia, and one beyond the BRICs, could design, chair and host a summit that delivered by the then due built-in deadlines the initiatives central to the G20's foundational mission of promoting financial stability by strengthening at both the domestic and international level the respective central pillars of the world's private banks and the IMF. Canada saw its "fix the banks first" priority finally agreed as the Seoul summit approved the adoption by all G20 members of the Basel 3 accord on banking capital, liquidity and leverage. Canada also played a key role in the second, as it gave up just enough of its quota share at the IMF to allow Brazil to claim Canada's tenth ranked spot, and that allow the BRICS and the others to accept the IMF voice and vote reform deal. In doing so, Canada was sacrificing its national share in a zero sum game for the greater global good of modernizing a resistant IMF that had been designed in and for the world of 1944.

5. Liberating Libya through NATO and the UN, 2011

The fifteenth key decision coming in the realm of security, was going to war in 2011 to liberate Libya's civilians from a slaughter that was highly likely to happen at the hands of its 42 year long dictator, of Muammar Ghaddafi. Canada stood with France and Britain as the first ranking NATO allies to call for diplomatic sanctions, for authorizing UN Security Council Resolution to invoke the principle of an international responsibility to protect (R2P) and to deploy and employ air forces in combat to protect endangered Libyan civilians in Benghazi and elsewhere.

In late February the emphasis was on rescuing Canadians and imposing economic sanctions. Foreign minister Cannon announced that Canada was seeking to evacuate Canadians from Libya to Europe, while working very closely with like-minded countries including France, the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand to secure seats for Canadians on their outgoing flights. He next condemned the violence and supported a "discussion" about sanctions at the UN Human Rights Council. The UN Security Council statement on February 22 contained for the first time ever an explicit reference to R2P. Harper stated that Canada would pursue sanctions against Libya in partnership with other states or "unilaterally if necessary." After Harper and Obama spoke on the phone each said "they would co-ordinate their expanding humanitarian efforts and consider other options should they become necessary." Harper then announced Canada would impose

sanctions to punish Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, along with the other members of the UN, but including measures beyond those of the UNSC. It thus froze all financial transactions with the Libyan government.

As March opened, Ottawa planned to participate in an international effort to airlift aid to opposition-held areas of Libya. Harper announced CAN\$5 million in humanitarian aid in Libya, sent a frigate, along with the US and special forces for evacuation, aid insertions into rebel held areas or even a blockade. It welcomed the decision by the Arab League calling for a no-fly zone over Libya. It declared that the UN Security Council was the proper place to decide on action against Libya, as G8 countries refused to support a no-fly zone proposed by France and Britain.

On March 17, the UNSC imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and approved all necessary measures to enforce the no-fly zone. Canada immediately prepared to send six fighter jets to enforce the zone. On March 18 US Secretary of State Clinton met with French president Nicholas Sarkozy and U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron before joining a closed-door lunch with the leaders of Canada, Germany, Qatar the Arab League, and the U.N. Led by Britain, the US and Canada, NATO led in organizing the needed military force. Cannon met in Paris with a member of Libya's Transitional Council, which Ottawa regarded as a "valid interlocutor"

On March 21 four CF-18 fighters and two CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refueling tankers took off from an Italian base to patrol Libya's coast. Defence minister Peter MacKay announced that Canadian warplanes would conduct high-level strategic strikes over Libya. On March 25, MacKay announced that Lt.-Gen. Charles Bouchard of Canada would take over command of the NATO mission in Libya. The decision, taken after considerable debate among the allies, was, in MacKay's words, a "testament to the respect Canada's military enjoys around the world"

On March 29 Morris Rosenberg, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, attended the London Conference on Libya Participants as minister Cannon was in the midst of an election campaign. On April 13 Cannon left the campaign to attend the meeting of the Contact Group on Libya in Doha where ministers met with Libya's rebels in a show of support for insurgents who are seeking to overthrow Gaddafi. On June 9 Julian Fantino, Associate Minister of National Defence, attended the third meeting of the Contact Group on Libya. MacKay said the Canadian mission in Libya had cost \$26 million and could rise to \$60 million by September. The total included the cost of fuel for fighter planes and patrol craft as well as the 300 laser-guided bombs dropped between March 19 to June 2. On June 15 the House of Commons voted to extend Canada's participation in *Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR* to the end of September 2011.

On June 27 John Baird, Canada's new Foreign Affairs Minister following the general election that returned Harper with his first majority government, secretly visited Benghazi to meet with leaders of Libya's National Transitional Council (NTC). He recognized the legitimacy of NTC as the representative of the people of Libya and invited Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Chairman of the NTC, to Canada to extend Canada's diplomatic ties

with Libya.” On July 15, Baird at the end of the fourth meeting of the Contact Group on Libya, held in Istanbul, Turkey, expressed Canada’s continued commitment to protecting Libyan civilians. On August 8, Canada declared all remaining diplomats at the Libyan embassy in Ottawa persona non gratae, effective immediately. On August 14 Ottawa allowed Libyan rebels to contact a firm, Aeryon Las in Waterloo, with high-tech Canadian drones. On August 25 Baird welcomed Abubaker Karmos, appointee of the National Transitional Council (NTC) of Libya, as *chargé d'affaires ad interim* at the Embassy of Libya in Canada.

On September 1, Harper attended talks on Libya hosted in Paris by Sarkozy. There he met with other world leaders and the leaders of Libya's NTC to discuss what was needed to rebuild and move to democratic elections in about 18 months. Harper stated there that Canada would be a part of the military mission “until it reaches its conclusion.” He then announced that “Canada had lifted its unilateral economic sanctions on Libya, now that the Gaddafi regime no longer holds power. On September 12, Canada reopened its embassy in Libya's capital. On September 20 Harper told the United Nations, at a high-level meeting on Libya attended by dozens of nations and Libya’s National Transitional Council that “Canada will stay the course in Libya” to help it rebuild. On September 22, British Prime Minister David Cameron in Ottawa complimented Canada's military, past and present, and noted how Canadian and British troops fought together in Afghanistan and now in Libya.

This cadence of decision suggests that Canada led along with France and Britain in militarily liberating Libya and supporting the replacement of the Ghaddafi regime by a democratic one. It also suggests that Canada was compensating for a politically constrained America that could not politically fly manned air combat missions over Libya, but that provided the critical specialized intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources need to win and the critical diplomatic initiative at the UN to authorize the use of all necessary means to implement the international responsibility to protect. It seemed like somewhat of a role reversal from the distant days when Canada had concentrated on diplomacy and left front line military combat to the US. It successfully advanced the doctrine of “enlightened sovereignty” in R2P form in the military and political field.

Appendix F-4: Mali 2013

January 11, 2013. France launches a surprise offensive in Mali

January 13, 2013. Canada supplies a C-17 Globemaster military transport aircraft and 40 CAF personnel for one week to assist the French military mission in Mali against Al Qaeda affiliated terrorists. The US provides satellite information and logistical support. Britain provides two military transport planes. France launched its Rafaele and Mirage airstrikes on Friday, January 11, without waiting for clear approval from the UN. The UNSC resolution of December 20 said an international military campaign in Mali would need to be “further refined” French airstrikes drive the Islamists out of Konna and Gao. Harper refuses a military mission despite demands from African leaders.

Canadian firms are among the largest investors in Mali, including Imagold.

January 14, 2013. Canadian special forces land in neighbouring Niger to train its soldiers. Niger is contributing 500 troops to the fight against Mali’s rebels. One French helicopter pilot has died.

January 24, 2014. Canada extends its military mission 30 days to February 15.

January 27. The US agrees to provide air tankers to refuel French warplanes.

February 13, 2013. Baird tells the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Canada will not do more in Mali, as it becomes an insurgency and as public disapproval in Canada increases.

March 14, 2013. Harper rules out supplying troops to the mission in Mali, even as France tries to replace its mission with a UN peacekeeping force.

Harper says the aircraft will be available “as long as we feel there’s a need” and that humanitarian and development assistance would continue

Appendix F-5: Defending Ukraine

January 26: Andrew Bennett, Canada's Ambassador for religious Freedom visits Ukraine to express concern about human rights violations and show support for Ukraine

February 14: John Baird announces funding for supplies, equipment and medical care for Ukrainian activists through the International Renaissance Foundation, a Ukrainian NGO

February 28: Baird visits Ukraine with Parliamentarians and representative of the Ukrainian-Canadian community

March 1: Harper has bilateral phone call with Obama and convenes cabinet meeting, then announces:

- Suspension of engagement in preparations for the G8 Sochi Summit
- Recall of Canada's ambassador for consultations
- Support for deployment of UN and OSCE monitors
- Engagement in discussions about a financial package for Ukraine

March 2: Canada and G7 statement condemns Russia and say they will "suspend our participation in activities associated with the preparation of the scheduled G-8 Summit in Sochi in June, until the environment comes back to where the G-8 is able to have a meaningful discussion."

March 3: Harper demands that Putin immediately withdraw his military from Crimea and cancels government participation at the Paralympic games and instructs officials to review all planned bilateral interaction with Russia.

March 4: Harper suspends all planned bilateral activities between the Canadian Armed Forces and Russian military, including NORAD's Exercise Vigilant Eagle.

March 5: Canada freezes assets of members of the Yanukovich regime, at the request of Ukraine. 18 listed under the Freezing Assets of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act.

Canada suspends the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission

Canada to participate with two military observers in OSCE military observer mission to report on military activities in Ukraine, at Ukraine's request

March 6: Harper declares Russia's invasion of Ukraine and act of aggression and that Canada will not recognize the results of a referendum held under illegal military occupation.

March 12: G7 leaders call on Russia to not change the status of Crimea and to halt a referendum.

March 13: Harper announces more than \$220 million to help Ukraine stabilize its economy, as a loan or loan guarantee, conditional on IMF support. Canada will also help IMF deliver technical assistance in economic transition and financial sector reforms.

March 16: Harper declare results of referendum in Crimea illegitimate, with no legal effect, and Canada does not recognize it.

March 17: Harper announces further economic sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Act (SEMA) and more travel bans against Ukrainian and Russian officials. He meets with Ukraine's ambassador to discuss the situation.

March 18: Harper announces economic sanctions and travel bans against 17 more Ukrainian and Russian officials.

March 21: Harper announces economic sanctions and travel bans against another 14 Russian officials and Bank Rossiya.

March 22: Harper announces \$775,000. to an OSCE-led political and security monitoring mission to Ukraine

April 17: Canada announces dispatch of six CF-18's to Europe and 20 personnel to NATO headquarters in Mons

April 28: Six Canadian CF-18's to be sent to Romania, bordering Ukraine. They will go with one heavy lift plane, two Airbus transports and about 250 military personnel. They left Bagotville on Tuesday, April 29th, through Iceland.

April 28: Harper announces additional economic sanctions on nine individuals (including travel bans) and two Russian banks. (The US on the same day imposed sanctions on seven Russians and 17 companies).

April 30: Canada deploys the warship, HMCE Regina, from the Arabian Sea to the NATO Standing Maritime Forces "as part of NATO's reassurance package."

The CAF members take command of an OSCE international military observation team in Ukraine.

May 2: Canada sends 50 soldiers to participate in NATO training manouvres in Poland.

May 4: Canada imposes sanctions on 16 more Russian entities as Harper says Russia's "illegal occupation of Ukraine and provocative military activity" are a serious concern.

July 11: Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) amended to include additional names

July 20 (Monday): John Baird from London says Canada is ready to level more sanctions, against individuals, entities and entire sectors of the Russian economy, similar to those already imposed by the US.

July 23: Canadian officials explains none of the \$220 million promised on March 13 has flowed because its takes time to ensure the right conditions are attached, including reporting requirements, restrictions on where the money will be spent, if its for banking reform or anti-corruptions measures. Rick Roth, Director of Communications for John Baird, says Ottawa

Appendix G: Canada-U.S. Outcomes, 2006

Source	Win	Difference	Tie	Similarity	Loss
Balance (061030)	6	8	-	4	1
Win					
Softwood Lumber	•				
Energy Security	•				
Rice Visit	•				
Passport Plan	•				
Great Lakes Exercises	•				
Internet Sales	•				
Difference					
ANWR		•			
Arctic Sovereignty		•			
Iraq Troops		•			
BMD		•			
Kyoto		•			
Conventional Arms		•			
ICC		•			
Landmines		•			
Tie					
Similarity					
Lebanon Conflict				•	
Iran				•	
North Korea				•	
China				•	
Loss					
Arar Apology					•

Notes:

Win = Canada win. U.S. adjusts to Canada's initial preferences (i.e., those when issue first arose. Scored when issued effectively resolved (although it could be reopened or recur as in softwood lumber, 1,2,3 etc). Ongoing disputes are scored as Difference.

Difference. Ongoing disputes are scored as Difference, without judgments as to whose side time and delay is on.

Tie: resolved through mutual and balanced adjustment

Similarity = spontaneously the two sides arrive at and maintain a similar position. neither side adjusts. Both adopt the same position spontaneously, autonomously, egotistically, without any anticipated reaction communication or pressures necessarily being involved. May reflect common or convergent interests and values

Loss: Canada adjusts to U.S. or is forced to acquiesce in a refusal to give Canada what it wants. (why is this different than Difference? — case effectively resolved. Canada moves on to other things

Harper's Win-Loss Record with the U.S., 2006

Canada's Wins (America Adjusts to Canada)

Softwood Lumber Deal

- “a historic softwood lumber agreement” (Harper 061005)
- Canada gets 80% of money (back) cf. 0% for past several years and a standstill for several years ahead (cf. deserved more, could have gotten more with a different strategy. no calculation of whose aide time is on. referent is the real world before)

Energy Security

- “A better U.S. appreciation of Canada’s growing contribution to continental energy security” (Harper, October 5, 2006)
 - President Bush’s 2006 State of the Union Address
- Rice Visit September 11, 2006
- “some very gracious and grateful words for Canada from Secretary of State Rice on the fifth anniversary of 9-11”
 - She had many places in the U.S. to be on 9-11 plus five
 - Symbolically showed U.S. need for Canada — U.S. planes landing in an open Canada on 911

Passport Plan Reprieve

- “a reprieve from Congress on their passport plan” (Harper)
- (U.S. exemptionalism for Canada”? Mexico too?)
- recognition of interdependence

Great Lakes Live Fire Exercise Suspension

- U.S. 911 Security Imperative trumped
- NI of territorial (human) security: Canadian boaters killed
- DNV of anti-militarism: Rush-Bagot Agreement violated
- DNV of environmentalism: copper and lead casings pollute Lakes

Internet Pharmacy Sales

- U.S. re-opens imports from Internet Canadian pharmacies
- thus adjusts internal U.S. policies in Canada’s favour (due to U.S. vulnerability of soaring health care costs and fiscal deficit and Canada’s distinctive capability of low cost generic medicine)

Canada-U.S. Ties (Neither Country Adjusts, No Change from Status Quo)

Canada Deters Offensive American Actions within America

- Alaska National Wildlife Reserve Closure

Canada’s Deters Offensive American Actions Against Canada on the Continent

Arctic Sovereignty

- The U.S. did not surface a submarine, send a ship through, or commission a new heavy icebreaker to assert its Arctic claims

Both Diverge Globally

Iraq

- Canadian troops remain largely out

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

- Despite North Korean nuclear explosion and the Canadian Senate (Colin Kenney) report recommendation

Climate Change Control and Kyoto Commitment

- Canada still in Kyoto with control measures in support
- if U.S. harmonized and similar ones

Compatibility Naturally Arises (Neither Adjusts to Other to Arrive in Same Place)

Lebanese Conflict

Iran

North Korea

China

Canada Deters Offensive American Actions Within Canada

- No penetrative threats to Canadian sovereignty (internal interference) yet (?) (beyond the Arctic claims)

Canada's Losses

Maheer Arar Apology

Appendix G-1: Harper's Win-Loss Record with the US, 2006

1. Canada's Wins (America Adjusts to Canada)

Softwood Lumber Deal

- “historic softwood lumber agreement” (Harper 061005)
- Canada gets 80% of money (back) cf. 0% for past several years and a standstill for several years ahead (cf. deserved more, could have gotten more with a different strategy. no calculation of whose aide time is on. referent is the real world before)

Energy Security

- “A better U.S. appreciation of Canada's growing contribution to continental energy security” (Harper, October 5, 2006)
- President Bush's 2006 State of the Union Address

Rice Visit September 11, 2006

- “...some very gracious and grateful words for Canada from secretary of State Rice on the fifth anniversary of 9-11.
- She had many places in the US to be on 9-11 plus five
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Internet Pharmacy Sales

- US re-opens imports from Internet Canadian pharmacies
- thus adjusts internal US policies in Canada's favour
- (due to US vulnerability of soaring health care costs and fiscal deficit and Canada's distinctive capability of low cost generic medicine)

2. Canada US Ties (Neither Country Adjusts, No Change from Status Quo)

A. Canada Deters Offensive American Actions within America

Alaska National Wildlife Reserve Closure

B. Canada's Deters Offensive American Actions Against Canada on the Continent

Arctic Sovereignty

- The US did not surface a submarine, send a ship through, or commission a new heavy icebreaker to assert its Arctic claims

C. Both Diverge Globally

Iraq

- Canadian troops remain largely out

Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)

- Despite North Korean nuclear explosion and the Canadian Senate (Colin Kenney) report recommendation

Climate Change Control and Kyoto Commitment

- Canada still in Kyoto with control measures in support
- if U.S. harmonized and similar ones

D. Compatibility Naturally Arises (Neither Adjusts to Other to Arrive in Same Place)

Lebanese Conflict

Iran

North Korea

China

E. Canada Deters Offensive American Actions Within Canada

No penetrative threats to Canadian sovereignty (internal interference) yet (?) (beyond the Arctic claims)

3. Canada's Losses

- Can you think of any?

Appendix H: Harper's Achievements in Shaping World Order, 2006 (First Nine Months)

It is probably unreasonable to expect that Stephen Harper, after only nine months on the job, will have sought to and succeeded in re-shaping world order in ways that embed Canada's national interest and distinctive national values in the global community as a whole. This is especially true for a young rookie Prime Minister, with no previous interest or involvement in international affairs, with no father to have taught him, with a front bench with little cabinet experience, leading a newly minted party with often fractious components, with only a minority and no ideological soul-mates from any other party in the House, and thus always facing the prospect of defeat at any time. Yet even under these most unpromising conditions, there are signs of influential forward movement, that may produce more clear and consequential achievements in the months and years to come. On the list of candidates, three stand out.

1. New Defining Principle 1: Democracy Defeats Terrorism, even in the Middle East

When any democracy is attacked by a terrorism organization, other democracies should come to its aid. This is a different principle than that enshrined in the UN Charter, which does not recognize the value of democracy, has not enshrined a definition of terrorism, not applied it to sanctionist and supportive action, especially in the Middle east. At the UN there still prevails the old principle of national self determination, that new states can be created by violent non-state actors using any means. Thus one person's terrorist is still a freedom fighter. At the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg Canada largely drafted the G8 Statement on the Middle East. Subsequently, Harper's speech to B'nai Brith on October 18, 2006 proclaimed the new principle directly, even as he called for a Palestinian state.

2. New Defining Principle 2: Cultural Diversity Trumps Open Markets

"At the Francophonie we were able to stress our support for the UN Convention on Cultural Diversity, a document that reflects the unique history and eclectic identity."
[Canadianization of the global order]

Quebec at UNESCO here - not pander to Quebec votes
Francophonie
Canada was first to ratify the new convention.

3. New Defining Principle 3: Genocide Must be Recognized and Condemned

Did France follow Canada in condemning Armenian genocide
Retroactive R2P, when all that can be protected is the memory by calling it for what it was and is.

4. High Seas Overfishing.

“...recently at the meetings of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization, where by standing firm and making clear we are prepared to act, he managed to get real progress on our goal of ending international overfishing off the Grand Banks.” (Harper 061005.

These new principles flow directly from Canada’s national interests and national values of both the shared and distinctive kind.

Appendix H-1: Harper Campaign Platform and Promises Fulfilled

As of November 27, 2006

<u>Promise</u>	<u>Status (kept, ongoing, dumped, opposite)</u>
The Platform, Stand Up for Canada	
U.S. Relations:	
Softwood Lumber: protect Canada's interests	Kept: Deal Done
Wheat Board: protect Canada's interests	
Byrd Amendment: protect Canada's interests	Compromised by Softwood Deal
Imported Crime: protect Canada's interests	
Economics:	
NAFTA: chart a course for the future	Kept by hosting SPP Summit
FTAA negotiations: reassert Canadian leadership	
Japan: "explore ... possibility of free trade negotiations"	
India: explore ... possibility of free trade negotiations"	
Environment:	
Greenhouse gas emissions: control in coordination	
North Atlantic: extend management on Shelf, Grand Banks, Flemish Cap	
Security:	
terrorist attacks,	
natural disasters, and	
"outbreaks of disease world-wide."	
Education:	
Immigrant Credentials: facilitate recognition	
UNESCO: invite Quebec to play a role	
Development:	
Double Aid to Africa by 2008-9	Reaffirmed, on track
Move to OECD Average on ODA	Reaffirmed, on track

The Campaign Promises (23 Releases on International Affairs)

Promise	Status (kept, ongoing, dumped, opposite)
Security (13):	
The Military (9)	
Arctic Sovereignty (2)	Kept by declaration, visits
Afghanistan (2)	Kept
Immigration/Multiculturalism (3):	
Head Tax: act against	Kept
Democratization (3):	
Ukraine's "orange revolution celebrated	
Iran's pledge to destroy Israel condemned	Kept in Middle East policy
Death United Arab Emirates leader mourned	
Development (3):	
ODA: \$425 million added	Kept largely
Asian Tsunami commemorated	
AIDS: World AIDS Day noted	
Trade (1):	
Pacific Gateway Initiative promised	Kept by Liberal's funding honoured

Appendix I: The Vulnerabilities and Specialized Capabilities That Count 2006

a. Harper's Conception of Canada's Vulnerabilities

Terrorism

- A new global conflict without borders fought at home and abroad that will not be easy nor short. "Last months arrests of 17 persons in the Toronto area. (060714 London), 061005 (Ottawa).
- "After 24 Canadians died on 9-11, we also became aware that domestic security cannot be divorced from global security." (060920 New York)
- On Afghanistan. "Some might say that's not Canada's problem. Well it is. And September 11th, 2001 shattered any illusion that it isn't – the day when the Taliban were revealed as accomplice in the horrific attacks against innocent civilians on this continent, including on citizens of this country." 061005

b. Harper's Conception of the Capabilities that Count (25)

July 14, 2006, London, UK

- **Open Democracy.**
- **Cultural Diversity.** "But the best weapon in the fight against terrorism is another gift of our British heritage – our open and democratic society, and more specifically, our embrace of cultural diversity" [the direct match with the one vulnerability]
- **Energy (5).** "We are currently the fifth largest energy producer in the world." "An energy industry that is increasingly one of the most important in the world." 060920
- **Natural Gas (3).** "We rank third in global gas production" 060920
- **Oil (7).** We rank seventh in global oil production 060920
- **Hydro-electricity (1).** "We generate more hydro-electric power than any other country on earth." "Second in hydro-electric generation" 060920
- **Uranium (1).** "We are the world's largest supplier of uranium." "The Shield also yields a third of the world's uranium supply." "First in uranium production" 060920
- **Oil Deposits (2).** "The oils ands are the second largest oil deposit in the world, bigger than Iraq, Iran or Russia, exceeded only by Saudi Arabia."
- **Political Stability.** "Even now Canada is the only non-OPEC country with growing oil deliverability... We are a stable, reliable producer in a volatile, unpredictable world." 061005 the world's only growing producer of this strategic commodity with a secure stable government.
- **Petroleum Exports.** "Canada surpassed the Saudis four years ago as the largest supplier of petroleum products to the United States
- **High Tech MNCs.** Research in Motion, ATI, Bombardier — "the largest full time employer in Northern Ireland"
- **Minerals.** "We have long been a major producer of nickel, gold, copper, potash, coal and cement."
- **Diamonds (3).** "Canada is now the world's third largest producer of diamonds."

- **Nuclear Technology.** “We also manufacture the state-of-the-art Candu reactor technology”
 - **Nuclear Waster Disposal.** “and we’re world leaders in the safe management of fuel waste”
- September 20, 2006, New York
- **Economy.** A strong and robust economy
 - **Balanced Budgets (1 in G7).** This spring we tabled “Canada’s ninth consecutive balanced budget.”
 - **GDP Growth (1 in G7).** “We are projected to lead the G7 in GDP growth this year.”
 - **Current Account Surplus.** “Our current account is in surplus for the 27th consecutive quarter.”
 - **National Pension Plan.** “Our national pension plan is actuarially sound for the next 70 years.” [population – aging]
 - **Government Debt (1 in G7).** “And we have dramatically lowered government debt – to around – 35% of GDP – the lowest in the G7 and falling.”
 - **Corporate Tax Rate.** “Our corporate tax rate is now lower than the United States.”
 - **Free Markets and Rule of Law.** “The United States largest energy supplier is its largest trading partner, an enduring democracy that believes in free markets and binding contracts.”
 - **Trade:** “We are operating the largest commercial relationship in the history of the planet.”
 - **Defence Capabilities.** “new strategic and tactical lift aircraft, new helicopters and new supply ships, with more improvements of our defence capability still to come.”
 - **Public Service Co-ordination.** Seen in the evacuation of Lebanon, breaking up the “alleged terrorist plot in Toronto earlier this year.”

c. Harper’s Conception of Canada’s Resulting Rank (Objective Capability)

060714 London:

- **Energy Superpower:** British investors has recognized “Canada’s emergence as a global energy powerhouse – the emerging energy superpower our government intends to build...” “Canada as an energy superpower.” “And Canada is an emerging energy superpower, the only stable and growing producer of this scarce commodity in an unstable world.” 060920

September 20, 2006, New York

- **Economic and Fiscal Performance (1).** “We are leading the G-7 in economic and fiscal performance” “We’re on the best economic footing of any of the G7 countries.”

October 5, 2006, Ottawa

- **International Institutional Influence.** “While not among the ranks of world powers, we have long been a significant part of important and influential world bodies” Commonwealth, Francophonie, NATO, NAFTA, G8.
- **G8 Member.** “And perhaps all of these things explains the seat we hold at the table of the G8 – one of the worlds most exclusive bodies.”

- **Great Power Equivalent.** “Canada was able to evacuate as many of its citizens and as quickly as the great powers that have immensely more military reach.” (re Lebanon, summer 2006)

d. Harper’s Conception of Canada’s Resulting Role (Asserted Position)

July 14, 2006, London, UK

- We promised “to reclaim the **modest leadership role** we once held on the world stage”
- “We’re also taking a **leadership role** in the international effort to choke off terrorist financing. Last week Toronto was named the permanent headquarters of the secretariat of the Egmont Group, representing financial intelligence agencies from 101 countries.” 060920 [niche leadership role, matches terrorist vulnerability]

September 20, 2006, New York

- “Canada intends to be **a player.**”
- “Canada’s determination to **play a leading role** to take on **the challenges facing our planet.**”
- “Canada’s role in the world will **extend beyond this continent.**” [global leadership]

October 5, 2005, Ottawa

- “That objective is to make Canada **a leader on the international stage.**” [global leadership]
- “a Canada that leads.”
- “Alberta must become a world leaders in environmentally-responsible energy production.”

Appendix J: Acknowledged Status — Tony Blair's Canada, October 17, 2006

On 16 October 2006 Tony Blair chose to speak in his own country, to a special lunch for the Canada-UK chamber of commerce. In his speech he acknowledged Canada's status as follows:

... we are partners in the UN and NATO, we are the only two members of both the Commonwealth and the **G8**. [LI, PD?, fellow members of the global concert]

... we went through what is almost a kind of checklist of what happens at a meeting between any two **world leaders** in today's **global politics** — trade links, energy, climate change, new conflicts in the world, and notably of course our joint endeavours in Afghanistan. [primacy of politics, globe]

... We are gateways to two of the **largest trading blocs** in the world — the EU and NAFTA.

... we are actually **learning a lot** and preparing for this speech from the work **that Canada has done in successfully** commercialising its research. [technology first, human capital]

Canada, as Stephen Harper was saying I think when he was here and told this Chamber, **it is becoming in effect a new energy super power**. Hydro-electricity provides two-thirds of Canada's electricity, a strong hydrogen economy is developing and developing research into clean nuclear power, and also Canada is emerging as a **world leader** in carbon sequestration. [technology first, re environment]

Both our countries have been involved in energy production, Canada as I was saying is a **major super power in the energy field**, both to be suppliers that are **secure** and to be people at the **forefront of technological** the developments in climate change is an enormous business opportunity. [resources and technology]

We also are going to be aware of this, we are going to go from a situation in the UK where we are at the moment 80–90% self-sufficient in oil and gas, to 80–90% importing oil and gas literally within a period of about 10 or 15 years. [British vulnerability matching Canadian capability]

The **leadership** that Britain and Canada have shown in the Atomic Energy Authority, in the UN and at the G8 has focused international attention on Iran, and Canada has played **a leading role** in calling on Iran to respect human rights and political freedoms. [nuclear leadership on Iran]

... celebrate the fact that in a world of danger and difficulty and challenge today **there are two countries of our weight** and of our ability, with our alliances, **to make our**

influence felt in the world who share so much of a common vision for a shared future.
[equal weight and influence]

... We have got **something to give in this world, something very important, something that really matters**, something that if it is allowed to flourish can give people a sense that the values that our two countries are based on are the values that should inform globalisation, that they are the way through the problems the world faces because in the end they are not western values, they are not Canadian or British, they are the values of the human spirit, they are important from whatever part of the world people come. [the world needs Canada's DNV of multiculturalism].

... that relationship will strengthen still further, it is important for our two countries, and just as important as that, it is **important for the world**. [Canada counts]

Appendix K: National Interests and Values Affirmed

National Interests	Promoted	Violated
Survival/Unity	UNESCO Participation	
La Francophonie		
G8 Education reframed		
Security	Afghanistan Extension	
Sovereignty		
Legitimacy		
Territory	Arctic Sovereignty Shelf, Nose, Tail, Cap	
Capability		
Distinctive National Values:	Promoted	Violated
Anti-Militarism	BMD Refused U.S. Great Lakes Arms Tests	
Multiculturalism	Armenian Genocide Darfur Highlighted	
Openness	Immigration levels Chinese Head tax Lebanese rescue Dual Citizenship re-affirmed	
Environmentalism	G8 Energy Security — markets Kyoto Remains Ratified U.S. Great Lakes Arms Tests	Bottom Trawling
International Institutionalism	G8 Energy security — environment SPP Summit PDI	
Globalism	Summitry	

Appendix L: Canadian Capability, American Vulnerability

Date	CAD:USD	Gold:USD	OIL:USD	CAD:Euro	CAD:Yen
1861	par				
1864 June	278.00				
39 September	90.00				
740400	104.00				
761100	Parity				
770700	102.88				
780100	90.80				
850100	75.60				
900100	86.40				
911100	89.30				
920700	84.58				
950100	71.30				
980800	63.76				
000100	69.10				
020121	61.75 lowest ever				
Date	CAD:USD	Gold:USD	OIL:USD	CAD:Euro	CAD:Yen
2006: (Harper)					
060123	87.01	558.70	68.10		
060206	87.22	570.20	65.11		
060405	85.31	594.30	66.74		
060501	89.83	660.20	73.70		
070423M	89.08	694.20	65.89		
070501T	90.05	677.30	64.40		
070601					
070701					
070801					
070912	95.01	723.80	77.49		
071001	100.87	754.10	80.24		
071101		800.00+			
071201					
2008:					
080101					
080211	100.67	909.40	90.02		
080315	101.40	999.50	110.21		
Minus 060123	87.01	548.70	68.10		
Gain	14.39	450.80	42.11		
% Gain	16.5%	82.2%	61.8%		

Notes:

In January 2002, Canada needed CA\$1.61 to buy US\$1. On October 1, 2007, the Canadian dollar reached 1.009 intraday, the highest level since November 22, 1976. James Powell, *History of the Canadian Dollar*.

Appendix M: World Oil Prices

Date	Crude Oil Price	Summit Month	Crude Oil Price
Jan-75	48.55	Nov-75	45.74
Jan-76	45.50	Jun-76	48.57
Jan-77	53.86	Apr-77	52.51
Jan-78	53.86	Jul-78	51.23
Jan-79	49.28	Jun-79	59.88
Jan-80	94.69	Jun-80	108.26
Jan-81	99.00	Jul-81	89.08
Jan-82	81.36	May-82	85.01
Jan-83	72.29	May-83	68.55
Jan-84	66.04	May-84	66.90
Jan-85	55.09	Apr-85	61.09
Jan-86	47.46	Apr-86	26.82
Jan-87	38.04	Jun-87	40.00
Jan-88	33.62	Jun-88	31.75
Jan-89	33.65	Jul-89	35.79
Jan-90	40.28	Jul-90	32.40
Jan-91	42.03	Jul-91	35.65
Jan-92	30.89	Jun-92	36.18
Jan-93	30.33	Jun-93	29.93
Jan-94	23.26	Jul-94	30.01
Jan-95	27.13	Jun-95	27.38
Jan-96	27.72	Jun-96	29.58
Jan-97	35.86	Jun-97	27.11
Jan-98	23.44	May-98	20.69
Jan-99	17.20	Jun-99	24.40
Jan-00	36.50	Jul-00	39.05
Jan-01	38.29	Jul-01	33.78
Jan-02	25.18	Jun-02	32.15
Jan-03	41.09	May-03	34.76
Jan-04	41.94	Jun-04	45.43
Jan-05	55.67	Jun-05	68.09
Jan-06	74.88	Jul-06	82.88
Jan-07	61.11	May-07	69.17
Jan-08	99.81	Jul-08	137.51
Jan-09	44.81	Jul-09	67.46
Jan-10	81.82	Jun-10	78.36
Jan-11	92.04	May-11	100.90
Jan-12	100.39	May-12	89.52
Jan-13	96.40	Jun-13	93.54
Jan-14	94.53	May-14	98.52
Feb-14	99.32	Average	55.89
Mar-14	97.43		
Apr-14	95.68		
May-14	98.52		
Jun-14	100.87		
Jul-14	93.42		
Aug-14	93.07		
Sep-14	86.88		
Oct-14	77.88		

Note: World crude oil prices, US dollars. Source: <http://www.macrotrends.net/1369/crude-oil-price-history-chart>. For summits that take place in the first week of the month the price of oil from the month prior was used.

Appendix N: Canadian Societal Support, Minority Governments

Prime Minister	Parliament	Party	Seats	Year(s)	Duration
King	14th	Liberal	118/235 ^a	1921-1925	3 years, 326 days
King	15th	Liberal	100/245	1925-1926	319 days
Meighen	15th ^b	Conservative	115/245	1926	88 da7s
King	16th	Liberal	116/245	1926-1930	3 years, 317 days
Diefenbaker	23rd	Progressive Conservative	111/265	1957-1958	294 days
Diefenbaker	25th	Progressive Conservative	116/265	1962-1963	304 days
Pearson	26th	Liberal	128/265	1963-1965	1 year, 182 days
Pearson	27th	Liberal	131/265	1965-1968	2 years, 229 days
Trudeau	29th	Liberal	109/264	1972-1974	1 year, 221 days
Clark	31st	Progressive Conservative	136/282	1979-1980	273 days
Martin	38th	Liberal	135/308	2004-2006	1 year, 125 days
Harper	39th	Conservative	124/308	2006-present	-

Notes:

^aIn the 14th parliament, King's liberals won exactly enough seats to form a majority government, but due to resignations and floor crossing, they shifted back and forth between majority and minority status. However, the government was in little danger of losing a confidence vote because the Progressive party usually allowed free votes among its members, some of whom would always vote with the government.

^bIn the 15th parliament, King's government was replaced by Meighen's without an election.

Appendix O: Canadian Societal Support, Approval Ratings

Date	Conservatives/ Harper	Liberals/ Dion	Bloc/ Duceppe	NDP/ Layton	Greens/ May	Undecided/ Other
060126*	36%	30%	11%	18%	5%	1%
060918-1012	37%	28%	9%	18%	7%	1%
060918-1012*	53%	38%	62%	54%	-	-
061208-30	34%	32%	8%	14%	11%	1%
061208-30*	53%	47%	56%	53%	-	-
070111-14*	54%	59%		59%	58%	-
070300*	41%	18%	-	-	-	-
070313-0403	36%	28%	8%	16%	12%	1%
070313-0403*	54%	40%	56%	54%	45%	-
070500	-	18%	-	-	-	-
070605-30	37%	28%	7%	17%	11%	-
070605-30*	48%	38%	53%	56%	42%	-
070917-1014	33%	29%	7%	19%	11%	1%
070917-1014* (best choice for PM)	37%	12%	4%	19%	4%	24%
070917-1014	52%	33%	50%	56%	42%	-
071200*	31%	14%				
071206-09	32%	29%	10%	16%	13%	-
071212-080103	36%	27%	7%	17%	13%	<1%
071212-080103* (best for PM)	42%	12%	5%	16%	4%	20%
071212-080103	57%	34%	54%	58%	46%	-
080110-13	36%	30%	11%	14%	10%	-
080110-13*	58%	39%		55%	56%	-
080222	34%	17%				
080222*	34%	17%				

Notes:

* Election Results

* Indicates leader approval ratings

Appendix P: Canadian Societal Support, Confidence Votes

Date	Subject	Margin	Yeas	Nays
060517	Afghanistan	4	149	145
080212	Crime Bill	145	172	27
080303	Budget-lib amend	195	7	202
080304	Budget	35	125	90
080310	Climate change	37	84	121
080313	Afghanistan	121	198	77
080313	Private member's bill	37	124	87

Appendix Q: Canadian Societal Support, By-Elections/Defections

Date	Province/MP	Outcome
January 2006	David Emerson	Conservative (from Liberal)
November 27, 2006	Ontario	Liberal
November 27, 2006	Quebec	Bloc
September 17, 2007	Quebec	NDP
September 17, 2007	Quebec	Conservative
September 17, 2007	Quebec	Bloc
March 17, 2008	Saskatchewan	Conservative
March 17, 2008	Ontario	Liberal
March 17, 2008	Ontario	Liberal
March 17, 2008	BC	Liberal
November 9, 2009	2 Quebec, 1 BC, 1 NS	2 Conservative, 1 Bloc, 1 NDP

Appendix R: Canadian Governmental Changes

Foreign Affairs Ministers

Peter MacKay, February 6, 2006
Maxime Bernier, August 14, 2007
David Emerson, May 29, 2008
Lawrence Cannon, October 30, 2008
John Baird, May 18, 2011

Defence Ministers

Gordon O'Connor, February 6, 2006
Peter MacKay, August 14, 2007
Rob Nicholson, July 15, 2013

International Cooperation Ministers

Josée Verner, February 6, 2006
Bev Oda, August 14, 2007
Julian Fantino, July 4, 2012
Christian Paradis, July 15, 2013

Trade Ministers

David Emerson, February 6, 2006
Michael Fortier, June 25, 2008
Stockwell Day, October 30, 2008
Peter Van Loan, January 19, 2010
Ed Fast, May 18, 2011

Finance Minister

Jim Flaherty, February 6, 2006
Joe Oliver, 2014

Environment Ministers

Rona Ambrose, February 6, 2006
John Baird, January 4, 2007
Jim Prentice, October 30, 2008
John Baird, November 5, 2010
Peter Kent, January 4, 2011
Leora Aglukkaq, July 13, 2013

Foreign Affairs Deputy Ministers

Peter Harder, 2006
Len Edwards, 2007
Morris Rosenberg, 2011
Jean Daniel, 2013