

# Lecture 1

## Introduction and Organization

POL 312Y Canadian Foreign Policy  
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University of Toronto  
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### 1. Introduction

Welcome, *bienvenue*, to POL 312Y Canadian Foreign Policy. I'm Professor **John Kirton** and I have been teaching this course since I returned to the University of Toronto as a professor in 1977.

If you are looking for a course full of **teaching experience** and **research expertise** on Canadian foreign policy, this is the course for you.

We have as our Teaching Assistant, **Michael Kunz**. Michael, a veteran TA for this course, is helping with the marking, advising you on your tests and essay and giving a few lectures during the year. I will introduce Michael to you next week.

I assume everyone here is already properly **enrolled** in the course through ACORN.

If not and if you are still on the **wait list**, please see me immediately after this class to give me your name and your rank on the wait list.

#### a. Format

The format for our course is as follows:

- It is generally a **two-hour lecture** with a ten-minute break in the middle, although today we will go right through to try to end early.
- **Arrive by 10h10AM** when we start, to hear the opening announcements, and give us maximum class time. Do not enter the lecture hall before 10h00, as that may disturb a previous class in here.
- We will try to **end at 12h00 noon** sharp so you can get to your other commitments.
- Feel free to ask **questions** at any time but understand I may defer answering them.
- We have **no tutorials**, but do come to see me during my office hours, Tuesday from 2.00-4.00 PM, Room 209N at 1 Devonshire Place.

Despite our large numbers, I hope to get to know you all by the course's end.

Throughout the year I will have some outside **guest lecturers** to broaden the intellectual perspectives and pool of expertise.

I will also keep you posted on the most relevant special lectures or seminars on campus.

If anyone is entering the fourth year of any International Relations Programme, as a Specialist, Joint Specialist or Major, you should apply for a **Catherwood Scholarship**. For details see Marilyn Laville in the IR Program office

I assume everyone has a course syllabus/reading list. It explains the basics.

## **b. Today's Agenda**

Today in this introductory session I want to:

- Introduce the **subject** of Canadian foreign policy,
- Explain the **organization** of the course,
- Outline the **requirements**, and
- Discuss the **mechanics** of how to succeed.

## **2. The Subject of Canadian Foreign Policy: What, Why, How**

In taking up the subject of Canadian foreign policy, we confront the three basic questions of “what,” “why” and “how”:

- A. **What** is it?,
- B. **Why** do we study it?, and
- C. **How** do we study it?

The answers of each scholar will vary. The following answers indicate the approach we will be taking in this course.

### **a. What Is Canadian Foreign Policy?**

Whenever I tell anyone that I teach Canadian foreign policy, I usually get two responses.

The first and most frequent is: “**I didn’t know we had one.**” This may reflect widespread doubt that those leading the federal government are **competent** enough to mount and maintain a single, integrated, coherent policy for dealing with the world. It may also flow from a related belief that Canada is just too **small**, in a globalized world dominated by a single superpower, rising or returning rivals, or market forces to have the kind of strategic, proactive “policy” that normal major powers have. In short, in a world where hegemony, competition or globalization emasculates smaller, open, internationally-exposed states, Canada doesn’t count and thus doesn’t even try to count. For example, as the 2003 war in **Iraq** drew near, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien said, at the end of his September 9th, 2002 summit with U.S. President George Bush in Detroit that the

president had not given him a plan so he had nothing to say on the subject.<sup>1</sup> Canada was presumably just too small to be expected to have a plan of its own.<sup>2</sup>

The second response I often get when I say I teach Canadian foreign policy is: “**Which One?**” We saw why at this time fifteen years ago, on **September 11, 2001**. Then Jean Chrétien and Foreign Minister John Manley had distinctively different responses to the terrorist attacks on North America that took 26 Canadian lives. Subsequently, Jean Chrétien himself seemed to have several different approaches about what to do in **Afghanistan**, first deciding to get increasingly involved in combat and then suddenly pulling out.<sup>3</sup>

Such responses suggest that Canadian leaders may be **disorganized**. But they also imply that Canada is **big** enough to have not just one but several foreign policies and to change them when circumstances do. They further imply that there may be more than one approach simultaneously unfolding, as different **tendencies** compete for dominance in Canadian foreign policy as a whole. This means that scholars need **multiple theories** to understand Canadian foreign **policy**, rather than a single, constant truth. This menu of multiple theories should include the possibility that Canada under certain circumstances can become, or even already is, a **country that counts** in the world.

We thus begin with a broad but focused conception of what Canadian foreign policy is and what is meant by each of its component terms.

## **b. What is “Canadian”?**

First, what is the “**Canadian**” in Canadian foreign policy? Our focus is on governments, above all the **federal government**, as authoritative actors. To be sure, non-state actors, civil society organizations, empowered individuals and their networks matter. We include them. But ours is a classic **state-centric** view. Nation-states still matter most, especially in today’s world where Canada and many other consequential countries regularly go to war.

Thus we:

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<sup>1</sup> In the Prime Minister’s words “At this moment there is no plan that has been given to me by the President.” Meanwhile, France was preparing a two-stage plan of its own and British Prime Minister Tony Blair was initiating phone calls to several world leaders, including Jean Chrétien. There was no evidence that Chrétien phoned anyone himself.

<sup>2</sup> More recently it was difficult to discern in any detail what Canada’s distinctive policy was toward Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August 2008, beyond the familiar instinct to follow one’s friends.

<sup>3</sup> He also seemed to change his mind about the Iraq war in 2003, as he seemed to favour different options at different times. One was to support the 16 United Nations’ (UN) resolutions that said Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program must go. A second was to let Iraq get such weapons and their delivery systems but act only if Iraq’s intent to use them could be proven. A third was to do nothing until the US could prove that Iraq was involved in the September 11th attack. On September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2002, the day Chrétien and Bush met in Detroit, Manley noted that Canada has not ruled out being part of a UN-approved strike against Iraq to enforce Security Council resolutions.

- Begin with the **prime minister** and his or her distinctive approach to the world.<sup>4</sup> Canadian foreign policy usually starts or stops at the top.
- We then look at the **many actors and policies within the federal government**, beginning with the **foreign minister** and his or her colleagues in trade, international development, national defence and finance<sup>5</sup>;
- We pay attention to the **provinces**, which under Canada's constitution have some authoritative, sovereign, or otherwise consequential roles in international affairs, as the current case of **climate change** shows;
- Above all, we always include **Quebec**. The Quebec question is fundamental to our subject. The "**national unity imperative**" is often a primary driver of Canadian foreign policy, even when it is not seen. Thus, "Our Canada includes Quebec," and indeed often begins with Quebec. That is why there is no more important country in the world for Canada than — **France**, with whom and for whom Canada usually goes to war.

### c. What is "Foreign"?

Second, what is the "**foreign**" in Canadian foreign policy? We should think of it as simply meaning "**outside**." It is everything outside Canada's borders, and things within Canada that are closely connected to things outside.

To be sure, in the view that **realist** scholars of international politics start with, Canada seems like a **very normal polity**, an exclusive, territorial, sovereign state competing with about two hundred others to survive and thrive in an anarchic world. However underneath, Canada is a more **complex**, somewhat **special** case. Thus we should think of "foreign" as meaning not "alien," nor of that outside world as largely being a different, distant, dangerous place. For Canada is so closely connected to so many of those outside countries and citizens that it does not consider them foreign at all. With the 52 countries of the **Commonwealth**, Canada exchanges "high commissioners" rather than "ambassadors." It shares a single "sovereign" — **Queen** Elizabeth the Second, the queen of Canada and 16 other countries. Canada shares its Queen with many more countries in her capacity as the **head** of the Commonwealth. Over the past 31 years Canada has come to think of the more than 50 countries of la **Francophonie** in a similar way.

Some Canadians have also started to consider Mexicans and citizens of the neighbouring United States as fellow members of a common **North American community**, now governed by several trilateral institutions. And with Canadians coming from, living in and traveling to **so many countries**, and often having dual or multiple **citizenships**, the world outside is not seen as "foreign" at all.

It certainly was not for two of Canada's recent **governor generals**, our queen's resident representatives or deputy head of state Adrienne Clarkson and Michelle Jean were both born outside Canada, in other parts of the Commonwealth and francophonie. In the U.S. to get to the top job as head of state the constitution requires a person to be "**born in the USA**," as Bruce Springsteen says. Former California Governor (or "Gubernator") Arnold

<sup>4</sup> Remember Prime Minister Kim Campbell in 1993.

<sup>5</sup> Remember Flora MacDonald in 1979 and Barbara MacDougall later as foreign minister.

Schwarzenegger and Texas Senator Ted Cruz know this all too well. But in Canada it is the opposite. Canada's head of state has always been born outside the country. In fact for all her 64 years in office the Queen has lived and largely worked outside the country. She is somewhat like some of her subjects in these respects – an estimated **two million** of them. They include the late Nelson Mandela, who was made a Canadian citizen some years ago.

#### **d. What is “Policy”?**

Third, what is the “**policy**” in Canadian foreign policy? It is everything the federal government does aimed at the world outside or aimed inside Canada to deal with the world outside. Canadian foreign policy we thus define broadly as **governing and managing Canada's and Canadians' relations with the outside world.**<sup>6</sup> The policy can be reactive, confused, contradictory, and incoherent. But it can be proactive, clear, centralized and coherent too.

In our analysis we focus on **measurable behaviour**. We do so in part to liberate us from the often narrow confines of current public policy discourse and to uncover the often surprising patterns that lie underneath. That behaviour consists of three things: **Declarations, Distributions of Resources and Decisions.**

#### ***Declarations***

First, we start with **declarations** because words matter. Discourse, concepts, principles, norms, naming and framing do make a difference, as constructivist scholars of international relations emphasize (Deutsch 1957). Words should be treated with scholarly skepticism but cannot be dismissed as empty rhetoric. Indeed **newer concepts** such as “soft power,” “human security,” the “responsibility to protect (R2P),” global “leadership,” an “emerging energy super-power” and “enlightened sovereignty” struggle and sometimes succeed in dominating Canada's way of thinking about and acting in the world.

Which words matter most? We focus in particular on the authoritative **initial declarations** on foreign policy which governments issue when they first take office, their underlying ontological and epistemic understandings, and the conceptions of interests, values, priorities and preferences they contain. We will ask how well Stephen **Harper's concepts** of Canada as an “energy superpower” and then a “clean energy superpower” practicing “enlightened sovereignty” fit Canada's actions in our rapidly globalizing, post-September 11th world. Can Canada really be, in any sense of the term, something called a ‘**superpower**’ in the world today (Fox 1944)?<sup>7</sup> Does Justin Trudeau's conception have a better fit?

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<sup>7</sup> The concept was invented in 1944 by American international relations scholar William T.R. Fox in his 1944 book *The Superpowers*.

## ***Distribution of Resources***

Second, we examine the **distribution of resources** available to develop and deliver these declarations, through the many instruments of foreign policy that the government can deploy. However potent “soft power” slogans and moral suasion may be, the hard power of money and material resources matter. We are still “living in a material world,” as Madonna knows. During the dismal, deficit-laden, **downsizing 1990s**, the ensuing debates over “niche diplomacy” and the commitments-capabilities-credibility” gap reminded us that real resources are required to develop, deploy and employ even the most attractive doctrines and ideas. From **1997 to 2007** the question became how to spend the government’s sustained, substantial, fiscal surplus. Then after the **2008 global financial crisis**, and the initial spending spree, it was back to “what to cut” as a new era of fiscal consolidation began. After November **2015**, when fiscal surplus returned and Justin Trudeau arrived, it was “what to spend it on” again.

Should more go to health care or paying down the national debt or to international affairs? Within the latter, should it go to defence, development, diplomacy, sustainable development, diversity protection or democracy promotion? What is the desirable configuration of “D’s” that Canada should deploy in a **Ukraine** whose territories are being invaded and annexed by its neighbour, or in **Syria** where both defence and development assets are being used? Above all, how should Canada deploy the scarcest fixed asset in government — the **prime minister’s** time and personal engagement.<sup>8</sup> What should the prime minister worry about and where in the world should he or she go? When Justin Trudeau arrived he quickly chose to go to Antalya, Turkey for the G20 Summit on November 15-16, then distant Manila for the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) Leaders’ Meeting on November 18-19, and then to the Paris for the UN Climate Change summit in mid December.<sup>13</sup> That is why every week we should ask, as professional “**summitologists**,” what is the Prime Minister worrying about and where is he visiting now?

## ***Decisions***

Thirdly, we are interested in **decisions**, particularly the big, foundational decisions that resolve crises or mark major turning points. It is these singular successes or defining disasters that help set the policy for decades to come. None has a greater hold on the minds of many older Canadians than **Suez in 1956**. On September 9, 2002, on the first anniversary of 9/11, Prime Minister Chrétien in Detroit lectured President Bush about how Canadians loved the UN because Lester Pearson invented peacekeeping there in 1956.<sup>9</sup> Even today, 60 years later, when conflict rages in Afghanistan, Libya or Syria, some still instinctively call for Canada to act more as a “peacekeeper,” rather than take sides or use force. Yet for other Canadians, including Stephen Harper, the defining remembered success is the Canadian military victory at **Vimy Ridge** in World War One. We will see how many references to Mike Pearson, peacekeeping or Suez pop up, like

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<sup>8</sup> In the mid 1990’s foreign policy adviser James Bartleman told Prime Minister Jean Chrétien he should plan to spend 20% of his time on international affairs. In practice it turned out to be more.

<sup>9</sup> “I said to him that Canada is very strong on the role of the United Nations against Saddam Hussein...It is extremely important to follow the process of the United Nations for Canadians because of Lester B. Pearson and the creation of [peacekeeping] troops sent all over the world.”

friendly ghosts during this year. It is in these major decisions that we can see most closely how individual, governmental, societal and external **determinants** come together to shape the available alternatives and lead to a particular choice.<sup>10</sup>

### ***Differences Made***

There is a fourth “D” we should remember – the **difference** that Canada makes. With the appropriate doctrines, distributions and decisions, can Canada make a difference in the world? All too often practitioners and even scholars of Canadian foreign policy tend to focus on trying to get Canada to do more of the right thing, whatever the results may be. But ultimately in international politics, it is not just being there, playing the game, fighting the good fight, or being a beautiful loser, but the result that counts. Here it is far better to **win** than to lose. So does Canada get what it wants? Was its policy effective in securing its desired goal?

Consider the possibility that Canada just might be one of the **biggest winners** in the world. Canada has become the country with the second largest territory in the world. Canada has not lost any of the many **wars** it fought, at home or abroad, in the past 250 years, since its defeat in British North America’s civil war in 1776. More broadly, we ask: what was Canada’s influence and impact, not only in getting what it wanted for itself from the world but also in **shaping world order** as a whole for all? These questions assume that Canada can be, under certain circumstances, big enough, focused enough, and smart enough, not just to protect its own interests but also to change the international system, to shape in its own image global governance and world order as a whole – to make the world look like **Canada writ large**.

### ***Further Issues***

There are three further issues we must address in considering what Canadian foreign policy is. These are:

- What time period do we cover?
- What issues of “high” or “low” politics do we deal with? and
- What regions of the world do we focus on?

### **What Time Period?**

First, we focus on the **post-1945 period** and continuity and change since then. To be sure Canada was playing on the world stage for long before, as a country that was created in 1867, 1763, 1608, or even a few years before. But in 1945 Canada took a step-level **jump**, psychologically, behaviourally and legally, to become a more autonomous actor in the world. The year 1945 also marked the world’s last general or **system-wide war** (Ikenberry 2001). That year was thus a major breakpoint, at home and abroad.

This look at over seventy years since 1945 allows us to address several key questions:

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<sup>10</sup> What do you think the most important decisions in Canada’s long foreign policy life have been? Looming large is the historical memory of Canadian foreign policy decisions are the Alaskan Boundary Arbitrations of 1903.

- How much **continuity** and **change** in Canadian foreign policy exists?
- Is the post-Cold War, globalizing, post-911, post global financial crisis, twenty-first century world and thus Canadian foreign policy fundamentally **different** now?
- How can the past help us interpret Canadian foreign policy **now**?
- How much **innovation** in Canadian foreign policy has there been?
- What is the range of alternatives and scope for choice that Canadians can realistically assume exist and ask their governors to use?

### **What Issues? High, Low and Middle Level**

Second, we focus on issues of **both high and low** politics, and indeed the middle-level politics of global issues, transnational processes or new security threats in between. We do so because:

- First, political and economic subjects are often **linked**. We see this in energy and nuclear policy and in the economic sanctions Canada imposed on the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, on apartheid South Africa, on Iran, and now on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine in 2014 (Kirton 1987, Kirton and Kulik 2014).
- Second, the post-Cold War globalizing system has elevated “**new security**” issues, human security issues, global issues and economic competitiveness to be leading concerns. But 911 and the ensuing war in Afghanistan keep the high politics of peace and security remain in first place. Other issues have arisen, notably climate change and its impact on Canadian sovereignty and territory in the Arctic and the deadly SARS attack on Toronto in 2003.

A few issues do stand out. The first is **war**. Since 1990 Canada has gone to war a lot. Its troops have now left Afghanistan, which had become Canada’s longest war. It may also be the first one, in Canada’s 250 year long, war-prone history that Canada might actually ultimately lose. And now Canada’s troops have entered Iraq, which they did not in 2003. They added Syria soon after. Will Canada’s armed forces be fighting and perhaps dying before our course ends, and if so where - in Iraq and Syria still, in Ukraine or somewhere else?

The second issue an existential one, of a classic sort. It is **nuclear war**, and the nuclear proliferation and terrorism that lie behind. Nuclear war has already happened once – in 1945. It worries many today, with nuclear proliferation in an unpredictable North Korea, Pakistan and still Iran. On nuclear war, proliferation and arms control, Canada has, physically and politically, been a global pioneer since the start. It has also been important in the broader context of controlling weapons of mass destruction (WMD), helping removing Syria’s chemical weapons after the G20’s St. Petersburg Summit in September 2013.

The third issue is the other existential one of **climate change**. The evidence increasingly suggests that unless major action is taken now, communities, countries and conceivably human life itself could be gone. Understandably this issue arises in Canadian federal elections and in the G8 and G20 summits that Canada hosts and attends. Canada was the

co-inventor of the global governance of climate change at its start, at the G7 Tokyo Summit in June 1979 (Kirton and Kokotsis 2015).

### **What Regions?**

Third, we mount a geographically **global coverage** that embraces all regions of the world. Canada may not be a global power but it is, or tries to be, a global player, by acting everywhere. Canada is affected by and often feels it has to react to events from all around the world, be it Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the genocide in Rwanda in 1996, the fear of it in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, building an Afghanistan safe for democracy and diversity half a world away or the uprisings in Libya in 2011, Mali and Syria in 2013 and Iraq now. The globalizing system is making many long local issues global. For centuries, the burning issue of where Torontonians should dispose of garbage was a local or least a provincial one. Now it involves Michigan and Canada's relations with the U.S.

Canada has in practice often decided to be not just a niche player but a full strength player — one that sent combat forces to fight to:

- the Persian Gulf in the air and sea in 1991;
- Medak Pocket in the Balkans in 1993
- Rwanda in 1996
- Kosovo in the air in 1999;
- Afghanistan on the ground in 2001 to 2012;<sup>11</sup>
- Libya in the air in 2011;
- Mali in a support role in January 2013.
- Iraq in a training role since September 5, 2014.
- Syria in the air on March 24, 2015
- Ukraine to training role in August 2015
- More recently, Canadian troops have been dispatched for non combat roles to the Baltic states in 2016

We do emphasize the nearby U.S. and North America, given the weight of the U.S. in the world, where it still ranks number one in the capabilities and vulnerabilities that affect all. But we are equally concerned with global governance and **world order** as a whole, in our increasingly interconnected, complex, uncertain, inter-vulnerable, tightly wired world.

### **e. Why Study Canadian Foreign Policy? Three Reasons**

If this is Canadian foreign policy, why do we study it? There are many reasons.

- One may be your **career interests**, with international organizations, as a foreign service officer, with internationally-oriented business or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

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<sup>11</sup> Can you remember where you were on the morning of September 11, 2001? What did you think when you first learned that North America, or was it just the U.S., had been attacked, and that many innocent civilian Canadians, or was it just Americans, had died?

- Another may be as a **citizen living here** where you constantly encounter dangers from the outside world, from severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), swine flu, financial crisis and climate change or whatever you do in your daily life.
- Another may flow from your **intellectual ambitions**: Foreign policy is a chance to explore politics on the world stage, at its biggest, broadest and most complex.

Most of the reasons for studying Canadian foreign policy usually reduce to three.

### ***1. Self-Defence***

The first is **self-defence**. We're here and so is it. Canada is the only country we've got, close at hand at least for now, before we move somewhere else for a better life. As a relatively small, highly open, heavily exposed society, economy and polity, Canada must cope with the outside world's heavy impacts into the country, starting from the USA next door. Much of what is domestic policy in the neighbouring U.S., France, Denmark and Russia, is foreign policy for Canadians as they cope with these intense inflows from abroad.

### ***2. The Model Middle Power***

The second reason is Canada's image as a **model middle power**. Most analyses of international relations and foreign policy focus on the actions of the world's few great powers whose behaviour matters most to how the world works. Some also focus on the many small, weak, countries involved in north-south relations or global development. But it is also useful to look in the middle, at the **middle class** of the global state system. For when these middle powers combine and act together, they can collectively matter to the world. Canada has long thought itself to be, and been thought by others to be, a model middle power. By studying Canadian foreign policy, we can thus see how middle powers behave in international affairs. We might also see how once middle, now rising, "systematically significant" powers are changing world politics, and if Canada can be considered a member of this class (Kirton 2013b).

### ***3. A Major Power that Matters to the World***

The third reason is that Canada might be a **major power that matters** to the world. Canada could count all by itself. It regularly behaves as if it did. It takes initiatives, displays leadership, and is included among the select clubs of major powers trying to govern the globe. A few years ago the British newsmagazine the *Economist* held a contest for the world's most boring phrase. The winner was a "Worthwhile Canadian Initiative." It was not just a joke. Canadian initiatives are indeed often boring. But they are often there. And they are occasionally worthwhile. Not all these initiatives are well conceived. Not all succeed. But they are launched in steady succession as a central part of Canadian behaviour abroad.<sup>12</sup> And sometimes they work, in a major way. One case was

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<sup>12</sup> These include: Paul Martin and the response to 1997-9 Global Financial Crisis, b) Phillippe Kirsch and the World Criminal Court as a permanent body, c) Lloyd Axworthy and the antipersonnel landmines convention, d) 1996 Spring. Jean Chrétien's short lived Rwanda intervention, e) 1995 Spring. Brian Tobin and the Turbot War and UN Convention, f) 1994 December. The FTAA at the Miami Summit of

Paul Martin's success in 2005 in making the revolutionary idea of an international "responsibility to protect" (**R2P**) an accepted international norm. Another was his crusade as prime minister to bring to life his concept of leaders' meetings of the Group of 20 (G20) systemically significant countries, a club he had co-founded at the finance ministers' level in 1999 (Kirton 2013a). And Stephen Harper hosted that G20 and the older Group of 8 (G8) in 2010, having the former stave off an erupting financial crisis in Europe and the latter deliver the Muskoka Initiative to save the lives of millions of poor mothers and children in the world (Kirton, Bracht and Kulik 2014).<sup>13</sup>

Each of these three reasons for **why** we study Canadian foreign policy (CFP) has implications for **how** we study CFP, as we will soon see

This is an especially exciting time to be studying Canadian foreign policy, for we are moving into a new world and a new Canada. There are several features changes worth noting.

1. First, a new configuration of **power** in the **post Cold War world** is still being shaped. A new era is arising from the end of the Cold War and the Eurocentric, Atlantic-centric international order put in place in 1919 and 1945. But the old Cold War is not fully over, in North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, China, Japan's Senkaku Islands, and the South China Sea. And the old Cold War in Europe may be coming back – in Georgia, Ukraine, the Arctic, and the Baltic states. Will the new world be marked by the rise of China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa — the BRICS powers as they are known but who are mostly declining now (Kirton 2013c). In this new world, what is Canada's role?

This new post-Cold War world has brought surprises. First, it is an era of war, not peace. Indeed, during the 1990s, for the first time in forty years, Canada started regularly going to **war**. It began with the 1990-91 war in the Gulf. It ended the decade with the war to liberate Kosovo in the spring of 1999. And it started the twenty-first century by going to war for over a decade in distant Afghanistan and then Libya in 2011, Mali in 2013 and Iraq in 2014 and Syria in 2015.<sup>14</sup>

2. Second, the new **process** of **globalization** is now entering a new intensified phase, as shown by the global financial crises that began in 2008. Globalization is being driven by the information technology revolution, the spread of finance and trade, open democratic ideals, infectious disease such as SARS, MERS and Ebola, climate change and much else. The cold war success in spreading markets and democratic polities around the world has brought the openness needed for Canadians to connect easily, instantly and inexpensively almost everywhere around the world.<sup>15</sup> Does this primarily mean new penetrations into Canada or new opportunities for Canadian influence abroad? Is the

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the Americas, g) 1992 Brian Mulroney and the Biodiversity Convention, h) WTO, i) cultural diversity UNCLOS, j) Trudeau peace initiative

<sup>13</sup> We will soon ask "where does Canada rank" in a world of 200 states with more being added all the time! To divide the 200 up in the big, the middle, and the small, just where do you draw the line?

<sup>14</sup> All of Canada's neighbours are going to war too. Russia, with its invasion of Georgia in August 2008 after a long sabbatical joined the list.

<sup>15</sup> Did you email, chat or text with anyone outside Canada during the past week?

Internet a new channel of American penetration or a global public utility that Canada, as a leading communications power, can use to propagate its soft power, distinctive national values and preferences throughout the world?

3. Third, a new generation of **global governance** is being born. It is based on new international institutions, networks and global principles, notably those of the new comprehensive plurilateral summit institutions (PSIs) — such as

- the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),
- the Co-operation Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
- the UN environmental summits and secretariats for biodiversity and climate change, starting at Rio in 1992 and continuing to Paris in December 2015.
- the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) in November 1993;
- the Summit of the Americas (SOA) in 1994.
- the G8 with Russia added in 1998 and then the G7 with Russia excluded in 2014
- the MEM-16 on climate change in 2008
- The Group of Twenty (G20) in 2008

In finance have come the ministerial level Financial Stability Board (FSB). In trade there have arisen: the 1989 Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA); NAFTA on January 1, 1994, with the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC); the Canadian-inspired World Trade Organization (WTO), on March 1994 in Marrakesh. Canada added the Canada-European Union Trade Agreement in 2014, still awaiting ratification and is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) now. Canada's *métier* has long been international institutional reform, in keeping with its ideal of — peace order and good global government at home. Governance has gone global now.

4. Fourth, there is a **new generation of leaders** in office. They include the transition from Obama in the U.S. in November, May in the UK in 2016, and Xi in China in 2013.

5. Fifth, there has been a change in the **Canadian government**. Canada had:

- The same prime minister for almost ten years, since January 2006. Harper stood second in the Group of 7 (G7) only to Germany's Angela Merkel. Harper won three elections in a row, culminating in his first majority government in 2011. The October 19, 2015 election brought Justin Trudeau in.
- He and his predecessor, to their great surprise, rapidly became foreign policy ministers on the job.
- A *new foreign policy doctrine* has been incrementally unveiled, both by Harper and Trudeau, neither of whom initiated a foreign policy review.
- A Parliament with a decimated Bloc Québécois, and Elizabeth May's Green Party with its one seat in the House.

6. Sixth, **demographically**, Canadian society is now an international society. Over **11%** of its people have been born outside the country, compared to about 7% in the United States. Canada has a high and sustained immigrant intake, of 200,000 to **250,000** people

per year. Since 1996 Canada's population increase has come more from net immigration than from net natural births. Immigrants increasingly come from all over the world. Canada now has the **world within itself**. And Canadians now live in the **world without**, in a global diaspora that can exercise influence on Canada's behalf. Canada's diaspora can also call on Canada to rescue them when war breaks out abroad, as it did in Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

7. Seventh, **economically**, the Canadian economy has become a foreign policy economy. Close to **40%** of its overall gross domestic product (GDP), and half of its private sector production typically comes from exports now. Increasingly that trade is diversifying from the US to the world at large, in part due to Canada's expanding bilateral and plurilateral free trade deals.

## **f. How to Study Canadian Foreign Policy: The Need for Theory**

How then do we best study Canadian foreign policy? About half of the television newscast each night is usually composed of international stories. In most of them, Canada is involved or affected.

Canada's relationship with the outside world is so voluminous, complex, and multifaceted, that scholars have to move beyond the flood of ephemeral events to identify the underlying cadence of behaviour, its causes and its consequences.

To do this we need at least a **conceptual framework**, a set of **concepts**, to organize our data.<sup>16</sup>

We also need a **model** that shows how the different concepts are **logically related** to one another.

And we finally need a **theory**, which gives an idea **why** the relationship among the concepts operates the way it does

We need theory to accurately **describe**, compactly **explain** and accurately anticipate or even **predict** Canadian foreign policy. Only on this foundation can we **prescribe** responsibly and reliably how it can be improved, having judged it "good" or "bad."

As citizens or as professionals, we need theory to produce **policy change**. What are the key sources of change, the real leverage points? What variables will have the largest impact and are open to our influence? Will actions that we find instinctively appealing and readily available really have the desired effects? If we generously let in many migrants will that impel many more to barge their way in? Did this happen when done before, as they did with the Lebanese boat people in 2006 or the Indochinese refugees in 1979?

Hence we approach our subject with **three competing theories**.

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<sup>16</sup> Here James Rosenau's pretheory is the classic starting point.

The first is a **liberal-internationalist** (LI) theory focused on Canada's pursuit, as a middle power, of harmonious multilateral associations and shared international values. The second is a **peripheral dependence** (PD) theory, which depicts a small, penetrated Canada heavily constrained at home and abroad by dominant American power. The third, is a **complex neo-realist** (CNR) theory. It suggests that after 1990, Canada has emerged a principal power in a diffuse international system, globally advancing its own national interests, competitively pursuing external initiatives, and promoting a world order based on Canada's distinctive values.

## **g. Summary**

To recap: the distinctive emphases of the course are:

- **Theory** — the use of three distinct, competing theories
- **Choice** — Among the three theories and the alternative policies Canadian foreign policy decision-makers have
- **Change** — in Canada and the world
- **Prime Ministers** and their summits— where all the pressures come together and where foreign policy on the toughest issues is often made.
- **National Unity** — the national unity imperative, essential for Canada's survival, is always at work
- **France First** — especially for the many Prime Ministers from Quebec
- **America the Vulnerable** — rather than “America the Victorious,” as in 1945 and 1989. Perhaps it will soon become “America the vanquished” in Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and the global war on terrorism, as it was in Vietnam in 1975.
- **Winning Wars** — Canada fights many wars, and has lost none so far.
- **Shaping Global Governance** — through the dominant international institutions and ideas, notably the Commonwealth since 1917 and 1950, the United Nations since 1955, the G8 since 1975, la Francophonie since 1985, the G20 since 1999, and R2P since 2005.

## **3. The Organization of the Course**

Thus, as you can see on your syllabus, we start with theory, and move to evidence. We examine in turn:

1. Three Competing Theories;
2. Behavioural and Historical Evidence, from 1945 to now;
3. The Foreign Policy Making Process of Governmental, Societal and External Determinants;
4. Relations with the United States and North America;
5. Canada's Relations with the other Regions; and
6. Canada's Approach to Global Governance through the UN, G8 and G20.

## 4. Requirements

There are three assignments for the course:

- a. A first-term **Test** (worth 25%) held in the final class in this term on December 6.
- b. A February **Essay** (worth 50%) due at the first class after reading week on February 28, 2017. Also submit your essay to Turnitin and do not plagiarize as the penalties are severe.
- c. A final **Test** (worth 25%) held in the final class of the year on April 4.

If this system of evaluation does not suit you, you should seek your intellectual destiny in another course now. For the syllabus is the equivalent of a legal contract, that cannot be changed.

**Essay topics** are listed in the course syllabus.

The **late penalty** for overdue essays is 2% per day, including weekends and holidays. You may get exemptions, where possible, in advance from the instructor for allowable cause. These include medical, professional or personal reasons. Vacations, heavy workloads in other courses or extra-curricular involvements do not count, no matter how worthy they may be.

**Weekly readings** are largely drawn from the two textbooks, available in the bookstore, and the major works. They average a manageable 90 pages or so of reading each week, seasonally adjusted to reflect the other demands on your time.

The textbooks you should buy and use. They are available for purchase at the bookstore. They are, in order of importance:

1. John Kirton (2007), *Canadian Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Toronto: Thomson Nelson). It was designed as and serves as the core textbook for this course. Its chapters and content map the structure of the lectures. It covers the evidence up to May 6, 2006. You should start by reading the designated chapter(s) from it each week and do so before the lecture on the subject, which will focus on more recent years.

It also comes with a course website <[www.kirton.nelson.com](http://www.kirton.nelson.com)>

I would be grateful for your comments about what works well in the textbook and on the website, and what could be improved, especially as the textbook is now being revised and translated into Chinese.

2. Duane Bratt and Chris Kukucha, eds. (2015), *Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas* (Toronto: Oxford University Press 3<sup>rd</sup> edition). This core reader relates very well to the textbook and to the structure of the course.

The basic library you should use is the John Graham Library of Trinity College at 1 Devonshire Place, East House. All weekly readings are on reserve there.

You should also use several websites, including those noted in the Bratt-Kukucha book, on the Foreign Affairs Canada website at [www.international.gc.ca](http://www.international.gc.ca) and above all the G7 Information Centre at [www.g7.utoronto.ca/teaching](http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/teaching), where I will post materials for this course.

## 5. Mechanics: How to Succeed through Five Basic Rules

To succeed in this course, there are **five basic rules** to follow:

- a. Attend the **lectures**. At the start they will stay close to the material in the textbook and weekly readings so we can be confident you have mastered the basic building blocs. But they will then increasingly diverge, assuming that you have mastered the material in the book.
- b. Do the key weekly **readings**, which include different views.
- c. Start your major **essay** in the next few weeks. Choose your case study topic, consult me about it and start your reading and research. Rely on scholarly writings for it – not whatever other materials may be available on the web – starting with the bibliography I will provide.
- d. See me in my **office hours**, given that I get about 100 emails each day.
- e. Offer your **own answers**, given the novelty of the challenges that Canada’s currently faces in a rapidly changing world.

Are there any **Questions**?

If you are not yet enrolled in the course but would like to be, come up to the front to see me now.

See you all here next week.

## References

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- Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis (2015), *The Global Governance of Climate Change: G7, G20 and UN Leadership* (Farnham: Ashgate)
- Kirton, John and Julia Kulik (2014), Socialization, Sanctions, Force: G7/8 Security Governance Success,” Paper prepared for on the Pre-G7 Summit Conference “2014: From G8 to G7? The Future of the GX System and Global Governance,” Egmont Palace, Brussels, June 2, 2014.
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