



# G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024

Advancing Sustainable Development in Africa







## G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024: Advancing Sustainable Development in Africa

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## Executive Summary

The African continent, with its young and fast-growing population, rapid urbanisation dynamics, abundance of natural resources, rising levels of education and a sustained regional integration process, holds enormous potential for sustainable development and represents a key partner of the G7 for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Although African countries are making progress towards the achievement of the SDGs and the African Union's Agenda 2063, significant development challenges remain and many African countries experienced setbacks due to the social, environmental and economic impacts of multiple crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, international and domestic conflicts and the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution.

Against this backdrop, the Italian G7 Presidency has made Africa a key priority of the G7 development agenda. The G7 support and reaffirmed partnership with African countries has a long-standing commitment, which led to the adoption of the G8 Africa Action Plan in 2002. Throughout the different G7 Summits, G7 members have been strengthening and reaffirming their commitments to Africa's security, stability, and sustainable development, also by emphasising the importance of building effective and equitable partnerships with African countries and regional organisations.

Africa's increase in working-age population - the fastest globally -, vast reserves of critical minerals and renewable energy resources, regional integration through digitalisation and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), represent some of the crucial opportunities to drive Africa's socio-economic transformation and sustainable development. G7 leaders have made substantial commitments to support Africa's economic transformation, including through the support to regional trade, infrastructure, and digitalisation as game-changers for sustainable economic growth and industrialisation.

The food and nutrition crises in many African countries have been exacerbated by climate change, conflicts, and the COVID-19 pandemic, with women, as well as people in vulnerable situations, including children, bearing the worst consequences. The G7 development agenda has put great emphasis on supporting more sustainable and resilient food systems and addressing humanitarian food and nutrition crises, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Through multilateral and bilateral cooperation, G7 interventions focused on enhancing food security, nutrition, and sustainable food systems in the region, while also addressing the nexus with climate change, air and marine pollution, biodiversity loss and land degradation.

Effective social policies can be instrumental in empowering individuals, breaking the cycle of poverty, and advancing towards sustainable development, including by ensuring equal access to inclusive and quality education and promoting gender-transformative development approaches. In previous G7 Summits, the G7 committed to improving education quality and women's economic empowerment, including through

key programmes and initiatives like the 2X Challenge, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), the Gender at the Centre Initiative, the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa initiative, and the Women Entrepreneurs-Finance Initiative.

Protracted instability in some African countries and regions hinders regional efforts to achieve lasting peace, stability and sustainable development. The G7 has adopted a multifaceted approach to address the linkages between durable peace and security, human mobility and sustainable development, including through supporting migrants and refugees, maritime security and conflict prevention and response.

Building on this strategic and forward-looking vision, the G7 stands ready to continue strengthening its partnership with African countries to embody the ambitions of Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030, and advance common efforts toward the achievement of the SDGs.

# Introduction

## **The G7 accountability process**

Guided by the overarching principles of the rule of law and democracy, the G7 has prioritised accountability and transparency as core principles for enhancing the credibility of the G7 Leaders' decisions.

The G7 facilitates both external and internal accountability practices. In fact, through the accountability process, the G7 aims at increasing awareness, credibility and transparency of its joint efforts and actions towards partner countries and external stakeholders. At the same time, the G7 accountability process also serves to facilitate G7 coordination of internal policies and institutional learning while, ultimately, aiming at ensuring greater coherence and effectiveness of the Leaders' decisions.

In 2009, under the Italian G7 Presidency, the G7 established a permanent framework to follow-up on the G7 development and development-related commitments and produced the first Preliminary Accountability Report. Ever since, the G7 Accountability Working Group (AWG), guided by specific terms of reference, has ensured the monitoring of these commitments.

The G7 Accountability Working Group has the responsibility of delivering the G7 Progress Report. Through its work, the G7 scrutinises the performance of governmental activities of G7 members by collecting and harmonising information and presenting results. Through its sixteen years of activity, the AWG has produced nine G7 Progress Reports focused on specific sectors or themes and five G7 Comprehensive Progress Reports assessing all commitments the group is monitoring.<sup>1</sup>

The AWG carries out its responsibility to monitor G7 Leaders' development and development-related commitments through an agreed methodology for reporting. For each commitment, the AWG identified a specific baseline, indicators, data sources and relevant SDGs. Over the years, this methodology has been constantly improving to enhance the relevance and accuracy of the information included in the Progress Reports.

The AWG also draws on the knowledge of relevant sectoral experts and assesses both qualitative and quantitative information within its Progress Reports.

## **G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024**

The G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 is the ninth thematic G7 accountability report and takes a geographical focus on Africa.

While the G7 development agenda has a global reach, Africa is at the core of many G7 development and development-related commitments and is a key priority of the Italian G7 Presidency in 2024. The African continent - which hosts 33 of the 45 Least Developed Countries of the world as of today<sup>2</sup> - remains the region most exposed to the effects of

multiple global crises (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution) including in terms of reduction of trade and financial flows, health and social impacts on informal economies and people in vulnerable situations, food insecurity and malnutrition, and environmental disasters.

And yet, with its young and fast-growing population - that is projected to almost double to 2.5 billion by 2050 - rapid urbanisation dynamics, abundance of natural resources, rising educational attainment levels and a sustained regional integration process, the African continent has enormous potential for sustainable development and must be a major partner of the G7 for the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Within this vision, the G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 assesses the progress made on existing G7 development and development-related commitments that have a focus on Africa and its regions and will serve to inform future G7 cooperation strategies with African partners.

Out of forty-two G7 existing commitments being monitored by the AWG, the 2024 Progress Report reviews progress on nine G7 commitments that have a focus on the African continent.<sup>3</sup> Progress is monitored across different sectors namely, i) trade and infrastructure, ii) digital transformation, iii) food security, nutrition and climate resilience, iv) basic education, v) women's economic empowerment, vi) maritime security, vii) crises and conflicts, viii) climate risk reduction and insurance and ix) migration and refugees. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that G7 cooperation with African countries goes beyond these specific sectors and commitments.

For the first time, this report also applies a gender lens - based on the OECD-DAC gender equality policy marker - to assess how each commitment is supporting gender equality through Official Development Assistance (ODA) disbursement flows.<sup>4</sup> Qualitative and quantitative information is provided to describe the G7's efforts and actions to advance gender equality and women's empowerment, with an intersectional and gender transformative approach.<sup>5</sup>

Besides monitoring G7 commitments with a focus on Africa, this Progress Report provides an overview of the G7 cooperation with Africa (Chapter 1), with a focus on key areas for Africa's sustainable development, namely: economic transformation (Chapter 2), food security, nutrition and climate resilience (Chapter 3), social services and women's empowerment (Chapter 4), human mobility, peace and security (Chapter 5). To fully capture G7 ODA contributions to Africa, the G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 presents G7 imputed multilateral ODA flows allocated to Africa from 2017 alongside traditional bilateral ODA flows. For the latter, the double OECD-DAC methodology for ODA is applied (net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards). Throughout the report, the figures representing G7 bilateral ODA disbursements based on OECD data always include contributions from the EU, whereas EU disbursements were not considered in the multilateral estimates to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7. The data considered in the report was published by the OECD in December 2023 in current prices.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> List of G7 Accountability reports published since the establishment of the G7 Accountability framework. Thematic/Sector Progress reports: 2009 L'Aquila; 2011 Deauville; 2012, Camp David; 2015, Elmau; 2017, Taormina; 2018, Charlevoix; 2021, Carbis Bay and 2023, Hiroshima. Comprehensive Progress Reports: 2010, Muskoka; 2013, Lough Erne; 2016, Ise-Shima; 2019, Biarritz and 2022, Elmau. 2014. The G7 did not publish reports in 2014 (when it changed format from the G8 to the G7 with Russia's participation suspension) and in 2020 (due to the COVID-19 pandemic).

<sup>2</sup> United Nations (2023). *LDCs at a Glance | Economic Analysis & Policy Division*. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/lpcs-at-a-glance.html>

<sup>3</sup> The commitment to "beneficial ownership transparency" is not considered in this report due to its recent adoption (Elmau G7 Summit, 2022).

<sup>4</sup> OECD/DAC Gender marker is a qualitative statistical tool to record development activities that target gender equality as a policy objective. The gender equality policy marker is used to indicate for each aid activity whether it targets gender equality as a policy objective. The data based on the marker provides an estimate of the development finances allocated in support of gender equality, but is not indicative of actual disbursed funds for that purpose.

Score 2 of the OECD-DAC gender equality policy marker assesses whether a development project or programme has a principal objective that directly addresses gender equality or women's empowerment. Hence projects or programmes assigned Gender Marker 2 are those whose primary purpose is to promote gender equality or advance women's rights, including initiatives focused on increasing women's access to education, healthcare, economic opportunities, political participation, or ending violence against women. Score 1 of the OECD-DAC gender equality policy marker is applied to development projects or programmes that do not have gender equality as a principal objective but are expected to have gender-related outcomes or impacts, so far contributing indirectly to improving gender equality or women's empowerment. By mainstreaming gender considerations throughout the project cycle and ensuring that both direct and indirect impacts on gender are accounted, organisations can better address the diverse needs and realities of women and men, ultimately leading to more effective and sustainable development outcomes. See DAC gender equality policy marker - OECD.

<sup>5</sup> In accordance with the DAC recommendation on Gender Equality in Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Assistance adopted on 14 May 2024.

<sup>6</sup> See Methodological Note in the Annex B of this Report.

# Chapter 1 - Overview of the G7 cooperation with Africa

## Progress on the 2030 Agenda and the Agenda 2063

Africa continues to face significant challenges impacting its sustainable development, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the world region that exhibits the lowest Human Development Index (0.547 in 2021).<sup>1</sup> Today, the African continent is home to 33 of the world's 45 Least Developed Countries<sup>2</sup> and is the lowest performing region on the Women, Peace and Security Index - with nine African countries sitting in the bottom 15 of the index.<sup>3</sup>

UNDP reveals that although Africa is making progress toward the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the number of targets on track are less than the number of targets that are unchanged or in reverse.<sup>4</sup> SDG1 in particular requires acceleration, with 60% of the world's extreme poor living in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and extreme poverty expected to be concentrated in SSA by 2030.<sup>5</sup> The African Union and the OECD estimate that Africa needs an extra USD 1.6 trillion by 2030 to achieve its SDGs.<sup>6</sup> Further efforts are therefore needed to ensure that Africa achieves the SDGs by 2030 and the G7 is committed to accelerating international efforts to that end.

2023 was a milestone, marking both the midpoint of the implementation of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the evaluation of the African Union's first 10-year implementation plan of Agenda 2063. In 2023, the SDGs that received the highest scores in Africa were SDG 13: Climate action (96.7), SDG 12: Responsible consumption and production (93.1); and SDG 8: Decent work and economic growth (63.6).<sup>7</sup> In addition, the proportion of the African population using safely managed drinking water services increased from 36% in 2015 to 39% in 2020. At the continental level, most progress was achieved in North Africa and in Southern Africa, where respectively 77% and 74% of the population have access to safely managed drinking water (SDG 6).<sup>8</sup> Electrification rates in Africa continue to increase, with access to the electricity rising from 48.8% in 2015 to 57.9% of the population in 2021, and the share of renewable energy in total final energy consumption in Africa rising from 54.7% in 2015 to 57.1 % in 2020 (SDG 7).<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, African countries have been investing in infrastructure and innovative technologies that support the establishment of mobile telephone networks. Africa is on track in terms of its mobile network coverage, with a 20% increase overall in 4G mobile network coverage between 2017 and 2020.<sup>10</sup> Based on current trends, Africa will meet the relevant Goal 9 target by 2030.<sup>11</sup> In 16 out of the 21 sub-Saharan African countries in which more than 20% of adults have a mobile money account, women were equally or more likely than men to only have a mobile money account in 2021 (SDG 9).<sup>12</sup> As for SDG5, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of women ages 20 to 24 who were married by age 15 declined from 15% in 2001 to 11% in 2021, while those married by age 18 declined from 39% to 35%.<sup>13</sup> In the same region, the proportion of girls between 15 and 19 years of age who have undergone female genital mutilation (FGM) decreased from 34% in 2001 to 22.3% in 2021.<sup>14</sup>

Significant challenges remain and the continent experienced setbacks due to the social, environmental and economic impacts of multiple crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, international conflicts and the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution. Public debt in Sub-Saharan Africa increased significantly over the last decade. From 2012 to 2022 the median public debt to GDP ratio increased by about 30% points, from 28.8% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 59.1% according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with half of the low-income countries in the region at high risk or in debt distress.<sup>15</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic, climate-related events and natural disasters, and high international prices for food, fuel, energy, and fertilisers after Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine as well as rapidly rising interest rates, all contributed to rising debt, food insecurity and malnutrition.<sup>16</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic created a major learning crisis, which affected around 300 million learners in Africa who did not attend school for over a year and hindered progress towards SDG 4.<sup>17</sup> The region also continues to experience significant exchange rate pressures and a high level of inflation, at double digits in 14 countries and above target in most countries.<sup>18</sup> In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa's economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic has been slower than other regions.<sup>19</sup> Africa has the largest food insecurity levels worldwide. Nearly 282 million people (about 20 percent of the population) are undernourished in Africa, an increase of 57 million people since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, with Sub-Saharan Africa bearing the brunt of this burden (93.8%).<sup>20</sup> While only contributing less than 4% of global greenhouse gas emissions<sup>21</sup>, Africa remains one of the most vulnerable regions to the adverse effects of climate change. The continent has struggled with extreme weather events exacerbated by climate change, biodiversity loss, resulting in substantial economic and human tolls on its communities, along with a concerning rise in conflicts linked to climate change effects.<sup>22</sup> On SDG 5 and the access to sexual and reproductive health and rights, despite important progress following the adoption of the Maputo Protocol, over 70% of maternal deaths take place in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, despite considerable gains made by African countries in maintaining and preserving peace over the previous decade, escalating insecurity, increasing levels of violence, military takeovers, and political fragility have threatened democracy, the rule of law and stability particularly in West Africa and the Sahel region.<sup>24</sup> In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa also suffered a significant democratic reversal in 2023, with its regional average score of the EIU Democratic Index falling from 4.14 in 2022 to a historical low of 4.04 in 2023, driven mostly by the wave of military coups that have occurred across the Sahel. Despite some recent progress, half of the countries in the region (22 out of 44) are classified as "authoritarian regimes" in 2023.<sup>25</sup> In this context, 2024 marks a "super election year" globally, where half of the world's adult population has the opportunity to vote, including in at least 23 African countries.<sup>26</sup> The outcome of these elections is critical for the future of democracy in Africa.<sup>27</sup>

Urbanisation is another key trend that is shaping Africa's development, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the world's fastest urbanising region. Projections indicate that by 2050, the urban population in the region will surge to 60% from the current 40%.<sup>28</sup> While urbanisation has been associated with development opportunities, urbanisation in Sub-Saharan Africa has been characterised by high urban sprawl, in-migration of the poor and the proliferation of slums and informal settlements in large urban centres.<sup>29</sup>

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) underscores the urgent need for quality infrastructure investments in the public transport, waste management and air quality sectors to achieve SDG 11 in Africa (sustainable cities and communities).<sup>30</sup> Intermediary cities, defined as urban centres with less than 1 million inhabitants, can provide an opportunity towards more sustainable urbanisation patterns.<sup>31</sup>

In February 2024, the African Union identified seven "Moonshots"<sup>32</sup> to guide African development over the next decade, aiming for middle-income status, increased integration and connection, responsive governance, peaceful conflict resolution, African cultural promotion, empowered citizens, and global influence. To reach these goals, it recognises that Africa stands at the brink of transformative development opportunities, bolstered by recent advancements and demographic advantages. The COVID-19 pandemic catalysed enhanced pandemic preparedness across the continent, as proved by examples such as the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), the establishment of the African Medicines Agency (AMA) in Kigali, Rwanda, and the accelerated efforts to build capacities and an enabling environment for vaccine and other medical commodity production in African countries. Moreover, with almost 60% of its population under 25, Africa emerges as the world's youngest continent, with young Africans projected to constitute 42% of global youth by 2030. Recognising this demographic dividend, the AU Youth Charter acknowledges Africa's youth as its most significant resource, offering immense potential for growth and development. The advancements in digital transformation, health, and education further empower Africa's youth, positioning them for unprecedented opportunities in human capital advancement. In particular, Africa's flourishing digital sector -with over 500 African fintech companies spearheading technology-enabled innovations in financial services- presents governments with a strategic avenue to catalyse development, facilitating innovation and job creation across various sectors.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, as new technologies emerge and economies transition to low-carbon models, Africa can increasingly leverage its significant human capital and natural resources.<sup>34</sup> Regional integration through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement established in 2018 presents a major opportunity for Africa's development, connecting 1.3 billion people across 55 countries with a combined GDP valued at USD 3.4 trillion.<sup>35</sup> One of the latest milestones on regional integration has been the operationalisation in 2022 of the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, a platform that works in conjunction with central banks to facilitate direct transactions among the more than forty currencies used throughout the continent.<sup>36</sup>

## **The G7 and Africa**

Against this backdrop, the G7 and Africa have been collaborating for the achievement of the mutually reinforcing UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union Agenda 2063. In May 2023, at the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, G7 Leaders reiterated their determination to strengthen partnerships with African countries and regional organisations including the African Union, and support greater African representation in multilateral fora, notably the G20. Leaders also committed to support African

governments in addressing “the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, violent extremism, and instability across Africa” and particularly “African-led efforts on peace, stability and prosperity in West Africa and the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Great Lakes regions”.<sup>37</sup> In Elmau in 2022, the G7 reiterated its support to initiatives to strengthen the business environment and sustainable infrastructure investments in Africa, including through the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), the Just Energy Transition Partnership with South Africa, and guided by the objectives of the Agenda 2063.<sup>38</sup> During the 2021 Summit at Carbis Bay, the G7 resolved “to deepen [its] current partnership to a new deal with Africa, including by magnifying support from the International Monetary Fund for countries most in need to support our aim to reach a total global ambition of USD 100 billion”. Additionally, recognising the severe impacts of COVID-19 on the African continent, the G7 committed to advancing recovery plans aligned with the 2030 Agenda, employing innovative measures and substantial budgetary support, particularly in Africa. The G7 also reiterated its dedication to fostering sustainable growth in Africa, urging Multilateral Development Banks, particularly the World Bank (WB), to mobilise more private financing into the continent by enhancing risk-sharing instruments for the benefit of African small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Furthermore, the G7 reaffirmed its support for the G20 Compact with Africa as a pivotal framework for enhancing the business environment in Africa and called on reform-oriented partners to bolster this initiative.<sup>39</sup>

In the 2019 Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership, G7 leaders alongside Egypt, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Burkina Faso and the African Union Commission, stressed their determination to collaborate on (i) promoting women’s entrepreneurship in Africa, (ii) digital transformation in Africa, and (iii) transparency in public procurement and the common fight against corruption.<sup>40</sup> In Biarritz, the G7 also focused on bridging the finance gap for women entrepreneurs in Africa by financing the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa. At the Charlevoix Summit in 2018, the G7 reiterated its commitment to Africa’s security, stability, and sustainable development, pledging to support African-led initiatives, including at regional levels. Emphasising collaboration with the African continent, the G7 pledged support for the African Union Agenda 2063 to unlock Africa’s potential and promote stability, democracy, and unity.<sup>41</sup> Acknowledging Africa’s pivotal role in global stability and development, the G7 underscored at the 2017 Taormina Summit the importance of cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organisations. The G7 pledged to empower African capacity to prevent, respond to, and manage crises and conflicts, aligning with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Moreover, recognising the need for sustainable investment in Africa, the G7 commended initiatives such as the EU’s External Investment Plan (EIP), the G20 Partnership Initiative with Africa and promotion of investment announced at the Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD VI). Emphasising the importance of expanding reliable access to energy in Africa, the G7 also affirmed its commitment to supporting the Agenda 2063 and fostering innovation, education, quality infrastructure, gender equality, and human capital development to unlock Africa’s potential and provide a prosperous future for its young generation.

Additionally, the G7 leaders committed to enhancing collective support for food security, nutrition, and sustainable agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, prioritising Official Development Assistance and responsible private investments aligned with African countries' priorities and the African Union Agenda 2063.<sup>42</sup> At the G7 Summit at Ise-Shima in 2016, a strong focus was set on Africa. Leaders affirmed for the first time that addressing Africa's development challenges was central to the realisation of the SDGs and committed to supporting<sup>43</sup> Africa's development aspirations as outlined in Agenda 2063 in partnership with the African Union and its members, emphasising the importance of African ownership in these efforts. In Elmau in 2015, the G7 reiterated its commitments to support African partners in addressing security, governance and stability challenges<sup>44</sup>, while committing to support Africa's response to climate change by accelerating access to renewable energy and supporting the African Risk Capacity. On this occasion, the G7 Leaders also encouraged support for the African Legal Support Facility.<sup>45</sup> Furthermore, the collaboration between the G7 and Africa is underscored by the invitation of different African Heads of State at the G7 Summit since the 2000 G7 in Okinawa, Japan and the participation of the African Union Chair in the G7 Summit annually, commencing from 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland. Dialogue with African partners has been further emphasised by the Italian Presidency of the G7 in 2024, and in particular in the Development Track focusing on "Investing in Africa's Sustainable Development to Build Resilient and Shared Prosperity Worldwide". To this end, the Italian Presidency has promoted the participation of the African Union in the G7 work on the PGII, Food Security, Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment and Education.


## **G7 ODA to Africa**

Considering the above-mentioned pledges and the reaffirmed partnership between the G7 and Africa, this report seeks to examine the tangible progress made in implementing these commitments by analysing the allocation of ODA and the self-reporting of the G7 as the main data sources.

Overall, the aggregate G7 members' bilateral ODA to Africa experienced a gradual increase from USD 27.0 billion in 2015 to USD 33.3 billion in 2022. Members' bilateral ODA to African countries in 2021 reached a high of USD 37.5 billion to mainly address the COVID-19 crisis.<sup>46</sup> However, in 2022, there was an 11% decrease compared to the previous year.

The share of G7 members' total bilateral ODA allocated to Africa remained relatively consistent around 43-45% of total ODA over 2015-2021, while 2022 marked a stark decrease with ODA to Africa representing only 35.9% of total ODA. (see Figure 1). This decline was mainly due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and sudden natural shocks in non-African countries (Türkiye and Syria).<sup>47</sup>


**Figure 1. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to Africa, 2015-2022 (USD million)** <sup>48</sup>



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards.

Focusing on the G7 contributions to Africa through multilateral channels, these accounted for over half of the total funds disbursed - on average 54.3% over 2017-2022. There was an increase between 2017 and 2021, from USD 13.3 billion (53.2% of the total) to USD 20.0 billion (57.7%), while in 2022, there was a decline in multilateral ODA to African countries, dropping to USD 14.5 billion (50.3% of the total). (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. G7\* imputed multilateral ODA disbursements to Africa, 2017-2022 (USD million)**




\*EU disbursements not included to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7.

Source: Own compilation based on OECD imputed multilateral estimations.

Regarding sectoral distribution, throughout 2015 to 2022 the sector that attracted the highest bilateral support from the G7 was Social Infrastructure and Services (USD 117.9 billion – 46.1%), followed by Humanitarian Aid (USD 7.1 billion – 18.4%) and Economic Infrastructure and Services (USD 33.4 billion – 13.1%). (see Figure 3).


**Figure 3. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 910, 930, 998). Other sectors include: 500 Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance, 600 Action Relating to Debt, 910 Administrative Costs of Donor, 930: Refugees in Donor Countries, 998 Unallocated +/- Unspecified.

In terms of imputed multilateral ODA, Social Infrastructure and Services (USD 46.3 billion – 49.9%) also emerged as the primary recipient of funding, trailed by Economic Infrastructure and Services (USD 15.9 billion – 17.2%), Other Sectors (USD 9.8 billion – 10.6%) and the Production Sectors (USD 8.3 billion – 9.0%). Humanitarian aid trended upward in funding, from USD 802.4 million in 2017 to USD 987.0 million in 2022, with a peak at USD 1.1 billion in 2019. (see Figure 4).

**Figure 4. G7\* imputed multilateral ODA disbursements to Africa by sector, 2017-2022 (USD million)**




\*EU disbursements not included to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7.

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS imputed multilateral estimations (Sector codes: 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 910, 998). Other sectors include: 500 Commodity Aid / General Programme Assistance, 600 Action Relating to Debt, 910 Administrative Costs of Donor, 998 Unallocated / Unspecified.

Recognising that women and girls’ inclusion is key to building resilient communities and that different genders live in situations of different socio-economic vulnerabilities and face different risks and opportunities due to social norms and structural discrimination, the G7 decided to review the gender equality policy marker across all 7 commitments in which ODA flows are examined in this Progress Report. Overall, while the amount of bilateral ODA to Africa with gender as a principal or significant objective fluctuated over the years, the share stayed relatively constant between 39.5% and 46.6% of total bilateral ODA to Africa. (see Figure 5 and Chapter 4 for further details).

**Figure 5. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to Africa with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards.

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- <sup>8</sup> WHO/UNICEF (2022). *Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene*. Retrieved from: WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program for Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene (JMP) – Progress on household drinking water, sanitation and hygiene 2000-2022: Special focus on gender | UN-Water ([unwater.org](http://unwater.org))
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- <sup>43</sup> Through bilateral and multilateral partnerships with African countries including the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the Italy-Africa Ministerial Conference, EU-Africa partnership and the U.S.-Africa Leaders' Summit.
- <sup>44</sup> Including in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Nigeria and most recently Burundi.
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<sup>48</sup> As there is no collective G7 commitment on ODA to Africa, the ODA totals presented are aggregation of individual G7 members' total ODA expenditures to Africa. This is also the case for all the other figures included in this report.

## **Chapter 2 - G7 support to Economic Transformation in Africa**

### **2.1 Overview of the G7 support to Economic Transformation in Africa**

Multiple crises due to trade turbulence, economic uncertainty, elevated inflationary pressures, geopolitical tensions, climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution are disrupting the global economy, with strong impacts on African countries. Nonetheless, amid these global crises, through vast human and natural capital and fast-growing domestic markets, the continent holds great opportunities for economic transformation and sustainable development.<sup>1</sup>

By 2050, Africa's population is expected to reach 2.4 billion, increasing Africa's share of the global population to 26% by 2050. Africa's urban population is projected to increase from 472 million in 2015 to 1.3 billion in 2050. To respond to these demographic changes, Africa urgently needs to accelerate and scale up sustainable, resilient, inclusive and quality infrastructure development, especially roads, bridges, energy, water and broadband.<sup>2</sup> This must be done in conjunction with improvements to governance structures to avoid elite capture, corruption and displacements that contribute to conflict. The current infrastructure investment needs are estimated by the African Development Bank (AfDB) at USD 130–170 billion a year, with a financing gap in the range of USD 68–108 billion.<sup>3</sup>

However, Africa's demographic trend also represents a major opportunity for the continent. African countries can pave the way towards inclusive growth by investing in human capital. Over the next three decades, the region is expected to experience the fastest increase in its working-age population globally, with a projected net increase of 740 million people by 2050, 30% of whom will be young people. In the upcoming years, up to 12 million youths will enter the labour market every year, yet the current rate of formal wage job creation stands at only about 3 million per year. In the years to come, policy should be geared towards sharing the benefits of growth more equitably.<sup>4</sup>

Expanding African trade through the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) represents a major opportunity to unlock the potential of the continent. Once the AfCFTA is implemented in full, it promises to increase intra-African trade and strengthen regional value chains in goods, services, and digital products by cutting tariffs and non-tariff barriers, opening up services markets, liberalising trade in digital products, boosting investments and building links between companies and local suppliers, while helping domestic industries better integrate in the global economy.<sup>5</sup>

Another comparative advantage for Africa's economic transformation is its vast reserves of critical minerals and renewable resources. In addition to solar energy, Africa's renewable assets include wind power, biomass, and hydroelectricity, and minerals such as lithium, graphite, aluminium, cobalt, copper, and manganese, which are needed for renewable energy technologies including the production of solar panels and batteries

for electric vehicles. Investing in renewable energy is key to meet the needs of those 600 million people, or 43% of the African population, who still lack reliable access to electricity on the continent<sup>6</sup>, while generating opportunities for economic transformation and sustainable development on a low-carbon pathway. These vast natural resources are also set to create a new export market for Africa as the global demand for clean energy and critical minerals and metals contributing to the energy transition intensifies.<sup>7</sup> This also represents an opportunity to foster Corporate Social Responsibility practices and decarbonisation of critical minerals value chains.

Digital transformation is another key catalyst for economic transformation across Africa and a powerful tool to advance the African Union's Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. It allows for greater integration of the different African economies and opens up innovative and new opportunities for millions of people, including women and youth. AfDB Group's latest projections indicate that overall economic growth will advance, rising to 3.8% in 2024 and consolidating at 4.2% in 2025, with a sustained growth momentum expected in 41 countries.<sup>8</sup> In this scenario, the digital economy, which accounts for more than 5% of GDP<sup>9</sup> in several African countries, is projected to grow into a USD 180 billion industry by 2025.<sup>10</sup> As digitalisation advances in Africa, it will be crucial to address the digital divide, including existing barriers and inequalities between urban and rural areas, in education, training and employment levels, as well as the gender divide to fully unleash the potential of digitalisation for economic transformation and decent and quality job creation.<sup>11</sup>


In order to support Africa's economic transformation, the G7 committed in Lough Erne in 2013 to increase their support for trade and infrastructure in Africa. In 2021 in Carbis Bay, G7 Leaders launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment as a joint endeavour to mobilise up to USD 600 billion in public and private investments in quality infrastructures, including in Africa, and in line with the 2016 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment. This commitment was reiterated in 2022 at Elmau. In the past years, the G7 has also provided critical support to the implementation of the AfCFTA through various initiatives aimed at providing technical training, enhancing intra-African trade, developing strategic infrastructures, dismantling non-tariff and technical trade barriers, involving the private sector, enhancing employment opportunities and gender equality and inclusion. In doing so, the G7 has aimed at enhancing a green and social economic development in Africa. In Elmau in 2022, the G7 committed to increase the share of ODA for green jobs and social protection for a just transition, including through the Just Energy Transition Partnerships. In 2017 in Taormina, and as reaffirmed in 2021, G7 Leaders have also pushed for responsible supply chains, in which "better application and promotion of internationally recognised social labour, safety, tax cooperation and environmental standards throughout the global economy" are promoted. Furthermore, at the 2019 G7 Summit in Biarritz, G7 Leaders committed to provide strong support to bridge the digital divide and promote digital transformation through a common strategy for Africa focused on key priority areas, including digital infrastructure, digital literacy and skills, entrepreneurship, digital security, legislative and regulatory frameworks, and private sector financing.

The G7 has adopted a multisectoral approach to support the economic transformation in Africa, where the largest portion of bilateral and multilateral ODA was allocated to the energy sector (USD 13.8 billion, 34.9% of bilateral ODA between 2015-2022 and USD 5.7 billion, 31.1% of multilateral ODA between 2017-2022). In particular, this included USD 6.3 billion in bilateral ODA disbursements for energy generation from renewable sources.<sup>12</sup>

The energy sector was followed by transport and storage (USD 9.5 billion, 24.0% of bilateral ODA and USD 5.2 billion, 28.6% of multilateral ODA), and banking and financial services (USD 7.7 billion, 19.4% of bilateral ODA and USD 3.5 billion, 19.4% of multilateral ODA) sectors in the period 2015-2022. (see Figures 6 and 7).


Since the launch of the G7 commitment on digital transformation in Africa, the G7 bilateral ODA disbursements on Africa’s communication sector rose from about USD 51 million to USD 110 million in 2022, while the G7 multilateral ODA increased from approximately USD 98 million in 2017 to USD 125 million in 2022, with a peak of over USD 171 million in 2019.

**Figure 6. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to support the economic transformation in Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 220, 210, 230, 240, 250, 320, 331, 332). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Economic Transformation”. The list might not be exhaustive.

**Figure 7. G7\* imputed multilateral ODA disbursements to support the economic transformation in Africa by sector, 2017-2022 (USD million)**



\*EU disbursements not included to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7.

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS imputed multilateral estimations (Sector codes: 220, 210, 230, 240, 250, 320, 331, 332). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Economic Transformation”. The list might not be exhaustive.

## 2.2 Trade and Infrastructure in Africa

### COMMITMENT 3 Trade and Infrastructure in Africa

“The G8 will work with African countries and regional economic communities to meet the AU’s target of doubling intra-Africa trade and reducing crossing times at key border posts by 50% by 2022. The G8 commits to provide increased support for project preparation facilities for African regional infrastructure programmes.”

*Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders’ Communiqué, paras. 19-20*

#### Overview

The implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) – the world’s largest free trade area in terms of members, with a market of 55 countries and more than 1.4 billion people<sup>13</sup> – represents both one of the most encouraging advances on the African continent and one of the main challenges of the coming years.

The most recent World Bank estimates<sup>14</sup> show that the AfCFTA could unlock the potential of the continent, boosting the exports to the rest of the world by 32% and intra-continental exports by 109% by 2035. Moreover, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows could surge by 111% to 159%, fostering the creation of new jobs and expertise, strengthening local capacities and connecting African companies to both regional and global value chains.

The new free trade area would also help reduce the gender pay gap, as it would lead to higher-paid and better-quality jobs, with women achieving the biggest wage gains. Overall, if the AfCFTA goals are entirely realised, 50 million people could get out of poverty by 2035, and real income could rise by 9%.<sup>15</sup>

The African Union dedicated the theme of the year 2023 to the acceleration of AfCFTA implementation, with the aim to secure the commitment of all stakeholders to speed up the process of economic integration of the Continent, following through the previous target of doubling intra-African trade and reducing by half the transit time of goods at border post crossings.

In this context, the G7 committed in Lough Erne in 2013 to increase their support for trade and infrastructure in Africa. Since then, the G7 has been supporting the implementation of the AfCFTA through various initiatives aimed at providing technical training, enhancing intra-African trade, developing strategic infrastructures, dismantling non-tariff barriers and technical barriers to trade, involving the private sector, enhancing employment opportunities and contributing to strengthening the general welfare in Africa. The G7 monitors the improvements made on this commitment, focusing on key border crossings, intra-African trade and the G7 contribution to regional project preparation facilities.

## Continuing G7 support to intra-Africa trade

Since its launch in 2003, **Canada** has been supporting the Africa Trade Policy Centre (ATPC) within the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) headquarters in Addis Ababa. The ATPC's current project focuses on the implementation of the AfCFTA (CAD 15.2 million, 2021-26), whereas its previous project supported intra-African trade (CAD 13.1 million, 2015-20), including through supporting the development of the African Union's AfCFTA.

As part of its Aid for Trade programme (PRCC) implemented by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), **France** funded a EUR 4.2 million programme to intra-Indian ocean trade and governance. In this context, it also organised a regional economic forum in 2022 with approximately 300 participants as well as other hybrid regional conference cycles in 2023 with topics ranging from i) low carbon transition, ii) agriculture and biodiversity, iii) blue economy, iv) sustainable tourism, v) building and energy, vi) maritime connectivity, with almost 1000 participants. Moreover, France has provided a EUR 4 million contribution to the EU Technical Assistance Facility to the AfCFTA Secretariat and has been collaborating with the Regional Economic Communities (RECS) for the development of a Revised Regional AfCFTA Implementation Strategy for the East African Community (EAC) and for capacity building on Competition Policy to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The French "Organisation for the Harmonisation of Corporate Law in Africa" (OHADA) has also been facilitating the digitalisation of commercial registries to enhance the entry of small and medium enterprises into the formal economy. Proparco, a subsidiary of the AFD Group focused on private sector development, has also launched a new Africa Trade Finance strategy in 2022. For example, in 2023, Proparco supported Touton, a major African player in the trade of cocoa, coffee, vanilla and spices.

As of today, **Germany** has contributed EUR 163 million to the realisation of the AfCFTA, making it the largest bilateral donor to the AfCFTA.<sup>16</sup> Support to intra-African trade has taken place through several programmes, in collaboration with continental stakeholders such as the African Union Commission and the AfCFTA Secretariat, Regional Economic Commissions (SADC, ECOWAS and EAC) as well as selected pilot countries.<sup>17</sup> Furthermore, Germany to date contributed EUR 8 million to the EU Technical Assistance Facility to the AfCFTA Secretariat. Additionally, since 2022 and until 2025, Germany will support East African Integration through SEAMPEC II, a programme dedicated to improving regional and continental trade in the East African Community<sup>18</sup> and is an active member of the Global Alliance for Trade Facilitation.

In 2021 and in 2022, **Italy** supported the two phases of the "Training Programme towards an effective AfCFTA" with a financial contribution of EUR 870,000 to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). This ongoing initiative, implemented in collaboration with the Italian NGO ASeS – Agricoltori Solidarietà e Sviluppo, has the specific objective to strengthen the leadership capacity of the AfCFTA national African committees. To this end, it offers specialised training for African officials involved in tax,

customs, commercial and legislative-related matters, as well as support of local businesses, in particular Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs).

In June 2022, the **Japan** International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the African Union Development Agency-NEPAD (AUDA-NEPAD) jointly published the 3rd edition of the One-Stop Border Post (OSBP)<sup>19</sup> Sourcebook. Between 2019 and 2023, JICA also provided a series of trainings to a total of 105 officials of Revenue Authority and customs officials at major borders in South Sudan on trade facilitation and enhancement of customs revenue collection. Japan also provided funding to the World Customs Organisation (WCO). This resulted in 13 workshops in 2022 and 2023 organised by WCO to build capacity of customs authorities in 12 African countries as well as a Master Trainer Programme (MTP) by JICA and the WCO, where Japan contributed to develop 149 “Master Trainers” from 2013 to 2021 within 16 African countries. These “Master Trainers” have so far delivered trainings to more than 49,000 people in 2018-2023. Similarly, since 2021, JICA-WCO have developed 41 Master Trainers on Rules of Origin in 21 African countries to contribute to smooth implementation the AfCFTA. Japan was also a donor to the International Trade Centre (ITC)’s Ethical Fashion Initiative from 2013 to 2018, focused on sustainable and inclusive development of the fashion and textile industries in Africa, as well as to the ITC’s SheTrades Connect programme since 2019, which links women entrepreneurs including those from Africa to international buyers and investors.

**United Kingdom** funding to TradeMark Africa (TMA), a multi-donor funded organisation supporting regional and international trade, totals over GBP 400 million of ODA support to date. Other G7 funders include United States and Canada. In addition to the work on trade facilitation through TMA, the UK has supported the AU Commission and, more recently, the AfCFTA Secretariat to achieve regional integration and the full implementation of the AfCFTA.<sup>20</sup> British International Investment (BII), the UK’s Development Finance Institution, provides support to the production, manufacture and trade of goods in developing countries through investing in businesses in these supply chains and through its trade financing offer. BII recently announced a USD 100 million finance facility with the Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB). The facility will empower TDB to provide trade finance support to local businesses and financial institutions across key markets in Africa.

The **United States** is working to assist the AU, the AfCFTA Secretariat and Member States to build stronger sanitary and phytosanitary regulatory systems harmonised with international standards. By reducing regulatory bottlenecks to support the flow of food across borders, access to safe and nutritious food is increased.<sup>21</sup> Additional support includes conducting outreach to African SMEs to understand and implement the AfCFTA; supporting the integration of African value-chains; helping to streamline customs and borders procedures to facilitate regional trade and investment; and working with the AfCFTA Secretariat to help develop the agreement’s Digital Protocol.

The **European Union** supports intra-Africa trade facilitation through the EU-World Customs Organisation (WCO) Harmonised Systems Africa programme (EU contribution of EUR 5 million), and two key achievements from 2022/2023 can be highlighted. First, the programme supported African countries with implementing the Harmonised Systems (all but 10 African countries migrated to the HS 2022). Second, the programme

supported African countries' understanding of tariff dismantling, with the deployment of an electronic tariff platform, the e-tariff book for the AfCFTA.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, in partnership with EU Member States and with an EU total contribution of EUR 29.5 million, the EU funds the AfCFTA Technical Assistance Facility (TAF) to the AfCFTA, operational since 2021. The facility is one component of a broader and dedicated Global Gateway Team Europe Initiative, jointly with EU MS, to support economic integration towards the AfCFTA.<sup>23</sup>

## Improvements at key border crossings

**France** Aid for Trade programme (PRCC), implemented by AFD, funded several programmes such as a EUR 6 million grant to improve the Abidjan-Lagos corridor, with a specific focus on borders between Togo, Benin and Ghana in 2023. Proparco financed infrastructure projects like ports and airports; major projects in 2022-2023 were a USD 50 million financing in 2023 of the Damietta Alliance Container Terminal in Egypt, where volumes will come from transshipment but also from the local markets. This project will transform Damietta Port into a global centre for transit trade in the Mediterranean zone. Furthermore, a USD 20 million contribution in 2023 to the rehabilitation of the Cabo Verde Airports<sup>24</sup> (security, regulation, and environmental-related investments), improving air traffic with African routes going to Senegal or Morocco.

From 2016 onwards, **Germany** has supported improvements at the border crossings in Kasumbalesa (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia) and along the Dakar-Bamako trade corridor, through the Trade for Development Fund, financed by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.<sup>25</sup> In 2021 and 2022, the "Trade for Development Fund" also supported significant improvements at border crossings in the Gambia and between Zambia and Malawi. In 2023, Germany remains involved in Kasumbalesa<sup>26</sup> cooperating with the SADC through the German CESARE programme, focusing on trade promotion in Southern Africa among others.<sup>27</sup> Through NEPAD-IPPF, Germany supported the design, construction and opening of a 1.9 km bridge crossing the Gambia River in 2019. The project contributes to the development of transport infrastructures in West Africa. It is also a key link contributing to the Trans-African Highway (TAH) programme, which is a sub-programme of the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

In October 2022, **Japan**, through the JICA, signed a Record of Discussions with the Government of the Republic of South Africa for the Project for Capacity Development on Smooth Operation of One Stop Border Posts (OSBP) on the North-South Transport Corridor, a technical cooperation project. The project aims to improve customs clearance procedures at the targeted OSBPs located on the North-South Transport Corridor and reduce labour/economic costs as well as the transportation time for border crossing.<sup>28</sup> Beyond this support measure, Japan has been a donor to the WCO's Security Project for West and Central Africa which was implemented from 2018 to 2020, which supported customs administrations and border agencies to address terrorist threats<sup>29</sup>, and to the WCO's project "Developing an Operational Handbook on security strategies, equipment and personnel training for Customs in fragile borderlands" including the North Africa

region in 2020.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, Japan has financially contributed to the WCO's project "Support to Improve the Capacity of Developing Countries' Customs Administrations in Response to Covid-19" in 2020 for WCO developing Members<sup>31</sup>, which include countries in Africa, and to the WCO's initiative "Operation STOP II" from 2021 to 2022 to combat the distribution of counterfeit goods related to Covid-19, such as vaccines and medications for WCO Members, including countries in Africa.<sup>32</sup>

As of 2022, with **United Kingdom** support, TMA has developed 15 OSBPs to reduce transit times across East African border crossings. The Nimule-Elegu (South Sudan - Uganda), completed in 2020, resulted in a 43-47% time reduction.<sup>33</sup> In 2023 the completion of the two-lane, 22.5km Hargeisa Bypass, funded by the UK through TMA and implemented by the Somaliland Ministry of Transport and Roads Development, cut travel time by 39% (3 hours). Through UK funding, TMA began work on the Lagos-Abidjan corridor in 2022, starting at the Ghana-Togo joint-border-post.

Prosper Africa, led by the **United States**, is a Presidential-level national security initiative to strengthen the strategic partnership between the U.S. and Africa by catalysing two-way trade and investment at transformative scale. As a whole of U.S. government initiative, Prosper Africa complements the full suite of financial instruments and resources from 17 U.S. federal agencies and departments in order to scale capital flows and impact. The Africa Trade and Investment platform, USAID's flagship effort in support of the Prosper Africa initiative, expands and accelerates regional, international, and U.S.-Africa trade and investment. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a U.S. unilateral trade preference programme that allows eligible countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to export to the United States up to 6,900 products duty free, increasing trade and investments between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa. Since going into effect, AGOA has encouraged new investments, trade, and job creation in the United States and Africa. It serves as a critical market entry point for U.S. businesses, buyers, and service providers into Africa's markets. Under the Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) initiative, Pillar One addresses Digital Economy and Infrastructure with the goal of expanding access to open, interoperable, reliable and secure Internet for Africa communities across sectors.<sup>34</sup>

As part of the West Africa Trade Facilitation programme (EUR 20 million), over the period 2018-2023 and in partnership with the World Bank and the GIZ, the **European Union** supports the pursuit of the implementation of the Interconnected System for the Management of Transit Goods – SIGMAT, as a key achievement in 2022/2023. The SIGMAT system is part of the Automated System for Customs Data (ASYCUDA) programme led by UNCTAD and ECOWAS.<sup>35</sup> The EU supports the Tripartite Transport & Transit Facilitation Programme (TTTFP) covering the SADC, COMESA and EAC regions with EUR 18 million. The programme supports road infrastructure development and the harmonisation of related enabling policies, as part of the implementation of the Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) between the three regions. It includes four key results areas: 1) Vehicle Load Management (VLM) Strategy Implemented in the continental area of the Tripartite; 2) Harmonised Vehicle Regulations and Standards Implemented; 3)

Transport Registers and Information Platform and System (TRIPS) Implemented; and 4) Efficiency of Regional Transport Corridors Improved.<sup>36</sup>

### **G7 Members' contributions to regional project preparation facilities**

**France**, through the AFD supported AUDA-NEPAD in the development of a continental masterplan concerning the production and transmission of electricity, through a study on the associated financing modalities.<sup>37</sup> AFD has set up a regional facility in North Africa, with European funding (EUR 20 million), to support energy efficiency in buildings in the sub-region.

**Germany** expanded its support to the African Union's Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) with an additional EUR 7 million in 2021 until 2024 through its technical assistance programme "Green Infrastructure Corridors for Intra-African Trade", supporting green infrastructure development by pushing projects to a financial close and promoting digital, green smart technologies to secure private-sector investment.<sup>38</sup>

The AUDA-NEPAD Infrastructure Preparatory Facility (NEPAD-IPPF) supports the development of regional and continental infrastructure projects in Africa in line with priorities of the African Union. Germany supports the Facility with a grant of EUR 30 million in total. 69 projects (mainly feasibility studies) have been completed. By financing these studies, the IPPF has been able to help mobilise around USD 11 billion of investments for infrastructure in Africa so far. In 2023 alone, Germany provided EUR 10 million to NEPAD-IPPF to replenish the special fund focused on project preparation<sup>39</sup>, pledging a further EUR 18.4 million for 2024.<sup>40</sup> In addition, there are global project preparation facilities supported by Germany that are also active on the African continent, including the Global Infrastructure Facility (GIF), the City Climate Finance Gap Fund and the C40 Cities Finance Facility. Finally, Germany supports the SADC Secretariat with a EUR 13.5 million grant (2017) for the SADC Project Preparation Development Facility (PPDF).

**Japan** is a donor to the ITC's Vaccine Investments and Trade Ecosystems in Africa (VITEA) project in 2023, which contributed to facilitating vaccine manufacturing and trade.<sup>41</sup>

To aid infrastructure project development in developing markets, the **United Kingdom** supports the Private Infrastructure Development Group (PIDG), an infrastructure project developer and investor. The UK has provided 70% of all funding to PIDG and in 2023 agreed a further GBP 391 million, a significant proportion of which will be channelled towards project preparation activities in Africa. Through technical assistance, PIDG finance initial project development and invest at an early stage to provide management and capital to address risks. This develops bankable projects that can attract private sector investment. UK support has enabled PIDG to have committed USD 5 billion in 266 investments and mobilise USD 39.8 billion, including USD 19 billion from the private sector in Africa.

In September 2023, the **United States** contributed USD 5 million to the African Legal Support Facility, housed at AfDB, which provides legal advisory services to governments on a variety of transactions including infrastructure, complex commercial projects, extractives, and energy projects. In September 2023, the US expanded the eligibility of the Transaction Advisory Fund (TAF) to include countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (in addition to the Western Hemisphere and Indo-Pacific) and allocated USD 8 million for use from 2023-2028. TAF provides best-in-class legal and consultative services to host governments in support of infrastructure projects.

**Methodology**

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs	
2013	1. Improvements at key designated border crossings, regardless of whether they are achieved through improvement in policy or infrastructure, where there is currently concerted action by the G7.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• G7 members own records of activities</li> <li>• Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) Annual Report</li> <li>• Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility (IPPF) Annual Report</li> <li>• EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) Annual Report</li> </ul>	 <p>9 – Industry, innovation and infrastructure</p>	
	2. Continuing G7 support for intra-Africa trade.			 <p>17 – Partnerships for the goals</p>
	3. G7 Members' contributions to regional project preparation facilities.			

## 2.3 Digital Transformation in Africa

### COMMITMENT 7 Digital Transformation in Africa

“We collectively endeavour to provide strong support to bridge the digital divide and promote digital transformation in Africa in line with our national commitments. (...)

Our common strategy for Africa will be based on the following objectives:

- (i) Enabling the necessary digital infrastructure in order to reduce the digital gap and inequality, including in isolated countries and regions that are excluded or underserved, and encouraging the transport and logistics activities that serve e-commerce and e-government on a regional basis (...).
- (ii) Developing digital literacy and skills, particularly in the field of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), in order to equip young people, especially young women and girls, with the skills necessary to take advantage of the growth and prosperity promised by the digital economy, whilst protecting against online risks and harms, and promoting inclusion, notably for women.
- (iii) Fostering digital transformation for growth, entrepreneurship, job creation, and private-sector empowerment, particularly digital start-ups, SMEs and innovative community initiatives, by using digital technologies to provide support.
- (iv) Expanding new solutions offered by digitalization across other sectors, such as health, agriculture, energy, e-commerce, electronic payment and governance.
- (v) Creating enabling environments to allow national stakeholders to manage digital risks in coordination with the existing work of international and African organizations.
- (vi) Sharing best practices between G7 and African partners, including experiences about creating legislative and regulatory frameworks, notably regarding data protection.

We also commit to addressing telecommunications security – including 5G security - and to ensuring that the digital transformation benefits all and promotes good governance, environmental sustainability, equitable economic transformation and job creation.”

*Biarritz 2019, Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership, para 8; Digital transformation in Africa*

*(Annex of the Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership), paras. 4 & 6*

## Overview

Digitalisation is a powerful tool to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union's Agenda 2063. The diffusion of digital applications holds vast potential to drive Africa's socio-economic transformation, for example through efficient production and distribution of goods and services, opportunities for youth employment, transparent governance systems, enhanced regional integration and connectivity between civil society, firms, governments, and organisations.

In the last two decades, digital technologies have been growing rapidly on the African continent, mainly driven by the mobile revolution and related innovations. Today, there are 92 mobile-cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants in Africa.<sup>42</sup> Telecom sectors are growing fast, while technology hubs and incubators keep flourishing in large metropolitan areas. In some cases, innovative mobile platforms have disrupted traditional value chains in different sectors of the economy to meet the increasing demand for health, education and agriculture, among others. The spread of financial technology (Fintech) solutions is showing important results in terms of business innovation and financial inclusion, by serving the needs of people excluded from basic financial services, especially women and in the informal economy.<sup>43</sup>

However, despite fast progress, structural barriers and inequalities in digital access limit the diffusion of digital innovations to the whole economy and inhibit large scale job creation on the continent. Only 37% of the African population uses the internet, compared to a global average of 67%.<sup>44</sup> Large digital divides persist across urban and rural areas, gender, disability status, and socio-economic conditions. Expanding access to digital infrastructures and services beyond urban centres, investing in digital skills development, especially for young women and girls, and supporting SMEs' digital uptake are some of the key priorities to advance Africa's digital transformation. At the same time, adopting harmonised regulations on digital security and data protection at national, regional and continental level will be pivotal to unleash the full potential of digitalisation for Africa's development.<sup>45</sup>

The African Union's Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030)<sup>46</sup> aims to harness digital technologies and innovation to transform African societies and economies to promote Africa's regional integration, generate inclusive economic growth, stimulate job creation, break digital divides, and eradicate poverty. In its strategy, the African Union has set 16 specific objectives, from building a Digital Single Market by 2030 to digitalising key sectors such as agriculture, health and education.

At the 2019 G7 Summit in Biarritz, G7 Leaders identified digital transformation as a potential game-changer for the African continent and an opportunity to boost inclusive and sustainable economic growth and industrialisation, while alleviating poverty and improving people's lives. In their final declaration, they collectively endeavoured to provide strong support to bridge the digital divides and promote inclusive and sustainable digital transformation through a common strategy for Africa focused on key priority areas, including digital infrastructure, digital literacy and skills, entrepreneurship, digital security, legislative and regulatory frameworks, and private sector financing. To keep track of this endeavour, the G7 committed to monitoring their bilateral ODA

spending on communication as well as FDI to the digital sector in Africa. Furthermore, the G7 tracks developments in mobile-broadband subscriptions and the number of African students graduating with degrees in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM), disaggregated by sex (in accordance with SDG indicator 4.4.2). Lastly, the G7 reports on best practices and experiences between the G7 and African partners on promoting digital infrastructure, fostering telecom innovation, securing advanced communication networks, and creating legislative and regulatory frameworks for personal data protection, in coordination with the work of international and African organisations.

### **Access to mobile internet and internet use in Africa**

According to International Telecommunication Union (ITU)<sup>47</sup>, active mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 people in Africa increased from 33.7 in 2019 to 48 in 2023. Despite fast progress, this is still significantly less than the global average (87 in 2023). Overall, in 2023, 77% of the African population was covered by a 4G/3G network but only 37% used the Internet. Digital divides remain more significant than in other world regions: in 2023, 42% of African male population used the Internet, compared to 32% of the female population and 57% of urban dwellers used the Internet compared with just 23% of people living in rural areas. Besides digital infrastructure coverage, the high cost of digital services, limited digital literacy, and gender norms that discourage women and girls from accessing and using the internet and other ICTs remain major barriers hampering digital transformation in Africa.<sup>48</sup>

### **Students graduating from STEM programmes in Africa**

The African Union's Agenda 2063 recognises the strategic role STEM education can play in fast-tracking Africa's development. However, numerous challenges hinder the diffusion of STEM education on the continent, such as low participation and a weak pipeline in STEM fields, as well as inadequate infrastructure and resources including low access to electricity and internet connectivity, combined with lack of capacity and inadequate training.<sup>49</sup>

According to available data on 18 African countries, on average 43% of African STEM graduates are women.<sup>50</sup> However, in most Sub-Saharan African countries, women are underrepresented within the STEM workforce, especially in engineering. Developing STEM skills for Africa's women and youth requires addressing gender norms that discourage this participation directly, developing gender-transformational and inclusive digital ecosystems, and collectively engaging governments, educational institutions, and the private sector.<sup>51</sup>


## **Foreign Direct Investment to the digital sector in Africa**

Total FDI flows to Africa amounted to USD 48 billion in 2023 - representing 3.5% of global FDI flows in the same year - and remained quite stable compared to the previous year.<sup>52</sup> Based on the latest available data, four G7 countries (United Kingdom, France, United States and Italy) ranked among the top 10 investors economies in Africa by FDI stock in 2020.<sup>53</sup> According to the 2023 Africa Attractiveness Report<sup>54</sup>, the United States, the United Kingdom and France are actively investing in Africa's digital space while South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya are Africa's five largest technology investment hubs. Africa's growing technology and digital ecosystem represents one of the main drivers of FDI to the continent. The private sector, in partnership with public institutions and development partners, has a key role to play to accelerate investments in digital infrastructure development and support Africa's digital transformation.<sup>55</sup>

## **G7 bilateral ODA to the communication sector in Africa**

Since the launch of the G7 commitment on Digital transformation in Africa in 2019, total G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to Africa's communication sector followed an upward trend, from USD 61.6 million in 2019 to USD 110.2 million in 2022. (see Figure 8). During this same period (2019-2022), the majority of G7 bilateral ODA spending in this sector came from the EU (39.4%), France (30.8%) and Germany (11.0%), while the most targeted sub-sectors were and Information and Communication Technology (ICT) (44.0%) and Telecommunications (43.3%).


**Figure 8. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to the communication sector in Africa by sub-sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose codes: 22040, 22030, 22020, 22010).

The G7 is also increasing its ODA support to gender equality within Africa’s communication sector. In 2022, G7 bilateral ODA spending with gender equality objectives reached the highest level in both absolute terms (USD 48.5 million) and relative terms (62.0% of total G7 bilateral ODA in the communication sector). This trend was mostly driven by ODA flows with gender equality as a significant objective, which reached USD 47.0 million in 2022 (or 60.2% of G7 bilateral ODA to the communication sector). (see Figure 9).

**Figure 9. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to the communication sector in Africa with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose codes: 22040, 22030, 22020, 22010).

**Best practices and experiences between the G7 and African partners to promote digital transformation in Africa**

**France** supports Rwanda’s National Transformation Strategy (2017-2024) through the digitalisation of public services and the development of innovative industries.<sup>56</sup> A EUR 37 million loan from the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) finances the establishment of a Geospatial Hub managed by the Rwanda Space Agency, to modernise network infrastructure for central and local administrations and enhance evidence-based policies in fields like urban planning, disaster response, health, agriculture. The loan also finances the construction of a centre of excellence as part of the privately managed Drone Operations Centre for testing new industry use cases. The contribution includes a EUR 1.2 million grant for mobilising the French expertise, facilitated by the AU-EU Digital for Development (D4D) Hub that conducted the feasibility study.

Moreover, in 2022, Proparco, the private sector financing arm of AFD, supported Africa Mobile Network (AMN) in bridging the digital divide in rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa through the deployment of 5,000 new towers.<sup>57</sup> With USD 40 million in financing, including a EUR 8 million equity investment from Proparco, the support targets the expansion of AMN activities across 19 African countries to deploy 10,000 towers by 2025. This aims to extend internet access to over 1.3 million people in rural areas, particularly in fragile states, fostering security, public engagement, social cohesion, and economic

development. Digital Africa, which is a subsidiary of Proparco, supports digital entrepreneurs – incubators, financial institutions, venture capitalists and tech clusters – across the African continent with the aim of equipping them with tools that can help them design and scale-up groundbreaking projects. Digital Africa provides funding and technical assistance to startups at the ideation and MVP stages through its investment facility “Fuzé”. As part of the French “Choose Africa” initiative which was launched in 2017 and was extended in 2023, Digital Africa aims to facilitate access to finance for young people and women entrepreneurs and contribute to fostering an enabling environment for entrepreneurship and innovation.

In 2020, **Germany** launched the programme “DataCipation”, a joint initiative of the African Union Commission and German development cooperation, to advance harmonised digital policies in Africa, facilitating frameworks for digital ID, AI and data.<sup>58</sup> Following the development of the AU Data Policy Framework and its adoption by the AU Summit 2022<sup>59</sup>, a Team Europe “Data Governance Initiative” was launched to promote inclusive data economies and societies in Africa.<sup>60</sup> Supported by German development cooperation’s “Data Economy” programme, this effort led to Kenya’s first Data Governance Framework for agricultural data in 2022<sup>61</sup> and to Senegal’s national data strategy in 2023.<sup>62</sup> This Team Europe initiative works with African countries to develop harmonised data regulation, promote cross-border dataflows and partnerships for green and secure data infrastructure. The partners aim to create a single digital market in line with the African Continental Free Trade Area, the AU Digital Transformation Strategy and the Agenda 2063.<sup>63</sup>

In 2023, **Italy** adhered to the European D4D Hub initiative.<sup>64</sup> Through the involvement of national stakeholders in the field of digital development and digital transformation, Italy joined the Hub with a strong interest in implementing activities related to connectivity, artificial intelligence, green and digital in the South Saharan African regional and in the NEAR branches, with a leading role in North Africa.

Furthermore, between 2022 and 2023, the Italian Cooperation, in partnership with the Agency for Digital Italy, launched the project “DIGIT – Supporting the Strategic Plan for the Information Society in Mozambique through Tech Hubs of Digital Excellence” in Mozambique. The initiative, implemented with the Mozambican Ministry of Science, Technology and Higher Education, supports the Mozambique's efforts towards digital transition, in line with the “Strategic Plan for the Information Society” (2019-2028). Italy finances the project through a EUR 3.5 million grant.<sup>65</sup> The project aims to establish an international public-private partnership for the realisation and development of a Digital Innovation Hub. The Hub will contribute to implementing innovative tools for the improvement of public utilities and increasing digital skills, especially for young people. It will also act as an incubator and accelerator for start-ups.

In 2023, **Japan** launched a digital talent development programme<sup>66</sup> as part of a larger collaboration initiative with the Government of Ethiopia and Safaricom Ethiopia to promote “Digital Ethiopia 2025” and accelerate an inclusive digital transformation. The programme aims to foster innovation and address youth unemployment issues in Ethiopia with focus on skills development to kick-start full-time engineering careers for

Addis Ababa-based university students and youth specialising in computer science or related STEM fields.

The **United Kingdom** supports African partners to achieve inclusive, responsible and sustainable digital transformation – an approach set out in the UK’s Digital Development Strategy 2024-2030. For example, the UK worked with the Nigerian Communications Commission to provide technical assistance to support the launch of Nigeria’s National Broadband Plan for 2020-2025 and the creation of digital policy frameworks focused on digital literacy and skills coverage. This helped close the digital gender gap by facilitating digital access for more than 5 million women and extended digital access penetration to 70% of Nigeria’s population - with special consideration to persons with disabilities and promoting internet affordability.<sup>67</sup>

In 2021, British International Investment (BII) partnered with British company, Vodafone, in the Global Partnerships for Ethiopia consortium, to bring better and more affordable access to digital services in Ethiopia. The telecoms network was switched on by Safaricom in October 2022, providing mobile services in 11 cities. The investment will improve quality and affordability of mobile services for 49 million users and is estimated to boost Ethiopia’s GDP growth by 4.6% by 2032.<sup>68</sup>

In 2022, the **United States** launched the Digital Transformation with Africa (DTA) initiative to expand digital access in Africa; increase engagement between U.S. and African companies; support increased connectivity, digital literacy, and strengthen digital enabling environments.<sup>69</sup>

Launched in 2018, the US Government’s Digital Connectivity and Cybersecurity Partnership (DCCP) aims to expand secure Internet access in targeted emerging markets; encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and secure digital infrastructure; and increase adoption of cybersecurity best practices.<sup>70</sup> The U.S. endorses the Principles for Digital Development, which provide guidance to governments, donors, and partners to encourage responsible digital innovation.<sup>71</sup> Through the Advancing Digital Democracy programme, the US promotes the engagement of governments, private sector, civil society and the donor community.<sup>72</sup>

The U.S. and Canada launched the Donor Principles for Human Rights in the Digital Age<sup>73</sup> during the United Nations’ 2023 Internet Governance Forum. These principles establish a framework for governments to help ensure that their digital engagements and investments align with human rights and democratic values.<sup>74</sup>

The Women in the Digital Economy Fund (WiDEF) is a joint effort between the U.S. and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to accelerate progress on closing the gender digital divide. The U.S. will commit up to USD 50 million in Gender Equity and Equality Action (GEEA) fund resources, and the Gates Foundation will commit USD10 million by the end of 2026, with at least half of each of these commitments focused on Africa.

By collaborating with the East African Community (EAC) to invest in data infrastructure elements of the EAC’s Digital REACH Initiative, USG supports the EAC to improve the enabling environment for private and public investment and digital innovation across East Africa.<sup>75</sup>


A flagship program of the G7-led Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), Digital Invest is a U.S. government-funded program that partners with the private sector to advance internet connectivity and digital financial services for un- and underserved communities in emerging markets. Since 2022, Digital Invest has provided USD 8.45 million in U.S. government funding to private sector partners, ultimately catalysing over USD 1.15 billion in external investments.

Digital transformation is a key area of cooperation between the **European Union** and its African partners as reaffirmed in the “Joint Vision for 2030”.<sup>76</sup> In 2023, the EU and its Member States launched the “Data Governance in Africa Initiative” as part of the Global Gateway Team Europe Initiative “Digital Economy and Society in Sub-Saharan Africa”, for support and technical assistance to the African Union Commission (AUC) in the implementation of their Continental Data Policy Framework.<sup>77</sup> The initiative extends technical assistance to AU Member States and regional institutions and sets up a Digital Investment Facility to identify opportunities and catalyse investments for green and secure data infrastructure. The AUC is the primary partner for the implementation of the Data Policy Framework at continental level, together with the Regional Economic Communities, AUDA-NEPAD and Smart Africa.

The European Union financed the Africa-Europe Digital Regulators Partnership for a conducive ICT regulatory environment for affordable and secure connectivity for all in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>78</sup> The 2021 HRVP/Commission’s Joint Communication “Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood” has also identified digitalisation as a key area for cooperation, aiming for green, digital, resilient and just recovery, guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement and the European Green Deal. The EU contributes to different digital sectors, like cybersecurity, promotion of digital skills, and development, harmonisation and implementation of harmonised digital regulatory frameworks in the Southern Neighbourhood.

The EU provided a significant grant contribution of EUR 40 million to the “Medusa digital submarine cable” - the longest in the Mediterranean - promoted by European companies and co-financed by the EIB. The total estimated cost amounts to EUR 342 million and it shall significantly boost interconnectivity between both shores of the Mediterranean. The EU grant will offer high speed connectivity to public research and education centres in North Africa and ultimately trigger an upgrade of the education and scientific collaboration between both regions.

## Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2019	1. Part of the G7 bilateral ODA disbursed on communications dedicated to Africa (volume and percentage).	OECD-CRS (Sector code 220 for communications)	 4 – Quality Education
	2. G7 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to the digital sector in Africa.	Africa Attractiveness report, World Investment Report (UNCTAD)	
	3. African's score of A- active mobile-broadband subscription /100 inhabitants in Africa and B- Percentage of individuals using the Internet, disaggregated by gender.	ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database	 8 – Decent work and economic growth
	4. Percentage in Africa of students graduating from STEM disaggregated by sex, in accordance with SDG indicator 4.4.2 methodology.	The Global Gender Gap Report (World Economic Forum)	
	5. Best practices and experiences between G7 and African partners on promoting digital infrastructure, fostering telecom innovation, securing advanced communication network, and creating legislative and regulatory frameworks for personal data protection, in coordination with the existing work of international and African organisations.	Self-reporting	 9 – Industry, innovation and infrastructure

## 2.4 Case Studies

### **GERMANY - Trade and Infrastructure in Africa**

#### **Support to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)**



The AfCFTA is one of the flagship projects of the AU's Agenda 2063 and offers enormous potential for the African continent: Fully implemented, the AfCFTA could double intra-African trade by 2035, create larger and more lucrative markets and increase the resilience of African economies. With 163 million euros to date, Germany is the largest bilateral donor to support the realisation of the trade agreement. In a multi-level approach, German development policy supports the negotiations and implementation of the free trade area both at continental level with actors such as the AU Commission and the AfCFTA Secretariat, at regional level in cooperation with selected Regional Economic Commissions (RECs; SADC, ECOWAS and EAC) and at national level in ten pilot countries.

One focus of support in recent years has been on providing technical assistance to the AU, RECs and member states in negotiations on the AfCFTA, particularly with regard to trade in goods and services, digital trade and the inclusion of women and youth. Key activities included, e.g., the implementation of various negotiation training sessions for the actors involved. As of today, 42 AU member states have already been able to conclude customs negotiations, which is an essential basis for the start of trade in goods under the AfCFTA. Eight pilot countries have thus been able to export selected products under free trade conditions for the first time since 2022 under the Guided Trade Initiative.

Technical assistance is also provided at the national, regional and continental level in order to reduce Technical Barriers to trade. Strengthening the quality infrastructure institutions in Africa is vital to establishing framework conditions in line with international agreements. One outcome of this international cooperation is the Africa Quality Policy, which was adopted in 2021, ensuring that standards and quality requirements are met and trade barriers are removed.

Germany supports women-owned businesses to benefit from trade opportunities created by the AfCFTA through capacity building, networking, and advocacy since 2019. Next to fostering dialogue and exchange between women's business associations and policy makers during all phases of the negotiations, a primary focus was on tailored training and peer-learning support. As a result, almost 600 women entrepreneurs are now trained in export readiness and digital trade. As the AfCFTA negotiations come to an end, Germany focuses its support on the actual implementation of trade under the trade agreement. The focus will be on promoting the private sector, women and youth participation.



Participants in a training course in Kenya for women entrepreneurs to prepare their companies for successful exports under the AfCFTA. *Credit:* Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ).

## EUROPEAN UNION - Digital Transformation in Africa



### **AfricaConnect: high-capacity connectivity for research and education**

Affordable and secure connectivity is the first building block for Africa's digital development and one of the main investment priorities under Global Gateway. Connecting universities and research centres expands opportunities for learning and innovation, enables skills development and provides data for evidence-based decision making.

In line with the African Union Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020-2030), the European Commission has been funding and managing AfricaConnect (EUR 37.5 million) since 2011. Currently in its third phase, it is designed to support National and Regional Research and Education Networks (NRENs and RRENs) in the provision of open affordable and secure broadband connectivity, data management and storage facilities, secure links to exchange sensitive information, international roaming services for users in research and tertiary education and capacity building. The main partners have been: GÉANT, the pan-European network for the research and education community; UbuntuNet Alliance, the RREN of Eastern and Southern Africa; WACREN, the West and Central African Research and Education Network; and ASREN, the Arab States Research and Education Network.

The project has managed to connect more than 1900 institutions in Africa with more than 5 million end-users. 23 out of 38 African NRENs have been connected to their regional network. By centralising the negotiation with service providers, the project acted as a buying club for universities, research centres and schools, cutting the cost per Mb by more than 90% in some cases. The free roaming service eduroam is now available for 284 institutions in Africa. In addition, it has allowed access to digital tools and services to women and has boosted active participation and women leadership in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM). Enabled by AfricaConnect, RRENs have acted as catalysers of growth and interconnection of NRENs within each sub-region, fostering research collaboration, digital transformation and digital skills development.

The following lessons learnt can be drawn:

- Efforts led by RRENs to improve digital connectivity should be coherent and complementary to regional cooperation and integration plans, including within Regional Economic Communities;
- AfricaConnect has so far been focusing on providing support via and for the regional level; further support to African NRENs needs to be strengthened to reinforce country-specific efforts in connecting research and education communities.



WACREN Regional Conference 2024 (Abuja, Nigeria). A platform for stakeholders from the R&E community in the West and Central Africa region to connect with each other, discuss solutions to key challenges and reflect upon the untapped potential of the Research and Education Network ecosystem. *Credit: WACREN network, 2024.*

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- <sup>12</sup> The rest of disbursements went towards energy distribution (USD 3.9 billion), energy policy (USD 2.7 billion), 803.1 million for energy generation from non-renewable sources, nuclear energy plants (USD 44.8 million) and hybrid energy plants (USD 3.3. million).
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- <sup>15</sup> *Ibidem*
- <sup>16</sup> The actors have been supported in the negotiations and implementation of the AfCFTA, in the dismantling of non-tariff and technical trade barriers, in the involvement of the private sector and the implementation of trade facilitation measures.
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## **Chapter 3 - G7 support to Food Security, Nutrition and Climate Resilience in Africa**

### **3.1 Overview of the G7 support to Food Security, Nutrition and Climate Resilience in Africa**

Food security, poverty, and nutrition trends are moving in the wrong direction. In this context, Sub-Saharan Africa stands out as the world's region with the highest rates of food insecurity and malnutrition and the least growth in agricultural productivity over the last decades.<sup>1</sup> This food and nutrition crisis has been exacerbated by climate change, conflicts, inequality and poverty, and the COVID-19 pandemic, with women as well as persons in vulnerable situations including children, bearing the brunt of its impact. Since 2022, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has yet worsened an already dire situation. Recognising the urgency to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG2) – Zero Hunger – by 2030, G7 leaders committed to enhancing global food security and nutrition, including at Elmau in 2015 and 2022, at Taormina in 2017, and focusing particularly on Africa.

The G7 plays a crucial role in supporting more sustainable and resilient food systems and addressing humanitarian food and nutrition crises in Sub-Saharan Africa. Through partnerships with international organisations and financial institutions like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), World Food Programme (WFP), and the World Bank (WB), as well as bilateral channels, G7 interventions aim to enhance food security, nutrition, and sustainable agricultural productivity in the region, while also addressing climate change, air and marine pollution, biodiversity loss and land degradation and restoration. The endorsement by the G7 members of the Emirates Declaration on Sustainable Agriculture, Resilient Food Systems, and Climate Action at the COP28 also underscores the G7 members' commitment to addressing the nexus between food security and nutrition, and climate change, especially affecting groups in vulnerable situations.

Transforming food systems towards sustainability and resilience, while attaining productivity gains, is key for achieving SDG 2 - including more sustainable agriculture and aquaculture practices respectful of biodiversity and ecosystems, sustainable food production, equitable access to safe, affordable and healthy diets, access to critical inputs such as seeds of improved and adapted varieties and fertiliser, improved global, regional and local supply chains, and decreased food loss and waste - especially as the African population continues to grow and urbanise.

Addressing the nexus between climate risks and food security and nutrition is also vital, particularly in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa, where vulnerability to natural disasters causes severe economic damage, particularly on agriculture, and exacerbates food insecurity and malnutrition.


The alarming frequency of climate-induced hazards recorded in Africa, such as droughts and floods, underscores the urgent need for proactive measures. Multi-Hazard Early

Warning Systems (MHEWS) and Climate and Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (CDRFI) serve as critical tools in enhancing resilience and ensuring food security. The G7 has spearheaded some initiatives like the V20 and G20+ led InsuResilience Global Partnership and the V20/G7 Global Shield against Climate Risks to expand access to climate risk insurance, while also supporting global initiatives such as the UN Early Warnings for All (EW4All) and the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiatives.

These initiatives have been facilitating a rapid and appropriate disaster response and recovery, supporting access to timely and reliable financing in the event of a disaster to safeguard the food security, nutrition and livelihoods of populations in vulnerable situations in Africa.


This multidimensional approach to tackling food security and nutrition is reflected in the sectors that have received G7 ODA support to enhance food security and resilience in Africa. These include Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing (USD 15.0 billion in bilateral ODA disbursements over 2015-2022 and USD 6.0 billion in multilateral ODA disbursements over 2017-2022), followed by Other Multisector (USD 10.0 billion in bilateral ODA and USD 5.3 billion in multilateral ODA), Development Food Assistance (USD 6.7 billion in bilateral ODA and USD 278.8 million in multilateral ODA), General Environment Protection (USD 5.4 billion in bilateral ODA and USD 1.5 billion in multilateral ODA) and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (USD 1.1 billion in bilateral ODA and USD 892.4 million in multilateral ODA). (see Figure 10 & 11).

**Figure 10. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to support food security, nutrition and climate resilience in Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS Net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 310, 430, 520, 410, 740). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Food security, nutrition and climate resilience in Africa”. The list might not be exhaustive. In addition, “other multisector” includes multisector aid, urban development and management, rural development, non-agricultural alternative development, Disaster Risk Reduction, food security policy and administrative management, household food security programmes, food safety and quality, multisector education/training, and research/scientific institutions.

**Figure 11. G7\* imputed multilateral ODA disbursements to support food security, nutrition and climate resilience in Africa by sector, 2017-2022 (USD million)**



\*EU disbursements not included to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7.

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS imputed multilateral estimations (Sector codes: 310, 430, 410, 740, 520). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Food security, nutrition and climate resilience in Africa”. The list might not be exhaustive. Other multisector includes multisector aid, urban development and management, rural development, non-agricultural alternative development, Disaster Risk Reduction, Food security policy and administrative management, household food security programmes, food safety and quality, multisector education/training and research/scientific institutions.

### 3.2 Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development

#### COMMITMENT 18 Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development

“As part of a broad effort involving our partner countries, and international actors, and as a significant contribution to the Post 2015 Development Agenda, we aim to lift 500 million people in developing countries out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030.

The G7 Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development Approach, as set out in the annex, will make substantial contributions to these goals”.

*Elmau 2015, Elmau Leaders' Communiqué, p. 19;*

*Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 27*

“We have therefore decided to raise our collective support for food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa through an array of possible actions, such as increasing Official Development Assistance, better targeting and measuring our respective interventions in line with food security and nutrition-related recommendations defined at Elmau and Ise-Shima, and ensuring they reach women and girls, backing efforts to attract responsible private investments and additional resources from other development stakeholders. We will encourage blended finance and public private partnerships (PPPs). We will act in line with African countries' priorities and consistently with the African Union Agenda 2063, aiming to reach also the most neglected areas and the most vulnerable people.”

*Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 30;*

*Carbis Bay 2021, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 66*

#### Overview

Food and nutrition security remains one of the most severe challenges for Sub-Saharan Africa, which is the region most affected worldwide. According to the State of Food Security and Nutrition (SOFI) in the World report, the number of people suffering from hunger in this region increased from 2021 to 2022, leading to a 22.5% share of the population in a situation of food insecurity.<sup>2</sup> Globally, 20% of children are undernourished, and nearly 50% of all child deaths are a result of malnutrition.<sup>3</sup> Of the 18 hunger “hotspots” expected to experience worsening food insecurity in 2024 in a total of 22 hunger hotspots around the world, 11 are located in Sub-Saharan countries<sup>4</sup>, mostly in the Sahel and in the Horn of Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is also the region where agriculture productivity has increased the least compared with the rest of the world during the last few decades. Women typically eat last and least due to gender inequality<sup>5</sup>, and the prevalence of anaemia in women aged 15-49 years old in Africa

reached nearly 39% in 2019, and almost 40% in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>6</sup> These figures have an impact on women as well as on persons in already vulnerable situations including children. The combination of the COVID-19 pandemic, its slow recovery, and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine weighed on this dire context, acting on a scenario already jeopardised by climate change, biodiversity loss, pollution, financial instability, conflicts, and political instability. While most progress is expected to occur in Asia, no progress is foreseen in Latin America and the Caribbean, and hunger is projected to increase significantly in Africa by 2030.<sup>7</sup>

The achievement of SDG 2 has never been so distant for Sub-Saharan Africa. Urgent, coherent, and intense action is needed to confront the above-mentioned crises and work to achieve SDG 2 before 2030. The G7 is contributing both to enhancing sustainable food systems' transformation and to tackling the most severe humanitarian food crises through emergency assistance and support to strengthen resilience in the region. Interventions are carried out in partnership with specialised international organisations (such as FAO, IFAD, WFP, World Bank, CGIAR) or through bilateral channels. The different G7 countries and the EU have also prioritised the region over the years in their respective international development cooperation strategies, working within the regional and national frameworks of African countries.

The G7 commitment to food and nutrition is also connected to infrastructure development, as contributing to sustainable food systems development and regional food trade feeds into initiatives such as the EU Global Gateway or the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.

### **Trends on hunger and all forms of malnutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa, since the baseline 2015**

Since 2010, hunger-related figures in Africa have not stopped rising. The Prevalence of Undernourishment (PoU), "an estimate of the proportion of the population whose habitual food consumption is insufficient to provide the dietary energy levels that are required to maintain a normal active and healthy life" (FAO), rose by more than 4% points since 2015.<sup>8</sup>

The impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are one of the main drivers of the current state of global hunger and all forms of malnutrition in Africa. The increase in PoU in Sub-Saharan Africa between 2019 and 2020 was 2.1% (equivalent to 29 million people), far greater than the 0.4 % increase observed between 2018 and 2019.<sup>9</sup> Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine also exacerbated the situation, by compromising the distribution and initially driving up the cost of basic food items (such as wheat) and agricultural inputs such as fertilisers, and fuelling hyper-inflation, which particularly affected low-income countries.

These two events mainly affected the cost of healthy diets, because of lockdowns, the weakening of the global, regional and local supply chains and transportation systems, and of labour shortages, which accompanied them. The cost of a healthy diet in Africa increased by more than 5% between 2020 and 2021; the largest increase in the number

of people unable to afford a healthy diet from 2019 to 2021 was reported to be in Sub-Saharan Africa (54 million more people).<sup>10</sup> Moreover, in 2023 climate-related shocks were the main drivers in 12 African countries, where 47.8 million people face high-levels of food insecurity and malnutrition.<sup>11</sup> Nonetheless, it should be noted that, in many African countries, internal conflicts remain a key contributor to food insecurity and malnutrition. As of 2021, conflicts in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Somalia, caused the destruction of livelihoods and the displacement of thousands of people, exacerbating food insecurity and malnutrition levels.<sup>12</sup>

Globally, current estimates predict that almost 600 million people will be chronically undernourished in 2030. This is about 119 million more undernourished people than in the scenario in which neither the COVID-19 pandemic nor Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine had occurred (the "projections before COVID-19" scenario) and around 23 million more than in the scenario where the war had not happened (the "projections before Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine" scenario). Africa is expected to be the continent most affected, where almost 300 million people may be facing hunger in 2030.<sup>13</sup>

Since 2019, more women have been affected by moderate or severe food insecurity than men in Africa, even though the gap is narrowing toward gender parity, with the largest decrease observed in Western Africa. Between 2020 and 2022, the prevalence of moderate or severe food insecurity for women and girls increased from 52% to 59.9%, while for men it increased from 49.8% to 58.7%.<sup>14</sup> It is also important to recognise that women are key actors in agri-food systems in Africa, where in Sub-Saharan Africa 66% of women employment is in agri-food systems, compared with 60% of men.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, women's roles tend to be marginalised and their working conditions are likely to be worse than men's – irregular, informal, part-time, low-skilled, labour intensive and thus vulnerable.<sup>16</sup>

Concerning child malnutrition, the "*Levels and trends in child malnutrition*" by United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO) and World Bank (WB) shows that the world continues to be off-track to meet the global target for 2030.<sup>17</sup>


Child stunting remains a critical challenge in Africa. If current trends continue, an estimated 128.5 million children will be stunted in 2030, 39.6 million more than the target. About half of those children will be children living in Western Africa and Central Africa. Over the last decade, the number of children with stunting increased from 55 million to 56.8 million in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>18</sup>

## **G7 ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa**

Between 2015 and 2022, the G7 ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition to Africa followed a continuous growth trajectory, with a decline in 2020. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa the macro-region constituted the world's main pool of ODA recipients for each of the years from 2015 and 2022 for the aforementioned areas of

concern. (see Figure 12). In 2022 alone, Sub-Saharan Africa received, in terms of the G7's ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition, more than the total of Europe, America, Asia and Oceania together (USD 5.7 billion versus USD 4.5 billion). In addition, from 2021, G7 ODA spending to Sub-Saharan Africa reached a level 30% above the 2015 baseline.


**Figure 12. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to agriculture, fishing, food assistance and nutrition in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and other world regions, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector and purpose codes: 311, 313, 32161, 52010, 72040, 12240).

Between 2015-2022, the sectors with the most overall increase in the region were Agro-Industries (+105.1%) and Emergency Food Assistance; with a 94.8% increase, amounting to an absolute increase of USD 1.6 billion. Agriculture (-14.4%) as well as Development Food assistance (-2.1%) saw a decrease while spending rose for all other sectors: Fishing (+53.5%) and Basic Nutrition (+6.8%). (see Figure 13).

**Figure 13. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to agriculture, fishing, food assistance and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector and purpose codes: 311, 313, 32161, 52010, 72040, 12240).

**G7 ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa with gender equality objectives**

The G7 ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa with gender equality objectives represented on average 37.2% of total ODA to agriculture, fishing, food assistance and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa. It followed an unsteady trend from 2015 to 2022. In fact, after an initial growth from 2015 (36.1%) to 2020 (41.7%) (except for a peak at 36.2% in 2019), the percentage of programmes with gender equality objectives compared to total ODA spending declined from 2020 to 2022. In 2022, it reached a level 6 percentage points lower than in 2015. (see Figure 14).

**Figure 14. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to agriculture, fishing, food assistance and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector and purpose codes: 311, 313, 32161, 52010, 72040, 12240).

**G7 ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa with climate adaptation and/or mitigation objectives**

G7 ODA spending for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa with climate adaptation and/or mitigation objectives has followed an upward trajectory from 2015 onward, experiencing a setback in 2021, coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, the percentage of ODA to these sectors with climate-related significant and principal objectives was 18.1% and 3.6%, respectively, mostly driven by projects with climate adaptation objectives. (see Figure 15).

**Figure 15. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to agriculture, fishing, food assistance and nutrition in Sub-Saharan Africa with Rio markers for Climate Change, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector and purpose codes: 311, 313, 32161, 52010, 72040, 12240).

### G7 actions to improve food security and nutrition development

**Canada** supports diverse initiatives across Sub-Saharan Africa focused on health systems and agri-food systems resilience to deliver food security, nutrition, gender equality and climate action outcomes. In response to growing food and nutrition insecurity, Global Affairs Canada’s Resilient Agri-Food Systems Framework was launched to prepare for future shocks and disruptions to agri-food systems. The Framework promotes evidence-based food systems approaches and shows how programmes can support multiple development objectives, including food security, nutrition, gender equality, inclusive growth, and climate action. Through this Framework, Canada seeks to strengthen agri-food systems’ resilience to climate, economic and conflict shocks at various scales to deliver gender-responsive outcomes. Examples of existing support include:

- In Senegal, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, Canada supports Nutrition International to provide micronutrient supplementation, nutrition education and services, and food fortification to vulnerable groups, including adolescents, pregnant women, and children. By March 2023, Nutrition International had treated 236,000 children that year in Ethiopia with zinc/ORS to prevent diarrhoea, and 740,107 adolescents in Senegal with nutrition education. Globally, Nutrition

International reached 728 million beneficiaries from April 2022 until March 2023. In Senegal, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, Canada supports Nutrition International to provide micronutrient supplementation, nutrition education and services, and food fortification to vulnerable groups, including adolescents, pregnant women, and children. By March 2023, Nutrition International had treated 236,000 children that year in Ethiopia with zinc/ORS to prevent diarrhoea, and 740,107 adolescents in Senegal with nutrition education. Globally, Nutrition International reached 728 million beneficiaries from April 2022 until March 2023

- In South Sudan, Canada is contributing to the World Food Programme's implementation of the Food Assistance for Assets programme that provides cash and food assistance to vulnerable households in exchange for work on infrastructure that improves self-reliance and resilience to shocks, such as flood dikes, and vegetable gardens. So far, more than 800,000 people (54% women and girls) have been supported by this multi-donor safety nets initiative.<sup>19</sup> Canada also supports the World Food Programme to provide 32,000 school children with nutritious school meals in Somalia and South Sudan.
- Canadian funding is also supporting gender-sensitive value chain development for agri-food small and medium enterprises, including in the rice and vegetable sector in Ethiopia's markets<sup>20</sup> and Kenya's blue economy.<sup>21</sup> Support to UNICEF's vitamin A supplementation project reached over 38 million children in 2023 with two doses across 15 Sub-Saharan Africa countries.<sup>22</sup>

In July 2023, **France** placed the support to food sovereignty as a priority of its solidarity investment policy, Africa being a key identified area. Its strategy on sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition aims at fostering integrated actions focused on five broad areas:

1. strengthen global governance on food security and nutrition
2. develop sustainable food systems, including through the promotion of agroecology, through the French development agency but also research organisms (CIRAD, IRD, INRAE, CGIAR), training programmes
3. strengthen France's action on nutrition, through the French development agency, the Muskoka Fund and the French programmed emergency assistance
4. support to the structuring of sustainable value chains, providing decent jobs in rural areas, particularly for youth
5. strengthen food assistance actions for populations in vulnerable situation and improve their resilience, along the humanitarian-development nexus.

The French feminist diplomacy is applied in a cross-cutting manner.

In Togo, the PARC project (EUR 30 million in loan over 20 years, launched in 2023) supports the building of hill reservoirs in Togo which will enable the development of irrigated agriculture and agroecology and increase food production while strengthening populations' resiliency in the face of climate change. A whole aspect of this project is dedicated specifically to women's empowerment, in their access to resources, particularly water and land.

**Germany** via the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) invests about EUR 2 billion annually in global food security and rural development, making Germany one of the biggest bilateral donors. BMZ supports the transformation of agricultural and food systems in order to reduce hunger, poverty and inequality, foster sustainable use of resources and crisis resilience.

Geographically BMZ focusses on Africa. Gender equality is a cornerstone of BMZs activities.<sup>23</sup> Some of the initiatives and programmes include:

- The global programme “Food and Nutrition security, enhanced resilience to food crises” that is implemented in 10 African countries including specific programme components on the role of women and positive masculinity.<sup>24</sup>
- The “Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme” that supports the strengthening of sustainable local agricultural production to increase crisis resilience. Nearly EUR 300 million have been invested on the African continent since 2021. Germany has supported the fund with EUR 208 million in 2022.
- Through the Global Programme Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture, 7 African countries have implemented 28 measures to realise sustainable fisheries and aquaculture including important levers to strengthen the role of women along the value chain.<sup>25</sup>

As stated in the “Three-year programming and policy planning document 2021 – 2023”, food security constitutes a key priority of the Italian Cooperation. Based on a crosscutting and inclusive approach, **Italy** aims to promote agribusiness and to support diversified and sustainable food production, increasing resilience to climate change and including targeted actions to counter the discrimination faced by women food producers in areas such as access to land, information, credit and technology.<sup>26</sup>

The ongoing initiatives of the Italian Cooperation in this field involve many African countries, such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Tunisia. For example, Italy is launching, together with the International Center for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM Bari), a project in Sudan called “MIPRO-SUD” and financed through a EUR 5.4 million grant.<sup>27</sup> The main goal is to strengthen institutional capacities in the management of water resources for agricultural use as well as to ensure technical and financial support to small local producers in the Eastern Sudanese states (Red Sea and Kassala).

Furthermore, in 2023, Italy – as host Country and co-organiser of the UN Food Systems Summit +2 – has put Africa among its priorities, elevating several issues that concern Africa especially, such as the nexus between food security and climate change.

In 2023, **Japan** exchanged notes on the provision of rice and other food items with 18 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa as part of the food aid scheme of Japan’s ODA, helping improve food security and nutrition in the region.

Japan has provided a total of approximately USD 6 million in agricultural support for securing and enhancing food security through the FAO for the year 2023 in the Sub-

Saharan African region. In addition, Japan has also committed USD 6 million to the Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS) initiative led by the FAO, the AU, and the US.

In 2023 alone, Japan provided about USD 4 million in nutrition-related assistance to six Sub-Saharan African countries through WHO and IPPF. These projects mainly target at women and children in vulnerable situations affected by drought and conflicts.

Japan has provided a total of approximately USD 2 million for development assistance projects related to nutrition and agricultural production in the Sub-Saharan African countries for the year 2023. These projects are conducted by agricultural research centres belonging to CGIAR.<sup>28</sup>

The **United Kingdom** is committed to supporting Africa to meet its future food demands through strengthening food security, markets and trade. Working with the AU, Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), and Regional Economic Communities including COMESA and ECOWAS, the UK has helped strengthen regional food trade and resilience by improving policies and infrastructure to enable movement of food from surplus to deficit areas. The UK is also an active member of the donor group supporting the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme chaired by the AU.

The UK's GBP 35 million Africa food trade and resilience programme works through AGRA to support African companies to better integrate smallholder farmers and SMEs into regional value chains; and improve the transparency and predictability of government policies to unlock regional food trade and investment. The UK has also pioneered de-risking investment solutions, most notably supporting the scale-up of AgDevCo – an impact investor dedicated to African agribusinesses.

The UK is a major humanitarian donor to sub-Saharan Africa, reaching at least 5,570,000 people between April 2022 and March 2023<sup>29</sup> with GBP 243 million ODA support in the form of food aid, cash, and vouchers (provided in 2022). The UK is working closely to monitor the impact of humanitarian crises in Africa, including any impact on food security.

BII has committed USD 630 million in support of food security across Africa, including USD 100 million in Export Trading Group (ETG), which helped to connect over 500,000 African smallholder farmers to global markets to increase agricultural yields and production of staple foods.

The **United States**, through the Feed the Future initiative, supports research and development on crop genetics, improved practices, systems wide interventions, and climate solutions to promote food security and nutrition in sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. funds agricultural R&D and sustainable agriculture practices in Sub-Saharan Africa through the CGIAR and the Nutritious Foods Financing Facility (N3F), a debt financing fund targeting MSMEs in the nutritious foods sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Accelerated Innovation Delivery Initiative (AID-I) has reached 2 million African farmers, with the improved seeds, fertiliser, and practical information needed to increase harvests.

The Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS) seeks to boost agricultural productivity and nutrition in Africa by developing diverse, climate-resilient crop varieties and building and maintaining healthy soils. The U.S. supports agricultural-led economic growth, food security, nutrition, and open trade through the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

With U.S. support, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme (GAFSP) projects have provided agricultural support also to African rural women.

In the 2014-2020 multi-annual financial framework, the **European Union** committed over EUR 10 billion to improve food security in partner countries, including EUR 6.12 billion in Africa.<sup>30</sup> In the period 2021-2027 the EU will support food systems in about 70 partner countries. For the period 2021-2024, the EU has committed EUR 8.4 billion in grants for food security, including EUR 4.5 billion for Africa. The EU also pledged EUR 2.5 billion for 2021-2024 to reduce all forms of malnutrition at the Nutrition for Growth Summit in 2021.<sup>31</sup>

The EU launched the Global Gateway Africa – Europe Investment Package in 2022. The Investment Package supports more sustainable African agri-food systems by creating a conducive and transparent policy environment for sustainable private investments, enhancing investments in support to agri-food and fish-processing, facilitating innovation and boosting improved nutrition. Examples of recent Global Gateway flagships include investments in food storage in West Africa; rehabilitation of 350Km of irrigation infrastructure in Somalia; and scaling investment in Lobito Corridor infrastructure to boost agri-value chains.<sup>32</sup>

Other initiatives in 2023 include the roll out of programmes worth almost EUR 300 million to boost sustainable food production in response to worsening food security in Sub-Saharan Africa and the implementation of additional EUR 225 million "Food and Resilience Facility" to support Northern African partners exposed to high global food prices.

## Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2015	1. (total and Sub-Saharan Africa data reported separately): Trend of hunger and malnutrition • No of people suffering from hunger, • No. of people suffering from stunting.	Alignment with SDG2 Monitoring (e.g. FAO SOFI; UNICEF-WB Stunting Database; ICN2 Progress Report, GNR).	 1 – No poverty
	2.1 Percentage of G7 member programmes on agriculture and rural development that include objectives and expected results to increase the incomes of smallholder farmers.	• G7 self-reporting, • OECD-DAC data base.	 2 – No hunger
	2.2. Percentage of resources committed to agriculture that include specific gender equality objectives.		
	2.3. G7 donors' performance standards for ODA supported investment instruments are reviewed to be aligned with the VGGT and the Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems.		
	2.4 Percentage of resources committed to agriculture that include climate adaptation and/ or mitigation objectives.		
	2.5 Resources committed to nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive interventions.		
	2.6 G7 strategic focus to strengthen linkages between short-, medium- and long-term food security and nutrition support/programmes and to enhance transition between relief and development.		
	2.7. G7 governments have provided technical support and/or funding to improve and/or expand capacities to collect, analyse, and/or use food security and nutrition indicators in support of SDG2 targets.		
	3.1 G7 members Direct Assistance for agriculture, fishing, food security and nutrition (total and Sub-Saharan Africa data reported separately).	G7 Self-reporting based on OECD-CRS codes and agreed methodology.	
	3.2 G7 members other assistance with explicit objectives to improve people's food security and/or nutrition.		

### 3.3 Climate Risk Finance, Insurance and Disaster Risk Reduction

#### COMMITMENT 35 Climate Risk Finance, Insurance and Disaster Risk Reduction

“We will intensify our support particularly for vulnerable countries’ own efforts to manage climate change related disaster risk and to build resilience.

We will aim to increase by up to 400 million the number of people in the most vulnerable developing countries who have access to direct or indirect insurance coverage against the negative impact of climate change related hazards by 2020 and support the development of early warning systems in the most vulnerable countries. To do so we will learn from and build on already existing risk insurance facilities such as the African Risk Capacity, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility and other efforts to develop insurance solutions and markets in vulnerable regions, including in small islands developing states, Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.”

*Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13, para. A;*

*Carbis Bay 2021, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 41*

#### Overview

Over the past fifty years, the frequency of recorded climate-related disasters has surged fivefold, driven in part by human-induced climate change and its adverse effects such as increasing extreme weather events and slow onset processes, with the most vulnerable and food-insecure regions bearing the brunt of the impact. Specifically, close to 12,000 extreme weather, climate, and water-related disasters were recorded worldwide between 1970 and 2021. These events resulted in the deaths of over 2 million people and caused economic losses totalling USD 4.3 trillion.<sup>33</sup> While extreme weather events and slow onset processes had significant impacts across all inhabited continents – with major floods, tropical cyclones, extreme heatwaves and droughts, with associated wildfires, being observed globally - more than 90% of the 2 million deaths attributed to climate-related disasters in the last 50 years occurred in developing countries.<sup>34</sup> Especially, least developed countries and small islands developing States are suffering a disproportionately high cost.<sup>35</sup>

Between 1970 and 2021, 1,839 disasters attributed to weather, climate and water extremes were reported in Africa. These caused 733,585 deaths – of which droughts accounted for 95% – and USD 43 billion in economic losses. Tropical cyclone Idai in March 2019 was the costliest event that occurred in Africa (USD 2.1 billion) over this period.<sup>36</sup> In 2022 alone, more than 110 million people were affected by climate-related disasters, resulting in 5000 reported fatalities, of which 48% were associated with drought and 43%

with flooding. These events also caused more than USD 8.5 billion in economic damages.<sup>37</sup>

The African continent is assessed to be one of the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate-related disasters. Recognising these needs, the African Union established in 2014 the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Group to support African governments in enhancing their capacities to plan, prepare, and respond to extreme weather events and other climate-related disasters. Operating as a specialised agency, it enables countries to strengthen their disaster risk management systems and access rapid and predictable financing when disaster strikes to protect the food security and livelihoods of their populations in vulnerable situations.

While reducing greenhouse gas emissions remains the most important measure that the G7 can take to address the risk of climate-related disasters, as the frequency and intensity of such events increases with each increment of warming, scaling up climate adaptation, disaster risk reduction (DRR) actions and disaster risk finance at local, regional, national and global levels, is a priority. In particular, early warning systems and climate risk insurance are key factors in increasing the resilience of the most climate-vulnerable communities and facilitating a rapid and appropriate disaster response and recovery.

As such, the G7 has taken steps to support its partner countries in these areas. In Elmau in 2015, the G7 launched the InsuResilience Initiative to increase access to direct or indirect insurance coverage against the impacts of climate change, initially for up to 400 million of the people in most vulnerable situations in developing countries by 2020. This initiative progressed into the InsuResilience Global Partnership, jointly launched by the V20 and G20 in 2017, with its associated “Vision 2025”, setting objectives for 2025. The G7 reaffirmed its commitment to this initiative during the Carbis Bay G7 Summit in 2021, while in 2022 at COP27 the V20 and G7 launched the Global Shield against Climate Risks, building on the InsuResilience Global Partnership and other initiatives. At Hiroshima in 2023, G7 Leaders reaffirmed their support to strengthen the resilience of climate-vulnerable groups through enhancing climate change adaptation, support for responding to loss and damage and climate disaster risk reduction, response and recovery and early-warning systems including through the Global Shield against Climate Risks and other initiatives related to early-warning systems and the adoption of climate-resilient debt clauses. The G7 confirmed that it would accelerate international disaster risk reduction cooperation in line with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and the output of its midterm review conducted by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR). In addition, the G7 Leaders emphasised the importance of a disaster preparedness approach and investment in human capital, goods and infrastructure that contribute not only to “risk transfer” but also to “risk reduction,” resulting in the strengthening of anticipatory actions. The G7 has also pledged USD 434.60 million<sup>38</sup> out of the total USD 661.30 million pledged so far to the newly established fund for responding to loss and damage, as well as other contribution for the funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage.<sup>39</sup>

To assess the effectiveness of those measures, the G7 monitors factors such as the accessibility of climate risk insurance for populations, the implementation of early

warning systems for disaster response, risk reduction and preparedness, and the support provided by the G7 to enhance the local capacities on Multi Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS) in the most vulnerable developing countries.

### **G7 support to Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance<sup>40</sup>**

Considering that Africa is very vulnerable to the impacts of climate-related disasters – the African Development Bank estimating 5 to 15% loss on Africa’s gross domestic product annually because of climate change and its related impacts - risk transfer, such as anticipatory insurance, risk pools, catastrophe bonds - have the potential to play a key role in building resilience to climate change by ensuring that financial burden caused by disasters does not directly fall on individuals, communities and countries.<sup>41</sup>

The African Risk Capacity Insurance Company Limited (ARC Ltd) has worked on providing risk transfer services through risk pooling and access to reinsurance markets, in particular to improve the response to climate-related food security emergencies (caused by droughts, tropical cyclones and river flood). Since 2014, it has provided USD 900 million of drought and tropical cyclone insurance coverage protecting over 90 million people. It also made payouts of up to USD 124 million to 10 countries following droughts and tropical cyclone disasters to directly support over 6 million people, preventing loss of lives and livelihoods.<sup>42</sup> In 2023, the ARC launched a Risk Insurance Product focused specifically on floods in Madagascar, Mozambique, Malawi, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, which should be expanded to other countries in 2024.<sup>43</sup>

In this landscape, the G7 has been supporting the ARC and has emerged as a pivotal force in advocating for and supporting Climate and Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance (CDRFI) by launching in 2015 at the Summit in Elmau the InsuResilience Initiative. By the end of 2022 the InsuResilience Global Partnership had 29 active programmes across 475 projects and 123 countries, safeguarding about 190 million individuals financially.<sup>44</sup> Through the InsuResilience Global Partnership, the G7 is currently contributing to the implementation of 17 country projects of the ARC and 11 of the ARC Replica.<sup>45</sup>

In 2022 during the G7 German Presidency, the G7 launched the Global Shield against Climate Risks with the V20, building on the InsuResilience Global Partnership and other initiatives.<sup>46</sup> The Global Shield started its work in eight pathfinder countries including Ghana, Malawi and Senegal and one region (pacific small island developing states) and also supports regional risk pools such as the ARC. Five additional Global Shield countries were announced at the last Global Shield Board Meeting in April 2024, including four on the African continent, namely The Gambia, Madagascar, Rwanda and Somalia. As of December 2023, the Global Shield raised about EUR 300 million in donor funding. Following the COP27 decision of establishing new funding arrangements for responding to loss and damage, at COP28, the V20/G7 Global Shield against Climate Risks was explicitly acknowledged as one of the mechanisms to enhance the response to loss and damage.<sup>47</sup>

The G7 has contributed to CDRFI in Africa through the Global Shield and other bilateral initiatives, including:

**Canada** supports the Strengthening Climate Risk Management in Africa Project and contributes to the African Risk Capacity (ARC) Agency.<sup>48</sup> Additionally, Canada provided CAD 7 million to the Global Shield Financing Facility, to help make climate-vulnerable countries more resilient and protect the lives and livelihoods of the most vulnerable by strengthening the Global Climate Risk Finance and Insurance Architecture.

Through the AFD, **France** has contributed EUR 20 million in grant funding to the Global Shield - Solutions Platform (2023) and EUR 5 million to the ARC Group.<sup>49</sup>

At COP27, **Germany** announced a contribution of around EUR 170 million to the Global Shield and complementary programmes.<sup>50</sup> Through the Tripartite Agreement (TPA) with UNDP and the Insurance Development Forum, Germany is also scaling up CDRFI solutions for people in vulnerable situations in 22 countries underpinned by an offered risk-capacity of USD 5 billion from the insurance industry partners. This includes 6 African countries, namely Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Mozambique, Madagascar and Ethiopia.<sup>51</sup>

**Japan** contributed JPY 800 million to the Global Shield Financing Facility in 2023 and JPY 685 million in March 2024.

The **United Kingdom** is playing its part in delivering the Global Shield, acting on its pledge of GBP 120 million to Disaster Risk Finance (DRF) made at Carbis Bay in 2021. This includes capital investments in regional risk pools in Africa (see UK case study) which, alongside premium subsidies, help countries, public utilities and humanitarian agencies afford the cover they need to respond better and earlier to disasters. Technical assistance through the World Bank and the Centre for Disaster Protection (CDP) helps countries identify the risks they are facing and put in place pre-arranged finance to respond.

FSD Africa (Financial Sector Deepening Africa) is the UK's specialised institution aiming to mobilise green finance and find innovative solutions to protect people against impacts of climate change, such as floods, droughts and tropical cyclones. For example, they worked with insurers, reinsurers, and brokers, helping them to pledge to underwrite USD 14 billion of cover for climate risks by 2030, as part of the African Climate Risk Facility (ACRF) – the first commitment of its kind. ACRF will protect 1.4 billion Africans.

The **United States** provides support to the Africa Disaster Risk Financing Programme (ADRIFI), ARC Ltd, and ARC Replica, all of which work together to help African member countries cope with extreme weather events, food insecurity, and other issues exacerbated by climate change.<sup>52</sup>

The **European Union** has provided EUR 49 million to climate risk finance. The EU has already provided EUR 9 million grant to the African Risk Capacity (ARC), and it will now mobilise additional EUR 10 million. The EU has also pledged EUR 30 million to the Global Shield against Climate Risks.<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, in the context of the Global Gateway Team

Europe Initiative (TEI) on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience in Africa launched at COP27 in 2022, the EU will promote Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance (CDRFI) mechanisms to protect populations in vulnerable situations against residual risks.

### **G7 support to early warning systems**

An integral aspect of reducing risk of climate-related disasters involves the establishment of operational multi-hazard early warning systems.<sup>54</sup> Multi-hazard early warning systems (MHEWS) are a proven, effective and feasible climate adaptation measure that saves lives and provides at least a tenfold return on investment.<sup>55</sup>

Therefore, the African Union has adopted an Institutional and Operational Framework for a Multi-Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (MHEWAS) to guide multi-agency and multisectoral coordination and communications structures in this area of work at the Member State, Regional and Continental level.<sup>56</sup> In addition, following UN Secretary General's call for Early Warning for All, the Multi-hazard Early Warning for All Action Plan for Africa (2023-2027) was developed and unveiled at the Africa Climate Summit in September 2023.<sup>57</sup>

The Global Status of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems 2023 report outlines the progress that has been made under the Early Warnings for All (EW4All) initiative. It highlights that Sub-Saharan Africa has doubled its early warning systems coverage - 20 countries (or almost 45% of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa) reported having MHEWS by 2022, compared with only 9 countries (20%) reporting having MHEWS in 2015- but still falls below the global average.<sup>58</sup>

Since 2015, G7 members have been providing support to vulnerable countries by funding the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiative. Launched by France at COP21 in 2015, CREWS is an innovative pooled financing mechanism - implemented in collaboration between WMO, World Bank/GFDRR and UNDRR - that aims to significantly increase access to early warnings and risk information in LDCs and SIDS. As of April 2024, total contributions to the CREWS Trust Fund amounted to USD 125 million, against an initial target to raise USD 100 million by 2020.<sup>59</sup> In 2022 alone, 111 million more people in 15 countries globally were covered by new early warning and forecasting services. CREWS contributes to the objectives of the Early Warning for All and responds to the priority capacity gaps and needs identified in the Early Warnings for All Action Plan.

As of 2022, 36 African countries were assisted through CREWS, 4 regional programmes, 7 country programmes and 2 accelerated support interventions were registered, allowing to expand sand and dust forecasts to six additional African countries and reducing the risk for 90 million more people. Hydro-met related decrees in DR Congo, Mozambique and Togo also laid legal foundations for early warning.<sup>60</sup>

Furthermore, the G7 contributes to the Green Climate Fund (GCF), which has invested USD 1,045 million in climate Information and early warning systems through 80 projects of which 37 in Africa (USD 544 million).<sup>61</sup>

Lastly, there is great potential to link climate and disaster risk insurance solutions with early warning systems. The above-mentioned Global Shield against Climate Risks and early warning systems can complement and strengthen each other. While early warning systems can help to collect data and to anticipate risks and can thus contribute to their mitigation, CDRFI instruments provide financial protection for unavoidable, residual risks through their pre-arranged finance approach. For example, the Global Shield can facilitate implementation of risk financing instruments linked to early warning systems, by utilising the provided weather data to improve pre-arranged finance solutions and the provided extreme weather forecasts for trigger-based, anticipatory pay-outs.

The G7 has contributed to MHEWS in Africa through the CREWS, GCF and other bilateral initiatives, including:

**Canada** contributes to CREWS. In addition, it supports the Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) Forecast-Based Action, which is a funding mechanism operating mainly in Africa and specifically designed to fund forecast-based Early Action Protocols developed by Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 2018.<sup>62</sup>

**France** contributes to CREWS annually and, in the context of the Early Warnings for All initiative, has doubled its contribution which amounts to EUR 4 million per year. The contribution of France to CREWS represents EUR 38 million in 2016-2023.

**Germany** has contributed EUR 18 million to CREWS and is also supporting the Early Warning for All Initiative, including its implementing partners such as SOFF, politically.

**Italy's** Agency for Cooperation and Development (AICS) supports the project "Climate Change: early warning and civil protection for floods and drought in Sudan – APIS. The Italian Ministry of Environment and Energy Security has supported the development of EWS in countries like Ethiopia, ESwatini, the Maldives and Botswana. In addition, Italy has financed the establishment of the Africa Multi-hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) Situation Room at the African Union Commission (AUC).<sup>63</sup>

**Japan** has been leading discussions to raise awareness of early warning systems since immediately after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and supported the UN Early Warnings Initiative "Early Warnings for All".<sup>64</sup> In terms of bilateral assistance, Japan has been providing supports for capacity building in meteorological observation and forecasting and warning, mainly in Asia. In terms of multilateral support, Japan has been contributing to the international dissemination of "Early Warnings for All" through financial contributions to the UNDRR, UNDP, UNITAR and others.

The **United Kingdom** provides leadership and expert advice across multiple global initiatives, sitting on the advisory panel of the UNSG's Early Warning for All (EW4A) initiative and serving as the Steering Committee Chair of CREWS - contributing over GBP 9 million to this to date including GBP 5 million at COP28. The UK co-chairs and

funds the Risk Informed Early Action Partnership (REAP) launched in 2019 to bring together stakeholders across climate, humanitarian and development communities to enable effective early action. Since 2015, the UK Met Office's Weather and Climate Information Services programme (WISER) has helped people to plan and prepare for extreme weather, seasonal events, and climate change. Under the WISER Africa Programme, 3.3 million households across 14 countries in sub-Saharan Africa now have improved access to weather and climate information services.


The **United States** supports the Systematic Observations Financing Facility (SOFF), with its initial contribution in 2022 focused specifically on the African continent. In addition, through the President's Emergency Plan for Adaptation and Resilience (PREPARE), the United States is responding to the UN Secretary General's call for Early Warning for All, including in Africa. Additionally, U.S. government investments have supported the development of early warning systems for climate hazards throughout Africa, such as through the implementation of flash flood guidance systems in partnership with the World Meteorological Organization and National Meteorological and Hydrological Services, the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET); SERVIR; and Climate Smart and Weather Ready Nations.

The **European Union** supports and has funded several actions on EWS in the past years and across developing countries, with a strong focus on Africa, in cooperation with the authorities of partner countries. Notably, examples include Copernicus, the EU's Earth Observation Programme, that provides several detections, monitoring information and alert systems with a global scale that can be fully accessed anywhere in the world, at no cost for end-users (which includes European and global observation, information and awareness systems on wildfires, floods and droughts). Other key examples of programmes funded by the EU supporting EWS include the EUR 85 million "Climate Services and Related Applications Programme (ClimSA)" of which EUR 52 million are allocated to Africa; the EUR 100 million "Intra-ACP Natural Disaster Risk Reduction Programme" which includes a EUR 10 million contribution to CREWS, channelled via the GFDRR of the World Bank; the EUR 28.3 million "Global Monitoring for Environment & Security (GMES) & Africa"; The Space and Earth Observation in Africa flagship to which the Global Gateway TEI on Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience also contributes with EUR 20 million provided as part of the first implementation batch of the EU-AU Space cooperation programme; the Sub-Saharan Africa Programme Scientific and Technological Support to Regional Centres of Excellence.

### **G7 ODA to support multi-hazard response preparedness<sup>65</sup> in Africa**

The G7 support to multi-hazard response preparedness in Africa amounted to almost USD 131.7 million in 2022. This represents more than 35% increase compared to 2015 (36.2%). Throughout these 8 years, the total contribution of the G7 to multi-hazard response preparedness in Africa amounted to more than USD 1 billion. Major contributors over 2015-2022 were the United Kingdom (40.8%), the EU (32.2%) and the United States (12.6%). (see Figure 16).


**Figure 16. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to multi-hazard response preparedness in Africa, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose code 74020).

Due in large part to gender inequities, women are disproportionately affected by climate-related disasters.<sup>66</sup> These gender dynamics include for example the fact that 71% of men receive early warning from a formal source, while 51% of women access warnings through informal and social sources.<sup>67</sup> In recognition that women and girls’ empowerment is fundamental for building communities’ resilience to extreme climate events, the G7 has reviewed its ODA spending for multi-hazard response preparedness in Africa with a gender equality objective. Overall, less than half of the financed multi-hazard response preparedness spending had a gender equality dimension over the period 2015-2022 (43.2% with a significant or principal gender equality objective). In particular, a notable decline in ODA contributions was observed between 2015 and 2018 – from 56.1% to 26.2%. While there has been progress over the past four years, resulting in a return to a 45.3% level in 2022, there is room for improvement in this regard. (see Figure 17).

**Figure 17. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to multi-hazard response preparedness in Africa with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose code 74020).

**Methodology**

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2015	<p>1. Number of additional people in most vulnerable countries with access to risk insurance.</p> <p>2. Number of most vulnerable developing countries where early warning systems (for disaster prevention and preparedness) are promoted.</p> <p>3. G7 support to strengthen multi hazard early warning systems (MHEWS) capacities in the most vulnerable developing countries.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• “InsuResilience” initiative</li> <li>• Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) initiative</li> <li>• OECD-DAC (72040)</li> <li>• World Meteorological Organisation</li> <li>• Sendai Framework</li> </ul>	 <p>1 – No poverty</p>  <p>2 – No hunger</p>  <p>13 – Climate Action</p>

### 3.4 Case Studies

#### **UNITED STATES - Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development**



#### **Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS)**

The Vision for Adapted Crops and Soils (VACS), launched by the United States and co-sponsored by the African Union (AU) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN, is a movement that aims to foster more resilient and nutritious food systems, starting in Africa and in line with the Elmau, Taormina, and Carbis Bay commitments, by focusing on the fundamentals of food security: climate-adapted crop varieties and healthy, fertile soils.

VACS is bringing together a global coalition to identify and elevate African opportunity crops and to catalyse their improvement and adaptation, to get improved seeds and land management practices into farmers' hands and minds, and to bring improved agricultural products to market. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), CGIAR, and FAO established funding mechanisms to finance the long-term work of VACS and are working to integrate VACS objectives into their institutions' respective programmatic strategies and organisational strategic planning. G7 members Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and others have made major financial commitments to invest in VACS to promote lasting food security. The VACS Champions Program is elevating the work of non-governmental entities in pursuing VACS objectives, and the VACS Community of Practice is bringing interested parties of all stripes together to discuss relevant issues and to identify crosscutting innovative solutions. VACS has leveraged this coalition to improve food security by boosting FAO soil mapping efforts, providing technical assistance to African smallholder farmers through the VACS-aligned Southern Africa Accelerated Innovation Delivery Initiative (AID-I) Rapid Delivery Hub funded by the United States Government Feed the Future Initiative, and publishing two key reports on African opportunity crops and climate change that will help guide future investment priorities.

VACS grew into a global movement in part due to its flexibility. VACS has welcomed multiple avenues for collaboration as well as financing, which has enabled partner countries, donors, the private sector, and NGOs options to contribute to the movement. The VACS research agenda on crop varieties leveraged experts across several disciplines including nutrition, climate change, crop breeding, government, market-orientation, and more. This diverse body of representatives enabled organic discussion and problem solving which was key to strengthening the project's outcomes.

VACS will continue to catalyse a global movement toward achieving food security in the face of climate change. Under the leadership of the Italian Presidency, the G7 will make major commitments to advance VACS goals.



Baskets of African crops in a Nairobi market.  
*Credit: Modified from Philou1000/Olga Korica/Bapi Ray/Shutterstock*

## UNITED KINGDOM - Climate Risk Reduction and Insurance



### African Risk Capacity: How the UK is reducing the cost of climate change in Africa?

The UK and other donors helped set up African Risk Capacity (ARC), a Specialised Agency of the AU, to provide disaster risk insurance across Africa. Member governments buy insurance cover as a group (a 'risk pool'), to protect their countries against climate-related disasters, making prices cheaper than is possible through commercial contracts. Payouts are triggered by pre-agreed criteria such as a harvest failure – with funds linked to a pre-agreed plan to ensure they are targeted and timely. By responding quickly, countries pre-empt damage and help families cope with shocks and protect livelihoods and health.

The UK continues to support countries by subsidising their premiums through the African Disaster Risk Finance (ADRFi) Programme at the African Development Bank. Since 2014, ARC has transferred USD 1.2 billion of climate risks from African Governments to insurance markets, with cover provided for 30 million people per year. It has paid out more than USD 170 million to disaster-hit member states. Madagascar, for example, received USD 11.5 million following drought and tropical cyclone in 2022 as a result of just USD 1.5 million premiums supported by the UK, and a further USD 1.2 million last year in the wake of Cyclone Freddy.

ARC also insures other initiatives, including the World Bank's Shock Responsive Social Protection in Malawi and its 'DRIVE' programme ("The De-risking, Inclusion and Value Enhancement of Pastoral Economies in the Horn of Africa"), which protected 170,000 climate-vulnerable farmers in the Horn of Africa in its first year, including payouts of close to USD 3.5 million in Kenya and Ethiopia.

With support from the UK and other G7 members, ARC has expanded to offer 'Replica' insurance policies so that UN bodies and aid agencies can also benefit from ARC's more cost-effective offer. Start Network (a network of NGOs ranging from local to international), for example, received more than USD 10 million in 2019 under its ARC Replica drought policy in Senegal. That enabled enriched flour and cash transfers to reach more than 335,000 people across seven regions at pace.

Of the ten ARC countries that the UK, Germany, USA and Canada currently support with premium subsidies, seven of them are fragile or conflict-affected - including Somalia and in the Sahel - defying the assumption that this sort of mechanism is not viable in such settings.

ARC is now pushing to expand cover across Africa. The more countries that join, the more impactful the risk pooling effect - and the better the insurance prices for everyone. And it works. New research from the World Food Programme found

payouts through its ARC Replica programme in Mali enabled communities to purchase essential food items more quickly after a failed harvest, saving up to 20% of their costs, with the most significant savings in years when drought occurred.



A beneficiary of African Risk Capacity (ARC) and Africa Disaster Risk Financing Programme (ADRFi) explains how insurance payouts helped her and her family survive food shortages after the 2022 drought devastated crops in Madina Angaleh village, Kiang Central District, Lower River Region, The Gambia.

*Credit: African Development Bank.*

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- <sup>8</sup> *Ibidem* p. 9
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- <sup>27</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, Steering Board of the Development Cooperation. *List of approved initiatives 30 March 2023*. Pp. 76-77. Retrieved from: [Elenco\\_Delibere\\_e\\_Pareri\\_II\\_Riunione\\_CC\\_30.03.2023-1.pdf](https://www.esteri.it/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Elenco_Delibere_e_Pareri_II_Riunione_CC_30.03.2023-1.pdf) (esteri.it)
- <sup>28</sup> Japanese Supplementary Budget for FY2023
- <sup>29</sup> FCDO (2023). *FCDO humanitarian and social protection results, April 2022 to March 2023*. Retrieved from: [www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-humanitarian-and-social-protection-results-april-2022-to-march-2023](https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fcdo-humanitarian-and-social-protection-results-april-2022-to-march-2023)

<sup>30</sup> European Commission (2022). *EU support to sustainable agri-food systems in partner countries 2014-2020*. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/52b21b77-8be1-11ed-999b-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-278426104>

<sup>31</sup> European Commission. *Bi-annual progress report on EU nutrition commitments*. Retrieved from: [https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/publication/action-plan-nutrition-seventh-progress-report-april-2021-%E2%80%93-march-2022\\_en](https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/publication/action-plan-nutrition-seventh-progress-report-april-2021-%E2%80%93-march-2022_en)

<sup>32</sup> European Commission. *EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package*. Retrieved from: [https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-region/initiatives-Sub-Saharan-africa/eu-africa-global-gateway-investment-package\\_en](https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/initiatives-region/initiatives-Sub-Saharan-africa/eu-africa-global-gateway-investment-package_en)

<sup>33</sup> World Meteorological Organisation (2023). *Economic costs of weather-related disasters soars but early warnings save lives*. Retrieved from: <https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/economic-costs-of-weather-related-disasters-soars-early-warnings-save-lives>

<sup>34</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>36</sup> World Meteorological Organisation (2023). *Economic costs of weather-related disasters soars but early warnings save lives*. Retrieved from: <https://wmo.int/news/media-centre/economic-costs-of-weather-related-disasters-soars-early-warnings-save-lives>

<sup>37</sup> World Meteorological Organisation (2023). *State of the Climate in Africa 2022*. Retrieved from: <https://wmo.int/publication-series/state-of-climate-africa-2022>

<sup>38</sup> Canada announced CAD 16 million (USD 11.60 million), the European Commission EUR 25 million (USD 27.10 million), Germany USD 100 million, France EUR 100 million (USD 108.90 million), Italy EUR 100 million (USD 108.90 million), Japan USD 10 million, United Kingdom GBP 40 million (USD 50.60 million) and the United States of America USD 17.50 million)

<sup>39</sup> UNFCCC. *Pledges to the Loss and Damage Fund*. Retrieved from: <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/funds-and-financial-entities/loss-and-damage-fund-joint-interim-secretariat/pledges-to-the-loss-and-damage-fund>

<sup>40</sup> Climate and Disaster Risk Finance and Insurance (CDRFI) refers to all financial instruments and strategies that aim to improve the financial preparedness and resilience of individuals and communities in the face of climate and natural hazards. CDRFI is a component of Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management and has gained significant importance in the past years.

<sup>41</sup> UNDP (2022). *How insurance and risk finance can build climate resilience in Africa*. Retrieved from: <https://irff.undp.org/blog/how-insurance-and-risk-finance-can-build-climate-resilience-africa>

<sup>42</sup> AU. *African Risk Capacity. Celebrating 10 years of service towards building a resilient Africa 2012-2022*. Retrieved from: <https://au.int/en/newsevents/20220901/african-risk-capacity-celebrating-10-years-service-towards-building-resilient>

<sup>43</sup> African Risk Capacity (2023). *African Risk Capacity launches the first Flood Risk Insurance Product in Africa*. Retrieved from: <https://www.arc.int/news/african-risk-capacity-launches-first-flood-risk-insurance-product-africa>

<sup>44</sup> Global Shield. Retrieved From: <https://www.globalshield.org/resources/faq/>

<sup>45</sup> InsuResilience Secretariat. *Annual Report 2022*. Retrieved from: [https://www.insuresilience.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Annual\\_report22\\_230503-005.pdf](https://www.insuresilience.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Annual_report22_230503-005.pdf)

<sup>46</sup> InsuResilience Global Partnership Governance has been merged into and replaced by Global Shield structures since May 2023, with the Global Shield Board replacing the High-Level Consultative Group, the Programme Alliance transformed into the Global Shield Coordination Hub, and the InsuResilience Global Partnership Secretariat is transitioning to the Global Shield Secretariat. However, Vision 2025 will be continued as a work item under the Global Shield Board, ensuring continuous commitment towards its targets by InsuResilience Global Partnership programmes and donors, and corresponding tracking of indicators by the Global Shield Secretariat. See <https://www.globalshield.org/resources/faq/>

<sup>47</sup> The Decision states that "Initiatives such as Early Warnings for All, Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems, the Systematic Observations Financing Facility and the Global Shield against Climate Risks are welcome, and relevant actors are encouraged to increase their support for activities that enhance response to loss and damage" See <https://unfccc.int/documents/636618>

<sup>48</sup> *Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: Canada*. Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127580.pdf>

<sup>49</sup> *Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: France*. Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127583.pdf>

<sup>50</sup> *Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: Germany*. Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127585.pdf>

<sup>51</sup> Tripartite Agreement. Retrieved from: <https://irff.undp.org/sites/default/files/2022-11/tripartite-agreement-221114.pdf>

<sup>52</sup> *Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: United States*. Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127589.pdf>

<sup>53</sup> <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000133921.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> UNDRRR defines multi-hazard early warning systems as integrated systems that address several hazards and/or impacts of similar or different type in contexts where hazardous events may occur alone, simultaneously, cascadingly or cumulatively over time, and taking into account the potential interrelated effects.

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<sup>55</sup>Data shows that countries with limited to moderate MHEWS coverage have a nearly six-times-higher disaster-related mortality ratio compared with that in the countries with substantial to comprehensive coverage (4.05 mortality per 100,000 population, compared with 0.71). Similarly, countries with limited to moderate MHEWS coverage have nearly five times more disaster-affected people than countries with substantial to comprehensive coverage (3,132 compared with 688). See <https://www.undrr.org/media/91954/download?startDownload=true>

<sup>56</sup> AU (2022). *Institutional and operational framework for multi-hazard early warning and early action system for Africa*. Retrieved from: <https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/africa-multi-hazard-early-warning-and-early-action-system>

<sup>57</sup>World Meteorological Organization, UNDRR, AU, ITU and IFRC. Multi- Hazard Early Warning for All – Africa Action Plan 2023-2027. Retrieved from: [https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/3b6a731d-ab08-4d8c-97c7-6f91160b2204/content?authentication-](https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/3b6a731d-ab08-4d8c-97c7-6f91160b2204/content?authentication-token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJlaWQiOiI1MTk2YzgwOC1hZmUxLTQ1YWVtYjBIZiJyZzE4OGE1ZWQxMmY1LCJzZyI6WylwMzViNWZlOC00ODc0LTRiMTgtOGNjNy0yYzdmYTlwZWm4NWliXSwiYXV0aGVudCJlYXRpb25NZXRpb2Q1OiJzZGFwiwiXzhwIjoxNzA1NTY4NDY0fQ.WAClunCAkGAKHrUqObrVvhi_W7dUA-L-4n9EsxrXjNE)

[token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJlaWQiOiI1MTk2YzgwOC1hZmUxLTQ1YWVtYjBIZiJyZzE4OGE1ZWQxMmY1LCJzZyI6WylwMzViNWZlOC00ODc0LTRiMTgtOGNjNy0yYzdmYTlwZWm4NWliXSwiYXV0aGVudCJlYXRpb25NZXRpb2Q1OiJzZGFwiwiXzhwIjoxNzA1NTY4NDY0fQ.WAClunCAkGAKHrUqObrVvhi\\_W7dUA-L-4n9EsxrXjNE](https://cgspace.cgiar.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/3b6a731d-ab08-4d8c-97c7-6f91160b2204/content?authentication-token=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJlaWQiOiI1MTk2YzgwOC1hZmUxLTQ1YWVtYjBIZiJyZzE4OGE1ZWQxMmY1LCJzZyI6WylwMzViNWZlOC00ODc0LTRiMTgtOGNjNy0yYzdmYTlwZWm4NWliXSwiYXV0aGVudCJlYXRpb25NZXRpb2Q1OiJzZGFwiwiXzhwIjoxNzA1NTY4NDY0fQ.WAClunCAkGAKHrUqObrVvhi_W7dUA-L-4n9EsxrXjNE)

<sup>58</sup> UNDRR and World Meteorological Organization (2023). *Global Status of Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems*. Retrieved from: <https://www.undrr.org/media/91954/download?startDownload=true>

<sup>59</sup> The World Bank. *Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS)*. Retrieved from: <https://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/dfi/fiftrustee/fund-detail/crews>

<sup>60</sup> World Meteorological Organization, GFDRR, the World Bank and UNDRR (2023). *Annual Report 2022*. Retrieved from: [https://www.developmentaid.org/api/frontend/cms/file/2023/06/CREWS\\_AR\\_2022\\_EN.pdf](https://www.developmentaid.org/api/frontend/cms/file/2023/06/CREWS_AR_2022_EN.pdf)

<sup>61</sup> Green Climate Fund. Retrieved from: <https://data.greenclimate.fund/public/dashboard/sectoral-guide/approved-individual/sectoral-guides-in-countries>

<sup>62</sup>*Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: Canada*. Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127580.pdf>

<sup>63</sup> *Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: Italy*. Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127586.pdf>

<sup>64</sup> *Comprehensive Support from Disaster Prevention to Disaster Relief and Recovery Assistance. Country Sheet: Japan.* Retrieved from: <https://www.env.go.jp/content/000127587.pdf>

<sup>65</sup> Note that this OECD purpose code (74020) encompasses MHEWS and CDRFI

<sup>66</sup> Note that to tackle this issue, the “Gender Action Plan to Support Implementation of the Sendai Framework” (Sendai GAP) was launched in New York on 18 March 2024 in the margins of the 68th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW68).

<sup>67</sup> UNDRR. *UNDRR Focus Areas: disaster risk reduction in action – Gender inequality*. Retrieved from: <https://www.undrr.org/gender>

## **Chapter 4 - G7 support to Social Services, Education and Women's Empowerment in Africa**

### **4.1 Overview of the G7 support to Social Services, Education and Women's Empowerment in Africa**

Progress towards achieving SDG 4 (Quality Education) and SDG 5 (Gender Equality) within the framework of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is interconnected and mutually reinforcing. Effective social policies can be instrumental in empowering individuals, breaking the cycle of poverty, and advancing towards sustainable development, including by ensuring equal access to inclusive quality education and promoting gender transformative approaches within economic, social, educational and health systems.

Although there has been significant progress in increasing access to education across Africa, many challenges still prevail, and the African Union has declared 2024 as the Year of Education with the theme- "Educate an African fit for the 21st Century: Building resilient education systems for increased access to inclusive, lifelong, quality, and relevant learning in Africa". While the majority of upper-middle- and high-income countries are achieving their national targets of nearly universal enrolment for adolescents in lower secondary school age, low- and lower-middle-income countries, primarily from Sub-Saharan Africa, are facing challenges. As many as 40% of countries with available data have made no progress since 2015.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the COVID -19 pandemic created a major learning crisis, which affected around 300 million learners in Africa who did not attend school for over a year and hindered progress towards SDG 4.<sup>2</sup> In this context, millions of children still lack access to quality education due to factors such as poverty, conflicts, emergencies, child labour, and related forms of exploitation. Although there has been tremendous improvement in expanding access to basic education, its quality may remain low, contributing to poor learning outcomes. The World Bank reports that 89% of African children's learning is "poor"- as they are unable to read and understand a basic text at age 10 or when they complete third grade.<sup>3</sup> In this context, technology, when integrated into classroom instruction, - such as internet connectivity, digital learning platforms, mobile-based educational content, and distance learning programmes - can play a transformative role in expanding access to education and improving learning outcomes in Africa.<sup>4</sup>


Addressing gender disparities is essential to further expanding access to quality education. Promoting girls' education and literacy is a key precondition for gender equality and women's empowerment, and specifically for countering gender discrimination and enhancing women's access to equal opportunities for employment and entrepreneurship, as well as overcoming obstacles such as unequal pay and limited access to credit and resources. Yet the World Bank recorded that even if African countries have succeeded in closing the gender gap in primary education, only 29% of children are enrolled in secondary schools at a grade appropriate for their age and that

a third of teenage girls are out of school, increasing their exposure to gender-based violence.<sup>5</sup> At the same time, education is key to empowering women economically and can enhance productivity, drive economic growth, and reduce poverty, in line with key priorities of the African Union Strategy on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (GEWE) 2018-2028<sup>6</sup> as well as the African Development Bank Gender Strategy 2021-2025.<sup>7</sup> Increasing women's representation in political decision-making processes and enhancing active political participation of women and girls in all their diversity is crucial to effectively tackle discriminatory laws and practices for a gender inclusive governance, for example for the definition and implementation of social protection programmes and to ensure women and girls' access to healthcare services, including sexual and reproductive health services, maternal and child health services, and preventive care.<sup>8</sup>

In past G7 Summits, the Leaders committed to improving education inclusiveness, quality, gender equality, and women's empowerment by achieving complementary targets and monitoring their progress through common indicators within a set timeframe, focusing in particular on the Sahel region "to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems, thus increasing our coordination and our political and financial support to education, including basic education"<sup>9</sup> and "to overcome discrimination, sexual harassment, violence against women and girls and other cultural, social, economic and legal barriers to women's economic participation"<sup>10</sup> also through "the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA) initiative including through the Women Entrepreneurs-Finance Initiative (We-Fi)<sup>11</sup> the 2X Challenge and bilateral programmes supported by the G7".<sup>12</sup>


In addition to the education and gender equality sectors, the G7 is also an active contributor in Africa to the social sector at large, with interventions impacting upon welfare and healthcare policies and services. In fact, the largest G7 bilateral ODA (2015-2022) and multilateral ODA (2017-2022) to Africa was registered for Population Policies/Programmes & Reproductive Health (USD 32.2 billion for bilateral ODA and USD 8.3 billion for multilateral ODA) and Health (USD 23.3 billion for bilateral ODA and USD 18.3 billion for multilateral ODA), followed by Education (USD 21.0 billion for bilateral ODA and USD 2.9 billion for multilateral ODA), and Water Supply and Sanitation (USD 8.7 billion for bilateral ODA and USD 3.7 billion for multilateral ODA) and Social Infrastructures and Services (USD 6.8 billion for bilateral ODA and USD 3.9 billion for multilateral ODA). (see Figures 18 & 19).

**Figure 18. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to support social services and women’s empowerment in Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 120, 130, 110, 160, 140). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Social Services and Women’s Empowerment in Africa”. The list might not be exhaustive.

**Figure 19. G7\* imputed multilateral ODA disbursements to support social services and women’s empowerment in Africa by sector, 2017-2022 (USD million)**



\*EU disbursements not included to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7.

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS imputed multilateral estimations (Sector codes: 120, 130, 110, 160, 140). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Social Services and Women’s Empowerment in Africa”. The list might not be exhaustive.

## 4.2 Basic Education in the Sahel

### COMMITMENT 21 Basic Education in the Sahel

“We recall that 3 million children are still deprived of access to primary school in the Sahel region, due in particular to the closure of schools in conflict-affected areas, and that the quality of teaching remains a significant issue.

We will continue our engagement in support of education and will encourage partner countries’ governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems, thus increasing our coordination and our political and financial support to education, including basic education. We encourage the commitment of G5 Sahel countries for improved education systems and policies, with an emphasis on gender equality, which remains an overarching need.”

*Biarritz 2019, Sahel partnership Action Plan, para. 15*

### Overview

The G5 Sahel was a regional organisation established in 2015 to foster cooperation among five countries in the Sahel region of Africa: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.<sup>13</sup> Between 2022 and 2023 Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger announced their withdrawal from the Group of Five for the Sahel mechanism, followed by the decision of Chad and Mauritania to dissolve the Group in December 2023.<sup>14</sup>

The primary aim of G5 Sahel was to address common challenges such as security threats, terrorism, transnational crime, and economic development. G5 Sahel, in addition to its focus on security concerns, also placed significant emphasis on development and education: recognising the importance of education in promoting long-term stability, economic growth, and social cohesion, G5 Sahel initiated various programmes and projects aimed at improving access to quality education across the region.

During the 2019 Summit in Biarritz, the G7 pledged to support education and encouraged the former G5 Sahel countries and other donors to strengthen their education systems. Given the timeframe of this report, to track progress on these commitments, the G7 monitored contextual indicators and their own contributions. The former G5 Sahel countries' contextual indicators for education include the net enrolment rate, proportion of teachers with the minimum required qualifications, and share of government spending. Indicators measuring G7 contributions include G7 bilateral ODA to basic education in former G5 Sahel countries, the proportion of humanitarian appeals in education funded by the G7 in these countries, and G7 actions and good practices to encourage former G5 Sahel countries' governments and other donors to strengthen education systems collectively.

## Net enrolment in primary and secondary education in the former G5 Sahel countries

In 2018-2022 (2023 for Niger), net enrolment rates in primary education in the former G5 Sahel countries have on average varied from rates ranging between 56.3–75.7%. (see Table 1). Enrolment is significantly lower at higher levels of education, recording several differences among former G5 Sahel countries. The enrolment rates range between 24.9–66.9% for lower secondary and 10–38.1% for upper secondary education.<sup>15</sup>

**Table 1. Net enrolment rates at different educational levels in the former G5 Sahel countries**

Country	Primary (%)	Lower Secondary (%)	Upper Secondary (%)	Years of reference
Burkina Faso	75.7	54.8	33	2018
	74.3	52.2	33.3	2019
	71.6	51.4	32.3	2020
	71	50.5	31.4	2021
	67.8	46.2	26.7	2022
Chad	72.6	40.3	21.8	2018
	71.6	38.2	22.9	2019
	-	-	-	2020
	74.1	41.2	25.4	2021
	75.3	-	24.5	2022
Mali	56.3	44.7	23.6	2018
Mauritania	72.6	58.9	35.6	2018
	69.4	66.9	38.1	2019
Niger	59.3	33.3	13.3	2018
	61.9	29.8	13.4	2019
	-	-	-	2020
	60.8	28.1	12.5	2021
	60.8	26.9	11.6	2022
	60.4	24.9	10	2023

Source: Data.UIS.unesco.org (March 2024)

## Qualification of teachers in the former G5 Sahel countries

In relation to all five former G5 countries, data concerning the qualification of teachers are available for the period 2019-2022 in relation to pre-primary, primary, lower secondary and upper secondary education. In Burkina Faso, a decrease in required qualification levels was recorded for pre-primary education (42.62% to 27.28%), while qualification of teachers for primary education was almost confirmed (around 89%) and qualifications for teachers in lower and upper secondary education arose significantly (60.84-60.83% to 69.46-69.45% respectively). In Chad, only for 2022, the proportion of teachers with required qualifications in pre-primary, primary, lower and upper secondary education amounted to 80.10%, 64.73%, 79.22% and 49.73%, assessing the utmost relevance to early pupils and school-age children who need well-trained teachers to provide key and high-quality education. In Mali, there is one data point concerning the qualification of teachers

in lower secondary education for 2018 (55.41%). In Mauritania, data is available for 2019, reporting for primary, lower and upper secondary education a proportion of teachers with required qualifications as for 96.86%, 93.01% and 92.07% respectively. In Niger, data recorded for 2021 refer to pre-primary, primary, lower and upper secondary education in terms of percentage of teachers with required qualifications as follows: 95.09% (slight increase 95.77% in 2022), 96% (significant increase 98.74% in 2023), 20.39% and 12.65%, confirming the relevance of teachers' role to support early pupils in accessing to school paths.<sup>16</sup>

### **G5 Sahel countries' expenditure on education**


According to the UIS database, the share of government expenditure for education in Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger from 2019 to 2022 was below the internationally recommended margin of 15%–20%. In particular, as for 2022 compared to 2021 – no data for Mali – the GDP percentage government expenditure on education slightly increased as follows: 5.22% in 2021 to 5.28% in 2022 in Burkina Faso, 2.54% in 2021 to 2.99% in 2022 in Chad, from 3.82% in 2021 to 4.10% in 2022 in Niger; conversely, in Mauritania it decreased from 1.75% in 2021 to 1.28% in 2022.<sup>17</sup>

When data are assessed focusing over expenditure on education as a percentage out of the total government expenditure, the rate is quite analogous for Burkina Faso (21.56% to 21.96%) and for Chad (15.66% to 16.72%), while it clearly decreased for Mauritania (9.10% to 5.04%) and, conversely, it slightly increased for Niger (11.95% to 12.37%).<sup>18</sup>

### **G7 ODA to total and basic education in former G5 Sahel countries**

The G7 ODA on total education and basic education in the former G5 Sahel countries gradually increased from 2015 to 2022, following a slight decrease in 2020 - possibly due to pandemic constraints - until a higher rate of USD 209,13 and of USD 110,84 in 2022 respectively. (see Figure 20).


**Figure 20. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to Education and to Basic Education in the former G5 Sahel countries, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 110, 112).

Overall, the G7 ODA to education in the former G5 Sahel countries with a principal or significant gender equality objective as a share of Total Bilateral Allocable ODA decreased from 80.1% in 2015 to 69.8% in 2022 although the amount rose in 2019 and 2020 (79.5% and 73.0%), followed by a marked decrease in 2021 (51.2%). (see Figure 21).

**Figure 21. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to basic education in the former G5 Sahel countries with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 112).

**Proportion of humanitarian appeals in education in former G5 countries funded by the G7**

From 2021 to 2023, G7 funding to humanitarian appeals in education in the former G5 Sahel countries fluctuated, reaching a peak of USD 29.8 billion in 2023. As of March 2024, already USD 8.4 billion have been directed to humanitarian appeals in education in the former G5 countries, which represents almost all humanitarian appeals in education in Burkina Faso (93%), Chad (100%), Mali (100%) and Niger (100%). (see Table 2).

**Table 2. G7 disbursements contributing to humanitarian coordinated appeals in the education sector in the former G5 Sahel countries, 2021-2024 (USD)**

<b>Burkina Faso</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>
All Appeals	5,996,663	8,393,374	11,690,689	3,439,762
G7 funded appeals	4,776,761	2,310,753	6,579,235	3,189,762
<b>Share of G7 funded appeals</b>	79.65%	27.53%	56.27%	92.73%
<b>Chad</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>
All Appeals	7,341,659	3,513,521	14,697,687	2,271,341
G7 funded appeals	5,128,345	3,513,521	5,599,373	2,271,341
<b>Share of G7 funded appeals</b>	69.85%	100%	38.1%	100%
<b>Mali</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>
All Appeals	7,405,590	16,387,582	10,334,467	2,529,817
G7 funded appeals	4,929,519	7,491,823	4,404,008	2,259,817
<b>Share of G7 funded appeals</b>	66.56%	45.71%	42.61%	100%
<b>Niger</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>	<b>2024</b>
All Appeals	6,144,623	18,289,885	20,006,691	421,343
G7 funded appeals	0	8,688,769	13,213,297	421,343
<b>Share of G7 funded appeals</b>	0%	47.5%	66%	100%

Source: *FTS.UNOCHA.ORG (March 2024)*

N.B. No recorded data for Humanitarian Appeals in Mauritania

## **G7 actions and good practices to encourage the strengthening of education systems in the Sahel**

The G7 members contribute to the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), which supports Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in providing quality education to children in vulnerable situations. In 2022-2023, GPE worked with partner countries to strengthen national education systems Globally, GPE reached 6.6 million students in the Sahel. The UN Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI) and UNESCO's Gender at the Centre Initiative (GCI), implemented in eight pilot countries, including the former G5 Sahel countries, was launched in 2019 and works along with the Global Partnership for Education to strengthen gender-responsive education. G7 members also contribute to Education Cannot Wait, which supports Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger in supporting education in emergencies and protracted crises.

**Canada** is committed to ensuring all children and youth in crisis situations, including in the Sahel, have access to safe, inclusive quality learning environments, with a focus on refugee and displaced children and youth, particularly girls. In 2022-23, Canada continued to work through its bilateral and multilateral channels, such as GPE, ECW and the GCIUN Girls' Education Initiative (UNGEI), to strengthen education systems in the

Sahel. ECW's multi-year resilience programmes in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger brought together humanitarian and development actors to jointly deliver inclusive, quality education to children and youth left furthest behind in the Central Sahel. Canada's institutional support to UNGEI facilitates the collaboration of learners, civil society organisations and Ministries of Education to improve gender-responsive education sector planning in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. To further this work, the GPE Knowledge and Innovation Exchange (KIX), implemented by Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC), through its regional Hubs (including Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, and South Sudan) facilitated policy dialogue to strengthen national education systems. KIX brought together Ministries of Education, senior government officials, researchers, and civil society organisations to surface and utilise data, research, and knowledge in the areas of non-formal education, digital education, and education in crises to strengthen education policy and practice.

**France** is committed to supporting quality and inclusive education by contributing substantially to the work of GPE, as the third largest donor of the current funding cycle and as an implementing partner through AFD. Between 2018 and 2022, France provided EUR 10 million in support for Education Cannot Wait (ECW), of which EUR 4 million has been earmarked for Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). Initiated in 2019 under the French Presidency of the G7, with the support from France, United Kingdom, Germany, Italy and the European Union, Gender at the Centre Initiative (GCI) is promoting gender equality in and through education in eight countries in Africa (Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone). Jointly coordinated by the UN Girls' Education Initiative and UNESCO International Institute for Educational Planning, GCI is based on a whole-system and multi-stakeholder approach gathering education ministries, civil society, G7 donors and GPE. Thanks to the implementation of GCI, 14 African countries (including the former G5 Sahel countries) have adopted a clear political commitment to gender equality in and through education by signing the Freetown Manifesto. France is GCI's main funder with a contribution of EUR 6.6 million for phase 1 (2020-22) and will support GCI's phase 2 (2024-26).

**Germany** supports education systems in the former G5 Sahel countries through increased contributions to the GPE (EUR 114 million, 2022-23) and ECW (EUR 110 million, 2022-23). Since 2021, ECW has been implementing a regional Multi-Year Resilience Programme in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger (USD 42 million). In addition, to support girls' education Germany funds the G7 Gender at the Centre Initiative (EUR 2.6 million, 2019-2024): more than half of the amount is channelled to activities in the Sahel. Germany co-initiated the Feminist Network for Gender Transformative Education in 2022 (EUR 1.35 million): the annual network meeting brings together diverse actors in an interdisciplinary exchange on gender-transformative education. It is characterised by strong participation from countries of the global South, including in the Sahel region. In addition, education is one of three foci of the German Presidency of the Sahel-Alliance, a multi-donor network aiming to improve joint implementation, coordination and communication of donors on the Sahel. All G7 countries are members of the Sahel-Alliance.

Voluntary contribution to GPE was granted in 2021 by **Italy** for an amount of EUR 5 million, including EUR 2.5 million specifically targeting girls' education. In 2022 and 2023, Italy disbursed an additional EUR 5 million per year for a total amount of EUR 10 million. In early 2024 a further contribution of EUR 5 million to GPE was approved. These funds included the support to the 3-years "Girl's Education Acceleration Project" started in 2021 and was developed by the Ministry of Primary Education, Literacy, Promotion of National Languages and Civic Education to intensify interventions for women's education in 10 municipalities of the Maradi Region with the technical assistance of UN Women for the "implementation of the National Strategy for Accelerating the Education and Training of Girls and Women (SNAEFF)". Furthermore, for 2021-2023 Italy supported a GCI initiative granting funds for a JPO Gender Sensitive Associate Education Policy Analyst, posted at the International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP) – UNESCO/Dakar Office for a total amount of USD 381,630.

In October 2023, **Japan** and UNICEF signed the memorandum of understanding for the project entitled "Promotion of children's education based on the School for All model in vulnerable areas". The project, financed by Japan and developed in collaboration with Mali's Ministry of Education, will focus primarily on access and quality in 432 schools in Mali. Project activities consist of capacity-building for education sector players, awareness-raising campaigns on the importance of education, construction and rehabilitation of classrooms and water, hygiene and sanitation infrastructure, including water points and separate toilets for girls and boys, and the provision of school kits and menstrual hygiene kits. Japan contributed to GPE approximately USD 2.4 million for "Tackling Climate Change through Education in Sub-Saharan Africa Region", which covers Niger and other 7 Sub-Saharan countries to enhance their capacities to mainstream climate change adaptation and environmental sustainability into education.

The **United Kingdom** continues to champion the right of every girl to access 12 years of quality education. In the UK's 2021 G7 Presidency, leaders committed to two global SDG4 milestones by 2026: 40 million more girls in school and 20 million more reading by age 10, underpinned by the sustainable financing of GPE. The UK is the largest, longest term bilateral donor to GPE, and remains one of the largest donors to ECW. ECW programmes in 2022 contributed to providing education to 470,886 vulnerable girls who have been impacted by climate change and conflict in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad. The UK funded the first phase of the Gender at the Centre Initiative (GCI), which was completed in December 2023. Between 2020 and 2023, GCI promoted gender equality in and through education in eight countries, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in the Sahel - piloting a whole-system approach to gender-transformative education through the strengthening of technical gender capacity, fostering political will and supporting the transformation of harmful gender norms. As a founding member of the Global Coalition for Foundational Learning, the UK is supporting African partners to champion, strengthen and accelerate country-led efforts to transform education systems and eliminate learning poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, including during the 2024 AU Year of Education.

Through its bilateral and multilateral support to GPE and ECW, the **United States** is strengthening education systems in the Sahel region to advance gender equity and equality goals and learning for underserved and vulnerable populations. In addition, the United States bilateral work in the region includes Mali's Girl's Leadership and Empowerment through Education (GLEE) Activity (2018-2023), which successfully provided adolescent girls access to accelerated learning, enrolment in public schools, health services, and life skills within a supportive enabling environment. United States programmes enrolled 23,484 out-of-school girls in a nine-month accelerated learning programme to catch-up on reading, writing, and mathematics and transitioned 22,485 out-of-school girls to public school. GLEE used a comprehensive approach which combined education with access to health services, provision of latrines and access to water at school, establishment and use of school emergency plans, and provision of birth certificates for girls to thrive and to prevent early marriage.

As for the **European Union** actions in the Sahel, several activities have been put in place. In Chad, the main good practice implemented for a coordinated effort in the education sector in 2022-2023 is the formulation of a joint European Commission/French Development Agency (AFD) programme, whose implementation was launched in September 2023 and which was articulated in the "EU/Programme to improve the quality of education in Chad (AQUEDUCT)", with a European Union contribution of EUR 28 million, and the "FR/Improving learning practices to empower young people (ALAPAJ)", with a FR contribution of EUR 12 million. This joint programme will serve as a basis for a structured EU/FR policy dialogue with the Chadian government to provide multifaceted support to Chad's formal and non-formal education systems, including support for ensuring a joint coordination with Chad's Ministry of Education. In Niger before the coup (July 2023), education was one of the priority sectors and the EU had a budget support programme (SRBC IV) with technical assistance, and three indicators (around EUR 20 million) allocated to the education sector, covering the school map, girls' education and education in emergencies. In 2001, the EU also contributed to the Common Fund for Education (*Fonds Commun Sectoriel pour l'Éducation*) managed by AFD. Regarding regional initiatives, Niger benefitted of the BRICE programme "Building Resilience: Education Opportunities in Fragile and Crisis Affected Environments" between 2018 and 2022 with good results despite the security context: enrolment rates improved by 12% over the project; student literacy scores increased from 5.5% to 30% for girls, and from 5.6% to 25% for boys; and 90% of teachers improved at least one level in teacher proficiency, in six or more competencies. In Mali, through budget support policy dialogue and the PAIS project (*programme d'Appui à l'Inclusion Scolaire*) implemented with the WFP, the European Union has contributed to strengthening school feeding to improve school enrolment, also counting upon a strong governmental commitment, partners involvement and funding from the European Union, Germany and the United States.

## Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2019	1. G7 bilateral ODA disbursed to education and basic education dedicated to the G5 Sahel countries.	OECD CRS-GE (Sector codes 110 for education and 112 for basic education)	 4 – Quality education
	2. Progress in national budget dedicated to education in the Sahel region, to be compared with the international recommendation of allocating 15-20% of public expenditure to education and 4-6% of GDP.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNESCO UIS tracking,</li> <li>• UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report</li> </ul>	
	3. SDG Indicator 4.c.1. Proportion of teachers in: (a) pre-primary education; (b) primary education; who have received at least the minimum organised teacher training (e.g. pedagogical training) pre-service or in-service required for teaching at the relevant level-disaggregated for the G5 Sahel countries .	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report,</li> <li>• SDG Tracker if available</li> </ul>	 5 – Gender equality
	4. G7 actions and good practices to encourage partner countries' governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems.	Self-reporting	
	5. Education in Emergencies indicator: Proportion of humanitarian appeals in education that are funded by the G7 in the Sahel region.	Financial Tracking Service UNOCHA	
	6. Net enrolment rate (%) disaggregated by level of education (pre-primary, primary, lower secondary, upper secondary) in the G5 Sahel countries.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• UIS Stats Database,</li> <li>• UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report,</li> <li>• Global Partnership for Education Annual Results Report,</li> <li>• Education Cannot Wait Annual Results Reports</li> </ul>	

## 4.3 Women's Economic Empowerment

### COMMITMENT 25 Women's Economic Empowerment

"We will support our partners in developing countries (...) to overcome discrimination, sexual harassment, violence against women and girls and other cultural, social, economic and legal barriers to women's economic participation".

*Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p.16;*

*Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 18*

"We call for reforms to address the social, legal and regulatory barriers to women's full and free economic participation and empowerment. We support the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA) initiative including through the Women Entrepreneurs-Finance Initiative (We-Fi). We also further encourage the 2X Challenge and bilateral programmes supported by G7 members."

*Biarritz 2019, Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership, para. 7;*

*Carbis Bay 2021, G7 Summit Communiqué, paras. 28 & 68*


### Overview

Women's economic empowerment is crucial for achieving gender equality and inclusive economic growth. It encompasses equal participation in labour markets, access to productive resources and decent work, involvement, and active contribution to economic decision-making in public and private settings. In particular, the consolidation of processes aimed at empowering women have concretely impacted upon organisational and operational performance of business companies, especially when women have advanced in careers achieving top and senior management positions.

The OECD tracks ODA spending of its members who identify whether their projects have gender as a significant objective (Gender Marker 1) or a principal objective (Gender Marker 2).

From 2015 to 2022 the percentage of G7 ODA dedicated to economic-growth related initiatives impacting on gender equality and women's empowerment has fluctuated from 43.2% to 56.1%. For ODA with a principal gender equality objective, the highest disbursements were registered in 2022 with USD 343.1 million, while for the significant objective it was recorded in 2020 with USD 4.6 billion. (see Figure 22).

**Figure 22. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to women's economic empowerment in Africa based on the gender equality policy marker, 2015-2022 (USD million)**




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector and purpose codes: 113, 114, 12181, 12281, 14081, 160, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 311, 312, 313, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 41081, 43030, 43040, 43081).

**G7 ODA dedicated to economic-growth-related initiatives advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment**

In 2015, the three key sectors where the G7 bilateral ODA focused the most on advancing gender equality were Industry, Mining and Construction (87.9%), Other Social Infrastructure (74.8%) and Education (65.0%), while in 2022 these were Health (81.1%), Business and other services (79.1%) and Other Social Infrastructures (77.2%). Banking and financial services (61.1%) followed in 2015 and Education (73.4%) in 2022. Overall, an increase in the share of ODA with gender equality objectives was observed in all sectors between 2015 and 2022, except for Banking and financial services (- 12.6 percentage points) and Industry, Mining and Construction (-25.8 percentage points). The most significant progress was registered in the Other Sectors (+45.0 percentage points), Business and other services (+27.9 percentage points), Trade Policies (+26.0 percentage points) and Health (+23.6 percentage points). (see Figure 23).

**Figure 23. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to Africa with a gender equality objective by sector, 2015 and 2022 (% of G7 total bilateral ODA to Africa)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector and purpose codes: 113, 114, 12181, 12281, 14081, 160, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 311, 312, 313, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 410081, 43030, 43040, 43081). Other sectors include: 14081 Education and training in water supply and sanitation, 323 Construction, 332 Tourism, 41081 Environmental education/training, 43030 Urban development and management, 43040 Rural development, 43081 Multisector education/training.

**G7 main actions supporting gender equality and women’s empowerment in the economic sectors**

Several G7 initiatives focused on achieving gender equality and women’s empowerment in Africa are reported below.

Coordinated by the African Development Bank and the African Guarantee Fund and supported by all G7 countries, the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA) is a pan-African initiative aimed at bridging the USD 42 billion financing gap facing women entrepreneurs throughout the African continent. It is implemented in 32 countries and supports financial institutions to develop specific products to facilitate women entrepreneurs’ access to the market and to develop their business through three pillars: financing, technical assistance, and enabling environment including supporting legal, policy and regulatory reforms.

In 2021, **Canada’s** International Assistance Innovation Programme (IAIP) provided USD 13 million in repayable contributions to the African Guarantee Fund (AGF) for its Pan-African Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa Fund, to unlock financing for women entrepreneurs. In 2022-2023, AFAWA guarantees unlocked USD 98 million to women-led small and medium-sized enterprises (WSMEs). This enabled approximately 5,000 WSMEs to access loans ranging from USD 3,000 to 1,500,000. Canada is also supporting the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi), which initiated the 2022-2028 round “Africa Digital Financial Inclusion Facility (ADFI)”, a blended finance

facility that combines grant money and debt financing to support the development of digital financial services. We-Fi funding is used to scale the provision of digital financial services to WSMEs to bolster their business productivity and resilience: key programme components are technical assistance, capacity building, and blended finance and results-based mechanisms.

**France** promotes WEE with the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa initiative (AFAWA) by providing USD 95 million since the 2019 French Presidency of the G7. Additionally the “Pour Elles” project in Democratic Republic of the Congo provides support for women entrepreneurs with an amount of EUR 12 million in subsidies: with WEE as the main objective, this project supports women-led businesses and strengthens gender mainstreaming in the public-private entrepreneurial ecosystem and has provided training and support to around 1,200 beneficiaries (micro-entrepreneurs, small businesses and medium-sized businesses) spread between Kinshasa, Bukavu and Kikwit, primarily targeting initiatives with potential for change of scale. Since 2020 France launched its Support Fund for Feminist Organisations (FSOF), with EUR 134 million directed to feminist organisations (2020-2022), after an initial target of EUR 120 million in the same period. A new commitment of EUR 250 million announced in last September for 2023-2027. In 2023, the intermediated fund "Feminism, women's empowerment and participation in economic life" was launched. Over 3 years, a consortium of CSOs led by Geres, and including CARE France, Empow'Her, WACSI, CONLACTRAHO and SAWDF will provide EUR 10 million to finance grassroots feminist CSOs in 11 countries, including Democratic Republic of the Congo, Benin, Togo, Guinea, Morocco.

In close cooperation with the private sector, **Germany** is fostering decent jobs in the formal sector and better working conditions, also engaging to achieve gender-responsive economic conditions. It supports business start-ups and women entrepreneurs by providing easier access to loans for women and training for women with a special focus on digital expertise. Germany also advises African partner countries on labour market and social policies to mainstream gender equality at the institutional level and to promote childcare, maternity and parental leave. For example, Germany addresses the unequal distribution of care work through its project “Gender-responsive and inclusive politics and economy in the MENA region” and by providing financial support (with up to EUR 2.9 million) for the UN Women Programme “Transformative approaches to recognise, reduce, and redistribute unpaid care work in women's economic empowerment” in Rwanda and Senegal. Another focus of Germany's commitment to foster women's economic empowerment lies in the access to and control over productive resources, supported for instance through the Stand for Her Land Campaign. Moreover, with EUR 75 million, Germany is the biggest donor of the We-Fi, which contributes to the AFAWA. Additionally, Germany supported the 2X Global design phase of the certification mechanism for gender-lens investing – a 2022 G7 deliverable. In its support to women's economic empowerment, Germany also aims to foster the green transition, for instance through the “Employment promotion for women for the green transformation in Africa (WE4D)” programme.

**Italy** funded several initiatives in Africa, aiming specifically to achieve gender equality and women's empowerment as significant components, in line with key priorities of the Italian Development Cooperation: agricultural development and food security; environment and climate change; women's empowerment and the private sector; maternal, child, sexual and reproductive health; gender-based violence and women's/girls' rights; and education, vocational training and employment. In 2022 while some country-specific gender initiatives were approved in Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, in other 20 countries gender components were included in multisectoral projects. In 2022, the Italian Development Cooperation approved new interventions placing gender equality and women's empowerment as principal and significant objectives for a total amount of more than EUR 8 million and EUR 146 million respectively: as for the latter, for example, "Cultivating Value: good practices and innovative methods for inclusive and sustainable agro-livestock production" project in Burkina Faso was aimed at consolidating the productive role of the agro-livestock farm in Bagré, paying special emphasis on women's empowerment through the transfer of knowledge to rural women's groups for nutritional improvement and family-based food production. To contribute to the financial inclusion of women on the African continent, where over 70% of women are excluded from access to credit, Italy disbursed in 2021 EUR 2 million to the African Development Bank's Gender Equality Trust Fund - Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA).

**Japan** has supported the Global Survivors Fund, which has carried out the Global Reparations Study in over 20 countries. The study, including the legal framework analysis, has aimed to assess the impact of conflict-related sexual violence and survivors' access to reparations and to identify opportunities for reparations and interim reparative measures. Moreover, Japan supported UN Women's projects for promoting women's empowerment in Burundi, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, South Sudan, Mozambique, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Somalia, Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in 2022 and 2023.

The **United Kingdom's** Work and Opportunities for Women (WOW) Programme has supported women in supply chains through partnerships with private sector multinational companies and has joined with Business Fights Poverty to support businesses to apply a gender equity lens to net-zero planning, including through developing practical guidance for companies who are decarbonising. BII is a champion of gender-smart investing and has committed to 25% of its new investments during 2022-26 having a gender-lens to support women's economic empowerment. BII provided a USD 50 million loan to one of Zambia's leading women-led banks – Zanaco – to boost climate finance and entrepreneurship by providing targeted finance for micro-SMEs and climate-related projects. It also has recently launched Zee Women's Banking, which is tailored to the financial needs of women-led SMEs. The UK is also driving progress on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR), which is key to unlocking the potential, agency and freedoms of women and girls in Africa, through major UK funding to multiple SRHR programmes including the UNFPA Supplies Partnership. Since its inception in 2018 the UK's Women's Integrated Sexual Health (WISH) programme has supported 11.6 million women and adolescent girls globally with access to modern methods of family planning, helping to prevent over 18.7 million

unintended pregnancies: over 6.9 million unsafe abortions and an estimated 52,000 maternal deaths - mostly through WISH's operations across 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the UK has contributed GBP 3.7 million to We-Fi since 2015.

The **United States** Feed the Future (FTF) programmes ensure that women producers have equal access to assets, inputs and technology, develop agricultural interventions and practices, prioritise labour-saving technologies that benefit women in the agricultural arena, and improve access to financial services for women in farming and agribusiness. In FY 2022 alone, through FTF, the United States helped more than 373,000 women and women-owned businesses in Africa access over USD 87 million in agriculture-related financing and helped over one million African women apply improved technologies or practices to lift themselves out of hunger and poverty. The United States supports women entrepreneurs in Africa as a top priority in the region, supporting programmes such as the African Women's Trade and Investment Programme, the African Women's Entrepreneurship Programme, the Academy for Women Entrepreneurs (AWE), the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi), and Providing Opportunities for Women's Economic Rise (POWER). Since 2019, AWE has operated in 25 countries in Africa and has empowered more than 6,000 women entrepreneurs to grow their businesses and reach their full economic potential and POWER programmes in Africa have included 14 partnerships and 7 countries. Additionally the United States contributed USD 50 million to We-Fi. With total funding of USD 354 million from 14 governments, We-Fi supports women entrepreneurs by scaling up access to finance, markets, networks, mentors, and information. AfDB was allocated USD 75 million for the AFAWA Initiative through We-Fi in 2019 and 2022. The U.S. is working to advance care infrastructure and decent work for care workers. Through its "Invest in Childcare" initiative, the U.S. is partnering with the World Bank and other donors to expand access to quality and affordable childcare. In Sub-Saharan Africa alone, the initiative has matched four recipient-executed grants implemented by governments, totalling USD12.9 million, and invested in 14 catalytic grants executed by the World Bank totalling USD 2.6 million.

The **European Union** promotes women's economic empowerment (WEE) through different instruments, including through its External Investment Plan. In 2023 the EIB, with the support of blended funding from the European Commission, signed EUR 158 million to women entrepreneurs SMEs providing quality leadership and employment in nine countries.<sup>19</sup> Another example is the Investment Climate Reform Facility that works with public and private partners to improve the investment climate for private sector to thrive, create decent jobs and sustainable growth. In 2023, a EUR 10 million top-up focused on WEE. Another good practice is the Team Europe Initiative "Investing in Young Businesses in Africa" (IYBA), of EUR 4.6 million for technical and financial support to early-stage businesses. The EU "Women's Financial Inclusion Facility" is a partnership with the Women's World Banking and KfW, where the EU invests EUR 10 million in a private equity fund and technical assistance programme for financial service providers in Africa, responding to the needs of women not met by the market. The fund has raised additional public and private investments and reached a size of EUR 100 million, which is being invested in WEE. The EUR 20 million EU-OACPS pilot programme "Women Entrepreneurship for Africa (WE4A)" supports women entrepreneurs with

entrepreneurship training and access to finance. A new EU contribution of EUR 38 million will fund its continuity, reaching around 1800 women entrepreneurs with seed financing and further access to finance.

## **G7 ODA focused on the elimination of discrimination, sexual harassment and gender-based violence**

During the 2015 Elmau Summit, the G7 committed to support developing countries in overcoming discrimination, sexual harassment, and gender-based violence.


By addressing discrimination, sexual and gender-based violence, institutional players are called to create more inclusive and equitable societies where all individuals can fully participate and thrive. This not only promotes human rights, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and social justice but also contributes to achieving sustainable development goals related to gender equality, poverty reduction, and peace and security. The G7 have provided financial and technical support to developing countries' efforts to address this violence, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Along this approach funding for programmes and projects, technical assistance, and knowledge sharing platforms have been implemented to facilitate learning and exchange of best practices.

Overall support is instrumental to fuel economic empowerment and financial independence for women who face discrimination, sexual harassment, and gender-based violence, including access to credit, vocational training, entrepreneurship programmes, and employment opportunities. It is a matter of fact that economic empowerment can reduce women's vulnerability to discrimination and violence by increasing their economic autonomy and bargaining power.

Targeted support encompasses, for example, training programmes to enhance the capacity of government officials, law enforcement agencies, judiciary, healthcare providers, educators, and civil society organisations in identifying, preventing, and responding to discrimination, sexual harassment, and gender-based violence. At the same time, development aid could be used to establish and strengthen mechanisms for victims and survivors to access legal aid services, healthcare and shelter facilities that are sensitive to their personal needs. Furthermore, dedicated assistance might be provided for awareness-raising campaigns and educational initiatives aimed at challenging harmful gender norms, promoting gender equality, and fostering respect for human rights, involving men and boys, communities, schools, workplaces, and the media to change attitudes and behaviours related to discrimination and violence to fully advocate for gender equality and respectful relationships.

In 2022, the G7 collectively spent USD 139.6 million on initiatives aiming to prevent violence against women in Africa. (see Figure 24). Their spending strongly increased compared to 2016, with European Union Institutions, Canada, and the United Kingdom being the main contributors in 2022 (USD 43.2 million, USD 38.0 million, and USD 28.6 million, respectively).<sup>20</sup>

**Figure 24. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to prevent violence against women in Africa, 2016-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose code 15180). N.B. The gender-based violence purpose code was agreed upon for the purposes of this analysis. Users should be aware that it may not capture all support towards prevention of VAW given the cross-cutting nature of this issue across multiple sectors. In addition, although not represented in this graph, the baseline year for this commitment is 2015.

## G7 actions to prevent and counter violence against women

**Canada's** efforts to end sexual and gender-based violence and promote sexual and reproductive health and rights include financial support to multilateral and global organisations that prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence, including harmful practices such as child early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation (FGM). On this issue Canada supports the UNFPA-UNICEF Joint Programme on the Elimination of Female Genital Mutilation (CAD 7.5 million, 2022-2025) which has country-level interventions in 16 African countries and regional-level interventions. Canada is also a long-time supporter of the UNFPA-UNICEF Global Programme to End Child Marriage (CAD 30 million, 2015-2023; CAD 35 million, 2023-2028) which is implemented in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Zambia and engages in regional initiatives including the African Union Campaign to End Child Marriage. Partnering with the International Planned Parenthood Federation, Canada was the founding donor to three regional comprehensive sexuality education (CSE) Centres of Excellence (the Centres) which reached almost 900,000 young people with CSE training or SRH services (CAD 14.5M, 2019-2022). In addition, the Centres focused on strengthening a regional enabling environment for CSE by improving training,

curriculum and other tools used by teachers and government employees to deliver quality CSE, as well as partnering strategically with sexual and gender-based violence organisations to centralise delivery of remote, quality and integrated SRHR and sexual and gender-based violence information and referrals.

**France** FSOF's projects strongly focus on funding feminist movements on the African continent. Launched in 2021, Feminist Opportunities Now is a EUR 14 million intermediate fund, granted via AFD and coordinated by a CSOs consortium (IPPF- ARO: leader, Médecins du Monde-France, Empow'Her, FIDH and CREA). This project aims to fund feminist grassroots organisations fighting against gender-based violence, while building knowledge and advocacy on this issue across various countries including Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ethiopia, Kenya and Mali. By 2023, 57 feminist organisations were supported as part of this project. The WPS intermediate fund is another FSOF intermediate project of EUR 10 million across 3 geographic areas - Sahel, Central Africa and the Middle East – and it is aimed at combating gender-based violence and sexual violence in crisis and conflict-affected context, applying UN resolutions on combatting rape as a weapon of war. “Fight against gynaecological and obstetrical violence in Guinea” is an emblematic EUR 1.13 million project run by Equipop, in partnership with AMREF and the NGO Cellule de Recherche en Santé de la reproduction en Guinée, whose main scope is to support projects and practices promoting care and respect to reduce gynaecological and obstetrical violence. There are as well other projects on fighting gender -based violence, like the EUR 3 million project in Central Africa Republic to build a holistic approach in fighting gender-based violence, based on the Mukwege experience in Democratic Republic of Congo against sexual violence.

**Germany** helps to prevent gender-based violence, working with non-state and private-sector actors and advocating critical reflection on social norms and role models. In political dialogue with African partners, Germany emphasises the importance of this issue as a human rights violation and an obstacle to development; special attention is also paid to the particular impact on LGBTIQ+ individuals.

**Italy**, through its Italian Development Cooperation, is committed to work towards the achievement of systemic change, in order to address the root causes of gender-based violence and ensure a survivor-centred approach that guarantees the safety and dignity of women and girls. Italian funding has been allocated in favour of women living in Libya and Ethiopia, where the protection of women from gender-based violence and the provision of life-saving maternal and child health services have been the focus of humanitarian action. In particular, in Libya a new intervention was launched for a total amount of EUR 750,000, named "Provision of integrated emergency reproductive health and gender-based violence response services to the most vulnerable population in Libya" with the aim of supporting the activation, at municipal level, of life-saving maternal, child and reproductive health services, through the deployment of specialised medical teams, awareness-raising campaigns and capacity-building activities. In Ethiopia, the Italian Development Cooperation supported the initiative of UNFPA on "Provision of Life Saving gender-based violence prevention and response interventions to reduce inequalities in protection outcomes for Internally Displaced Populations" with a contribution of EUR 2 million. This project aims at strengthening access to quality

comprehensive and integrated services on gender-based violence, sexual and reproductive health, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse, mental health and psychosocial support. The fight against sexual and gender-based violence was also mainstreamed in multisectoral interventions. In Libya, through the intervention "Multisectoral response to increase access to basic services for the most vulnerable population in Libya" (total amount EUR 5 million), the availability and improved access to specialised and quality services that protect the most vulnerable has been promoted strengthening the capacities of local communities in the provision of social care services, reproductive/sexual health and gender-based violence services. In Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda, Italy has financed the initiative "Response to the complex South Sudanese emergency in South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda" (total amount - EUR 6 million) to reinforce protection mechanisms for the most vulnerable segments of the population, with particular emphasis on improving the legal and clinical management of cases of sexual and gender-based violence and psychosocial assistance related to post-traumatic mental health services, also through awareness-raising and training activities.

**Japan** supported UN Women, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC) and the Global Survivors Fund (GSF) in the areas of eliminating gender-based violence, strengthening legal systems, improving access to justice system for the survivors, and providing training officers to combat sexual violence in conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Mali in 2022 and in 2023 respectively.

The **United Kingdom's** International Women and Girls Strategy is framed around 3 'Es': educating girls, empowering women, and ending gender-based violence. The UK is investing up to GBP 67.5 million in the "What Works to Prevent Violence – Impact at Scale" Programme, the first global programme to systematically scale up violence prevention efforts and the largest investment by any single donor government to prevent violence against women and girls globally. The programme produces world-class evidence and is supporting interventions on the African continent in Uganda, Eswatini, Somalia, Malawi and Madagascar. Eliminating FGM is a high priority in the UK's broader commitment to end gender-based violence and defend comprehensive SRHR. The UK is investing GBP 35 million in the Africa-Led Movement (ALM) to end FGM, working in Kenya, Senegal, Ethiopia and Somaliland, and continues to step up its support to tackle child marriage and to give girls greater say over their bodies and futures. UK support to the UN Global Programme to End Child Marriage has contributed to a 15% reduction in the global prevalence of child marriage over the last decade, averting 25 million marriages.

The **United States** is expanding programmes to prevent, mitigate, and respond to child, early, and forced marriages and unions (CEFMU). The United States invested USD 1.5 million in Niger and Somalia in activities that elevated adolescent girls' access to services, also working with the World Health Organisation Regional Office for Africa to eliminate gender inequities in healthcare provision. The DREAMS (Determined, Resilient, Empowered, AIDS-free, Mentored and Safe) partnership aimed to reduce rates of HIV among adolescent girls and young women in African countries and supported 2 million

adolescent girls and young women in 2023. The United States has further launched the Transform Digital Spaces initiative, a three-year USD 6 million activity to pilot responses to prevent and address technology-facilitated gender-based violence, complemented by a specific project to support women in politics who have experienced technology-facilitated gender-based violence. The United States supports WPS efforts across Sub-Saharan African countries. With a special focus on Nigeria, the Dignity and Security project has been implemented to develop the capacity of women-led organisations to prevent and address gender-based violence and harmful cultural norms.

Based on the European Union Gender Action Plan III (GAP III), the **European Union** and Member States, in a Team Europe spirit, have worked together with national authorities and many other stakeholders in partner countries, including civil society and women's rights organisations, to achieve gender-transformative outcomes for all world-wide, leaving no one behind. Since the adoption of the EU GAP III in November 2020, and despite the gender backlash in many parts of the world, tangible progress has been achieved in key areas, increasing protection against gender-based violence and harmful practices, promoting women's and girls' participation in public and political life and improving access to quality education, health and social protection for women and girls. New gender-targeted programmes with focus on gender-based violence are in place in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Sierra Leone and Uganda. The Gender for Development Uganda (G4DU) Action adopted in 2022, contributes to the Team Europe Initiative (TEI) on demography and social inclusion. The G4DU Action is composed of 2 components: adolescent girls' education (indicative EU budget: EUR 40 million), and reducing gender-based violence, including sexual violence, and promoting SRHR building on the successful Spotlight initiative in Uganda (indicative EU budget: EUR 20 million). The second component of the G4DU Action, building on the ongoing Spotlight initiative, will aim at reducing forms of gender-based violence that contribute to girl- child school drop- out and promoting SRHR at national and sub-national level. In a TEI approach, significant funding from both the German and Belgian Federal Governments will complement the EU contribution to increase the scope and impact of the Action.

## Methodology

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2015	<p>1. G7 ODA dedicated to economic growth-related initiatives focused on achieving gender equality and women's empowerment (Gender markers: 2. Principal and 1. Significant – as total and single markers) as a percentage of total ODA screened in selected relevant OECD DAC codes: 113, 114, 12181, 12281, 14081, 160, 210, 220, 230-236, 240, 250, 311, 312, 313, 321, 322, 323, 331, 332, 41081, 43030, 43040, 43081.</p> <p>2. G7 ODA focused on the elimination of violence against women (OECD DAC purpose code violence against women – 15180).</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OECD CRS,</li> <li>• OECD Gender Policy Marker</li> <li>• Self-reporting [ILO's Annual Publication: World Employment Social Outlook - Trends for women, Table: Labour force participation rate by sex (%) and gender gap (percentage points)]</li> </ul>	<div data-bbox="1236 365 1393 517">  <p>5 GENDER EQUALITY</p> </div> <p>5 – Gender equality</p> <div data-bbox="1236 633 1393 786">  <p>10 REDUCED INEQUALITIES</p> </div> <p>10 – Reduced inequalities</p> <div data-bbox="1236 902 1393 1055">  <p>16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS</p> </div> <p>16 – Peace, justice and strong institutions</p>

## 4.4 Case Studies

### COLLECTIVE - Basic Education in Sahel



#### GPE's work in the Sahel region

Transforming education systems to be fit for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century is essential to equipping young people and societies with resilience against conflict, climate, and economic crises. In a region facing multiple complex challenges, the role of education in the Sahel is foundational to its future peace and security, and the youth demographic surge can only be leveraged as an opportunity if we close the learning gap. That is why, faced with navigating the challenges of complex insecurity, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE, originally founded by the G7 in 2002) works flexibly to respond to the evolving situation, bridging the humanitarian and development divide and ensuring children's right to an education is not another casualty of poverty and instability. Since 2021, GPE grants have benefited over 6.6 million children in the Sahel, reaching on average 17% of the school-age population across all five countries.

G7 funding to GPE has helped develop an inclusive learning environment: from the development of alternative education for out-of-school children and youth in Chad; life skills training; the provision of school meals in food-insecure areas; and supporting girls to ensure safe transition from primary to secondary school.

GPE support has improved the learning environment for some of the most marginalised children, from building new classrooms across the region and driving more equitable and relevant learning through revising the curriculum in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, to tackling the pupil-to-teacher ratios (one of the worst in the world) through efforts like deploying qualified teachers in early grades and through regional on-the-job teacher training initiatives to help retain staff. To date, support to teachers' community of practice has reached 4,000 schools in Mali; and implementation of training in Chad benefited 9,418 teachers and school directors.

Operating through a systems approach, GPE has also invested more than USD 80 million in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger through its accelerated funding mechanism, which has led to continuity of learning even in the toughest circumstances, including the safe return to school following COVID-19 and climate-related crises. For example: in Burkina Faso, child friendly spaces helped identify internally displaced children and put them back on the path to school; while in Mali and Chad, distance learning programmes were set up with support from local operators and classrooms were rehabilitated.

G7 investment through GPE's unique partnership approach has enabled bespoke response to the challenges of each country's education system needs and contexts. These reform efforts, working alongside the governments in the region, have helped boost the overall resilience of schools and learners to withstand future threats.



Children at Al-Bouhaira Primary School, Lake Chad, 2019. *Credit: GPE/Carine Durand.*

## **CANADA - Women's Economic Empowerment in Africa**



### **Canada's Women's Voice and Leadership Programme**

Since 2017, Canada's Women's Voice and Leadership (WVL) programme supports local women's organisations to advance gender equality, promote women's rights, and advocate for gender transformative policy and legislative change in Africa. A flagship initiative under Canada's Feminist International Assistance Policy, WVL's programme in 14 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and a pan-Africa regional project supports women's economic empowerment in countries like Ethiopia and South Africa.

In Ethiopia, local WVL partners are changing negative gender norms and practices related to land access, ownership, and inheritance rights and helping women build practical business skills. Last year in the Oromia region, 2,056 women were trained in sustaining regular savings and accessing loans. In the Amhara region, partners helped 665 women to open bank accounts, and organised savings groups for 1,500 women, increasing their economic capital. This was complemented by monthly dialogues by 150 women's alliance members on women's rights to control rural land and property, and advocacy and awareness campaigns on women's economic rights targeting local government officials and decision makers. These initiatives empower women in securing livelihood and employment opportunities.

In South Africa, WVL supported eight local organisations focused on economic empowerment. The South African School of Practical Skills implemented the Phakamisa Girls Economic Empowerment Programme in the KwaZulu-Natal province to address social and economic risks through education, access to employment and entrepreneurship. Through social groups called Hand Up Girls Squads (HUGS), participants explore ways to start their own businesses. This includes business training and competitions, mentorship, seed capital, workshops, and vocational trainings in diverse areas such as technology and computers, business registration, and cake baking and sales. These new skills, networks, and knowledge-sharing within communities contribute to increased economic opportunities for young women.

While local WVL partners have adopted multiple interconnected strategies to address women's economic empowerment, they still face challenges. Local women partners can extend their reach and deliver improved economic outcomes through stronger networks, sustained financial support and increased organisational capacity.

In 2023, Canada announced the renewal and expansion of the WVL programme for another five years. The renewed programme takes a more intentional approach in expanding support in conflict and crisis affected contexts, and in reaching structurally excluded groups, with emphasis on feminist, locally-led development

projects implemented in direct partnership with women's rights organisations, including women living with disabilities and LGBTQI+ groups in the Global South.



Celebrating graduates of the Phakamisa Girls Economic Empowerment Programme - Hand Up Girls Squad (HUGS). *Credit: SasopsBiz*

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- <sup>1</sup> UNESCO-UIS. 2024. “SDG 4 scorecard progress report on national benchmarks: focus on teachers”. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.54676/JPJG2407>.
- <sup>2</sup> ADEA & APHRC. (2023). The Long-Term Impact of COVID-19 on Educational Systems in Africa: Perspectives of Education Stakeholders from sub-Saharan Africa. Retrieved from: <https://www.gpekix.org/knowledge-repository/long-term-impact-covid-19-educational-systems-africa>
- <sup>3</sup> The World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF, Foreign, Commonwealth & development office, USAID and Bill&Melinda Gates Foundation (2022). “The State of Global Learning Poverty: 2022 Update”.
- <sup>4</sup> UNESCO-UIS. 2024. “SDG 4 scorecard progress report on national benchmarks: focus on teachers”. Retrieved from: <https://doi.org/10.54676/JPJG2407>.
- <sup>5</sup> World Bank (2020). “Learning Poverty in the Time of Covid-19: A Crisis within a Crisis”. Retrieved from: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/163871606851736436/pdf/Learning-Poverty-in-the-Time-of-COVID-19-A-Crisis-Within-a-Crisis.pdf>
- <sup>6</sup> African Union (2019). *AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment*. Retrieved from: [https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36195-doc-au\\_strategy\\_for\\_gender\\_equality\\_womens\\_empowerment\\_2018-2028\\_report.pdf](https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/36195-doc-au_strategy_for_gender_equality_womens_empowerment_2018-2028_report.pdf)
- <sup>7</sup> African Development Bank Group (2021). *The African Development Bank Group Gender Strategy 2021 – 2025 | Investing in Africa’s women to accelerate inclusive growth* Retrieved from: [https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/strategy-documents/african\\_development\\_bank\\_group\\_gender\\_strategy\\_-\\_2021-2025.pdf](https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/documents/strategy-documents/african_development_bank_group_gender_strategy_-_2021-2025.pdf)
- <sup>8</sup> The World Bank (2023). *World Development Indicators*. Retrieved from: <https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators>.
- <sup>9</sup> G7 Biarritz Summit 2019. *Sahel Partnership Action Plan*. Para. 15. Retrieved from: <a47d34992ae172f71af981698f05524ffed81b24.pdf> (elysee.fr).
- <sup>10</sup> G7 Schloss Elmau Leaders’ Declaration 2015. Pp. 19-20. Retrieved from: Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, 7-8 June 2015 (bundesregierung.de).
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- <sup>11</sup> G7 Biarritz Summit 2019. *Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership*. Para. 7. Retrieved from: <2b23c8767bc581f1a204029870f8f400cd2546ae.pdf> (elysee.fr)
- <sup>12</sup> G7 Biarritz Summit 2019. *Biarritz Declaration for a G7 & Africa Partnership*. Para. 7. Retrieved from: <2b23c8767bc581f1a204029870f8f400cd2546ae.pdf> (elysee.fr).
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- <sup>15</sup> Data.uis.unesco.org (March 2024)
- <sup>16</sup> Data.uis.unesco.org (March 2024)
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibidem* (March 2024)
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibidem* (March 2024)
- <sup>19</sup> Nine African countries: Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia
- <sup>20</sup> Gender Based Violence (GBV) purpose code is undercounted and not indicative of all support towards prevention of Violence Against Women (VAW) due to single-purpose-coding.

## **Chapter 5 - G7 support to Human Mobility and Peace and Security in Africa**

### **5.1 Overview of the G7 support to Migrants and Refugees, Peace and Security in Africa**


Promoting peace and addressing the causes of conflicts while fostering migration governance<sup>1</sup> are among the main objectives of the African Union Agenda 2063. Yet, African nations, particularly those in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to grapple with enduring security hurdles and protracted conflicts and crises, often driven by violent extremism and accompanied by the risk of cross-border spillover effects. These challenges have all hindered Africa's efforts to achieve lasting peace, sustainable development, and growth. In particular, maritime security threats, including piracy, armed robbery, human trafficking, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and marine pollution, persist and were worsened by the Red Sea Crisis, undermining the development of the blue economy and impeding international trade. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as of January 2024, the seven-day rolling average of Bab al-Mandab strait has dropped to 46% compared to the same period last year.<sup>2</sup> This context of instability has led to a steady increase in African migration, which, if current trends persist, will see African cross-border migration reach 11 to 12 million people by 2050.<sup>3</sup> In fact, human mobility is driven by diverse factors, including conflicts, civil unrest, border insecurity and instability, climate-related disasters and environmental degradation, violent extremism and terrorism, economic insecurity and high unemployment.

Against this backdrop, the G7 plays a crucial role in addressing the linkages between durable peace, inclusive and sustainable development, security and stability. G7 leaders have stressed the importance of tackling the nexus between human mobility and development, such as during the G7 Ise-Shima Summit in 2016. At the G7 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Capri in 2024, the G7 reiterated its commitment to addressing forced displacement and irregular migration in an integrated, comprehensive and balanced manner, by reducing the root causes of irregular migration flows, and by creating the conditions to ensure regular, safe and orderly migration pathways. At the 2023 G7 Summit, leaders also agreed to support African governments in tackling the underlying causes that have led to the spread of terrorism, violent extremism and instability across Africa. At the G7 Taormina Summit in 2017, G7 leaders noted the importance of prioritising Africa's security, stability and sustainable development, in particular through enhanced cooperation and dialogue with African countries aiming to bolster their capacity to prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts. Regarding maritime security, G7 leaders committed to supporting maritime security capacity development in Africa at Kananaskis in 2022, Sea Island in 2004, Heiligendamm in 2007, L'Aquila in 2009 and the Muskoka Summit in 2010.

Furthermore, G7 leaders actively provide financial support and technical expertise to conflict prevention, peace and security, and humanitarian and development assistance to countries of origin, transit and host communities in Africa. They channel their support through international organisations such as UNICEF, WFP, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC). The G7 has also provided support to strengthen maritime security in Africa, for example through supporting national authorities in preventing and combating piracy and other illegal activities at sea and via capacity-building activities.

This multidimensional approach is reflected in the sectors that have received G7 support for migrants and refugees, peace and security in Africa. These are Emergency Response (USD 44.8 billion, 83.2% over 2015-2022), followed by Conflict, Peace and Security (USD 6.8 billion, 12.6% over 2015-2022), Reconstruction, Relief and Rehabilitation (USD 1.2 billion, 2.2% over 2015-2022) and Disaster Prevention and Preparedness (USD 1.1 billion, 2.0% over 2015-2022). (see Figure 25).

**Figure 25. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to support migrants and refugees, peace and security in Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector codes: 152, 720, 730, 740). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Human Mobility, Peace and Security in Africa”. The list might not be exhaustive.

In terms of multilateral ODA, Disaster Prevention and Preparedness ranked as the second-highest funded sector (USD 892.4 million, 15.3% over 2017-2022) surpassing Reconstruction, Relief, and Rehabilitation (USD 332.2 million, 5.7% over 2017-2022) and

Conflict, Peace and Security (USD 95.0 million, 1.6% over 2017-2022), but preceded by Emergency Response (USD 4.5 billion, 77.3% over 2017-2022). (see Figure 26).

**Figure 26. G7\* imputed multilateral ODA disbursement to support migrants and refugees, peace and security in Africa by sector, 2017-2022 (USD million)**



\*EU disbursements not included to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7.

Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS imputed multilateral estimations (Sector codes: 152, 720, 730, 740). N.B. These codes have been selected as proxies for sectors that are most relevant to “Human Mobility, Peace and Security in Africa”. The list might not be exhaustive.

## 5.2 Maritime Security in Africa

### COMMITMENT 31 Maritime Security in Africa

“Support maritime security capacity development in Africa and improve the operational effectiveness and response time of littoral states and regional organizations in maritime domain awareness and sovereignty protection.”

*Kananaskis 2002, G8 Africa Action Plan;*

*Sea Island 2004, 9; Heiligendamm 2007, paras. 40, 42;*

*L'Aquila 2009, para. 129;*

*Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, Annex II/II*

### Overview

For many years, piracy and armed robbery at sea have threatened maritime security in Africa. Indeed, the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and the North-Western Indian Ocean have been especially affected during recent years. Beyond piracy and armed robbery, however, maritime threats in the region also encompass today other illicit activities at sea, including the trafficking of people and smuggling of illegal goods, illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and intentional marine pollution. All such sources of instability at sea seriously jeopardise the healthy development of the Blue Economy, a proper functioning of port infrastructures, they limit foreign and national investments, and increase costs of international trade.

At the L'Aquila Summit in 2009 and the Muskoka Summit in 2010, G7 leaders committed to supporting maritime security capacity development in Africa, thus extending previous commitments to support the capacity development of security authorities in several African countries. The G7 agreed to monitor progress on this commitment against two indicators: 1) Increased capacity and collaboration of affected states and regional organisations to counter maritime security infringements and indict offenders; and 2) G7 support for key areas.

### State of maritime security off African coasts

In the Gulf of Guinea, the years 2021 onwards marked an observable reduction in piracy attacks. The year 2022 marked a historical low in piracy incidents recorded within the region. Attacks followed a downturn trend from the peak of 2020, when 84 attacks were documented, to 2023 with only 22 attacks recorded.<sup>4</sup>

Patrolling international Navies, together with increased capacities of local Authorities, thanks to more sophisticated international cooperation, allowed to identify and better prevent activities by pirate action groups. Unfortunately, the root causes of piracy were not eradicated and in mid-December 2022, an upturn in kidnapping at sea was recorded with four cases involving a total of 16 crew members being kidnapped by pirates.<sup>5</sup>

In the Gulf of Aden and the North-Western Indian Ocean, the threat of piracy attacks has considerably decreased in recent years. From 2019 to 2022, only one incident was reported in the Gulf of Aden (2021, attempted attack) and none in the North-Western Indian Ocean. In 2023, one Iranian fishing vessel, believed to be conducting IUU fishing, was hijacked in the waters off the coast of Puntland<sup>6</sup>, the first successful hijack incident by alleged Somali pirates since 2017. Local sources stated the vessel had been taken by a local gang to be used as a mothership to conduct piracy activities. Since this initial occurrence, an upsurge of incidents that appear to be linked to hijacking and piracy of vessels was recorded in the North-Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.<sup>7</sup>

Such phenomenon may have increased following attacks by Houthi militias around the Bab-el-Mandeb strait. Indeed, since the Houthis began their attacks in the Red Sea and the Western Gulf of Aden, increasing numbers of commercial vessels have started sailing around the Cape of Good Hope to reach destinations in Europe or the US. This presents a significant increase in the number of “targets” for pirates to exploit vessels transiting to and from the Persian Gulf.

It is likely that the rise in the number of hijacking incidents in the region is due to two reasons: a) local fishermen becoming increasingly resentful of IUU fishing in their waters and b) local criminal groups acting opportunistically while international naval forces operating in the region are focused on events taking place in the Red Sea.

### **G7 activities and support to strengthen maritime security in Africa**

Since 2002, **Canada** has contributed to Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), which includes several members from Africa including Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya and the Seychelles. In May 2023, CMF stood up the Combined Task Force 154 (CTF-154) and holds the Deputy Commander position. CTF-154 conducted an exercise in the Seychelles in 2023 focused on maritime security enhancement training. Canada supported the participation of representatives from across the region and provided trainers. CTF 154 held additional exercises throughout 2023.

The Royal Canadian Navy, in conjunction with the Canadian Coast Guard, continues contributing to capacity building in the Gulf of Guinea and Western Mediterranean by training and working with the Navies and Coast Guards of African partner nations and other allies. Since 2017, Canada has sent two patrol vessels and headquarters staff to participate in the OBANGAME EXPRESS series of exercises in the Gulf of Guinea. These exercises develop regional maritime forces’ capacities to operate jointly and to interdict piracy and trafficking in the region.

Canada’s capacity building efforts through Combined Maritime Forces, Combined Task Force 154 focus on maritime awareness, maritime law, maritime interdiction, maritime rescue and assistance, and leadership development.

**France's** efforts to increase capacity and cooperation are focused primarily on the countries of the Gulf of Guinea and the southern Indian Ocean. France is also deployed very regularly with first rank frigates in the Mediterranean and Red Seas to enforce maritime security. In the Gulf of Guinea, France permanently deploys a ship and maritime surveillance aircraft in the frame of Corymbe operation and actively support the regional “architecture of Yaoundé”. It also carries out joint patrols and exercises

(Nemo) with countries in the region and in conjunction with regional organisations involved in the maritime safety and security and exchanges operational and intelligence information. In the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, it participates in several multinational and European operations (CTF 150, 152 and 153, EMASoH-Agénor, Atalanta, Aspides) in the fight against piracy and illegal traffic and to enforce freedom of navigation. In the Mediterranean Sea, it participates in the European operation Irini, which aims in particular to enforce the arms embargo on Libya. Finally, within the framework of the EU, France participates in the Coordinated Maritime Presences, which ensures, with its European partners, a continuous maritime presence in the GoG. It also implements the EU-funded CRIMARIO project, which promotes information sharing and the development of several African partners' maritime capabilities.

France also finances over a hundred training courses in France, offering courses on Navy ships in particular, joint exercises at sea between French and African vessels are organised. France also donates materials (boats, etc.) and equipment (semaphores). The budget allocated is about EUR 1 million per year.

France plays an active role in the operation of two regional maritime training schools in Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea.

**Germany** has supported coastal States and regional Organisations by organising three plenary sessions in the frame of the co-Presidency of the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (GoG). Further, a German financed project (UNODC) specifically targeted the root causes for piracy and armed robbery at sea (e.g. in the Niger Delta / Nigeria). Other projects, set-up with IMO and UNODC, work for a better and homogenous approach in Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) (supply of equipment and training) in the Zones of the GoG (specifically Zone G) as well as for better inter-organisational cooperation between the ECOWAS and the ECCAS region. The financing of a project with UNITAR shall provide training for maritime personnel given through ISMI in Abidjan.

Germany has already offered to support the Italian co-presidency of the G7++ FoGG through a Troika Model and will be available throughout the year 2024.

**Italy** provides continuous naval presence in the Gulf of Guinea and the Western Indian Ocean: it provides one Navy Patroller under national command for an eight month a year shift in the Gulf of Guinea (Operation "Gabinia"); and it participates with one Navy Unit to the EUNAVFOR Atalanta Operation in the Western Indian Ocean. It also supports maritime security in the Mediterranean both through the national operation "Mediterraneo Sicuro" in most of the Mediterranean international waters and the participation to the EUNAVFORMED Irini, of which Italy is in command. In the Gulf of Guinea, it conducts capacity-building initiatives with the aim of preventing and combating piracy and other illegal activities at sea. In 2022 and 2023 it supported UNODC Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure support and evidence collection training programme to the benefit of Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Republic of Congo and Senegal.

In December 2023, at the onset of the Houti attacks to international shipping in the Red Sea, Italy provided a Navy Unit to ensure a security framework to merchant ships transiting through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.

Italy regularly takes part in the exercises OBANGAME EXPRESS and GRAND AFRICAN NEMO with European and US Navies and coastal Countries of the Gulf of Guinea. It is a major personnel provider of EUCAP Somalia, contributing with an integrated approach to the strengthening of capacities of the Somali Coast Guard forces by providing support to the Somali Maritime Administration and to the Puntland Maritime Police Force.

**Japan** has contributed USD 1.15 million to the programme aimed at strengthening regional policy and coordination to ensure freedom of navigation and response to maritime incidents in the Western Indian Ocean, and at increasing capacities for maritime law enforcement agencies to deal with maritime and environmental crimes, including trafficking in person, trafficking of drugs and weapons through UNODC (2021-2022).

Since 2020, Japan has also contributed around USD 1.1 million to peacekeeping training centres in Ghana and Nigeria through UNDP for capacity building on anti-piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

As announced at TICAD 8 in 2022, Japan has strengthened maritime law enforcement capabilities of relevant countries, including through capacity building and provision of equipment.

Japan has been conducting counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somalia since 2009. It has been conducting joint exercises with some G7 countries and the EU off the coast of Somalia. In November 2023, Japan Maritime Self Defence Force and Djiboutian Navy conducted a joint cruising exercise.

At Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC), which was built with the support of Japan's contribution to IMO, Japan sponsored IMO's maritime security workshops for officials engaged in maritime law enforcement of the neighbouring countries in March and June 2022. Japan also supports UNODC in key areas such as trafficking in person, trafficking of drugs and weapons and maritime pollution, environmental crimes. In 2023, Japan organised a "Knowledge Co-Creation Programme" in which participants acquired the new knowledge and skills necessary for maritime law enforcement, including countermeasures against piracy in Asia and Somalia, through lectures, site visits, and practical training. Japan's counter-piracy operations including joint exercises with some G7 countries and the EU have been contributing to deterring piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia. Japan's joint exercise with Djibouti and the capacity building projects including workshops at DRTC are aiming at enhancing the region's relevant agencies' capacity to address illicit maritime activities including piracy as well as its root causes.

The **United Kingdom** contributes to maritime security-focused capacity-building projects in Africa, working both bilaterally and with multilateral partners. In West Africa, the UK supports the Yaoundé Process through its operation of the Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) mechanism alongside France. In East Africa, the UK's Joint Maritime Security Centre (JMSC) delivered the maritime security element of the UK/Kenya Strategic Security Compact signed in May 2023 to enhance co-operation between the Kenyan Joint Operations Centre and the JMSC. In 2023, the UK undertook port security capacity development with partners in Southern and West Africa, including crisis management and cyber awareness training. In addition, the UK carried out joint port surveys in Mozambique, Ghana, and Nigeria. Finally, the UK

established a dedicated Maritime Liaison role to ensure a Royal Naval Officer is able to identify the training needs of the navies of the Gulf of Guinea States.

Boosting the capability of regional navies to tackle illicit maritime activity is a UK priority. Royal Marines trained Kenya Marines in 2022/23, with the US, to create a Marine Commando Unit capable of shoreline and maritime operations. The UK conducted training of marines as part of the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which will tackle IUU fishing and counter terrorism. UK engagement has developed the Nigerian Navy's counter-piracy, kidnap-for-ransom and oil bunkering mission capability. The UK also conducted a counter narcotics capacity building project with Cabo Verde in 2023.

A Royal Navy exercise conducted by HMS Trent in 2023 encompassed visits to a range of Gulf of Guinea Nations and patrols within their Exclusive Economic Zones, forging bilateral and multilateral relationships. It included training in Vessel, Board Search and Seizure and Maritime Domain Awareness. Trent also engaged on Exercise Grand African Nemo, contributing to the deterrence of illicit activities.

Since 2015, the **United States** has funded complementary programmes with INTERPOL and UNODC to build the capacity of maritime crime investigators and judicial systems in West Africa. INTERPOL has trained and mentored regional investigators on maritime crime scene preservation and investigation. In parallel with INTERPOL's programme, the United States has funded UNODC to 1) help States implement new legislation on maritime crime to bring their legal frameworks in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and give broader authorities to prosecute pirates, and 2) train judges and prosecutors on maritime crime cases through mock trials. In 2018 the United States initiated similar programme with UNODC in East and Southern Africa, with additional focus placed on regional collaboration and capacity building to increase maritime interdictions, counternarcotic, and deter transnational crime. In 2020 State/INL expanded support for complementary programming with INTERPOL to include East and Southern Africa. The U.S. supports the development and use of innovative technologies and techniques to address IUU fishing in Africa.

The United States support for maritime crime investigators and prosecutors has helped to contribute to a decline in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea since 2020 and an increase in maritime crime investigations and prosecutions overall. The programmes supported by the United States in East and Southern Africa have helped build a very different maritime security environment in the region than was the case a decade prior, with regional collaboration and maritime interdictions significantly increased.

The **European Union** addresses piracy and maritime threats in the Gulf of Guinea through a number of capacity building programmes such as WeCAPS, SEACOP SWAIMS, EnMAR, GoGIN+, GoGIN II and PASSMAR. These actions aim to reinforce the Yaoundé Architecture, tackle maritime criminality at sea, and strengthen the legal frameworks to prosecute piracy.

In the Indian Ocean, the European Union is acting to reinforce information sharing and strengthen port security and safety of navigation through the MASE programme (and related agreements), the Red Sea Programme, the Port Security and Safety of Navigation Programme and the ESIWA and CRIMARIO projects.

Moreover, the continental "Safe Seas for Africa" programme will be active in the Gulf of Guinea and Western Indian Ocean to strengthen the capacities of maritime law enforcement agencies, support countries to develop appropriate legislation against crimes at sea and establish legal finish, and reinforce the maritime security architectures for information sharing in the two targeted regions.

The coordination of Member States' vessels' in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea is guaranteed by the "Coordinated Maritime Presences". In addition, two CSDP missions EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta and EUNAVFOR Operation Aspides, guarantee safe navigation in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region.

**Methodology**

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2002	1. Increased capacity and collaboration of affected States and regional organisations to counter maritime security infringements and indict offenders.	We have drawn on our own G7 records and monitoring and reporting systems.	 <p>14 – Life below water</p>
	2. Is G7 support hitting key areas?		 <p>16 – Peace, justice and strong institutions</p>

## 5.3 Crises and Conflicts in Africa

### COMMITMENT 33 Crises and Conflicts in Africa

“Our goal is indeed to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organizations to develop African capacity in order to better prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts, as regards the relevant goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

*Taormina 2017, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 26*

#### Overview

Promoting peace and preventing the causes of conflict are among the main objectives of the African Union Agenda 2063. Over recent years, the progressive deterioration of the African security landscape; the weakening and, in some cases, the crisis of sub-regional organisations, the backsliding of democratic values and the rule of law, the expansion of terrorism and violent extremism and, the destabilising impact of activities by terrorist groups in some countries have all become elements of grave concern in an increasingly fluid and unpredictable context, that hinders Africa's possibilities towards a peaceful and sustainable growth. The G7 recognises the work of African partners, particularly women's civil society and youth organisations as well as non-government partners, in strengthening democracy, the rule of law, peace and security. However, more effective and timely cooperation among African countries and regional organisations, with renewed efforts by all relevant actors and stakeholders concerned, is needed in order to address the root and structural causes of insecurity. At the Taormina G7 Summit in 2017, G7 leaders agreed to step up cooperation and regional dialogue with African countries and regional organisations to strengthen and further develop the capacity to prevent, respond and manage crises and conflicts in Africa. The G7 therefore decided to report on all endeavours contributing to this objective, with a particular focus on financial efforts and activities related to conflict management and prevention and to fostering peace and security in African countries.


Unresolved conflict and political crises still remain a critical issue affecting the stability of the African continent. In 2023, the deterioration of the political and security landscape affected various areas such as the Central Sahel region (Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso), eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Horn of Africa (Somalia and Ethiopia), Sudan and South Sudan, the northern areas of Mozambique, as well as some parts of Nigeria and Libya. Moreover, there has been a significant increase in the number of *coups d'état* in the continent from 2020 to 2023 (Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon). In the Sahel, the crisis of regional security cooperation frameworks supported by G7 countries, such as the former G5 Sahel and the declaration of the central Sahelian states of their withdrawal from ECOWAS, has had a negative impact on

regional cooperation. This situation has contributed further to deteriorating conditions in the Sahel, notably the spread of terrorist threats and activities, the multiplication of human rights violations and abuses on the population, and growing displacement among civilians. The increased presence of Russian proxies and operatives in the region is of grave concern. Furthermore, according to the last Global Terrorism Index, the terrorism epicentre has shifted to Sub-Saharan Africa, concentrated mostly in the Sahel region, which now accounts for almost half of all deaths from terrorism globally. In fact, during 2023, the jihadist offensive has continued to gain ground in the Sahel (in the so called Liptako-Gourma or Three Border Area), with the growing risk of security spillovers spreading further instability into the States of the Gulf of Guinea.<sup>8</sup>

### **G7 bilateral ODA to support activities to conflict prevention, peace and security**

The G7 bilateral financing to activities in this particular field has fluctuated around an average of USD 925.1 million level during the 2017 – 2022 period, with a sharp increase in 2021, when the G7 joint amount reached USD 1.2 billion. Looking at specific sectors, activities of “civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution” represented by far the most important share in financial overall disbursements, spanning from 65.6% of the total in 2017 to 70.9% in 2022, with a peak at 73.9% in 2020. The second-largest share throughout the considered period was represented by “security system management and reform”, from a minimum of 15.0% of the total in 2020 to a maximum of 27.2% in 2018. The third-largest sector of financing, “participation in international peace-keeping operations” accounts on average for 5.8% of total spending throughout the 2017-2022 period, with a very significant increase, reaching 9.4%, in 2021 coinciding with the start of new peace-keeping operations in Mozambique and Sudan. (see Figure 27).

**Figure 27. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to conflict prevention, peace and security in Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**




Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector code 152).

**G7 resources disbursed to activities to support conflict prevention, peace and security with a gender equality focus**

The volume of G7 resources allocated to the funding of projects on conflict prevention, peace and security with a gender equality objective increased from USD 426.8 million in 2017 to USD 521.6 million in 2022 with the highest amount of USD 617.4 million in 2021. In the same period, the spending on gender equality objectives, increased from 47.8% in 2017 to 65.4% in 2022. (see Figure 28).

These resources have been used to help women and girls contribute to decisions that will directly impact their security.

**Figure 28. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to conflict prevention, peace and security in Africa with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Sector code 152).

**G7 actions to increase capacity and collaboration for response to and prevention of crises and conflicts in Africa**

G7 adopted a multifaceted approach in order to reach their respective objectives in the field of conflict management/prevention and enhancing peace and security in African States. Cooperation with international and regional organisations (African Union – AU and Regional Economic Communities - REC) has been central to national strategies. Support and financing to UN Agencies and Organisations as well as participation in UN peace-keeping operations was a key component of national strategies alongside capacity-building and training activities carried out directly by national agencies and security forces of the Member States. The following Member States’ activities have been coordinated to ensure coherence and effectiveness.

In the frame of **Canada’s** support to the African Union, a portion of its grant to the AU Commission (2020-2024) was dedicated to peace and security, particularly Women, Peace and Security (WPS). This included support for FemWise-Africa (strengthening the role of women in conflict prevention and mediation), the AU’s agenda for WPS (including training for countries on WPS national action plans), increased involvement of women in peacebuilding, and the AU Special Envoy for WPS. Canada supported efforts by the AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) to strengthen coordination, particularly on preventive diplomacy and conflict mediation. Canada engaged directly with four RECs through accreditation and/or project funding. Further, Canada contributed to

strengthened UN-AU engagement through forums including the UN Peacebuilding Commission and UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, where Canada is a permanent co-chair. Canada is the eighth-largest financial contributor to UN peace operations (through assessed contributions) and has deployed military and police personnel to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa.

**France** financed development projects dedicated to crisis and conflict prevention in Africa. Between 2017 and 2022, in the framework of the "peace and resilience" fund managed by AFD, more than EUR 750 million were allocated to projects in Central African Republic, Lake Chad and Sahel countries. To bolster crisis recovery, France follows a comprehensive approach linking defence, diplomacy and development (3D). In partnership with States and civil societies, France supports and implements actions aimed at re-establishing the presence of the State through its public services and its regalian missions of security, justice or civil status. It includes reinforcing the protection of populations in fragile environments, putting in place the conditions for dialogue between groups and communities and strengthening the civil societies of States in crisis. In border areas of the Sahel and the Gulf of Guinea, France supports governments and communities in the prevention and management of community conflicts. In the Sahel countries, before 2023, France was supporting the redeployment of basic services, including government services, in the tri-border region through the "Programme trois frontières". In Ethiopia, France is supporting the Peace process, through Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration activities. Finally, in various areas, France is engaged in mediation.

Furthermore, the French Government has contributed to the establishment of regional cooperation mechanisms in the field of security, in particular by supporting the G5-Sahel and the Alliance pour le Sahel. Outside the Sahel, France has provided capacity-building to various African peace-keeping operation contingents in the Continent, such as the Togolese and Senegalese contingents deployed within the former UN mission to Mali (MINUSMA), and the Djiboutian and Ugandan contingents detached to the UN mission to Somalia (UNSOM). As regards the West Africa and Gulf of Guinea region, France has supported the so-called Architecture of Yaoundé through the organisation of joint maritime exercises with several States of the Gulf of Guinea (Op CORYMBE). Further, it has provided similar training and conducted similar maritime activities with countries in the Horn of Africa region (Op ATALANTA). Furthermore, France has contributed to capacity building of African armed forces and security personal, through a multifaceted training strategy, which includes activities developed in French prepositioned bases in Africa (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Tchad, Gabon, Djibouti) and the Indian Ocean (FAZSOI); training activities provided to around 350 African officers per year in military training schools in France; and capacity-building activities through a network of 19 African National Schools with a Regional Vocation (ENVR) to train African partners in multiple areas related to security (around 3,000 officers per year). Finally, France has participated in several European Union Common Security and Defence Policy missions and peacekeeping operations in Africa.

**Germany** continued to support the security architecture of the African Union and its regional organisations. In particular, Germany backed the AU in implementing the

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) policies and approaches on the level of its member states, especially in the following focal areas: transitional justice; empowerment of women and youth as peace agents; climate, peace and security nexus; mental health and psychosocial support. In this context, Germany engaged intensively with the African Union Commission and regional organisations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Southern African Development Community, as well as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the APSA training centres, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana) and the Southern African Development Community Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (Zimbabwe). As president of the Sahel Alliance, Germany employed in its project implementation the “Approche Territoriale Intégrée” which aims to improve the supply of basic services to the population in defined priority zones across national borders in line with the humanitarian-development-peace nexus. "Germany also stepped up its commitment towards West African Coastal countries that face spill-over jeopardizing their development gains.

In the Horn of Africa, **Italy** continued to support IGAD in its endeavour to facilitate the peace process in Ethiopia and to strengthen the rule of law in combating violent extremism in East Africa and the Horn. Italy provided funding to the GCERF and financed capacity-building activities for Somali judges and prosecutors in the field of enhancing the rule of law when countering violent extremism. In the Sahel region, Italy provided Nigerian police and security forces with training and capacity building as well as with technical equipment aimed at strengthening border control abilities, eventually halting security cooperation following the coup d'état in July 2023. Further, Italy supported interreligious dialogue and the strengthening of civil society in the Sahel through capacity building programmes in Niger, Mauritania and Mali. Italy provided funding to UNODC, both in the Sahel region, where it worked to enhance local criminal justices' response to terrorism; and in the Gulf of Guinea region, where it supported the UNODC Visit, Board, Search and Seizure programme (VBSS) aimed at strengthening evidence collection to counter piracy and illegal trafficking at sea. Italy financed UNOCT, both in the Sahel and in the coastal States of West Africa, where it supported the Integrated Border Stability Mechanism for the coordination of border management. In this region, Italy endeavoured with regional and UN organisations to counter the risk of security spillovers from the Sahel to the Coastal States. Furthermore, Italy started a collaboration with the International Counter-Terrorism Academy (AILCT) based in Abidjan, where it financed training courses on assistance to victims of terrorism. Finally, in the Great Lakes region, Italy provided capacity building and training courses to Rwandan Police Forces.

Since 2017, **Japan** has provided financial assistance and expertise through the UNDP to Peacekeeping Training Centres in 13 African countries (Benin, Cameroon, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Tanzania and Togo). Japan has also contributed to the AU Peace Fund to support the implementation of African-led activities for Peace and Reconciliation, including but not limited in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Mali, Ghana, Madagascar, Burundi and Guinea-Bissau. Further, Japan supported institutional building and human resources development in African countries by implementing quality capacity building

projects through contributions to the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Recognising the crucial role that AU-led peace support operations (AUPSO) play in maintaining peace and security in Africa, Japan has decided to support AUPSO personnel under the UN Triangular Partnership Programme (TPP). Finally, Japan continued to dispatch staff officers to UNMISS peace-keeping operation to support stabilisation in South Sudan.

The **United Kingdom** continues to partner with African states and organisations to improve conflict prevention and responses. The UK has developed strategic security and defence partnerships with key regional players such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ghana. Support has been provided through both ODA and non-ODA funding, including through the Integrated Security Fund (ISF) which funds interventions worth GBP 62.5 million in Nigeria, Somalia, East Africa, West Africa and the Sahel focused on tackling the drivers and impacts of conflicts. In 2023, the UK and AU signed a refreshed Partnership Memorandum of Understanding, strengthening security and training partnerships. The UK also worked with the AU and international community to get critical political transitions back on track and, since 2021, supported the AU Commission through its AU Conflict and Governance programme which focusses on women, peace and security, electoral observation, conflict early warning, and climate security. The UK is the fifth largest contributor towards both the UN Regular Budget and to the Peacekeeping Budget. In FY 2022-2023, the UK provided GBP 242.3 million to UN Peacekeeping missions in Africa, alongside deployments of UK personnel to those missions. The British Peace Support Team Africa (BPST), a permanent military and civilian team in Kenya, trained 5,425 soldiers and police officers for African peace support operations with the AU and UN in 2022-23, supporting five enduring PSO partnership countries (Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Malawi, and Uganda) and the AU. UK support has helped partner governments deliver their own human rights and gender training to armed forces.

In 2022, the **United States** government committed to a partnership with the five Coastal West African states of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo, and also with Mozambique and Libya through the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS). In Coastal West Africa, the regional partnership seeks to advance responsive governance, social cohesion, and accountable security, especially in historically marginalised northern regions. U.S. peace and stability-focused efforts are pivotal to prevent the destabilising threat of violence and extremism, and complement activities to counter and prevent violence extremism in the Sahel under the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership Programme. In Mozambique, the United States supports the Government of Mozambique, local leaders and communities, and collaborates with other donor partners through the Donor Coordination Platform to promote reconciliation, inclusive and sustainable development, and resilience in historically marginalised and conflict-affected areas, focusing first on conflict-affected areas in northern Mozambique and then expanding over time to the entire country. In Libya, the United States is working to convene local stakeholders, the USG interagency, and international partners to develop concrete steps to create conditions for Libya's long-term peace and stability – building upon identified resiliencies and promising initiatives.<sup>9</sup>

The **European Union** supported the African Peace and Security Architecture – APSA – under the leadership of the African Union and the capacity-building activities in favour of AU and RECs to collaborate also at Member States level. The EU financed the AU – APSA IV programme with EUR 40.5 million for the period 2020-2024 with an aim to: improving conflict cycle management under APSA; implementing effective early warning systems for the African Standby Force; increasing the effectiveness of cooperation within and around the APSA framework (including with civil society organisations); implementing the Architecture in a way that is inclusive of youth and children. Furthermore, the EU supported preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts of AU and RECs to prevent, deescalate and respond to conflicts and crisis through the Early Response Mechanism managed by the African Union. Moreover, the EU financed the APSA III programme with EUR 25 million for the period 2020 – 2024. Until now, it has supported RECs’ activities in South Sudan (IGAD Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism) and Mozambique (SADC peace support to the police and civilian sectors), and endeavoured to facilitate democratic political transitions in Chad, Sudan, Mali and Burkina Faso. Above all, the EU is committed through peacebuilding efforts, several missions in GoG, Sahel, Mozambique and Central African Republic. It also offers substantial support in the area of military and defence through the European Peace Facility, both at bilateral level and to African-led peace support operations.

### **UN statistics on the implementation of SDG 16**

The G7 has supported African partners to make progress on the full range of SDG 16-related areas, including but not limited to: demobilising child soldiers, removing landmines, reintegrating and controlling small arms and light weapons, supporting peacekeeping operations, reform of security systems and supporting peacebuilding, conflict resolution and prevention.

The context however remains extremely challenging. The number of civilian deaths in conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa increased by 66% in 2020 relative to 2015. The homicide rate in Africa has not shown progress between 2015 and 2020. Furthermore, there has been very little progress in the collection of light weapons – which represents the main cause of civilian deaths between 2016 and 2022. Moreover, homicide rates on the African continent did not decrease between 2015 and 2020. Finally, the number of human rights defenders, journalists and trade unionists killed has decreased both in North and Western Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>10</sup>

**Methodology**

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2017	1. G7 actions to increase capacity of and collaboration with affected African States and regional organizations to improve response to and prevention of crises and conflicts.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Self-reporting and African Union</li> <li>• OECD-DAC statistics on ODA (152)</li> <li>• UN statistics on the implementation of SDGs</li> </ul>	 <p>16 – Peace, justice and strong institutions</p>  <p>17 – Partnerships for the goals</p>

## 5.4 Migration and Refugees

### COMMITMENT 40 Migration and Refugees

“We commit to increase global assistance to meet immediate and longer-term needs of refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities, via humanitarian, financial, and development assistance, cooperation... (We recognize ...migration management, and) ...we commit to strengthen our development cooperation with our partner countries, with special attention to African, Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit.”

*Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 18 41 Drivers of migration*

#### Overview

Africa stands out as a continent of origin, transit, and destination for migrants. Over 31 million Africans live outside their country of birth, the majority within the African continent.<sup>11</sup> In fact, about 75% of the migration flows on the continent are internal. Migration and forced displacement – triggered by the effects of climate change, persecution and security and economic issues – has reached unprecedented levels over the last few years. According to UNHCR, in 2023 110 million people fled homes because of persecution, conflict, violence and human rights violations.<sup>12</sup>

Sub-Saharan Africa hosts more than 26% (over 18 million) of the world's refugees.<sup>13</sup> The number of refugees has risen over recent years, particularly due to ongoing crises, new conflicts, and human rights abuses.

These also contribute to greater movement outside of the African continent. According to IOM data, about 400,000 movements were recorded across the Eastern route in 2023, while an additional 80,000 movements were recorded on the Southern route, particularly to South Africa.<sup>14</sup>

In this context, the wider development strategy of Africa should pursue well-managed human mobility. The differing needs of those on the move should be recognised, enabling people to reach their productive potential. With increasing migration and displacement flows across Africa, activities should be framed in a way that addresses the root causes of the migratory phenomenon.

Against this backdrop, the G7 has been playing a crucial role in working towards well-managed and supported human mobility. As such, during the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, the G7 committed to increasing global assistance to meet the immediate and longer-term needs of refugees, internally displaced people and host communities and strengthen development cooperation with partner countries, with a focus on African, Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit. In 2017, G7 leaders focused


on the implications of migration and refugee flows for security and human rights, recognising the importance of managing and controlling migrant flows and supporting refugees. The African continent was defined as high priority and the G7 set the strengthening of cooperation and dialogue with the African countries and regional organisations as a key objective. This goal was reiterated in 2018, where safe, orderly and regular migration was presented as an objective to be jointly achieved. In addition, the G7 committed to sharing the burden and responsibility between countries to address irregular migration and forced displacement, as well as their drivers and consequences. During the 2019 Summit, the G7 leaders encouraged again and coordinated efforts particularly in the fight against migrant smuggling and human trafficking, as well as the protection of human rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. The G7 Communiqué in 2021 also outlined the need to support African countries – particularly through their regional organisations and the African Union – in protecting migrants and refugees. In 2024, the G7 is promoting enhancement and accessibility of safe and legal routes and also emphasising migration as an adaptation strategy for climate change, to which Africa is the most vulnerable continent.

The G7 monitors the achievements of the aforementioned commitment by reporting on its ODA towards migration and forced displacement and, support to relevant multilateral organisations. Moreover, the G7 monitors assistance and funding to Africa, the Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit.

### **G7 bilateral and multilateral development assistance and humanitarian assistance**

The G7 ODA mobilised to support humanitarian assistance for migrants and refugees increased by more than USD 2.2 billion from USD 4.8 billion in 2015 to USD 7.0 billion in 2022. (see Figure 29). While OECD data indicates that Material Relief Assistance and Services (Purpose code 72010) decreased from USD 2.7 billion to USD 2.4 billion from 2015 to 2022, this trend was driven by an increase of G7 ODA in the two other components of humanitarian assistance. Specifically, the Emergency Food Assistance (Purpose code 72040) sector rose from USD 1.7 billion to USD 3.3 billion and Relief Coordination and Support Services (Purpose code 72050) went from USD 452.1 million to USD 1.3 billion.

**Figure 29. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to support humanitarian assistance for migrants and refugees in Africa by sector, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose codes: 72010, 72040, 72050).

Table 3 below summarises the funding of the G7 provided to multilateral organisations from 2022 to 2023 to support refugees and migrants as well as host communities in hotspots in Africa.


**Table 3. G7 disbursements to international organisations in support of migrants, refugees and host communities in Africa, 2022- 2023 (in million)**

	YEARS	Canada CAD	France EUR	Germany EUR	Italy EUR	Japan USD	UK USD	USA USD	EU EUR
<b>UNHCR</b>	2022	24.6	12.1	77.3	29.3	26.3	40.7	767.6	40.6
	2023	29.1	29.9	60.0	10.8 <sup>15</sup>	33.3	- <sup>16</sup>	746.1	63.6
<b>IOM</b>	2022	3.8	2.0	7.5	30.2	14.6	7.7	185.1	151.5
	2023	8.0	3.5	12.0	12.7 <sup>17</sup>	24.5	-	239.4	212.0
<b>WFP</b>	2022	205.9	92.2	233.0	6.2	140.3	49.3	3,290.2	117.1
	2023	174.5	74.0	106.1	1.0	98.7	-	2,317.1	201.5
<b>UNICEF</b>	2022	256.1	2.7	24.5	1.5	50.4	9.9	357.1	34.1
	2023	94.5	6.5	19.9	2	54.5	-	265.7	114.8
<b>ICRC</b>	2022	39.5	12.1	42.5	-	16.9	118.3	256.8	48.9
	2023	40.6	12.0	52.5	-	15.3	-	222.3	70.0
<b>IFRC</b>	2022	-	-	-	-	2.8	16.1	-	0.2
	2023	-	-	-	-	4.1	-	-	2.5
<b>OCHA</b>	2022	22.2	2.0	54.0	-	1.1	25.9	22.5	1.5
	2023	55.0	2.7	68.2	-	1.5	-	24.6	0.9
<b>UNFPA</b>	2022	29.3	-	-	2.75	4.2	9.9	14.1	-
	2023	31.5	2.0	-	-	8.6	-	29.1	2.7

Source: G7 self-reporting

According to IOM, “the roles, expectations, relationships and power dynamics associated with being a man, woman, boy or girl, and whether one identifies as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and/or intersex (LGBTI), significantly affect all aspects of the migration process, and can also be affected in new ways by migration”.<sup>18</sup> Recognising the need for gender-sensitive initiatives in the context of migration and human mobility, the G7 reviewed the ODA with principal and significant gender equality objectives. Between 2015 and 2022, the share of ODA to Africa to support migrants, refugees and host communities with a gender equality objective fluctuated with an overall decreasing trend from a share of 19.0% in 2015 to 14.1% in 2022. (see Figure 30).

**Figure 30. G7 bilateral ODA disbursements to support migrants, refugees and host communities in Africa with a gender equality objective, 2015-2022 (USD million)**



Source: Own compilation based on OECD-CRS net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards (Purpose codes: 72010, 72040, 72050).

**G7 development assistance and funding to countries of origin and transit in Africa**

In 2023, **Canada** provided over CAD 340 million in humanitarian assistance on the African continent. Canada’s humanitarian assistance is provided through flexible funding to UN, NGO and Red Cross partners. Interventions include programmes that targets refugees or other forcibly displaced people (recognising they face unique protection challenges); in many cases these groups are included as beneficiaries in broader programmes. Canada has significantly increased the share of its humanitarian funding in food and nutrition, providing CAD 285 million in extra budgetary resources in these sectors between 2021 and 2023.

Consistent with UNHCR’s global resettlement priorities, Canada focuses its resettlement efforts on refugees in most need of protection. At the 2023 Global Refugee Forum, Canada announced plans to resettle over 136,000 refugees in the next 3 years. This commitment includes resettling women in precarious situations, ethnic and religious minorities, and members of LGBTQI+ communities, Rohingya refugees and human rights defenders. Canada completed its commitment to resettle 10,000 individuals from Africa between 2021 and 2023. The establishment of multi-year commitments demonstrates Canada’s response to priority refugee populations and enables predictable planning and resource allocation.

Canada provides UNHCR with predictable, multi-year, and flexible funding. In 2019, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada launched a five-year initiative (CAD 24.5 million) with UNHCR for global resettlement and complementary pathways activities that supports referrals for the majority of refugees resettled under Canada's Government Assisted Refugee and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes. It directly supports refugees being considered for resettlement to Canada and funds the commensurate UNHCR staffing capacity to support this work.

In 2023, **France** supported migrants, refugees and other displaced persons and host communities in African countries, via several means: through direct financial contributions to international organisations, NGO's, the UE, and partner governments, via the implementation of projects by French stakeholders such as the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) Group and also through humanitarian emergency funding supporting the work of local and international NGOs.

These programmes and funding address a wide range of topics, ranging from maximising the benefits of migration (e.g. diaspora engagement, support to entrepreneurship) to capacity-building for States to enable safe, orderly and regular migration (e.g. support for the most vulnerable migrants and displaced persons, fighting human trafficking, durable return and reintegration etc.). France's response to the needs of refugees, returnees and internally displaced persons is based on integrated approach in Sub-Saharan Africa. In 2023, responding to the displacement crisis due to the conflicts in Sudan, France committed 55.2 million euros to support the humanitarian response implemented by international organisations and NGOs.

**Germany** provides support for bilateral and multilateral development assistance and humanitarian assistance as well as advice on better migration management, regional migration politics and free movement of people. In 2023 Germany provided a total of EUR 578 million in humanitarian assistance to countries on the African continent, mainly through regional and flexible funding of UN-, NGO- and ICRC partners. Labour migration was facilitated; gender-based violence, internal displacement and human mobility in the context of climate change were addressed. From 2015 to 2023, Germany supported migrants, refugees, other displaced persons as well as their host communities in African countries i.e. through projects of the Special Initiative "Displaced Persons and Host Countries", Transitional Development Assistance, and International Development Cooperation and humanitarian assistance. As chair of the Sahel Alliance, which Svenja Schulze, Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, assumed in 2023, Germany intensified its efforts to support refugees and host communities in the Sahel region. Germany has been cooperating in this regard with the African Union, countries in the Horn of Africa, West Africa, Central Africa, North Africa and Madagascar.

With over 157,000 arrivals in 2023, **Italy** was the first country of destination for migrants heading to Europe through the Mediterranean routes. To face such challenge, in 2023 the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation promoted a renewed collaboration between Countries of origin, transit and destination and scaled up initiatives in priority countries (North Africa and Sahel regions). Specifically, initiatives of

the relevant UN Agencies were elaborated for a total value of EUR 33 million. Moreover, the Italian Cooperation allocated a total of EUR 32 million for different initiatives in support of displaced populations in African countries, including Algeria, Ethiopia, Central African Republic, Libya and Sudan. In 2022 and 2023, Italy also funded a project by IOM in Côte d'Ivoire named "Protection and Assistance to Vulnerable Migrants". The aim of the project is to strengthen institutional capabilities and operational mechanisms to fight against the phenomena of Trafficking in persons (TiP) and smuggling of migrants (SoM), with a gender-sensitive approach. Italy has also underlined the importance and the relevance that the theme has for Italy, during the last Global Refugee Forum, where it contributed to the multi-stakeholder/mega pledge on "Protection-gender equality and protection from gender-based violence".

In line with the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), **Japan** has been funding interventions to support vulnerable people including migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons in various African countries through bilateral and multilateral channels. Japan provided various assistances in 2023, including emergency food assistance in 13 African countries, as well as assistance to support refugees in the Great Lakes, people affected by conflict in Sudan, earthquake in Morocco, and flood in Libya, through UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC, IFRC, OCHA and UNFPA totalling approximately USD 241 million. In response to increasing forced displacements due to climate change, Japan is also committed to supporting these vulnerable people affected by climate change in improving livelihood means, strengthening host community resilience etc. in various African countries. Japan also actively supports initiatives to protect women and girls who are often particularly vulnerable among refugees and displaced persons, from a women, peace and security (WPS) perspective.

In 2023, the **United Kingdom** was the 4th largest bilateral donor to UN humanitarian appeals in sub-Saharan Africa. Through humanitarian and development interventions the UK aims to ensure that displaced people are protected, with expanded access to durable solutions, supporting them to lead safe, empowered lives. Recognising that the rising number of forcibly displaced people, and their hosts, require more support, the UK announced an ambitious policy and programme package at the 2023 Global Refugee Forum, including 15 pledges and almost GBP 40 million in funding. This included new programming to reduce the IDP caseload in Somalia through support for climate-sensitive durable solutions. In addition, the UK has contributed GBP 10 million since 2021, primarily in the East, Horn, and North of Africa, through a migration for development programme (Better Regional Migration Management (BRMM)) which aims to demonstrate the development benefits of well-managed migration.

In U.S. government Fiscal Year 2022 through Fiscal Year 2023, the **United States** provided USD 13.4 billion in humanitarian assistance to international partners in Africa. This assistance includes more than USD 8.7 billion for UNHCR, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC, OCHA, and UNFPA.

As a significant humanitarian and development donor, the **European Union** remains fully committed to supporting and protecting migrants, refugees, other forcibly displaced persons and their host communities worldwide. In the period 2021 to 2022, the EU increased its engagement with partner countries in support of comprehensive

Migration Partnerships, in line with the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. EU development assistance under the NDICI-GE instrument for the period 2021-2022 resulted in spending on migration and forced displacement for a total amount of EUR 3,364 billion. Out of this, close to EUR 800 million was provided in support of Sub-Saharan countries, in addition to EUR 1.5 billion to countries in the EU Neighbourhood region.

**Methodology**

Baseline	Indicators	Data source	Associated SDGs
2015	<p>1. G7 bilateral and multilateral development assistance and humanitarian assistance including for material relief assistance and services; emergency food aid; relief and coordination, protection and support services benefiting affected populations, including refugees, IDPs, migrants, and host communities, primarily in developing countries, in situation of large-scale migration movements and protracted displacement.</p> <p>2. G7 development assistance and funding to African, Middle East and neighbouring countries of origin and transit.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• OCHA/FTS data</li> <li>• UNHCR, UNRWA, IOM, WFP, UNICEF, ICRC/IFRC data</li> <li>• OECD/DAC-CRS (72010,72040 and 72050)</li> <li>• Self-reporting</li> </ul>	 <p>1 – No poverty</p>  <p>10 – Reduced inequalities</p>  <p>16 – Peace, justice and strong institutions</p>

## 5.5 Case Studies

### JAPAN - Maritime Security in Africa



#### Japan's Cooperation on Maritime Safety and Security in Africa

Japan is developing various measures to realise a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)", a vision that Japan has announced as a guiding perspective to be shared by the international community. Among these measures, Japan has been working to share its principles and knowledge for ensuring the rule of law at sea and to strengthen the maritime law enforcement capacity of the countries concerned.

Japan's cooperation in the field of maritime safety and security began in the late 1960s with cooperation in the areas of navigational safety and charting and surveying of the Malacca-Singapore Strait. Because piracy and armed robbery at sea increased rapidly, maritime security agencies were established in many countries in the 1990s and 2000s. During this period, Japan's cooperation for maritime law enforcement was initiated, and efforts were made to support the establishment of maritime law enforcement agencies and to strengthen their capacities. In Africa, cooperation to the Djibouti Coast Guard was started in 2008 including capacity building and provision of patrol vessels. In 2015, the Maritime Security Policy Programme was launched in Tokyo, a master's degree programme aiming at contributing to the maintenance of maritime order based on international law and to develop their networks.

Japan's international cooperation through JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) focuses on Japan's sea lanes and is designed and executed in cooperation with the Japan Coast Guard, combining the dispatch of Japanese experts, training in Japan and the provision of equipment. In the African region, the cooperation focuses on human resource development through training programmes in Japan or in third countries, e.g., Malaysia. In the area of maritime law enforcement, the "Maritime Law Enforcement" programme has been conducted since 2001.

This programme is designed for law enforcement officers and aims to build a strong international network for combating piracies among the regions and around the world. To date, a total of 380 participants from 35 countries have participated (as of 2022); additionally in 2023, 17 trainees from 12 countries including Djibouti, Mozambique, and Nigeria participated. There also is a provision of patrol vessels to Djibouti Coast Guard. Japan has been supporting maritime security in Africa in cooperation with international organisations such as IMO, UNODC and UNDP. In March and June 2022, Japan sponsored IMO's maritime security workshops at Djibouti Regional Training Centre (DRTC). Japan will continue to contribute to maritime security cooperation in the African region.



Group photo at the opening ceremony of the "Maritime Law Enforcement" training program by JICA in 2023. 17 trainees from 12 countries including Djibouti, Mozambique, and Nigeria participated.  
*Credit: JICA*

## FRANCE - Crises and Conflicts in Africa



### Regionally-oriented national schools: focus on the International Counter-Terrorism Academy in Abidjan

Developed in 1997, the concept of ENVR (regionally-oriented national schools) is known as an emblematic tool of France's structural cooperation on security and defence, specifically in Africa. Resulting from a bilateral partnership between the host states and France, ENVR schools are « national » in that they are located within the jurisdiction of a partner country. They are « regionally oriented » in that they welcome trainees from both the host country as well as all countries in the surrounding region and sub-region.

In response to strategic developments, the ENVRs have adapted their activities and now cover five main training areas: health, internal security, civil protection and judicial police, defence, counter-terrorism and cyber-security. In addition, a project to create an ENVR dedicated to the protection of the environment and natural resources is currently under development in Congo. Mainly located in West Africa, ENVR schools develop interoperability between defence and security forces, enable them to fight effectively against transnational threats (trafficking, piracy, terrorism, etc.). ENVRs thus contribute directly to strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which came into force in 2003. In light of its strategic dimensions, this model is attracting a great deal of interest from other countries.

One of the flagship projects of the school network is the International Counter-Terrorism Academy (in French AILCT) announced by both French and Ivorian Presidents in 2017. The Jacqueville campus (35 km from Abidjan) was inaugurated in 2021 and is now acknowledged as a reference centre designed to support African countries in capacity building (including strategy matters) and inter-ministerial capacities to counter terrorism.

To ensure the consistency of the training on the entire spectrum of counter-terrorism, the Academy is based on three pillars:

- Pillar 1: an inter-ministerial school of senior administration staff, which is aimed at the people responsible for counter-terrorism on the national level (judges, representatives, high-ranks officers)
- Pillar 2: a training centre for special forces and specialised intervention units.
- Pillar 3: an institute of strategic research bringing together researchers and experts in issues relating to counter-terrorism to allow forward-thinking strategies and a thorough understanding of the economic and social factors behind terrorism.

Since mid-2023, all the AILCT's strategic decisions have been validated by a Board of directors comprising 16 representatives of the contributing countries and international organisations such as ECOWAS and the AU. This strong desire for

international openness is also reflected in the teaching, thus since last year the experts are no longer solely Ivorian or French, but also Congolese, German, Spanish and Italian.



Members of the AILCT Executive Board.

*Credit:* Luc ROUSSOULIERE/Inontsina

## ITALY - Migration and Refugees

**CinemArena - The itinerant education and information programme raising awareness on socio-economic opportunities and promoting empowerment in Africa, as alternatives to irregular migration**



CinemArena is a "traveling caravan" that brings Italian and international cinema to areas where poverty, disease and destitution characterise the lives of populations. It is the tool developed by the Italian Cooperation to convey educational and information campaigns on various social and health issues in the most remote and deprived areas of the world. Thanks to its ductility and to the experience gained in 23 years of activity, this project has been deemed particularly suitable for conducting awareness campaigns also on the risks of irregular migration.

In the last few years, the programme CinemArena has been managed by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and funded by the Migration Fund of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The overall goal of the initiative is to set up and run awareness campaigns in countries of origin to properly inform people on the risks connected to irregular migration, as well as on available legal pathways and alternative livelihood opportunities, thus providing a powerful response to misinformation and helping potential migrants make informed decisions.

A first phase of the project was implemented in 2018-2020 in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal and The Gambia. A second phase took place in 2021-2022 in Côte d'Ivoire and Senegal. Travelling from one country to another, the caravan stopped in urban and rural areas, reaching communities in migration-prone areas, targeting not only younger generations, but also family groups - that usually take part in migrants' decision to leave their country - and outreaching to over 195,000 participants in about 400 events including film screenings, school tours, training events and festivals. Furthermore, a media and digital campaign was launched with the elaboration of more than 40 media products, as well as 11 radio shows, 3 TV shows and over 1,000 broadcasts. The social media campaign was also reinforced to reach about 40,000 followers on Facebook.

The third phase of the project is currently underway and is being implemented in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal, Gambia and Tunisia, aiming at raising awareness on socio-economic opportunities in those countries and at promoting empowerment of youth and vulnerable communities as an alternative to irregular migration. It started in December 2022 and its scheduled deadline is May 2025.

CinemArena has proven to be a very powerful tool as it addresses, through entertainment and leisure activities, pivotal topics directly reaching the targeted populations.



CinemArena, Burkina Faso. *Credit:* Cooperazione Italiana.

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<sup>1</sup> The Africa Union Agenda 2063 has recognised as one of its pillars, the free movement of people.

<sup>2</sup> IMF and PORTWATCH. *Trade Disruptions in the Red Sea*. Retrieved from: [eventc1000000 | PortWatch \(imf.org\)](https://portwatch.imf.org/)

<sup>3</sup> Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2024). *Africa Migration Trends to Watch in 2024*. Retrieved from: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/african-migration-trends-to-watch-in-2024/>

<sup>4</sup> ICC (2023). *IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report*. Retrieved from: [2023\\_Annual\\_IMB\\_Piracy\\_and\\_Armed\\_Robbery\\_Report\\_live.pdf \(icc-ccs.org\)](https://www.icc-ccs.org/2023-Annual-IMB-Piracy-and-Armed-Robbery-Report-live.pdf)

<sup>5</sup> UNODC (2023). *"Pirates of the Niger Delta II"*. Retrieved from: [https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime\\_crime/UNODC\\_GMCP\\_Pirates\\_of\\_the\\_Niger\\_Delta\\_Part\\_2.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/Maritime_crime/UNODC_GMCP_Pirates_of_the_Niger_Delta_Part_2.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> ICC (2023). *IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Report*. Retrieved from: [2023\\_Annual\\_IMB\\_Piracy\\_and\\_Armed\\_Robbery\\_Report\\_live.pdf \(icc-ccs.org\)](https://www.icc-ccs.org/2023-Annual-IMB-Piracy-and-Armed-Robbery-Report-live.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> UKMTO - UK Maritime Trade Operations

<sup>8</sup> EIU (2023). *Democracy Index 2023*. Retrieved from: <https://industrvs.org/eiu-democracy-index-2023-age-of-conflict/>

<sup>9</sup> *The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability 10-Year Plan for Libya 2022-2032*. Retrieved from: <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/The-U.S.-Strategy-to-Prevent-Conflict-and-Promote-Stability-10-Year-Plan-for-Libya-Accessible-3.22.24.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> dataUNODC. Retrieved from: <https://dataunodc.un.org/>

<sup>11</sup> UN. *Migration Dynamics, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa*. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/migration-dynamics-refugees-and-internally-displaced-persons-africa#:~:text=Over%2031%20million%20Africans%20live,African%20migrants%20go%20to%20Europe.>

<sup>12</sup> UNHCR (2023). *Refugee Statistics*. <https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/>

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>14</sup> IOM (2024). *Appeal for USD 112 Million for Migrants along the Eastern and Southern Africa Routes*. Retrieved from: <https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/news/appeal-usd-112-million-migrants-along-eastern-and-southern-africa-routes>

<sup>15</sup> The Italian Ministry of Interior funded UNHCR with EUR 1.53 million through the Regional Development and Protection Programme for North Africa (RDPP NA).

<sup>16</sup> UK 2023 figures will be published in August 2024.

<sup>17</sup> The Italian Ministry of Interior funded IOM with EUR 0.94 million through the Regional Development and Protection Programme for North Africa (RDPP NA).

<sup>18</sup> IOM. *Gender and Migration*. Retrieved from: <https://www.iom.int/gender-and-migration>.

## Conclusion

The G7 Progress Report underscores the unwavering, steadfast, and continuous dedication of G7 members to uphold accountability in their commitments to strengthen reliable and innovative partnerships with partner countries. For the first time, the G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 introduces a geographic focus on the African continent. The Report provides a comprehensive analysis of the progress made on G7 development and development-related commitments from 2015 to 2022 that have a focus on Africa or one of its regions.

Despite the impacts that multiple crises had on ODA budgets, G7 bilateral and multilateral ODA flows disbursed towards Africa between 2015 and 2022 increased overall, representing around 43% of total G7 bilateral ODA between 2015-2022 and more than half (54%) of total G7 multilateral ODA between 2017-2022.

In navigating Africa's development challenges - exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, international and domestic conflicts, regional instability and the impacts of the triple planetary crisis - G7 cooperation with African countries has covered many critical areas for advancing sustainable development, including economic transformation, food security and nutrition, climate resilience, social services, gender equality and women's empowerment, human mobility, peace and security, and ending gender-based violence. Impactful initiatives in these areas supported by the G7 include the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), the G7/V20 Global Shield against Climate Risks and the Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems (CREWS) as well as the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA) initiative, the Global Partnership for Education (GPE) and other technical and financial support to the United Nations, International Organisations and African Union-led peacekeeping operations. Despite notable progress, multiple global and regional crises call for enhanced G7 cooperation efforts with African partners, especially in the areas of economic transformation, food security, nutrition and climate resilience, as well as migration and refugees.

A notable feature of this report is the application of a gender equality lens in assessing the progress made on the commitments. Over the years, the G7 has showcased continued leadership and commitment to gender equality. This was demonstrated by an increased proportion of bilateral ODA flows to Africa with gender equality objectives, allocated to initiatives targeting women's economic empowerment, as well as conflict prevention, peace and security and the communication sector. This marks an important step towards fostering a gender-transformative development approach within G7 cooperation strategies with African partners and underscores the recognition of the pivotal and crucial role of African women and girls in all their diversity in driving sustainable and inclusive development.

Over the years, the G7 reaffirmed its engagement with African partners and during the Italian Presidency in 2024, the G7 placed Africa at the core of its sustainable

development agenda. African leadership will be key to addressing major challenges and taking advantage of opportunities to promote sustainable development and tackle climate change; G7 and African cooperation is therefore essential and a G7 priority. The G7 will strengthen its partnership with African countries to advance sustainable development on the continent, focusing particularly on those living in the most vulnerable situations. In this respect, insights derived from the G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 will be instrumental in guiding the G7's forthcoming cooperation strategies with African countries and regional organisations. By drawing on lessons learnt and best practices, a renewed G7-Africa partnership can significantly contribute to advancing sustainable development and hastening progress towards the objectives of the African Union's Agenda 2063, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement.

## Annexes

### Annex A: List of Active G7 Commitments

#### I – Aid and aid effectiveness


Commitment 1. Increasing development assistance	Associated SDGs
<p>“We reaffirm our respective ODA commitments, such as the 0.7% ODA/GNI target as well as our commitment to reverse the declining trend of ODA to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and to better target ODA towards countries where the needs are greatest.” <i>Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p.19</i></p> <p>“We are determined to take on a leading role in reversing the setback of progress towards the SDGs. Recognizing that 2023 is the halfway point to achieve the SDGs, we highlight the importance of the SDG Summit in September and will ambitiously contribute to a successful outcome. We reaffirm our commitment to revitalizing international cooperation and strengthen multilateralism.” <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 11</i></p>	  


Commitment 2. Innovative financing	Associated SDGs
<p>“...we have committed to the <u>Charlevoix Commitment on Innovative Financing for Development</u> to promote economic growth in developing economies and foster greater equality of opportunity within and between countries.”</p> <p>“We recognise the value in development and humanitarian assistance that promotes greater equality of opportunity, and gender equality, and prioritizes the most vulnerable, and will continue to work to develop innovative financing models to ensure that no one is left behind.” <i>Charlevoix 2018, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 7</i></p>	 


## II – Economic Development

Commitment 3. Trade and infrastructure in Africa	Associated SDGs
<p>“The G8 will work with African countries and regional economic communities to meet the AU’s target of doubling intra-Africa trade and reducing crossing times at key border posts by 50% by 2022.</p> <p>The G8 commits to provide increased support for project preparation facilities for African regional infrastructure programmes.”</p> <p><i>Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders' Communiqué, paras. 19-20</i></p>	 
Commitment 4. Quality Infrastructure Investment	Associated SDGs
<p>“..we strive to align our own infrastructure investment with the G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment, as set out in the Annex. We further encourage the relevant stakeholders, namely governments, international organizations, including MDBs, and the private sector, such as in PPP projects, to align their infrastructure investment and assistance with the Principles, including the introduction and promotion of a transparent, competitive procurement process that takes full account of value for money and quality of infrastructure.”</p> <p><i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 9</i></p>	
Commitment 5. Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)	Associated SDGs
<p>“Building on our commitments in Carbis Bay [Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para 67], we have further shaped and implemented our Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) as a joint offer to narrow the investment gap for sustainable, inclusive, climate resilient, and quality infrastructure in emerging markets and developing countries, based on intensified cooperation, democratic values, and high standards. We will mobilise the private sector for accelerated action to this end.”</p> <p>“Building on our initiatives and strong commitment, and using all financial instruments at our disposal, we aim at collectively mobilising up to USD 600 billion in public and private</p>	 

<p>investments with a particular focus on quality infrastructure over the next five years.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, pp. 15f</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 14</i></p>	
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<p><b>Commitment 6. Responsible global supply chains</b></p>	<p><b>Associated SDGs</b></p>
<p>“We will strive for better application of internationally recognized labour, social and environmental standards, principles and commitments ..., increase our support to help SMEs develop a common understanding of due diligence and responsible supply chain management ..., strengthen multi-stakeholder initiatives in our countries and in partner countries ..., support partner countries in taking advantage of responsible global supply chains. We also commit to strengthening mechanisms for providing access to remedies including the National Contact Points (NCPs) for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ...”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 6</i></p> <p>We commit to striving for better application and promotion of internationally recognized social, labor, safety, tax cooperation and environmental standards throughout the global economy and its supply chains.</p> <p><i>Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para 22</i>  <i>Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para 29</i></p>	 <p>The image shows three Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) icons stacked vertically. The top icon is red and represents '1 NO POVERTY' with a family silhouette. The middle icon is maroon and represents '8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH' with a bar chart and upward arrow. The bottom icon is gold and represents '12 RESPONSIBLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION' with a circular arrow symbol.</p>

Commitment 7. Digital transformation in Africa	Associated SDGs
<p>“We collectively endeavour to provide strong support to bridge the digital divide and promote digital transformation in Africa in line with our national commitments. (...) Our common strategy for Africa will be based on the following objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i. Enabling the necessary digital infrastructure in order to reduce the digital gap and inequality, including in isolated countries and regions that are excluded or underserved, and encouraging the transport and logistics activities that serve e-commerce and e-government on a regional basis (...).</li> <li>ii. Developing digital literacy and skills, particularly in the field of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), in order to equip young people, especially young women and girls, with the skills necessary to take advantage of the growth and prosperity promised by the digital economy, whilst protecting against online risks and harms, and promoting inclusion, notably for women.</li> <li>iii. Fostering digital transformation for growth, entrepreneurship, job creation, and private-sector empowerment, particularly digital start-ups, SMEs and innovative community initiatives, by using digital technologies to provide support.</li> <li>iv. Expanding new solutions offered by digitalization across other sectors, such as health, agriculture, energy, e-commerce, electronic payment and governance.</li> <li>v. Creating enabling environments to allow national stakeholders to manage digital risks in coordination with the existing work of international and African organizations.</li> <li>vi. Sharing best practices between G7 and African partners, including experiences about creating legislative and regulatory frameworks, notably regarding data protection.</li> </ul> <p>We also commit to addressing telecommunications security – including 5G security -and to ensuring that the digital transformation benefits all and promotes good governance, environmental sustainability, equitable economic transformation and job creation.”</p> <p><i>Biarritz 2019, Biarritz Declaration for a G7 &amp; Africa Partnership, para 8; Digital transformation in Africa (Annex of the Biarritz Declaration for a G7 &amp; Africa Partnership), paras 4 &amp; 6</i></p>	  

Commitment 8. Green jobs and social protection for a just transition	Associated SDGs
<p>“By 2025, we will increase the share of our ODA employment and skills promotion programmes that is directed specifically towards green sectors and greening traditional sectors in alignment with our emerging and developing partner countries’ strategies, and subject to our budgetary processes.”</p> <p>“We emphasise the value of social protection, particularly in times of crises and in the face of climate change and environmental degradation, and underscore the human right to social security. The effects of climate change disproportionately affect the marginalised and most vulnerable in society, exacerbating poverty and economic, gender and other social inequalities. To address these effects, we will accelerate progress towards universal, adequate, adaptive, shock-responsive, and inclusive social protection for all by 2030 in line with the UN Secretary-General’s initiative for a “Global Accelerator on Jobs and Social Protection for a Just Transition” which aims to create 400 million jobs and to extend social protection.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, pp. 8, 12</i></p>	    

### III – Health

<b>Commitment 9. Attaining Universal Health Coverage (UHC) with strong health systems and better preparedness for public health emergencies</b>	<b>Associated SDGs</b>
<p>“We are therefore strongly committed to continuing our engagement in this field with a specific focus on strengthening health systems through bilateral programmes and multilateral structures. We are also committed to support country-led HSS in collaboration with relevant partners including the WHO.”</p> <p>“We commit to promote Universal Health Coverage (UHC) ...We emphasize the need for a strengthened international framework to coordinate the efforts and expertise of all relevant stakeholders and various for/ initiatives at the international level, including disease-specific efforts.”</p> <p>“We...commit to...strengthen(ing) policy making and management capacity for disease prevention and health promotion. We...commit to...building a sufficient capacity of motivated and adequately trained health workers.”</p> <p>“We place particular emphasis on increasing the resilience of global health systems to deal with outbreaks of emerging and enduring pathogens, including by investing in the health and care workforce worldwide to build capacity and keep health care workers safe, and ensuring fairness, inclusion and equity, including the empowerment and leadership of women and minorities in the health and care sectors.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p.12;</i>  <i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, pp. 2, 11,12</i>  <i>Carbis Bay Summit 2021 Communique, pp.16</i></p> <p>“We recommit to working alongside global partners to assist countries to achieve UHC... . To this end, we endorse the “G7 Global Plan for UHC Action Agenda”.... .”</p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 34</i></p>	 

Commitment 10. Preventing, preparing and responding to future outbreaks globally	Associated SDGs
<p>“In order to avoid the devastating consequences of future pandemics (...) we reaffirm our commitment to work in partnership to strengthen health systems worldwide and step up our efforts in pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response under the One Health approach (...).</p> <p>We will strengthen global pandemic readiness including by enhancing collaborative surveillance and predictable rapid response, based on a highly qualified and trained public health workforce at all levels, and endorse the G7 Pact for Pandemic Readiness to this end. Within the framework of the G7 Pact for Pandemic Readiness, we will provide support to assist at least one hundred low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in implementing the core capacities required in the International Health Regulations (IHR) for another 5 years until 2027.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, p. 13, 14</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 33</i></p>	

Commitment 11. Reforming and strengthening WHO’s capacities	Associated SDGs
<p>“We support the ongoing process to reform and strengthen the WHO’s capacity to prepare for and respond to complex health crises while reaffirming the central role of the WHO for international health security. We commit to take leadership in reinforcing the Global Health Architecture, relying on strengthening existing organizations. ...We... support the WHO to implement its emergency and wider reforms, including its One WHO approach across the three levels of the Organization, namely its headquarters, regional and country offices, in a timely manner, recognizing its resource needs.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13;</i>  <i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p. 10</i></p> <p>We renew our strong commitment to developing and strengthening the global health architecture (GHA) with the World Health Organisation (WHO) at its core for future public health emergencies to break the cycle of panic and neglect, recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic has made an unprecedented impact on the international community.</p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 33</i></p>	

Commitment 12. Mobilising support for the Global Fund	Associated SDGs
<p>“Mobilizing support for the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. We fully support a successful 5th replenishment of the GF.</p> <p>We reaffirm our commitment to end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and look forward to the success of the 6th replenishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.”</p> <p><i>St. Petersburg 2006, Fight Against Infectious Diseases, 2; Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, para. 15; Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p. 12, Biarritz 2019 Sahel Partnership Action Plan, para. 16</i></p>	

Commitment 13. Antimicrobial Resistance	Associated SDGs
<p>“Acknowledging the rapid rise in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) at the global scale, we reiterate that we will spare no efforts to continue addressing this silent pandemic. We will continue to promote the prudent and responsible use of antibiotics in human and veterinary medicine, raise awareness on sepsis, lead in the development of integrated surveillance systems based on a One Health approach, concurrently advance access to antimicrobials, strengthen research and innovation for new antibiotics in international partnerships, and incentivise the development of new antimicrobial treatments with a particular emphasis on pull incentives.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, p. 14</i></p> <p>“Recognizing the rapid escalation of AMR globally, we continue to commit to exploring and implementing push and pull incentives to accelerate R&amp;D of antimicrobials as well as promoting antimicrobial access and stewardship for their prudent and appropriate use...toward the UNGA HLM on AMR in 2024.”</p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 35</i></p>	

Commitment 14. Neglected tropical diseases	Associated SDGs
<p>“We commit to supporting NTD-related research, focusing notably on areas of most urgent need. ... We support community based response mechanisms to distribute therapies and otherwise prevent, control and ultimately eliminate these diseases. We will invest in the prevention and control of NTDs in order to achieve 2020 elimination goals. We also acknowledge the importance and contribution of R&amp;D and innovation to preserve and deploy existing remedies, and to discover new remedies for these and other health areas, such as neglected tropical diseases and poverty related infectious diseases.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 11;</i>  <i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 10</i></p>	 

Commitment 15. Ending preventable child deaths and improving maternal health	Associated SDGs
<p>“We are committed to ending preventable child deaths and improving maternal health worldwide.” “We continue to take leadership in promoting the health of women and girls, adolescents and children, including through efforts to provide access to sexual and reproductive health, rights and services, immunization, better nutrition, and needs-based responses in emergencies and disasters.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 15;</i>  <i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, p. 12</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders' Communiqué, para. 34 &amp; 43</i></p>	  

Commitment 16. HIV/AIDS: Prevention, treatment and anti-discrimination	Associated SDGs
<p>“We reaffirm our commitment to come as close as possible to universal access to prevention, treatment, care and support with respect to HIV/AIDS.”  <i>Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, para. 15</i></p> <p>“We commit to counter any form of stigma, discrimination and human rights violation and to promote the rights of persons with disabilities and the elimination of travel restrictions on people with HIV/AIDS.”  <i>L’Aquila 2009, Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future, para. 123</i></p>	 

Commitment 17. Polio	Associated SDGs
<p>“We stress our continuing commitment to the eradication of polio which is a reachable objective ... To this end, we will continue to support the Global Polio Eradication Initiative. We...reaffirm our continued commitment to reaching polio eradication targets.”  <i>Deauville 2011, Deauville G8 Declaration, para. 60 (d); Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p. 12</i></p>	

## IV – Food Security

Commitment 18. Broad food security and nutrition development	Associated SDGs
<p>“As part of a broad effort involving our partner countries, and international actors, and as a significant contribution to the Post 2015 Development Agenda, we aim to lift 500 million people in developing countries out of hunger and malnutrition by 2030. The G7 Broad Food Security and Nutrition Development Approach, as set out in the annex, will make substantial contributions to these goals.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Elmau Leaders’ Communiqué, p. 19</i>  <i>Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para 27</i></p> <p>“We have therefore decided to raise our collective support for food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa through an array of possible actions, such as increasing Official Development Assistance, better targeting and measuring our respective interventions in line with food security and nutrition-related recommendations defined at Elmau and Ise-Shima, and ensuring they reach women and girls, backing efforts to attract responsible private investments and additional resources from other development stakeholders. We will encourage blended finance and public private partnerships (PPPs). We will act in line with African countries priorities and consistently with the African Union Agenda 2063, aiming to reach also the most neglected areas and the most vulnerable people.”</p> <p><i>Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para 30</i>  <i>Carbis Bay, 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para 66</i></p>	 

Commitment 19. Mobilising support for the Global Alliance for Food Security	Associated SDGs
<p>“We, the Leaders of the G7, will spare no effort to increase global food and nutrition security and to protect the most vulnerable, whom the food crisis threatens to hit the hardest.”</p> <p>“ ... in strong support of the UN GCRG, we are building the Global Alliance for Food Security jointly with the World Bank as a coordinated and solidarity response to the challenges ahead.”</p> <p>“We commit to an additional USD 4.5 billion to protect the most vulnerable from hunger and malnutrition, amounting to a total of over USD 14 billion as our joint commitment to global food security this year.”</p>	  

<p>"We will ensure that our response to the current challenges also strengthens the long-term resilience and sustainability of agriculture and food systems (...)."</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 G7 Statement on Global Food Security (para. I, II, III.1, III.6)</i></p>	
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## V – Education

Commitment 20. Quality education for women and girls	Associated SDGs
<p>“Through the <u>Charlevoix Declaration on Quality Education for Girls, Adolescent Girls and Women in Developing Countries</u>, we demonstrate our commitment to increase opportunities for at least 12 years of safe and quality education for all and to dismantle the barriers to girls’ and women’s quality education, particularly in emergencies and in conflict-affected and fragile states.”  <i>Charlevoix 2018, G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 11</i></p>	  
Commitment 21. Basic education in the Sahel	Associated SDGs
<p>“We recall that 3 million children are still deprived of access to primary school in the Sahel region, due in particular to the closure of schools in conflict-affected areas, and that the quality of teaching remains a significant issue. We will continue our engagement in support of education and will encourage partner countries’ governments and other donors to join a collective effort in strengthening education systems, thus increasing our coordination and our political and financial support to education, including basic education. We encourage the commitment of G5 Sahel countries for improved education systems and policies, with an emphasis on gender equality, which remains an overarching need.”  <i>Biarritz 2019, Sahel partnership Action Plan, para 15</i></p>	 
Commitment 22. Girls’ education targets	Associated SDGs
<p>“COVID-19 has exacerbated underlying inequalities, leading to one of the worst education crises in history for children around the world, but especially for the most marginalised and at risk girls. Around 11 million girls from pre-primary to secondary school are at risk of not returning to school. We commit to two new global SDG4 milestone girls’ education targets: 40 million more girls in education by 2026 in low and lower-middle income countries; and 20 million more girls reading by age 10 or the end</p>	

<p>of primary school by 2026, in low and lower-middle income countries.” <i>Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, para 47</i></p>	 The icon for Sustainable Development Goal 5, Gender Equality. It features a red square with the number '5' in the top left corner, the words 'GENDER' and 'EQUALITY' stacked vertically to the right of the number, and a white symbol in the center. The symbol is a combination of the male (♂) and female (♀) symbols, with an equals sign (=) inside a circle.
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## VI – Equality

Commitment 23. Sexual and reproductive health and rights	Associated SDGs
<p>“We are committed to ensuring sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights, and ending child, early and forced marriage and female genital mutilation and other harmful practices.”</p> <p><i>Brussels 2014, The Brussels G7 Summit Declaration, para. 21, Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 18, Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 46 Elmau, 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, page 24 Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 43</i></p>	 
Commitment 24. Technical and vocational education and training for women and girls	Associated SDGs
<p>“We commit to increasing the number of women and girls technically and vocationally educated and trained in developing countries through G7 measures by one third (compared to “business as usual”) by 2030.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, para. 20</i></p>	 
Commitment 25. Women’s economic empowerment	Associated SDGs
<p>“We will support our partners in developing countries (...) to overcome discrimination, sexual harassment, violence against women and girls and other cultural, social, economic and legal barriers to women’s economic participation.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 16 Taromina 2017, Leader’s Communiqué, para. 18</i></p> <p>“We call for reforms to address the social, legal and regulatory barriers to women’s full and free economic participation and empowerment. We support the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (AFAWA) initiative including through the Women Entrepreneurs-Finance Initiative (We-Fi). We also further encourage the 2X Challenge and bilateral programmes supported by G7 members.”</p> <p><i>Biarritz 2019, Declaration for a G7 &amp; Africa Partnership, para. 7 Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, paras 28 &amp; 68</i></p>	  

Commitment 26. Advancing gender equality through non-discriminatory legislation	Associated SDGs
<p>“We also intend to advocate for the promotion of gender equality, in order to create a global coalition committed to the full empowerment of girls and women around the world. In that regard, we express our deepest concern that too many women and girls around the world are affected by discriminatory laws and the lack of legal protection. Aside from our domestic commitments, we stand ready to support interested countries through our different expertise and development mechanisms to adopt, implement and monitor laws that remedy this and advance gender equality. The support of the G7 to these countries will be monitored by the existing G7 Accountability Working Group.”</p> <p><i>Biarritz 2019, Declaration on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment, para 3</i></p> <p>In recognition of increased violence against women and girls during the COVID-19 crisis, we commit to preventing, responding to and eliminating all forms of sexual and gender-based violence (GBV). We will achieve this through women’s empowerment and by scaling-up implementation of evidence-based, accessible survivor and victim-centred policies, prevention and support programmes, including through our pandemic response and recovery at home, in partner countries and in conflict zones.</p> <p><i>Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para 46</i></p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 43</i></p>	  

## VII - Governance

Commitment 27. G7 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	Associated SDGs
<p>“The G8 will take action to raise global standards for extractives transparency and make progress towards common global reporting standards, both for countries with significant domestic extractive industries and the home countries of large multinational extractives corporations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- EU G8 members will quickly implement the EU Accounting and Transparency Directives.</li> <li>- The US, UK and France will seek candidacy status for the new EITI standard by 2014.</li> <li>- Canada will launch consultations with stakeholders across Canada with a view to developing an equivalent mandatory reporting regime for extractive companies within the next two years.</li> <li>- Italy will seek candidacy status for the new EITI standard as soon as possible.</li> <li>- Germany is planning to test EITI implementation in a pilot region in view of a future candidacy as implementation country.</li> <li>- Russia and Japan support the goal of EITI and will encourage national companies to become supporters.”</li> </ul> <p><i>Lough Erne 2013, G8 Leaders' Communiqué, paras. 36, 38</i></p>	 
<p><b>Commitment 28. Base Erosion and Profit Shifting</b></p> <p>“We reiterate our strong political commitment to the timely and effective implementation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) / G20 Inclusive Framework Two-Pillar Solution, to address the tax challenges arising from globalisation and the digitalisation of the economy with a view to bringing the new rules into effect at the global level. We will continue to provide support to developing countries for the implementation of this historic agreement.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders' Communiqué, p. 9</i></p>	 
<p><b>Commitment 29. Beneficial Ownership Transparency</b></p> <p>“In order to defend the integrity and transparency of democratic systems, we will continue to step up our fight against corruption</p>	<p>Associated SDGs</p>

<p>in all relevant bodies, and accelerate work on implementing and strengthening our beneficial ownership transparency registers, including by improving their accuracy, adequacy, and timeliness. In this regard, we also welcome the recently strengthened standards on beneficial ownership transparency of legal persons by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and look forward to their swift implementation. To hold kleptocrats, criminals and their enablers to account globally, we will broaden our global fight against cross-border corruption, including by supporting African partners in setting up 15 additional beneficial ownership registers.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders' Communiqué, pp. 25f</i></p>	
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<p><b>Commitment 30. Asset recovery</b></p>	<p><b>Associated SDGs</b></p>
<p>“We will promote the effective implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), as well as other key international instruments such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and will promote full participation in their respective review mechanisms.”</p> <p>“Reaffirming that strengthening international cooperation among law enforcement agencies is a global imperative to effectively combat transnational corruption and to facilitate effective recovery of stolen assets, their disposal and social re-use, we will carry on making efforts through:</p> <p>(a) Continuing to promote efficient and effective means for providing mutual legal assistance (MLA) and extradition of persons for corruption offences, consistent with applicable domestic and international instruments, while respecting the principle of the rule of law and the protection of human rights.</p> <p>(b) With a view to facilitating MLA requests and other forms of international cooperation, promoting dialogue among practitioners which are particularly valuable in investigations of corruption, and coordination and cooperation on asset recovery through interagency networks, including regional networks where appropriate.</p> <p>(c) Following up on asset recovery efforts of Arab countries and, applying the lessons learned in this effort to address global needs. In this regard, we will focus on promoting practical cooperation and engage financial centers in Asia and other parts of the world. In this context, we welcome proposals for a Global Asset Recovery Forum to be held in 2017, co-hosted by the United States and United Kingdom, with support from the joint World Bank and</p>	

<p>UNODC Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR), which will focus on assistance to Nigeria, Ukraine, Tunisia and Sri Lanka. (...)” <i>Ise Shima 2016, Leaders’ Declaration and G7 Action to Fight Corruption, Section 2 “Strengthening law Enforcement Cooperation on Corruption”, paragraphs 1 to 4.</i></p>	
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## VIII – Peace and security

Commitment 31. Maritime security in Africa	Associated SDGs
<p>“Support maritime security capacity development in Africa and improve the operational effectiveness and response time of littoral states and regional organizations in maritime domain awareness and sovereignty protection.”</p> <p><i>Kananaskis 2002, G8 Africa Action Plan</i>  <i>Sea Island 2004, 9; Heiligendamm 2007, paras. 40, 42</i>  <i>L’Aquila 2009, para. 129</i>  <i>Muskoka 2010, Muskoka Declaration: Recovery and New Beginnings, Annex II/II</i></p>	 
Commitment 32. Women, Peace and Security	Associated SDGs
<p>“We...remain committed to supporting efforts by other countries, both financially and technically to establish and implement National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security or similar gender-equality related strategies.”</p> <p><i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p. 14</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 43</i></p>	 
Commitment 33. Crises and conflicts in Africa	Associated SDGs
<p>“Our goal is indeed to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with African countries and regional organizations to develop African capacity in order to better prevent, respond to and manage crises and conflicts, as regards the relevant goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”</p> <p><i>Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 26</i></p>	 

## IX – Environment and energy

Commitment 34. Biodiversity	Associated SDGs
<p>1. “We...commit to the global mission to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030.”</p> <p>2. “We commit to champion ambitious and effective global biodiversity targets, including conserving or protecting at least 30 per cent of global land and at least 30 per cent of the global ocean by 2030.”</p> <p>3. “Committing to increase finance for nature-based solutions through to 2025.”</p> <p>4. “Supporting agreement and delivery of targets to prevent loss, fragmentation and degradation of ecosystems to restore significant areas of degraded and converted ecosystems.”</p> <p><i>Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué (Annex of the G7 2030 Nature Compact), para. 43</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 22</i></p> <p>5. “G7 members that are parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) commit to revise, update and submit our National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans (NBSAPs) aligned with the GBF...”</p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 24</i></p>	  
Commitment 35. Climate Risk Finance, Insurance and Disaster Risk Reduction	Associated SDGs
<p>“We will intensify our support particularly for vulnerable countries’ own efforts to manage climate change related disaster risk and to build resilience. We will aim to increase by up to 400 million the number of people in the most vulnerable developing countries who have access to direct or indirect insurance coverage against the negative impact of climate change related hazards by 2020 and support the development of early warning systems in the most vulnerable countries. To do so we will learn from and build on already existing risk insurance facilities such as the African Risk Capacity, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility and other efforts to develop insurance solutions and markets in vulnerable regions, including in small islands developing states, Africa, Asia and Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2015, Leaders’ Declaration G7 Summit, p. 13, para. a</i>  <i>Carbis Bay G7 Summit 2021 para. 41</i></p>	  

Commitment 36. Marine litter	Associated SDGs
<p>“The G7 commits to priority actions and solutions to combat marine litter as set out in the annex, stressing the need to address land- and sea-based sources, removal actions, as well as education, research and outreach.”  <i>Elmau 2015, Leaders' Declaration G7 Summit, p. 14 (see also Annex, pp. 8-9)</i></p> <p>“We commit to fight plastic pollution worldwide by committing to the rapid progression of negotiations towards an internationally legally binding instrument initiated under the UNEA 5.2 resolution 5/14. To this end, we endorse the G7 Ocean Deal and ask Environment Ministers to report back on progress by the end of the year.”  <i>Elmau 2022 Leaders' Communiqué, p. 7</i></p>	

Commitment 37. Fossil fuel	Associated SDGs
<p>“We will phase out new direct government support for international carbon-intensive fossil fuel energy as soon as possible, with limited exceptions consistent with an ambitious climate neutrality pathway, the Paris Agreement, 1.5°C goal and best available science (...) We commit now to an end to new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021, including through Official Development Assistance, export finance, investment, and financial and trade promotion support (...) we reaffirm our existing commitment to eliminating inefficient fossil fuels subsidies by 2025.”  <i>Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, para. 38 &amp; 39</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders' Communiqué, paras. 25 &amp; 26</i></p>	 

Commitment 38. Climate finance	Associated SDGs
<p>1. “We commit to each increase and improve our overall international public climate finance contributions for this period... (through to 2025)”</p> <p>2. “[this] includes more finance contributing to adaptation and resilience, disaster risk and insurance...”</p> <p>3. “(...) the G7 commits to leverage different types of blended finance vehicles including through our greater strategic approach to development finance, greater collaboration between our DFIs and billions worth of planned commitments towards CIF and Green Climate Fund, all of which will mobilise billions more in private finance. We commit to establishing the necessary market infrastructure for private finance to support and incentivise the net zero transition. (...)”</p> <p>4. “we will develop gender-responsive approaches to climate and nature financing, investment and policies, so that women and girls can participate fully in the future green economy.”</p> <p><i>Carbis Bay 2021 G7 Summit Communiqué, paras 40 &amp; 41</i></p> <p>“We renew our strong commitment and will intensify our efforts to delivering on the collective USD 100 billion climate finance mobilisation goal as soon as possible and through to 2025. (...) We commit to working alongside others towards the implementation of the Glasgow Climate Pact’s call to collectively at least double the provision of climate finance for adaptation to developing countries from 2019 levels by 2025.”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, p.3</i></p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 20</i></p>	 

Commitment 39. Just Energy Transition Partnerships	Associated SDGs
<p>“We will support partners in developing countries and emerging markets to also make their just transitions to clean energy through ambitious new development partnerships and accelerating access to financing, including through Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), supported by the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).”</p> <p><i>Elmau 2022 Leaders’ Communiqué, pp. 5</i>  <i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 19</i></p>	  

## X – Human mobility

Commitment 40. Migration and refugees	Associated SDGs
<p>“We commit to increase global assistance to meet immediate and longer-term needs of refugees and other displaced persons as well as their host communities, via humanitarian, financial, and development assistance, cooperation... (We recognize ...migration management, and) ...we commit to strengthen our development cooperation with our partner countries, with special attention to African, Middle East and neighboring countries of origin and transit.”</p> <p><i>Ise-Shima 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, p. 18</i></p>	  

Commitment 41. Drivers of migration	Associated SDGs
<p>“We agree to establish partnerships to help countries create the conditions within their own borders that address the drivers of migration, as this is the best long-term solution to these challenges...we will safeguard the value of the positive aspects of a safe, orderly and regular migration.”</p> <p><i>Taormina 2017, Leaders’ Communiqué, para 25</i></p>	  

## XI - Humanitarian assistance

Commitment 42. Increasing humanitarian assistance	Associated SDGs
<p>“We are determined to address the unprecedented number of humanitarian crises, focusing on women and girls and those in vulnerable situations. In this regard, we commit to providing over \$21 billion in total to address the worsening humanitarian crises this year, including in response to urgent food crises.”</p> <p><i>Hiroshima 2023, Leaders’ Communiqué, para. 16</i></p>	  

## **Annex B: Methodological Note**

The AWG has established specific data sources for each of the active commitments being monitored with the aim of ensuring consistency and accuracy of the report. The AWG relies on publicly available data and those collected from G7's administrations, including EU Institutions, as main sources of qualitative and quantitative information. "Self-reporting" is supported by information retrieved from available reports, databases and websites.

Most commitments of the G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 are monitored against the G7 Official Development Assistance (ODA) spending on African countries, by sectors and purposes. ODA is an important source of international cooperation. All G7, including EU, report annually on ODA to the OECD-DAC, which plays a quality assurance role of the data and figures presented by its members. This information is published on the [OECD Data Explorer](#).

ODA flows from a donor to a recipient country including in the form of grants or loans. Until 2017 ODA flows were indicated as net ODA on a flow basis. Starting from 2018, the OECD-DAC introduced a new method for calculating ODA, namely the grant equivalent measure.

To fully capture G7 ODA contributions to Africa, the G7 Apulia Progress Report 2024 presents G7 imputed multilateral ODA flows allocated to Africa from 2017 alongside traditional bilateral ODA flows. For the latter, the double OECD-DAC methodology for ODA is applied (net ODA flows until 2017 and grant equivalent from 2018 onwards). Throughout the report, the figures representing G7 bilateral ODA disbursements based on OECD data always include contributions from the EU, whereas EU disbursements were not considered in the multilateral estimates to avoid double counting with contributions from EU Member States that are part of the G7. Furthermore, all ODA figures are reported as current prices (i.e. using the exchange rates prevailing in the year of the flow) and refer to disbursements (i.e. actual international transfers of financial resources instead of the expressed intentions of donors).

This Progress Report builds on the data on ODA published by the OECD on 27 December 2023 (for years until 2022) as well as some financial data provided by the G7's members (for subsequent years 2023 and 2024). Specific information on OECD DAC CRS tables used for reporting on disbursement data, figures and tables is provided to ensure greater re-traceability of information presented. Project-level information has been used for tracking ODA spending on sectors and purposes as well as on gender equality policy marker and Rio marker for climate change. To calculate the percentage of ODA allocated to these markers the "Bilateral allocable aid screened against the marker"<sup>1</sup> has been used.

Estimates on imputed multilateral flows by recipient and sector are based on the OECD's methodology for calculating imputed multilateral ODA, which is an approximation. Specifically, building on the official approach to estimate imputed multilateral aid by recipient for each provider, the OECD piloted a bespoke calculation for this report of such

aid by recipient and sector, which involved the application of the percentage of each multilateral agency's total annual gross disbursements to each recipient and sector, multiplied by a provider's contribution in the same year to the core resources of the agency concerned to arrive at the imputed flow from that provider to each recipient and sector. This calculation is repeated for each multilateral agency. These results are then summed to approximate the total imputed multilateral aid from each provider to each recipient country-sector combination. Caution is strongly recommended when interpreting the results of this exercise, as these estimates are derived from a calculation rather than representing official statistics reported to the OECD. The caveats found on OECD methodology for calculating imputed multilateral ODA - OECD, particularly pertaining to multilateral agencies for which the OECD does not have outflow data, apply to these estimates as well.

The purpose codes and groupings used in ODA analyses throughout this report were agreed upon by G7 members in order to standardise the G7's reporting and this methodology can be found at the end of each sub-chapter. For the overviews of Chapters 2, 3 and 4, for which there is no previously agreed methodology, G7 AWG endorsed Presidency's chosen codes as proxies for the sectors most relevant to the commitments covered by the chapter. Finally, this report provides accountability relating to G7 inputs (ODA and other types of financing) as well as outputs (programme results).

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<sup>1</sup> Handbook-OECD-DAC-Gender-Equality-Policy-Marker.pdf



## **Annex C: List of Abbreviations**

### **A**

ADRFi	Africa Disaster Risk Financing
AFAWA	Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa
AfCFTA	African Continental Free Trade Area
AFD	French Development Agency
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa
AICS	Italian Agency for Development Cooperation
AMN	Africa Mobile Network
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation Health Africa
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
ARC	African Risk Capacity
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUDA	African Union Development Agency
AWE	Academy for Women Entrepreneurs
AWG	Accountability Working Group

### **B**

BII	British International Investment
BMZ	Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Germany)

### **C**

CDRFI	Climate and Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance
CIHEAM	Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies
COMESA	Common Market for eastern and southern Africa
CREWS	Climate Risk and Early Warning Systems
CRIMARIO	Critical Maritime Routes Indo-Pacific

CSOs	Civil society organisations
CTF	Combined Task Force

## **D**

D4D	Digital for Development
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## **E**

EAC	East African Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECW	Education Cannot Wait
EEZs	Exclusive Economic zone
EnMAR:	Enhanced Maritime Action
ESIWA	Enhancing Security Cooperation In and With Asia
EUNAVFOR	European Union Naval Force
EW4All	UN Early Warnings for All

## **F**

FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FIDH	International Federation for Human Rights
FoGG	Friends of the Gulf of Guinea
FSOF	Support Fund for Feminist Organisations

## **G**

G4DU	Gender for Development
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GCI	Gender at the Centre Initiative

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEWE	Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment
GFDRR	Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
GIZ	German Agency for International Cooperation
GPE	Global Partnership for Education

## **I**

ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPPF	Infrastructure Project Preparatory Facility
IPPF-ARO	International Planned Parenthood Federation Africa Regional Office
ISMI	Interregional Maritime Safety Institute
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
IUU	Illegal, unreported and unregulated

## **J**

JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
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## **K**

KIX	Knowledge and innovation exchange
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**L**

LDCs Least Developed countries

**M**

MASE Maritime Security

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MHEWS Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems

MSMEs Micro-, Small, and Medium-Sized Enterprises

MTP Master Trainer Programme

**N**

NDICI-GE Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument  
– Global Europe

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development

NEPAD-IPPFNEPAD Infrastructure Project Preparatory Facility

**O**

OACPS Organisation of the African, Caribbean and Pacific States

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OECD –DAC OECD – Development Assistance Committee

OHADA Organisation for the Harmonisation of Corporate Law in Africa

OSBP One-Stop Border Post

**P**

PASSMAR Support Programme to the Maritime Security Strategy in Central Africa

PGII Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment

PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa

PoU Prevalence of Undernourishment

POWER Providing Opportunities for Women's Economic Rise

PSP Port Security Plan

## **R**

RECS Regional Economic Communities

## **S**

SADC Southern African Development Community

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

SIDS Small Island Developing States

SIGMAT System for Management of Transit Goods

SMEs Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises

SOFF Systematic Observations Financing Facility

STEM Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics

SWAIMS Support to West Africa Integrated Maritime Security

## **T**

TEI Team Europe initiative

TMA TradeMark Africa

## **U**

UAE United Arab Emirates

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNDRR United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

UNFPA United Nations Population Fund

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**W**

WB	World Bank
WCO	World Customs Organisation
WeCAPS	Western and Central Africa Port Security
WEE	Women's Economic Empowerment
We-Fi	Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMO	World Meteorological Organisation
WPS	Women, Peace and Security
WTO	World Trade Organisation

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## Annex E: List of Members of the G7 Accountability Working Group

G7 AWG members' list - Italian Presidency 2024		
Delegation	Department/Ministry	Name/Title
Canada	Global Affairs Canada	Tamara Sorger, Deputy Director, International Assistance Relations Division
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		Julie Danysz, Policy advisor G7/G20 development
Germany	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development	Thomas Piesch, Head of Division, Head of Delegation
		Marvin Tarek Söderberg, Senior Policy Officer/G7 Coordinator and AWG Focal Point
Italy	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation	Loredana Magni, Chair of the G7 AWG
		Francesco Ceravolo, Deputy Chair of the G7AWG
		Francesco Napolitano, Italian G7 AWG Team
		Diana Mannarelli, Italian G7 AWG Team
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		Shugo Ito, Assistant Director, Development Assistance Policy Planning Division International Cooperation Bureau
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