Explaining G8 Effectiveness: The Democratic Institutionalist Model of Compliance with G8 Commitments

Dr. Ella Kokotsis
Director of Analytic Studies
G8 Research Group
University of Toronto
ekokotsis@hotmail.com
905.469.7377

Paper prepared for a panel on "Explaining G8 Effectiveness" at the 45th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA), Montreal, Quebec, March 17-21, 2004. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the University of Toronto G8 Research Group, particularly Janel Smith and Michael Malleson, for their research assistance. Version dated March 10, 2004.

Abstract

Since its inception almost 30 years ago, the G7 and now G8 Summits have become a focal point of contemporary scholarly and policy criticism as skeptics have long-since questioned the overall necessity, efficacy and utility of this annual Summit meeting. Much of this pessimism has centered on the apparent failure of the G8 to address and deliver on its core task of managing the global financial system along with its new priorities brought on by the forces of globalization, including, among other issues, trade, health, conflict prevention and assistance to the developing world, particularly Africa. This paper explores the G8's credibility based on its ability to reliably implement the commitments it reaches within a number of core issue areas. By focusing on the democratic institutionalist model, we can identify and explain the compliance performance of the annual Summits from 1996 to the present, with particular attention on the outcome of the most recent Summit in Evian, France.

Introduction

Since their first gathering in Rambouillet, France in 1975, the annual meetings of the G7/8 have evolved from a relatively informal and apparently one-time event to an annual, permanent and increasingly more institutionalized gathering of the leading industrialized nations in the world. With an ever-expanding range of global issues on their agenda, an increasingly intensive preparatory and follow-up process, a strong network of supporting personnel in national governments and a well-established, regular timetable, the G8 process has developed an organizational infrastructure comparable to that of an established international institution. Moreover, since their inception, the Summits have increasingly produced ambitious and wide-ranging commitments[1] in an effort to generate multilateral consensus on a diverse number of global issues.

Since their first meeting, however, these annual gatherings have become a focal point of criticism within scholarly, policy and media circles as skeptics have long-since questioned the overall necessity, utility and overall effectiveness of these annual Summit meetings. Much of this skepticism has focused not only on the apparent failure of the G8 in managing the global financial system, but also on its apparent failure to manage emerging priorities brought on by the forces of globalization, including, among other issues, trade, health, conflict prevention and assistance to the developing world. Moreover, skeptics argue that although the process may generate far-reaching ambitious agreements that are timely and well-tailored, the G8 lacks the ability, as a collective institution, to induce its members to comply once the Summit has ended, the media have dispersed and the leaders return home to their domestic national constituencies. In other words, compliance with decisions reached at the annual Summits often fail.[2] And even when they do keep their word, skeptics have argued they are unable to impose their collective will on outside non-member countries or key international organizations. Thus, at the end of the day, the success of the Summits is seen as ephemeral and non-enduring in the post-Summit period.

Does it make sense, however, for the leaders of the richest and most politically potent industrialized nations in the world to invest their time and resources, potentially risking their political and personal reputations, to generate collective commitments if they have little or no intention on complying with these commitments at Summit's end? This paper will argue that leaders at the Summit not only produce tangible and credible commitments that are timely, appropriate and in many cases highly ambitious, they also have an overall positive track record of complying with their core Summit commitments in the months and years following the conclusion of these annual meetings. Building on the democratic-institutionalist model of compliance behaviour allows us to draw certain conclusions about Summit compliance patterns by country, across issue area and over time.

This paper thus begins, in part one, by charting compliance during the Summit's most recently completed fourth cycle, the globalization era, from 1996 – 2002, outlining the overall trends and comparing them with results found during earlier periods. As an early predictor of the

[1] Commitments are defined as discrete, specific, publicly expressed, collectively agreed statements of intent. In other words, they are promises or undertakings by leaders to take future action to move toward an identified target or commitment. See Analytical and Compliance Studies - Methodoloy at: www.g8.utoronto.ca

[2] See, for example, Smyser, W.R. "Goodbye G7", *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1993, p. 24; *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. 143, 147, 152, 154.

final 2003 Evian compliance scores, the interim compliance results of the most recent Summit in Evian, France are assessed in part two. Part three examines what the findings on Summit compliance suggest and applies the democratic-institutionalist model as a credible framework for explaining compliance performance. And part four offers some conclusions about what the overall compliance record might mean for the US-hosted Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, on June 8-10, 2004.

Charting Compliance: 1996 - 2002

What do we know about Summit compliance?[3] Recent scholarly studies on compliance with Summit commitments indicate that these annual gatherings of the world's leading industrialized nations do in fact produce tangible, credible results, although compliance records vary by country, issue area and over time. For example, when von Furstenberg and Daniels measured overall Summit compliance scores with economic and energy undertakings from 1975-1989, they found the overall compliance score to be 32%, suggesting that roughly one-third of what the leaders promised was actually delivered. Their compliance scores varied widely by country, with high compliance coming from Canada and the United Kingdom and low compliance form the United States and France. Compliance further varied widely by issue area, with high compliance scores in the area of international trade and energy and low overall scores with interest and exchange rate management.[4] Subsequent compliance studies conducted by Kirton and Kokotsis (1997) and Kokotsis (1999) assessed the compliance record of the G7 in regard to key environment and development commitments which flourished during the third Summit cycle, 1988-1995. These studies explored the compliance record of the G7's most and least powerful countries, Canada and the US, in an effort to examine the effects of overall relative capability and key differences in national institutions on the effects of compliance with Summit resolutions. The results of these findings suggest that during this period, the G7 produced a large number of specific and ambitious environment and development commitments. Canadian and US compliance with these commitments was generally positive, with an overall compliance score of 43%. As with earlier studies, however, compliance was found to vary widely by country, issue area and over time. Canada's net score of 53% contrasts with the US's net score of 34%, with compliance much higher in the area of assistance to Russia and developing country debt, than for climate change and above all, biodiversity.[5]

---

[3] Compliance is achieved when national governments alter their own behaviour and that of their societies in order to fulfil the specified goal or commitment. Leaders legitimize their commitments by including them within their national policy agendas, referring to them in State of the Union Address or Throne Speeches, assigning specialized task forces or working groups to negotiate mandates, launching new diplomatic initiatives or allocating budgetary resources; all designed to fulfill the specified welfare target. Full or nearly full conformance with a commitment here is assigned a score of +1. A score of -1 indicates complete or nearly complete failure to implement a commitment. An "inability to commit", or a "work in progress" is given a score of 0. An "inability to commit" refers to factors outside of the executive branch impeding the implementation of a given commitment and a "work in progress" refers to an initiative that has been launched by a government but is not yet near completion and whose results can therefore not be judged.

[4] Von Furstenberg, G. and Daniels, J. P. *Economic Summit Declarations, 1975-1989: Examining the Written Record of International Cooperation.* Princeton Studies in International Finance. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1992.

[5] Kirton, J.J. and Kokotsis, E. "National Compliance with Environmental Regimes: The Case of the G7, 1988-1995. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Ontario, March 18-22, 1997; and, Kokotsis, E. *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995.* Garland Publishing, Inc. New York, 1999.

Building on previous analytical studies and applying the concepts and methodology developed by Kirton and Kokotsis, the University of Toronto's G8 Research Group has assessed the compliance record of the G8 with the Summit's core commitments from 1996 to the present. As these analytical studies directly follow and apply earlier concepts and methods, their results are directly comparable with earlier compliance assessments. As they cover all core issue areas and the compliance record of all participating G8 members, they offer a comprehensive portrait of Summit performance in the years since globalization first became a major Summit preoccupation.[6]

Several striking patterns in these findings appear. First, as Appendix A indicates, the average level of compliance for this period is 45%. This is considerably higher than the 1975-1988 average of 32%, and very close to the more limited-approach Kokotsis 1988-1995 average of 43%. Moreover, the level of compliance has varied widely by year. It starts at a relatively normal 36% in 1996-97, drops to 27% in 1997-98, rises sharply to 45% in 1998-99, stays at a relatively robust 39% in 1999-00, surges to 80% in 2000-01, secures an above-average score of 53% in 2001-02 and drops below the mean to 33% in 2002-03. As all of these scores are well above the 32% identified by von Furstenberg and Daniels (with the exception of 1997-98), these findings contradict those who see the G8 in the 1990's as delivering a lower level of performance than the Summit in previous years.

As Appendix A also shows, in the 1996-2002 period, compliance continues to vary widely among countries, even if all members have positive rather than negative compliance scores. Among the members, Britain with 64% continues to lead with Canada a close second at 62%. With these scores, both countries continue to rank similar to the 1975-89 ranking. The biggest change is the United States, which with 47% has now risen to the rank of third highest complier, from the position of second worst in 1975-89. This suggests that the high levels of compliance for the U.S. found by Kokotsis for her four issue areas in 1988-1995 was not a product of the particular issues areas or time selected, but a more durable and broadly based trend. France closely follows the U.S. at 44%, which ranks fourth overall; considerably improved from its last place finish in the 1975-89 period. Beneath these is Italy with 43%, followed by tied scores for Japan and Germany at 42%. With this score, Germany has plummeted from third highest complier to second lowest among the original seven. The newest member of the group (and thus not evaluated during the 1975-89 period), Russia, comes in last place with an overall compliance average of 11%. While the available data for Russia is slender, these scores appear plausible given the country's overall lack of national implementation capacity. Furthermore, they are consistent with the argument that democratic polities with popularly elected leaders at the time, combined with the socializing effects of the G8 as an international institution over time, generate higher compliance levels.

There is a similarly wide variation in the compliance record of the 1996-2002 Summit by policy sector and issue area. As Appendix B indicates, for the period as a whole, the compliance level in the core economic sector is 34%. Issues in the global/transnational sector score 43%. In both cases, these are above the comparable levels for the 1975-89 period. However, in the area of political security issues (which includes traditional east-west relations, terrorism, arms control, landmines and human rights), the level is an unusually high 72%. Unusually low scores are

[6] "Compliance here has been assessed against a selected set of priority commitments, rather than all commitments the last Summit produced. The priority commitments selected were not randomly chosen but identified to produce a representative subset of the total according to such dimensions as issue areas, ambition, specified time for completion, instruments used and, more generally, the degree of precision, obligation and delegation of each." See 2003 Evian Interim Compliance Report: www.g8.utoronto.ca

found in the Regional Security and Governance sectors (focused on UN reform), each at 11% and 17% respectively.

Although the partial nature of this data makes more detailed analysis difficult, some patterns are clear. First, among the 33 issue areas assessed across the seven years, there are only six negative and twelve neutral scores. This is consistent with the argument that these Summits are indeed worth doing for they do generate positive results over time. At the other end of the spectrum, the presence of fifteen perfect scores (ranging from macroeconomics to trade, debt of the poorest, the environment, global health, terrorism and security) suggests that the G8 can be very effective in governing globalization.[7]

Second, as the "globalization era" for the G8 began in 1996, the Summit compliance score averaged 32%. However the component sector scores of 34% in economics, 43% in global/transnational issues, 72% in political/security issues, 11% in Regional Security issues and 17% in governance issues suggests a particularly robust role for the modern G8 in the political/security field.

An examination of particular issue areas where sufficient multi-year data exist suggests several trends. Most striking is the high, indeed, perfect scores for macroeconomics; a sharp contrast from its low scores in 1975-89. Also noteworthy is the low score for trade, again a striking contrast with its high scores in 1975-89 and confirmation by many about the G8's recent poor performance in this area.[8] A third is the high scores in the areas of the environment (including climate change) terrorism, and landmines, suggesting that the G8 is indeed a promising forum for advancing an expanding conflict prevention/human security agenda.

The 2003 Evian Interim Results

The leaders of the G8 met in Evian, France on June 1-3, 2003 in what would become the highest commitment-producing Summit in its 29-year history. Despite the divisions among the G8 leaders bred by the war in Iraq, the Summit produced a record-high 206 commitments across 14 separate declarations grouped primarily under Jacques Chirac's four Summit themes of solidarity, responsibility, security and democracy. Following on the momentum of Kananaskis, the leaders made strong commitments on the African front in areas such as water, famine, infectious diseases, agricultural sustainability, peer review and debt relief for the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC). On the political-security front, the leaders pledged concrete action in the areas of transport security, radiological terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADs). Long-standing issues of sustainable development and the environment were met with revived action, while new momentum flowed in areas such as tanker safety, threats from SARS, corporate governance and the promotion of a responsible market economy.[9] Only in traditional economic areas, including trade, inflation, exchange rates, fiscal and monetary policy did the Summit yield disappointingly fewer concrete results.

---

[7] Kirton, John." Explaining G8 Effectiveness", in Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds. *The G8's Role in the New Millennium*. Ashgate: Aldershot. 1999.

[8] Bayne, Nicholas. "The G7 and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Past Performance, Future Challenges", in John Kirton and George von Furstenberg, eds. *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalization in the Twenty-First Century*. Ashgate: Aldershot. 2001.

[9] The complete set of Evian documents is available on the University of Toronto G8 Information Centre web site at: www.g8.utoronto.ca.

Yet despite the unusually high number of commitments achieved across such a diverse number of policy areas, the G8 leaders at Evian pledged a total of $3 billion at the Summit and only for the replenishment of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Relative to the $27 billion pledged at Kananaskis the year before, the leaders, through their modest financial contributions, offered little to ensure that the commitments made at Evian would be effectively complied with in the months and years ahead. Moreover, despite the copious number of documents and commitments produced, Evian offered only 3 remit mandates that would bind the leaders to follow-up with any issues at the US-hosted Summit the following year, and one additional remit mandate committing them to review progress on the Africa Action Plan no later than 2005 (Appendix C).

Given these outcomes, what do the interim compliance scores tell us about the G8's success in reliably implementing the commitments made at Evian now that the Summit presidency has passed from the French to the Americans?

Based on an assessment of the 12 priority issue areas identified in the Evian documents, the post-2003 interim scores reveal a compliance rate of 47% (Appendix D). Compared to the Kananaskis Summit the year before (the first year in which interim compliance scores were assessed), these interim results reveal some interesting trends. First, the overall compliance spread by country seems to have decreased considerably, from 77% at Kananaskis (77% for Canada and 0 for Italy), to 25% in Evian (58% for Canada and 33% for Italy). These results seem to indicate a significant narrowing of the compliance gap by the G8 with greater convergence between Summit members on the implementation of their core priority commitments.

Similar to the Kananaskis interim results, the highest complying members across the 12 priority issue areas post-Evian were Canada and the United Kingdom, with a tied score of 58%. France (the hosting country) and the United States (the next in the hosting rotation) tie for second place with an overall compliance score of 50%. This again compares with the 2002 interim results, where France and the U.S. fall in third and fourth place respectively. Germany, Japan and Russia follow with a score of 42%, with Italy in last place at 33%. These scores again compare almost identically with the 2002 interim results.

These results also indicate that compliance during this period also varied considerably by issue area, with commitments focused on Information and Communications Technology (ICT), Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) scoring perfect compliance scores across all G8 countries. Compliance scores are also high in the area of Development Assistance (ODA) and Health (AIDS) at 88%. Transport Security and the Environment (Marine) score below the overall average at 38%, while Crime and World Economy score 25% and 13% respectively. A "work in progress"[10] is found for commitments associated with Debt (HIPC) and Energy. And finally, a score in the negative range is revealed for commitments relating to Trade (-25%) indicating that not only have the G8 not acted to fulfill their priority commitment in this issue area since Evian, they have in fact done the opposite of what they committed to.

Once again, these interim Evian results reveal striking similarities with the interim Kananaskis results, as political security issues (terrorism and WMD) yield the highest compliance by the member states across both years. Development, the environment and global health fall in the middle range, with compliance across both interim reports the lowest with G8 trade initiatives.

In overall terms, however, the interim compliance scores for Evian compare quite favourably with the interim compliance scores from the Kananaskis Summit the year prior.

[10] A "work in progress" is depicted by an overall score of "0".

Overall compliance by country has increased by 20%, climbing from 28% at Kananaskis to 47% in Evian. Similarly, compliance by issue area has also increased by a significant margin during this period, climbing from 30% in Kananaskis to 47% in Evian. Overall compliance, therefore, compared for both interim periods, has increased from 29% in Kananaskis to 47% in Evian.

Although a comprehensive assessment cannot be made until the final compliance scores are in, an extrapolated compliance score based on the interim findings estimates the final Evian compliance score to be 66%.[11]

Were this the case, the final Evian scores would exceed all previous Summits during the 1996-2002 period, with the exception of Okinawa in 2000.

Explaining Compliance

Over the past decade, we have witnessed an overwhelming surge in the volume of scholarly literature aimed at explaining the G8's emergence as an "…effective centre of global governance, and thus as an international institution worthy of serious study…."[12] But as John Kirton points out, "amidst this ever more expansive academic activity, there has been little move toward consensus on any essential analytical or empirical points". Despite this lack of analytic consensus, however, his application of nine competing models or indicators of G8 performance since the Summit's inception suggest "yearly and cyclical variations in G8 performance, but a secular trend toward increasingly high performance across most functions…".[13] These "major governance functions" include, for example, Summit deliberations (i.e., length of working sessions), direction-setting (i.e., number of documents issued), decision-making (i.e., number of commitments agreed to), delivery (i.e., compliance and monies mobilized), and global governance development (i.e., remit mandates and ministerial institutions created). These core Summit functions provide a solid basis against which the overall performance of the Summits can be assessed.

Although a breadth of scholarly literature exists on the Summit's role with respect to deliberations, direction-setting and decision-making[14], much less has been offered with respect to the Summit's overall delivery role, that is, the extent to which it is able to reliably implement commitments made. Von Furstenberg and Daniels introduced the seminal work in this area in 1992, when they charted the G7's compliance record across core economic and energy undertakings from 1975-1989, revealing an overall compliance score of 32%. Subsequent

[11] This score is based on a conjectured extrapolation coefficient (lambda) of 1.4.

[12] Kirton, John. "Explaining G8 Effectiveness: A Concert of Vulnerable Equals in a Globalizing World". Paper prepared for a panel on "Explaining G8 Effectiveness" at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 127-20, 2004. p. 3.

[13] These nine competing models include: 1) American Leadership; 2) Concert Equality; 3) False New Consensus; 4) Democratic Institutionalism; 5) G8 Nexus; 6) Collective Management; 7) Ginger Group; 8)Group Hegemony; and 9) Meta Institution. John Kirton. "Explaining G8 Effectiveness: A Concert of Vulnerable Equals in a Globalizing World" p. 27.

[14] See for example, (I) Putnam, Robert D. and Nicholas Bayne. *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven Power Summits*, rev. ed. Cambridge MA.:Harvard University Press. 1987.; (II) Wallace, William. "Political Issues at the Summit: A New Concert of Powers?" in C. Merlini, ed., *Economic Summits and Western Decisionmaking*. Croom Helm, London). 1984.; (III) Kirton, John. "Contemporary Concert Diplomacy: The Seven Power Summit and the Management of International Order". Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Conference, March 29-April 1, 1989. London, England; (IV) Bayne, Nicholas. Hanging in There: The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity and Renewal. Ashgate: Aldershot. 2000; (V) Hodges, Michael. "The G8 and the New Political Economy", in Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Jospeph Daniels, eds. *The G8's Role in the New Millennium*. Ashgate: Aldershot. 1999; (VI) Bailin, Alison. "From Traditional to Instiutionalized Hegemony". G8 Governance 6. February, 2001.www.g8.utoronto.ca; (VII) Pentilla, Risto. "The Role of the G8 in International Peace and Security". Adelphi Paper 355. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 2003.

compliance studies by Kokotsis and Kirton (1999) found an overall compliance score of 43% for the Summit's key environment and development commitments which flourished during its third cycle from 1988-1995. Following similar methodological approaches developed by Kokotsis and Kirton, the University of Toronto's G8 Research Group has annually assessed the G8's compliance performance during its fourth cycle, from 1996 to the present, revealing an overall average compliance score of 45%. What accounts for these positive, generally rising compliance patterns over time, particularly during the Summit's fourth cycle, or the "globalization era"?

These findings suggest that the sustained, positive and increasing compliance patterns over time can be largely attributed to key democratic institutionalist variables which impact the Summit's ability to deliver compliance results. These variables include: (i) enhanced Summit institutionalization at both official and ministerial levels; (ii) strong domestic bureaucratic units; (iii) effective multilateral organizations controlled by the G8; (iv) commitment by leaders to the G8's institutions and issues; (v) popular domestic support for leaders and issues they embrace; and (vi) institutional/structural changes from within.

In the first instance, patterns of enhanced Summit institutionalization, or the development of an institutional architecture within the Summit process, means there's an established framework within which agendas can be initiated, measures can be approved and commitments can be pursued. Seen as a component of institutional momentum, we find, particularly during the Summit's fourth cycle, a proliferation in both the depth and breadth of the G8's inter-Summit ministerial process.[15] For example, of the 207 such meetings since the Summit's inception in 1975, the 1996-2003 period has produced 126 inter-Summit ministerials, or 60% of the 29-year total. If follow-up ministerials are seen as a cause of compliance with the previous Summit's commitments, then some interesting patterns prevail.[16] Of the 89 follow-up ministerials since 1975, the 1996-2003 period produced 50, or 56% of the total. The lowest complying period, as assessed by von Furstenberg and Daniels, spanning two Summit cycles from 1975-1989, produced only 19 follow-up ministerial meetings, or 21% of the total. The 1989-1995 period, as assessed by Kokotsis, yielded the second highest compliance average, again consistent with the second highest number of follow-up ministerials during this period - 24 - or 27% of the overall total.

Similar patterns are obvious when one assess the number of G8 institutions created, adjusted, approved and continued.[17] During the 1996-2003 period, the Summit created, adjusted and approved/continued a total of 46 institutions. This compares to 40 during the Summit's first two cycles (1975- 1988) and 20 during the Summits third cycle (1989-1995). The surge in the

[15] Inter-Summit ministerials and equivalents are "meetings of the G7/8 ministers or heads or equivalents from these actors (collective statements issued in the name of the G7/8, conference calls) between the end of on year's annual Summit and the start of the Summit the regularly scheduled annual following year." John Kirton and Michael Malleson. "Inter-Summit Ministerials and Equivalents, 1975-2003". July 25, 2003. www.g8.utoronto.ca.

[16] Follow-up ministerials take place prior to the change in host on January 1 of the new year and can be seen primarily as following up or implementing the earlier Summit. Lead-up ministerials, taking place after January 1, can be seen as primarily preparatory to, or connected with, the subsequent Summit. Follow-up ministerials are therefore seen primarily as a cause of compliance with the previous Summit's commitments and lead-up ministerials are seen as a cause of the subsequent Summit's success. Kirton and Malleson, 2003.

[17] "New Institutions Created" includes, in its weakest form, convening officials for a meeting, on the grounds that this may lead to further meetings and thus the incremental creation of an institution. "Existing Institutions Adjusted" includes having their duration, membership, substantive mandate or relationship with other institutions extended, reduced, or newly specified. "Existing Institutions Approved and Continued" includes an acknowledgement of the institution's existence, and continuance of its works as currently mandated, merely noted, reaffirmed or approved. Fact Sheet, "Institutions Created by Summit, 1975-2003", compiled by Janel Smith, November 12, 2003. www.g8.utoronto.ca.

creation, adjustment and approval/continuation of Summit ministerials during this fourth cycle is therefore commensurate with the overall rise in Summit compliance during this period.

What accounts for this correlation between the rise in ministerials and enhanced institutionalization versus higher overall levels of compliance? The growth of ministerials and official institutions takes the pressure off leaders by allowing others to prepare and implement G8 consensus and commitments within their areas of competence, thereby freeing leaders to focus on only the most difficult and timely issues. With the rise in compliance levels in 1998, for example, the leaders for the first time found themselves without their foreign and finance ministers, which gave them the opportunity to focus on specific themes thereby generating a stronger depth of understanding and personal commitment to their agreements that carried through into more effective compliance the following year.

The existence of strong G8 bureaucratic units within a country's domestic governmental structures appear to account for increased levels of Summit compliance over time. In other words, compliance tends to be highest when a country's domestic administrative and bureaucratic structures are organized in a way that allows for prompt implementation. For example, where strong, institutionally entrenched departments such as State and Foreign Affairs serve as repositories for implementing G8 agreements, smaller, less institutionally developed departments such as health and the environment, typically tend to lack the necessary coordinating centres for G8-related activity and oversight. This trend is consistent with the compliance findings. For example, the Summit complies best during the 1996-2003 period with Political/Security issues, averaging 72%. Here, issues such as east/west relations, terrorism, arms control, landmines, human rights and security are absorbed within long-standing departments of State and Foreign Affairs, which typically serve as strong coordinating centres for the implementation of G8 agreements. On the other hand, global transnational issues, including the environment, biotechnology, human genome, health, cultural diversity and crime and drugs average 43% during this period, and are thus reflective of governmental units with less administrative and bureaucratic ability in managing and effectively implementing Summit commitments.

Higher levels of compliance are also assured in such cases where the G8 control, either through monetary/military contributions or political capital, existing broader regimes, and subsequently extend commitments and issue instructions made at the Summit to these international institutions. One of the strongest examples of this is with regards to the Summit's commitments on the debt of the poorest, for which exceptionally high compliance scores were recorded for both the 1999 Cologne Summit (86%) and the 2001 Genoa Summit (100%). Here, commitments made by the G8 on the highly indebted poor countries were subsequently coordinated through existing international institutions which its members effectively control, including the Paris Club, the IMF and the World Bank.[18]

The leader's commitment to international cooperation, the G7 as an institution, and the issues themselves are evidenced by the number of remit mandates produced. Remit mandates are "formal instructions contained in the documents the leaders collectively issue at the annual G8 Summit, specifying that they will deal with an item at their Summit the following year or in subsequent years".[19] According to Kirton, remit mandates are important for several reasons.

[18] See 1999 and 2001 Compliance Reports by the University of Toronto G8 Research Group at: www.g8.utoronto.ca

[19] Kirton, John and Antara Haldar. G7/8 Summit Remit Mandates, 1975-2003. June 24, 2003. www.g8.utoronto.com. Remit mandates take several forms: (i) they may specify that a report be prepared for the leaders at their next Summit; (ii) they may identify who is to prepare such a report; (iii) they may pledge that the leaders themselves will deal with a particular item or

First, they may "indicate the priority or seriousness that leaders attach to an agenda item, normative direction or decisional commitment". Second, they may constitute a form of "self-binding, giving a particular item a shadow of the future". And third, they may represent "a way of one year's host trying to bind a subsequent year's host to the priority items preferred by the former". Taken together, remit mandates serve as important causes or predictors of compliance through the delivery of specified discussion items, directions or decisions.

The empirical record of remit mandates shows that the overall average from 1975-2003 was 2.6. Consistent with compliance patterns over time, remit mandates averaged 1.0 in the 1975-1989 period, 3.1 in the 1989-1995 period and a surging 4.7 in the 1996-2003 period. This trend supports the argument that commitments are generally complied with when the leaders who made them have demonstrated a strong personal commitment to both the issues at stake and the Summit as an institution. By binding themselves to addressing an issue at their subsequent meeting, leaders are committing themselves to reviewing progress - which tends to place more pressure on them to deliver concrete results.

Deep public support for Summit leaders and the commitments they embrace grants the leaders an enormous amount of political capital thereby allowing them to more effectively follow through with their Summit commitments. For example, during the last cycle of Summitry, leaders were less afflicted by electoral uncertainties and thus enjoyed longer-lived governments. Given that same group of leaders that met in Evian, had also met in Kananaskis in 2002 and in Genoa in 2001 meant that the leaders had more political experience, greater Summit skills, experienced greater socialization at a personal level and came to the Summit with more balanced expectations. This type of environment tends to typically be conducive to greater overall levels of Summit compliance, evidenced by the results of the Summit's most recent cycle.

And finally, the institutional structure and composition of the G8 has also had an impact on compliance results. Sharp drops in compliance in 1997-98, followed by the sharp rise in 1999-2001 suggests the impact of changes to the Summit's format during these periods. In 1997, the Russians were admitted to the "Denver Summit of the Eight", leaving little time for the seven other leaders to meet alone. The new diversity of membership and hence less focus on substantive issues may have produced less "psychological buy-in" on the part of the leaders and thus lower compliance with their commitments the subsequent year. By contrast, the 1998 Birmingham Summit was the first permanent G8, giving Russia and the other Summit members a level of assurance with its membership. Here we find an overall compliance score of 45%; a sharp increase from the 27% produced post-Denver the year before.

The Road Ahead – Prospects for Sea Island

As we look ahead to the 2004 Summit in Sea Island Georgia, we find that a relatively experienced group of leaders will be represented, with Summit veterans including French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Canada's new Prime Minister, Paul Martin, comes to office with many years of Summit experience in his capacity as Canada's finance minister. And with Russia inserted into the hosting rotation in 2006, scrutiny on President Vladimir Putin's performance will surely mount. But with less than five months to go until the U.S. presidential election by the time of the

theme, or "review progress" on it; (iv) or they may require that action be taken by the time of their next Summit, implying that they will monitor whether it has been done or not.

Summit, all eyes will be on President George Bush as he undoubtedly positions the Summit's three pillars of freedom, prosperity and security against key re-election issues, including the U.S. economy and the ongoing crisis in Iraq. Although the final Sea Island agenda will unlikely emerge until late spring, we can expect that security from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction– the hallmark of the Bush presidency – will emerge front and centre under the Summit's "security" theme. "Prosperity" likely means trade liberalization for which discussions at the Summit on re-energizing global trade talks will focus on reducing agricultural and industrial subsidies and quotas through the stalled Doha Round. And "freedom", based principally on encouraging democracy in the Middle East, will focus primarily on the "capture of Saddam Hussein and the rebuilding of Iraq along democratic lines" with the opportunity to "prod other Middle Eastern nations into embracing free elections and civil liberties".[20]

Although it is difficult to predict with any degree of certainty what this forecast agenda might mean for compliance in the post-Sea Island period, based on historical precedent, we can expect that compliance with any proposed initiatives on terrorism will likely fare quite well, as terrorism has clearly been one of the defining issues in terms of high Summit compliance in the past few years. On the trade front, most recent Summits, with the exception of Genoa, have made weak contributions to trade issues, with Evian only making general commitments to a successful WTO meeting in Cancun and to the timely conclusion of the Doha Round. Again, if historical trends in this area serve as useful indicators, it is appears unlikely that much of substance will transpire on the trade front.[21] And finally, success in the area of democracy-building and the promotion of civil liberties and free elections in the Middle East will undoubtedly depend on the extent to which the Summit leaders will be prepared to potentially cough up billions of dollars for the Bush administration's military and economic re-building program for the Middle East, the so-called "Greater Middle East Initiative".[22] If Bush is capable of re-building the divide brought on by the war in Iraq with France and Germany, and to some extend Russia and Canada, we might expect to see considerable financial contributions on this initiative. But as Charles Doran notes, "any hint of imperialism [by the U.S] would just absolutely destroy the unity there".[23]

Sea Island will bring together the same group of leaders from the previous three Summits. As John Kirton notes, "In the 30-year history of the G7/8 Summit, never before has such cumulative continuity come".[24] As we have seen, leadership continuity brings with it a sense of predictability that seems to fare well for the Summit's overall success. It will therefore rest in the hands of George Bush, as he builds on the three pillars of security, prosperity and freedom, to see just how much success Sea Island can ultimately deliver.

---

[20] Chapman, Dan. "Bush to Shape G8 Summit: President to Use Talks as Centrepiece of his Foreign Policy, Re-election Effort". *Atlanta Journal Constitution*. January 17, 2004. www.g8.utoronto.ca.

[21] See John Kirton and Ella Kokotsis: "Producing International Commitments and Compliance without Legalization: G7/8 Performance from 1975 to 2002". Paper prepared for a panel on "Global Trade and the Role of Informal Mechanisms" at the 44th Annual Meetings of the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, March 1, 2003.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Kirton, John. Fact Sheet: "Guess Who Is Coming to Sea Island?". October 31, 2003. www.g8.utoronto.ca. Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin is the only exception, but with his tenure as finance minister from 1993-2002, Martin comes to Sea Island with extensive Summit experience.

Appendix A: G8 Compliance Assessments by Country, 1996-2003

	1996-97[a]	1997-98[b]	1998-99[c]	1999-00[d]	2000-01[e]	2001-02[f]	2002-03 (interim)[g]	2002-03 (final)[h]	2003-04 (interim)[i]	Average (final scores only)
France	0.26	0	0.25	0.34	0.92	0.69	0.38	0.62	0.50	0.44
U.S.	0.42	0.34	0.60	0.50	0.67	0.35	0.25	0.38	0.50	0.47
UK	0.42	0.50	0.75	0.50	1.0	0.69	0.42	0.62	0.58	0.64
Germany	0.58	0.17	0.25	0.17	1.0	0.59	0.08	0.15	0.42	0.42
Japan	0.21	0.50	0.20	0.67	0.82	0.44	0.10	0.08	0.42	0.42
Italy	0.16	0.50	0.67	0.34	0.89	0.57	0.00	-0.09	0.33	0.43
Canada	0.47	0.17	0.50	0.67	0.83	0.82	0.77	0.85	0.58	0.62
Russia	N/A	0	0.34	0.17	0.14	0.11	0.14	-0.09	0.42	0.11
EU	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.17	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Average	0.36	0.27	0.45	0.39	0.80	0.53	0.27	0.32	0.47	0.45

Notes:

[a] Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

[b] Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

[c] Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (human trafficking).

[d] Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).

[e] Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (conflict prevention, arms control and terrorism).

[f] Applies to nine priority issues, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (terrorism).

[g] Applies to the 13 priority issues assessed in the first interim compliance report, embracing economic, transnational, and political security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism).

[h] Applies to the 11 priority issues assessed in the final report, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (arms control, conflict prevention and terrorism). Excluded in the final report, which were assessed in the interim are debt of the poorest (HIPC) and ODA.

[i] Applies to the 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (WMD, transport security and terrorism).

Appendix B: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1996-2003

Issue Area	1996-97	1997-98	1998-99	1999-00	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03 (interim)	2002-03 (final)	2003-04 (interim)
TOTAL (based on average of *n*)	+36.2% (22)	+12.8% (6)	+31.8% (6)	+38.2% (6)	+81.4% (12)	+49.5% (11)	+29.8% (13)	+36% (13)	+47.1% (12)
Economic Issues (average 34%)									
World Economy	+0.307	-	-	-	+0.86	-			+0.13
IFI Reform	+0.29[d]	-	-	-	-	-1.0			
Exchange Rates	-	-	-	0	-	-			
Macroeconomics	+1.00	-	-	+1.0	-	-			
Microeconomics	+0.29[e]	-	-	-	-	-			
Employment	-	+0.38[f]	0[g]	-	-	-			
Aging	-	-	+0.33[h]	-	+0.86	-			
ICT[i]	+0.57[e]	-	-	-	+1.0	+0.75			+1.0
Trade	+0.29[e]	-	+0.33[j]	-0.57	+1.0	+0.88	0.0 / +0.14[s]	+0.13 / -0.13[z]	-0.25[t]
Development (General/ODA)	0[e]	0	-	-	-	0	+0.50	+0.50	+0.88
Debt of the Poorest/HIPC	-	-	0	+0.86	-	+1.0	-0.50	+0.25	0.0
Education	-	-	-	-	-	+0.58			
Global Transnational Issues (average 43%)									
Transnational Issues (General)	+0.48	-	-	-	-	-		+0.63[y]	0.0[w]
Environment	+0.14	+0.5[f]	+1.0[k]	-	-	+0.17	0.0 / +0.50[r]	+0.57 / +0.57	+0.38[u]
Biotechnology	-	-	-	-	+0.75	-			
Human Genome	-	-	-	-	+0.80	-			
Health[l]	-	-	-	-	+1.0	+0.75	+0.25[p]		+0.88
Cultural Diversity	-	-	-	-	+0.63	-			
Nuclear Safety	+0.29	-	-	-	-	-			
Crime & Drugs	+0.43[e]	0[f]	+0.25[m]	0[n]	-	-	+0.25	+0.25	+0.25
Political/Security Issues (average 72%)									
East/West Relations	+0.86[e]	-	-	-	-	-			
Terrorism	+0.71[e]	-	-	+1.0	+0.40	+1.0	+1.0	+1.0	+1.0
Arms Control	+0.29[e]	-	-	-	+0.88	-	+0.63	+0.25	
Landmines	+0.71	+0.75[f]	-	-	-	-			
Human Rights	+0.71[e]	-	-	-	-	-			
Security Issues	+0.310	-	-	-	-	-			+0.38 / +1.0[v]
Regional Security (average 11%)									
Asia	-0.43[e]	-	-	-	-	-			
Europe	+0.86[o]	-	-	-	-	-			
Middle East	-0.43[e]	-	-	-	-	-			
Russia	-	-0.86	-	-	-	-			
Conflict Prevention	-	-	-	-	+0.63	-	+0.60	+0.38	
Governance Issues (average 17%)									
UN Reform I ($ obligations)	+0.14	-	-	-	-	-			
UN Reform II (dev't agenda)	+0.14	-	-	-	-	-	+0.50 /0.0[q]	+0.25 /0.0[x]	

Notes:

[a] Data refer to members' compliance to commitments expressed in the Communiqué, as evaluated immediately prior the next Summit (i.e., 1996/1997 data refer to commitments made at the Lyon Summit in 1996 and assessed on the eve of the 1997 Denver Summit).

[b] Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to all G7 countries.

[c] Includes economic issues.

[d] Excludes Italy and France.

[e] Excludes Italy.

[f] Refers to G8 (includes Russia).

[g] Refers only to Japan, UK, Russia.

[h] Refers only to Canada, Germany, U.S.

[I] Information and communications technology; includes Digital Divide and Global Information Society.

[j] Excludes Germany.

[k] Refers to G8 countries (includes Russia); is average of data for two commitments referring to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.

[l] Includes infectious disease.

[m] Refers to human trafficking; refers only to France, Germany, Japan.

[n] Refers specifically to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.

[o] Excludes Japan.

[p] Refers to Africa Health

[q] Refers to Africa/Good Governance (+0.50) and Africa/Peer Review (0.0)

[r] Refers to Environment/Sustainable Agriculture (0.0) and Environment/Water (+0.50)

[s] Refers to Economic Growth/Agricultural Trade (0.0) and Economic Growth/Free Trade (+0.14)

[t] Refers to Multinational Trade Round (MTN)

[u] Refers to Marine Environment

[v] Refers to Transport Security (+0.38) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (+1.00)

[w] Refers to Energy

[x] Refers to Africa/Good Governance (+0.25) and Africa/Peer Review (0.0)

[y] Refers to Education

[z] Refers to Economic Growth/Agricultural Trade (+0.13) and Economic Growth/Free Trade (-0.13)

[aa] Refers to Environment/Sustainable Agriculture (+0.57) and Environment/Water (+0.57)

Appendix C: 2003 Evian G8 Remit Mandates

1. "We will review progress on our [Africa] Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report." (Chair's Summary)
2. "We agree to exchange information on national measures related to the implementation of these steps [on MANPADs] by December 2003. We will review progress at our next meeting in 2004." (G8 Action Plan on Enhancing Transport Security and Control of MANPADs).
3. "The G8 Presidency will produce a report for the 2004 Summit." (G8 Action Plan on Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism)
4. CTAG will…by…"Seeking to increase counter-terrorism capacity building assistance and coordination by the 2004 Summit"…Encouraging regional assistance programmes including delivery through regional and donor sponsored training centres by the 2004 Summit….Seeking to address unmet regional assistance needs by the 2004 Summit." (G8 Action Plan on Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism)

Appendix D : 2003 Evian Interim Compliance Scores*

	CDA	FRA	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	U.S.	Individual Issue Average
World Economy/Growth	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	1	0.13
ICT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Trade (MTN)	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	-0.25
Development (ODA)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.88
Debt (HIPC)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Environment (Marine)	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.38
Health (AIDS)	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.88
Crime (Terrorist Financing)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.25
Terrorism (CTAG)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Transport Security	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.38
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Energy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Individual Country Average	0.58	0.50	0.42	0.33	0.42	0.42	0.58	0.50	
Overall Issue Average									+0.47
Overall Country Average									+0.47
Overall Compliance Average									+0.47

*The average score by issue area is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The average score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. The overall compliance average is an average of the overall issue average and overall country average.

Appendix E: 2002 Kananaskis Interim Compliance Scores

	CDA	FRA	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	U.S.	Issue Average
Africa: Good Governance	1	0	0	N/A	0	N/A	1	1	+0.50
Africa: Peer Review	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0.00
Africa: Education	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	+0.25
Development: HIPC	0	0	0	–1	–1	–1	0	–1	-0.50
Development: ODA	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	+0.50
Arms Control/ Disarmament	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	+0.63
Conflict Prevention	1	1	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	1	+0.60
Agricultural Trade	1	0	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	–1	0.00
Free Trade	1	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0	+0.14
Sustainable Agriculture	0	0	0	0	0	N/A	0	0	0.00
Environment: Water	1	1	0	N/A	0	N/A	1	0	+0.50
Fighting Terrorism	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	+1.00
Transnational Crime/ Corruption	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	+0.25
Individual Country Average	+0.77	+0.38	+0.08	0.00	+0.10	+0.14	+0.50	+0.25	
Overall Issue Average									+0.30
Overall Country Average									+0.28
Overall Compliance Average									+0.29