Explaining Compliance with G7/8 Sustainable Development Commitments, 1975-2005

Ella Kokotsis, Ph.D.
Director of Analytical Studies
G8 Research Group
University of Toronto
ekokotsis@hotmail.com
905.469.7377

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Abstract

Preliminary studies of compliance with the G7/8's sustainable development commitments during the Summit's third cycle (1988–1995) reveal that compliance with climate change and biodiversity commitments during this period vary considerably by issue and Summit member. This paper addresses these variations in compliance behaviour, expanding on the existing findings to include compliance results for the Summit's climate change commitments from 1988 (when climate change first appeared on the leaders' agenda), until the most recent Summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, 2005. To do so, this paper draws on the democratic institutionalist model of G8 governance to explain the compliance record of the G7/8 with its climate change commitments. Although democratic institutionalism is key in explaining the G20's compliance record, the concert equality model is equally important in helping us understand the critical elements in accounting for these cross-institutional compliance trends.

Introduction

The latter half of the 1980's witnessed a dramatic series of global transformations which served to redefine the international system, alter the focus of policy priorities and set in motion a new direction in the conduct of foreign policy for the leaders of the industrialized world. Among these changes was a fundamental new appreciation of the importance of the global environment. Prior to this time, environmental issues were viewed as largely local or regional in nature, with little focus on the dynamic relationship between the effects of environmental degradation and other dimensions of the international system including economic growth, social equity, human health and sustainable development.

Although the importance of global environmental issues was first recognized during the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment and Development, it was the April 1987 Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development – the Bruntland Commission – which firmly placed environmental concerns on the international agenda and introduced the term "sustainable development" – the idea that "the environment and economic growth are not only compatible but interdependent."[1]

As international attention during this time began to focus away from traditional security threats and more on the new and evolving set of security concerns involving issues of ecological degradation, the annual Summits of the world's major industrialized democracies began to play a more pronounced and notable role in addressing these emerging international environmental concerns. Beginning at the 1988 Toronto Summit, the leaders recognized that "the protection and enhancement of the environment is essential" and that "threats to the environment recognize no boundaries."[2] In addition, they endorsed the concept of sustainable development and stressed that the urgent nature of the threats to the environment "requires strengthened international cooperation amongst all countries."

From 1989 onwards, the G7 became the first multilateral economic institution to focus, at the highest political level, on core environmental concerns as they began to fully emerge as severe challenges to the global community. In an era of global environmental cooperation, the G7 proved "an important forum for generating action on critical issues and, in particular, climate change, where

[1] Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. *The Halifax Summit: June 15-17, 1995. Background Information. Ottawa: 1995.* p. 29. The term "sustainable development" derives from the meaning established by the 1987 Bruntland Commission Report. According to the report, sustainable development is "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." At its core is ecological enhancement coupled with economic development.

[2] Garavoglia, Guido and Carlo Bassi. *The Twenty G7 Summits: The History, The Issues, The Protagonists and All the Official Declarations of the G7 Summits from Rambouillet to Naples, Roma*. Andkronos Libri, 1994. pp. 170-171.

energy production, consumption and C02 emissions are the core, and where forests play an important role as carbon sinks."[3]

International environmental agreements and policies entail long-term commitments that are not necessarily easy to quantify. The implications of variations in scientific research, coupled with the often unreliable monitoring of environmental conditions, also make it difficult to assess environmental trends. In an era of increasing public opinion, debate and support for climate change, however, we have witnessed the emergence of an enormous range of policies that increase government responsibility for the environment, both domestically and internationally. The success of these governmental initiatives can ultimately only be measured by the results achieved.

This paper thus assesses the extent to which the G7/8 has been able to honour and effectively implement its environmental commitments since the third Summit cycle, from 1988 onwards, until the most recent G8 Summit in 2005 Gleneagles, Scotland. It focuses specifically on one of the most complex, challenging, fully global and multi-sectoral environmental issues inciting the largest and most sustained attention by the G7/8 leaders – global climate change. This paper argues that although democratic institutionalism is key in explaining the G7/8's compliance record, the concert equality model is equally important in helping us understand the critical elements in accounting for these cross-institutional compliance trends.[4]

Charting Compliance - the Summit's Second Cycle: 1988-1995

Meeting in Toronto in 1988, the G7 endorsed, for the first time, the concept of sustainable development in their deliberations and acknowledged that urgent threats to the environment required strengthened international attention and cooperation. When they met the following year in Paris, foremost on the agenda was the deterioration of the global environment and the subsequent need for concerted action to deal with environmental degradation. For the first time, environmental issues had been given a first-ranked place among the world's foremost political and economic concerns.

By devoting fully one third of the final communiqué to environmental concerns at the 1989 Paris Summit, the heads of state and government established their

[3] Richardson, Sarah and John Kirton, eds. *The Halifax Summit, Sustainable Development, and International Institutional Reform*. Document prepared for the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy. Ottawa. March 1995. p. 111.

[4] Compliance is achieved when national governments alter their own behaviour and that of their societies in order to fulfil the specified goal or commitment. Leaders legitimize their commitments by including them within their national policy agendas, referring to them in State of the Union Address or Throne Speeches, assigning specialized task forces or working groups to negotiate mandates, launching new diplomatic initiatives or allocating budgetary resources; all designed to fulfill the specified welfare target. Full or nearly full conformance with a commitment here is assigned a score of +1. A score of -1 indicates complete or nearly complete failure to implement a commitment. An "inability to commit", or a "work in progress" is given a score of 0. An "inability to commit" refers to factors outside of the executive branch impeding the implementation of a given commitment and a "work in progress" refers to an initiative that has been launched by a government but is not yet near completion and whose results can therefore not be judged.

intention and commitment to take concrete actions in areas such as climate change, deforestation, transboundary air pollution, protection of the ozone layer, the prevention of oil pollution in the world's oceans and technology transfers to the developing world.

Subsequent Summits further demonstrated concerted support for environmental cooperation. Leaders at the 1990 Houston Summit urged the completion of negotiations on climate change and forests and pushed for the development of a strategy on land-based sources of marine pollution. They stressed the need to conserve and safeguard living marine resources and strengthen regional fisheries organizations. And finally, the leaders noted the importance of preserving biological diversity or "biodiversity."

The 1991 London Summit pressed for follow-up action and implementation of the commitments made by the G7 member states at the June 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The leaders further urged other countries to join them in establishing the United Nations Sustainable Development Commission (CSD) – a commission charged with overseeing the implementation of the Rio commitments.

The communiqué of the 1993 Tokyo Summit expressed the commitment of the G7 to implement and ratify the Rio conventions – most notably the ones on climate change and biodiversity – and to publish national action plans updating compliance progress made at Rio.

The following year at Naples, the Summit communiqué confirmed that the environment was a "top priority for international cooperation". The leaders urged the multilateral banks to continue their work in promoting local participation and incorporating environmental considerations into their programs. In addition, the G7 welcomed the replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and ensured that they would support it as the key financial mechanism in providing funding for the incremental costs of implementing the conventions signed at Rio.

The Canadian-hosted 1995 Halifax Summit brought with it a commitment by the leaders to integrating "environmental consideration into policy and decision making in all sectors" and stressed that the environment remained of "major global importance." The leaders would therefore work with others to fulfil their existing obligations under the climate change convention, would work to implement their commitments pursuant to the biodiversity convention, and would focus more attention on pollution prevention.

Given this heightened and sustained level of attention on climate change and its related environmental and ecological dimensions during this time, what was the result of the G7's endorsement of this issue and its capacity to deliver concrete results?

The research findings reveal that during its third septennial cycle, the G7 committed itself to implementing a number of policy measures aimed at limiting

and controlling the effects of human activity on the environment. In so doing, the Summit produced 34 specific and often ambitious commitments on climate change.[5] Canadian and U.S. compliance with these commitments was generally positive, with an overall net score of 34%.[6] Wide variations in compliance behaviour occur during this period by country and over time. Canada's score of 50% contrasts sharply with the U.S. score of 18%. Compliance for both countries is lower during the pre-Rio period of 1989-1991 than in the post-Rio period of 1992-1995. A notable peak of high compliance is centred around the year of the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, which both Canada and the U.S. share (see Appendix A) This is due in part to two important variables. First, 1992 marked the launch of a new era in environmental diplomacy with the convening of the Earth Summit in Rio. Of the five principal documents produced at Rio, the Climate Change Convention recommended curbing C02 and other greenhouse gas emissions responsible for global warming. Convening just three weeks later for their annual Summit in Munich, the G7 not only endorsed the Climate Change Convention in their deliberations, but assisted in the creation of the Rio process by brokering deals critical to the success of the Rio conference and its associated conventions. What follows, was a general recognition that if the Rio process was to have a significant and lasting impact, the G7 had to act collectively to implement the Rio conventions, thereby setting the standard for the rest of the international community. What follows is a "Rio-effect" of sorts, whereby sustained compliance with commitments reached at Rio are subsequently endorsed by the Summit process.

The second variable accounting for this "Rio effect" is coincident with the institutionalization of the G7 environmental ministerial process, following from the heels of Rio and launched in Germany just prior to the 1992 Munich Summit. Along with the commencement of this ministerial process – which continues to the present day – came the recognition of the importance of continuing with the sustained implementation of the Rio commitments through the annual G7 Summit process. Thus, for every subsequent Summit in this cycle, the importance of national implementation of the Rio climate change commitments was advocated through the environment ministerial process and then subsequently endorsed at the leaders' level. The initiation of an environment ministerial process through which the specifics of the climate change commitments could be negotiated, served to reinforce the significance of this issue by the time of the leaders' Summit, thereby accounting for increased compliance levels during this period.

Charting Compliance - the Summit's Fourth and Fifth Cycles: 1996-2005

Compliance by the G7/8 with its climate change commitments in the 1996-2005 period varies considerably, as the Lyon, Denver and Birmingham Summits

[5] Particular attention during this Summit cycle is granted to Canadian and American compliance with climate change commitments.

[6] This reflects a score of +23 over the 68 commitments accepted during this time. See Ella Kokotsis, *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7: 1988-1995*. New York, Garland. P. 86.

(1996-98) witness increasing levels of compliance on this issue, with no record of climate change compliance during the Cologne and Okinawa Summits (1999-2000). This follows with a surge on climate change commitments in Genoa (2001), but again no compliance record in Kananaskis and Evian (2002-03). Attention to climate change commitments escalate again for Sea Island and Gleneagles (2004-05) (See Appendix B) .[7]

Commitments made at the Lyon, Denver and Birmingham Summits ranged from taking "strong action" in anticipation of a "successful outcome of the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change Convention", to forging strong agreement that contains "quantified and legally-binding emission targets that will result in reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 2010" to resolving to "make an urgent start on the further work that is necessary to ratify and make Kyoto a reality."[8] Compliance with these commitments witnessed significant increases over these three years, with compliance post-Lyon at 14%, increasing to 50% in the post-Denver period and then reaching 100% in the period post-Birmingham.

Unlike the momentum of the previous three years, Cologne saw a relative decline in the amount of attention paid to environmental issues as the Summit seven focused their energy instead on the state of the world economy, a proposal to launch a new round of trade negotiations, and the launch of a new debt initiative for the developing world. Lack of focus on environmental issues was particularly surprising given the German's traditional strength in advancing coordination on global environmental initiatives. The Cologne communiqué offered little on climate change other than an affirmation that "climate change is an extremely serious threat to sustainable development."[9] And although the leaders recognized the importance of taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and committed to developing and implementing domestic measures in this regard, they failed to offer any concrete measures, targets or timetables to execute this commitment. As such, compliance is not tracked in the post-Cologne period.

Similarly, the 2000 Summit in Okinawa also paid little attention to environmental issues as the final communiqué failed to dedicate a stand-alone section to the environment. Instead, the only reference to issues relating to climate change fell under the "Human Genome" section of the communiqué where the leaders committed to "resolve as soon as possible all major outstanding issues, with a view to early entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol."[10] Apart from the recognition that "strong domestic actions and supplemental flexibility mechanisms" were required to achieve the goals of Kyoto, there were no substantive commitments offered to execute this goal. Instead, attention at Okinawa focused primarily around the global financial architecture, money

[7] Compliance information based on analytical assessments by the University of Toronto G8 Research Group. see: www.g8.utoronto.ca.
[8] See official documents for the 1996 Lyon, 1997 Denver and 1998 Birmingham Summits at www.g8.utoronto.ca
[9] Cologne Communique. June 20, 1999.
[10] G8 Communique Okinawa 2000. Okinawa, 23 July 2000.

laundering, the elimination of harmful tax practices, debt relief for the poorest of the poor, debate about the call for a new trade round, and social policies aimed at expanding wider network access and education through information and communications technology (ICT).

This retreat in attention to climate change during 1999-2000 takes a noticeable turnaround at Genoa in 2001 as commitments are generated across a number of climate change related issues ranging from promises to allocate funds to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) so it may promote efficient energy use and the development of renewable energy sources, to committing to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the Sixth Conference of the Parties (COP 6) and other relevant fora. Many saw the Genoa Summit as an important opportunity for high-level political debate over the divisions between the G8 and the Bush administration on Kyoto. However, given the U.S.'s abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol following President Bush's statement that Kyoto was "fundamentally flawed", others rightfully acknowledged that little would likely be resolved at Genoa on climate change. Indeed, compliance with the climate change commitments averaged 0 as positive commitments in the area of promoting early entry into force of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants were offset by the leaders' inability to make monetary contributions, as promised, to the GEF. All was not lost, however, as the high-level political discussions on climate change at Genoa paved the way for a 178 countries to agree on the basic rules of implementing the Kyoto Protocol at the COP6 in Bonn.[11]

Kananskis the following year proved to be a highly ambitious Summit with the leaders choosing to focus on three important themes, including "some of the most difficult dilemmas of the past half century – sustaining global growth, combating terrorism and reducing poverty in Africa."[12] Across these three levels, it was a "Summit of historic significance" as the leaders produced the ambitious Africa Action Plan, with good governance as its essential foundation, took stock of existing measures against global terrorism, including terrorist financing, and discussed developments in their own economies, expressing confidence in their economic recovery. Kananaskis was also hailed as "one of the greatest G8 Global fundraisers ever, mobilizing US$27 billion." One of the most significant outcomes, however, was the agreement by the leaders that Russia would host a G8 Summit for the first time in 2006. Environmental issues, however, fell considerably short, with climate change given all but a passing reference in the Chairman's Statement as the leaders noted that "climate change is a pressing issue that requires a global solution."[13] Without concrete or measurable commitments flowing from this statement, however, compliance results post Kananaskis on climate change remained unattainable.

[11] G8 Environment Ministers met in Bonn during the Genoa Summit in an effort to save Kyoto and induce the Americans to accept the European's proposal for increased penalties for countries failing to meet their targets. At Bonn, 178 countries agreed to the basic rules for implementing Kyoto.
[12] John Kirton. *The Promise of the Kananskis Summit*. Calgary Herald, June 26, 2002.
[13] *The Kananaskis Summit Chair's Summary*. Kananaskis, June 27, 2002.

The 2003 Evian Summit produced an historically high 207 concrete commitments across a diverse array of policy fields, ranging from transport security and radiological terrorism, to water, famine and infectious disease on the African front. Unlike Kananaskis the year before, Evian did produce an action plan on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in which the leaders noted their support "for the development of cleaner, sustainable and more efficient technologies."[14] Although the action plan highlighted the need for reducing greenhouse gases to address the challenge of global climate change, it too fell short on offering concrete targets, focusing instead almost exclusively on the need for more cooperative scientific research on energy technologies. One of the only references in the document to climate change was one in which the leaders effectively pushed the issue off to a later date, agreeing to "discuss various aspects of the global climate change problem at the World Conference on Climate Change in Moscow, September 2003."[15] Despite the volume of documents and commitments generated, Evian ended with only roughly one tenth of the money mobilized at Kananaskis and did little to ensure that its work would be effectively followed up by offering "virtually no requests or remits that bound the G8 to return to any issues at its US-hosted Summit" the following year.[16]

With the trilogy of security, prosperity and freedom emerging as the key policy priorities for the Bush administration in the lead up to the 2004 Sea Island Summit, it became increasingly clear that Bush – already sceptical about the value of G8 Summits – had as his central agenda item a vision for democratizing the Middle East, with issues of sustainable development virtually nonexistent in America's game plan. As preparations for Sea Island progressed, however, a noticeable shift occurred as other major policy deliverables began to emerge including transport security, private sector-led development, peace support for Africa, famine and food security, and delivery of the Doha round of trade negotiations. Pressures from France and Britain to address sustainable development and climate change initiatives had their limits as the U.S. affirmed their decision to leave these issues almost entirely to Tony Blair's 2005 G8 Summit. In the end, Sea Island proved to be a Summit of substantial achievement, producing 16 documents across 10 major issue areas and generating a record 253 commitments. Of these documents, one was dedicated to "Science and Technology for Sustainable Development," offering an action plan on implementation. Focusing on various recycling initiatives, in addition to cleaner and more efficient energy technologies, the document also adopted a 10-year implementation plan for an integrated earth observation system (EOS) used for observing and tracking climate change and other global environmental trends. In the ensuing year, all G8 members complied with their commitment to actively participate as members of the Group on Earth Observations, offering collective agreement on the international mechanism to provide coordination

[14] *Science and Technology for Sustainable Development: A G8 Action Plan*. Evian, June 2, 2003.
[15] Ibid.
[16] John Kirton and Ella Kokotsis. *Impressions of the G8 Evian Summit*. June 3, 2003. www.g8.utoronto.ca

and oversight on the fundamental components of the 10-year implementation plan. As such, the score for this commitment is 100% across all G8 members.

Although the terrorist attacks in London, leaving more than 50 dead, did overshadow the 2005 Gleneagles Summit to some extent, it did not prevent the G8 from reaching substantive agreement on the Summit's twin pillars of poverty reduction in Africa and agreements on climate change. And although discussions were curtailed to some extent with Tony Blair's departure for London to address the attacks, the Summit not only completed its agenda, but did so with exceptional solidarity between the G8 leaders.

As early as the fall of 2004, Tony Blair set out a very clear mandate for Gleneagles on climate change which included three primary components: (i) consensus on the science of climate change; (ii) expeditious technological processes and other measures to mitigate the threat; and (iii) the engagement of non-G8 members and emitters of the future on discussions surrounding their growing energy needs. Although there was little or no expectation that the Americans "would accept the Kyoto Protocol or introduce mandatory provisions on reducing greenhouse gas emissions,"[17] they were prepared to endorse Blair's three-part strategy. The result was the *Gleneagles Plan of Action: Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development* wherein the leaders noted that they face "serious and linked challenges in tackling climate change, promoting clean energy and achieving sustainable development globally."[18] On the science of climate change, the plan of action recognized the scientific evidence of human-made global warming – an issue refuted by the Americans for a long time. The document acknowledged that, "…human activities, contribute in large part to increases in greenhouse gas emissions associated with the warming of the Earth's surface." It further noted that "while uncertainties remain in our understanding of climate science, we know enough to act now to put ourselves on a path to slow and, as the science justifies, stop and then reverse the growth of greenhouse gases." On the development of new technologies, the G8 pledged to promote innovation by working together on energy efficiency, conservation and financing frameworks in order to accelerate the deployment of cleaner technologies, particularly lower-emitting ones. And on the issue of engaging the developing countries, the G8 launched a *Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development*, inviting other non-G8 countries to join the process. They further committed to "monitoring implementation of the commitments made in the Gleneagles Plan of Action" by agreeing to produce a progress report by the time of the 2008 G8 Summit. Although initial scepticism loomed over the inclusion of any references to Kyoto, the leaders acknowledged that the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) "was the appropriate forum for negotiating future action of climate change." They further endorsed Kyoto by noting that, "Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol welcome its entry into force and will work to make it a success."[19] In terms of

[17] Nicholas Bayne. *Overcoming Evil with Good: Impressions of the Gleneagles Summit, 6-8 July 2005*. www.g8.utoronto.ca
[18] *Gleneagles Plan of Action: Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development*. Gleneagles, July 8, 2005.
[19] Ibid.

endorsing concrete and more immediate commitments, the leaders pledged to advance "the global effort to tackle climate change at the UN Climate Change Conference in Montreal later this year." Those who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, they noted, "remain committed to it, and will continue to make it a success." Indeed, all G8 members participated at the Montreal meeting and all accepted a total of over 40 agreements. The most significant agreements reached included the adoption of the 2001 Marrakech Accords, which established how many of the Protocol's mechanism would be enforced, as well as agreement for movement forward on post-2012 emissions reductions negotiations. Therefore, with all G8 members fulfilling this commitment, an overall positive score of 100% is recorded.[20]

Explaining Compliance

Leaders at the annual G7/8 Summits have increasingly recognized the impact of climate change as one of the world's leading ecological concerns and have, over the years, committed themselves to implementing a number of policy measures aimed at mitigating the effects of climate change on the global environment. Both the number of commitments generated on climate change as well as the overall levels of compliance with these commitments, has generally increased over the Summit's second, third and fourth cycles. The Summit's third septennial cycle, for example, from 1988-1995, produced 34 specific and ambitious commitments on climate change, with Canadian and U.S. compliance scores averaging 34% during this time. During the Summits fourth and fifth cycles, from 1996-2005, we find 86 commitments generated on climate change, with an average compliance score over these years of 61% (see Appendix C). What then accounts for these sustained and increasing levels of Summit compliance with their climate change commitments over time? Explanations of increased compliance are grounded, for the most part, in the democratic intstitutionalist model of G7/8 governance, with concert equality also important in helping us understand the critical elements in accounting for these cross-institutional compliance trends.

Although there is no net compliance with the G7's climate change commitments in the 1989-1991 period, beginning in 1992, we begin to see higher levels of sustained compliance which both Canada and the U.S. share. As noted earlier, this is grounded primarily in a number of institutional variables that begin to take form during this time. The first is coincident with the launch of the UN Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, marking a new era in global environmental diplomacy. Rio represented a landmark opportunity in terms of heightening global awareness of the environmental challenges brought on by the impact of climate change. Meeting merely three weeks post-Rio for their annual G7 Summit in Munich, the leaders not only embraced the Rio conventions – including the Framework Convention on Climate Change – but took concrete steps to broker deals that would move the Rio process and its associated conventions forward. One critical element in moving this agenda forward was a

[20] See *Interim Gleneagles Compliance Report*. www.g8.utoronto.ca

general recognition on the part of the leaders that if Rio was going to have any lasting impact whatsoever, the Summit seven had to act collectively to implement the Rio conventions, thereby setting a positive example for the rest of the world. The "Rio effect" followed from this, demonstrating sustained and positive compliance levels with climate change commitments in the years post-Rio.[21]

The second institutional variable impacting rising compliance levels begins in 1992 with the onset of the institutionalization of the G7 environment ministerial process, beginning in Germany just prior to the 1992 Munich Summit. Until this point, never had the environment ministers of the industrialized world met to discuss the most pressing ecological issues of the day. Not only did this initial ministerial serve to reinforce the importance of keeping the spirit of Rio alive, it confirmed the necessity of continuing with an annual ministerial gathering of the world's leading environment ministers in an effort to forge consensus on global ecological issues – including climate change targets and national strategies to implement these targets. The launch of the initial environment ministerial process in 1992 forged the way for continued and sustained involvement by the G7/8's ministers of the environment as they have met every year since 1992, with the exception of 1993 and 2004 (see Appendix D). The launch and sustained involvement of the environment ministers' forum created a decrease in information barriers, allowing confidence levels between the leaders and their ministers to increase, thereby strengthening the forum's institutional platform and ultimately giving rise to higher compliance levels. We see this as compliance with climate change commitments increases from 34% during the Summit's third cycle, to 61% during the Summit's fourth and fifth cycles - a time when the G7/8 environment ministers process become more institutionally entrenched.

A third institutional variable accounting for increasing levels of Summit compliance with climate change commitments over time is explained by democratic institutionalism. Although the G7/8 Environment Minister's forum initially "bred virtually no ongoing working level groups to implement and prepare its work and strengthen co-operation among some of the key environmental powers in the world,"[22] the G8 has made significant gains in identifying areas where environmental cooperation through working groups is needed. Not only has the aggregate number of G7/8 official-level bodies and forums increased considerably over time (see Appendix E), but forums able to coordinate on the various aspects of climate change have also expanded considerably over the Summit's septennial cycles. Examples include the launch of the Officials Group of Forests (1997-2002) which, among other issues, examined the impact of reforestation as carbon sinks; the Renewable Energy Task Force (2000-2001); Senior Officials for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development (2003); International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (2004); the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (2004); Renewable Energy and

[21] Kokotsis, Ella. Keeping International Commitmetns. p. 87.
[22] John Kirton. *An Environment-First Foreign Policy for Canada*. Remarks prepared for an Experts Roundtable on "Foreign Policy Dialogue: Environment and Canadian Foreign Policy," Ottawa. May 12, 2003.

Energy Efficiency Partnership (2004); Global Earth Observation System of Systems (2004); Dialogue on Sustainable Energy (2005); and the Global Bioenergy Partnership (2005). Each of these official-level bodies and forums has served to strengthen environmental cooperation and coordination on climate-related issues thereby reducing the uncertainty associated with these issues and thus coinciding with higher compliance levels over time.

The concert equality model also points to variables as predictors of compliance with climate change commitments. Political control, for example, takes into account the impact of direct representation by heads of state and government at the Summit and the role they play in encouraging compliance behaviour. Presidents and prime ministers have the authority to raise these issues to the public's attention, define the terms of the debate and mobilize human and financial resources to domestically implement environmental commitments. Leaders are particularly prominent in policy implementation when they have the political authority to make top appointments to lead agencies including, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the U.S. Those appointed to the EPA are then expected to work closely with the White House in implementing the president's environmental policy agenda.[23]

Political control further points to the impact of public opinion and a leader's personal commitment to a particular policy initiative. As governments tend to be more responsive to the effects of mounting public opinion, the mobilization of national interest puts pressure on governments to respond. This is particularly the case with climate change, which has, since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, ranked among the most highly controversial and hotly debated global and environmental issues. Pressure by the public for leaders to respond to the mounting scientific evidence on climate change over the years corresponds positively with higher levels of compliance over time.

Leaders' personal commitment to the issue also plays a key role in how well a country complies. Canada, for example, has had a long history of environmental stewardship by its heads of state. A senior Canadian government official noted that Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, for example, was "able to transform the Rio commitments on the environment back into policy directives for environmental policy in Canada. And because he became personally associated with those commitments, they meant a lot to the government of the day."[24] We see this more recently at Gleneagles where very early in the Summit's preparatory process, Prime Minister Tony Blair noted that climate change would be one of the twin policy pillars of his Summit. Indeed, not only did Blair not waiver from his promise, his affirmative, action-oriented attitude made climate change a priority issue even in the dramatic backdrop of the London terrorist bombings. The result, as of the interim compliance scores, is that the United Kingdom, and indeed all G8 countries, are well on track for fulfilling their Gleneagles climate change commitments.[25]

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[23] Ella Kokotsis. *Keeping International Commitments.* 1999. p. 90

[24] Interview with Senior Canadian Government Official. See, Ella Kokotsis, *Keeping International Commitments*. Pg. 91

[25] See *Interim Gleneagles Compliance Report*. www.g8.utoronto.ca

Conclusions

Climate change has undoubtedly become one of the world's leading ecological issues, but with it has come a general recognition by the leaders of the world's leading industrialized democracies that they need to act collectively if the effects of climate change are to be stalled and ultimately reversed. With this increased awareness has also come sustained attention to climate change issues in the discourse of the world's leaders at their annual Summit gatherings. Not only have the number of commitments on climate change risen dramatically over the years, but the level of compliance has almost doubled from the Summit's third cycle, where climate change made its official first appearance. Causes of increased compliance levels are generally attributable to democratic institutional variables including the effects of the ongoing G8 environment ministerial process in addition to the creation of a number of G8-inspired official-level bodies and forums tasked with managing climate change initiatives. Concert equality also plays a key role for we find that compliance over time with climate change commitments is more likely when the leaders can raise these issues to the public's attention, have the ability to mobilize resources to implement these commitments, and are personally committed to seeing these issues followed through.

In an era where American ratification of the Kyoto Protocol is still an elusive variable in the climate change equation, what does this mean for the future of climate change issues, at least with respect to the G8? In the near term, as Russia prepares to host its first G8 Summit, President Putin has identified international energy security one of his Summit's key themes. In a recent address by Putin to visitors at the official G8 site in St. Petersburg, the President noted that, "This year, we plan to urge our partners to redouble efforts to ensure global energy security. I am convinced that our efforts towards attaining this goal should be comprehensive and must stimulate stabilization of the global energy markets, development of innovation technologies, use of renewable energy sources and protection of the environment." He further noted that, "Issues of global energy security should be considered in the context of two other crucial problems: global climate change and the lack of access of a considerable number of the world's poorest nations to pure and affordable energy." [26] Furthermore, as host of the Summit, Putin noted that Russia will "put forth a package of measures and an action plan to overcome economic and technological barriers to raising the efficiency of traditional and developing new energy technologies." As one of the world's largest energy producers and exporters, Russia is therefore "ready to participate in the creation of a global energy infrastructure to ensure effective production, transfer and use of clean energy."[27]

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[26] Official website of the G8 Presidency of the Russian Federation in 2006. *Address by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Visitors to the Official Site of Russia's G8 Presidency in 2006*. www.en.g8russia.ru/agenda. See also, Laura Sunderland. *The Prospective Agenda for the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit.* February 16, 2006. www.G8.utoronto.ca

[27] Ibid.

With these statements come sound promises that climate change, under the larger framework of energy security, will figure prominently on the leaders' agenda when they meet this summer in St. Petersburg. Only then, and in weeks and months to follow, will we have a better picture of how well the G8 did in terms of forging consensus on global climate change commitments and ultimately living up to those commitments in the aftermath of St. Petersburg.

Appendix A: Climate Change Compliance, 1988-1995

Summit Year	Total Number of Climate Change Commitments	Net Canadian Compliance	Net U.S. Compliance	Overall Compliance Average
Paris, 1989	4	0	-4	
Houston, 1990	7	-1	-1	
London, 1991	5	1	-1	
Munich, 1992	7	6	3	
Tokyo, 1993	4	4	2	
Naples, 1994	4	4	4	
Halifax, 1995	3	3	3	
Total	34	17	6	
% as Total		**50%**	**18%**	**34%**

Appendix B: Climate Change Compliance: 1996-2005

Issue Area	Lyon 1996	Denver 1997	Birmingham 1998	Cologne 1999	Okinawa 2000	Genoa 2001	Kananaskis 2002	Evian 2003	Sea Island 2004	Glen-eagles (interim) 2005
Climate Change									+1.00	+1.00
COP6						0.00				
GEF						-0.13				
Johannesburg Summit						0.00				
Stockholm Convention						+0.13				
Okinawa mandate			+1.00			0.00				
Kyoto	+0.14	+0.50	+1.00							
Annual Average	**+14% (1)**	**+50% (1)**	**+100% (2)**	**-**	**-**	**00% (5)**	**-**	**-**	**+100% (1)**	**+100 (1)**
Overall Compliance Average										**61%**

Appendix C: Index of Climate Change Commitments: 1988-2005

Total Number of Climate Change Commitments – 86

1989 Paris, France (3 commitments)

1989-21. We strongly advocate common efforts to limits emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, which threaten to induce climate change, endangering the environment and ultimately the economy.

1989-22. We need to strengthen the worldwide network of observatories for greenhouse gases and support the World Meteorological Organization initiative to establish a global climatological reference network to detect climate changes.

1989-23. We are committed to maintaining the highest safety standards for nuclear power plants and to strengthening international cooperation in safe operation of power plants and waste management, and we recognize that nuclear power also plays an important role in limiting output of greenhouse gases.

1990 Houston, USA (4 commitments)

1990-26. Climate change is of key importance. We are committed to undertake common efforts to limit emissions of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide.

1990-27. We reiterate our support for the negotiation of a framework convention on climate change, under the auspices of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

1990-28. The convention should be completed by 1992.

1990-29. Work on appropriate implementing protocols should be undertaken as expeditiously as possible and should consider all sources and sinks.

1991 London, UK (2 commitments)

We aim to achieve the following by the time of UNCED:
1991-24. an effective framework convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments and addressing all sources and sinks for greenhouse gases. We will seek to expedite work on implementing protocols to reinforce the convention.

1991-25. All participants should be committed to design and implement concrete strategies to limit net emissions of greenhouse gases, with measures to facilitate adaptation.

1992 Munich, Germany (2 commitments)

To carry forward the momentum of the Rio Conference, we urge other countries to join us:

1992-5. in seeking to ratify the Climate Change Convention by the end of 1993;

1992-6. in drawing up and publishing national action plans, as foreseen at UNCED, by the end of 1993;

1993 Tokyo, Japan - no commitments on climate change

1994 Naples, Italy (2 commitments)

1994-22. We look forward to the implementation of the Conventions already concluded, in particular those on biological diversity and climate change and in this respect we will work for the success of the forthcoming Conferences of these subjects in Nassau and Berlin.

1994-24. We are determined to speed up the implementation of our national plans called for under the Rio Climate Treaty and we will each report what we have achieved at next year's Summit.

1995 Halifax Canada (2 commitments)

Climate change remains of major global importance. We will work with others to:

1995-23. fulfill our existing obligations under the Climate Change Convention, and our commitments to meet the agreed ambitious timetable and objectives to follow up the Berlin Conference of the Parties;

1995-24. implement the medium-term work programme adopted persuant to the Convention on Biological Diversity;

1996 Lyon, France (2 commitments)

We commit ourselves to strong action and anticipate in 1997:

1996-89. the negotiation of a global, legally binding instrument on particular persistent organic pollutants (POPs);

1996-91. We will assess compliance with international environmental agreements and consider options for enhancing compliance.

1997 Denver, USA (4 commitments)

1997-8. At the Third Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Kyoto we must forge a strong agreement that is consistent with the Berlin Mandate and that contains quantified and legally-binding emission targets.

1997-9. We intend to commit to meaningful, realistic and equitable targets that will result in reductions of greenhouse gas emissions by 2010.

1997-10. Developing countries must also take measurable steps, recognizing that their obligations will increase as their economies grow. We agree to work in partnership with them to that effect by implementing technological development and diffusion and supporting environmental education and capacity building.

1997-11. We agree to work together to enhance international efforts to further develop global systems for monitoring climate change and other environmental trends.

1998 Birmingham, UK (8 commitments)

1998-31. The greatest environmental threat to our future prosperity remains climate change. We confirm our determination to address it, and endorse the results of our Environment Ministers' meeting at Leeds Castle.

1998-32. The adoption at Kyoto of a Protocol with legally binding targets was a historic turning point in our efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We welcome the recent signature of the Protocol by some of us and confirm the intention of the rest of us to sign it within the next year, and resolve to make an urgent start on the further work that is necessary to ratify and make Kyoto a reality. To this end:

1998-33. we will each undertake domestically the steps necessary to reduce significantly greenhouse gas emissions;

1998-34. as the Kyoto protocol says, to supplement domestic actions, we will work further on flexible mechanisms such as international market-based emissions trading, joint implementation and the clean development mechanism, and on sinks.

1998-35. We aim to draw up rules and principles that will ensure an enforceable, accountable, verifiable, open and transparent trading system and an effective compliance regime;

1998-36. we will work together and with others to prepare for the Buenos Aires meeting of COP4 this autumn.

1998-37. We will also look at ways of working with all countries to increase global participation in establishing targets to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

1998-39. We will work together with developing countries to achieve voluntary efforts and commitments, appropriate to their national circumstances and development needs.

1999, Cologne Germany (2 commitments)

1999-33. We underline the importance of taking action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions through rational and efficient use of energy and through other cost-effective means. To this end, we commit ourselves to develop and implement domestic measures including under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

1999-34. We will also promote increasing global participation of developing countries in limiting greenhouse gas emissions.

2000 Okinawa, Japan (1 commitment)

2000-86. We are determined to achieve a successful outcome at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the FCCC (COP6), in order to achieve the goals of the Kyoto Protocol through undertaking strong domestic actions and supplemental flexibility mechanisms.

2001 Genoa, Italy (4 commitments)

2001-41. We are determined to meet our national commitments and our obligations under the Convention through a variety of flexible means, drawing on the power of markets and technology.

2001-42. In this context, we agree on the importance of intensifying co-operation on climate-related science and research.

2001-43. We shall promote co-operation between our countries and developing countries on technology transfer and capacity building.

2001-45. We will ensure that renewable energy sources are adequately considered in our national plans and encourage others to do so as well.

2002 Kananaskis, Canada (no commitments)

2003 Evian, France (12 commitments)

2003-66. We will develop close co-ordination of our respective global observation strategies for the next ten years; identify new observations to minimise data gaps.

2003-67. We will build on existing work to produce reliable data products on atmosphere, land, fresh water, oceans and ecosystems.

2003-68. We will improve the world-wide reporting and archiving of these data and fill observational gaps of coverage in existing systems.

2003-69. We will develop an implementation plan to achieve these objectives by next spring's Tokyo ministerial conference.

2003-70. We will promote energy efficiency of all sources and encourage the diffusion and uptake of advanced energy efficient technologies, taking pollution reduction into account. Possible measures include standards, public procurement, economic incentives and instruments, information and labelling.

2003-71. We will promote rapid innovation and market introduction of clean technologies, in both developed and developing countries, including at the Milan Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and beyond, at the International Energy Agency (IEA) and other international fora such as the UN Economic Commission for Europe, the Expert Group on Technology Transfer, etc., finding appropriate methodologies to involve the private sector.

2003-75. We will participate in the International Conference on Renewable Energies, spring 2004 in Bonn.

2003-76. We will accelerate the development of fuel cell and hydrogen technologies (power generation, transportation, hydrogen production, storage, distribution, end-use and safety).

2003-78. We will work with industry to remove obstacles to making fuel cell vehicles price competitive, striving to achieve this goal within two decades.

2003-80. We will work together to facilitate the use of hydrogen technologies in our and other markets, including through development of infrastructures.

2003-81. We will expand significantly the availability if and access to cleaner, more efficient fossil fuel technologies and carbon sequestration systems and pursue joint research and development and expanded international co-operation, including demonstration projects.

2003-92. We will discuss various aspects of the global climate change problem at the World Conference on Climate Control (Moscow, September 2003).

2004 Sea Island, USA (1 commitment)

Last year at Evian we agreed "to support the development of cleaner, sustainable and more efficient technologies." We reaffirm our conviction that "cooperative scientific research on transformation technologies offers potential to improve public health by cutting pollution and reduce greenhouse gas emission to address the challenge of global climate change.

2005 Gleneagles, Scotland (37 commitments)

2005:1 - We resolved to take urgent action to meet the challenges we face. The Gleneagles Plan of Action which we have agreed demonstrates our commitment. We will take measures to develop markets for clean energy technologies, to increase their availability in developing countries, and to help vulnerable communities adapt to the impact of climate change.

2005: 2 - We will advance the global effort to tackle climate change at the UN Climate Change Conference in Montreal later this year. Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol remain committed to it, and will continue to work to make it a success.

2005:1 - We reaffirm our commitment to the UNFCCC and to its ultimate objective to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that prevents dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

We will, therefore take further action to:

2005:2 - promote innovation, energy efficiency, conservation, improve policy, regulatory and financing frameworks; and accelerate deployment of cleaner technologies, particularly lower-emitting technologies

2005:3 - work with developing countries to enhance private investment and transfer of technologies, taking into account their own energy needs and priorities.

2005: 4 - raise awareness of climate change and our other multiple challenges, and the means of dealing with them; and make available the information which business and consumers need to make better use of energy and reduce emissions.

2005:5 - We will work with developing countries on building capacity to help them improve their resilience and integrate adaptation goals into sustainable development strategies.

We therefore agree to take forward a Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, and invite other interested countries with significant energy needs to join us. We will:

2005:6 - address the strategic challenge of transforming our energy systems to create a more secure and sustainable future;

2005:7 - monitor implementation of the commitments made in the Gleneagles Plan of Action and explore how to build on this progress; and

2005:8 - share best practice between participating governments.

2005:9 - We will ask our Governments to take the Dialogue forward.

2005:10 - We welcome Japan's offer to receive a report at the G8 Summit in 2008.

2005:11 - Those of us who have ratified the Kyoto Protocol welcome its entry into force and will work to make it a success.

2005:12 - We will work together to advance the goals and objectives we have agreed today to inform the work of the UN Climate Change Conference in Montreal 2005.

2005:13 - We are committed to move forward in that forum the global discussion on long-term co-operative action to address climate change.

2005:13 – We will raise consumer awareness of the environmental impact of their vehicle choices, including through clear and consistent labelling for relevant energy consumption, efficiency and exhaust emissions data, and encouraging the provision of clearer information on the result of driving behaviour and choices for mode of transport.

Aviation

We will:

2005:14 - undertake a programme of collaborative work to explore and accelerate the potential for operational advances (including air traffic control and ground operations) that will continue to enhance safety, improve fuel efficiency and reduce emissions in air transport;

2005:17 - encourage co-ordination among our existing national research programmes on long-term technology developments with the potential to significantly reduce emissions.

2005:20 - develop partnerships, including sectoral and cross-border partnerships, with industry to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions intensity of the major industrial sectors of our economies; and

2005:21 - continue to support the work of the UNFCCC clearing house on technology transfer *TT:Clear* in disseminating information on available technologies, and cooperate further on sharing information on best practices and national policies to encourage the deployment of energy efficiency technologies.

Cleaner Fossil Fuels

We will support efforts to make electricity generation from coal and other fossil fuels cleaner and more efficient by:

2005:23 - inviting the IEA to carry out a global study of recently constructed plants, building on the work of its Clean Coal Centre, to assess which are the most cost effective and have the high efficiencies and lowest emissions, and to disseminate this information widely; and

2005:24 - continuing to work with industry and with national and international research programmes and partnerships on projects to demonstrate the potential of advanced fossil fuel technologies, including clean coal.

14. We will work to accelerate the development and commercialization of Carbon Capture and Storage technology by:

2005:25 - endorsing the objectives and activities of the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), and encouraging the Forum to work with broader civil society and to address the barriers to the public acceptability of CCS technology;

2005:26 - inviting the IEA to work with the CSLF to hold a workshop on short-term opportunities for CCS in the fossil fuel sector, including from Enhanced Oil Recovery and CO2 removal from natural gas production;

2005:28 - collaborating with key developing countries to research options for geological CO2 storage; and

2005:29 - working with industry and with national and international research programmes and partnerships to explore the potential of CCS technologies, including with developing countries.

We will encourage the capture of methane, a powerful greenhouse gas, by:

2005:30 - supporting the Methane to Markets Partnership and the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership (GGFR), and encouraging expanded participation; and

2005:31 - working bilaterally to support an extension of the World Bank's GGFR Partnership beyond 2006.

Renewable Energy

We will promote the continued development and commercialisation of renewable energy by:

2005:32 - promoting the International Action Programme of the Renewables 2004 conference in Bonn, starting with a Conference at the end of 2005, hosted by the Chinese government, and supporting the goals of the Renewable Energy Policy Network (REN 21);

2005:34 - working with developing countries to provide capacity-building assistance, develop policy frameworks, undertake research and development, and assess potential for renewable energy, including bioenergy;

2005:35 - launching a Global Bioenergy Partnership to support wider, cost effective, biomass and biofuels deployment, particularly in developing countries where biomass use is prevalent following the Rome International Workshop on Bioenergy;

Financing the transition to cleaner energy

We recognise that there are a range of tools to support a market-led approach to cleaner technology and energy resources and that each country will select those appropriate to its national circumstances.

We will:

2005:46 - support a market-led approach to encouraging energy efficiency and accelerating investment and the deployment of cleaner technologies which will help transition to a low-emission future;

2005:51 - use standards, or use pricing and regulatory signals to provide confidence in the near- and long-term value of investments, so as to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and / or pollutants.

2005:54 - market-based instruments including fiscal or other incentives for the development and deployment of technologies, tradable certificates and trading of credits for reductions of emissions of greenhouse gases or pollutants; and

Monitoring and Data Interpretation

The G8 made a commitment at Evian to strengthen international cooperation on global Earth observations. We will continue to exercise leadership in this area, and welcome the adoption of the 10-year implementation plan for development of the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) at the Third Earth Observations Summit which took place in Brussels in February this year.

We will:

2005:59 - move forward in the national implementation of GEOSS in our member states;

2005:60 - support efforts to help developing countries and regions obtain full benefit from GEOSS, including from the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) such as placement of observational systems to fill data gaps, developing of in country and regional capacity for analysing and interpreting observational

data, and development of decision-support systems and tools relevant to local needs;

2005:61 - in particular, work to strengthen the existing climate institutions in Africa, through GCOS, with a view to developing fully operational regional climate centres in Africa.

Appendix D: G7/8 Environment Ministerial Meetings

- Spring, 1992, Germany
- June 1992, Rio de Janeiro
- March 12-13, 1994, Florence
- April 29- May 1, 1995, Hamilton
- May 9-10, 1996, Cabourg
- May 5-6, 1997, Miami
- April 3-5, 1998, Leeds
- March 26-28, 1999, Schwerin
- April 7-9, 2000, Otsu
- March 2-4, 2001, Trieste
- April 12-14, 2002, Banff
- April 25-27, 2003, Paris
- March 15-16, 2005, London (with Energy Ministers)
- March 17-18, 2005, Derbyshire (with Development Ministers)

Appendix E: G7/8 Official-Level Bodies and Forums (by date of creation)

First Cycle (5)
1975 London Nuclear Suppliers Group, (1975-present)
1977 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group, (1977-1980)
1979 High Level Group on Energy Conservation (oil reduction) and Alternative Energy, (1979-1985)
1979 International Energy Technology Group, (1979-1980)
1980 International Team to Promote Collaboration on Specific Projects on Energy Technology, (1980)

Second Cycle (8)
1982 Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment, (1982-1986)
1982 Representatives to control exports of strategic goods, (1982)
1982 Procedures for multilateral surveillance of economic performance, (1982-1996)
1985 Expert Group on Desertification and Dry Zone Grains, (to report to Foreign Ministers) (1985)
1985 Expert Group on Environmental Measurement, (1985-1987, then taken up by UNEP until present)*
1986 Group of Experts on Terrorism, (1986-present)
1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), (1987-present)
1987 International Ethics Committee on AIDS, (1987-1989)

Third Cycle (9)
1989 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (with others, secretariat from OECD), (1989-present)
1990 Chemical Action Task Force, (1990-1992)
1990 Task Force to Study the State of the Soviet Economy, (1990-1991)
1990 Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group, (1990-1991)
1992 Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG), (1992-present)
1993 Support Implementation Group (SIG), (1993-1997)
1993 G8 Non-Proliferation Experts Group (NPEG), (1993-present)
1995 G7/P8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Lyon Group), (1995-present)
1995 GIP National Coordinators, (1995-1999)

Fourth Cycle (25)
1996 Group of Experts on Nuclear Safety and Security, (1996-1997)
1996 Group of Experts on Standardizing and Simplifying Customs Procedures, (1996-2000)
1996 G8 Lyon Group Law Enforcement Group on Environmental Crime, (1996-****)
1997 Expert Group on Financial Crime, (1997-1999)
1997 Subgroup on High Tech Crime (of the Lyon Group), (1997-present)
1997 Officials Group on Forests, (1997-2002)*

1999 Working Group on Kosovo, (1999-2001)
1999 South Eastern Europe Regional Table and Working Tables, (1999-present)
1999 Financial Stability Forum, (1999-present)
1999 Enhanced HIPC Initiative, (1999-present)
1999 G-20 Finance Ministers, (1999-present)
2000 Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting (CPOM), (2000-2001)
2000 Renewable Energy Task Force, (2000-2001)*
2000 Digital Opportunities Task Force (Dot-Force), (2000-2001)
2000 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis, (2000-present)
2001 G8 Task Force on Education, (2001-2002)
2001 Personal Representatives for Africa (APR), (2001-2003)
2002 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, (2002-present)
2002 G8 Global Partnership Senior Officials Group, (GPSOG), (2002-present)
2002 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group, (2002-present)
2002 G8 Experts on Transport Security, (2002-present)
2002 Global Health Security Action Group, (2002-present)
2002 Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) Laboratory Network, (2002-present)
2002 Technical Working Group on Influenza Pandemic, (2002-present)
2002 Working Group on Chemical Events, (2002-2003)

Fifth Cycle (20)
2003 High Level Working Group on Biometrics, (2003-2004)
2003 Counter-Terrorism Action Group
2003 Radio-Active Sources Working Group
2003 Senior Officials for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development*
2003 G8 Enlarged Dialogue Meeting
2004 Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)
2004 Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise
2004 Microfinance Consultative Group
2004 Best Practises Microfinance Training Centre
2004 Democracy Assistance Dialogue
2004 Task Force on Investment
2004 G8 Expert-Level Meetings on Peace Support in Africa
2004 Friends of the Convention on Corruption
2004 G8 Accelerated Response Teams on Corruption
2004 International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)*
2004 IPHE Implementation-Liaison Committee
2004 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)*
2004 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency partnership (REEEP)*
2004 Generation IV International Forum (GIF)
2004 Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)*
2005 Dialogue on Sustainable Energy*
2005 Working Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms
2005 Experts on IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting
2005 Global Bioenergy Partnership*
2005 African Dialogue Follow-up Mechanism

* G8-inspired official-level bodies responsible for various dimensions of climate change issues and implementation.