Enlarged Directorates
as Effective Global Governance for All

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Introduction

The architecture of global governance is a subject that has attracted innovative, even idealistic thinking from visionaries for millennia — dating back at least to the time of Thucydides, Herodotus and Plato in the Athens of old (Thucydides c400BC). Such thinking has sometimes inspired policy makers to use their power to put some of the particular formulae on intellectual offer into practical effect. The favourite idea has been to take the dominant unit of world politics, as it expanded from city-states such as Athens and Sparta in the fourth century BC into nation-states, global empires and superpowers in turn, and extend it further into a universal organization with the highly legalized authority and monopoly of coercive force that has long been the preserve of autonomous sovereign states in an anarchic world. Since this formula started to be put into practice at the outset of the twentieth century, the world has been devastated at least twice by its failure to work in preventing wars and producing prosperity in the real world.

Amidst its murderous wreckage, however, another classic candidate of proven worth has been increasingly re-discovered and relied on to provide the global governance required for an ever more globalizing world. That alternative is enlarged directorates, especially in the form of informal deliberately restricted plurilateral summit institutions (PSIs) with concerts at their core. Such PSIs and concerts have usually first been born in practice, and then codified in principle. They have come less from any visionary imagination than from occasional discovery, hard-learned lessons, accumulating experience and flexible adaptation in the real world. Their creators were not inventing *ab initio* a world that could be, but improving incrementally the real world of global governance that has emerged today.

This study identifies the emergence of, reasons for, benefits from and improvements needed in today's concert-centred global governance if it is to meet the needs of the twenty-first century. It argues that enlarged directorates in the form of informal, voluntary concert clubs, are a time-tested success, while the heavily legalized, aspirationally universal alternatives of the League of Nations and the United Nations have been major failures. Due to their failure, PSIs have proliferated in the post–World War Two, with relying at their core on modern democratic concerts that have proven to work well, for reasons practitioners and observers increasingly understand (see Appendix

A). The Group of Eight (G8) club of major market democracies, which first emerged in 1975 and has been enlarging since, is the most effective and legitimate of these concerts and is the centre of today's global governance, especially as the G8 evolves into a Group of Thirteen (G13) and Group of Twenty (G20) now. But the enlarging G8 needs to overcome its democratic deficit by building much more strongly the legislative components that its members depend on at home and that most other PSIs have long benefited from.

Concert Clubs as Time-Tested Successes

For several centuries, enlarged directorates, in the form of spontaneously emerging groups of nations claiming to represent the interests of the whole global community, have provided effective global governance. Such governance has often been voluntarily accepted as legitimate by all or most, usually on the grounds that it is superior to the governance provided by a single dominant power or by a balance-of-power system regularly producing deadly, destructive war among most major powers in the world. Flowing from the formula pioneered in embryonic form in the Greek state system of the fourth century BC, and much later in the Italian state system of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Concert of Europe provided peace and prosperity in the heart of the Euro-centric system, and produced global public goods such as the abolition of piracy and slavery as legitimate practices for the century from 1814 to 1914. On this foundation of peace, prosperity and social advance provided by the great powers in their concert came the great leap during the mid nineteenth century into functional intergovernmental organizations to provide key global public goods such as international communications and public health against trans-border infectious disease (Kirton 2009).

The earliest directorates of dominant states emerged in the Greek state system of the fifh century BC and in the Italian state system of the fifteenth century in order to prevent destructive wars among most major powers in an ever more densely interconnected system, where a pacific order was necessary to enable citizens fully to reap the benefits which their intensifying transnational interdependence brought. This formula for global governance, in the form of a self-conscious concert system succeeded in dampening destructive conflict on the Italian peninsula. But in this system most polities were non-democratic, the gains from permanent peace still circumscribed, and the temptations still strong to engage in competitive expansion outside the relatively small regional system. Thus the early concerts proved fragile, providing neither long-lived peace nor a platform on which other forms of collaboration could emerge to provide positive economic and social cooperation.

The Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 created, for the wider European state system then developing, the basic principles and increasing reality of the sovereign, exclusive, territorial nation-states that to this day have been reproduced around the world and taken for granted as the dominant unit of world politics. A fundamental feature of this system when it was first conceived and created was the absolute right of each exclusive, territorial sovereign to non-interference by outside actors in his or her internal affairs (Ikenberry 2001). The fundamental responsibility of each sovereign was not to interfere

in the internal affairs of others, no matter how great the destruction of human security or other values taking place there. With the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman Catholic Church as centres of supranational authority, legitimacy and capability, these new sovereign states lived and died in a system of anarchy, with no higher authority to ensure their basic national interests or survival. This they had to do themselves, by flexibly combining with any other autonomous state to balance against any state that sought to dominate the system. Or they could bandwagon with what looked like a winner for their individual benefit in the hopes that others would balance before it was too late or that if they did not, the resulting hegemon would be benign.

This Westphalian balance-of-power system routinely bred wars among the major powers, especially because such states were obliged to fight to prevent any of them alone or in alliance from gaining control of the system as a whole. Bilateral disputes thus became system-wide wars, a tendency fuelled by the non-democratic nature of most states and the expansionist rivalries that beckoned in the now accessible wider world beyond. The system was unkind to smaller states. With little weight they were less useful as allies to balance. They could easily be acquired by greater powers to enhance their strength in the great power balancing game.

The balance-of-power system was destroyed in deadly, destructive fashion by France as the eighteenth century come to a close. The French revolution of 1789 violently substituted a totalitarian, transnational ideology that demanded to be exported to all citizens of the planet, whether they lived inside the boundaries of another sovereign state or not. To this revolutionary purpose Napoleon soon added coercive force to produce across and beyond Europe an expanded empire that had seldom been seen before. In the end the balance of power, and the Russian winter, worked to defeat Napoleon, but barely. It was a very close call and left too many dead and too much destroyed to make it attractive as a formula for global governance in the postwar order that was created in 1815.

The Concert of Europe introduced at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 was based on several innovative principles (Kissinger 1957; Elrod 1976; Jervis 1985; Schroeder 1989; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991, 1995; Rosecrance 2008). The first was the responsibility to intervene in the internal affairs of other states, for the minimal but essential purpose of stopping before it could start the French-like revolutions that had bred Napoleon, massive death and destruction, and an existential threat to the system of sovereign states itself. The second was exclusive, collective great power governance, as it was the great powers alone that had the power and the incentive as top-tier powers to preserve order in the system the way it was. The third was to include all as well as only the great powers in the top-tier directorate, as a defeated, now non-Napoleonic France was instantly admitted as an equal member of the concert rather than left as a humiliated power to breed revolutionary and revisionist challenges from outside. The fourth was collective equality, as changes to the status quo, while possible, required the collective consent of all the great powers, who were treated as effective equals in this regard. The fifth was summit-level governance, as the leaders or their foreign ministers would meet face to face together in congresses to direct and decide upon Europe's and thus the world's affairs.

The sixth principle was that great powers must not be humiliated, not only as a matter of effective great power equality but due to the fact that it was leaders and ministers in person, rather than their paid, lower-level diplomatic servants, whose status, honour and reputation were at stake.

Over the next century, this concert system of a great power *directoire* proved its worth. For the first time there was no general war in Europe involving most great powers. The Crimean war between Russia and Britain at mid-century severely tested the system, which held. On this foundation there was a great increase in order, prosperity and social advances such as abolishing piracy and slavery as accepted social practices. These benefits were shared by great and lesser powers, both within Europe and without, although the latter paid a heavy price in the imperialism that the concert system could not contain.

The concert system was good to small states. They remained sovereign. They were protected by a pacific order guaranteed by all the great powers and were far less likely than before to be unilaterally preyed upon by larger powers and disappear. Indeed, some states, such as modern Greece and Belgium, owe their very creation and continuation to the governance the concert brought.

The concert system also incubated the intergovernmental organization taken for granted today. The pacific order created by the concert allowed still sovereign states both large and small to start in the mid 1800s to create the intergovernmental organizations needed to provide public goods in the functional areas, such as communications and health, that an ever more densely connected European state system desired. These new bodies still respected state sovereignty, which was voluntarily surrendered by the states for particular functional purposes from which they benefited most of all. Typically these new functional bodies were not created by waiting until all sovereign states in the system could come together as juridical equals to consensus on what the principles and rules of a new regime should be. Rather, they were produced by the spontaneous voluntary action of a core group of great powers taking the leadership to define a new, relatively high standards arrangement. It subsequently expanded to bring others in at low cost and much benefit to all.

The League and the United Nations as a Fundamental Failures

The Concert of Europe did not last forever. The many candidates offered as causes for its failure suggest that it was not its basic formula for global governance that was fatally flawed. Indeed, had leaders in the final decades of the nineteenth century and at the outset of the twentieth held regular annual face-to-face summits of the sort that are routine today, there is a substantial chance that Europe and the world could have avoided the spiralling misperception, lack of transparency and trust that provided the essential trigger to spark the general war that no one wanted in August 1914.

Upon its conclusion four years later, its unprecedented severity and global reach led not to the restoration of a concert system that was thought so recently to have failed. Rather it

gave rise to a revolutionary alternative with the principle of collective security at its core and a highly legalized organization as its form. Inspired by Immanuel Kant (1985), its immediate intellectual inventor was the American idealist Woodrow Wilson whose troops had arrived late in Europe to help win the war for the allies, and whose senate quickly withdrew its country's political and military power and presence from the new regime (MacMillan 2002). What remained to defend the global order was thus not the rising power of an isolationist free-riding America but the soft power of the collective security formula itself. Keeping the peace was again the collective responsibility of the great powers. But it now came not through discretionary action and readjustment arrived at by face-to-face collective consensus among those at the top, but through the automatic involvement of all against any aggressor using force to disturb the status quo. Under the new principle of national self-determination, the status quo was extensively rearranged in a big burst when the victor great powers created several new artificial fragile states. The sovereign right of all states to non-interference in their internal affairs was restored. A defeated but not conquered and now democratically led great power Germany was frozen out of the collective governance core, and saddled with heavy territorial losses and reparations as a result.

Not surprisingly, Germany soon became a revisionist and non-democratic power, saw the other status quo powers unable and unwilling to enforce their governance, and watched the legitimacy thought to come with the heavily legalized League of Nations evaporate when it was tested at times of stress. The legacy of the League and its collective security formula was thus economic depression, devastating world war among the major powers around the world and a major genocide in Europe that added six million to an already formidable death toll. It was of no use to smaller states such as recently created Czechoslovakia, other descendants of the recently dismembered Austro-Hungarian Empire or long-established Ethiopia. They were quickly invaded, conquered, absorbed and dismembered as the League stood idly by.

At war's end the victor powers put in place a postwar order that faithfully followed the legalized, collective security system, if with a few adjustments that they hoped would now make it work (Kennedy 2006; Abbott et al. 2000; Kirton and Trebilcock 2004). Once again the victors created a body, the United Nations, whose core Security Council (UNSC) gave them unique privileges through permanent membership and the veto power. It further froze out in perpetuity the recently defeated but soon rising democratic powers of Japan and Germany, on the grounds that they were enemy, alien, aggressor states. Once again relatively automatic collective security by all in response to any interstate aggression by anyone against the status quo was the focus of the formula. It was also a failure in practice as the veto ensured this power on paper was seldom used. The notable exception was when the boycotting Soviets were unable to stop the UN from retroactively legitimizing American unilateral behaviour in June 1950 to defend South Korea against North Korea's bolt-out-of-the-blue attack.

Once again, the formal legal arrangement seemed good for lesser states. The sovereign equality of all was affirmed through their membership in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). But on the rare occasions when UNGA seemed to be relevant, as in

the United for Peace resolution on Korea, this was more a matter of America mobilizing its then automatic majority rather than it was a spontaneous manifestation of UNGA's democratic will. Moreover, as poignantly pointed out by William T.R. Fox (1944), the inventor of the concept of superpower, you can give all the squirrels a certificate saying they are elephants but none of the elephants believe it, and nor do the squirrels.

The one major adaptation from 1919 was to replace the League's single organization with a set of ill-connected silos, each responsible for a particular functional task. Even before the UNSC was established for security in 1945, the victor powers produced the Bretton Wood bodies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for finance and the World Bank for development. Rounding out the system was a plethora of functional agencies, led by a reconstituted International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The additions of the late 1940s included the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), if only as a pale shadow of the intended International Trade Organization that the U.S. Congress unilaterally vetoed to take away from the world.

This adapted system suffered from several defects, in addition to the legalized collective security ones at its constitutional core. It was a system of separate silos, with no real higher authority or lateral coordination mechanisms to reap the synergies or resolve the conflicts across the hermetically sealed singe domains. It was thus at the global level the equivalent at the national level of a set of government departments without a cabinet or leader at the top. It was also a highly selective set of silos, devoid then and now of any organization, or even at times recognition in the UN charter, for the environment, energy, investment, competition policy and much else. Moreover it was a system that institutionalized an American imperial order, through the U.S. veto on the UNSC, the IMF and the World Bank, the backroom deal that made only an American eligible to lead the World Bank and the location of the new most powerful organizations in the United States. It was also, in the construction of its charter and composition of its Security Council, conceived and designed by a small directorate of major victor powers. Only 51 of the world's then 60 sovereign states were allowed to sign the charter and join the new organization's General Assembly in 1945. Most of today's small states were left as colonies of the imperial powers that dominated the directorate for another two decades or more.

With these defects, the UN system was unable to fulfill its essential task of keeping all three superpowers united, as they had been in the war they just won, for the postwar years so that they could win the peace as well. The Cold War meant that the UN, created as a deliberately restricted small group of wartime victor powers, remained as such for its first decade. Then a compromise deal brokered by a Canadian, Paul Martin Sr., allowed newer countries from each side of the Cold War to enter. This established the norm that all sovereign states (save for communist China) would automatically get in. Done just before decolonization began in full force, the result was the late creation of universal multilateral organizations in the General Assembly and functional organizations (the latter when the boycotting Soviets and their clients reunited). But adding everyone automatically here did

little to overcome the structural defects of separation, selectiveness and American dominance at the core. Indeed, the many small new members were even more wedded to the constitutional principle, set forth in article 2(7) of the UN charter, of the absolute prohibition of internal interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. They thus further crippled the organization when Holocaust-like genocides reappeared.

Even amidst the competition among the three co-called superpowers of 1944, the autonomous impact of the UN on world politics and on the behaviour of major and lesser powers was considerable. By endowing war-weakened but victorious states with the status of permanent veto powers on the UNSC, it encouraged them to render secure their then fragile legal status, quickly and inexpensively, by becoming independent nuclear weapons states, as Britain, France and China in turn did. The UNSC's Permanent Five (P5) thus became a monopoly of nuclear weapons powers and reinforced in practice the lack of concern with democracy displayed in the UN charter. A highly militarized approach to security — the precarious peace of the nuclear-armed Cold War — was thus reinforced. With attention focused on the Cold War, the UN system was unkind to the many small states its adoption of universality in the mid 1950s had helped create, for the UNSC largely stood by while those small states were attacked in clear acts of aggression, such as the deadly Iraq–Iran war of the 1980s, or as their own sovereigns slaughtered their own people with impunity, as in Pol Pot's genocide in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979.

The UNSC-P5's rule that gave each member a veto reinforced its nuclear weapons incentive in fostering a lack of cooperation among the superpowers and major powers below. Even in the clearest case for international functional cooperation, public health, the UN system failed. For the Soviet Union soon left the WHO, just as powers had previously found it easy to leave the League. In the case of United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), even America, Britain and Singapore later left. Meanwhile, the UN system struggled to create serious organizations to cope with the growing vulnerabilities caused by nuclear proliferation and environmental pollution. It did nothing by way of institutional creation to address transnational terrorism, crime, energy, investment, competition policy, forestry and much else. As most of the 1945 victor powers faded in relatively capability and as the vanquished states and other outsiders rose, no change at all was made to let the emerging powers into the inner management core, to add to the collective capabilities the UNSC, IMF and World Bank could wield to meet growing global needs. Also frozen in the world of 1945 was the heavily legally imprisoned UN charter, which remained unrevised in any substantive or principled way. The two minor changes made to it were rule changes to expanded number of lesser powers given second class status in its inner management's core for security. No greater security for the global community came as a result.

It was tempting to blame the UN's defects on Cold War competition among the superpowers, seeing the latter as the cause rather than the effect. There was thus an outburst of euphoria when the Cold War ended in 1990. Then came a conviction that the UN would finally act as its founders intended. This it did, but with results that surprised and disappointed most. In keeping with core UN principles, many new nation-states were

born, but often with great violence that left the many humans worse off in small, weak, contested, fragile and failing states while, true to its constitutional principle of non-intervention, the UN stood idly by during — and perhaps even in some cases encouraging — the genocides in the Balkans starting in 1992, in Rwanda in April 1994, at Srebrenica in 1995 and in Sudan's Darfur since 2004.

While many millions were slowly lifted out of poverty, this came with the setbacks caused by global financial crises. It was far more due to the growing, globalizing openness and democratization bred by the democracies' Cold War victory than to the UN's work in development through its functional agencies, Bretton Woods bodies or outburst of multilateral summitry. The latter started seriously with children in 1990 and the environment and development in 1992. It culminated with those that produced and reviewed the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 and September 2005. As the UN system failed to cope with climate change and biodiversity loss, some of the smallest states faced a real future of physical rather than just political removal from the international system, due to sea level rise and other ecological assaults.

Plurilateral Summitry's Proliferation, Performance and Propellers

The highly legalized, organized, allegedly universal UN system run by international civil servants and diplomats from capitals seemed nice to have. But the major powers and their lesser power associates knew realistically from the start that they needed much more if their safety, security and social well-being were to be protected and advanced in the post–World War Two world. They thus moved right away to create and rely on informal, institutionalized plurilateral summit institutions. These have proliferated and increasingly proven their worth (see Appendix A; see also Dunn 1996; Goldstein 1996).

These PSIs, as a deliberate alternative approach to global governance, are enlarging directorates at their core. By definition they are deliberately selective in membership, are defined by exclusionary principles, are delivered from the top and contain institutionalized predictability with few legalized constraints. They are designed above all to let leaders lead in an uncertain, fast-changing, complex world where matters that were long subject to local or national governance within Westphalian sovereigns quickly gravitate to the global level in a globalizing world.

A logical first step for states in such a world is to move from ad hoc summit diplomacy to institutionalized bilateralism and then geographic regionalism with their immediate contiguous or proximate neighbours. Here the European Union, with its European Council, is seen as the first mover and exemplar. But the trend was slow to evolve and has only recently spread to most regions of the world. A second trend, propelled by the logic or geopolitics and globalization, was to expand the geographic extent of the PSI beyond land contiguity or connection to provide a transoceanic reach. Here the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with its summits, was the first mover of consequence in a process that has today become routine. The third logical step was to go global, by including participants from some, many or most geographic regions around the world, with the selection still based on some exclusionary principle that deliberately

keeps the majority of states in the world out. Here the pioneer was the Commonwealth, born of the British Empire, and founded by Britain in Europe, Canada in North America, South Africa in Africa, and Australia and New Zealand in Asia. It is these global PSIs, growing strongly in size and number that have proven most well adapted as centres of global governance in a globalizing world.

As these global PSIs have proliferated, they have retained their defining features while expanding in several ways. Born initially as small directorates with one or more major powers at their core, they have grown enormously in membership, geographic reach, frequency of meeting, institutionalization and the diversity of their members in level of development, language, religion, culture, race and other civilizational ways.

Amidst these dimensions of expansion, common to each PSI, several patterns of their overall growth as centres of global governance stand out. One is the intensifying pace of creation, over each postwar decade and generation of PSIs. Another is the growing cumulative collection, as few of these major PSIs finish or fade away. Yet beyond this top-line linear logic, the patterns are more complex.

The process began, in defiance of linear, land-based geographic logic, on the global level. It started in the 1940s with the Commonwealth, which quickly added South Asia with the admission of India to a revised club in 1947 (Mayall 1996; Kirton 1987). Then came the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the 1950s (Morphet 1996). Later additions were La Francophonie in the 1980s and the transoceanic Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) at the leaders' level in 1993 (Kirton 1997; Kirton and Saravanamattu 1997; Kirton et al. 1997; Dupont and Huang 2005). The distinctive political character of this first generation was to cross and create the north–south and democratic–non-democratic divides.

The second generation started in the 1950s, on a transoceanic and expanded regional reach, in the Euro-Atlantic–centric system, with NATO in 1957 (Park 1996). Then came the European Council in 1961 (Redmond 1996). It was followed by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), later the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), starting in 1973 (Bredow, Jager and Kummel 1997). This second generation was devoted to winning and then crossing the east–west, democratic–non-democratic divides.

The third generation began in 1975, as a global concert of great power democracies from North America, Europe and Asia, in the form of the G7 and now G8. It was followed by the more regionally focused Summit of the Americas (SOA) in 1994 and the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) in 2005. Their distinctive purpose was to protect and promote democracy, in a way that the Commonwealth and NATO, with some non-democratic members, were not. The India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Trilateral, a multi-transoceanic club of democratic emerging powers, also falls into this camp.

The fourth generation, starting with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), is the creation of regional clubs. It has flourished in the twenty-first century, now with

major powers added, with the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the East Asian Summit (EAS) (Kirton 2006b). These are classic regional institutions like the EU, but without the latter's devotion to pure democratic membership or ideals. This generation of non-democratic regionalism raises the question of whether more global democratic plurilateralism will continue to win in defining the principles and processes of the global governance game.

The proliferation of PSIs is driven by a parsimonious set of powerful forces. It is seen most clearly as the causes of PSIs in their most pure, concentrated global democratic concert form (Kennan 1970; Kirton and Takase 2002; Kirton et al. 2005).

The first factor can be labelled "might is right." It refers to a concert's concentration of predominant capability in the international system, with relatively equality of contribution from all major power members. Predominance enhances the effectiveness of the concert's global governance. Each major power member is likely to have large and surplus capacity to contribute to a combination that overwhelms its rivals and is adequate to the problem to which it is addressed. Predominance also enhances the legitimacy that flows from the concert reliably producing the desired global public goods. Compared to other global governance architectures, one can count on concerts containing and contributing the needed capabilities in time. The internal equality of capability and contribution from its exclusively major power members diminishes tendencies for free-riding, enhances predictability and trust, and mobilizes the individual and collective responsibility of the great powers to provide global order (Bull 1977). In highlighting the importance of the particular configuration of capability that concerts contain, the realists are right in highlighting might.

The second factor can be labelled "right is might." This refers to the seminal mission, common principles and shared social purpose of the concert (Ruggie 1982). These give it the soft power that can be effective as moral suasion and securing voluntary consent for its governance. They endow the concert with substantive legitimacy. These features depend heavily on the global desire for and deference to the core principles, be it the classic Concert of Europe's "no more Napoleons and French revolutions" to the G8's open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. There come in both cases with a right to intervene in the internal affairs of sovereign states for these broadly accepted purposes alone. Here little powers look to the concert to lead, to put things right.

The third factor can be labelled "small is beautiful." The small number of states in the concert *directoire* reduces the transaction costs in coming together to deliberate, and the number of de facto veto points that can stop consensus and commitment. It thus facilitates fast, flexible agreements well tailored to the needs of the time. It enables each member to monitor the compliance of the others. It thus reduces the tendency to cheat, the ability to detect defection in time to prevent major loss, and the ability unilaterally to provide major power sanctions that will deter defection again. It thus generates transparency and the trust that flows from this over time. Moreover, the very exclusiveness and prestige of an elite club make its members eager to remain members in

good standing and thus to comply with its consensus when their momentary interests might not.

The fourth factor can be labelled "leaders lead." They alone have no higher source of authority to report to or appeal to back home. Moreover, far less than others in governments or intergovernmental secretariats, leaders are not prisoners of formal rules and procedures, fixed capacity/resources/budgets, or the organizational cultures of those accountable only to superiors above. Also, as leaders of major powers, they are professionally the loneliest people in the world. They share an understanding of and respect for their colleagues' dilemmas and a desire to help out, and can provide group therapy when they are on the ropes at home. The face-to-face interaction of the summit format tends to intensify these tendencies and bonds. At a summit, the leaders are left alone together to govern the globe and their countries back home, rather than meetings of spokespersons or agents who repeat the same lines on behalf of countries in competition playing by fixed rules in another version of the same old game. They can and do define rather than just deliver the game. Concerteers can thus commit with their colleagues in fast, flexible, far-reaching ways, with innovative directions and decisions that are timely and tailored well to the task.

The fifth factor can be labelled "leaders follow." In modern democratic concerts they ultimately follow their people who put them and keep them in their top jobs. They do come to the concert with a wide degree of freedom, discretionary power and purpose. But they also come with political capital flowing from the power and legitimacy of being democratically and popularly elected, by a citizenry who expects their leaders to lead and assumes that this "right rule" will make them "rule right." There because of voluntary consent rather than coercive rule at home, they are used to keeping their word, due to moral suasion and the somewhat short shadow of the future, when they will again be called to account by their voters back home and their concert colleagues abroad. That is why new leaders tend to keep old commitments and are embraced as equals — as agents of the same people who elected them rather than the person representing only himself or herself and the regime.

The G8 as an Effective, Legitimate Global Democratic Concert

Among the many PSIs and concerts that compete to serve as the centre of global governance, the G8 has emerged as the most effective and legitimate over the 34 years following its birth in 1975. It possesses the five propellers of PSI performance in the purest form.

The G8 was created, initially with six members, as a consequence of the failure of the established legalized Bretton Woods–UN multilateral organizations to cope with the cascading, cumulative crises that arrived in the first half of the 1970s to make major power democracies, above all the most powerful United States, vulnerable as never before. The first came in finance, on August 15, 1971, with America's unilateral destruction of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed if adjustable exchange rates, with the U.S. dollar anchored to and thus as good as gold. The second came in trade, from

America's unilateral imposition of a 10% import surcharge on August 15 (in the same announcement), through the stillborn launch of the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade liberalization and with Britain's entry into the protected European Community. The third came in energy in October 1973 when war in the Middle East led to an embargo by the Organization of the Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC) on America and its allies and a sudden severe rise in the price of oil around the world. The fourth came in nuclear weapons on May 18, 1974, when India exploded a nuclear device, making it the first country since 1964 and the first outside the UNSC-P5 to blast its way into the nuclear club. The fifth came in April 1975 when a vanquished America left Vietnam in retreat and defeat in its longest war. The sixth came during this same difficult half decade as the Euro-communism sweeping southern Europe threatened to extinguish democracy and install communists in countries from Spain to Greece and even Italy between.

Amidst the massive failure of the established multilateral and transoceanic Atlanticist institutions, the G8 was consciously conceived and created as a modern democratic concert. It took the classic concert, which American secretary of state Henry Kissinger had studied in his doctoral dissertation, and made it a modern democratic concert devoted to protecting within its members and globally promoting the values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance.

The G8 began as a classic directoire, composed of the "Berlin dinner four" of America, Britain, France and Germany. They met first at the finance ministers' level in the Library of the White House to consider a replacement for the recently destroyed Bretton Woods regime. They then met as the leaders at the British embassy in Helsinki to discuss coordinating their east–west economic relations, to accompany the new summit-level CSCE. But for the first G8 summit in November 1975 in Rambouillet, France, the founding directorate expanded to include a politically and financially endangered Italy. It added as essentially full members the territorially expanding Canada in 1976, the ever expanding European Community (now Union) in 1977 and the democratizing Russian Federation from 1992 through to 1998. Any country could enter the club as long as it clearly met the essential criteria of being a major power devoted to democracy with a sense of global responsibility, principles that the existing members and the G8's core mission demanded. This the original four at Helsinki in 1975 more than doubled to nine members in the 22 years to 1998. In sharp contrast, the UNSC-P5 at San Francisco in 1945 remained frozen at five for the following 63 years, and prospectively for many more in the years ahead.

This expanding G8 club was good for lesser powers in many ways. It gave an ever expanding number a permanent place at the G8 summit table at second hand by involving the EU, and others an occasional one by inviting the executive heads of the world's major multilateral organizations with increasing frequency and breadth starting in 1996. It allowed the leaders of major middle powers — Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece and Ireland — to participate directly on occasion in their capacity as rotating president of the European Council. Starting in 2000 and 2001 it brought an increasing number of the major democracies in Africa, and then from the broader Middle East, to most summits. Meanwhile the UNSC remained frozen in the number of rotating seats it contained,

despite the great effort at reform when the UN's World Summit was held in September 2005.

G8 governance was also good for small states in the output of the effective global governance it produced. It protected Italy and other European powers from being forced to go the way that Czechoslovakia had in 1948. It peacefully liberated many captive nations from the grip of an imperialist Soviet Union that disappeared for good. It then helped almost all liberated smaller powers and many Soviet satellites around the world become functioning, flourishing open democracies to this day. And in several fields of social advance such as development, debt relief, health, education and the environment, it provided the policies, programs and funds to provide global public goods for small, poor states when the UN system could not, in part because it could not earn the necessary trust of its own member states.

The G8's steady expansion showed most clearly that it was a legitimate centre of global governance. Global summits had soon become very popular as others tried to replicate the G8 formula. But the G8 was uniquely the one to which all the time-pressed leaders of the major power democracies always came. For an institution that depended fully on the free will of individual leaders rather than legally entrenched obligations at home, it is noteworthy that none of the members ever left, despite the difficulties they encountered when their preferred policies were not adopted by the group. So too, with the odd exception, did the G8 invitees. Any many other countries publicly or secretly schemed to get in.

As the G8 directorate expanded in members and participants, the extent and effectiveness of its global governance grew as well. As Appendix B shows, it has done so across all of the major dimensions of international institutional performance: deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery of those decisions and the development of G8-centred global governance as a whole (Kirton 2004b, 2004c; Collier 2008).

During this time the G8 generated several great success on defining issues that the UN system had failed to achieve or not even tried. In 1978 the G8 invented a regime against aircraft hijacking that remained highly effective in removing this threat from G8 and other countries until the terrorists changed to suicide attacks on September 11, 2001. Neither ICAO nor the broader UN system, which treated terrorists as freedom fighters, had done anything to stop this human security threat until they moved to help implement the G8's skyjacking regime.

In 1979, the G8 successfully countered the twin terrorist–oil shock brought by Iran's Islamic fundamentalist revolution. Again the UN system did nothing effective, despite its leading responsibility for peace in the Middle East since 1946. Nor was the UN effective is stopping Iraq's aggression against Iran in 1980 and the development of nuclear weapons programs by both countries, despite the action against the latter threat by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In 1979 the G8 came to consensus that the world needed immediately to stabilize carbon dioxide concentrations at existing levels in the atmosphere. They faithfully acted to do so by reducing their emissions for the following five years. Only when the UN subsequently discovered the problem of climate change, and took policy ownership of it did emissions start to rise again. The new UN-pioneered regime produced targets and timetables far less ambitious, respected and effective than the G8's ones had been.

In 1989 the G8 succeeded in peacefully winning the Cold War and peacefully pioneering the post–Cold War order. This order that brought openness, democracy and eventually growing prosperity to the remnant Russia and most other polities within the former Soviet Union and Soviet bloc. While the G8 had worked since its 1975 to achieve this result, the UN system had done little, due largely to the Soviet veto on the UNSC-P5. Even the IMF sprang to life on this issue only to implement the programs for financial assistance to the former Soviet Union that had been devised by the G8.

In 1999 came the G8's most dramatic and defining achievement, in preventing a major genocide in Kosovo that was almost certain to take place (Fearon 2008; Thakur 2006, 208–09; Malone 2003; Kirton 2002a, 2000; Kuhne 2000). At the start of 1999, as ethnic cleansing by the Serbian armed forces mounted in its province of Kosovo, the UNSC refused to act, consistent with its principle of non-intervention in internal affairs and deterred by the prospect of a Russian and Chinese veto. The G8, without its newest member Russia, initiated a military attack by air on March 24, 1999. When the air war alone appeared inconclusive, they decided to send ground forces in to finish the job. At that defining moment Russian president Boris Yeltsin decided to adopt Russia's new identity as a G8 member, and shed its historical identity as a defender of the Slavs and Serbs. Slobodan Milosevic pulled his forces out of Kosovo. He was sent soon out of the former Yugoslavia by his now democratic polity to be tried for war crimes in the Hague. The UN, in recognition of where the new institutional centre and defining principles of global governance now lay, retroactively legitimized the G8 action by copying and passing the G8 declaration as UNSC Resolution 1244.

Expanding the G8 Concert

Following the defining successes of the Kosovo intervention, and the G8-led response to the global financial crisis of 1997–99, the G8 took a great leap into enlargement, effectiveness and legitimacy, as the globalized twenty-first century dawned.

The G8 had earlier attempted to expand its participation by inviting non-members from the global community to its summit in various arrangements. It started in 1989 with developing countries coming for proximity talks. It continued in 1993 when the host met with Indonesia as the chair of the NAM on the summit's eve. It extended to a G8 post-summit lunch with the heads of four major multilateral organizations in 1996. It invited a few regional countries to meet with the Japanese host and a few other G8 leaders on the eve of the summit in 2000.

The largest leap outward came with the G8's creation of the G20 finance ministers' forum in 1999, in direct response to the global financial crisis of 1997–99 (Kirton 2001a, 2001b). This group gathered together as equals the finance ministers and central bankers from the 20 most systemically significant countries from around the global. The provision of financial stability was their core initial agenda, and proprieties were goal and deliberation and direction setting through consensus. Yet the G20 quickly broadened its subject matter, purposes and ambitions. During its first decade it proved effective across a broad range of economic, social and political-security governance, in its decision making, delivery and development of global governance domains (Kirton 2005a, 2005b, 2002b).

The success of the G20 has inspired some leaders, led by Paul Martin Jr., G20 co-founder and later Canadian prime minister, to call for it, in authentic or adapted form, to start meeting at the leaders' level in a new Leaders' Twenty, or L20. As such it would reinforce and perhaps someday replace the G8. This proposal has unleashed a competition among several combinations of differing sizes and constituents for expanding the G8 *directoire*, with the G8 still at the centre of all contenders, which have actually come to life.

The first candidate consists of flexible, ad hoc, G8 additions defined by the G8's priority agenda in any given year. Thus the leaders of four core African democratic powers of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria have come to every summit since 2001, accompanied by ever more of their regional colleagues over time. In 2004 several leaders from the broader Middle East and North Africa were added, including the leader of newly democratic but distant Afghanistan. Starting in 2001 the executive heads of major multilateral organizations have continuously come, save for the Sea Island Summit hosted by George W. Bush in 2004.

The second serious contender is the G8 Plus Five formula. It began in a larger context in 2003 and came to life in pure form in 2005 when G8 host and British prime minister Tony Blair invited China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa to his Gleneagles Summit. The five have come to every summit since, with the Japan's Toyako Summit in 2008 making their participation five years in a row. At the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit the formula of continuously involving these big five was extended to the official level, in the form of a Heiligendamm Process of structured dialogue on innovation, investment, development and energy (Kirton 2008). The process is to produce a final report for the Italian-hosted summit in 2009. This makes it highly probably that the Plus Five leaders will be invited to that summit to help receive the report and define the next stage.

The third serious contender is the L20, which has now come to life in an adjusted form (Kirton 2004a). The G20 finance forum began to be replicated with a slightly different membership in 2005, when the Gleneagles Dialogue of energy and environment ministers of 20 key countries was started with a mandate to end in 2008. It is destined to be continued by the 2008 G8 Toyako Summit, re-branded as the Toyako Process dedicated to devising a low carbon society. The L20 in purer form was almost born at the leaders' level at the 2005 UN World Summit, when Canadian prime minister Paul Martin

considered, but backed away from, calling a gathering on the margins of this multilateral meeting to discuss global health. However, in 2007, U.S. president George Bush launched his Major Economy Meeting (MEM) of 16 key states to deal with climate change. The MEM-16, which contains most of the G20 finance members, met first at the official and ministerial level. But it was always intended to culminate in a leaders' level event. It is destined to do so at Toyako, on July 9, 2008, in the form of the G8 summit's concluding session on climate change.

It is not yet known if an enlargement from a G8 Plus Five into a full G13 or G14 with Egypt as French president Nicolas Sarkozy has proposed, let alone into an L20, will enhance the G8's *directoire* as an effective and legitimate centre of global governance. But the additional numbers of leaders at the table is in itself not a decisive impediment. The G20 has demonstrated over its first decade that 20 countries can get global governance done in a more than adequate way. An L20 of the systemically significant powers would certainly increase the collective predominance of the group. But it would challenge its effective internal equality by asking the leader of the U.S. to treat those of South Africa, South Korea and Indonesia on the same plane. It will dilute the pure common democratic purpose and composition of the G8, by adding a currently non-democratic China, and, perhaps Saudi Arabia. Much will depend on whether the G8, which has helped democratize a long closed Russia, can do the same for China and Saudi Arabia by more than doubling the number and diversity of the democracies in an expanded L20 club.

While the debate over expanding the G8 to G13 or L20 remains the central drama of global governance through enlarged directorates, other possibilities come into play. One formula, inspired by the UNSC practice with rotating members and by the EU membership in the G8 itself, is to retain the G8 at the global epicentre, while having regional concerts covering the world plug into the central G8 in various ways. Another is to thicken the G8 structure itself, by creating bodies for all the portfolio ministers responsible for the matters that the G8 summit agenda now embraces, supported by stronger official-level bodies and processes and, even, a permanent secretariat as well.

Democratizing the G8 Concert

Yet the greatest need for architectural advance lies in a different direction. Rather than outreach to include more countries and international organizations, or "in reach" to thicken its own repertoire of institutions, the key imperative for expansion of the G8 directorate is "downreach." This involves including in a far more comprehensive, systematic fashion civil society actors starting with parliamentarians and the judiciary, and extending to the media, scientists, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious leaders, business and the mass citizenry at large (Hajnal 2007, 2006; Kirton 2006a).

For an institution founded to protect within its own members and extend on a global scale the values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, it is massively inconsistent that the G8 has remained overwhelmingly a global governance system of executive branch alone. At a time when globalization is driving so many once domestic

issues up to be deal with in the G8 global governance form, they are treated there without virtually any of the legislative or judicial involvement that all G8 governments have long formed necessary at home. The capacity, effectiveness and legitimacy of G8 governance would be much enhanced if the G8's executive branch governance did more to bring its civil societies in.

It is striking how late and little the G8's involvement of civil society has been, compared to the many other PSIs that have arisen and flourished as global governance contributions in the post–World War Two world. As Appendix A shows, most PSIs come with a legislative component, often from the very start or added soon after the club was formed. The G7/8 stands out in taking 27 years to have done so, making it a laggard exceeded only by the 30 years of the Organisation of the Islamic Council (OIC).

Historically, the world's first consequential PSI, the Commonwealth, began in 1887 with the irregular Colonial Conferences in 1887, 1897, 1902, 1907, intensified with the institutionalized Imperial Conferences every four years from 1911 to 1944, and then became the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Its parliamentary component arrived very early, in 1911 in the form of the Empire Parliamentary Association. It included Britain, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, but expanded in the 1920s to embrace Malta, Southern Rhodesia, India, Ireland, Ceylon, Bermuda, Barbados, Bahamas, Northern Ireland, three Canadian provinces and five Australian states. In 1948/1949 it became the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, which now has more than 17,000 parliamentarians from 170 parliaments and legislatures from 52 of the 53 Commonwealth countries. Thus even before the legalized League of Nations and the UN were created, a PSI with a parliamentary wing was contributing to global governance in what soon became an increasingly inclusive way.

The G8 concert, in contrast, only acquired a legislative component in 2002 (see Appendix C). It came after the G8's process of outreach had been launched in the twenty-first century. The G8 involved legislators in only the most fragile form, as an annual meeting of the speakers of the legislatures of each G8 country. Their meeting often takes place after the summit, a time that reduces the ability to influence what the G8 leaders do at their summit. Seven years after its start, there has been no increase in the intensity, intra-G8 inclusiveness or institutionalization of the G8's legislative arm.

There have recently been some slender moves to legislative outreach, with the Plus Five the partners of choice. Since 2005, with the initial support of Gleneagles host Tony Blair, Globe International, a worldwide network of legislators concerned with the environment, has gathered G8 and Plus Five legislators to discuss climate change. It includes Spain and Australia, and international business, civil society and opinion leaders. Designed to add a parliamentary component to the Gleneagles Dialogue, it has focused on agreeing on alternatives beyond the Kyoto Protocol. On June 3–4, 2007, about 100 G8 and Plus Five senior legislators met at the Bundestag in Berlin, to be addressed by Blair and hold a two-day forum. Yet this legislative forum is issue specific, was designed to expire in 2008, and has not been expanded, replicated or extended in any way.

The standard response to demands for greater downreach democratization has been that G8 leaders routinely do democracy domestically on G8 matters, negating any need to do it at the G8 level was well. But only rarely do G8 leaders even bother to report to their legislatures what they have done at the G8, or have parliamentary debates or committee hearings and reports on what their executive branch should do when they participate or host. And even more rarely do parliamentarians meet civil society directly to connect them to the leaders in the immediate lead-up to or at the summit itself (Graham 2006). There is thus in the G8 a dearth of democracy domestically, even in the basic form that freely elected legislatures bring.

There is a pressing need for the G8 democratic concert to develop its legislative arm. Democratically elected legislators connect citizens directly to their leaders by taking the views of citizens to their governors in an aggregated form. Legislators at their own initiative provide scrutiny of policy proposals and offer policy alternatives. They help ensure transparency. They monitor and thus help ensure that the executive keeps its commitments, or offers credible public explanations of why it cannot or should not. The legislature scrutinizes the expenditure of funds. Most generally, give the democratically elected G8 governors and their publics the confidence that G8 governors and their institution are doing what their people want.

A stronger G8 parliamentarians group (G8PG), assisted by a G8 judiciary group (G8JG), could perform several functions that the G8 badly needs and that parliamentarians have the specialized capability to supply. These include measuring the compliance of G8 governments' executive branches with their G8 commitments, holding hearings on critical G8 issues, receiving reports from their leaders on their priorities for and the results of their participation at the annual summit, and monitoring the expenditure of money devoted and deployed for G8 purposes to ensure that it is faithfully and effectively spent.

More broadly, a G8PG, especially one reaching out to and beyond the Plus Five across a full agenda, could socialize legislators from recent and future democratic polities into what the legislative dimension of genuine democracy involves. It could offer high standards benchmarks, partnership, mutual education and exchange of best practices here. It could strengthen the loyal opposition in all G8 and Plus Five members, and help spread knowledge of what the next generation of G8 governors might want and do.

Because G8 democracy works well in regularly sending to the summit new leaders with no previous experience in the G8 system, a G8PG could help train in advance the new G8 governors so they could "hit the ground running" when they arrive at the summit for the first time. This is of particular importance in the case of the most powerful members, the United States, whose presidential system has never sent to the G8 summit an individual with previous experience as a portfolio minister in a national government and rarely one with experience in Congress or a state legislature (see Appendix D). It is also important for all members, whose leaders may have served as finance ministers or foreign ministers but who have not come to the summit itself in this capacity since 1997. And in many

cases, some new leaders have arrived with no experience in those portfolios that the G8 has increasingly created ministerial bodies for since 1982.

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Appendix A: Plurilateral Summit Institutions with Parliamentarians

	Year Formed	Parliamentarians Added	Gap
Commonwealth	1944	1948/1949	4/5
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	1957	1955	2
European Council	1961	1949	12
Non-Aligned Movement	1961	No	47+
Organisation of the Islamic Council	1969	1999	30
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe	1973	1990/91	17/18
Group of Seven/Eight	1975	2002	27
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	1976/1997	1977	1
Francophonie	1986	1967	19
Group of 15	1989	No	19+
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation	1993	1991	2
Summit of the Americas	1994	2001	7
Asia Europe Meeting	1996	1996	0
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation	1996	2006	10
Group of 77	2000	No	8+
India-Brazil-South Africa Trilateral	2003	No	5+
East Asian Summit	2005	No	3+
Security and Prosperity Partnership	2005	No	3+

Appendix B: G8 Global Governance Performance

G8 Global Governance Performance: Part One

Year	Members			Outside Participants		Domestic Political Management	
	G8 Countries	EU Countries	Non-G8 EU Presidents	Countries	International Organizations	% Members	Average Number of References
1975	6	0	0	0	0		
1976	7	0	0	0	0		
1977	7	9	0	0	0		
1978	7	9	0	0	0		
1979	7	9	0	0	0		
1980	7	9	0	0	0		
1981	7	10	0	0	0		
1982	7	10	1 (Belgium)	0	0		
1983	7	10	0	0	0		
1984	7	10	0	0	0		
1985	7	10	0	0	0		
1986	7	12	1 (Netherlands)	0	0		
1987	7	12	1 (Belgium)	0	0		
1988	7	12	0	0	0		
1989	7	12	0		1 (NAM)		
1990	7	12	0		0		
1991	7	12	1 (Netherlands)	1	0		
1992	7	12	0	1	0		
1993	7	12	1 (Belgium)	2	1 (NAM)		
1994	7	12	0	1	0		
1995	7	15	0	1	0		
1996	7	15	0	1	4 (UN, WB, IMF, WTO)	40%	1
1997	7	15	1 (Netherlands)	1	0	40%	1
1998	8	15	0	0	0	25%	1
1999	8	15	0	0	0	80%	1.7
2000	8	15	0	4	3(WB, WTO, UNDP)	40%	6.5
2001	8	15	1 (Belgium)	6	4 (UN, WB, IMF, WTO)	33%	1.5
2002	8	15	1 (Spain)	4	1 (UN)	17%	1
2003	8	15	1 (Greece)	13	4 (UN, WB, IMF, WTO)	40%	2.5
2004	8	25	1 (Ireland)	12	0	33%	1
2005	8	25	0	11	6 (UN, WB, IMF, WTO, IEA, AU)	40%	1
2006	8	25	1 (Finland)	5	7 (UN, WHO, IEA, AU, IAEA, CIS, UNESCO)	38.8%	1.8
2007	8	27	0	10	6 (UN, WB, IMF, IEA, AU, OECD)	75%□	1
Total or average	7.27	13.06	0.33	2.21	1.12	42%	1

Notes:

Members:

G8 Countries = Number of G8 countries that attended the summit that year.

EU Countries = Number of countries that were represented by the European Union. This includes those countries that are also members of the G8.

Non-G8 Presidents = indicates if the president of the European Council is a non-G8 member. The European Council president started attending the G7/8 summits in 1981 and has attended every one since.

Outside Participants:

Countries = Number of non-G8 member countries that attended G7/8 summits for the year in question. This includes Russia up until 1998. It also includes one-off meetings that occurred.

International Organizations = Number of such organizations that attended the G7/8 summits for the year in question. This includes one-off meetings that occurred.

NAM = Non-Aligned Movement; UN = United Nations; WB = World Bank; IMF = International Monetary Fund; WTO = World Trade Organization; UNDP = United Nations Development Programme; IEA = International Energy Agency; AU = African Union; IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States; UNESCO = United National Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Domestic Political Management:

% Members = Percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year.

Average Number of References = Average number of references for those that did mention the G8 that year. 2007 includes United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the United States.

G8 Global Governance Performance: Part Two

Year	Deliberation			Direction Setting	Decision Making	Delivery	Development of Global Governance
	# of Days	# of Statements	# of Words	References to Core Values	Commitments	Compliance	Meetings
1975	3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1
1976	2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0
1977	2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1
1978	2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0
1979	2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	0/2
1980	2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1
1981	2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0
1982	3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3
1983	3	2	2,156	7	38	−10.9	0/0
1984	3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0
1985	3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2
1986	3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1
1987	3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2
1988	3	3	4,872	0	27	−47.8	0/0
1989	3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1
1990	3	3	7,601	10	78	−14.0	0/3
1991	3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0
1992	3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1
1993	3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2
1994	3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0
1995	3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2
1996	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3
1997	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3
1998	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0
1999	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5
2000	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4
2001	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	1/2
2002	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8
2003	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5
2004	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15
2005	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5
2006	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4
2007	3	8	25,857	651	329	33.0*	0/4
Total or average	2.9	5.9	9,283	32.9	90.4	44.7	0.3/2.4

Notes:
Direction Setting:
References to Core Values = Number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.
Delivery:
Compliance = Scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis.
Compliance scores from 1996 to 2007 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. The score for 2007 is the interim score for that year and is not included in the overall or cycle average.

Appendix C: G8 Parliamentarians' Performance

Meeting	1	2	3
Date	September 8, 2002	September 9, 2003	September 11–12, 2004
Location	Kingston, Canada	Paris, France	Chicago, United States
Host	Milliken	Debré	Hastert
Participants	7	7	NA
Documents	1	1	1
Deliberation	14,979*	NA	NA
Purpose	North America	NA	NA
Agenda	Democracy and terrorism	Parliamentary scrutiny and funding of political activities	Ensuring the uninterrupted work of the parliaments during crises and strengthening the institutions that support parliamentary activities
Outcome	"democracies had to be strengthened to combat terrorism."	Democracy and parliamentary activities need to be made livelier to meet citizens' expectations.	NA

Meeting	4	5	6
Date	June 6–7, 2005	September 15–16, 2006	May 30–31, 2007
Location	Edinburgh, Scotland	St. Petersburg, Russia	Berlin, Germany
Host	Martin	Gryzlov	Lanker (European Union) and Pfeiffer (Germany)
Participants	80	NA	130-150+
Documents	1	1	1
Deliberation	1,698	NA	1,789
Purpose	Conference designed to help parliamentarians maximize their influence, and that of the hundreds and thousands of constituents they represent, at the G8 Summit.	NA	NA
Agenda	Development challenges in Africa and the report by the Commission for Africa	International legal aspects of global energy security and the fight against terrorism and the links to illegal immigration	Economic rewards of investing in HIV/AIDS prevention and health
Outcome	"Clear sense of direction on the implementation, monitoring and ongoing support of the G8 summit commitments."	Agreed to create a consultative council to study energy technology and resources; to exchange legal documents relating to anti-terrorism and illegal migration; to a come up with a common provision of high-level security regarding non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Agreed that human trafficking needs a coordinated effort.	Recommendations for the G8 summit in June 2007, with a focus on HIV prevention by linking sexual and reproductive health services on HIV/AIDS programs.

Notes:
Deliberation = Total number of words in the G8 parliaments' declaration for the year in question. For 2002, the transcript of the discussion was used instead of the declaration.

Appendix D: New G8 Leaders Legislative Experience

Year	Leader	Member of federal legislature	Member of sub-federal legislature	Finance	Foreign	Health	Envir-onment	Trade	Other
1975	Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (France)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
1975	Helmut Schmidt (Germany)	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	1
1975	Aldo Moro (Italy)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
1975	Takeo Miki (Japan)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1975	Harold Wilson (United Kingdom)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1975	Gerald Ford (United States)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	Pierre Elliot Trudeau (Canada)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1976	James Callaghan (United Kingdom)	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
1977	Guilio Andreotti (Italy)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
1977	Takeo Fukuda (Japan)	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
1977	Jimmy Carter (United States)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	Roy Jenkins (European Commission)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	Joe Clark (Canada)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	Masayoshi Ohira (Japan)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1979	Margaret Thatcher (United Kingdom)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1980	Francesco Cossiga (Italy)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
1981	François Mitterand (France)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1981	Giovanni Spadolini (Italy)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1981	Zenko Suzuki (Japan)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	Ronald Reagan (United States)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1981	Gaston Thorn (European Commission)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1982	Wilfried Martens (European Union)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	Helmut Kohl (Germany)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	Amintore Fanfani (Italy)	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	1
1983	Yasuhiro Nakasone (Japan)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1984	Bettino Craxi (Italy)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1985	Brian Mulroney	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Year	Name								
	(Canada)								
1985	Jacques Delors (European Commission)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	Ruud Lubbers (European Union)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1988	Ciriaco de Mita (Italy)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1988	Noboru Takeshita (Japan)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
1989	Sousuke Uno (Japan)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
1989	George H. W. Bush (United States)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1990	Toshiki Kaifu (Japan)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1991	John Major (United Kingdom)	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
1992	Kiichi Miyazawa (Japan)	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	1
1993	Kim Campbell (Canada)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1993	Carlo Azeglio Ciampi (Italy)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1993	Bill Clinton (United States)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	Jean Chrétien (Canada)	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
1994	Silvio Berlusconi (Italy)	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	1
1994	Tomiichi Murayama (Japan)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	Boris Yeltsin (Russia)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1995	Jacques Chirac (France)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1995	Lamberto Dini (Italy)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	Jacques Santer (European Commission)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	Romano Prodi (Italy)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1996	Ryutaro Hashimoto (Japan)	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	1
1997	Tony Blair (United Kingdom)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1997	Wim Kok (European Union)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	Gerhard Schröder (Germany)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	Massimo D'Alema (Italy)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1999	Keizo Obuchi (Japan)	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
2000	Giuliano Amato (Italy)	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	1
2000	Yoshiro Mori (Japan)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
2000	Vladimir Putin (Russia)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2000	Romano Prodi (European Commission)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Year	Name (Country)								
2001	Junichiro Koizumi (Japan)	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
2001	George W. Bush (United States)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2003	Konstantinos Simitis (European Union)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	Paul Martin (Canada)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
2004	Bertie Ahern (European Union)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2005	Jose Manuel Barroso (European Commission)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	Angela Merkel (Germany)	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
2006	Stephen Harper (Canada)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	Matti Vanhanen (European Union)	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
2007	Nicolas Sarkozy (France)	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Shinzo Abe (Japan)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

Notes:
Includes only individuals who attended G8 summits as leaders of their country.
Includes individuals from each country and the European Union who have attended the annual G8 summit for the first time as leader of their respective countries.
Member of federal legislature: Refers to whether the individual served as member of parliament or governor in a presidential system. For the European Union it refers to whether or not the individual has served in the European Parliament.
Member of sub-federal legislature: Refers to whether the individual served time as member of provincial or state government or as senator in a presidential system. For the European Union it refers to whether the leader has served in his or her national government.
Finance, Foreign, Health, Environment, Trade, Other: Numbers indicate whether a leader has experience in that ministry or area. It does not account for time frame or number of times serving in that portfolio. Refers only to experience prior to being a leader. For the European Union it refers to portfolio experience within the European Union itself.