

**A Promising Push:
Complying with the Gleneagles G8 Africa Commitments
and Parliamentarians' Role**

DRAFT

Dr. John Kirton
Director
G8 Research Group
University of Toronto
john.kirton@utoronto.ca

Paper prepared for a conference on “Partnership Beyond 2005: The Role of Parliamentarians in Implementing NEPAD Commitments,” Sponsored by the Parliamentary Seminar on Africa, European Parliamentarians for Africa, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (UK), the British group Inter-Parliamentary Union, the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group, the British Council and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, The British Museum, London, England, 19-22 October, 2005. I gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the research on which this paper is based, for the research assistance of Dr. Ella Kokotsis, Laura Sunderland and Lindsay Doyle, for the compliance assessments of Taleen Jakujyan, Kathryn Kotris, Michael Lehan, Jelena Madunic, Francesca Mattacchione, Krystal Monpetit, Yumiko Nishikawa, Stanislav Orlov, Abby Slinger, Jacqueline Stillman and Danielle Takacs, and for the contribution of other members and analysts of the G8 Research Group. Version of October 21st.

Executive Summary

The Gleneagles G8 Summit provided a promising push toward compliance with its many ambitious African-related commitments but the G8 will have to be pushed by its leaders, citizens and parliamentarians to complete the job. The promising push comes firstly from the G8's respectable, rising record in complying with its African commitments over the past decade and the way its highest country complier, Britain, produced African-related commitments in 2005 that build directly on this platform from the past. It comes secondly from the priority the Gleneagles G8 gave to its African commitments, as priority placement has proven to be a potent compliance catalyst in the past. It comes thirdly from the way the G8 has taken charge in the three months since Gleneagles to ensure the fulfillment of the foundational debt cancellation commitment, by acting through the multilateral organizations it controls — the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank — to get the job done. It comes fourthly from the way many consequential G8 countries have started to move in the first three months after Gleneagles to fulfill its priority “top ten” African commitments. And it comes fifthly from the way Russia is already taking up the Gleneagles African agenda as it prepares with determination to host its first-ever regular G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006.

Yet amidst all this promise, there remain real doubts that the G8 will deliver in full on all its Africa commitments without an additional push. No past G8 summit has ever delivered fully on all its promises. Absent from the Gleneagles African commitments placed as a priority were the specified agents the leaders wanted to do the implementing work. The United Nations Millennium Development Review Summit saw few new actions to offer more aid from G8 members. It also produced few meaningful moves toward development friendly trade liberalization to help deliver the overdue Doha Development Agenda after its missed deadline of January 1, 2005, and before its fast approaching World Trade Organization ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005. On many of the top ten African commitments early, visible compliant action remains absent on the part of some G8 countries Africa has counted on in the past. And Russia still has much to do to adjust to Africa's agenda as robustly as the past five G8 summits have.

Thus the G8 needs a push to get the Gleneagles promises on and to Africa properly fulfilled. And as a critical part of this process, parliamentarians in the G8 members and their African partners can and should play a significantly stronger part than they have thus far.

Introduction

By most measures, the G8 Summit held at Gleneagles, Scotland from July 6-8, 2005 was the most successful summit ever in the entire 31-year life of the annual event. In their three days concentrated collective effort, propelled by the unprecedented Make Poverty History campaign, Live 8 concerts, and terrorist attacks in the G8 host country during the summit, the G8 leaders at Gleneagles put in one of the best performances ever on deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, and the development of global governance. They also set new summit records for domestic political management and new money mobilized. Much of this success flowed from the determination and skill of host Tony Blair in focusing the summit's agenda and achievements on his two central priorities of developing Africa and controlling climate change.

Yet as the most powerful democratically elected leaders of the world's most powerful democratic polities descended from their summit to return to routine politics at home, they faced the predictable protests from their own media, citizens and others that their summit was just another high profile "photo op" whose historic promises would not be kept. Such skepticism was understandable. For 31 years of summit history show that promises made do not translate automatically and easily into promises kept in full during the following year, before the summit leaders re-assemble to make promises yet again. Indeed, the available evidence shows that compliance with summit commitments varies widely by year, by issue and by country. Some summits such as Okinawa 2000 secured very high compliance while others performed very poorly as their members rushed off to do the opposite of the promises solemnly sworn. Moreover, despite a solid base of evidence and analysis on compliance with G7/8 commitments, and adequate explanations of the causes of high summit performance in most of the G8's other governance functions, there is yet no acceptable causal model of what makes a summit a high-complying success. Nor is there any hard evidence or analysis on what parliamentarians have done, or could do, to help their leaders and voters ensure that G8 summit promises made become promises kept.

This paper assembles and analyses the available evidence on compliance with G8 commitments related to Africa in order to provide a social scientific foundation for suggesting what is being done and what should be done to fulfill the Gleneagles G8 promises on Africa, and what role parliamentarians might play in this task. It first reviews the record of G8 compliance with its priority African commitments from the start of the fourth seven-year summit cycle in 1996 through to the American-hosted Sea Island summit in 2004. It secondly assesses what components of G8 commitments have catalyzed compliance in the past and how richly the 2005 Gleneagles G8 African commitments contain the compliance-catalysts that have been proven to work. It thirdly examines in general terms how the great Gleneagles African achievements on debt, aid and trade are being implemented, especially as the multilateral, highly organized and legalized hard law system of the United Nations summit in New York in early September, the IMF and World Bank ministerial meetings in Washington in late September and the forthcoming WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December help or hinder the Gleneagles delivery task. It fourthly provides a preliminary first quarter report on compliance with the Gleneagles "top ten" African priority commitments, to assess in more detail the compliance of G8 members in the three months from July 9 to October 9, 2005. It fifthly looks ahead to Russia's plans for the G8 Summit it will host in St. Petersburg, probably from July 15-17, to see how much and how Africa will remain alive on the Russian summit agenda and thus help leaders live up to last year's promises just before they meet one another face to face once again. The paper concludes by suggesting, on the basis of this evidence and analysis, what the priorities for African related implementing action are, and what role parliamentarians might play in this task. Throughout this study concentrates on the compliance record and dynamics of the G8's four non-European members of the United States, Japan, Canada and Russia, and the role of the G8 hosts of Britain in 2005 and Russia in 2006.

This study suggests that the Gleneagles G8 provided a promising push toward compliance with its many ambitious African-related commitments but that the G8 will have to be pushed by its leaders, citizens and parliamentarians to complete the job. The promising push comes firstly from the G8's respectable, rising record in complying with its African commitments over the past decade and the way its highest country complier, Britain, produced African-related commitments in 2005 that build directly on this platform from the past. It comes secondly from the priority the Gleneagles G8 gave to its African commitments, as priority placement has proven to be a potent compliance catalyst in the past. It comes thirdly from the way the G8 has taken charge in the three months since Gleneagles to ensure the fulfillment of the foundational debt cancellation commitment, by acting through the multilateral organizations it controls — the IMF and the World Bank — to get the job done. It comes fourthly from the way many consequential G8 countries have started to move in the first three months after Gleneagles to fulfill its priority "top ten" African commitments. And it comes fifthly from the way Russia is already taking up the Gleneagles African agenda as it prepares with determination to host its first-ever regular G8 Summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006.

Yet amidst all this promise, there remain real doubts that the G8 will deliver in full on all its Africa commitments without an additional push. No past G8 Summit has ever delivered fully on all its promises. Absent from the Gleneagles African commitments placed as a priority were the specified agents the leaders wanted to do the implementing work. The UN Millennium Development Review Summit saw few new actions to offer more aid from G8 members. It also produced few meaningful moves toward development friendly trade liberalization to help deliver the overdue Doha Development Agenda after its missed deadline of January 1, 2005, and before its fast approaching WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005. On many of the top ten African commitments early, visible compliant action remains absent on the part of some G8 countries Africa has counted on in the past. And Russia still has much to do to adjust to Africa's agenda as robustly as the past five G8 summits have.

Thus the G8 needs a push to get the Gleneagles promises on and to Africa properly fulfilled. And as a critical part of this process, parliamentarians in the G8 members and their African partners can and should play a significantly stronger part than they have thus far.

1. Past Performance: The Respectable, Rising Record

The first way the Gleneagles G8 provided a promising push was by producing African commitments that build directly on those that generated the G8's respectable, rising record of compliance during the previous eight years and more.

An initial indication of the likely compliance of G8 members with their Gleneagles Africa commitments comes from the record of compliance that the G8 has produced over its previous 30 years. For strong performance in the past provides both a platform and momentum that tend to propel high performance in the year ahead. It gives leaders and participants familiarity with the issue and experience in moving the relevant files forward, generates an upward spiral of self confidence and expectations, puts in place processes that make future performance easier, and can inspire external monitors in the media, NGO's and Parliaments to encourage the leaders to comply with their commitments in the months ahead.

The dean of G8 Summit scholars, Sir Nicholas Bayne, has highlighted how iteration has been a key cause of successful Summit performance (Bayne, 1999). The G8 has continuously dealt with Africa, and the same African-related issues, since 1988. Moreover, uniquely in the 31 year history of the Summit, all the same leaders have come to each of the past five Summits. The one exception, Canada's Paul Martin, who first came in 2004, had participated in the G7 Finance ministers' process and Summit as Canada's finance minister since 1994.

At Gleneagles, the leaders made a direct connection between past and present by once again giving centrestage to the African agenda, and by basing this agenda firmly on the revolutionary seven-step strategy for the twenty-first century that the new Africa adopted and the G8 accepted in 2002. That strategy — which was affirmed in NEPAD, the G8 Africa Action Plan, at subsequent summits, in the Commission for Africa report, and at Gleneagles — had a clear, sequentially important seven steps, as follows:

1. Peace
2. Governance
3. Confidence
4. Investment
5. Trade
6. Debt
7. Aid

With its faithful reiteration of this strategy, the Gleneagles G8 inherited the momentum from the G8's long-term and recent record of respectable and rising compliance with its Africa-related commitments. During the first two Summit cycles and cold war era from 1975 to 1989, Summit members complied with their development assistance, or "Aid and Schedules" commitments to a modest degree. Their average score was +27%, on a scale that runs from -100% to +100% (Von Furstenberg and Daniels 1993). While this aid compliance record was a little below the overall Summit average of +32% during those years, the Aid and Schedules issue area ranks fifth among ten issue areas, ahead of fiscal adjustment and demand composition. The reasons for this mediocre compliance may lie in the fact that implementing behaviour requires direct expenditure outlays from government budgets to meet costly targets. They are also beyond direct government control when ODA targets are expressed as a ratio of GNP, as the government has limited control over what the latter will be.

During the initial post cold war period from 1988-1995, debt relief for the poorest replaced aid as the centerpiece of the G7's African agenda. And here, there was much higher compliance on the part of Canada and the USA, who produced a combined performance of +73% Kokotsis (1999). Canada received a perfect score of +100%, while the US secured a score of +46%. Within the period, as the cold war ended, the US compliance record improved, reaching +100% from 1993 on. Debt relief promises thus proved easy for the G7 to deliver on from an early stage.

During the period of rapid globalization, from 1996 to 2004, G8 members made African-related commitments across a now much broader range of issue areas. Their compliance with them averaged +35%. This was lower than the overall Summit average of +44% for these years. But it was notably higher than the +27% the Summit had produced on aid alone in its first 15 years. Moreover, as Appendix A indicates, compliance with African-related commitments generally rose from 1996 to the most recent 2004-5 full year. There was a major jump in 2001. It was sustained save for the single dip in 2002-3 when the Summit was divided by its internal, UN-exacerbated political war over the war in Iraq. Even with this one year interruption, since George Bush first arrived at the Summit in 2001, the members' compliance with their African commitments has averaged +47%. This is a level almost equal to the summit's overall compliance record of +48% during this time. Indeed during the nine years since 1996, the highest compliance with African commitments, at a level of +57%, has come in response to those commitments made at the summit George Bush hosted at Sea Island in 2004. It appears that George Bush's America in the G8 and America's G8 have come through for Africa rather well.

Among the various African-related issue areas, debt relief for the poorest (as from 1988 to 1995), the environment, conflict prevention and health stand out as the areas where the highest compliance has most consistently come since 1996. In contrast, trade and development assistance do very poorly indeed.

<i>Issue¹</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Number Assessed</i>
Health	+88%	2
<i>HIV/AIDS</i>	+72%	2
Conflict Prevention	+56%	3
Environment	+55%	6
Trade	+29%	8
Development	-25%	4
<i>ODA</i>	+69%	2
<i>Education</i>	+61%	2
<i>Debt of the Poorest</i>	+50%	7

Across the member countries over this most recent nine full-year period, the average compliance on African commitments shows several patterns.

<i>Member</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Number Assessed</i>
EU	+72%	11
UK	+71%	42
Canada	+71%	42
France	+52%	42
Germany	+51%	41
United States	+50%	42
Japan	+36%	42
Italy	+21%	39
Russia	+07%	28
Pacific 3	+52%	
Pacific 4	+41%	
European 4	+49%	
Euro 5 (EU)	+53%	

First, all countries' compliance with the G8 African commitments is in the positive range. This suggests that these G8 summits are worth doing and devoting to Africa where delivery is concerned.

Second, a top-tier group composed of the European Union (EU), Britain and Canada, with a compliance level of about +71%. There is a middle tier of France, Germany and the United States, with a compliance level of about +51%. There is a lower tier of Japan, Italy and Russia, with a compliance level ranging from +36% to +7%.

This information also suggests several conclusions about the causes of compliance with G8 commitments.

First, the parliamentary-cabinet system of government makes a big, positive difference, especially when it operates free from formal coalition government, intense informal factions, and minority government. Such cohesive cabinet governments can uniquely have their executive branch leader commit his or her country at a Summit table with a high degree of confidence that he or she can control the legislature to make sure conforming implementing action will come within the following year. It is this attribute which

¹ Excludes issue areas or issues assessed in only one year.

unites Britain and Canada at the high complying top, both in regard to their African-related compliance from 1996 to 2005 and in their overall score, well beyond Africa, in the full 31 years from 1975 to 2005.

Second, international institutional affiliation seems to make a difference. The institutions that seem to matter most are the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. For these link high complying Britain and mid level France respectively with the African countries that numerically loom larger in both institutions. Both link Canada, the world's leading bilingual English-French country with Africa, the world's leading bilingual English-French continent. The fact that both Britain and Canada regularly sit at the high complying top, both on overall and African-related commitments, may also distinguish the Commonwealth from the Francophonie as the premier institution, given the greater global reach which the former has by virtue of India, Australia, South Africa and other consequential countries as important members there. The EU as an international institution looms less large. While the EU as a separate actor complies highly and leads the list, it does not compel its four G8 members to comply to an equally and consistently high degree. Finally G7 membership seems to matter. The older members (if not the founding four or five or six) comply higher than the newest member, Russia, which notably lags.

Third, relative capability seems to have restricted relevance. The most powerful members of the G8, the US and Germany, come in the middle, with Japan behind. Yet both relatively big Britain and relatively small Canada stand together at the top.

Finally, geography does not matter. There is no notable difference between the essentially European and geographically largely non-European members of the G8. Nor does proximity to Africa matter. As distant Britain and Canada have high compliance and proximate Italy low compliance. The imperial-colonial experience seems equally irrelevant. Non-imperial Canada ranks high and imperial Italy low.

2. Commitment Credibility for Compliance: The Gleneagles Promise

The second way the Gleneagles G8 provided a promising push was by including in its major African commitments the one component proven to have most catalyzed high compliance in the past.

A. Proven Compliance Catalysts in the Past, 1996-2004

In making collective commitments, on African-related and other subjects, the G8 leaders have regularly sought to enhance the likelihood of subsequent compliance with them by including within the individual commitment itself components they judge to be catalysts of compliance action. Eight such "compliance catalysts" have featured prominently: 1. priority placement in the chair's statement or the introductory "chapeau" of the main Summit Communiqué; 2. the inclusion of a specified, often numerical welfare target or objective; 3. the inclusion of a similarly specific numerical timetable for action or accomplishment; 4. a remit mandate committing the leaders to re-examine the commitment, its implementing action or accomplishment at a subsequent Summit; 5. mobilized money that dedicates specific or additional monetary resources or the equivalent to the commitment; 6. a specified agent or agency as the individual, country, group or other actor to do, take charge of, or otherwise be responsible for compliance and/or implementing action; 7. a G8-centered body at the ministerial, official or multi-stakeholder level to be responsible for implementing actions; and 8. another international institution, of plurilateral or multilateral but not G8-centered membership, similarly responsible for ensuring compliance.

From 1996 to 2004, in the commitments for which compliance data is available, all of these eight compliance catalysts have been used by G8 leaders every year (Appendix E). The most frequently used compliance catalysts every year and overall are, in order: priority placement, other international institutions, specified agency, timetables, and G8-centered bodies.

The data further suggest that in this decade-long preference pattern, G8 leaders are being only partly rational, in that only some of their favoured, most frequently chosen, compliance catalysts have actually proven to work. By far the most potent has been priority placement. It is followed in turn by specified agency and, less clearly, timetables, targets and remit mandates. There is no evidence that other international institutions and G8-bodies make any difference at all. Indeed, a preliminary analysis of this data shows that priority placement and specified agency are the only compliance catalysts contemporary G8 leaders can really count on to have their collective will realized in the real world.

B. Compliance Catalysts in the Gleneagles G8 African Commitments

It is this good news for Africa that the Gleneagles G8 gave priority placement to its African-related commitments across a broad range. Of the 14 commitments in the Gleneagles Chair's Statement binding all G8 members, a full 10 dealt with Africa.² These covered the issue-areas of trade, with three commitments, aid, with two, and debt, with one. They also embraced, with one commitment apiece, the issue-areas of peacekeeping, democracy, health-education, and investment-infrastructure. These ten commitments, covering seven issue-areas, were also offered in the Chair's Summary in an order that reflected the philosophy and strategy of NEPAD, the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan, and the 2005 report of the Commission for Africa (2005). Also promising was the fact that the priority placements were forward-looking and strategic. They emphasized, in at least three of the ten commitments, the vital lever of trade and hence the critical Hong Kong ministerial meeting of the WTO's Doha Development Round in December of 2005.

Beyond this great promise, however, there is a glaring gap in that none of the priority African commitments contain a specified agent identified to get the work done. To be sure, an actual recommitment in the Chair's Summary is a very strong form of recommitment. Moreover, some of the critical cognate African-related commitments in the component documents are replete with specified agents and other compliance catalysts. And the six debt, aid and trade commitments in the Chair's summary may implicitly contain specified agents, given the centrality of the UN Millennium Review Summit in September, the G7-IMF-World Bank meetings in September and the WTO meeting in December to the accomplishment of these commitments. But if this reliance on an implicit logic of "leave it to the established hard law multilaterals" is correct, the prospects are even more unpromising. For the choice of non-G8-centered other international institutions has proven to be a compliance catalyst that does not work.

3. The Great Gleneagles Debt-Aid-Trade Trilogy: Progress and Prospects

The third way the Gleneagles G8 provided a promising push was by having the G8 itself take charge in the three months since the Summit, within the multilateral system, so ensure that compliance with the first, foundational debt commitment came.

² This is a very strong form of priority placement, a recommitment.

Notwithstanding the interlinked breadth of the Gleneagles Chair’s Summary and the other G8 documents on Africa, the centrepiece of Gleneagles commitments and legacy came in the great trilogy of debt, aid and trade. A general review of what G8 governments have done to deliver them during the three months since the Summit ended shows a very mixed record. They have done very well in delivering debt relief, very poorly in delivering additional aid, and rather poorly in delivering more liberalized trade.

Across this very mixed pattern arises a clear pattern. Where the G8 is in the control of the multilateral organizations in formal charge of implementing action, and where the G8 has mobilized the political will and collective action to use this institutional power for G8 purposes, then high compliance quickly comes. This is seen in the G8-delivered September success on debt through the G7 Finance Ministers forum, the IMFC, the IMF and World Bank. It has also been seen in the September failure on aid at the UN where G8 members are not institutionally in control. It currently promises to produce a failure on trade at the WTO in December, unless the G8 moves quickly to take charge.

This present and prospective failure of the non-G8 guided multilateral organizations designed in the 1940s suggests the value of strengthening G8-centred institutions and giving them a more direct role in the compliance and implementation task. They could usefully be built on a more multistakeholder basis, with parliamentarians giving a greater role.

4. The Gleneagles First Quarter Compliance Report

The fourth promising push is the way many consequential G8 countries have already started to move during the first quarter after Gleneagles to fulfill its priority “top ten” African commitments.

A. The Overall First Quarter Performance

In the three months following the end of the Gleneagles Summit, the available evidence suggests that the nine G8 members have complied with their top ten Africa commitments at an average level of zero percent (see Appendix F). This suggests a reasonable start to the yearly compliance challenge. However, as no previous first-quarter compliance assessments have been conducted, it is difficult to judge how this would compare with a normal post-summit compliance cadence or with the G8 records in past years.

Those seeing this zero percent score as a reasonably good and fast start could point to the fact that it was done during a time when the summit planning teams and member countries went on vacation after the frenzy of summit preparations and delivery, when foreign services were conducting their annual rotation of personnel, and before governments and legislatures returned to begin their annual routines in the early autumn months.

Those seeing this zero percent as a disappointingly low and slow start could point to several factors. First, it came at time when the G8 had the unusual, once-in-a-half-decade benefit of the UN summit in New York. Second, previous G8 summits have seen their leaders return to make quick additional financial commitments from their “priorities reserves” to meet their new promises. Third, the great 2002-03 compliance dip, due to intra-G8 divisions over the spring 2003 war in Iraq shows the importance of quick front-end-loaded Q1 compliance rather than leaving it to the last quarters, when there is maximum time for extraneous forces to intrude and harm to normal compliance dynamic.

Issue Area		Actor
<i>Overall Average</i>	<i>-001 (-0005)</i>	<i>Overall Average</i>
High Compliers		High Compliers

Debt Cancellation	+100	U.S. (10)	+50%
Aid Doubling	+25	Japan (10)	+30%
Export Subsidies	+25	Mid Compliers	
Health	+17	UK (2)	0%
Mid Compliers		Germany (2)	0%
Extra Resources	0	France (2)	0%
LDC Products	0	Italy (2)	0%
Infrastructure	0	Low Compliers	
Low Compliers		Russia (10)	-20%
Conclude Doha	-50	Canada (10)	-20%
Peacekeeping	-75	EU (3)	-25%
Democracy	-80		

B. By Issue

A review of first-quarter compliance with the top ten African commitments by issue suggests three clusters of issues. First, high compliance has come in order on debt cancellation, health, aid doubling and agricultural export subsidies. Second, mid-level compliance averaging zero has with regard to extra resources, LDC products and infrastructure. Third, low compliance, all in the negative range, has come on the commitments to conclude Doha and promote peacekeeping and democracy in Africa. In all, the pattern shows a great inversion of the seven-step strategy most recently encoded in the Gleneagles chair's statement. Compliance is lowest with those commitments — democracy and peacekeeping — where the Gleneagles seven-point strategy starts.

C. By Country

A review of the first-quarter compliance with the top ten African commitments by G8 member also suggests three clusters of compliance. High compliance, all in the positive range, has come unusually from the compliance leaders U.S. and Japan. Mid-level compliance, all neutral, comes from the four European countries, including Britain as host (although the number of cases is much lower here). Low compliance, all in the negative range, has come from Russia and, unusually, Canada and the EU as well. There is thus a second great inversion, as the high-complying G8 members that Africa has traditionally relied on — Canada and the EU — stand at the very bottom of the list.

5. The Russian Reinforcement for St. Petersburg 2006

The fifth promising push is the way Russia is already taking up the Gleneagles African agenda as it prepares with determination to host its first ever regular G8 Summit in July 2006.

In the spring of 2005, when the Russians first started seriously to develop their strategic plan for their summit, all signs were that Africa would be absent both from the substantive agenda and from the outreach leaders invited to participate in the event. And most outsiders felt Russia lacked the interest in and historical connection with Africa that the recent G8 hosts of Britain, France and Canada had. Few remembered that George Bush's America had similarly started to plan a 2004 summit that was absent of Africa, but eventually produced one whose African accomplishments and attendance were greater even than those of the Americans' new priority on the broader Middle East.

But by mid autumn 2005 there were several signs that the Russians were following even faster the Americans' cadence as incoming host and adjusting their summit to the Africa agenda that had long had prominence at the G8.

First, President Putin, in his news conference at the conclusion of the Gleneagles Summit, made it clear that he intended to mobilize the largest legacy of personal, educational contacts Russia had cultivated with Africa during the many decades of the Cold War.

Second, by the late summer of 2005, Russia's summit planners had added to their prospective St. Petersburg agenda two African issues — African peacekeeping and development. Importantly, African peacekeeping is the G8 Africa Action Plan's first priority, an area where first-quarter compliance with the Gleneagles commitment is weak, and an area where Russian capacity is strong. It is thus a good three-way match.

Third, Russia's broader prospective agenda for St. Petersburg — starting with energy, education and health — fits well with the G8's African priorities over the past five years. Moreover, the environment, health and conflict prevention — the historic cognates or equivalents of the Russian priorities of energy, health and African peacekeeping — are the areas where the G8 produced the highest compliance from 1996 to 2004.

6. Conclusions

In conclusion, this analysis suggests three substantive areas for priority attention in the years ahead, and four institutional instruments through which parliamentarians can play a stronger, well-targeted role.

A. Priorities Areas

The first substantive priority is to focus on the first four of the seven-step strategy, starting with peace and order, followed by good governance.

The second is to broaden the priority of peace beyond peacekeeping to conflict prevention in full form, as outlined by the Commission for Africa Report and the G8's own emphasis from 1999 to 2002 (Kirton and Stefanova 2003). Here the EU in particular has an important contribution to make (Kirton 2004).

The third is to reinforce the gender equality dimension, which had a late start in G8, and was absent from the Gleneagles top ten African commitments.

B. Parliamentarians' Role

In considering the institutional instruments through which parliamentarians might play a stronger role in ensuring compliance with commitments and these and other priorities, there is a foundational starting point. It is the core mission and founding to promote the values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance on a global scale. In all G8 countries, the promotion of open democracy is as much or more the preserve of the legislature as of the executive branch.

With this central principle providing legitimacy, it is useful to take several modest, incremental steps, building directly on what has been done before. These steps should be taken with Russian and Francophonie parliamentarians more robustly brought in.

The first institutional step is to undertake parallel parliamentary committee reviews of compliance with the Gleneagles African-related commitment by mid or late spring of 2006.

The second constitutional step is to conduct a collective parliamentarians assessment. This would share and compare both methods and results, identify best practices on both fronts, and come to consensus on the state of affairs and how best to proceed.

The third step is to broaden the G8 parliamentary speakers institution that started in 2002, and the fourth step is to make this event an annual one, to ensure that the world has a reliable assessment during the critical first quarter after the annual G8 summit has been held.

References

- Bayne, Nicholas (1999), "Continuity and Leadership in an Age of Globalisation," in Michael Hodges and John Kirton, eds. (1999), *The G8's Role in the New Millennium* (Aldershot: Ashgate), 21-45.
- Commission for Africa (2005), *Our Common Interest: The Commission for Africa, An Argument* (London: Penguin).
- Hodges, Michael, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds. (1999), *The G8's Role in the New Millennium* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Kirton, John (2005), "America at the G8 Summit: From Vulnerability to Victory at the Sea Island Summit," in Michele Fratianni et al, eds. (2005), *New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8* (Aldershot: Ashgate), 31-51.
- Kirton, John (2004), "Co-operation Between the EU and G8 in Conflict Prevention," in Jan Wouters and Vincent Kronenberger, eds., *Conflict Prevention: Is the European Union Ready?* (TMC Asser Press, 2004).
- Kirton, John and Radoslava Stefanova (2003), *The G8, the UN and Conflict Prevention* (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Kokotsis, Eleonore (1999), *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995* (New York: Garland).
- Von Furstenberg, George and Joseph Daniels (1991), "Policy Undertakings by the Seven 'Summit' Countries: Ascertaining the Degree of Compliance," *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series of Public Policy* 35: 267-308, North Holland.

Appendix A:
G8 Compliance with Africa Commitments, 1996-2004³

Issue-Area	1996-7 Lyon	1997-8 Denver	1998-9 Birm.	1999-0 Koln	2000-1 Okin.	2001-2 Genoa	2002-3 Kanan.	2003-4 Evian	2004-5 Sea Isl.	Ave.
TOTAL (based on average of n)	+36.2% (22)	+12.8% (6)	+31.8% (6)	+38.2% (6)	+81.4% (13)	+49.5% (17)	+35% (13)	+51% (12)	+55% (18)	
Average Africa	+14% (3)	+25% (2)	+44% (3)	+15% (2)	+33% (5)	+56% (6)	+29% (9)	+45% (5)	+57% (10)	+35%
ECONOMIC ISSUES										
Trade	+0.29	-	+0.33	-0.57	+1.00	+0.88	-0.13 (+0.14)	-0.38 (-0.25)	+0.88 ⁴ (+1.00)	+29%
Technical Assistance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.56 (+0.22)	+56%
Agricultural	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.13 (0.0)	-	-	+13%
Development	0	0	-	-	-	0	-	-	-1.00	-50%
ODA							+0.50 (+0.50)	+0.88 (+0.88)		+69%
Debt of the Poorest/ HIPC	-	-	0	+0.86	0	+1.00	+0.25 (- 0.50)	+0.38 (0.0)	+1.00 (+1.00)	+50%
Education	-	-	-	-	-	+0.58	+0.63 ⁵	-	-	61%
Decision Points	-	-	-	-	-1.00	-	-	-	-	-100%
GLOBAL/TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES										
Environment	+0.14	+0.50	+1.00	-	-	+0.17	-	+0.50 (+0.88)	+1.00 (0.0)	+55%
Sustainable Agriculture	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.57 (0.0)	-	-	+57%
Health	-	-	-	-	+1.00	+0.75	-	-	-	+88%
HIV/AIDS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.88 (+0.88)	+0.56 (+0.33)	+72%
Polio	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.44 (0.0)	+44%
REGIONAL SECURITY										
Africa: (Darfur)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.89 (+0.78)	+89%
Good Governance	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.25 (+0.50)	-	-	+25%
Peer Review	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.00 (0.0)	-	-	0.0
Famine and Food Security	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+0.67 (+0.67)	+67%
Conflict Prevention	-	-	-	-	+0.63	-	+0.38 (+0.60)	-	+0.67 ⁶ (+0.44)	+56%
GOVERNANCE ISSUES										
UN Reform II (debt agenda)	+0.14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	+14%

³ Italicized sections are the interim compliance scores.

⁴ Trade: Doha Development Agenda

⁵ Africa: Education

⁶ Peace-building in Africa

Appendix B: Compliance with Africa Commitments, by Country, 1996-2004

	USA	Japan	Germany	Britain	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	EU	Ave.
1996:										
Trade	+1	+1	0	+1	0	-	0	-	-	+0.29
Development	0	+1	0	0	0	-	0	-	-	0.00
Environment	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	0	-	-	+0.14
UN Reform II	0	0	+1	-1	0	0	+1	-	-	+0.14
1997:										
Development	+1	0	+1	+1	-1	-1	-1	-	-	0.0
Environment	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0	+1	-	+0.50
1998:										
Trade	0	-1	-	+1	0	+1	+1	-	-	+0.33
HIPC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	0.0
Environment	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	+1.0
1999:										
Trade	0	+1	-1	-1	0	-1	0	-	0	-0.25
HIPC	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	-	+0.86
2000:										
Trade	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	-	+1.00
HIPC ⁷	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0
Decision Points ⁸	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.00
Health	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	-	+1.00
Conflict Prevention	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	0	-	+0.63
2001:										
Trade	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-	+0.88
Development										0.0
HIPC	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	-	+1.00
Education	0	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	-	-	+0.58
Environment ⁹	+0.17	0	+0.34	+0.17	+0.17	+0.17	+0.34	0	-	+0.17
Health	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	+0.75
2002:										
Trade	-1	-1	0	0	0	0	+1	0	-	-0.13
Agricultural Trade	0	0	0	0	0	0	+1	0	-	+0.13
ODA	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	0	-	+0.50
HIPC	0	-1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	-	+0.25
Education	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	-	+1	-1	-	+0.63
Sustainable Agriculture	0	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+1	-	-	+0.57
Good Governance	+1	0	0	+1	+1	-1	+1	-1	-	+0.25
Peer Review	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	0.0
Conflict Prevention	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	-	+0.38
2003:										
Trade	-1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	-	-0.38
Development (ODA)	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-	+0.88
HIPC	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	0	-	+0.38

⁷ No country-specific data on G8RG website, but there is an overall debt score of 0.0

⁸ No country-specific data on G8RG website, but there is an overall decision points score of -1.0

⁹ This data represents several environmental commitments undertaken, and thus is excluded from the calculation of the average country compliance score.

Environment	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	-	+0.50
Health	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-	+0.88
2004:										
Trade (Doha)	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	-	+1	+0.88
Technical Assistance	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	-1	+1	+0.56
Development	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1	-1.00
HIPC	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1.00
Environment	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1.00
HIV/AIDS	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+0.56
Polio	+1	0	+1	+1	-1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+0.44
Darfur	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.89
Famine	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	-1	+1	+0.67
Conflict Prevention	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.67
	USA	Japan	Germany	Britain	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	EU	
Ratio	21/42	15/42	21/41	30/42	22/42	8/39	30/42	2/28	8/11	
Average	50%	36%	51%	71%	52%	21%	71%	07%	72%	

Appendix C: Gleneagles African Top Ten Priority Commitments

Chair's Summary:

AFRICA AND DEVELOPMENT

1. Peacekeeping resources (Peacekeeping)

The G8 in return agreed a comprehensive plan to support Africa's progress. This is set out in our separate statement today. We agreed:

- *2005:3 - to provide extra resources for Africa's peacekeeping forces so that they can better deter, prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa*

2. Democracy, governance, corruption, & stolen assets (Democracy)

- *2005:4 - to give enhanced support for greater democracy, effective governance and transparency, and to help fight corruption and return stolen assets*

3. Health and education, HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and other (Health)

- *2005:5 - to boost investment in health and education, and to take action to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, TB and other killer diseases*

4. Growth, investment, trade capacity and infrastructure for business (Infrastructure)

- *2005: 6 - to stimulate growth, to improve the investment climate and to make trade work for Africa, including by helping to build Africa's capacity to trade and working to mobilise the extra investment in infrastructure which is needed for business*

5. Substantial extra resources for capable and committed countries (Extra Resources)

2005:7 - The G8 leaders agreed to back this plan with substantial extra resources for countries which have strong national development plans and are committed to good governance, democracy and transparency.

6. Double aid for Africa by 2010, at least \$25 billion extra a year for Africa (Double Aid)

2005:8 - We have agreed to double aid for Africa by 2010. Aid for all developing countries will increase, according to the OECD, by around \$50bn per year by 2010, of which at least \$25bn extra per year for Africa.

7. All debts of eligible HIPS to IDA, IMF, ADB cancelled (Debts cancelled)

2005: 12 - The G8 has also agreed that all of the debts owed by eligible heavily indebted poor countries to IDA, the International Monetary Fund and the African Development Fund should be cancelled, as set out in our Finance Ministers agreement on 11 June.

GLOBAL ECONOMY, OIL AND TRADE

8. Redouble effort to successfully conclude whole of the DDA (Conclude DDA)

2005: 13 - We agreed to redouble our efforts to achieve a successful conclusion across the whole of the Doha Development Agenda.

9. Open markets, reduce domestic subsidies, end all export subsidies by credible end date (End export subsidies)

2005: 14 - We reaffirmed our commitment to open markets more widely to trade in agricultural goods, industrial goods and services, and in agriculture to reduce trade distorting domestic subsidies and eliminate all forms of export subsidies by a credible end date.

10. Address products of least developed countries and ensure their flexibility on strategy (LDC products)

2005: 15 - We also committed to address products of interest to Least Developed Countries in the negotiations, and to ensure Least Developed Countries have the flexibility to decide their own economic strategies.

**Appendix D:
Gleneagles African Top Ten Commitments' Compliance Catalysts**

<i>¼ Interim Score</i>	<i>Commit ment</i>	<i>Issue Area</i>	<i>Target</i>	<i>Time- table</i>	<i>Remit Mandate</i>	<i>Money</i>	<i>Agent</i>	<i>G8- Centered Body</i>	<i>Int'l Institution</i>
	2005-3	Peace-keeping	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005-4	Democracy, governance, corruption	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005-5	Health & Education	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005-6	Growth, investment & trade	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005-7	Extra Resources	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005-8	Double Aid to Africa	(d)	A (d), 5 years	-	(d), \$25bn	-	C (d/g)	A (d/g)
	2005-12	Debt cancellation	(d)	-	-	-	-	C (d/g)	A (d/g)
	2005-13	DDA	-	-	-	-	-	-	B (d/g)
	2005-14	Open markets	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2005-15	LDC products	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Appendix E: Compliance Catalysts, 1996-2004

Highest 2 scores (n=55) v. Lowest 2 scores (n=37), annualized,¹⁰ total = 92

	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-centered Body	Int'l Institution	Priority Placement
Highest (n=55)	09%	31%	02%	02%	24%	22%	35%	44%
Lowest (n=37)	03%	11%	-	-	19%	16%	15%	24%
Total	12	42	2	2	43	38	50	68
Difference	06%	20%	02%	02%	05%	06%	20%	20%

All +1.00 scores (n=27) v. All -1.00 scores (n=5), not annualized, total = 32

	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-centered Body	Int'l Institution	Priority Placement
Highest (n=27)	15%	30%	04%	-	30%	26%	48%	67%
Lowest (n=5)	20%	20%	-	-	-	40%	60%	-
Total	35	50	04	-	30	66	108	67
Difference	-05%	-10%	04%	-	30%	-14%	-12%	67%

All Positive scores (n=114) v. All Negative scores (n=20), not annualized, total = 134

	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-centered Body	Int'l Institution	Priority Placement
Highest (n=114)	06%	24%	01%	02%	21%	18%	31%	50%
Lowest (n=20)	05%	15%	-	-	10%	20%	45%	20%
Total	11	39	1	2	31	38	76	70
Difference	01%	09%	01%	02%	11%	-02%	-14%	30%

All +1.00 (n=27) v. All Negative scores (n=20), not annualized, total = 47

	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-centered Body	Int'l Institution	Priority Placement
Highest (n=27)	15%	30%	04%	-	30%	26%	48%	67%
Lowest (n=20)	05%	15%	-	-	10%	20%	45%	20%
Total	20	45	04	-	40	46	93	87
Difference	10%	15%	04%	-	20%	06%	03%	47%

All +1.00 (n=27) v. All 0.0 (n=19) v. All Negative scores (n=20), not annualized, total = 66

	Target	Time-table	Remit Mandate	Money	Agent	G8-centered Body	Int'l Institution	Priority Placement
Highest (n=27)	15%	30%	04%	-	30%	26%	48%	67%
0.0 scores (n=19)	00%	16%	11%	-	26%	16%	26%	32%
Lowest (n=20)	05%	15%	-	-	10%	20%	45%	20%

¹⁰ Top 2 scores per year, reason for unequal number of commitments is that there were ties for the highest score (+1.00) per year.

Summary Table

	55 v. 37	27 v. 5	114 v. 20	27 v. 20	27 v. 19 v. 20
Priority Placement	20%	67%	30%	47%	67-32-20
Agent	05%	30%	11%	20%	30-26-10
Time-table	20%	(-10%)	09%	15%	30-16-15
Target	06%	(-05%)	01%	10%	15-00-05
Remit Mandate	02%	04%	01%	04%	04-11-00
Money Mobilized	02%	-	02%	-	00-00-00
G8-centered Body	06%	(-14%)	(-02%)	06%	26-16-20
International Institution	20%	(-12%)	(-14%)	03%	48-26-45

Definitions:

1. **Target:** A target is an attempt to achieve or move toward an identified and specific welfare target or general goal.
2. **Time-table:** A time-table is a specified date in which to achieve the target.
3. **Remit mandate:** is a commitment by the leaders to re-examine the issue at a subsequent Economic Summit.
4. **Money mobilized:** is a specified amount of new money (to be raised or budgeted) that is committed to an issue.
5. **Agent or agency:** is when the G8 designates a particular individual, country, group, etc. to take charge of the commitment.
6. **G8-centered ministerial or official level institution:** is a mention of an official level body, task force, expert group, etc. that is part of the G8-centered system.
7. **Other international institution:** is a mention of an international institution other than the G8 or G8-centered ministerials.
8. **Priority Placement** in Chairs Statement (2002-) or Summary (1990) or Communiqué chapeau (introduction or preamble), to deliberately give temporal primacy and prominence, and/or emphasis through repetition, and/or the direct authority of leaders to documents devised elsewhere.

Appendix F: First Quarter Compliance with Gleneagles Africa Commitments

Commitment	U.S.	JAP	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	CDA	RUS	EU	Ratio	Total
01 Peacekeeping	0	<i>0 (-1)</i>	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	-6/8	-75%
02 Democracy	-1	<i>-1 (0)</i>	-	0	-	-	-1	-	-1	-3/4	-75%
03 Health	(+1)	(+1)	0	0	0	-1	-1	(+1)	-	1/8	+17%
04 Infrastructure	+1	<i>+1</i>	-	-	-	-	-1	-1	-	0/4	0%
05 Extra Resources	+1	<i>+1</i> <i>(0)</i>	-	-	-	-	0	-1	-	0/3	0%
06 Double Aid	+1 ^a	+1 ^a <i>(0)</i>	-	-	-	-	0 ^a	<i>-1 (0)</i>	-	1/4	+25%
07 Cancel Debt	+1 ^b <i>(0)</i>	+1 ^b <i>(0)</i>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1 ^c	+1 ^a <i>(0)</i>	+1	6/6	+100%
08 Conclude Doha	<i>0</i> <i>(+1)</i>	-1 ^a <i>(+1)</i>	-	-	-	-	<i>0 (+1)</i>	0 ^a	-	-1/2	-50%
09 End Export Subsidies	+1 ^a <i>(0)</i>	0 ^a (-1) <i>(+1)</i>	-	-	-	-	0 ^c	0 ^b	-	1/4	+25%
10 LDC Products	0 ^a	0 ^b	-	-	-	-	0 ^a	0 ^a	-	0/4	0%
Ratio	5/10	3/10	0/2	0/2	0/2	0/2	-2/10	2/10	-1/4		
Total	+50%	+30%	0%	0%	0%	0%	-20%	-20%	-25%		

Note: Scores that appear in italics are those where the analysts have assigned different scores, and where no consensus has yet been reached. Therefore, these scores are not included when calculating the overall totals.

a = consensus on score reached by 2 analysts, working independently.

b = consensus on score reached by 3 analysts, working independently.

c = consensus on score reached by 4 analysts, working independently.

17 commitments have been agreed upon by 2 or more analysts, working independently.

7 commitments have been assigned divergent scores by 2 analysts, working independently.

21 scores have been compiled by only 1 analyst.