

Prospects for the G8 Sea Island Summit Seven Weeks Hence

[Professor John Kirton](#)
Director, G8 Research Group
University of Toronto

April 26, 2004

Paper prepared for a seminar at Armstrong Atlantic State University, Savannah, Georgia, April 22, 2003. The author gratefully acknowledges the research contribution of Nikolai Roudev and the G8 Research Group, and the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, through the “After Anarchy” project, for the research on which this paper is in part based. Revised on April 26, 2004.

Introduction

From June 8 to 10, 2004, President George Bush will host the 30th annual Summit of the Group of Eight major market democracies, at Sea Island, Georgia, in The Cloister. How successful is this Sea Island Summit likely to be? With only seven weeks left before the Summit opens, this is the question that is increasingly on the President’s — and everyone else’s — mind. It is a particularly important question for several reasons, including the still uncertain state of the war against terrorism, of the American and global economy, and of the American presidential election taking place a mere five months after the Summit ends.

Yet it is still a difficult question to answer confidently. The G8, unique among international institutions, is a system deliberately, designed, delivered and driven by leaders, who can and do determine — even during the Summit — what they want to discuss and decide. Without a formal legal charter or any international bureaucracy below, there is no one to tell these top leaders of the world’s most powerful countries what they must or should do. Among G8 leaders, U.S. presidents are historically the last to plan and prepare for the annual summit, and George Bush has proven to be been an all-American leader in this regard. Only once before, in 1976, has a U.S. president hosted a summit in a presidential elections year, and there are thus few guides for guessing how he will and should use this high-profile display of international leadership in global governance for maximum domestic electoral effect. More broadly, within the mainstream scholarly literature, there are now no fewer than nine major competing models that purport to explain what makes a G8 summit a high-performing success (Kirton 2004).

One of these nine offerings is the concert equality model, developed during the post-cold war years to explain the cadence of G8 governance for an ever-more complex, globalized world (Kirton 1989, 1993). This concert equality model is not one that most Americans found intuitively appealing during the post-cold war decade, at least until the September

11th terrorist attacks on America brought a new age. The model provides a portrait, not of “America the victorious” in the long cold war, but of “America the vulnerable” to elusive enemies who are everywhere, who kill Americas at home, and who require the full co-operation of all of America’s G8 allies to defeat. Getting the co-operation of this continuing, highly capable G8 “coalition of the willing” that one can count on requires an America willing to lead and act, but also to listen, learn and adjust to what the G8 allies want. Only then does effective G8-centred global governance flow forth, and America, its G8 partners, and the world as a whole emerge better off.

Will George Bush’s America pull off this difficult task of listening, learning and adjusting to the collective wisdom and will of the G8 as a whole? Even if Bush is personally reluctant to do so, will conditions in the world outside induce him co-operate, perhaps against his wishes, in his own country and in the light of the presidential election that looms? One answer comes from far-off history, for the last time a Republican president hosted a G8 Summit — at an upscale resort hotel on America’s Atlantic seaboard five months before the November presidential election — he went down to defeat.

Yet this unpromising precedent of Gerald Ford’s D-grade Puerto Rico Summit in 1976 comes from the very distant past. And, since then, the evidence strongly points in a different direction. During this time the G8, and America within it, has been on a strong upswing in its global governance performance, especially since the twenty-first century began. This promising 30-year past has been reinforced by the momentum from last year’s French-hosted Evian Summit, by U.S. plans and preparations for Sea Island, and by the conditions, deemed critical by the concert equality model, coming to dominate on the Summit’s eve.

Together, these forces suggest that Sea Island will be a successful, substantial, significant summit, worth about the B+ grade that G8 summits have usually earned in the past several years. However the success of this summit depends unusually on what its host, George Bush, decides what to do with it, and how to do it, in the next seven weeks and three days. There is thus a good chance that Sea Island could be a highly successful summit of truly historic significance, solving at last one of the most entrenched problems afflicting the global community for the past 56 years. Yet its highly ambitious, transformational, American agenda and game plan, if not exquisitely executed, could well lead to a failure even worse than that at Puerto Rico so long ago.

The Productive Past Thirty Years

The G8’s Growing Global Governance Effectiveness, 1975–2003

The promising sign for Sea Island is that the annual G7 and now G8 Summit (which includes Russia) has shown a rising trend of performance over the past 30 years. As shown by Appendix A, which describes the G7/8’s overall performance since its 1975 start, the G8 has put in an increasing and recently high performance on most of its major

functions (Kirtton 2004). The duration of its deliberations, measured in days, jumped to three days in 1982 and leapt last year to four days, if the G8 leaders' back-to-back meetings in St. Petersburg and Evian are combined. Its directional function of setting new principles and norms, measured roughly by the number of words in the leaders' concluding communiqués, jumped up to a high since 1996, generally sustained since then. Its decisional functional of making collective commitments similarly rose to a generally sustained high level in 1996, and reached a new peak of 206 commitments at Evian last year. And during the past decade, the delivery of these commitments through compliance by G8 members with them has been higher than in earlier years. The G8 has also been more active since 1995 in the development of global governance, most clearly by creating and directing G8 bodies of its own. This portrait of overall rising performance is confirmed, as Appendix B shows, by the higher scores awarded by the master grader of the summits, Sir Nicholas Bayne, to the summits in recent years.

America's Poor but Rising G8 Record, 1975–2003

The United States has also had a rising performance as host of the G8 every seven years. Bayne's grades by themselves suggest that America is the least successful summit host among the members, and that its performance peaked long ago, under Ronald Reagan at Williamsburg in 1983. But a broader look across all the individual summit functions shows that American-hosted summits have been on a rising trend. This was broadly true for George Bush's Houston Summit in 1990, and even more so, especially on compliance, for Bill Clinton's Denver Summit in 1997.

The Promising Past Year

The Momentum from Evian 2003

This long-term rise in G8 Summit performance has intensified over the past year since the French-hosted Evian Summit of June 1–3, 2004. As Appendix C shows, Evian produced a record-high 206 commitments, across a wide array of economic, transnational-global and political-security fields. While now nearly as potent as the Canadian-hosted US\$50 billion summit at Kananaskis in 2002, Evian did mobilize new money to help put some of its commitments into effect, as Appendix D details. It also asked for reports on terrorism and transport security at the American-hosted 2004 Summit, and on Africa at the British Summit in 2005 (see Appendix E). It further created three new G8 bodies, for terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and science and technology for sustainable development (see Appendix F). The Evian leaders issued several instructions to other international institutions, above all to the multilateral bodies of the United Nations system (see Appendix G). Above all, it recorded the common G8 determination to respond collectively to external shocks, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and sinking oil tankers polluting ecologically fragile shores (see Appendix H).

U.S. Plans and Preparations: From Minimalism to the Middle Range

Equally promising has been the direction of the U.S. preparatory process, from the time it assumed the presidency on January 1, 2004. Despite President Bush's initial skepticism about the value of the G8 Summit and his reluctance to devote much time to it, the U.S. has mounted a full set of lead-up finance and foreign affairs ministerials, with another for Justice and Home ministers responsible for counter-terrorism, if none for the environment or the many other subjects that had generated regular lead-up ministerial meetings during the decade past (see Appendix I). The U.S. has also offered a full set of four lead-up sherpa meetings, backed by a dense schedule of meetings for foreign affairs sous-sherpas (FASS), political directors, finance deputies and African personal representatives (APRs) (see Appendix J). The months leading up to Sea Island have also seen several new issue-specific "coalitions of the willing" created for several subjects, and an intense cross-cutting set of bilateral summit meetings among the G8 leaders.

Even more promising is the record of compliance with the priority commitments made at Evian. As Appendix K indicates, at the halfway mark between the Evian and Sea Island summits, the G8 had already complied at a rate of +48% (on a scale from -100% to +100%), a major advance from the comparable figure for the Iraq-divided G8 after Kananaskis the year before (G8 Research Group 2003a, 2003b). Also encouraging is the record of the primary Iraq-war political disputants, with last year's and this year's hosts, France and the U.S., both at an above-average +50% (Kirton and Kokotsis 2004).

A further sign of prospective success is the way the U.S. in the preparatory process is producing a focused but ambitious agenda, covering the economic and political-security domains and reflecting the distinctive priorities of its major G8 partners as well as America's alone. As Appendix L indicates, the Americans' initial thematic trilogy of "prosperity, security and freedom" has generated a wide-ranging, robust list. It combines the past G8 Kananaskis priorities of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, transport security and Africa with two ambitious innovations — the Greater Middle East Peace Plan (GMEI), integrally linked with the Middle East Peace Plan (MEPP) and the situation in Iraq, and Private Sector Development (PSD), in the spirit the recently released "Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor," a report produced by Paul Martin and Ernesto Zedillo. As the preparatory process has unfolded, the Americans have become increasingly willing to put new money on the summit table, and to invite their G8 partners to do so also, to fund their priority deliverables.

Seven weeks before the Sea Island Summit, the divisions among G8 members over ambitious expressions of most of these agenda items are of the predictable sort that have appeared and been solved before or at the summit in the recent past. The major exceptions are the new items of PSD and, above all, the GMEI and MEPP. The latter is by far the largest challenge. Its solution involves overcoming both the Iraq-war enhanced, longstanding divisions among G8 members, largely over a United States–continental European divide, and finding the formula for partnering with forward-looking polities in the region that might be willing to join the G8 in making an historic leap. Recent U.S. actions in regard to supporting Israeli leader Ariel Sharon's desire to keep some West

Bank settlements has made many pessimistic about whether enough Middle Eastern countries will come forward far enough and fast enough to make the badly needed new G8–Middle East partnership work.

The Competing, Uncertain Conditions at Present

Is it also not clear that outside conditions will unfold in ways that make those inside the G8 adjust to one another, and to potentially willing outsiders, and to find the formula in time to do so as the time to the Sea Island Summit becomes very short.

The Vulnerabilities of America and Its Allies

One powerful condition propelling America and its G8 allies into mutual adjustment and accommodation are the recent shocks that have reminded all G8 leaders of their individual vulnerabilities and thus common aversion to severe threats to their basic national needs. As Appendix M suggests, deadly terrorist attack over the past six weeks in Madrid in continental Europe and the Middle East (in Riyadh and now in Basra, where American sailors have died) have kept alive the spirit of solidarity bred by September 11th. They have also raised awareness of the closely connected, longstanding but rising — and now acute — energy vulnerability to Middle Eastern oil supplies that the U.S., the continental Europeans and Japanese have (even more so in the latter two cases).

While such shocks should help breed success on the counter-terrorism, transport security, and even energy-related Middle East agenda items, developments elsewhere provide less acute needs for G8 action, or opportunities to build on success. Libya's recent conversion from a state terrorist sponsor and proliferators of weapons of mass destruction will sustain G8 self-confidence and success on the counter-terrorism front, but might also create a call to expand the US\$20 billion Global Partnership on Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to meet the new task of safe nonproliferation in Libya itself. Recent moves to openness and engagement in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt (a partner in the New Partnership for Africa's Development, or NEPAD), Bahrain, Jordan and even Lebanon, if not Iran and Syria, also offer hope that GMEI might attract the needed Middle East partners on time. But the strength and specific natures of the shocks and supportive movements are still too weak and narrow to give an easy birth to an ambitious GMEI, which is now rapidly becoming the irreplaceable centrepiece deliverable by which the entire Sea Island Summit will be judged. High drama at the Sea Island Summit table almost certainly awaits.

The Poor Performance of the United Nations System

A similarly mixed picture comes from the recent performance of the existing UN organizations that are the first line of defence for protecting G8 countries and citizens, and those outside, from the large costs that severe shocks breed. In the case of terrorism,

where the shock is greatest and UN-dedicated organizations non-existent, the G8 can be confidently predicted to move effectively, by itself or by directing the multilateral system, to fill the gap. This is also true for transport security, where multilateral organizations such as International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Marine Organisation (IMO) can help implement G8 decisions but have long ago failed to respond to similar shocks and provide the global public good on their own. In the field of energy, the UN is not even a player. Thus, G8 action will be needed to put into effect appropriate action flowing from the research of the Atlanticist International Energy Agency (IEA). It will similarly be needed to deal with the current policies of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as well as an unstable oil-producing world and market beyond. In the field of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, with nuclear energy at its core, the proven ineffectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the weakness of the UN bodies responsible for chemical, biological and radiological weapons and delivery systems also imply a role for the G8 as global governor of last resort and thus a successful Sea Island result, in critical cases such as Iran and, if necessary, North Korea beyond.

The two cases where the G8 must work closely with the UN suggest two sharply different results. The successful result is likely to come from PSD, where the G8 has worked effectively with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the UN Conference on Financing for Development to produce the summit success on the African Action Plan (and Millennium Challenge Account) that was skillfully orchestrated, within the North American region, from Monterrey to Kananaskis in 2002. A similar synergy might carry peace support, in the form of police and constabulary training, primarily in Africa, through to becoming a well-financed Sea Island success, especially if it is possible to set aside suspicions that the trained forces are destined to be deployed in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East. The far greater challenge is in the Middle East, where summit success depends on the U.S. handing over reasonable authority to a UN-authorized leadership on June 30, but where the UN's recent and indeed 56-year record give little confidence that it is up to the task of bringing a just and durable peace, development and democracy to the Middle East.

The Equally Capable G8 as Equal to the Task

Where outside vulnerabilities flow through inadequate UN multilateral defences to threaten G8 members, they usually encounter a club with the collective capabilities in the world without — and the equal capabilities among members within — to inspire the internal burden-sharing that produces and effective results in the world as a whole. This year, as Appendix N shows, the G8 — even without the full European Union — still collectively dominates the global economy, despite the strong rise of communist China and democratic India of late. Recent G8 outreach to involve China, India and other G8 members in a dialogue at several levels, at the Evian Summit and ever since, suggests a steady move toward an embryonic, multi-purpose G20 that will reinforce the commanding capabilities and will of the G8 and its systemically important, increasingly democratic partners in the world.

Within the G8, the situation is more mixed. As the U.S. is the G7's 2003–04 growth leader in gross domestic product (GDP), with a currency that has very recently been on the rise, there may be a tendency for the U.S. to lecture its G8 partners and unilaterally bear the burden, rather than equally adjusting to what they want in order to get the resources needed by the U.S. But the even stronger rise in the value of all G8's partners currencies against the U.S. dollar since the Evian Summit, the long-awaited return of growth in Japan and a booming Russian tiger all point to an America that will listen, learn, pass the hat and make the adjustments necessary for effective collective action to emerge — if its leaders can focus on the medium term. Moreover, in terrorism and energy, where America's vulnerabilities are greatest, it is the G8's otherwise smallest countries, and America's immediate neighbours — Russia and Canada — that command the specialized capabilities America most needs.

The Common Purpose of Open Democracy and Social Advancement

Summits succeed when their agenda focuses on issues that directly invoke the G8's core mission of globally promoting open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, and where all G8 members have internalized these principles as part of their political practice and identity at home (Kirtton 2003). Here one impediment arises from worries that Vladimir Putin's Russia is backsliding from the G7 standards of practice in respecting the freedom of the media and renouncing arbitrary arrest. However, the larger force is the way that all know the need to defend open democracies against Islamist-linked terrorism and to build democratic societies of the front lines of Afghanistan and even in post-Saddam Iraq. The one hope for the G8's Sea Island Summit to generate an ambitious, historic GMEI in genuine partnership with the region, is to have it strongly focused on open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, and allow the soft power attraction of those ideals to inspire the peoples and countries of the region to buy in. It will similarly be necessary for the host to translate the all-American, divinely inspired theme of "freedom" into a set of concepts that connote open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement to the rest of the G8 and to the Middle East. There are signs at this late stage that the Americans are making a serious effort to do just this.

Political Capital and Control

Compounding the challenge is the fact that when the G8 leaders arrive at Sea Island, they will have limited freedom at home to alter national positions to produce the ambitious achievements they and the world may want. The G8 leaders' political capital and control is collectively weak, and internally equal, thanks to exceptional American weakness and Russian strength.

The host, President George Bush, has a very old and razor-thin electoral mandate, a looming election five months after the Summit and a plummeting — now minority — personal and party approval rating in the polls. Canada's Paul Martin is even more

electorally preoccupied and constrained, while Germany's Gerhard Schroeder, Britain's Tony Blair and the EU's Romani Prodi face lesser but still substantial limits to their domestic political capital and control. Japan's Junichi Koizumi is in better shape, but with elections that lie ahead in the near term. The only experienced, legislatively confident and electorally secure leader with political capital in domestic public opinion is Russia's Vladimir Putin. His recent re-election by a 71% majority, a massive majority in his legislature and very high approval ratings are the inverse of the ones wielded by his U.S. counterpart. President Bush may thus do well in areas — such as terrorism, transport security, weapons of mass destruction and energy — where Russia is a major player, but the challenges remain on the Middle East and Iran.

Constricted Participation: The Productive Sea Island Summit Format

Constricted participation also tends to breed summit success, especially when it is open to input and understanding of those outside. The Americans' strong attachment to the minimalist Montebello or Kananaskis model is well designed to bring out the leaders' common sense of vulnerability, responsibility for action, desire for an equal pooling of wisdom and resources, and commitment to democracy on a global scale (Kirtton and Kokotsis 2003, Bayne 2003, Fowler 2003). However, with only three working sessions and a dinner free for open discussion of any topic, over a period of less than 48 hours, there is no margin for error. And with the U.S. hosts still uncertain about whether they will invite any outsiders, how many and who to invite, and what to do with them at Sea Island, the costs of uncertainty and the capacity for unproductive diversion loom large.

Conclusion: The Remaining Challenges

Since the start, the Americans planned a highly ambitious, history-making summit, fit for a president who had come to dislike and distrust the G8 forum. Its centrepiece would be the theme of freedom and its promotion in the greater Middle East, aimed at making this hitherto immune region become, at long last, part of the democratic revolution that the G8 — starting with President George Bush Sr's first summit — had done so much to spread in every other region of the world. As the Sea Island Summit approached, the American hosts have moved to broaden their agenda. This is, in part, to spread the risks and have some useful deliverables, should the one great GMEI focus fail. It is also partly an adjustment to add the priorities of others, so that the others will offer support to the one great initiative led largely by the Americans alone.

This dynamic shows that the Sea Island Summit is likely to deliver a substantial set of important agreements, sufficiently timely and ambitious to take the Summit into the B range of success. Even if America's G8 partners have not yet put their money on the table, they are highly unlikely to become sufficiently adversarial and aggrieved to deny George Bush a minimally successful summit at home a mere five months before he goes to the polls. Moreover, they know that they are at least as equally vulnerable as the U.S. on many major agenda items should Sea Island fail.

Furthermore, the process shows that the Americans are listening, learning and adjusting, in ways that should help make the Sea Island Summit work. Even on the defining issue of the GMEI, the Americans are moving aggressively and creatively to get the needed outreach to and engagement from the region, and the most reluctant loyal Franco-German opposition is trying hard to find a formula they can all live with and that will work. They looking for a way to say to yes to an America that is now meaningfully adjusting to what its G8 partners want. This is, above all, because none of them wants to deal alone with the results from a Middle East where the GMEI, MEPP and Iraq genies — now permanently released from their bottles — explode and fail.

Were it up to the G8 alone, Kananaskis would thus be heading toward a strong success. But its fate now depends critically on the response of those in the Middle East region, and thus the willingness of all G8 members to use all their assets in the region, to the utmost, to get the required response. The required capabilities are those that America's G8 partners together certainly have. Whether they have the full commitment to deploy them in full, and the skill to do so in the right way at the right moment, is the remaining question that only the leaders themselves at Sea Island can resolve.

References

Bayne, Nicholas (2003), "Impressions of the Kananaskis Summit," in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., *Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Governance* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Bayne, Nicholas (2002), "Impressions of the Genoa Summit, 20–22 July 2001," in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., *Governing Global Finance: New Challenges, G7 and IMF Contributions* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Bayne, Nicholas (2001), "The G7 and Multilateral Trade Liberalisation: Past Performance, Future Challenges," in John Kirton and George von Furstenberg, eds., *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalisation in the Twenty-First Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Bayne, Nicholas (2000a), "The G7 Summit's Contribution: Past, Present and Prospective," in Karl Kaiser, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds., *Shaping a New International Financial System: Challenges of Governance in a Globalizing World* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Bayne, Nicholas (2000b), *Hanging In There: The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity and Renewal* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Fowler, Robert (2003), "Canadian Leadership and the Kananaskis G8 Summit: Toward a Less Self-Centered Policy," in David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer,

eds., *Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2003).

G8 Research Group (2003a), “2002 Kananaskis Interim Compliance Report, 2002–03,” <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2002interimcompliance> (April 2004).

G8 Research Group (2003b), “2002 Final Kananaskis Compliance Report, 2002–03,” <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2003compliance> (April 2004).

Kirton, John (2004), “Explaining G8 Effectiveness: A Concert of Vulnerable Equals in a Globalizing World,” paper prepared for the Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17–20, <www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2004/kirton_isa_040304.pdf> (April 2004).

Kirton, John (2003), “After Westphalia: Security and Freedom in the G8’s Global Governance,” in Thomas Noetzel and Marika Lerch, eds., *Security and Freedom: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics and Political Theory Perspectives* (Nomos: Baden-Baden).

Kirton, John (1993), “The Seven Power Summit and the New Security Agenda”, in David Dewitt, David Haglund and John Kirton, eds., *Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Relations* (Toronto: Oxford University Press).

Kirton, John (1989), “Contemporary Concert Diplomacy: The Seven-Power Summit and the Management of International Order,” paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Conference, March 29–April 1, London, England.

Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis (2004), “An Evaluation of the G8’s Commitment to the Kananaskis Pledges,” paper prepared for a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations G8 Africa Roundtable, Washington DC, February 4 <www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2004/kirton_africa_040204.html> (April 2004).

Kirton, John and Ella Kokotsis (2003), “The G7/8 Contribution at Kananaskis and Beyond,” in Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., *Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Governance* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Martin, Paul and Ernesto Zedillo (2004), “Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor,” United Nations Commission on the Private Sector and Development <www.undp.org/cpsd> (April 2004).

Appendix A

G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2004

Year	Site	Bayne Grade	# of Days	# of State-ments	# of Words	# of Commit-ments	Comp-liance Score	# of Minis-terials Created	# of Remit Man-dates	# of Leaders Bodies Cr	Ttl
	Ldg	A–	3	1	1,129	14	+57.1	0	1	1	1
<i>1976</i>	<i>Res</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>1,624</i>	<i>7</i>	<i>+08.9</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>
1977	Cap	B–	2	6	2,669	29	+08.4	0	1	0	1
1978	Cap	A	2	2	2,999	35	+36.3	0	0	2	3
1979	Cap	B+	2	2	2,102	34	+82.3	0	1	3	5
1980	Prv	C+	2	5	3,996	55	+07.6	0	1	0	3
1981	Ldg	C	2	3	3,165	40	+26.6	1	1	2	4
1982	Ldg	C	3	2	1,796	23	+84.0	0	1	3	3
<i>1983</i>	<i>Res</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>2,156</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>–10.9</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>2</i>
1984	Cap	C–	3	5	3,261	31	+48.8	1	3	1	4
1985	Cap	E	3	2	3,127	24	+01.0	0	1	2	5
1986	Cap	B+	3	4	3,582	39	+58.3	1	1	1	3
1987	Prv	D	3	6	5,064	53	+93.3	0	1	0	2
1988	Prv	C–	3	2	4,872	27	–47.8	0	1	1	3
1989	Cap	B+	3	11	7,125	61	+07.8	0	1	1	2
<i>1990</i>	<i>Prv</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7,601</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>–14.0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>5</i>
1991	Cap	B–	3	3	8,099	53	00.0	0	3	0	2
1992	Prv	D	3	4	7,528	41	+64.0	1	2	1	2
1993	Cap	C+	3	2	3,398	29	+75.0	0	5	0	2
1994	Prv	C	3	2	4,123	53	100.0	1	2	0	4
1995	Prv	B+	3	3	7,250	78	100.0	2	6	2	3
1996	Prv	B	3	5	15,289	128	+36.2	0	2	1	6
<i>1997</i>	<i>Prv</i>	<i>C–</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>12,994</i>	<i>145</i>	<i>+12.8</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>6</i>
1998	Prv	B+	3	4	6,092	73	+31.8	0	3	1	4
1999	Prv	B+	3	4	10,019	46	+38.2	1	3	1	2
2000	Res	B	3	5	13,596	105	+81.4	0	5	2	5
2001	Prv	B+	3	7	6,214	58	+49.5	1	4	1	6
2002	Res	B+	2	18	11,959	187	+35.0	1	6	3	8
2003	Prv	TBA	3		16,889	206	+65.8	0	4	2	9
<i>2004</i>	<i>Res</i>		<i>3</i>								
Av. All		C+			6,197	26	+.37	.38	2.6	1.1	3.5
Av. Cycle 1		B–			2,526	29	+.32	.14	1.0	1.1	2.6
Av. Cycle 2		C–			3,408	34	+.32	.29	1.0	1.3	3.1
Av. Cycle 3		C+			6,446	56	+.48	.57	3.1	0.9	2.9
Av. Cycle 4		B			10,880	106	+.41	.57	4.7	1.4	5.3
Av. Cycle 5		TBA			16,889	206	TBA	.00	4.0	2.0	9.0

Notes:

- Location: Ldg = Lodge on outskirts of capital city; Res = remote resort; Cap = inside capital city; Prv = provincial (not capital) city.
- Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2002 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. The compliance score for 2002 is an extrapolation from the interim compliance score based on the 2002 interim-to-final compliance ratio.
- U.S.-hosted summits are in italics.

Compiled by John Kirton, November 5, 2003.

Appendix B

Overall G8 Achievement: Bayne Grades

	Cycle 1 1975–1981	Cycle 2 1982–1988	Cycle 3 1989–1995	Cycle 4 1996–2002	Average
France	A-	C	B+	B	B
<i>United States</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>C-</i>	<i>C-</i>
United Kingdom	B-	C-	B -	B+	B-
Germany	A	E	D	B+	C
Japan	B+	B+	C+	B	B
Italy	C+	D	C	B+	C
Canada	C	C-	B+	B+	B-
Average	B-	C-	C+	B	C+

Note:

These grades are awarded for the overall importance of the co-operative agreements reached at the annual summit, including both policy co-ordination and institutional development. Bayne has specified and applied to the individual issue areas of finance and trade the criteria for judging summit success, identifying and defining the five criteria of leadership, effectiveness, durability, acceptability and consistency.

Sources:

Bayne (2000a; 2000b, 195; 2001; 2002, 207).

Compiled by John Kirton.

Appendix C

G8 Summit Commitments by Document, 2003 Evian

Chair's Summary	16
<i>Economics</i>	38
Growth and Responsible Market Economy	04
Corruption and Transparency	26
Trade	08
<i>Development</i>	21
Health	10
Famine	11
<i>Sustainable Development</i>	69
Sustainable Development Science	29
Marine Environment and Tanker Safety	24
Water	16
<i>Political-Security</i>	63
Weapons of Mass Destruction/Nonproliferation	02
Radioactive Sources	20
Transport Security/MANPADs	18
Terrorism	23
Total	207

Identified by Ella Kokotsis, June 3, 2003.

Appendix D

G8 Summit Money Mobilized 2003

New Money Promised

- “In keeping with our pledge at Kananaskis to provide, on a fair and equitable basis, sufficient resources to eradicate polio by 2005, we have pledged an addition US\$ 500 million and remain committed to playing our full part to ensure that the remaining funding gap is closed.” (Health: A G8 Action Plan)

Old Money Re-affirmed

- “We are determined to sustain and broaden our efforts towards: reaching our Kananaskis commitment of raising up to US\$20 billion over 10 years.” (Chair’s Summary)

Need for More Money and G8 Responsibility Recognized:

- “We noted that achieving these ambitious goals would require considerable efforts from both developed and developing countries, including increased resources. We welcomed the report of our Finance ministers’ discussions on our increased resources and on financing instruments. We invite them to report back to us in September on the issues raised by the financing instruments...” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We tasked our relevant Ministers to examine as soon as possible the measures necessary to support a plan for the revitalization and reconstruction of the Palestinian economy, including the leveraging of private investment, within the framework of the Middle East Peace Process.” (Chair’s Summary).
- “We are providing urgent humanitarian aid and, to address the financial consequences of this situation, we are instructing our relevant Ministers to report within one month on how best to help Algeria recover.” (Chair’s Summary).
- “To these ends we direct our ministers and officials to pursue urgently with WTO partners...Deliver capacity building technical assistance to developing countries in need to help them participate fully in WTO negotiations, implement trade agreements, and respond to the trade opportunities created, in co-operation with other bilateral and multilateral donors.” (Co-operative G8 Action on Trade)
- “The CTAG will analyse and prioritise needs, and expand counter-terrorism capacity building assistance...” (Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan).

Monitoring of Possible More Needed Money with G8 Responsibility Acknowledged

- “We welcomed the progress made towards completing our commitments in Kananaskis to fill the estimated financing gap in the HIPC Trust Fund, through the pledges of \$850 million made in Paris in October 2002. We will continue to monitor the financing needs of the Trust Fund.” (Chair’s Summary).
- “We will address new needs [against famine, especially in Africa] when they are confirmed with appropriate aid commitments.” (Action Against Famine, Especially in Africa: A G8 Action Plan).
- “...whilst recognising that significant additional funds are required. We commit, with recipient countries, to fulfil our shared obligations as contained in the declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS for the 2001 United Nations General Assembly Special Session.” (Health: A G8 Action Plan).

Notes:

The category “Money Mobilized” deals with the G8 itself putting, being likely to put or possibly putting in the future additional financial resources from the G8 for specified purposes. To be included in this category, an item requires explicit communiqué references to financial resources (broadly defined) and to the G8’s role or responsibility in relation to these financial resources. It excludes mere communiqué notations of where the G8 is already contributing financially without any additional element that more financing might be needed (from the G8 or not) (e.g. to the International Atomic Energy Agency). It also excludes communiqué references to the new purposes to which existing G8 funds might be put (e.g., radiological accidents from the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction). Also excluded are promises to improve the efficiency, timeliness, responsiveness, flexibility, sustainability, appropriateness and specific mix, as opposed to the overall volume, of aid (e.g., to combat famine in Africa). Also excluded are general statements that specify neither action nor level nor timing (e.g., “We undertake to work towards reversing the decline of official development assistance to agriculture...”, “We will...support efforts to ensure funding for genetic resources”).

Identified and compiled by John Kirton, July 2003.

Appendix E

G8 Summit Remit Mandates, 2003 for 2004 and Beyond

2003-4

- “We will review progress on our [Africa] Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We agree to exchange information on national measures related to the implementation of these steps on MANPADs] by December 2003. We will review progress at our next meeting in 2004.” (Enhanced Transport Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems [MANPADs]: A G8 Action Plan)
- “The G8 Presidency will produce a report for the 2004 Summit.” (Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan)
- “CTAG will ... by ... Seeking to increase counter-terrorism capacity building assistance and coordination by the 2004 Summit ... Encouraging regional assistance programmes including delivery through regional and donor sponsored training centres by the 2004 Summit ... Seeking to address unmet regional assistance needs by the 2004 Summit.” (Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan)
- “The G8 Presidency will produce a report [on terrorism] for the 2004 Summit.” (Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan)

Notes: Excludes deadlines and bodies to report to other than the next or subsequent G8 summits themselves. Includes injunction to complete action “by the 2004 Summit” even if no actual report “to” the Summit is demanded, as this implies that G8 leaders will be watching and will if necessary take up the item again.

Identified and compiled by Antara Haldar, June 2003.

Appendix F

G8 Summit Institutionalization, 2003 Evian

G7/8 Institutions Created (3)

- “We ... created a Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG)” (Chair’s Summary) ... “To this end the G8 will create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG).” (Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan)
- “The G8 will direct a working group to identify those elements in the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to prevent terrorists from gaining access to radioactive sources...” (Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Securing Radioactive Sources, A G8 Action Plan)
- “We will convene senior G8 policy and research officials and their research institutions to compare and to link programmes and priorities...” (Science and Technology for Sustainable Development: A G8 Action Plan)

G7/8 Institutions Adjusted (11)

- “We agreed to widen our dialogue to other African Leaders on NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan. We invite interested countries and relevant international institutions to appoint senior representatives to join this partnership.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We invite them [our finance ministers] to report back to us in September on the issues raised by the financing instruments, including the proposal for a new International Finance Facility.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “In this context [HIPC exogenous shocks] we have asked our Finance Ministers to review by September mechanisms to encourage good governance and the methodology for calculating the amount of ‘topping-up’ debt relief available to countries at completion point based on updated cost estimates.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “In accordance with our statement at Kananaskis, we established the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group and adopted its mandate and the Core Principles shared by each of us...” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We direct Finance Ministers to assess progress and identify next steps [on terrorist finance].” (Chair’s Summary, Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan)
- “To develop strengthened co-operation, we also ask Ministers to initiate a dialogue with counterparts in other countries [on terrorist finance]” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We tasked our relevant ministers to examine as soon as possible the measures necessary to support a plan for the revitalisation and reconstruction of the Palestinian economy, including the leveraging of private investment, within the framework of the Middle East Peace Process.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We are providing urgent humanitarian aid and, to address the financial consequences of this situation, we are instructing our relevant Ministers to report within one months on how best to help Algeria recover.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We will jointly ask ... FSF ... to work with us on these issues (corruption and transparency)...” (Fostering Growth and Promoting a Responsible Market Economy: A G8 Declaration)
- “Building on the work of the G8 Contact Group on famine, we will work actively to take this Action Plan forward in all relevant international fora.” (Action against Famine, Especially in Africa: A G8 Action Plan)
- “We direct our ministers and officials, working urgently with WTO partners, to establish a multilateral solution in the WTO to address the problems faced by these countries, rebuilding the confidence of all parties, before the Cancun Ministerial.” (Health: A G8 Action Plan)

G7/8 Institutions Approved and Continued (4)

- “We endorsed the report prepared by our Africa Personal Representatives. (Chair’s Summary)
- “We welcomed the report of the Finance Ministers’ discussions on our increased resources and on financing instruments.” (Chair’s Summary)
- “We endorse the “G8 Roma and Lyon Groups Statement on Biometric Applications for International Travel...” (Enhanced Transport Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems [MANPADs]: A G8 Action Plan)
- “We ... support issuance in June by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of a revised 40 recommendations that includes strong customer and due diligence provisions, enhanced security for politically exposed persons and a requirement to make corruption and bribery a predicate offence for money laundering.” (Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency: A G8 Declaration)

Appendix G

G8 Summit Institutional Instructions, 2003 Evian

G8 and UN (1)

- “Good governance needs to be promoted and capacity must be built for recipient countries to pursue an appropriate water policy and financial resources should be properly directed to the water sector in a more efficient and effective way, in order to achieve the goals of the Millennium Declaration and the Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development...We are committed to playing a more active role in the international efforts towards achieving these goals, on the basis of the Monterrey consensus and building upon the outcomes of the Third World Water Forum and the Ministerial Conference held in Japan in March 2003...we will take the following measures individually and/or collectively, particularly taking into account the importance of proper water management in Africa, in support of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, as stated in the G8 Africa Action Plan.” (Water: A G8 Action Plan).

G8 Alone (2)

- “We shall continue to implement the Action Plan we agreed at Kananaskis to secure safe, secure, efficient and reliable transportation worldwide.” (Enhance Transport Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADs): A G8 Action Plan).
- “G8 action to address famine in Africa will take place within the framework of the G8 Africa Action Plan, in support of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development.” (Action Against Famine, Especially in Africa: A G8 Action Plan).

UN Alone (5)

- “We recall the significant decisions we took last year at the Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development to increase international development assistance.” (Fighting Corruption and Improving Transparency: A G8 Declaration).
- “The multilateral system embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the current Doha Development Agenda, is thus central to the G8’s approach...We are therefore committed to delivering on schedule, by the end of 2004, the goals set out in the Doha Development Agenda...” (Co-operative G8 Action on Trade).
- “We recognize the need, as acknowledged in the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) Plan of Implementation, to support the development of cleaner, sustainable and more efficient technologies.” (Science and Technology for Sustainable Development: A G8 Action Plan).
- “We reaffirm our commitment to achieving the development goals set out in the Millennium Summit and at the World Summit on Sustainable Development. (Health: A G8 Action Plan).

Note:

“G8 Summit Institutional Momentum” is defined as public promises made at or by specified summits, conferences or action plans of international institutions, as referenced in the introductory opening passages or chapeau of each discrete document issued by, or in the name of the leaders at, the annual G8 summits. With various degrees of directness and explicit causal connection, they are specified by G8 leaders as a reference, impulse, justification or legitimation — in short as a shared institutional cause (and thus “process-tracing” proof) of the subsequently identified G8 agenda discussions, principles, commitments, mobilized monies, remit mandates and institutional development that follow in the document. Of particular importance is whether the institutions causally specified are those of the G8, of the broader United Nations system, or of other institutional systems. It can be hypothesized that the specification of both G8 and UN as “authorizing” references will lead to the greatest subsequent G8 action, followed by that of the G8 alone. Within each category, the strength of the variable is measured by the number of times reference is made to such institutional authorizations and to the number of different institutional authorizations to which reference is made.

Identified by John Kirton, July 2003.

Appendix H

G8 Summit Shocks Cited, 2003 Evian

- “The risks associated with **radioactive** sources have been the subject of increasing attention for several years now, particularly by the IAEA, with respect to safety and possible radiological accidents. But 11 September highlighted the risk posed by the use of certain highly radioactive sources for malevolent or **terrorist** purposes, i.e. the exposure of populations to radiation, or the use of one or more sources in a radiological dispersion device.” (Non Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Securing Radioactive Sources: A G8 Action Plan).
- “The threat of **terrorism** still, however, remains serious as has been seen in a series of terrorist incidents including in Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen over the past year.” (Building International Political Will and Capacity to Combat Terrorism: A G8 Action Plan).
- “The recent sinking of the “**Prestige**” [off Europe’s shore] has again demonstrated that tanker safety and pollution prevention have to be further improved. (Marine Environment and Tanker Safety: A G8 Action Plan)

Note:

“G8 Summit Shocks Cited” consists of explicit references to singular, dramatic events concentrated in time and place, contained in the introductory opening passages or chapeau on each discrete document issued by or in the name of the leaders at the annual G8 summits. With various degrees of directness and explicit causal connection, they constitute a causal justification (and thus “process-tracing proof) that the noted shock is a shared cause of the agenda discussions, principles, commitments, mobilized monies, remit mandates and institutional development and direction that follow in the document. The most intensely shock-driven summits are those that refer to such shocks in the opening passage of their overall summary document(s), and that do so in many of each individual document issued by leaders at the summit. Such opening passages can run a continuum from “things are going well in the world” to “things are going badly in the world” with “shocks “ sometimes grounding the latter, while “breakthroughs” (such as the fall of the Berlin Wall) can sometimes ground the former. The strength of such shocks can be measured in part by their durability — the number of years from the time that they happened to their referencing in a G8 communiqué. The first passage noted above at Evian provides a relatively pure case in which G8 leaders state that while the problem has long existed and been addressed by the relevant UN multilateral organization, a shock (that implicitly showed that the UN body was/is unable to cope) now requires ambitious (implicitly direct and autonomous) action on the part of the G8.

Identified by John Kirton, July 2003.

Appendix I

Inter-Summit Ministerials and Equivalents, 2003–2004 Compared to 2002–2003

Post-Summit Second Half 2002

September 27 G8 Development Co-operation Ministers Meeting, Windsor, Ontario
September 27 G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington
October 25 Statement by G8 Foreign Ministers in Connection with Terrorist Hostage Taking in Moscow

Post-Summit Second Half 2003

September 20 G7 Finance Ministers, Doha
September 30? G8 Foreign Ministers at United Nations General Assembly
September ?? Inter-Sessional Summit with Evian Outside Participants
October 26–27 G20 Finance Ministers, Morelia, Mexico
November 6–7 Global Health Security Initiative, Berlin
December 15–16 G8 Labour Ministers, Stuttgart

Pre-Summit First Half 2003

February 21–22 G7 Finance Ministers, Paris
April 11–12 G8 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington
April 24 G8 Development Ministers, Paris
April 25–27 G8 Environment Ministers, Paris
April 29 G8 Energy Ministers, Paris
May 5 G8 Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Paris
May 22–23 G8 Foreign Ministers, Paris
May 16–17 G7 Finance Ministers, Deauville, France
May 30–31 G8-EU Summit, St. Petersburg

June 1–3 G7/8 Summit, Evian-les-Bains, France

Pre-Summit First Half 2004

February 6–7 G7 Finance Ministers, Boca Raton, Florida
April 23–24 G7 Finance Ministers, Washington
May 10 G8 Roma/Lyon Justice and Home Affairs Ministers, Washington
May 14 G8 Foreign Ministers, probably Washington
May 22–23 G8 Finance Ministers, New York

June 8–10 G8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia

Appendix J

G8 Sherpa and Official-Level Meetings

November 10	First Forum for Partnership with Africa, Paris
November 17	Sherpa Meeting, Paris
November 17	Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), Paris
January 26	G7 Finance Deputies, Brussels
January 29–30	Sherpa 1, Washington
February 16–17	Foreign Affairs Sous Sherpas (FASS)
March 3–4	G20 Finance Deputies, Leipzig, Germany
March 8–9/15–19	Sherpa 2, Washington
March 11	Political Directors, Washington
March 30–31	FASS
April 19–20	Sherpa 3, Washington
April 22–23	CTAG, Paris
April 22–23	Political Directors, Paris
April 26	FASS-Finance Deputies with Outreach, Washington
May 18	FASS, Sea Island
May 19–20	Sherpa 4, Sea Island

Note: Excludes APRs

Appendix K

Compliance with Priority Commitments, Interim January 2004

Total	CDA	FRA	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	U.S.	Overall
World Economy/Growth	0	0	1	-1	0	0	0	1	0.125
Info and Communication Technology	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.000
Trade (Multilateral Trade Negotiations)	0	0	0	0	0	-1	0	-1	-0.250
Development (Official Development Aid)	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0.875
Debt (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.000
Environment (Marine)	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.375
Health (AIDS)	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.875
Crime/Terrorist Finance	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.250
Terrorism (CTAG)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.000
Transport Security	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.375
Weapons of Mass Destruction	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.000
Energy	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0.125
Overall	0.583	0.500	0.500	0.333	0.417	0.333	0.583	0.500	

Appendix L

The Prospective G8 Sea Island Summit Agenda as of April 21, 2004

The Major Four Items:

1. The Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) and Middle East Peace Plan (MEPP)
2. Transport Security Initiative (SAFTI)
3. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
4. Private Sector Development (PSD), formerly a third world development issue.

Additional Items:

5. Peace Support, Principally in Africa

Political Issues:

6. Iran
7. North Korea

G8 System Issues Possibly Elevated:

8. Famine
9. Health: Polio and HIV/AIDS and the Global Fund
10. Science and Technology for Sustainable Development
11. Global Environment Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)

Appendix M

Some Shocks from Terrorism to G8 Countries/Citizens

	Country	Target	Weapon	Deaths (Injuries)
1983	Lebanon	U.S. Marine barracks, Beirut (2)	Truck bombs	370 (175)
1985	Pacific	Air India 182 from Vancouver	Air bomb	329
1988	Britain	Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie	Air bomb	28
1992 Dec	Yemen	Hotel	Attack (Al Qaeda)	2
1993 Feb	U.S.	World Trade Centre garage	Truck bomb (Al Qaeda)	6 (1,000)
1993 Oct	Somalia	Mogadishu, 2 helicopters shot	MANPADs (Al Qaeda)	18 (73)
1995	Japan	Tokyo subway	Bioterrorism (Sarin)	12 (6,000)
1995 Nov	Saudi Arabia	U.S.-run training centre, Riyadh	Truck bomb (Al Qaeda)	7 (60)
1996 Jun	Saudi Arabia	U.S. military housing, Dhahran	Truck bomb	19 (200)
1998 Aug	Kenya/Tanzania	American embassies bombed	Truck bombs (Al Qaeda)	225 (4,085)
2000 Oct	Yemen	USS <i>Cole</i> hit in Aden	Suicide boat (Al Qaeda)	17 (39)
2001	U.S.	World Trade Center, Pentagon	Air suicide	2,992 (3,000)
2001	U.S.	Florida, New Jersey, Washington	Anthrax	5 (19)
2002	Indonesia	Bali nightclubs	Bomb	202 (229)
2003 May	Morocco	Casablanca	Suicide bombing	45 (100+)
2004 Mar	EU	Madrid	Bombs on trains	191 (1,800)

Appendix N

Relative Capability of G8 Members

G8 2004 Growth Rate Estimates of International Monetary Fund's World Economic Outlook, April 2004

U.S.	4.6%
Britain	3.5%
Japan	3.4%
Canada	2.6%
France	1.8%
Germany	1.6%
Italy	1.2%

"G10" Purchasing Power Parity

Rank Country	2002 PPP	% G10	% G8	% G7
1. U.S.	10,414	33%	46%	48%
2. China	5,792	18.4%		
3. Japan	3,481	11%	15%	16%
4. India	2,778	8.8%		
5. Germany	2,226	7%	9.7%	10.2%
6. France	1,609	5.1%	7.0%	7.4%
7. Britain	1,574	5.0%	6.8%	7.2%
8. Italy	1,510	4.8%	6.6%	7.0%
8. Russia	1,165	3.7%	5.0%	5.4%
10. Canada	907	2.8%	4.0%	4.2%
G10 Total	31,456			
G8 Total	22,886			
G7 Total	21,721			
G8/G10	73%			
G7/G10	69%			
Pacific 4/G8	70%			

Notes:

Data is from the World Bank World Development Indicators 2004, released April 23, 2004, and based on 2002 figures. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is determined by pricing all goods and services at U.S. prices and treating America as standard, rather than converting local currencies into dollars at foreign exchange rates. PPP figures cited above are in millions of U.S. dollars.