Toward Multilateral Reform:
The G20's Contribution

John Kirton
G8 Research Group
john.kirton@utoronto.ca
June 25, 2004

Introduction

Since its 1999 start, the Group of 20 (G20) systemically significant countries has attracted increased attention and appeal as a major institution for global governance in the twenty first century. Since the inception of the G20 as an annual forum for finance ministers, through to the recent proposals of Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin, there have been many advocates of elevating the existing institution into a Summit-level leaders' forum, akin to the Group of Eight (G8) major market democracies whose leaders have gathered in an annual summit for thirty years. To be sure, there are some "rejectionists" who judge the idea of a leader's level G20 to be expanding the existing G20 institutions "well beyond the level of their competence" (Foster 2003). Yet a larger group of "reinforcers" advocate adding a G20 leaders meeting to the existing array of global governance institutions, perhaps as one of many models to respond to globalization (Le Boucher 2003), as an ad hoc meeting to address a particular pressing global issue (Martin 2004a, Martin 2004b), or as a more permanent body with a more comprehensive agenda (Johnson 2001, Kirton 2001a, Schwab 2003). Much more ambitiously, a growing group of "replacers" call for the creation of a leaders-level G20 to substitute for a G8 that would effectively fade away (Weltke 1999, Beauchesne 1999, Bradford and Linn 2004, Peterson 2004, Heinbecker 2004). Their sympathizers suggest that a G20 leaders meeting could revitalize an otherwise immobilized United Nations (UN) (Stein 2004).

The enthusiasts for replacing the G8 with the G20 advance their claims largely on the basis of often internally contradictory, selectively supported or unproven assertions about current and future transformations in the international system, the failure of the G8 and UN systems in response and the alleged or assumed advantages of a more weighty and representative G20, in an often ill-defined Summit institution, in addressing these twenty-first century needs. Almost never is the case made on the basis of a disciplined and detailed analysis of what the model and nest for a G20 Summit — the existing G20 finance ministers' forum — has actually done during its first half decade in operation. To be sure, select institutionalized plurilateral bodies directly designed and delivered by leaders add an essential element that mere ministerial forums lack, as the evolution and co-existence of the of the G5/7/8 finance ministers and the G6/7/8 Summits show. Yet a close examination of the design and evolution, operation, and impact of the existing G20 finance ministers' forum provides an essential empirical foundation for arbitrating claims, and shaping the structure of a prospective G20 Summit. Once this foundation is firmly in place, the leap to the leader's level can be made, in part, with the thirty two year experience of the G8's finance ministers-leaders evolution and interaction as a further guide.

The few existing analyses of the G20's actual operation have provided no solid basis for building this essential foundation. The advocates of G20-as-G8-replacement have primarily argued, on the basis of assertion rather than analysis, that the G20 has been "useful," "important," "inclusive," experienced, successful and "effective," while the G8 has become an "inadequate," "obsolete," exclusionary, "antiquated," "anachronistic" "stale" "ineffective" forum for the "mere exchanges of views and pleasantries" (Bradford and Linn 2004). A second school, the G20-as-G8-reinforcement, more modestly judge the G20, on the basis of its operation during its first few years, to be a promising institution with a potentially valuable higher level contribution, if several substantial challenges are met (Porter 2000, Johnson 2000, 2001, Kirton 2001a, Helleiner 2001). Their assessment is supported by those who assess it as "an effective and legitimate institution that delivered significant achievements" during its first two years, or an institution that has worked during its first half decade (Kirton 2002, Martin 2004b, Crockett 2004: 53, Meyer et al. 2004: 82, Knight et al. 2004: 145). A third school of rejectionists concede the "competence" of the existing G20, but do so implicitly, or point to the formidable institutional defects or uncertain future of the G20 (Foster 2003, Culpepper 2000, Bryant 2003, Scholte 2002). And a fourth school could well charge "redundant", on the grounds that the existing G8, with its now routine inclusion of other countries, especially at the 2003 Evian Summit, has already become a G20 like Summit itself (Bayne 2003).

Amidst this rich debate, no-one has yet analyzed, alone or in a comparative context, the full five year performance of the existing G20. Nor has anyone credibly connected the G20's alleged advantages in weight, inclusiveness, representativeness and legitimacy, in its current, largely constant, configuration, with the changing pattern of successes and failure it has presumably enjoyed.

What then has the G20 actually done and what can and should it do, in reforming the international financial system, and the integrally interlinked larger global governance system and order built on this base? To address these questions, this chapter examines in turn the creation, constitution and charter of the G20 finance ministers' forum, its strong start in 1999 and 2000, and its institutional and normative evolution and impact over its full five years in operation. On this foundation it concludes by considering the G20 for the next generation, concentrating on the contributions it is capable of making and the challenges that lie ahead.

Based on this analysis, this chapter argues that the G20 was created as a consequence of American and G8 leadership as a consensus-oriented forum of systemically significant global countries with a mission to prevent financial, economic and resulting crises, and to institute the social protections that would make globalization work for the benefit of all. Based on a strong start in its first two years, it has evolved during its first half decade from a largely deliberative forum to one setting new normative directions, taking collective decisions, and developing global governance both by broadening its own agenda and thickening its own structure, and by working in conscious interdependence with other multilateral organizations and the G8. It has increasingly had an autonomous impact as an international institution in bridging differences between and within the developed and emerging countries, and in hastening agreement on "constitutional" issues in outside governance forms. Yet essential to its success has been its pattern of working closely in tandem with the similarly constructed, much more experienced, and much more cohesive G8, in support of the principles of transparency, openness, democracy, social advancement, and equity that that G8 has at its institutional core. The most likely emergence and valuable contribution of a leaders-level G20 is as an outgrowth of the G8's sustained twenty-first century move to outreach and inclusion, in the global strengthening of the core G8 principles of open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, under a steady succession of shocks to these values that the G8 and other institutions cannot eliminate on their own. The time is thus ripe for a leader's level G20 to be born, but in a somewhat different form than the recent appeals have foreseen.

The G20's Creation, Charter and Constitution

The Formative Causes

In part the G20 was a result of the American President Bill Clinton, and his ranking G8 allies, to find a more effective, and thus inclusive but still flexible forum, at the leaders' and ministerial level, to match the challenges of the rapidly globalizing world of the 1990's and to respond to the rising capabilities of emerging countries, particularly in Asia, that were not well connected to the inner management core of the global governance arrangements constructed in 1944-5 and 1975.

Clinton's leading achievements included the elevation of the Japanese-Australian inspired Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum into an annual autumn leader's meeting in 1993, and the expansion of the G7 Summit into the "Denver Summit of the Eight", with Russia included, in June 1997.

The advent of the Asian-turned global financial crisis in July 1997 quickly intensified American initiative and brought its G8 allies robustly into the innovation in global governance game. At the Canadian hosted APEC leaders meeting in Vancouver in November 1997, President Clinton pioneered a short lived Group of Twenty-Two (G22) to discuss the unfolding Asian financial crisis and the way to strengthen the international financial architecture in response. At the Summit they hosted in May 1998, the British permanently expanded the G7 into a G8 leaders meeting, and admitted the Russians to most — if not all — of the now separated Finance and Foreign ministers meetings and the many other ministerial forums the G7/8 had created since 1994. Under German hosting in the spring of 1999 the G7 created a new body, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), first for itself but soon with four new members added. The Forum was to confront the challenge of dealing with once technical issues among highly like-minded G7 members, but issues which had now become of greater political consequence and relevance to a broader world. At the same time, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) created a New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) group of 25, to overcome earlier resistance to G7 direction, and to provide the additional available in-place financial resources that the Mexican meltdown of December 1994 had shown would be needed to contain financial crises in the new age. The IMF also created a new International Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC), with Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, as the first and still only chair.

By far the most ambitious attempt to move from the G7 to a broader forum for global financial governance came with the creation in September 1999 of the Group of 20, in accordance with the commitment made by G7 leaders at their Cologne Summit in June 1999. As with the G7 itself at the moment of its creation in 1975, the formal mandate of this new political level forum centered on financial matters but also embraced the full economic domain. As with the G7 in 1975, the members of the Group collectively contained a predominant share of the world's economic capabilities. Moreover, in sharp contrast to the many issue-specific, G7-incubated but soon broadened bodies that had regularly arisen since the G7's start, the G20 quickly generated claims that it would soon emerge as an effective centre of centre of global governance in a crisis-ridden world.

The G20 finance ministers' forum was thus born from several forces. The most basic were structural changes in the challenges bred by globalization, the new strength of emerging, particularly Asian economies, the failure of the existing international organizations (as shown by the 1994 Mexican peso crisis and G7'a 1995 Halifax Summit UN reform effort) and American initiative through the agency of President Bill Clinton. But equally essential were three more proximate propellers. The first was a steady succession of ever-more severe shocks that escalated through Asia in 1997, came to defeat Russia and immobilize America itself in 1998, and spread to the Americas and elsewhere afterward. The second was the active initiative of Americas G8 partners, notably the American-German-Canadian coalition, and the institutional nest of plurilateral institutionalized Summits and ministerial meetings such as APEC, but above all the G7/8, to foster this coalition and give the G20 its formal birth. The third was the inadequate performance and response of the existing multilateral organizations, above all the British chaired IMFC, in a world where "hard law" institutions still commanded much hard power and far superior claims to inclusiveness, representativeness and legitimacy, and where several soft law informal plurilateral institutions beyond the G20 were also being born.

The Normative "Charter"

If the G8 nest was important in giving birth to a G20, it was even more important in determining the charter-ensconsed core mission, and the particular constitution of the membership in the new forum. The G8 leaders at their 1999 Cologne Summit, after welcoming the establishment of the FSF and IMFC, gave birth to the G20 by further welcoming "the commitment to work together to establish an informal mechanism for dialogue among systemically important countries, within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system" (G7 1999a). Following these instructions, the G7 Finance Ministers, at their September 25, 1999 meeting, formally created the G20 "as a new mechanism for informal dialogue in the framework of the Bretton Woods institutional system," but immediately added "to broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically important economies and to promote co-operation to achieve stable and sustainable world growth that benefits all (G7 1999b). The function of the forum thus quickly expanded from "dialogue" to "broader dialogue" to the potentially decisional role to "promote co-operation." The mission had similarly broadened from the narrowly financial Bretton Woods framework and its principles to economic issues aimed at "world growth" that was stable, but, in a burst of temporal and spatial equity, was "sustainable" and would benefit all as well. And the membership had been defined as the "systemically important" countries, subsequently qualified as being from "regions around the world" as well as representatives of the EU, IMF and World Bank.

These decisions were exclusively made by and negotiated within the G8, and reflect the outcome of the varying perspectives and hard bargaining there. The G20 reflected American dissatisfaction with the slow, conservative, Eurocentric Bretton Woods institutions, and the US unilateralist initiative in creating the American defined, invited and hosted G22, Willard Group and G33 as informal clubs to bypass the old. Yet the phrase "within the framework of the Bretton Woods institutions" reflected British and French concern, backed by the Italians, for the IMFC and IMF that their nationals headed. It also reflected Canadian questions about who the envisaged "GX" body bodies would report to, from whom its mandate and legitimacy would come, and how credible it would be if it was seen as a body chaired by the US, meeting in Washington's "beltway", and thus subject to the vicissitudes of the unpredictable politics there. The final formula satisfied the "GX's" catalytic Americans, the enthusiastically supportive Canadians, the favourably disposed British, Germans, and Japanese, and the resistant French and Italians who were wedded to their pre-eminence and prerogatives at the IMF and World Bank. Flowing from this compromise were the decisions to hold the first meeting in Germany, and have as the first chair Canada's Paul Martin (who beat out Britain's Gordon Brown in an informal G7 poll).

In similar fashion, the mission and the agenda grew well beyond the prevailing financial focus and principles at the core of the Bretton Wood's framework of 1944-1999. The German-hosted G8 Summit, under the impact of compounding crises, had just pioneered a new Cologne consensus on socially sustainable globalization that was distinctly different from the "Ronald Thatcherism" or "Washington consensus" that dominated the earlier G7 and the Bank and Fund to that day. As the G8 in 1999 was chaired by, and the G8, G7 and inaugural G20 meetings all hosted in, a Germany that was newly led by the Social Democratic party in coalition with the Greens, it was understandable that the "red" value of equity for all in outcomes, and the "green" value of intergenerational and thus ecological sustainability quickly found their way into the mission statement of the G20. Canadian Paul Martin, as chair of the first meeting, provided support from North America for these values, which were compatible with those the Clinton-Gore administration approved. Promoting global growth appealed to the many, within and outside the G7, who had not yet shared from the locomotive effects that the then American "goldilocks" economy so impressively produced. Moreover, within the financial core, an analysis of the recent crises showed many that exchange rates, liability management and international codes and standards were key issues for the G20's work.

The Constitution of the Membership

Although form substantially flowed from function, the question of how many and which actors would be admitted to the GX was the subject of vigorous dispute. The final decisions were essentially made by the U.S. Treasury Secretary and Canadian Minister of Finance. All G8 countries and China were on everyone's list. India was also a clear admit. But some lists excluded Australia, Korea, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which all made it. The Europeans succeeded in securing a place for the European Union (EU) and European Central Bank (ECB) uniquely among regional organizations. In the end, economic and especially financial capability proved decisive, as the admission of Saudi Arabia (backed by its oil resources and Middle Eastern location), and Thailand's exclusion showed.

But the G8's core mission of "open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement," transposed into the new G20, also mattered a great deal. Turkey, a consumer rather than a producer of financial security, was admitted to the G20 (but not the EU it desired), in order to sustain its character as a stable, Muslim democratic polity in a Muslin-dominated Middle East. Similarly, Indonesia had a place reserved for it once it proved that its embryonic democratic revolution, and the respect for human rights and anticorruption commitment that came with it, were for real. Asia's Malaysia was excluded, not because of its flirtation with capital controls but because its leader's autocratic treatment of its well respected finance minister defied the basic standards of democracy and the rule of law cherished by Canada's finance minister, a close colleague of his Malaysian counterpart in the Commonwealth club.

The G20 was thus born as a substantially compromised institution on all defining dimensions, into a very institutionally competitive world. But the G20 had the great benefit of its G8 maternity, and shared seminal thrust toward open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement.

The Strategic Concept of the Canadian Chair

Another benefit was the highly developed, and highly ambitious, strategic vision of its first chair, Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin. Here the G20 was seen not just as a deliberative body, but one that would encourage "the formation of consensus on international issues." (Canada 1999a). While its first crisis-bred focus was finance and its function to provide financial stability, Martin from the start aimed much more broadly. He declared: "There is virtually no major aspect of the global economy or international financial system that will be outside of the group's purview" (Canada 1999b). In his view the G20's task was "translating the benefits of globalization into higher incomes and better opportunities everywhere," including working people around the world (Beattle 1999). Six months after its first meeting Martin expanded the mandate into innovation in global governance as a whole, with the words: "It has a mandate to explore virtually every area of international finance and the potential to deal with some of its most visible and troubling aspects of today's integrated world economy — including the devastating effects of financial crises, the growing gap between the rich and poor, and the system of governance that has not kept pace with the sweeping changes taking place in the global economy" (Canada 2000b). Just before he chaired the second ministerial meeting, Martin added tackling "the broader problems associated with globalization." The G20 was thus to be a major source of political level, longer term strategic leadership, rather than a technically-oriented, limited, issue-specific forum reacting to the immediate issue of the day.

Institutionally, in the Canadian conception, the G20 would involve the chair of the IMF's Interim and Development Committees and EU to ensure the G20's work was "well integrated" with that of these existing organizations. More ambitiously, the G20 would also "help coordinate the activities of other international groups and organizations, such as the Financial Stability

Forum," "facilitate deliberations" in the IMFC, and potentially develop "common positions on complex issues…to expedite decisionmaking in other fora" (Kirton 2001). Its function was thus to be the source for the direction and development of global governance in the wider institutional world.

Internally, the G20 would have a chair firmly controlled by the G7 at the start, a two year rotational cycle for the chair, a link of its meeting to those of the G7 at the start of each year, a deputies process to prepare and support the ministerial meeting, and an ability to call on the resources of the IMF, World Bank and outside experts, and to "form working parties to examine and make recommendations" on its own.

To achieve these ambitious objectives, Canada sought an inclusive, regionally balanced group of individual countries that would focus on sharing experiences through open discussion, rather than restating fixed positions from the briefing notes for hard law bodies elsewhere or from the familiar north-south dialogue of old. Here Canada had to fend off the instincts of some to use the G20 to press the issues of the south against the north, the fears of others that its would produce a US-led "G7-ization" of the world through a forum where the South lacked the hard law protections of the IMF and World Bank, and the concerns of still others that it might lead to the G7 losing control.

Critical to the success of the new body was the decision to join by China, a weighty country that had long been internationally unengaged and that saw itself a standing between the north and south rather than as a member of either group (Kirton 2001b, Meridos and Fravel 2003). Martin's desire to use the G20 to promote better supervisory and self regulation arrangements made it easy for China to join.

The Strong Start: Berlin 1999 and Montreal 2000

Vancouver November 1999

At the first preparatory meeting in Vancouver, Canada in November 1999, G20 deputies determined, for ministerial adjustment and approval the following month in Berlin, rules of the game that would have the new body sustain, rationalize, legitimate and globalize what was neglected in the G7. The deputies agreed that the G20 should efficiently exchange ideas on the key issues of finance, build consensus on them, and then lead by example. The Group's finance ministers and central bankers would avoid the broader economic issues dealt with by the G7. There would be one ministerial meeting per year and two deputies meetings. The Bank and the Fund would provide input for the G20's work. The G20 would not be a decisionmaking forum, would work on a confidential basis, and would have no secretariat and no working groups.

Beyond this deliberately modest start, there were substantial differences about what the substantive agenda, and by implication the ambition, of the Group should be. The IMF led the tendency arguing that the G20 should focus on difficult issues where the IMF's own Executive Board had not been able to agree. The counterargument, led by Canada, was to start gently, by focusing on central issues, such as appropriate exchange rate regimes and private sector involvement, where there was substantial existing, emerging or prospective agreement among all in the group. The fledgling Group would thus tackle tough and important issues, but also build momentum for, and comfort and confidence in, the new body. Canada won its case. Nor was the IMF able to secure agreement that the G20 examine the Contingent Credit Lines (CCL), collective action clauses (CAC) for modifying bonds (where a Joint Public-Private Sector Working Group was suggested), and debt standstill, with a view to securing a G7-G20 agreement on reform. The G20 deputies also discussed exchange rates, capital account, and financial sector debt management, but broke little new ground.

The deputies finally agreed that their discussions would serve as the agenda for the ministers, where there would be only a relatively informal Chairman's concluding statement rather than a collectively drafted and agreed communique. The ministers would start, as Canada insisted, with issues where there was some reasonable prospect of an effective consensus being secured.

Berlin, December 2000

The inaugural Berlin ministerial as designed an informal, "get to know you", roundtable that would set the rules of the game, and identify the purpose of the group. Documentation for it was prepared by the Canadians as chair and the Germans as host, and only to a lesser extent by the US

Starting in the evening and proceeding for the following full day, the Group dealt with standard broad topics through an open dialogue that Martin encouraged all ministers to join. Its discussions of macroeconomic forces and prospects focused thematically on areas where the global economy as a whole was vulnerable, rather than on individual countries.

As the Canadian chair had hoped, the meeting featured free flowing discussion, even if the conclusions were familiar. However the European venue, German host and EU presence did encourage the European members to speak with a single European voice. This result reinforced the reluctance of some non-European members to add more European claimants to the club.

Once again, the IMF-led coalition, with Europe's France and Italy within, asked that the G20 deal with issues where there was no consensus in the EB, IMFC or international community. Once again, the Canadians, with Germany and the US, won with their consensus-based approach. Their victory eroded any initial hope or fear that the G20 would be a forum for the rapid legitimation of U.S.-bred, G7-approved ideas for IMF and international financial system reform. Moreover, contentious issues, such as Larry Summers' public call on the eve of the meeting for reform of the IMF, were discussed only a little, as part of the dialogue on "vulnerabilities" in the international system. The G20's agenda focused rather on exchange rate arrangements, financial sector regulation and supervision and prudential liability management, all areas, in Paul Martin's judgment, "of architectural reform in which national governments working collectively have become increasingly prepared to take the steps required to reduce vulnerabilities to crises" (Canada 2000a)

Having resisted capture by either the IMF and France or the G7 and the US, the meeting made some small progress in bridging the old north-south or potential established- emerging economy divide. On issues such as codes, an "anglo-saxon"/German project, Canada and the US were encouraged that the Turks and others appeared to agree, rather than voicing the hesitations they had aired in the IMFC and IMF. The developing countries, much more modestly, viewed the meeting as a way to learn and to exchange views rather than as a negotiation from which decisions would come.

The G20 ministerial in itself did not immediately and clearly change any minds on the part of resistant emerging economies about the issues of transparency, codes, and governance. These issues the three anglophone countries (the US, UK and Canada), usually backed by Germany and to a lesser extent Japan, regarded as the foundation of a new international financial architecture. Following the meeting, China and Brazil continued to express their deep concerns about IMF programs and, along with Mexico and Argentina, about strong conditions imposed from an external source. Partly as a result, the G20 ended by creating no working groups. Yet all G20 countries agreed to ask the IMF and World Bank to examine how their national financial rules measured up to international standards and how they might be strengthened. Open deliberation had thus generated a balanced consensus leading to one clear decision, on codes, and a minimal form of developing global governance, to follow up with the request to the IMF and World Bank. It was a promising start, if not quite the "important breakthrough in the establishment of generally accepted principles of global governance" that the Canadian host optimistically claimed (Canada 2000b).

Hong Kong, March 2000

G20 deputies met in Hong Kong in March 2000 to review the results of Berlin and begin preparations for the next ministerial, to be held in Montreal, Canada on October 24-25, 2000. The G20 could claim first mover advantage, for the deputies met just prior to the IMFC deputies preparing for the first ever IMFC meeting at the semi-annual Bank-Fund meeting, in mid-April 2000. The G20 deputies proved to be pleased with the results of Berlin. This led the Canadian chair to adopt a more ambitious approach to the second ministerial in Montreal. Canadian ambitions were further fuelled by the somewhat disappointing experience of the G20's major competitor organization, the IMFC, at the latter's inaugural outing in Washington (Kirton 2001).

Toronto, August 2000

At the subsequent G20 deputies meeting, in Toronto in August, there were strong signs that the fledgling G20 had secured real buy in from its major emerging market members. Russia was more energized. South Africa was very active. From the Muslim world, Indonesia was variable and the Saudis good team players. Above all China, having just decided on international engagement with its decision to join the WTO, was a strong supporter of both the G20 forum and the preferred Canadian approach.

Montreal, October 2000

At the Montreal ministerial in October 2000, the G20 moved beyond the narrow, often technical issues of finance, to confront the broad problematique of globalization, and assure those outside the G7, many within, and global civil society, that their concerns were being heard, understood and addressed. The G20 took its first major step into normative governance, by setting new directions in global economic, social and ecological governance as a whole (Kirton 2001).

At its first meeting in Berlin, G20 ministers had come to consensus on a core agenda, an identification of the problem, and an agreement to work by cooperation on standards and rules, if not regulations, on international and domestic banking and private sector involvement. As the first year unfolded the G20 generated a growing consensus that the G20 was needed, that there were serious social costs to globalization that must be addressed through new initiatives, and that new limits must be set. A more precise consensus emerged that codes and standards were needed, that they could be shaped by developed and developing countries working together, and the principle that the private sector must to some degree accept risk and be involved in the solution. There was also a consensus on exchange rates and mechanisms, with all agreeing that different approaches and mechanisms were required in different circumstances. Yet this emerging G20 consensus had not yet changed what member representatives argued within the Executive Board of the IMF or World Bank

The Canadian chair and emerging country members felt strongly that there was a shared interest in reducing the social costs of globalization, and involving civil society in the task of determining how to do so. They thus had the broad topic of globalization form the centerpiece of the G20's Montreal agenda. Here Canada was supported by Britain and Australia, and opposed by a France still protective of the prerogatives of the IMF. The US, while not wanting to undermine its hard law veto at the IMF and World Bank in favour of a freewheeling forum where it was just one of twenty equal members, was comforted by the chair being held by its North American neighbour, and persuaded by intellectual arguments in favour of the Canadian approach.

Procedurally, the Canadians sought highly interactive sessions, with no distractions from social, bilateral or G7-specific sessions. Institutionally, they sought to secure the future of the forum by identifying its meeting schedule and chair for the following year. Substantively they sought to secure a concluding recognition that globalization had two sides — the finance and economic side and the social side, including health, education, welfare and employment.

Martin felt very strongly that civil society organizations (CSOs) were raising real issues. He agreed, as chair, to meet NGO's before the G20 meeting, and bring those views into the G20 meeting itself. While Martin personally wanted to do more, there was no consensus on having representatives of CSOs involved in the G20.

The deliberations proved to be spontaneous and substantive, dealing with four themes: responses to the challenges of globalization; the state of the world economy; action on an FSF presentation; and followup on means to reduce vulnerability to crises.

The discussion on globalization was an open, even soul searching exchange about the reasons for the reactions to globalization that members were witnessing, and what the G20 could do to better engage the opponents. Participants spoke of the marginalization of many countries in the globalization process, the insecurity that bred, the invisibility of the benefits of globalization, the increasing the distance between winners and losers, and the increased demand for redistribution and insurance. Yet as globalization made it more difficult for governments to tax their citizens and corporations, who would otherwise leave, governments had less money to meet these demands. One result was a loss of control, as individuals and institutions beyond borders and beyond the electoral process were seemingly making decisions that affected people, without direct accountability to the populations of sovereign states. Globalization was infringing on sovereignty, and in the view of one participant, leading to the victory of the Anglo-Saxon model of economic and social organization.

All agreed the challenge to globalization was increasing, would continue to do so, and would require constructive action by the international community. While there was no simple solution, current developments must be put into perspective to show the gains, and more active energetic efforts taken to reduce the imbalances globalization created. The G20 must deal aggressively with trade, including the impediments to access in industrial country markets, ensure that the rules kept pace with global integration, deal with poverty, including through increases in ODA, and speak forcefully on these issues.

The discussion on the state of the world economy, centered on a presentation of the World Economic Outlook by the Chief Economist of the IMF, saw some divergence about the importance and implications of the US current account deficit. Here the US and one G7 central bank governor saw little risk in the new world of private sector dominated capital flows. Two continental European G7 governors countered that the combined European and US deficits and their exchange rates posed important risks. The developing countries generally backed the Europeans, arguing that turbulence in G7 exchange markets was a significant problem for their economic growth, and needed to be limited in some way. Both G7 and developing countries expressed concerned about the price and volume of oil, but agreed prices were driven by political rather than economic factors. The oil exporters argued that prices should fall once these short term political driven developments passed.

Andrew Crockett led the discussion on the new FSF activities of market liquidity and volatility; .e-finance, and the wind up of complex instruments such as hedge funds. Some argued that the FSF should expand its membership, and that if it failed to do so, it should be required to report to the more inclusive G20.

The last session, on reducing vulnerability to crises, dealt once again with standards and codes, external liabilities, exchange rate regulation, and private sector involvement. On standards and codes there was some concern about too rigid a process, with developing countries arguing that there should be more than one model. It was also innovatively suggested that there should be standards on the delivery of official development assistance (ODA). On exchange rates there were polar extremes, but more support for believing that floating exchange rates were the only viable long range option. As floating involved a concern with exchange rates, some intervention was consistent with this approach. The US finally gave a very positive assessment of the prospects for the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) legislation being passed by Congress, as it subsequently was.

The Montreal meeting was important in the deliberative domain, in making the G20 a more comprehensive centre of global governance. The G20's agenda went well beyond the hard-core finance subjects of crisis response, architecture construction, and stability to embrace debt, development assistance, trade liberalization, health, agriculture, the environment, and social policy. As Martin importantly noted, its agenda would make the conclusions of Montreal the subject of discussion among many other ministers in national governments. It was also an agenda whose breadth, and arguably ambition, was appropriate for G20 leaders themselves collectively to address.

Montreal was also important for the new principled and normative directions it set. It offered what Martin called the "Montreal consensus" on globalization with shared benefits and social protections for all. The Montreal consensus, much like the G8's 1999 Cologne consensus before it, consisted of an interlinked and balanced affirmation of three central points: that globalization was good for all; that its benefits had to be more broadly shared; and that the poor had to be protected from its costs (Kirton, Daniels and Freytag 2001). In the new normative trilogy, liberalization, stability and equity through protection had an equal place.

Yet the Montreal consensus importantly moved the Cologne consensus into and beyond a representative group of consequential developed and developing countries, and hastened the global normative shift from a singular focus on stabilizing the global economy to the need to share its benefits and safeguard the poor. Montreal was also the first time that the enormously diverse and influential countries assembled in the G20 all affirmed that globalization was the proper direction for them individually and the global community as a whole to take. Coming in the immediate wake of the 1997-9 global financial crisis and embracing countries such as China and Saudi Arabia, this acceptance was remarkable indeed. Yet the effectiveness of the emerging economies voice, and the important of the distributional dimension, was heard in the communiqué passages calling for "improved access for developing countries exports to advanced economies markets," and affirming that "Governments have an important role to play." The consensus of embedded liberalism had returned to triumph over the "Ronald Thatcherism" that has displaced it during the two decades before (Ruggie 1983).

Perhaps most importantly, the concept of globalization endorsed by the G20 was broadly defined as "the increasing integration of national economies resulting from the greater international mobility of goods, services, capital, people and ideas." It was thus far more than the mere economic liberalization at the heart of the neo-liberal "Washington consensus" of old. Indeed, it was infused with political content, in its celebration of globalization's generation of "greater access to ideas." The G20's normative contribution to globalizing the G8's core value of "open democracy' had begun.

Of less prominence and potency on the surface were the specific commitments made at Montreal. Little new was contained in the promises to improve the effectiveness, transparency, and co-operative spirit of international institutions. The steps on the international financial architecture, detailed in an annex, represented at best small steps forward, although the emphasis on implementation was a useful reminder of the work that remained. Of more magnitude, coming from finance ministers with great influence on national budget expenditures, was the recognition that "emerging market economies should be supported with technical assistance" and the pledge to "contribute to international efforts to increase the provision of other public goods" regarding infectious disease, agricultural research, and the environment. The passage on HIPCs reaffirmed the need for a sharp focus on poverty reduction and economic reforms, and added a veiled reference for the need for the U.S. to contribute its share. Here the G20 finance ministers moved into the realm of mobilizing money to put into effect their principles and promises, with an emphasis on transferring new G8 money to the poor.

Also significant were the institutional processes the G20 put in place. The agreement to have two deputies meeting and one ministerial meeting (time and place to be determined) in the following year represented a weakened continuation of the year-one pattern, rather than a move to a more dense schedule. It did, however, ensure that the G20 had become a permanent body, with an agenda — guiding globalization — to give it a rationale, well beyond the initial crisis response and architectural reconstruction, once the 1997-9 crisis had passed. Moreover, with Paul Martin apparently chairing the body for another full year and thus prospectively hosting the 2001 ministerial, the body could be guided by an enthusiastic and effective chair as it went through its third year. In addition, the ministerial mandated three follow-on processes: a series of case studies of real-world countries' experiences in being affected by and responding to globalization, aimed at providing a common diagnosis and balanced evaluation to advance the debate and identify key factors; a study of international institutions, conducted by G20 deputies, to look at the gaps and overlaps and functional responsibilities for global governance; and a G20 seminar on exchange rate regimes aimed at providing concrete advice to guide real-world decisions. Private-sector representatives would be involved in these activities, as they had been when G20 deputies met in Toronto in August. It was clear that the emphasis had shifted from Berlin's directions to other international institutions, to Montreal's development of the G20 as an institution in its own right.

The G20's Institutional and Normative Evolution and Impact

Since its strong start in its first two years, the G20 has produced a mixed performance in both the institutional and normative domain. Institutionally, it has done much to develop internally as a balanced, full function, soft law institution of equals. But it has done less to reach out beyond the international institutions in which it was nested to involve other increasingly consequential countries in its expanding governance tasks. In the normative domain, it has extended throughout its membership at least formal adherence to the G8's core principles of open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, and spread the compromises first incubated in a G7 context throughout the G20 and then into the multilateral hard law institutions of the Bretton Woods bodies and the UN. But this G20 normative consensus has come primarily when its G7 members have been internally divided, and then come in the first instance to an accommodation among themselves that it is minimally compatible with the preferences of the emerging countries in the G20. The G20 has thus embryonically served as a potential court-of-appeal that has induced G7 members to come to prior consensus among themselves, rather than air their full divisions in a broader group. The active engagement and public assent of the G20 has also been useful in reinforcing the more balanced G7-bred consensus that has first come, in invigorating the work program of outside institutions, in working with other forces to foster hard law outcomes favoured by the emerging members at the WTO and UN on trade and development issues, and in this sense giving a real role to the systemically significant countries in shaping global governance outcomes. The G20 has in particular helped the G8's smaller, most economically open, and resource dependent economies, led by Canada, secure within the G8 their preferences on principles and consequent actions that were at first only a minority within the G8 club. But there is still no strong evidence that the G20 has enabled its systemically-significant members to initiative norms or collective decisions of any consequence that have altered an existing consensus within the G8, or shaped outcomes in other institutions and the wider world where a united G8 has been opposed. Nor has it, in cases such as successfully concluding the Doha Development Agenda by its specified deadline, helped the G8 succeed on matters where it has performed well in the past but is now widely thought to be impotent in acting alone.

This pattern suggests that the G20 — at the finance ministers and the leaders' level — needed the G8, and a G8 that goes first — to make an autonomous contribution to global governance. It further suggests that a G20 leaders forum should be constructed in such a way as to avoid the temptation for G8 leaders to delay or otherwise duck tough issues that they have successfully dealt with in the past, on the grounds that these issues should now be dealt with by a G20 Summit, where the onus will be on a much more diverse and disparate group of systemically important countries to deliver and claim the responsibility for success or failure. The failed Montebello-to-Cancun-to global negotiations cadence of 1981, the failure of a G20-like group at the autumn 1982 ministerial, and the failure thus far to deliver Doha in a world where the leader's G8 has recently backed off in favour of the two G20's that now exist, underscores the importance of forging a properly tight and appropriately sequenced G8-G20 link.

Institutionalization

During its first half decade in operation, the G20 has done much to develop internally as a "thicker', still flexible, innovative institution of 20 equal members, performing effectively in the deliberative, directional, decisional and development of global governance domains.

Its first accomplishment has been to meet the liberal-institutionalist standard of providing a predictable transaction point, with a lengthening shadow of the future, from which efficient interaction, transparency and trust can come. As Appendix A shows, the G20 has evolved into an institution that meets at the ministerial level once a year, in the autumn, for a two-day event that begins with an opening dinner and continues for the full next day. It has largely avoided the distractions of social events or of subgroups caucusing on a G8, emerging economy or other basis. However, the Moreila ministerial in 2003 saw an outburst of bilateral activity, especially on the part of the Americans, that affected the tenor and public impact the meeting had. The G20 has also "self-institutionalized", by increasingly declaring at the end of one meeting who would host and chair the next year. At Moreila in 2003, it decided who would do so for the subsequent two years.

From a bifurcated beginning, the G20 has come to give the chair and hosting to a single country for a full year. In doing so it has increasingly acquired G8-emerging country balance, as the hosting/chairing by G8 members Canada and Germany during the first three years have passed to emerging member India in 2002, Mexico in 2003, Germany in 2004 and China in 2005. To be sure, the move from G8-hosted gatherings did make the Indian-hosted meeting less well attended than the others. But the back-to-back chairing by India and Mexico has done much to restore balance more broadly after the three-year start in the G8. The most recent Mexico-Germany-China cadence suggests that an annual G8-emerging country rotation for hosting/chairing has become the new procedural norm. The G20 is thus moving steadily from being an institutionally G8-dominated to a fully balanced G8-emerging country club. This is particularly the case if one notes that Canada's 2001 chairing was a result of the September 11th terrorist crisis, which made some G20 members reluctant to travel for a long meeting in a distant locale such as India. The fact that the 2001 meeting was held at all, and held in North America, was a sure sign of the G20's institutional resilience under crisis, and a visible display of global faith in a shaken North America now under attack. The Ottawa meeting showed that the G20 was needed by all its members, including the US, in the radically different post-911 world. It also indicated that the US needed the assistance of the G20, and in particular its emerging members, to win the new "war" into which it had suddenly and brutally been thrust.

The hosting-chairing sequence further speaks, in a political science version of the economists "revealed preference," of the G20's success in furthering its seminal if nascent norms. Unlike the G6-7-8, and unlike APEC at the 1989 ministerial or 1993 leaders level, it is noteworthy that in the G20, the United States, and other G8 members France, Britain and Japan appear nowhere in the existing or intended hosting-chairing sequence. This represents a realization of the seminal Canadian instinct to have the new body not appear as an American designed and dominated project. Yet it also raises questions about the existing and prospective buy in of major G8 members, with their privileges at and preferences for the IMF and IMFC.

The hosting/chairing sequence also shows some success in regional representativeness. Among G8 members, the German and Canadian contributions weigh Europe and North America proportionally as much as the G8 does. The German anomaly — of hosting in 1999 and chairing in 2004 — does, however, do little to comfort American concerns about the undue Eurocentricity of the 1944-15 institutions, and of the subsequently created "G's" from the G10 to the G8. Among non-G8 members, where emerging countries rather than developed Australia or oil rich Saudi Arabia have been selected, Asia with India and China has been the big winner. The Americas, with Mexico, have had a place as well. While this regional balance may roughly correlate with regional weight in the world economy, the omission of the Middle East and Africa stands out.

The sequence also suggests the primacy of the various principles that account for membership, and by extension prominence, in the club. Among G8 members, the Canadian-German combination suggests that the G20 is particularly committed to rendering more prominent those systemically important countries that were, for various reasons, awarded less than first tier positions in the organizations created in 1944-45. In the case of the emerging members, the selection of India first, Mexico second and China only third points to the primacy of the principle of durable, developed democracy, over raw capability or vulnerability of systemic importance. With 12% of India's 1.1 billion people being of Muslin faith, it may also speak to the embryonic importance of domestic diversity in language, culture and religion, and of the need for multicultural dialogue and tolerance, especially in a post-September 11th world.

The G20's Deliberative Performance

The performance of the fledgling institution should be first assessed, especially given its seminal purpose of open dialogue, as a deliberative forum aimed at a free exchange of views among its members, with transparency, trust, understanding and an emerging consensus on legitimate and key issues as the key results. As Appendix B shows, when measured by its collective, public product released to the world in the written record at the end of each ministerial meeting, the G20's deliberative record has been mixed. From its slender start at Berlin in 1999, with a communiqué of only six paragraphs and no substantive annexes, it soared at Montreal in 2000 to produced a communiqué of 14 paragraphs, and a substantive annex of 24 paragraphs more. Crisis-afflicted Ottawa in 2001 saw a sharp drop to 9 paragraphs, but came with an Action Plan, on terrorist finance, that added another 22 paragraphs. The subsequent two meetings have held steady at a 9-10 paragraph communiqué, with no annexes.

This initial indication of declining performance, however, is strongly qualified by a closer look at the issues on the agenda, and the iteration and innovation this agenda contains. At first glance, the individual issues on the agenda show the same cadence of a slow start in 1999, with only five issues on the agenda, a great leap forward in 2000 with 19, and then a fall off in crisis-ridden 2001 to 13. But there was a rapid return to a high level and thus broad agenda, in 2002 with 19 and in 2003 with 18 issues discussed. More importantly, as befits a flexible forum for free exchange, there has been a major expansion of the agenda, with 13 new issues added in 2000, 4 in 2001, 3 in 2002 and 6 in 2003. There has also been some selectivity, with many earlier issues being dropped in 2001, 2002 and 2003.

Taken together, the G20 has thus featured a core agenda of three subjects discussed at every meeting — global economic growth and conditions, trade liberalization, and international codes and standards. Apart from crisis-ridden 2001, two other subjects — financial system vulnerability and crisis response and prevention (– the initial focus for the forum –) can be added to the list. The 2000 great leap forward added two items that have survived — poverty reduction and development assistance. 2001 added terrorist finance as a continuing item. 2003 brought the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)/New Plan for African Development (NEPAD).

This evolution in the core agenda shows that the initial financial crisis-inspired focus on the G8 agenda of growth-trade-codes, quickly added (in 2000) the emerging economy agenda of poverty reduction and development assistance, and, a year later, the "American and all allies" agenda of terrorist finance. In much the same way as the G7 Summit, the G20 thus expanded from an economic into a development and then political-security one. Terrorism on aircraft providing the spur for this "politicization" G20 in its third year, just as it had for the G7 Summit in its fourth year with the issue of "skyjacking" at Bonn in 1978. In addition, the rather neo-liberal agenda of growth-trade-and codes quickly passed into a distributive agenda of development, then a "common enemies" (or "public bads") agenda of terrorism and crime, and finally an embryonic democratization-as-good governance agenda with the addition of NEPAD in 2002. At the same time, the agenda moved from general issues such as globalization, into more specific, targeted, and action-oriented concerns, including country-specific crisis response, as in the case of Argentina. However many of Canada's social policy expansions at Montreal — notably the public goods of health, agriculture, the environment and social safety nets — have quickly been purged.

The G20's Directional Performance

The normative evolution and impact of the G20 can be assessed by tracing its development of publicly declared consensus principles on the three dimensions of distribution, embedded liberalism under globalization and democratization, against the G20's core values of stability, growth and equity, and the G8's comparable trilogy of open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement.

Since its start the G20 has constantly affirmed that its ultimate core values or targets are those of stability, growth and equity. As the 1999 communique noted, the G20 sought "to achieve stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all." Ottawa 2001 extended this to "growth, equity, and well-being for all our peoples." New Delhi in 2002 ended with "a more stable, prosperous, and equitable global economy." This constant core normative commitment stands in considerable contrast to the G8's equivalent, "constitutional" normative trilogy of "open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement." Yet over the first five years, the G20 has come much closer to the G8's core normative commitment, through significant G20 extensions toward a new consensus on embedded liberalism under globalization in the economic and social domain, and on open democracy, if not individual liberty, in the political sphere.

The first normative evolution came in regard to distribution or equity, as Appendix D charts. 1999's sparse distributional principle of "growth that benefits all" expanded in 2000 to a focus on income inequality, poverty reduction, and benefits to the poorest countries, most vulnerable groups of society all members as individuals. 2001 brought minor extensions, 2002 a specific attachment to the MDGs and 2003 a "fairness" norm. The strong sustained commitment to delivering benefits to the poorest, most vulnerable and all members of global society is clear.

A second normative development came in regard to embedded liberalism under conditions of globalization (Ruggie 1983). This centered on changes in major values related to international opening/closure and domestic opening/closure and adaptation/strengthening, and the balance between the two. As outlined in Appendix E, international openness has been a constant value. It started with trade liberalization, added globalization in general in 2000, extended to "well" and then "appropriately" sequenced capital account opening in 2000 and 2002, and added the internally interventionist principle of "no safe haven" for terrorists from 2001 onward, and internal access to combat financial abuse in 2003. Yet this normative attachment to expansive forms of international openness was tempered from the start with a strong emphasis on domestic protections by national governments. These started in 1999 with sound economic and financial policies that could differ by country, and extended in 2001 to domestic government's important role in producing policies that spread benefits to all and promoted social safety nets to protect the vulnerable. As the initial financial crisis of 1997-9 was superseded by the terrorist crisis of 2001, the domestic emphasis shifted to sound policies that accorded with international best practices, sound structural policies, and efficient and solid markets. Yet these domestically adaptive neo-liberal additions were balanced by an equally strong extension into strong institutions, sound social policies, investments in infrastructure and human capital and appropriate management of the process of reform. Taken together, the overall emphasis had shifted from the question of "how much and what can and should a national government domestically protect" to what national governments should domestically build. And the embryonic additions of environmental values in 1999 and 2000 were soon ended, stopping the G20 from evolving into the consensus on embedded ecologism that had become a hallmark of the G8 (Kirton 2002b).

The third normative development came in regard to "open democracy." As Appendix F shows, the G20 started in 1999 on the fragile foundation of "transparency" alone. But in 2000 it quickly added international mobility and citizen's access to outside ideas in all countries of the world. Since 2001 "good governance" has formed the new core, with long democratic India's ministerial in 2002 adding accountability, worldwide surveillance, the rule of law, support for NEPAD and information and knowledge exchange. Although Mexico's ministerial in 2003 saw some fall off, the generic principle of "good governance" remained firmly in place.

Even more important was the way the G20 progressively linked these principles in an ever tighter causal model. The major move came in 2001, when the communiqué stated: "To obtain the full benefits of globalization, our governments have a *critical* role in creating well-developed domestic institutions, good governance and sound domestic macroeconomic, social, and structural policies. As reflected in the Montreal Consensus, by sustaining such policies we *ensure* that our economies are better able to maximize the contribution of open markets to growth, equity and well being for our peoples" (emphasis added). 2002 proclaimed that "strong institutions, a climate that fosters savings and investment, transparency, and the rule of law, coupled with increased investments in infrastructure and human capital in developing countries, are *essential* ingredients for promoting growth and reducing poverty" (emphasis added). 2003 declared that "The G-20 is uniquely placed to deepen the linkages between aid, good governance, financing and trade." In the G20's consensus, democracy in the form of good governance and the rule of law had thus become instrumentally essential to produce the ultimate goals of growth, equity, social well-being and poverty reduction. The G20 has also become essential to forge the liberalized trade, aid and finance for development, and democratic good governance link.

The G20's Decisional Performance

The G20 has also come to put in a respectable performance in the decisional realm. As Appendix G displays, since the start the G20 ministerial meeting have generated a steady stream of collective commitments, with the dip to only two in 2002 followed by a bounce back to six in 2003. However, the level is well below that of the G8 Summit during its early years, and that of most G7 Finance ministers' sessions from 1999 to 2003 (notably the average of 15 per meeting from April 20, 2002 to May 17, 2003). Moreover there has been no trend to a rising decisional performance in recent years. Indeed, if the commitments in the Annexes are included, 2001 stands out as the great peak and outlier, by virtue of its Action Plan on terrorist finance. The increasing performance of the G20 as a deliberative and directional body has not yet clearly extended into the decisional domain.

The G20's Development of Global Governance

At the same time, the G20 has done much to develop global governance, both as an institution in its own right, and as one that has provides direction and support to an expanding array of other institutions in the world. Internally, the G8 has made increasing reference to its past and future, monitoring its follow up on past directions and decisions, and giving itself "remit mandates" to return to specified subjects in future years. It has also moved to mobilize money to back its promises. While no comprehensive audit of the G20 members' compliance with their commitments has yet been conducted, these internal, mechanisms for self-binding support a respectable compliance performance.

The G20 has also done much to institutionally "thicken." In its vibrant deputies' process, senior officials meet twice a year to follow up and prepare for the ministerials. The G20 has conducted a rich set of workshops and conferences, and involved the private sector, on specified subjects.

At the level of the ministers, the G20's performance has been mixed. In the Darwinian world of international institutional competition and selection, it is surviving well, as more influential individuals favour the G20 taking over the FSF, and understand the skepticism developing countries have of an IMFC dominated by the G7. More than the G8, it has regularly welcomed presentations by the heads of international organizations, and most recently by the head of an American-based "think tank." This is consistent with its emphasis on deliberation and direction-setting, as opposed to the decisionmaking of the G7 and G8. Yet unlike the G8, the G20 has done nothing to include outside countries, on even a partial and flexible basis, in its forum. Far more than the UNSC or G6/7/8, the G20 has been a closed club that no-one else can join or even participate in, regardless of their claim to relevance in the changing world from 1999 to 2004 (See Appendix I).

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the G20 growing is the role it has played in developing an alternative to the IMF proposed, US-backed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) as a way of dealing preventatively with the destructive defaults of the Argentinian sort. The G20 had an important role, second only to the G7, in securing acceptance of a voluntary, market based Collective Action Clause (CAC) mechanism, rather than a mandatory, intergovernmentally driven SDRM. The G7 then asked the G20 to play the major role in the second stage of developing a voluntary code of conduct that would outline the rules of the game and, unlike in the Argentina case, let everyone know in advance what should and would take place when a sovereign borrower faced default. The G20 was chosen because it was thought to be a balanced group of debtors and creditors, unlike an IMF and IMFC seen as the captive of G7 creditors and that has much less ongoing contact than the G20 with relevant stakeholders such as policymakers at the banks, controllers of the currencies, financial market operators and supervisors. Even with this recent success, those within the G20 prefer to keep it as a technical, intimate, club, rather than push it into a leader's level forum with the large decisionmaking burdens, stress and global attention that such a body would inevitably involve. Should such a G20 Summit emerge, it will thus need a pull from the leaders outside, rather than flow naturally from a push from below on the part of those within.

Conclusion

From this record, it is clear that the G20 was created as a consequence of American and allied leadership as a consensus-oriented forum of systemically significant global countries with a mission to prevent financial, economic and resulting crises, and to institute the social protections that would make globalization work more equitably and assuredly for the benefit of all. It got off to a strong start in its first two years, especially with a great leap forward in its institutional and normative contribution, and in its deliberative, directional and development of global governance performance at its second meeting, in Montreal in 2000. The shock of September 11th showed its resilience, legitimacy and necessity in the judgment of its members. For the G20 held its third meeting in Ottawa in the immediate aftermath of the attack on North America, and shifted its deliberative agenda, normative directions of domestic intervention to fight common enemies, decisional commitment to collective action, and development of global governance to the fight against terrorism and crime in the global security field. These achievements have largely endured, even as hosting has passed from G8 to emerging country members in India in 2001 and Mexico in 2003. Montreal in 2000 showed the influence which the smallest G7 member, Canada, has in the G20. Ottawa in 2001 showed its importance to the largest G8 member — a shocked and highly vulnerable America now under attack. New Delhi 2002, with its strong emphasis on both development and democracy indicated that the G20's most democratic and second most powerful emerging country member could also be influential in shaping the still fledgling forum, to bring its values of equity together with those of open democracy at the core of the G8 club.

Yet there are still few signs that the G20 has become, or is even trending toward becoming, an institution strong enough to replace the G7/8 at the level of either the finance ministers or leaders themselves. In particular, its decisional performance has been weak. In developing global governance, unlike the G8 system, it has shown no sign of involving other portfolio ministers in its existing forums, nor of inspiring colleagues in other portfolio's to constructs G20's of their own. And while doing well in involving international organizations and civil society think tanks, it has completely frozen outside countries out.

The overall cadence of the first half decade shows that the G20 has served as the essential connector, transmitting G8 principles into a commensurate consensus among a broader array of consequential countries, and then pushing that consensus into and through a wide array of multilateral institutions, both formal and informal, in the economic and security fields. Most noteworthy has been G20's move from its normative core of stability, growth and equity, toward its adoption of the G8's charter principles of open democracy and social advancement, if not individual liberty, and if only as essential instruments to reach the G20 target trilogy rather than as ultimate values in their own right. Even so, a consensus incubated in the G8, then broadened and reinforced in the G20, has thus helped set the pace and path for the diffusion of democratic norms and behaviour in the broader multilateral world.

The G20 has served as an intervening institutional variable through its role in driving normative consensus in particular directions, when the G8 members have been divided and when the G20's lesser members have found it useful to have a broader constituency to back their case. Yet essential to its success has been its pattern of working closely with the similarly constructed, much longer experienced, and much more cohesive G8, in support of the principles of transparency, openness, democracy, social advancement, and equity that that G8 shares at its institutional core.

The most likely emergence of and contribution from a leader's-level G20 is thus as an outgrowth of the G8's sustained twenty-first century move to outreach and inclusion, in the global strengthening of the core G8 principles of open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, under a steady succession of shocks to these values that the G8 and other institutions cannot eliminate on their own. The time is thus ripe for a leader's level G20 to be born, as an outward looking G8 reinforcement, in the specific form than plays to these particular strengths.

Probably the easiest and most productive way to bring a G20 Summit to life is to hold it in the immediate lead up to, or as the first part of, a regular, or even special inter-sessional G8 Summit, along the lines that all twenty first century G8 Summit's have already done with regional leaders from Africa and the Middle East and with a larger select group of leading countries from around the world. Such a G20 Summit could indeed have a single issue focus, ideally one similar to the thematic emphasis of the G8 Summit, as did the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit that culminated in a joint session with invited African leaders.

Such a gathering, as at Rambouillet in 1975, could usefully be presented as an ad hoc one-off event, in part to make it easier to add to, or even adjust, the existing G20 membership to deal more optimally with the specific single issue at hand. For example, a G20 gathering focused on terrorism, and concerned generally about the G20's global weight in population and geographic representation, might do well, despite the additional transaction costs, to add Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt — countries with far less functional relevance should completing the WTO's Doha Development Agenda be the issue at hand. Moreover the desire to support the normative democratization of the G20, and the effectiveness as its link in taking the democratic revolution from its G8 core to global governance as a whole would reinforce the Nigerian claim. It is unlikely that the existing G20, picked as a result of the financial crisis in 1999, will be the optimally constructed permanent group to globally govern all subjects for all time. But as with the G4/5/6/7, growing upward from the finance ministers to the leaders' level, and outward from the "Berlin dinner four" to a regionally representative and globally weighty G7, from 1973 to 1977, it would be best for the G20 Summit to remain flexible and potentially open to others in its early years.

The G8's Sea Island Summit of June 2004 suggests the moment may be at hand to give birth to a G8 Summit begun this way. Sea Island showed an America willing to listen, learn and adjust to the priorities and perspectives of its G8 partners, to address a broad range of global issues, and to include 13 outside leaders, from the Middle East and Africa, for a dialogue with the G8. Both the G8 leaders and their guests found the dialogue productive, despite the rather late decision to add it to the long scheduled G8. Moreover at Sea Island there was a consensus among all the G8 leaders, virtually all of whom had been meeting with outside leaders at all their G8 Summits for the past four years, that its would be valuable to expand participation in the G8. Yet as with the perennial debate over UN Security Council reform, they then became deadlocked over which and how many new members. The use of an upgraded version of the existing G20 would solve this impasse. The G20 has already proven its worth on the subjects — Africa and financing for development, if not sustainable development and climate change — that will be the focus of the G8 at the Gleneagles Summit of July 5-8, 2005. A G20-G8 dialogue at Gleneagles could also address the vital question, core to both the G8 and G20's seminal agenda, of the reform of the international financial system — a subject that the G8 alone neglected as the world marked the 60th anniversary of the creation of the Bretton Woods principles, rules, decisionmaking procedures and institutions in 2004.

References

Bayne, Nicholas (2003), "Impressions of the Evian Summit, 1-3 June 2003," G8 Information Centre, www.g8.utoronto.ca.

Bayne, Nicholas (2000), *Hanging in There: The G7 and G8 Summit in Maturity and Renewal*, Ashgate: Aldershot.

Beattle, Alan (1999), "New forum to supplement G7 work," Financial Times, September 27, p. 5.

Beauchesne (1999) as cited in Kirton (2001)

Bergsten, Fred and Randall Henning (1996*), Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven,* (Washington, D.C.; Institute for International Economics).

Bradford, Colin and Johannes Linn (2004), "Global Economic Governance at a Crossroads: Replacing the G-7 with the G-20," *The Brookings Institution Policy Brief* 131 (April)

Bryant, Ralph (2003), *Turbulent Waters: Cross-Border Finance and International Governance*, (Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D. C.).

Canada (2000a), "Statement by the Honourable Paul Martin, Minister of Finance for Canada, to the Institute for International Economics," Washington, D.C., April 14. Finance Canada.

Canada (2000b), "Speech to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade: The Honourable Paul Martin," Ottawa, May 18, Finance Canada.

Canada, G20 (2000). 'News Release'. Montreal, 25 October. <www.g8.utoronto.ca/g20/montrealoct252000.htm> (February 2001).

Canada (1999a), New G-20 Forum: Backgrounder, Canada, Department of Finance, www.g7.utoronto.ca

Canada (1999b), Department of Finance Press Release, September 25, 1999.

Crockett, Andrew (2004), "Progress Towards Greater International Financial Stability," in David Vines and Christopher L. Gilbert, eds., *The IMF and its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture,* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), pp. 36-58.

Culpepper, Roy (2000). 'Systemic Reform at a Standstill: A Flock of Gs in Search of Global Financial Stability'. Paper presented at Critical Issues in Financial Reform: Latin-American/Caribbean and Canadian Perspectives, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1–2 June. Toronto.

Financial Stability Forum (1999), "First meeting of the Financial Stability Forum," Press Release, April 6.

Foster, Peter (2003), "Far More New Faces Than new Ideas," *National Post* December 13.

G7 (1999a), *G7 Statement*, June 18 at www.g7.utoronto.ca.

G7 (1999b), Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, September 25, 1999, Washington, D.C. www.g7.utoronto.ca

Hajnal, Peter (1999), The G7/G8 System: Evolution, Role and Documentation, (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Heinbecker, Paul (2004), as quoted in Shawn McCarthy, "Canada still supports UN, Graham Says," *Globe and Mail* May 1.

Helleiner, Gerald (2001), "Markets, Politics, and Globalization: Can the Global Economy be Civilized?" in *Global Governance* 7, (July-September): 243-264.,

Johnson, Pierre Marc (2001), "Creating Sustainable Global Governance," in John Kirton, Joseph Daniels and Andreas Freytag, eds., *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty First Century,* (Ashgate: Aldershot). G20 (2000), pp. 245–282.

Johnson, Pierre Marc (2000). 'Beyond Trade: The Case for a Broadened International Governance Agenda'. *Policy Matters* vol. 1, no. 3 (June), pp. 4–36.

Kirton, John (2002a), "Guiding Global Economic Governance: The G20, G7 and IMF at century's Dawn," in John Kirton and George Von Furstenberg, eds., *New Directions in Global Economic Governance*, (Ashgate: Aldershot).

Kirton, John (2002b), "Embedded Ecologism and Institutional Inequality: Linking Trade, Environment, and Social Cohesion in the G8," pp. 45-71, in John Kirton and Virginia Maclaren, eds., *Linking Trade, Environment and Social Cohesion: NAFTA Experiences, Global Challenges (*Aldershot: Ashgate).

Kirton, John J. (2001a). 'The G20: Representativeness, Effectiveness, and Leadership in Global Governance'. In J. J. Kirton, J. P. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, pp. 143–172. Ashgate, Aldershot.

Kirton, John (2001b), "The G7/8 and China: Toward a Close Association," in John Kirton, Joseph Daniels and Andreas Freytag, eds.*, Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty First Century*, (Ashgate, Aldershot), 189-222.

Kirton, John (2000), "The Dynamics of G7 Leadership in Crisis Response and System Reconstruction," in Karl Kaiser, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, eds., Shaping a New International Financial System: Challenges of Governance in a Globalizing World, (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 65-94.

Kirton, John (1999), "Explaining G8 Effectiveness," in The G8's Role in the New Millennium, edited by Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, (Aldershot: Ashgate), pp. 45-68.

Kirton, John (1993), "The Seven Power Summit and the New Security Agenda," in D. Dewitt, D. Haglund and J. Kirton, (eds.), Building a New Global Order: Emerging Trends in International Security, (Oxford University Press, Toronto).

Kirton, John J., Joseph P. Daniels, and Andreas Freytag, eds. (2001). *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. Ashgate, Aldershot.

Kokotsis, E. (1999), *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995*, Garland Publishing, Levittown.

Kokotsis, E. and J. Daniels, (1999), "G8 Summits and Compliance," The G8's Role in the New Millennium, edited by Michael Hodges, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 75-94.

Knight, Malcolm, Lawrence Schembri and James Powell, "Reforming the Global Financial Architecture: Just Tinkering Around the Edges?", in David Vines and Christopher L. Gilbert, eds., *The IMF and its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture,* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), pp. 124-155.

Le Boucher, "Pourquoi les antimondialistes gagnet du terrain," *Le Monde* November 8.

Martin, Paul (2004a), "Speech by the Prime Minister," Woodrow Wilson for International Scholars, Washington, D. C., April 29.

Martin, Paul (2004b), "Speech by the Prime Minister," Montreal, May 10.

Meridos, Evan and Taylor Fravel (2003), "China's New Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 82 (November/December): 22-35.

Meyer, Laurence, Brian Doyle, Joseph Gagnon and Dale Henderson, "International Coordination of Macroeconomic Policies: Still Alive in the New Millennium?", in David Vines and Christopher L. Gilbert, eds., *The IMF and its Critics: Reform of Global Financial Architecture,* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), pp. 59-105.

Peterson, Jim (2004), as quoted in January Dean, "Trade Minister Says PM's Right on Expanding G7," *The Mississauga News,* April 21.

Porter, T., 2000, "The G-7, the Financial Stability Forum, the G-20 and the Politics of International Financial Regulation," Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Los Angeles, California, Wednesday, March 15, 2000.

Putnam, R. and N. Bayne (1987), *Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits, second edition, Sage Publications, London.*

Ruggie, John (1983). 'International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order', in S. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 195–232.

Scholte, Jan Aart (2002), "Governing Global Finance," in David Held and Anthony McGrew, eds, *Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance,* (Polity Press: Cambridge), pp. 189-208.

Schwab, Klaus (2003), "Address to the Plenary Session of the World Economic Forum — Africa Economic Summit 2003," Durban, South Africa, June 12.

Stein, Janice (2004), as quoted in Shawn McCarthy, "Canada still supports UN, Graham Says," *Globe and Mail* May 1.

Weltke, Ernst (1999), as cited in John Kirton (2001).

Notes

John Kirton is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto

This is a revised version of a paper first prepared for a conference on "The Ideas-Institutional Nexus: The Case of the G-20," sponsored by the Centre on International Governance Innovation,

United Nations University FLACSO, and the University of Waterloo, Claridge Hotel, Buenos Aires, May 19-21, 2004. I am grateful for the comments of my colleagues at the conference.

Appendix A:
G20 Ministerial Meetings, 1999–

1. **Berlin, December 15–16, 1999**
   G20 Ministerial Meeting
   Overview
   Backgrounders
   - Financial Sector Regulation and Supervision
   - Prudent Debt Management
   - International Codes and Standards
   - Prudent Debt Management

2. **Montreal, October 24–25, 2000**
   G20 Ministerial Meeting
   News Release
   English Videos (Department of Finance, Canada)
   Vidéos français (Department of Finance, Canada)

3. **Ottawa, November 16–17, 2001**
   Meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
   Statement
   G20 Action Plan on Terrorist Financing

4. **New Delhi, November 23, 2002**
   Meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
   Delhi Communiqué

5. **Morelia, Mexico, October 26–27, 2003**
   Meeting of G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors

Appendix B:
The G20's Deliberative Performance by Length of Communiqué

Date	**Communiqué**	**Annexes**
1999	6	List of Participants
2000	14	Annex of 24 paragraphs
2001	9	Action Plan (Terrorist Finance) of 22 para.
2002	10	–
2003	9	–

Note: Length of communiqué and annexes is measured in number of paragraphs or bullet points.

Appendix C:
The G20's Deliberative Performance by Agenda Issue

Issue	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Total	6	19	13	19	18
New	6	13	4	3	6
Global Economic Conditions	x	x	x	x	x
Trade Liberalization	x	x	x	x	x
Financial System Vulnerability	x	x	x	x	x
Crisis Response and Prevention	x	x	x	x	x
Codes and Standards	x	x	x	x	x
Globalization	x	x	x	x	
Poverty Reduction		x	x	x	x
Exchange Rate Regime	x	x	x		
Prudential Liability Management	x	x	x		
Private Sector Involvement		x		x	x
Technical Assistance		x		x	
Capital Account Liberalization	x	x	x		
Debt Relief for Poorest (HIPC)	x		x	x	
Development Assistance (ODA)	x	x	x	x	
Financial Abuse/Crime	x			x	
Health/Infectious Disease		x			
Agricultural Research		x			
Environment		x			
Social Safety Nets		x			
Security			x		
Terrorist Finance			x	x	x
Liquidity Maintenance		x	x		
Argentina			x		
Infrastructure and Human Capital				x	
Trade Distorting Subsidies				x	
Millennium Development Goals/NEPAD				x	x
Economic Imbalances					x
Structural Reform					x
InstitutionBuilding					x
Precautionary Facilities (CCL)				x	
Tax Evasion					x
Financing for Development					x

Appendix D:
The G20's Evolving Norms of Distribution

Value	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Growth that Benefits All	1				
Attack Income Inequalities		1			
Reduce/Fight Poverty		2	1	1	1
Needs of Lowest Income Economies		1			
Benefits to All Members of Society		1			
Protect Most Vulnerable Groups of Society		1			
World's Poorest and Most Vulnerable			1	1	
Share Benefits by All, inc. Poorest Countries			1	2	
Equity and Well Being for All Our Peoples			1		
Sound Domestic Social Policies			1		
Socially Effective Response to Financial Crises				1	
Millennium Development Goals				1	1
Equitable Global Economy				1	
Fairness					1
Broadly Shared, Particularly by Poorest Countries					1

Appendix E:
The G20's Evolving Norms of Embedded Liberalism Under Globalization

Value	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Trade Liberalization/Globalization Good	1	1	1	2	1
Sound National Economic/Financial Policies	1	1			
Range of Possible Domestic Policy Response	1				
Government's Important Role		1			
Well Sequenced Capital Account Opening		1			
Domestic Policies to Spread Benefits to All		1			
Promote Social Safety Nets to Protect Vulnerable		1			
No Safe Havens for Terrorists			1	1	1
Adopt Sound Policies Per International Best Practices				1	1
Well Developed Domestic/ Strong/Solid Institutions			1	2	1
Sound Macroeconomic, Social, Structural Policies			1	1	1
Appropriately Sequenced Capital Account Opening				1	
Appropriate Domestic Policies				1	
Investment in Infrastructure and Human Capital				1	
Acceleration of Structural Reforms					1
Efficient and Solid Markets and Institutions					1
Institution-Building in Financial Sector					1
Appropriate Management of Process of Reform					1
Information Exchange/Access on Financial Abuse					1

Appendix F:
The G20's Evolving Norms of Open Democracy

Value	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Transparency	1	2	1	1	
International Mobility of Ideas		1			
Access to Ideas in All Countries		1			
Anti-Corruption		1			
Good Governance			1	1	1
Accountable International Institutions				1	
Worldwide Surveillance				1	
Rule of Law				1	
Supporting NEPAD				1	
Exchange of Information & Knowledge				1	

Note: Main communiqué only

Appendix G:
The G20's Decisional Commitments, 1999–2003

Year	**Communiqué**	**Annex**	**Total**
1999	4	0	4
2000	7	1	8
2001	4	20	24
2002	2	0	2
2003	6	0	6

Total number of commitments: 4

Appendix H:
The G20's Development of Global Governance*

Institution	**1999**	**2000**	**2001**	**2002**	**2003**
Bretton Woods Institutional System	1				
Bretton Woods Institutions	1				
World Trade Organization	1	1	3		1
International Monetary Fund	1	8	3	1	7
World Bank	1	4	3		3
International Institutions		1			
HIPC Initiative		1		1	1
International Monetary and Finance Committee		3	1		
Paris Club		1			
Financial Stability Forum		2	3		
Development Committee			1	1	
International Financial Institutions			2	3	1
Financial Action Task Force			9		2
United Nations Security Council			2		
UN Convention for Suppression of Financing of Terrorism			1		
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime			1		
UN Resolutions			1		
UN Counterterrorism Committee			1		
Basle Committee of Banking Supervisors			1		
Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units			1		
Other Multilateral and Regional Organizations			1		
Relevant International Bodies			1		
Monterrey Conference				1	1
Johannesburg Conference				1	
Millennium Development Goals/Declaration				1	3
NEPAD				1	
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development					1
Institution					
G20 Deputies	2	1	1		2
G20 Deputies Roundtable		1	1		
G20 Case Studies				1	
G20 Globalization Workshop in Sydney				1	

Notes: *References of direction, support and relevance in G20 communiqués, including annexes.

Appendix I:
G20 and Global Country Capabilities

Country	Population [rank]	GDP [rank]	PPP [rank]	Democracy
a. G8 (excl. EU)				
Canada	32,207,113 [35]	$934.1 billion [12]	$29,400 [9]	Free
France	60,180,529 [20]	$1.558 trillion [6]	$25,700 [21]	Free
Germany	82,398,326 [13]	$2.16 trillion [5]	$26,600 [18]	Free
Japan	127,214,499 [10]	$3.651 trillion [3]	$28,000 [13]	Free
Russia	144,526,278 [7]	$1.409 trillion [9]	$9,300 [78]	P Free
Italy	57,998,353 [22]	$1.455 trillion [8]	$25,000 [25]	Free
Britain	60,094,648 [21]	$1.528 trillion [7]	$25,300 [23]	Free
United States	290,342,554 [3]	$10.45 trillion [1]	$37,600 [2]	Free
b. G20 (excl. G8, EU)				
Argentina	38,740,807 [30]	$403.8 billion [23]	$10,200 [70]	P Free D
Australia	19,731,984 [52]	$525.5 billion [16]	$27,000 [15]	Free
Brazil	182,032,604 [5]	$1.376 trillion [10]	$7,600 [94]	Free
China	1,286,975,468 [1]	$5.989 trillion [2]	$4,400 [129]	Not Free
India	1,049,700,118 [2]	$2.664 trillion [4]	$2,540 [156]	Free D
Indonesia	234,893,453 [4]	$714.2 billion [15]	$3,100 [149]	P Free
Mexico	104,907,991 [11]	$924.4 billion [13]	$9,000 [80]	Free
Korea	48,289,037 [24]	$941.5 billion [11]	$19,400 [39]	Free
Saudi Arabia	24,293,844 [45]	$268.9 billion [29]	$10,500 [69]	Not Free
South Africa	42,768,678 [26]	$427.7 billion [21]	$10,000 [72]	Free
Turkey	68,109,469 [16]	$489.7 billion [17]	$7,000 [98]	P Free
c. Global Top 20 (excl. G8, G20, EU)				
Pakistan	156,127,453 [6]			
Bangladesh	138,448,210 [8]			
Nigeria	133,881,703 [9]			
Philippines	84,619,974 [12]			
Vietnam	81,624,716 [14]			
Egypt	74,718,797 [15]			
Iran	67,147,618 [17]			
Ethiopia	66,557,553 [18]			
Thailand	64,265,276 [19]			
Spain		$850.7 billion [14]		
Iran		$458.3 billion [18]		
Thailand		$445.8 billion [19]		
Netherlands		$437.8 billion [20]		
Luxembourg			$44,000 [1]	
Bermuda			$35,200 [3]	
Cayman Islands			$35,000 [4]	
San Marino			$34,600 [5]	
Norway			$31,800 [6]	
Switzerland			$31,700 [7]	
Ireland			$30,500 [8]	
Belgium			$29,000 [10]	
Denmark			$29,000 [11]	
Aruba			$28,000 [12]	

Austria	$27,700 [14]
Monaco	$27,000 [16]
Netherlands	$26,900 [17]
Finland	$26,200 [19]
Hong Kong	$26,000 [20]

A. G8 (excl. EU) Member States Population Total:	854,962,300
B. G20 (excl. EU) Population Total:	3,100,443,453 (excl. G8, EU)
C. G20	3, 955,405,753

Sources:

Freedom House, “Table of Independent Countries: 2003,” <www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/table.pdf> (May 2004).
G20, “G20 Members (2004),” <www.g20.org/public/index.php?page=members&skin=1> (May 2004).
GeoHive, “Global Statistics (2003),” <www.geohive.com/global/linkg.php?xml=world&xsl=c_p_pop50> (May 2004).
Nationmaster, “Map & Graph: Economy: Top 100 GDP,” December 2003 <www.nationmaster.com/graph-T/eco_gdp> (May 2004).
Sea Island Summit, “Member Information (2004),” <www.g8usa.gov/g8usa/c10466.htm> (May 2004).
U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base, “Countries Ranked by Population: 2003,” <www.census.gov/cgi-bin/ipc/idbrank.pl> (May 2004).
World Facts and Figures, “GDP per capita (October 30 2003),” <www.worldfactsandfigures.com/gdp_country_desc.php> (May 2004).