

**Compliance with G8 Commitments:
The Peace and Security and Conflict Prevention Agenda,
From Okinawa 2000-Genoa 2001**

Prepared for the DFAIT's Policy Planning Division in Preparation for the Canadian Presidency of
the G8 Foreign Ministers' Process in 2002

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Preface

In March 2001, the Canadian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's (DFAIT) Policy Planning Division invited the University of Toronto's G8 Research Group to assess compliance with the conflict prevention commitments generated at the 2000 Miyazaki G8 Foreign Ministers meeting and prepare an analysis in preparation for the Canadian Presidency of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Process in 2002. This work was completed by Professor John Kirton and Dr. Ella Kokotsis, with the assistance of numerous research analysts from the University of Toronto G8 Research Group, working under the leadership of Gina Stephens as Co-ordinator. The papers' findings were presented to the Policy Planning Division prior to the 2001 Italian-hosted Genoa Summit.

The authors wish to thank DFAIT's Policy Planning Division for the opportunity to prepare this work, to provide the necessary financial resources, and to present its findings and forward its policy options to the Department in preparation for the Canadian Presidency of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Process in June 2002. We also wish to express our gratitude to a number of University of Toronto G8 Research Group analysts without whom this work would not have been possible, particularly: Andre Belelieu, Bryn Gray, Caroline Konrad, Michael Malleson, Ana Milkovic, Klaudyna Osiaka and Jonathan Papoulidis.

We welcome the opportunity for interested parties to comment and build upon any aspect of this study by emailing their comments to: john.kirton@utoronto.ca.

Executive Summary

This study first examines the G7/G8 compliance record from 1996-2000 across all Summit issue areas, including the Summit's political-security agenda at a time when issues surrounding globalization have become a predominant Summit theme. In doing so, it offers six particular patterns as a foundation for assessing the compliance record of the Summit members with their conflict prevention commitments generated at the 2000 Okinawa Summit. This study further provides an empirical assessment of the G8's individual compliance records within the Miyazaki Foreign Ministers' process; a process which resulted in a lengthy, detail-rich, stand-alone document on conflict prevention generating extensive and concrete commitments on: (i) support for efforts to reduce destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons; (ii) actions to prevent the illicit trade in diamonds responsible for aggravating armed conflict and humanitarian crisis; (iii) provision of support for children in armed conflict; and (iv) initiatives aimed at improving international civilian police (CIVPOL) capabilities. This preliminary analysis finds that: (i) compliance with the Foreign Ministers' priority conflict prevention commitments is higher than the leaders' overall Summit average for the 1975-1995 period; (ii) the Miyazaki Foreign Ministers scored as well - from a compliance perspective - with their conflict prevention commitments as their leaders had with their political security commitments from the previous five years; (iii) there is wide variation in compliance by country, with Canada complying fully with its conflict prevention commitments, followed by Germany; Italy and Japan score the lowest amongst the G8; (iv) there is significant variation by issue area, with diamonds securing the highest compliance score, suggesting that compliance is best in areas where the G8 can explicitly add weight to a process already underway and sanctioned by the UN Security Council.

Overall, this study finds that in the field of conflict prevention, the G8 at the foreign ministers' level, as at the leaders' level, has proven a promising forum for advancing and expanding the conflict prevention/human security agenda.

1. Introduction

Since their inception in 1975, the annual meetings of the G7/G8 have evolved from a relatively informal and apparently one-time event to an annual, permanent and increasingly more institutionalized gathering of the leading industrialized nations in the world. With an ever-expanding range of global issues on their agenda, an increasingly intensive preparatory and follow-up process, a strong network of supporting personnel in national governments and a well-established, regular timetable, the G8 process has developed an organizational infrastructure comparable to that of an established international institution. Moreover, since their inception, the Summits have increasingly produced ambitious and wide-ranging agreements in an effort to generate multilateral consensus on a diverse number of global issues.

However, skeptics of the Summit process have argued that although the process may generate far-reaching ambitious agreements which are timely and well-tailored solutions to pressing international problems, the Summit members fail to keep their word once the Summits are over; in other words, compliance with decisions reached at the annual Summits often fail.¹ And even when they do keep their word, skeptics have argued that they are unable to impose their collective will on outside non-member countries or key international organizations. Thus, at the end of the day, the success of the Summits is seen as ephemeral and non-enduring in the post-Summit period.

Recent scholarly studies on compliance with Summit commitments indicate that these annual gatherings of the world's leading industrialized nations do in fact produce tangible, credible results, although compliance records vary by country, issue area and over time. For example, when von Furstenberg and Daniels measured overall Summit compliance scores with economic and energy undertakings from 1975-1989, they found the overall compliance score to be 32%, suggesting that roughly one-third of what the leaders promised was actually delivered. Their compliance scores varied widely by country, with high compliance coming from Canada and the United Kingdom and low compliance from the United States and France. Compliance further varied widely by issue area, with high compliance scores in the area of international trade and energy and low overall scores with interest and exchange rate management.² Subsequent compliance studies conducted by Kirton and Kokotsis (1997) and Kokotsis (1999) assessed the compliance record of the G7 in regard to key environment and development commitments which flourished during the third Summit cycle, 1988-1995. These studies explored the compliance record of the G7's most and least powerful countries, Canada and the US, in an effort to examine the effects of overall relative capability and key differences in national institutions on the effects of compliance with Summit resolutions. The results of these findings suggest that during 1988-1995, the G7 produced a large number of specific and ambitious environment (climate change and biodiversity) and development (developing country debt and assistance to Russia) commitments. Canadian and US compliance with these commitments was generally positive, with an overall compliance score of 43%. As with earlier studies, however, compliance was found to vary widely by country, issue area and over time. Canada's net score of 53% contrasts with the US's net score of 34%, with compliance much higher in the area of assistance to Russia and developing country debt, than for climate change and above all, biodiversity.³

¹ See, for example, Smyser, W.R. "Goodbye G7", Washington Quarterly, Winter 1993, p. 24; Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Pp. 143, 147, 152, 154,

² Von Furstenberg, G. and Daniels, J. P. Economic Summit Declarations, 1975-1989: Examining the Written Record of International Cooperation. Princeton Studies in International Finance, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1992.

³ Kirton, J.J. and Kokotsis, E. "National Compliance with Environmental Regimes: The Case of the G7, 1988-1995. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Toronto,

Building on previous analytical studies and applying the concepts and methodology developed by Kirton, Kokotsis, and Daniels, this study first examines the G8's compliance record from 1996-2000 across all issue area, including the Summit's political security agenda at a time when issues surrounding globalization have become a predominant Summit theme. This section provides a systematic and analytic breakdown of the G8's compliance record by year, country and issue area. It further draws on the most recent generation of the G7/G8 compliance studies in which commitments are scored according to their level of ambition and significance, rather than treated as being of equal value. This section further provides six particular patterns as a foundation for assessing the compliance record of the Summit members with their conflict prevention commitments.

The second section of this study assesses the G8's compliance record of the conflict prevention commitments generated at the 2000 G8 Foreign Ministers meeting in Miyazaki, Japan. It was at Miyazaki that the Foreign Ministers built on the results of the December 1999 G8 Foreign Ministers' first stand-alone meeting in Berlin on conflict prevention; an issue which subsequently emerged as a core theme at Okinawa, both at the Foreign Ministers' level, but also at the leaders' level, where three solid commitments were made in the final communiqué aimed at effectively preventing and working to resolve armed conflicts. This study thus assesses the individual compliance records of each of the Summit countries within the 2000 G8 Foreign Ministers process; a process which resulted in a lengthy and detail-rich stand-alone document on conflict prevention - *G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention*. This document specified a number of discrete and quantifiable conflict prevention commitments, particularly in the area of: (i) support for efforts to reduce existing destabilizing accumulations of small weapons and arms; (ii) actions to prevent the illicit trade in diamonds responsible for aggravating armed conflict and humanitarian crises; (iii) provision of support for children in armed conflict; (iv) initiatives aimed at improving international civilian police (CIVPOL) capabilities.

2. The G7/G8 Compliance Record, 1996-2000

The most recent comprehensive examination of G7/G8 commitments and compliance comes from the annual assessment conducted by the G8 Research Group (G8RG) for the years 1996-2000. As these analytical studies directly follow and apply the concepts and methods developed by Kokotsis (Kokotsis 1999, Kokotsis and Kirton 1997, Kokotsis and Daniels 1999), their results are directly comparable with those of Kokotsis covering the years from 1988-1996. As they cover all issue areas, including for the first time the Summit's political-security agenda, and the compliance record of all participating G7 and at times G8 countries, they offer a comprehensive portrait of Summit performance in the years since "globalization" first became a major Summit preoccupation.

At the same time, these results must be treated with considerable caution. For most years only a subset of the relevant issue areas, and only the priority commitments within each area, were assessed. While an effort was made to consider the compliance record of all countries with these selected commitments, some absences due to the lack of data availability remain. As a result, the average level of commitment by year, by issue area and by country rests on a somewhat variable rather than stable, fully systematic foundation. Perhaps most importantly, different individual analysts assessed compliance for each issue area each year, and no formal inter-coder reliability studies were done to verify their consistency. Thus while these results meet minimum standards as policy-oriented research, they remain suggestive rather than conclusive.

a. Compliance by Year

Ontario, March 18-22, 1997; and, Kokotsis, E. Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995. Garland Publishing, Inc. New York, 1999.

With these caveats, several striking patterns appear. First, as Table A indicates, the average level of compliance for the full period is 33.75%. This is slightly above the 1975-1988 figure of 31% (if below the more limited-look Kokotsis 1988-1975 average level of 43%). Moreover, the level of compliance has varied widely per year. It starts at a relatively “normal” 36% in 1996-7, drops to 15% in 1997-8, rises sharply to 45% in 1998-9 and stays at a relatively robust 39% in 1999-2000. As three of these scores are well above the basic 31% identified by Von Furstenberg and Daniels, these findings contradict those who see the G7 in the 1990’s as shaving a sharply lower level of performance than the G7 in previous years (Bergsten and Henning 1996). Moreover both the level and variability suggests that there is no constant “globalization effect” which renders national governments more constrained or powerless in the face of pervasive societal or market forces. Indeed, the higher scores from 1998 onward suggest that the 1997 crisis of financial globalization (Kaiser, Kirton and Daniels 2000) may have inspired the G7 to more effective and sustained compliance performance.

Perhaps most importantly, the sharp drop in 1997-8 followed by the sharp rise in 1998-9 are suggestive about the impact of changes in the Summit format introduced in those two years. 1997 witnessed the admission of the Russians to the ‘Denver Summit of the Eight,’ leaving little time for the leaders to meet alone at seven and producing an emphasis on portraying Russia to the public as an equal member. The new diversity of membership and lack of depth in grappling with substantive issues may have produced less psychological “buy in” on the part of leaders and thus less compliance with those commitments in the ensuing year. In contrast, Birmingham in 1998 was the first permanent G8, giving the Russians the assurance that they were members for good. Perhaps more importantly, the leaders met for the first time without their finance and Foreign Ministers, held a half-day retreat and focused on three specific themes (jobs, money and crime). They could thus easily have generated the depth of understanding and personal commitment to their agreements that carried through into more effective compliance in the following year. This pattern thus suggests that the leaders themselves do not always have a comparative advantage in dealing with political-security issues, but that when they focus on specific themes, including potentially conflict prevention, they can generate commitments that count.

b. Compliance by Country

As Table A also shows, in the 1996-2000 period, compliance continues to vary widely among countries, even if all members have positive rather than negative compliance scores. Among the members, Britain with 54% continues to lead, as it did in the 1975-1988 scores. The biggest change is the United States, which with 47% has now risen to the rank of second highest complier, from the position of second worst in 1975-88. This suggests that the high levels of compliance for the US found by Kokotsis for her four issue areas in 1988-1995 was not an artifact of the particular issues areas or time selected but a more durable and broadly based trend. The US is closely followed by Canada at 45%, which thus ranks third, or one position below its second place spot in 1975-1988. Beneath these three predominantly “anglophone” countries on top comes Italy with 42%, followed by Japan with 40%. After this array of good Summit citizens there is a sharp drop. Germany with 29% has plummeted from third highest to second lowest among the original seven. France at 21% continues to place last among the original seven.

At the bottom of the scale come the two most recent members – the European Union and Russia. While the available data is slender, especially for Russia, these scores appear plausible given the cumbersome decision-making in the former actor and the lack of implementative capacity in the latter. They are consistent with an argument that democratic polities with popularly elected leaders at the time, and the socializing effects of the G7 as an international institution over time generate higher compliance levels.

c. Compliance by Issue Area

There is a similarly wide variation in the compliance record of the 1996-2000 Summit by policy sector and issue area. As Table B indicates, for the period as a whole the compliance level in the core economic sector is 37%. In the global/transnational sector it is 34%. In both cases these are a little above the comparable levels for the 1975-1988 period. However in the sector of political security issues (which includes the traditional east-west relations, terrorism, arms control and regional security areas, and the newer conflict prevention/human security field, the level is an unusually high 67%. In the sector of global governance, focused on UN reform, it is an unusually low 14%.

The partial nature of the data makes more detailed analysis difficult. Nonetheless some patterns are clear. First, among the 40 scores for each issue area for each year, there are only four negative scores (Asia and Middle East in 1996-7, Russia in 1997-8 and trade in 1999-00) and seven neutral scores. This is consistent with an explanation that these Summits are worth doing, and perhaps more so than from 1975-1988 where more negative scores and ones dominating full issue areas, existed. At the other end of the spectrum, the presence of four perfect scores (macroeconomics in 1996-7 and 1999-00, climate change in 1998-9, and terrorism in 1999-00) suggests (absent any information on the level of ambition of those commitments) that the G7/8 can be very effective in governing globalization, particularly in those issue areas where the processes of globalization and its downsides are thought to be most intense (Hodges, Kirton and Daniels 1999, Kirton, Daniels and Freytag 2001).

Second, as the “globalization era” for the G7 began in 1996, (and where scores for a full array of 21 issue areas exist) the G7 compliance score was a “normal” 32%. However the component sector scores of 39% in economics, 34% in global/transnational issues, 40% in political/security issues and 14% in governance issues suggests a particularly robust role for the modern G7/8 in the political/security field.

An examination of particular issue areas where sufficient multi-year data exist suggests several trends. Most striking is the high, indeed, perfect score for macroeconomics in a globalizing era, a sharp contrast from its low scores in 1997-88. Also noteworthy is the low score for trade, again a striking contrast with its high scores in 1975-88 and confirmation of the judgment of many about the G7/G8’s recent poor performance in this area (Bayne 2001, Ullrich 2001). A third is the high scores in the areas of the environment (including climate change) terrorism, and landmines, suggesting that the G7/G8 is indeed a promising forum for advancing an expanding conflict prevention/human security agenda.

d. The Juricevic Findings

The most recent generation of G7/G8 compliance studies, conducted by Diana Juricevic in 2000, sought to introduce two conceptual advances to the ongoing research program. The first, in the realm of compliance, was to develop a scale by which commitments could be scored according to their ambition and significance, rather than treated, as previous studies had assumed, as being each of equal value, or with less systematic individual judgments about which was the one top priority commitment to focus compliance monitoring upon. The second, in the realm of compliance, was to control for compliant behaviour being caused by the major, annual, constitutionally-grounded, national commitments, as measured in the U.S. State of the Union Address, British Queen’s Speech, Canadian Speech from the Throne and equivalents in other G8 members) as opposed to G7/G8 commitments. This was done by systematically identifying the difference in the commitments offered at the two levels of analysis in the same year and seeing which, or if both together, best predicted compliant outcomes. As a prototype, this framework

was applied to G7/8 commitments in the issue areas of trade and debt from 1996-1999, and to the compliant behaviour of the US and Canada in these areas and years.

Juricevic found relatively high compliance levels for this period. Canada scored 50% on debt and 50% on trade, while the US scored 75% on debt and 50% on trade. (These country rank orderings are the same as those found by the G8RG for the same period). When these scores are adjusted for the significance of the commitments, Canada scored 58% on debt and 69% on trade, while the US scored 71% on debt and 46% for trade on the significance-adjusted measure. In short, in both issue areas, Canada implemented a smaller number of more significant commitments and the US a larger number of less significant commitments.

Using the national-level control on the international-level G7/G8 commitments, Juricevic found in the first instance that, for the full four years for the US, more commitments were made at the G7/8 level (36 on trade and 20 on debt) than at the national level (17 on trade and 2 on debt.) The same was true for Canada where, for the three years (without 1998), there were 26 trade and 17 debt commitments at the G7/8 but only 11 and 1 respectively at the national level. For some, perhaps long inherently international issue areas, one needs the international level and nest of the G7/8 if high level commitments are to be made at all. This is prima facie evidence that the G7/8 powerfully induces co-operation, by generating commitments that would not otherwise exist if member national governments were left to make solemn decisions on their own.

A comparison of the commitments reveals relatively little correlation between commitments made first at the national level and then subsequently repeated at the international level in the immediately following G7/G8. In contrast, there is a substantially stronger correlation between commitments first appearing at the G7/G8 and then appearing in the immediately following expression of commitments at the national level. This pattern was evident both for the US and Canada, and for both debt and trade. While there were occasional bursts of US nationally generated initiatives that were subsequently collectively accepted by the G7/G8, as on trade at Cologne in 1999, the overall pattern is clear. The G7/G8 leads and its member countries follow. It is the G7/G8 that is the primary source of commitment. The US and Canada adjust nationally to accept commitments collectively reached at the Summit rather than the other way around. And this pattern holds true for the G7/8's most powerful member – the US – as well as its weakest – Canada. As the period of intense globalization took hold, it bred an America that adjusted and complied as an ordinary G7/G8 member, rather than one that uniquely led (Putnam and Bayne 1987).

e. Implications for the G8 Conflict Prevention Record

What does this 1996-2000 record offer as a foundation for assessing the compliance record of members with the peace and security commitments generated at the Okinawa Summit in July 2000? In addition to providing an empirical baseline against which the most recent performance can be assessed, it offers six particular patterns to focus on over the past year.

First, because leaders themselves do not always have a comparative advantage in dealing with political-security issues, the now stand alone Foreign Ministers meeting, both thematically specific ones separated in time for the Summit and the general one held in the immediate lead up to the Summit, can be a powerful source of commitments that bind. Moreover, because Summits that focus on specific themes, seem to generate commitments that count, there is utility in having conflict prevention identified as one such area for a thematic summit, perhaps for the Canadian-hosted Summit in 2002.

Second, in the sector of political security issues (which includes the traditional east-west relations, terrorism, arms control and regional security areas, and the newer conflict prevention/human security field), the 1996-2000 Summit generated an unusually high 67%. Politically focused summits thus have a real contribution to make.

Third, constructing such a Summit must be done with due not for the low scores on regional security commitments, notably Asia and the Middle East in 1996-7, and in Russia in 1997-8. While acknowledging that Asia and the Middle East have long been difficult issues for anyone to deal with, this suggests that regional security and east-west relations may not be the most promising components of the political security-sector to focus upon, leaving arms control and conflict prevention as the residual prime candidates.

Fourth, the 1996 component sector scores, with a leading 40% in the political/security sector, reinforce this developing portrait of a particularly promising role for the modern G7/8 in the political/security field.

Fifth, the multiyear data, showing high scores in the areas of the environment (including climate change) terrorism, and landmines, further suggest that the G7/G8 is indeed a promising forum for advancing an expanding conflict prevention/human security agenda.

Sixth, the control for national level commitments and level of ambition significance show that the G7/G8 leads and its member countries follow, with the important commitments as well as those that are more routine. Getting G7/G8 commitments on political-security matters, including conflict prevention can thus bind the most powerful US, as well as those members that are relatively weak. The place to produce change is not by individually lobbying Washington to change its national policy, but by getting the G7/G8 to commit to a different course.

Table A: G8 Compliance Assessments, 1996–2000^a

	1996–1997 ^b	1997–1998 ^c	1998–1999 ^d	1999–00 ^e	Average
1. United Kingdom	+0.42	+0.5	+0.75	+0.5	+0.54
2. United States	+0.42	+0.34	+0.6	+0.5	+0.47
3. Canada	+0.47	+0.17	+0.5	+0.67	+0.45
4. Italy	+0.16	-0.5	+0.67	+0.34	+0.42
5. Japan	+0.21	+0.5	+0.2	+0.67	+0.40
6. Germany	+0.58	+0.17	+0.25	+0.17	+0.29
7. France	+0.26	0	+0.25	+0.34	+0.21
8. Russia	N/A	0	+0.34	+0.17	+0.17
9. European Union	N/A	N/A	N/A	+0.17	+0.17
Average	+0.36	+0.15	+0.45	+0.39	+0.34

^a Scores are an equally weighted average of a country's compliance to commitments made at the summit.

^b Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

^c Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

^d Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (illegal trafficking of human beings).

^e Applies to six priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).

Source: G8 Research Group, Analytic Studies (available at www.g7.utoronto.ca)

Table B: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1996–1997 to 2000–2001^{a,b}

Issue Area	1996-1997	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-00	Total
ECONOMIC ISSUES					+0.365
Economic Issues	+0.307	-	-	-	
IFI Reform	+0.29 ^c	-	-	-	
Exchange Rate Management	-	-	-	0	
Macroeconomics	+1.00	-	-	+1.0	
Microeconomics	+0.29 ^d	-	-	-	
Employment	-	0.375 ^e	0 ^f	-	
Aging	-	-	+0.33 ^g	-	
Global Information Society	+0.57 ^d	-	-	-	
Trade	+0.29 ^d	-	+0.33 ^h	-0.57	
Development (General)	0 ^d	0	-	-	
Debt of the Poorest ⁱ	-	-	0	+0.86	
GLOBAL/TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES					+0.342
Transnational Issues (General)	+0.475	-	-	-	
Environment	+0.14	+0.5 ^e	-	-	
Climate Change	-	-	+1.0 ^j	-	
Nuclear Safety	+0.29	-	-	-	
Crime	+0.43 ^d	0 ^e	-	0 ^k	
Human Trafficking	-	-	+0.25 ^l	-	
POLITICAL SECURITY ISSUES					+0.667
East/West Relations	+0.86 ^d	-	-	-	
Terrorism	+0.71 ^d	-	-	+1.0	
Arms Control	+0.29 ^d	-	-	-	
Landmines	+0.71	+0.75 ^e	-	-	
Human Rights	+0.71 ^d	-	-	-	
Security Issues	+0.310	-	-	-	
Regional Security					
Asia	-0.43 ^d	-	-	-	
Europe	+0.86 ^m	-	-	-	
Middle East	-0.43 ^d	-	-	-	
Russia	-	-0.86	-	-	
GOVERNANCE ISSUES					+0.14
UN Reform I (\$ obligations)	+0.14	-	-	-	
UN Reform II (dev't agenda)	+0.14	-	-	-	

a Data refer to members' compliance to commitments expressed in the Communiqué, as evaluated immediately prior the next summit (i.e., 1996/1997 data refer to commitments made at the Lyon Summit in 1996 and assessed on the eve of the 1997 Denver Summit).

b Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to all G7 countries.

c Excludes Italy and France.

d Excludes Italy.

e Refers to G8 (includes Russia).

f Refers only to Japan, UK, Russia.

g Refers only to Canada, Germany, U.S.

h Excludes Germany.

i Refers to debt of the poorest and the Köln Debt Initiative.

j Refers to G8 countries (includes Russia); is average of data for two commitment referring to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.

k Refers specifically to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.

l Refers only to France, Germany, Japan.

m Excludes Japan.

3. The 2000-2001 G8 Conflict Prevention Compliance Record

a. The G8 and Conflict Prevention

As conflicts rooted in national, ethnic and religious causes escalated and laid claim to countless victims internationally, 1999-2000 witnessed an increased focus on the part of the international community on combating the various factors of instability through conflict prevention means such as poverty elimination, political, economic and social development, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.⁴ Conflict prevention thus emerged as one of the prominent themes in various international fora in 1999, most prominently the G8 Cologne Summit and the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in June, followed by the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on conflict prevention held in Berlin in December 1999. It was at these meetings, that increased international attention on behalf of the world's leading industrialized democracies began to turn to the importance of recognizing and preventing conflict before it erupts rather than dealing with the increased instability and multitude of challenges in various post-conflict stages.

Agreeing at the 1999 Cologne Summit to hold a special stand-alone G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting on conflict prevention in December of that year, the G8 Foreign Ministers met in Berlin on December 16-17 and resolved to make conflict prevention a priority on their political agendas by examining "long term concrete and sustainable strategies of prevention".⁵ The G8 Foreign Ministers agreed that the causes of armed conflict are "multiple and complex" and that its prevention required "an integrated comprehensive approach encompassing political, security, economic, financial, environmental, social and development policies, based on the principles of the UN Charter, the rule of law, democracy, social justice, the respect for human rights, a free press and good governance".⁶ By working in collaboration with the UN, international and regional organizations, NGOs, private and business sectors and states at risk, the Foreign Ministers agreed at Berlin that their approach should include work on addressing issues such as the spread and accumulation of small arms, the roll of organized crime in fuelling conflict, the use of children in armed conflicts, mercenaries and private military activity, environmental issues in relation to the contribution of conflict, as well as the illicit trade in certain high value commodities, particularly diamonds. Emphasis during these discussions was placed on the importance of what the G8 could do to not only in terms of post-conflict rehabilitation and development, but also preventing the occurrence of conflict in the first instance by examining the various components of conflict prevention and early warning in the pre-conflict stages. Following the conclusion of the meeting, the Foreign Ministers instructed their political directors, "to use appropriate means, including G8 meetings of officials, under the Political Directors' guidance, to contribute to the preparation of the range of conflict prevention issues in the run-up to their meeting in Miyazaki in July".⁷

b. Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention

Meeting in Miyazaki on July 12-13 2000, the Foreign Ministers of the G8 reaffirmed their position expressed in Berlin that in order for conflict prevention to be successful, steady and consistent efforts at mobilizing all policy tools available were required at each stage of the conflict, through both the pre and post-conflict stages. In their final declaration, the Ministers further reaffirmed their Berlin commitment to a sustained effort to promote a "Culture of

⁴ 2000 Diplomatic Bluebook. Chapter II. "Sectoral Analysis of the International Situation and Japan's Foreign Policy". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. p. 1.

⁵ "G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Berlin, 16 and 17 December, 1999". The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 1.

⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 2.

Prevention” by pursuing a “Comprehensive Approach” from the pre-conflict phase aimed at preventing conflicts from outbreak, to the post-conflict phase in ensuring that conflicts do not recur. In a separate, stand-alone thematic document issued specifically on conflict prevention, the G8 Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their determination to make prevention of armed conflict a “high priority in coming years” and that efforts to prevent conflict, “must be based upon observance of international law, including the UN Charter, democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development, and other fundamental values, which constitute the foundation of international peace and security”.⁸

The G8 Foreign Minister initiatives for conflict prevention were based on three essential criteria: (i) whether the issue had direct relevance to conflict prevention, (ii) whether the G8 had a comparative advantage over the other players in dealing with the issue, and (iii) whether a joint initiative by the G8 could bear fruit. Given these criteria, the G8 Foreign Ministers agreed at Miyazaki to endorse a number of conflict prevention commitments, the most tangible of these being the following eight commitments, spanning across four distinct issue areas:

1. Small Arms and Light Weapons

- a) "While recognizing that transfers of small arms are consistent with the right of self-defence enshrined in the UN Charter, {the G8} confirms that we will exercise a high degree of responsibility in controlling and licensing such exports".
- b) "{The G8} pledges its full support for the effort to reduce existing destabilizing accumulations of small arms. The G8 encourages affected countries and regions to adopt confidence-building measures and incentives to encourage the collection and destruction of surplus or illegally-held small arms. The G8 confirms that we are ready to support such efforts through the voluntary provision of financial and technical assistance".

2. Illicit Trade in Diamonds

- a) "The G8, which accounts for the bulk of the global market for diamonds, will cooperate closely with governments of diamond-producing states, neighbouring states, major marketing centers, regional organizations and industry in order to curb illicit diamond flows".
- b) "{The G8} welcomes the 'Technical Forum on Diamonds' held at Kimberly, South Africa, as an important contribution to finding pragmatic solutions. The G8 supports rapid follow-up, involving all the key actors, which should include the exploring of a possible certification scheme for rough diamonds from conflict areas, industry codes of conduct and an international body to promote transparency and accountability"

3. Children in Armed Conflict

- a) "{The G8 agrees to} provide support for the office of the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in its role as an advocate on behalf of war-affected children, and to UN agencies including UNICEF".
- b) "{The G8 agrees to} make close contact, through UNICEF and other fora, on individual reintegration programs e.g. to identify and share best practice, noting the particular needs of displaced and vulnerable children in rehabilitation and reintegration programs and being sensitive to gender differentiated experiences".

4. International Civilian Police (CIVPOL)

⁸ “G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention”. G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Miyazaki, Japan, 13 July 2000. P. 1.

- a) "The G8 calls upon the UN and regional organizations to work with member states to explore ways to meet this demand in a timely and effective way".
- b) "The G8 calls on the UN, in close consultation with member states, to take further steps to improve its international civilian police capabilities. Such steps should include development, on the basis of national contributions, of a reserve list of pre-trained, UN-certified international civilian police officers for possible service".⁹

c. The Post-Okinawa G8 Compliance Record on Conflict Prevention

If the documents produced by the G8 leaders and their key ministers at the annual Summits are considered to be more than merely aspirational or hortatory and indeed designed to initiate a process that brings governments' behaviour in line with the obligations set forth in the final communiqué, then it becomes essential to assess the compliance record of the key commitments reached by the respective G8 governments at their annual Summit gatherings.

Within the text of the *Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention* document, the G8 Foreign Ministers committed their governments to the above-stated eight commitments spanning four issue areas. Individual analytic assessments on the compliance record of the G8 countries for each of these commitments are provided below.

(i) Small Arms and Light Weapons

In their final communiqué, the G8 Foreign Ministers noted that the "uncontrolled and illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons and the existence of destabilizing accumulations of these weapons in many parts of the world pose a serious threat to peace, security and prosperity". They therefore confirmed their commitment to strongly support "national, regional, and international efforts to ensure that transfers of small arms are carried out in a responsible and legal fashion, and to reduce existing destabilizing accumulations to levels consistent with legitimate defence and security needs".¹⁰ Further to this, the Foreign Ministers committed their national governments to the following two action-oriented commitments:

- a) "While recognizing that transfers of small arms are consistent with the right of self-defence enshrined in the UN Charter, {the G8} confirms that we will exercise a high degree of responsibility in controlling and licensing such exports".
- b) "{The G8} pledges its full support for the effort to reduce existing destabilizing accumulations of small arms. The G8 encourages affected countries and regions to adopt confidence-building measures and incentives to encourage the collection and destruction of surplus or illegally-held small arms. The G8 confirms that we are ready to support such efforts through the voluntary provision of financial and technical assistance".

Britain

The United Kingdom "attaches great importance to international efforts to curb small arms proliferation"¹¹ and proposed, along with three other states, to convene a *United Nations*

⁹ "Conclusions of the Meeting of the G8 Foreign Ministers' Meeting", Miyazaki, Japan, 13 July 2000.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pgs 2, 3.

¹¹ "Arms Control and Non-proliferation". Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom, 2000. <http://www.fco.gov.uk/keythemapage.asp?PageID=237>

*Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Arms in All Its Aspects*¹². This conference will conclude a small arms and light weapon regulatory process that began with the *First Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, New York, 25-28 May 1998*.¹³ Regionally, the United Kingdom rapporteured the *NATO/EAPC workshop on SALW with the participation of countries parties to the “Mediterranean Dialogue”*; Brussels, 21 November 2000¹⁴ and was a signatory to the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons.¹⁵ The U.K. also works regionally on small arms control under the 1998 EU Joint Action on Small Arms agreement¹⁶. Although the U.K. has played a critical role in restricting the transfer of small arms and light weapons, the culmination of its work and other states will be the United Nations Conference in July 2001. As such, the U.K. receives a score of "0", designating a “work in progress” for both small arms and light weapons commitments.

Canada

Canada has been a strong advocate for global, regional and national efforts to address the issue of small arms. While work in this area has not yet been completed, the government of Canada has put great emphasis on both the prevention of illicit trafficking as well as the strict control of legal flows of small arms.

Internationally, Canada has worked through the United Nations to help develop a feasible solution to this issue. In December 1999, Canada supported the UN General Assembly resolution 54/54 which decided to convene the *United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* in July 2001. This resolution also established a preparatory committee and a panel of government experts, both of which Canada was a member of, to further discuss the issues and framework for the conference in 2001.¹⁷

Holding the position of Vice Chairman in the preparatory committee, Canada advocated the development of a meaningful action plan of concrete measures at the Convention to reduce the trade and supply of illegal arms, with a timetable for implementation. As part of the smaller panel of government experts, Canada and the other panel members examined the nature of the issue as well as the many areas which needed to be addressed in the conference such as measures to restrict the illegal flow of arms. On this particular issue, the panel advocated that states should develop, “laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the production of small arms and light weapons within their areas of jurisdiction and over the export, import, transit or retransfer of such weapons, in order to prevent unauthorized manufacture of and illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons.”¹⁸

In addition to its work in these two groups, the Canadian government also hosted the *International Conference on War Affected Children* in September 2000. At this conference, small arms was a major area of discussion leading to the reiteration of international support and

¹² “Reports of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”. General Assembly Document: A/CONF.192/1

¹³ Chronology of Key Events in the Area of Conventional Arms/Small Arms
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/events.htm>

¹⁴ Ibid, supra 3

¹⁵ Ibid, supra 2

¹⁶ Ibid, supra 5

¹⁷ General Assembly, *Resolution 54/54*. December 1, 1999; and, Group of Governmental Experts for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on All Its Aspects, *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 54/54*. Third Session. March 12, 2001; and, “Towards a United Nations 2001 Action Plan on Small Arms” *Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on Illicit Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. July 21, 2000.

¹⁸ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Small Arms and Light Weapons: What Are They and Why Do They Matter?* <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/convweap3-e.asp> May 16, 2001.

consensus on the need to work towards the development of a system to licence and control the exports of arms.¹⁹

Regionally, Canada has also worked to ensure that the issue is discussed in many of the organizations that it is a member of such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, the Commonwealth, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and La Francophonie. These efforts have led to resolutions that have supported and complemented international efforts in this area.

Regarding efforts to address the destabilizing effects of small arms, the Canadian government has supported international and national efforts to destroy the existing supply of illicit small arms. Through the Canadian International Development Agency, the Canadian government has provided monetary assistance for the collection and destruction of small arms in post-conflict states. Examples of this include the “Good for Guns” program in El Salvador and the “Transforming Arms into Tools” in Mozambique. These programs have not only encouraged the destruction of arms but also provided critical development assistance necessary to help the society progress in its post-conflict setting.²⁰

Internationally, Canada been a part of efforts at the United Nations to ensure that arms destruction is part of any solution to the small arms issue. In preparations for the *United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, Canada has been part of both the preparatory committee and government panel of experts which have each advocated the importance of the destruction of existing arms. In the final report of the preparatory committee, it was recommended that the first day of the conference be proclaimed “Small Arms Destruction Day”. In so doing, the committee has called upon all states to organize public events in collaboration with NGOs to support arms destruction. On the panel of government experts, the third and final report advocated the collection and destruction of illegal and surplus small arms as one of the recommended measures.²¹

In addition to efforts in the two UN committees, Canada supported the General Assembly Resolution 55/33 in November 2000 which encouraged states to “take appropriate national measures to destroy surplus, confiscated and or collected small arms and light weapons”. Canada has also advocated the inclusion of arms destruction in the mandates of UN Peacekeeping Operations.

Given the concrete actions on behalf of the Canadian government to further its G8 small arms and light weapons commitments, Canada receives a score of +1 for both commitments.

France

¹⁹ _____, *The Agenda for War-Affected Children*. http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/Final_Agenda-e.asp. 17 September 2000.

²⁰ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada to Support Projects in El Salvador to Curb Small Arms Proliferation*.

http://www.dfait-aeci.gc.ca/english/new/press_releases/98_press/98_195e.htm August 19, 1998; and, Canadian International Development Agency, *Peacebuilding Fund Approved Projects (1997-99)* <http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/> May 16, 2001.

²¹ Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Statement by Mr. Paul Meyer to the Opening of the Preparatory Committee for the Convention on Illicit Arms*, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/paul_meyer_speech-e.asp 2000; and, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Statement by Mr. Paul Meyer to the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/prepcom-e.asp>. January 8, 2001; and, Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, *Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. Third Session. April 16, 2001.

Consistent with its pledge at the Miyazaki foreign ministers meeting in 2000, France has begun to make an effort at improving accountability and transparency in the controlling and licensing of small arms exports. In December 2000, the Ministry of Defense submitted to parliament the first public annual report aiming to implement such measures. This report contained information regarding not only the quantities and destinations of France's small arms exports, but it also allowed for an increased parliamentary scrutiny on the subject which subsequently resulted in several inquiries into small arms destined for export. Furthermore, this increased parliamentary scrutiny is supplemented not only by France's membership in all five major multilateral military-related export control regimes, but also in its support of the EU Code of Conduct. This code binds France not only to common European standards in the exporting and licensing of small arms, but also to additional scrutiny by the EU Council of Ministers.²²

However despite these recent improvements, France's record remains a work in progress. While the annual report is the result of a political commitment and not an international obligation, France has failed to implement other important measures to increase domestic scrutiny and transparency and to fill several loopholes in existing practices and legislation. For example, France remains a target of NGO criticism for failure to provide sufficient information regarding licenses granted and the types, quantities, and end-users of exported French military equipment. Furthermore, the French government has been also accused of failure to respond to recommendations made by the National Assembly Defense and Armed Forces Committee, which called for increased transparency including the publication of a breakdown on exports by countries and equipment. Moreover, the French government is currently engulfed in two major scandals concerning exports of arms to Angola and Cameroon through French middlemen and brokers working for government-licensed export firms. These arms have not only allegedly contributed to escalating civil war in both nations, but also opened the question of corruption by former senior officials in the French government.²³

Overall France is a major player on this issue, and its compliance is an important step in improving transparency on this issue. With French arms sales totaling 900 million in 1999, France remains one of the EU's top three arms exporters. In addition, according to Saferworld, France accounted for 10% of all global arms exports between 1995-1999.²⁴ With these statistics in mind, current efforts by the French government to increase parliamentary scrutiny of small arms exports is welcomed, yet the current scandals that threaten to implicate high members of the French government also are a cause for concern. Thus, while France is moving in the right direction, the alleged charges of corruption and the scandals are a small reminder that France needs to strengthen controls on small arms exports and show a higher degree of responsibility in controlling and licensing such exports.²⁵

Since the Miyazaki Foreign Ministers meeting, France has been working to find solutions to small arms transfers and to build an international consensus on this issue. Accordingly, France has been a key player in the various international Prep Com meetings and international fora preparing proposals and targets to be discussed at the *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects* in July 2001. Along with Portugal and Sweden, France has committed itself to working on an Action Plan to adopt a strong certification scheme designed to better track small arms. Within the context of the European Union, France has always

²² International Action Network on Small Arms, "The Government Wants to Control Brokerage Activities for Small Arms Exports." (www.iansa.org)

²³ International Action Network on Small Arms, "French Arms Scandal Implicates Politicians." (www.iansa.org)

²⁴ Saferworld, "Transparency and Accountability in European Arms Export Controls: Towards common standards and best practice." (www.saferworld.co.uk); Saferworld, "Arms Bulletin #18" (www.saferworld.co.uk)

²⁵ Government of France, "Politique Francaise en Matiere D'Exportation et de Transfert d'Armes Legeres," (www.doc.diplomatie.fr)

supported some of most progressive measures on this issue, including stronger language on export controls, the marking and tracing of weapons, addressing the social problems caused by small arms, and preventing the diversion of arms into the wrong hands. France has also co-sponsored with Canada conferences on the proliferation of small arms in Mali and Cameroon. In February 2001, France attended discussions on conventional weapons transfers in Cambodia with 24 other countries which sought to build stronger mutual trust and cooperation in controlling transfers of conventional weapons. In addition to attending, France has also contributed financially contributed to these meetings (eg, 330 000 F for the Mali Conference).²⁶

Given that France's efforts are geared towards the UN conference slated for July 2001, France's proposals and efforts remain a work in progress. While France is showing welcome efforts internationally to fight the proliferation of small arms, such efforts, and the establishment of specifically targeted funds, will remain the work of the UN Conference in July 2001. As such, France is awarded a score of "0" for both of its G8 small arms and light weapons commitments.

Germany

In January 2000, and again at the Miyazaki meeting of G8 Foreign Ministers, Germany committed itself to new arms exports guidelines aiming at increasing accountability and transparency in the controlling and licensing of small arms exports. Since that time, Germany has begun respecting that pledge, with the German government submitting its first annual report on arms exports to parliament in September 2000. This report provides information ranging from licensing decisions made during the reported period to the total value of all license applications made by each country during that same time frame. It also allows for increased parliamentary scrutiny by revealing government decisions on the country destination of arms exports, number of export licenses granted for war materials, as well as refused licenses. As a result, since 1998 (and the election of the current Red-Green coalition) there have been 14 minor interpolations and 40 individual questions submitted to parliament regarding arms transfers. This increased domestic scrutiny replaces what was once a fairly limited process with one which is now supported by the annual review report of the EU Council of Ministers (through the standards of the EU Code of Conduct). The increased domestic scrutiny has also resulted in Germany's membership on five major multilateral military-related export regimes.²⁷

However, while this limited process is being replaced and Germany is increasingly submitting licensing and export decisions to domestic and international scrutiny, high levels of German accountability and transparency with regards to controlling and licensing remain a work in progress. NGO's continue to accuse the German government of providing answers to parliamentary inquiries that lack significant detail, and similar complaints have been issued concerning the lack of comprehensive details regarding licensing decisions within the annual report.

Germany remains a major player on this issue as the current Red-Green coalition has made conflict prevention through measures such as curbing arms exports to countries in civil strife a priority item in its foreign policy agenda. In 1999, German arms exports totaled US\$ 4 billion and Germany remains one of the EU's top three arms exporters. Thus, while increasing transparency and detailed reports are replacing limited information and low levels of accountability, Germany still has much to accomplish in increasing its responsibility in controlling and licensing exports of small arms.²⁸

²⁶ See also, Le Monde (www.lemonde.fr); Le Monde Diplomatique (www.monde-diplomatique.fr); French Foreign Ministry (www.france-diplomatie.fr)

²⁷ Government of Germany, "Political Principles Governing Arms Export Policy." (www.bundesregierung.de)

²⁸ Ibid.

Germany has further made significant strides to adopt progressive proposals to curb the illegal sales of arms and to create stronger international agreements to achieve this end. Germany's participation has been geared primarily toward reaching consensus between the world's major arms exporters and preparing for the *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects*, July 2001. German governments have assisted in the introduction of numerous UN resolutions on the small arms question, including the proposal in October 1999 to convene a conference on small arms (now referred to as "the UN conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects").²⁹

Along with the other 15 members of the European Union, Germany is supporting a series of progressive measures to be discussed at the July conference including stronger language on export controls, the marking and tracing of weapons, addressing the social problems caused by small arms, and preventing the diversion of arms into the wrong hands. Moreover, Germany has been a regular participant in various Prep Com meetings working towards an Action Plan for the July UN conference. In February 2001, Germany attended a seminar on conventional weapons transfers in Cambodia which sought to achieve a greater degree of mutual trust and cooperation between the participants.³⁰

With the conference only a few months away, Germany has not sought to discuss specific targets or push forward detailed and specific proposals. Such tasks remain the work of the UN Conference. Germany's involvement on this issue, however, is showing promising signs of a strong commitment towards forging an international consensus in solving some of this issues' more pressing problems. However, with no concrete agreements or specific targets - only promising signs that such targets and agreements can be reached - Germany's compliance with both of its G8 small arms and light weapons commitments remains a "0", i.e., a work in progress.

Italy

Although the commitment aimed at controlling, licensing and restricting illegal arms exports has not yet been fulfilled, Italy has supported regional and international efforts aimed towards achieving this commitment. Through the European Union, Italy, along with fellow EU members, has sought to restrict arms exports from this region; efforts which resulted in the development of the Code of Conduct adopted by the EU in 1998. Since this time, regional Cooperation has allowed movement towards an overall reduction in arms exports.

Although Italy has advocated regional and domestic solutions, the government of Italy has acknowledged that national efforts are not sufficient to address this issue. Consequently, Italy has called for international collaboration to improve existing agreements and instruments of inspection as part of the solution to this growing international problem. Internationally, Italy supported the 1999 General Assembly Resolution 54/54 which resulted in the decision to convene a *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* in July 2001. Since that time, Italy has been part of the preparatory committee for the conference during each of its three sessions. In addition to other issues, this group has pushed for the licensing and restriction of illegal arms as a fundamental part of the overall agenda for the July Conference.³¹

²⁹ Die Welt (www.welt.de); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (www.faz.de)

³⁰ Stockholm Institute for Peace Research, "National Export Control System for Conventional Arms (<http://projects.sipri.se>)

³¹ General Assembly, *Resolution 54/54*. 1 December 1999; and, Group of Governmental Experts for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons on All Its Aspects, *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 54/54*. Third Session. 12 March 2001; and Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, *Report of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. Third Session. April 16, 2001.

With respect to efforts aimed at reducing existing destabilizing accumulations of small arms, Italy has supported international efforts through the United Nations to include the destruction of existing surplus arms as a critical aspect of any final solution to the small arms issue. Italy supported UN General Assembly Resolution 55/33 in November 2000 which encouraged states to “take appropriate national measures to destroy surplus, confiscated and or collected small arms and light weapons”. In addition, Italy has actively advocated efforts to ensure that arms destruction plays an imprint role on the agenda of the *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*. As a member of the preparatory committee, Italy and other members recommended the proclamation of “Small Arms Destruction Day” for the first day of the July 2001 conference. Through the support of the Italian government, the committee has further advocated the organization of public events, with the assistance of international NGOs, to recognize this day globally.³²

And finally, through the European Union, Italy has financially supported the efforts of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to collect and destroy thousands of small arms. These projects have also provided income generating activities for ex-combatants to reintegrate into society.³³

Although Italy has supported regional and international efforts aimed at licensing and restricting illegal arms as well as destroying existing surplus of light weapons, both of these commitments continue to be a work in progress for Italy, thus a compliance score of "0".

Japan

Although Japan itself is not an exporter of weapons, including small arms and light weapons³⁴, Japan has demonstrated an exemplary sense of international responsibility with its long-standing support and commitment to addressing the problem of small arms and light weapons. While Japanese leadership in this issue area is evidenced as early as 1995, a glance at Japanese policies and initiatives in the brief period since the G8 Miyazaki initiatives on conflict prevention reinforces the view of Japan as a leader in its support for the need to address the issue of small arms and light weapons as well as ensuring the prominence of the issue on the international agenda; an agenda which includes the need for higher responsibility in terms of controlling and licensing such exports as well as support in the form of technical and financial assistance.

The Japanese government first proposed a resolution that in 1999 began the process towards the *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects* in July 2001. Throughout the past year, Japan has remained an equally prominent participant in the efforts to bring about this landmark event. The conference represents an effort on behalf of states to increase their responsibility in licensing and exporting small arms and light weapons in addition to addressing the problem of their accumulation: “..How to reduce the excessive availability of such weapons, and how to control their supply, is one of the most urgent tasks confronting all nations today, and this is precisely why the *United Nations Conference on ‘Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects’* is to be convened in July this year.”³⁵

The conference's preparatory meetings earlier this year saw active participation on behalf of Japan, including Japan's running for the presidency of the conference. Although Japan later withdrew its candidate to endorse the Colombian candidate for the position, Japan continues

³² *Italy and the General Assembly*, <http://www.italyun.org/frsc.html>. May 21, 2001; and, General Assembly, *Resolution 55/33*. November 20, 2000.

³³ United Nations Development Program, *Flame of Peace Ignites Hope in Brazzaville*.
<http://www.undp.org/erd/smallarms/20Apr2001.html>

³⁴ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pamph2000/arms.html>

³⁵ <http://www.guncontrol.ca/Content/Temp/03-04-01.htm>

efforts to support this summer's conference, with Japanese Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki chairing high-level sections of the conference.³⁶ Moreover, during the Conference of Ministers of Justice and the Interior held in Milan, February 26-27 2001, Japan as a G8 member, reaffirmed its commitment to conclude the process of negotiations and support the endorsement of the "Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunitions" thus fulfilling the mandate of the General Assembly on the Convention and related Protocols in order to fight transnational organized crime.³⁷ Subsequently, the completion of the Firearms Protocol was finalized in March 2001. The Protocol is legally binding and provides an international law enforcement mechanism for crime prevention and the prosecution of traffickers. However, the exclusion from these measures of the transfers of arms between states for national security adds to the significance of the July conference. State responsibility in the transfers of small arms and light weapons will be the subject of the *UN Conference on Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms in all its Aspects*, in New York.³⁸ Japanese leadership during the conferences' preparatory sessions is largely aimed at achieving overwhelming support on behalf of participating states for the draft plan of action.

In addition, as part of a follow-up of the G8 Miyazaki initiatives on conflict prevention, Japan hosted an International Symposium on Culture of Prevention in March 2001. The hosting of this event demonstrated strong Japanese compliance with both commitments reached in the Miyazaki communiqué. The Symposium dealt in part with the case of Cambodia; a case that has acquired an important place in Japanese policy in the area of small arms and light weapons. Discussions entailed the collection and destruction of weapons in the formerly war-torn south-east Asian state, information sharing, future coordination of international efforts, and specifics regarding Japanese policy in assisting Cambodia on several projects relating to small arms.³⁹ Emphasis was given specifically to the issue of financial and technical assistance to the Cambodian police in an effort to increase police infrastructure, which in turn, would strengthen overall security and reduce the role of small arms and light weapons in providing an alternative security source for individuals.⁴⁰ More significantly, reference was made to the importance of support for work in this area on behalf of the G8 countries, assuming the political will of smaller states such as Cambodia was realized.⁴¹

Earlier in the year, small arms and light weapons were discussed at length within the ASEAN Regional Forum at the co-sponsorship of Japan. Likewise, in February 2001, the Japanese also participated in the ARF/CBMs Seminar on Conventional Weapons Transfer in Phnom Penh ; discussions aimed at serving valuable input for the July conference⁴² . Finally, while Japan is actively involved in addressing the issue of small arms and light weapons in international and plurilateral fora, Japanese commitment to the issue may also be said to extend to its bilateral relations. More specifically, in an official government statement addressing its relations with Russia, Japan called on Russia to play a more constructive role in the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific. This role, according to Japan, should include concerted action to end illicit traffic in small arms and light weapons, “ by making arms transfers more transparent and

³⁶ “Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects 38th Meeting March 30th 2001,

<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/DC2767.doc.htm>

³⁷ http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/global/I_crime/high_tec/conf0102.htm

³⁸ http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/global/I_crime/high_tec/conf0102.htm;

<http://www.guncontrol.ca/Content/Temp/03-04-01.htm>

³⁹ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/conflict/sympo0103/report1.html>.

⁴⁰ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/conflict/sympo0103/report1.html>.

⁴¹ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/conflict/sympo0103/report1.html>

⁴² <http://www.bigpond.com.kh/users/eojc/p010221.html>

supporting regional disarmament measures, taking account of all the recommendations of the forthcoming *UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*".⁴³

The outstanding involvement of Japan on the issue of small arms and light weapons results in an overall Japanese compliance score of +1 for both G8 commitments in this issue area.

Russia

In contrast with Japan, the Russian Federation is the second leading exporter of small arms and light weapons. Domestically, Russia faces a strong military–industrial lobby and a large share of the state’s revenue depends on the sales of these lethal commodities. Consequently, domestic obstacles need to be accounted for in assessing Russia’s compliance with its G8 small arms and light weapons commitments. Nonetheless, the Russian Federation, as a major producer and exporter of small arms and light weapons, claims to be carrying out a responsible policy in the area of the supply of weapons to the international market by “...undertaking measures at the national level to tighten control over the export, production and supplies of small arms and light weapons and intensifying the fight against their illicit proliferation.”⁴⁴ In December 2000, Russia saw the passing of a presidential edict (nr.1953) that reinforced the already existing federal legislation on the "Russian Federation's Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States"; the intent being the strengthening of the effectiveness of the Russian Federation's military-technical cooperation with foreign governments, including its G8 counterparts.⁴⁵ The edict was aimed at establishing a committee into the complex Russian government and bureaucratic hierarchy that would deal with matters directly linked to the licensing and controlling of arms exports. The committee was to be entrusted with the passing of: (i) several statutes dealing with the Russian Federation's Military-Technical Co-operation agreement with foreign governments; (ii) procedures for the “..review of foreign customer requests and approval of draft resolutions of the Russian Federation President, the Russian Federation Government, and the Russian Federation Committee for Military-Technical Co-operation with Foreign States concerning the supply of military-purpose goods”; and (iii) licensing procedures for the import and export of military-purpose goods.⁴⁶ More significantly, the edict outlined that these procedures be in force as of February 2001. With respect to ensuring better control over exports, the Committee was mandated with outlining “...the Federal Organs of Executive Authority for the coordination of activities and control in the field of the Russian Federation's military-technical cooperation with foreign states...”⁴⁷ Overall, the edict demonstrated significant potential in making an immense contribution to addressing the problem of small arms. However, it remains to be seen whether the edict will fulfill this potential and yield concrete results.

In addition to these domestic events, the Russian Federation was present and active at the preparatory meetings intended to help bring forth a draft plan for the *UN Conference on Illicit Trafficking of Small Arms in all its Aspects* in July. At the January 2001 preparatory meeting, the Russian Federation made explicit statements on the issue.⁴⁸ During the third preparatory session preceding the UN Conference March 2001, Russia demonstrated support for the event, being among one of the speakers on the proposed draft program of action during this session. However, it should be noted that Russia's position at the conference emphasized that work in this area should not undermine the principles of non-interference and right to self-defense embodied in the

⁴³ Speech By Dr. Tatsuo Arima, the Representative of the Government of Japan at the 37th Munich Security Council Meeting “ Bilateral Relations with Russia from Japan’s Perspective” February 4th, 2001, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/speech0102.html>

⁴⁴ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/DC2767.doc.htm>

⁴⁵ http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Russia/decre_1953.htm

⁴⁶ http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Russia/decre_1953.htm

⁴⁷ http://projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Russia/decre_1953.htm

⁴⁸ <http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/files/2001confpc52e.pdf>

UN Charter.⁴⁹ As one of the major exporters of small arms and light weapons, Russia emphasized that the focus of the conference should be the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons as well as its preference for national and sub-national measures to address illicit trade, particularly those undertaken by affected states themselves.⁵⁰

Overall, the December 2000 edict demonstrates that the Russian government is demonstrating significant potential in addressing the problem of small arms. However, given that it still remains to be seen whether the edict will fulfill its potential and yield concrete results, the Russian Federation is awarded a score of 0, or a "work in progress". Due to the inability to isolate empirical evidence allowing for an assessment of the Russian government's compliance with the second small arms commitment, a score with respect to financial and technical assistance is not available (n/a).

United States

The United States has been a consummate supporter of tighter regulation involving the export of small arms—hosting the *First Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, New York, 25-28 May 1998*⁵¹ and working towards the nascent *United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Arms in All Its Aspects*.

With respect to promoting stronger regulation at the regional and local level, the U.S. was a signatory to the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons⁵² and participated in the *NATO/EAPC workshop on SALW with the participation of countries parties to the "Mediterranean Dialogue"; Brussels, 21 November 2000*⁵³. The United States has also adopted Complex Contingency Operations (CCO) that attempts to attenuate the flow of illicit small arms transfers, inter alia, in conflict regions.⁵⁴ Notwithstanding the positive work of the U.S., the culmination of the small arms regulatory process will not conclude until this summer with the United Nations conference. Hence, U.S. efforts are considered a "work in progress", thereby allocating the US a compliance score of "0" for both small arms and light weapons G8 commitments.

(ii) Illicit Trade in Diamonds

At their G8 meeting in Miyazaki, the Foreign Ministers expressed concern that the "proceeds from the illicit trade in certain high value commodities, especially diamonds, are providing funds for arms purchases, thus aggravating conflicts and humanitarian crises in Africa". While insisting that "the interests of the legitimate diamond producers and traders are not put at risk",⁵⁵ the G8 Foreign Ministers committed their governments at Miyazaki to take the following measures to counter the illicit trade in diamonds:

- (a) "The G8, which accounts for the bulk of the global market for diamonds, will cooperate closely with governments of diamond-producing states, neighbouring states, major marketing centers, regional organizations and industry in order to curb illicit diamond flows".

⁴⁹ <http://www.iansa.org/calendar/2001/events/Jan10.htm>

⁵⁰ http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/docs/4048_rus.htm;
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/files/2001confpc52e.pdf>

⁵¹ Press statement by Madeline Korbel Albright, 24 September 1999.

http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/smallarms/docs/4048_usa.htm

⁵² OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation on 24 November 2000 prior to the Eight Ministerial Council of the OSCE, Vienna, Austria, 27-28 November 2000

⁵³ NATO Parliamentary Assembly Report AT-273-STC-00-6. www.naa.be/publications/comrep/2000/at-273-e.html

⁵⁴ U.S. Small Arms report, 25 May 1999. http://www.un.org/Depts/dda/CAB/smallarms/docs/260_usa.htm

⁵⁵ "G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention", Miyazaki, Japan, 13 July 2000.

- (b) "{The G8} welcomes the 'Technical Forum on Diamonds' held at Kimberly, South Africa, as an important contribution to finding pragmatic solutions. The G8 supports rapid follow-up, involving all the key actors, which should include the exploring of a possible certification scheme for rough diamonds from conflict areas, industry codes of conduct and an international body to promote transparency and accountability"

Britain

With respect to curbing illicit diamond flows, Britain has been working closely over the past year with the government of Sierra Leone in restoring the peace process and rebuilding the country's infrastructure; both efforts aimed at increasing the legitimate trade in diamonds which has risen from US\$ 2 million a year ago to over US\$ 17 million in 2001. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook welcomed the UN Sierra Leone Expert Panel report on the link between small arms and the illicit trade in Sierra Leone diamonds. Further to this, Britain pledged to work with its international partners to act against those named by the Panel involved in the illicit flow of diamonds.⁵⁶ In addition to Sierra Leone, those countries named by the Panel also include Angola, for which Britain has a representative on the five-member monitoring mechanism for. Similar to Sierra Leone, the purpose of the Angola monitoring mechanism is primarily to "shine a bright light on violators of the sanctions' regime, and to pursue the findings of the Panel of Experts".⁵⁷

Regarding the second commitment, Britain has played a seminal role in all aspects of the "Kimberly Process". Initially by rallying support for a technical forum on rough diamond certification in Kimberly, the UK then acted as a vocal proponent of the "process" at the *International Diamond Ministerial* in Pretoria, South Africa. Moreover, it also jointly supported adding conflict diamonds to the agenda of the G8 Summit in Okinawa. Britain also hosted the *London Inter-Governmental Meeting on Conflict Diamonds* - a meeting conceived of in Okinawa and aimed at further exploring ways to break the link between conflicts and illicit diamonds. Moreover, Britain also provided leadership in crafting and ratifying UN General Assembly Resolution 56 intended to diminish or eliminate the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts. Lastly, Britain has also shown support for the nascent workshop in Windhoek, Namibia aimed at developing certification guidelines for rough diamonds.⁵⁸ Further to this, FCO Minister Peter Hain stated at the *World Diamond Council Meeting* in January 2001 in London his country's commitment to work with the World Diamond Council to ensure that the Kimberley Group returns to the UN General Assembly with a completed proposal for a certification scheme ready for government approval.⁵⁹

Britain's efforts with respect to both curbing illicit diamond flows in Sierra Leone and Angola, in addition to moving forward on a possible certification scheme, result in a score of +1 for the UK on both of its Miyazaki diamond commitments.

Canada

Given Canada's international interest in the development of a human security agenda, coupled with its domestic interest as a leading international diamond producer with a significant emerging capacity in the world market, Canada has been a strong vocal international advocate for

⁵⁶ Speech by British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, October 2000. www.bbc.co.uk

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "London Conference Tackles Global Diamond Certification". <http://www.diamonds.net>. October 26, 2000.

⁵⁹ Speech by FCO Minister of State, Peter Hain, World Diamond Council Meeting, London, January 18, 2001. www.bbc.co.uk.

breaking the link between illicit diamonds and conflict. Much of this advocacy began when Canada chaired the Angola Sanctions Committee during its recent UN Security Council term (1999-2000) during which time Robert Fowler (as chair) issued a report linking diamonds and armed conflict. The report served as a model for subsequent UN interventions in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Liberia. Its effectiveness was proven when the DRC announced on April 27, 2001 that it would be signing an agreement to set up a certification scheme for Congolese diamonds.⁶⁰

In September 2000, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien stated that there was a need to “deny the agents of violence and conflict their sources of supply” particularly through methods such as “controlling the illicit trade in diamonds.”⁶¹ Canada’s official position on this issue was further solidified in a January 25, 2001 statement by Michel Duval, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations when he stated, “We reiterate our support for international efforts to devise effective and pragmatic measures to eliminate conflict diamonds, with a particular focus on proposals for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds”.⁶² In addition, over the last year, Ambassador Duval has urged the Security Council to consider putting in place a standing, integrated monitoring arrangement to reduce overlap in the Council's efforts to detect violations in the illegal trafficking in high-value commodities, particularly conflict diamonds.

As a participant in the “Kimberely Process”, Canada co-sponsored, along with the UK, the *International Diamond Ministerial* in Pretoria, South Africa in September 2000. At this meeting, the *World Diamond Council* (a working group first established in May 2000), put forth proposals for a global certification process. On October 25-26 of that year, Canada attended the *London Inter-Governmental Meeting on Conflict Diamonds*, along with representatives of 36 governments involved in the processing, exporting and importing of rough diamonds. This conference sought to foster greater international support for breaking the link between illicit diamonds and conflict as well as increase dialogue on a possible certification regime. The international consensus and support forged in London led to the December 1, 2000 General Assembly Resolution 56, sponsored by Canada, which reaffirmed the G8 Okinawa Commitment to break the link between rough diamonds and conflict. Resolution 56 called for an intergovernmental process to develop effective and pragmatic measures to address the problem, with particular focus on the development of proposals for an international certification scheme for rough diamonds.⁶³

In addition to the global certification process, the Canadian government has also sought to eliminate conflict diamonds through improving the sanctions policy of the United Nations. As Chair of the Angola Sanctions Committee, Canada has made recommendations to the United Nations to develop a more systematic approach to monitoring sanctions. Canada believes that this method would better detect violations of Security Council measures, such as the export of conflict diamonds, rather than the case by case approach currently adopted. Further to this, in his address to the president of the Security Council on January 25, 2001 in New York, UN Ambassador Michel Duval urged the Security Council to consider putting in place a standing, integrated monitoring arrangement to reduce overlap in the Council's efforts to detect violations in the illegal trafficking in high-value commodities.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign/humansecurity/background-e.asp

⁶¹ Address by Prime Minister Jean Chretien to the Plenary Session of the Millennium Summit of the United Nations. 7 September 2000. <http://www.pm.gc.ca>

⁶² Statement by Ambassador Michel Duval, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Sierre Leone. New York, 25 January 2001. <http://www.un.int/canada/html/s-25jan2001duval.htm>

⁶³ UN General Assembly Resolution 56. Press Release. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001201_ga9839.doc.html. December 1, 2000.

⁶⁴ Statement by Ambassador Michel Duval, Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the UN, to the UN Security Council, New York, January 25, 2001.

As part of the Kimberley Process, Canada currently works very closely with the World Diamond Council, the European Commission, the World Customs Organisations, and representatives from civil society and the UN Sanctions Committee for Angola and Liberia. As a representative on the *Kimberly Process Task Force*, Canada assists the Chair in preparing draft agendas for meetings, coordinating the preparation of detailed working papers, and tracking the task forces' overall progress. In attendance at the most recent meeting of the Kimberley Process in Brussels on April 25-27, Canada agreed to evaluate a set of minimum acceptable standards for certificates at the next meeting in Moscow in July 2001.

Given Canada's active involvement since Miyazaki on both the curbing of illicit trade in diamonds and moving forward on a global certification scheme, the Canadian government is granted a compliance score of +1 for both commitments reached in this issue area.

France

Although France is not a major exporting, importing, or processor of diamonds internationally, it has nonetheless played an active role in global efforts to break the illicit trade of diamonds through its position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. As an active member of the UN Panel of Experts that examined the link between the sale of diamonds and conflicts in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and through its role as the rotating President of the European Union during the first stages of the “Kimberley Process” (the last six months of 2000), France was able to further the issue of illicit diamond trading through its membership in such critical international fora by reiterating the importance of playing a “constructive and active role” on this issue.⁶⁵

France both attended and supported the proposals of the *London Intergovernmental Conference* in October 2000, which examined several means of breaking the link between conflict and illicit diamonds. It also supported and ratified General Assembly Resolution 56, which built on the proposals of the London conference and laid the groundwork for a forum on establishing an international diamond certification scheme.⁶⁶ Furthermore, as the rotating President of the European Union in the last six months of 2000, France was charged with speaking on behalf of the members of the European Union during important debates at the UN General Assembly on the issue of illicit diamond trading.

However, while the French government has officially endorsed and supported all international efforts since the “Kimberley Process” began, it has also used this issue to bring a less punitive approach to sanctions against leaders of “blood diamond” nations. For example, France fought for the inclusion of a sunset clause on UN sanctions against Liberia, which resulted in accusations by many NGO's of a self-serving French policy of supporting sanctions on the sale of diamonds, but rejecting sanctions against other areas of the Liberian economy such as timber (France is Liberia's largest importer of timber). However, France's concern about sanctions against Liberia reflected their overall view of punitive sanctions, which in the opinion of the French government, had in the past been destructive to many innocent civilians. As such, France fought hard and won support for more limited but flexible sanctions which it believed allowed the UN Security Council to measure their effectiveness on a more consistent basis. This approach enabled the international community to target the leaders of these “blood diamond nations” directly, thus avoiding the unnecessary suffering of innocent civilians through punitive sanctions.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Interview with Senior Government Official, French Embassy, Ottawa Canada. June, 2001.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ UN General Assembly Document, A/55/PV.79. December 1, 2000; www.un/int/france

While France has been vocal in criticizing certain aspects of international sanctions on this issue, its constructive and vocal approach has nonetheless supported all major initiatives taken by the international community to break the link between conflict and illicit diamonds. Since France is not a major exporting, importing, or processing nation of diamonds, it will most likely assume a more diminished role on this issue in the future as the targets become more specific and the impetus is placed on exporting, importing, and processing nations to take action. Since Okinawa, however, France has been an active participant in the important progress spearheaded by the G8 in breaking the link between armed conflict and the international trade of illicit diamonds. Thus, given the high level of French involvement in the issue of conflict diamonds, France is awarded a compliance score of +1 for both commitments within this issue area.

Germany

As part of its regional African policy, which aims to promote democracy, order, and stability, Germany has supported all efforts undertaken by the United Nations and the European Union to halt the sale of illicit diamonds responsible for financing and prolonging conflicts that threaten democracy and stability in many parts of Africa. Since the issue of conflict prevention has been a key foreign policy priority of the current Red-Green coalition, Germany has been an active member of concerted international efforts aimed at finding a final solution to the illegal sale of raw diamonds used to finance conflicts in states under civil strife including Angola and Sierra Leone.⁶⁸

However, since Germany is not a major exporting, importing, or processing state on the international diamond market, its influence in making decisive decisions on finding a solution to “blood diamonds” is limited. Due to its incapacity to exert a meaningful leadership role on this issue, the German government has instead employed a supportive approach to all international efforts, including the establishment of an international diamond certification scheme, and the promotion of its position on this issue through multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, and the G8. Germany attended the *London Intergovernmental Conference* in October 2000, aimed at examining ways of breaking the link between conflict and illicit diamonds. Germany further supported UN General Assembly Resolution 56 which built on the proposals of the London conference and laid the groundwork for a forum on establishing an international diamond certification scheme at Windhoek, Namibia in February 2001.⁶⁹

As part of its approach on this issue, Germany endorsed all international efforts aimed at attacking the sources of prolonged conflicts created as a result of the financing of illicit diamonds in several African countries. At a conference in Berlin in November 2000, devoted to the new regional foreign policy of the German government in Africa - hosted by the German government and attended by members of the European Union, South Africa, and other African nations - Germany reaffirmed the role played by diamonds in financing conflicts in Africa, and called for an immediate end to this situation in an effort to promote democracy and stability on that continent.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the German government has also taken the lead on pushing major international diamond cartels such as De Beers in adopting similar measures.

Overall, Germany has played a constructive and supportive role in international efforts aimed at limiting the role of illicit diamonds in fuelling armed conflicts. As such, Germany is granted a score of +1 for both G8 commitments in this regard. It should be noted however, that

⁶⁸ "Conflict Diamonds being Squeezed", *Angola Peace Monitor*.
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/2000/1004conf.htm>

⁶⁹ UN General Assembly Resolution 56. Press Release.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001201_ga9839.doc.html. December 1, 2000.

⁷⁰ www.bundesregierung.de; www.faz.de

while Germany's role to curb the sales of illegal diamonds has been very positive to date, its role stands a chance of becoming reduced in the future as the process moves to more specific and ambitious targets in which the major exporting, importing, and processing nations of diamonds will have to assume the lead.

Italy

Although Italy has not been at the forefront of the movement to eliminate conflict diamonds, the Italian government has been involved in some of the more important international efforts to push this agenda forward. At the *London Intergovernmental Conference* in October 2000, Italy was among the 36 countries in attendance and played a key role in the discussions surrounding the need to break the link between illicit diamonds and conflict. Italy further supported the subsequent December 1, 2001 General Assembly Resolution 56 which reaffirmed the commitment made by the G8 in Okinawa to break the link between illicit diamonds and conflict, particularly through the development of an international certification process.⁷¹

Although the Italian government has shown support for its G8 commitments in the area of conflict diamonds by attending international conferences and supporting related UN General Assembly resolutions, Italy's efforts have proven to be less robust than those of its G8 counterparts. As the hosting country of the 2001 Genoa Summit, where stock will be taken on conflict prevention initiatives since Miyazaki, the Italian government's report card will indicate a work a progress, or an overall compliance score of "0" in the area of conflict diamonds.

Japan

Japan's commitment to conflict prevention has been most pronounced in its involvement in Africa; a continent which, according to the Japanese, has been a leading source of conflicts resulting from the illicit trade of rough diamonds. Japanese Prime Minister Mori has shown his commitment to the issue of illicit diamond trading during a series of bilateral visits to Africa in the post-Okinawa period. In his discussions with African state leaders during these bilaterals, the Prime Minister promoted support for the work of ECOWAS (Economic Cooperation of West African States) and the "Kimberley Process".⁷² Prime Minister Mori expressed on more than one occasion during these bilaterals that the resolution of issues pertaining to natural resources such as diamonds was critical in terms of conflict prevention.⁷³

Japan, along with its G8 partners and 36 other countries, was present at the October 2000 *London Inter-Governmental Conference on Diamonds and Conflict*.⁷⁴ In addition, on December 1, 2000, Japan voted in favour of unanimously adopting UN General Assembly resolution 55/56, aimed at breaking the link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds and armed conflict, as a contribution to the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts.⁷⁵

Although Japan has been vocal in its support for preventing armed conflicts through the reduction in trade of illicit diamonds, Japan's compliance with its G8 commitments on this issue have been less concrete than those of its G8 counterparts. By showing interest in bilateral meetings with key African nations and voting in favour of UN General Assembly resolution

⁷¹ UN General Assembly Resolution 56. Press Release.
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001201_ga9839.doc.html. December 1, 2000.

⁷² <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/pmv0101/n-meet.html>

⁷³ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/pmv0101/n-meet.html>

⁷⁴ <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?4309>

⁷⁵ <http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html>

55/56, the Japanese government is granted a "0", or a work in progress, for moving forward but failing to reach any tangible results on its G8 illicit diamond commitments.

Russia

As the world's second largest diamond producer, Russia initially approached proposals for an international certification scheme cautiously in the post-Okinawa period, sensing, to some extent, that these measures might extend too far in terms of intervening in Russia's domestic politics.⁷⁶ However, in spite of its initial position, Russia has taken decisive action to halt the illegal trade in diamonds used to finance protracted violent conflict, particularly in countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola and Democratic Republic of Congo. Further to its Okinawa pledge to establish an international conference that would build on the "Kimberley Process", Russia reinforced this commitment by attending and contributing to the meeting of experts in Windhoek, Namibia (September 4-5), the Ministerial meeting in Pretoria (September 19-20), and subsequently, the *London Inter-Governmental Conference on Diamonds and Conflict* in October.⁷⁷ At London, practical approaches aimed at breaking the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and armed conflict were considered as an increased international consensus among a broader array of states on the need to drive forward the "Kimberley Process" was reached.⁷⁸ In December, following the London Conference, Russia declared to the U.N. General Assembly that it was working on concluding the preparation and launching of a national certification system for rough diamonds. Finally, as an active participant in the *London Inter-Governmental Conference on Diamonds and Conflict* and as an endorser of the UN General Assembly resolution 55/56, Russia supported the initiative of the government of Namibia to host further expert discussions on the development of certification guidelines for rough diamonds.⁷⁹

As the host of the next meeting of the Kimberley Process in Moscow in July, it is hoped that Russia will push forward the issue of a proposed "certificate of origin" for diamonds. As the second major diamond producer in the world, Russia has an enormous responsibility in taking a strong position at the Moscow meeting, both for its own domestic purposes and for the purposes of moving forward on its G8 commitments on this issue.

Given Russia's efforts to curb illicit diamond trading in key diamond producing nations, coupled with its initiatives aimed at moving forward on a certification scheme in the post-Kimberley period, Russia is granted a +1 for both of its G8 commitments in this issue area.

United States

With one-third of global diamond sales, the U.S. initiated leadership towards exploring ways of preventing conflicts fuelled by diamonds by jointly leading the initiative to place conflict diamonds on the agenda of the G8 Summit in Okinawa. Following Okinawa, the US hosted an international conference in Washington that focused on economies of war, which, inter alia, opened a direct dialogue with diamond officials from Botswana and Angola.

Also in the post-Okinawa period, Congressman Tony Hall (D-OH) introduced into the US House of Representatives a bill entitled the *Clean Diamonds Act* (H.R. 918). Under the proposed act, diamonds could not be imported into the United States unless the exporting country

⁷⁶Richard Lloyd Parry and Stephen Castle, Britain and Russia Discuss Plan for 'Diamond Summit' The Independent July 22, 2000:<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/diamond/summit.htm>

⁷⁷ UN General Assembly Document: <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/55/pv/a55pv79.pdf>; and, "Diamonds: The Road from Kimberly". Ministerial Conference on Diamonds, Pretoria, South Africa. September 21, 2000.

⁷⁸ http://www.fco.gov.uk/text_only/news/newstext.asp?4309&printVersion=yes; "Removing Conflict Diamonds from the World's Markets". International Diamonds Conference, London. October 25, 2000.

⁷⁹ <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?4309>; and, UN General Assembly Resolution 56. Press Release. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001201.ga9839.doc.html>. December 1, 2000

was implementing a system of controls on the export and import of rough diamonds as described in the UN General Assembly's December 2000 Resolution. Elements of the Act would be monitored by a presidential committee mandated with developing a labeling process intended to certify that a diamond being imported into the United States be deemed "clean", ie, not a "blood" or "conflict" diamond. The proposed act suggested that violators would be subject to civil and criminal penalties and that the proceeds from diamonds seized would be transferred to the US AIDS's War Victims Fund. This Act was subsequently followed by the introduction of a second conflict diamond bill on April 26, 2001. Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) introduced the Conflict Diamonds Act of 2001 (S 787) to the US Senate, building on critical elements of the proposals reached at the World Diamond Council (WDC) earlier that year.

In April 2001, the US Embassy, facilitated by USAID in Freetown, Sierra Leone, hosted a three day training workshop to improve mine-monitoring officers' ability to tackle diamond smuggling. Following the workshop, on May 26, 2001, President Bush prohibited the import of all rough diamonds from Liberia. This initiative followed from the UN's Security Council sanctions on Liberia - implemented following UN Resolution 1343 which called for both an embargo on Liberia's diamond exports and an air ban intended to stop its gem-for-guns trade with Sierra Leone.

At Kimberly, the U.S. reached an agreement on principles with Belgium and Britain on key aspects of the "Kimberly Process". Moreover, it jointly led an initiative that guided the World Diamond Council in establishing a "chain of warranties" to hedge against illicit diamonds. In addition, it contributed to the communiqué of the *London Inter-governmental Meeting* - a conference conceived of at the G8 Okinawa Summit and intended to further the momentum of the "Kimberly Process" by exploring ways to de-link conflicts and illicit diamonds.⁸⁰ Finally, the U.S. not only ratified UN General Assembly resolution 56 (aimed at mitigating the role of diamonds in fuelling conflicts), but also pledged to the General Assembly that it would advance the process of creating certification guidelines for rough diamonds at the international technical conference and workshop in Windhoek, Namibia.

Given the US's active involvement in fulfilling both of its G8 illicit diamond commitments, the US government is granted a score of +1 on both of its Miyazaki diamond commitments.

(iii) Children in Armed Conflict

During their meetings in Miyazaki, the G8 Foreign Ministers affirmed that "the plight of war-affected children...is one of the most disturbing human security issues facing the world today." They further noted that "the G8 is particularly concerned by the issue raised by children in armed conflict both as participants and victims".⁸¹ In this context, the G8 agreed upon a number of approaches in dealing with this issue on a global level, the most resolute of which were the following:

- (a) "{The G8 agrees to} provide support for the office of the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in its role as an advocate on behalf of war-affected children, and to UN agencies including UNICEF".
- (b) "{The G8 agrees to} make close contact, through UNICEF and other fora, on individual reintegration programs e.g. to identify and share best practice, noting the particular needs of

⁸⁰ "Removing Conflict Diamonds from the World's Markets". International Diamonds Conference, London. October 25, 2000.

⁸¹ G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention, Miyazaki, Japan, 13 July 2000. p. 7

displaced and vulnerable children in rehabilitation and reintegration programs and being sensitive to gender differentiated experiences".⁸²

During the interim summit period of 2000/2001, the U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Ottunu, made a concerted effort to garner the support of the international community in alleviating the devastating effects of war on children. More specifically, Ottunu targeted the role of the U.N. Security Council in addition to UNICEF, and called for a breach of amnesty for war criminals suspected of crimes against children. The Special Representative and various U.N. bodies established that although advancements have been made at the G8 level, greater challenges in the *implementation* of resolutions and decrees presented the real obstacle to combating the devastating effects of children in armed conflict. In an address made by Ottunu to the 55th Session of the General Assembly on October 3, 2000, specific suggestions were given intended to facilitate the implementation of summit decrees, and advance action on this issue to a higher proactive, rather than reactive, level. Such suggestions included, for example: increasing pressure on those who target children in armed conflict; promoting the adoption and implementation of international standards and mechanisms; supporting global and regional outreach initiatives; promoting the protection, rights and welfare of children during peace negotiations, peace consolidation and post-conflict reconstruction; and supporting the work of the Special Representative and United Nations bodies including UNICEF.⁸³

While the majority of the G8 commitments concerning war-affected children focus on reducing children's involvement in armed forces, the second commitment seeks to develop "best practices" for reintegrating child soldiers and war-victims whose lives have already been displaced by war. This commitment is jointly supported by the United Nations Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Ottunu, along with the U.N. Security Council.

The *International Conference on War-Affected Children* was held in Winnipeg, Canada during September 2000. Official members from each of the G8 countries attended the conference and made pledges indicating their future support for war-affected children. A publication entitled "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children," also known as the *Machel Review*, was released at the conference. This document, published by the United Nations Children Fund and the United Nations Development Fund for Women, summarizes the recommendations and progress made since the influential 1996 *Machel Report*. The *Machel Review* devotes an entire chapter to "Reconstruction and Reconciliation." Machel reiterates her previous plea that children should be the primary focus of post-war reconstruction programs, and suggests that National Commissions on the Rights of a Child, such as the one used in Sierra Leone, are vital in achieving this goal. Machel also recommends a more extensive use of "Truth and Reconciliation Commissions," so that memories of wartime injustice can be partially reconciled in the minds of children, thus enabling them to end the cycle of injustice and violence.⁸⁴

Lastly, the *Machel Review* focuses attention on the lack of promised financial aid from developed countries as a major barrier to helping war-affected children reintegrate into society. The *Machel Review* encourages developed countries to significantly increase their percentage of foreign aid to post-war reconstruction and reconciliation programs, and also to increase their acceptance and protection of war-affected children and adolescent refugees.⁸⁵

Britain

⁸² Ibid., pg. 8.

⁸³ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/freports.htm>

⁸⁴ <http://www.war-affected-children.gc.ca/>

⁸⁵ Ibid.

On the 7th of September, 2000, Britain signed the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts* (OP-CRC-AC) which was adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution A/RES/54/263 in May of 2000.⁸⁶ Such an obvious commitment to Ottunu's call for the international community's support of the Protocol was also compounded by Britain's role in the Security Council. Britain's 'permanent membership' on the U.N. Security Council allowed it to vote to adopt Resolution 1314; a Resolution which was passed unanimously and called on all 189 U.N. member countries to sign the OP-CRC-AC. In addition to its support for this resolution, Britain also participated in international summits on this issue, including the *Berlin Conference on Children in Europe and Central Asia* and the *Winnipeg Conference on War-Affected Children*.⁸⁷

Yet, although these recent advancements show signs of British compliance with its Summit commitments, Britain's domestic policies pose stark contrasts to its policies adopted within various international fora. With the signing of the OP-CRC-AC, Britain submitted a declaration revealing its domestic policy to be in direct violation of the protocol. With Britain representing the G8 country with the lowest minimum age for military recruitment and the largest recruitment of children under 18 into the regular armed forces, it is not surprising that the British government did not commit to the under-18 minimum age requirement for military service; a requirement that not only serves as the keystone of the OP-CRC-AC, but one that is quickly becoming an accepted international norm. And although Britain claimed that it would "take *feasible* measures to ensure that members of its armed forces who have not attained the age of 18 years (would) not take a *direct* part in hostilities", no guarantee has been made on the part of the British government that its armed forces would *not* enlist and deploy children under the age of 18.⁸⁸ As a result, Britain has been impeded from making any substantial contributions to raising the minimum age for participating in battle which is one of Ottunu's main criteria for the successful advancement of the plight of child security in conflict situations.

Regarding the commitment aimed at child reintegration, although Britain participated in both the September 2000 *Winnipeg International Conference on War-Affected Children* and the May 2001 *Berlin Conference on Children in Europe and Central Asia*, it did not make substantial pledges to improve the reintegration of war-affected children.⁸⁹ There is also no evidence to suggest that Britain has deepened its relationship with UNICEF or any other international organization in determining "best practices" for dealing with children in post-war countries in the post-Okinawa period. These shortcomings, combined with the fact that Britain has refused to ratify the *Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts* (OP-CRC-AC) within its own borders, causes Britain to receive a negative score on both of these G8 commitments.⁹⁰

Canada

Canada has emerged as the world leader in developing policies designed to lessen the impact of war on children; a position highlighted by the fact that it was the first country to sign the OP-CRC-AC when it was opened for signature in June 2000. Ratification of the protocol by the Canadian government took place on July 7, 2000 - just days prior to the Miyazaki meeting on Conflict Prevention. Being the first of the G8 to sign and ratify the protocol, Canada came to the table at Miyazaki urging its G8 colleagues to follow suit.

⁸⁶ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/fUnDocs.htm>

⁸⁷ <http://www.war-affected-children.gc.ca/>

⁸⁸ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/fUnDocs.htm>

⁸⁹ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/freports.htm>

⁹⁰ Ibid.

Since Miyazaki, Canada has become actively involved in increasing international awareness on the issue of children in armed conflict. In September 2000, Canada played host to the *International Conference on War-Affected Children*, in which all G8 members attended and submitted pledges outlining their future support for war-affected children initiatives. In addition to being the host country, Canada showed its strong support by participating at the ministerial level. The Winnipeg Conference led the way to the drafting of an *Agenda of Action*, which designated the issue of child soldiers as a top priority for the UN General Assembly Special Session on Children scheduled for the fall of 2001. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade was also a major financial contributor to the Machel Report - an influential publication outlining progress and suggestions for “best practice” in reintegrating war-affected children into society.⁹¹

Canada made several specific pledges at the Winnipeg Conference relating to reintegration of war-affected children. Canada committed itself to “recruit, train and deploy experts on child rights, child protection, justice, mediation and program delivery.” Canada also pledged to develop staff for peace operations including a specialized roster of “children’s issues experts.” In Sierra Leone, Canada pledged to provide the “necessary resources to ensure that child protection and advocacy experts serve on the staff of the Independent Special Court for Sierra Leone.” In addition to these measures, the Canadian government further advocated at Winnipeg its support for the establishment of a National Children’s Agency.⁹²

Efforts aimed at moving forward on the issue of children in conflict continued in April of 2001 as Canada participated in the UNICEF-sponsored *Amman Conference on the Use of Children as Soldiers in the Middle East and North Africa*. The conference established that all states should criminalize the use and recruitment of children under 18 in their national legislations, thereby supporting the efforts of the U.N. to outlaw crimes against children.⁹³ Canada’s position on this issue has been to no longer recruit volunteers into its armed forces who are under the age of 18, particularly in cases where such volunteers could be assigned to conflict regions.

The combination of progressive changes made in its domestic and foreign policy has earned Canada a positive score for both of its commitments aimed at supporting the office of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict and participating in child reintegration programs. As such, Canada is granted a score of +1 for its Summit commitments in this regard.

France

Following Miyazaki, France similarly took important steps aimed at diminishing the harmful effects of armed conflict on children by signing the OP-CRC-AC on September 6, 2000. With this, France ended its voluntary enlistment of children under the age of 18 years into its armed forces.

Along with its G8 colleagues, France also sent a representative delegation to the *Berlin Conference for Children in Europe and Central Asia* during May 16-18 2001. This conference allowed governments to move towards a consensus on abolishing child enlistment in the armed forces. The most significant decree to emerge from the Berlin Conference was a call to participating countries to “take all measures in order to ensure the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (by ratifying), as soon as possible, the two Optional Protocols to this Convention...”⁹⁴

Further support for the UN Special Representative on Children in Armed Conflict was advanced by France’s membership and involvement within the U.N. Security Council. As a

⁹¹ Ibid; <http://www.cdi.org/weekly/2000/issue46.html#2>

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/>

⁹⁴ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/freports.htm>

member of the Council, increased pressure was placed on the French government to understand the importance of the strategic role of the protocol's ratification to the future of children in armed conflict. In response, France supported the passing of Resolution 1314, which was hailed by Ottunu as being a genuine breakthrough on the road towards raising the enlistment age of children in armed forces to 18.

The combination of France's ratification of the protocol, and its support for the international community to follow suit, shows clear support for the U.N. Special Representative's efforts to combat the involvement of children in armed conflict. However, while France has played an important role in passing the OP-CRC-AC through the U.N. Security Council, little evidence can be found to confirm that France has deepened its contribution to child reintegration programs during the G8 Summit interim period. As a result, France is granted a score of +1 for its efforts aimed at supporting the UN's initiatives, but a score of -1 in its efforts to further advance child reintegration programs in the post-Okinawa Summit period.

Germany

Similar to its G8 counterparts, Germany also succeeded in complying with its Summit commitment to decrease the effects of armed conflict on children with the signing of the OP-CRC-AC on September 6, 2000. Furthermore, Germany (along with Bosnia) co-hosted the *Berlin Conference on Children in Europe and Central Asia*, during which time UNICEF served as the substantive regional secretariat. The conference was held in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 54/93 and served to encourage appropriate national and regional activities on children's issues - with an ultimate view aimed at contributing to the preparations for the U.N. Special Session on Children in the fall of 2001.⁹⁵

Germany has made substantial contributions towards developing child reintegration programs in post-war countries in conjunction with UNICEF during the G8 Summit interim period. In Guatemala, the German Federal Ministry for Cooperation (BMZ) supported a UNICEF program for education in post-conflict situations. In Sri Lanka, the BMZ is mandating with managing a project for the reintegration of disadvantaged children in conflict areas. Furthermore, in Africa a study has been financed by the German government to investigate the socio-psychological problems of child soldiers and possibilities for their reintegration.⁹⁶

Efforts to heed the Special Representative's call to combat child involvement in armed conflict and to cooperate with international organizations such as UNICEF, demonstrate that Germany has complied with its G8 Miyazaki commitment aimed at supporting the efforts of the U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. Coupled with Germany's contributions to regional child reintegration programs, the German government scores a +1 for both of its G8 Miyazaki Summit commitments in this issue area.

Italy

On September 6, 2000, Italy signed the CRC-OP-AC, 2000 thereby directly supporting the directive of the U.N. Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. In addition, Italy, along with its Summit partners, participated in the *Berlin Conference on Children in Europe and Central Asia*, which established the importance of ratifying the Optional Protocol in Europe.

With respect to the issue of child reintegration, Italy was the only country that attended the *International Conference on War-Affected Children* in Winnipeg at the ministerial level (along with the host country, Canada). Franco Danieli, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, delivered a pledge promising to offer greater debt relief as a means to help ease poverty in developing nations, a serious obstacle facing most war-affected children. The pledge highlighted US \$23 million spent by Italy since 1998 on aid specifically targeted at minors in developing

⁹⁵ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/fUnDocs.htm>

⁹⁶ Ibid.

countries. At the conference, the Italian government further highlighted a more recently formulated relationship between Italy and organizations such as UNICEF aimed at helping develop “best practices” for issues relating to war-affected children.⁹⁷ As such, Italy’s signing of the CRC-OP-AC, in addition to their active participation in reintegration initiatives at both the Winnipeg and Berlin conferences, contribute to a positive score (+1) for Italy on both of its G8 Miyazaki commitments in this issue area.

Japan

With regards to the first commitment aimed at supporting UN agencies on the issue of children in armed conflict, Japan has failed to sign and ratify the OP-CRC-AC. As the only member of the G8 yet to sign the protocol, Japan has failed to take the most critical first step in complying with its Miyazaki commitment aimed at supporting the efforts of the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict.⁹⁸

However, following the G8 Ministerial in Miyazaki, Japan organized a variety of conferences focusing on best practices for reintegration. On November 7, 2000, the Japanese government hosted the *International Workshop-Symposium on Children and Armed Conflict Reintegration for Former Child Soldiers in the Post-conflict Community* to determine how best to approach the issue of reintegrating child soldiers into Japanese as well as global societies. Immediately thereafter, on November 19- 21 2000, Japan co-hosted the *International Workshop-Symposium on Children and Armed Conflict* in Tokyo. At the conference, Japan announced US\$ 86 million in grant assistance to Africa in the areas of education, healthcare and infrastructure; a portion of which was specifically targeted towards assisting war-affected areas and children in conflict. According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the workshop and subsequent symposium were the direct result of decisions reached at the G8 Miyazaki Ministerial and aimed at furthering Japanese international support to end the use of children in conflict situations.⁹⁹

Although the conferences in Tokyo were aimed at addressing the problem of war-affected children, Japan failed to comply with its G8 commitment aimed at supporting the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict through the signing and ratification of the OP-CRC-AC. For failing to live up to this Summit commitment, the Japanese government earns a score of -1. However, through its various efforts on the issue of supporting regional child reintegration programs, the Japanese government has made significant progress, thereby securing a score of +1 on this particular issue.

Russia

Regarding efforts aimed at supporting UN agencies on issues regarding children in conflict, Russia participated in the *Berlin Conference on Children in Europe and East Asia* in May 2001, working towards prioritizing the issue of child soldier recruitment as the primary concern among the special representatives of the heads of state. Russia also contributed an affirmative vote in passing the U.N. Security Council’s Resolution 1314 aimed at increasing the global recruitment age for armed forces personnel to 18. Moreover, along with its G8 partners, Russia complied with its G8 initiative aimed at supporting the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict by signing the CRC-OP-AC on February 15, 2001.¹⁰⁰

Although Russia participated in, and contributed to, international conferences aimed at elevating the effects of armed conflicts on children, there is no evidence on the part of the Russian government to support reintegration initiatives for war-affected children. Thus, Russia’s signing of CRC-OP-AC indicates support for the UN Special Representative’s efforts on behalf of

⁹⁷ <http://www.war-affected-children.gc.ca/>

⁹⁸ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2000/10/1027-2.html>

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/freports.htm>

war-affected children, thereby granting the Russian government a score of +1 on this issue. Given the lack of information in support of Russian efforts aimed at child reintegration initiatives, a non-available (n/a) indicator is allocated to Russia on this particular issue.

United States

Although initiatives have been taken by the US domestically to further its G8 commitments in the area of war-affected children - signing the CRC-OP-AC on July 5, 2000; raising its recruitment age to the armed forces to 18; supporting the passing of Resolution 1314; hosting the U.N. Millennium Summit in New York in September 2000 where states were invited to sign OP-CRC-AC¹⁰¹ - certain actions by the US government suggest that their actual policy on this issue is ambiguous at best. For example, domestically, although the U.S. has increased the minimum age for army recruitment to 18, the Pentagon has stepped up a campaign to enlist youth and middle teens into militarily-sponsored programs. Internationally, the US has agreed to supply Israel - a major U.S. weapons customer - with an additional \$800 million in U.S. military aid beyond the \$2.8 billion appropriated by Congress. The \$800 million is based on a promise made by President Clinton to Israeli President Ehud Barak during the July 2000 Camp David peace summit, and will essentially leave the Israelis with \$550 million to purchase new U.S. weapons and training materials.¹⁰² Appropriations by the US to Israel directly contradict suggestions made by U.N. Special Representative Ottunu at the Miyazaki Summit calling on the G8 to increase pressure on states - including Israel - involved in the deployment of children in armed conflicts. Moreover, with the U.S. losing its voting power in the U.N. Human Rights Commission - a main supporting organ of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict - the U.S. has further alienated itself from complying with its commitment made in Miyazaki to support the UN's efforts to combat the use of children in conflict situations.

With respect to the second Summit commitment regarding child reintegration efforts, the United States attended both conferences in Winnipeg and Berlin, and made several notable pledges. First, the U.S. promised to spend one million dollars per year for the next four years (until 2004 fiscal year) on aid towards female children displaced by conflict in developing countries. Second, the United States promised to build on its close relationship with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "to help protect and assist child refugees, with a particular sensitivity towards the special needs of female and adolescent war-affected children."¹⁰³ Third, the U.S. promised to build on its relationship with governmental and non-governmental international organizations to help develop education and other strategies to help deal with the psychosocial needs of war-affected children.¹⁰⁴

As a result, since Miyazaki, the US has demonstrated mixed compliance results on its first commitment aimed at providing support for the UN Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. Although the CRC-OP-AC protocol has been signed, it has yet to be ratified. Moreover, congressional debates over the age of military recruitment, coupled with increased military financial assistance to states currently deploying children in armed conflict, grant the US a score of "0", or a work in progress. On the other hand, US efforts aimed at child reintegration programs since the G8 Miyazaki ministerial earn the US a score of +1 on this issue.

¹⁰¹ <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/global/refugees/archive/00091701.htm>

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf>

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.war-affected-children.gc.ca/>; <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/freports.htm>

(iv) International Civilian Police (CIVPOL)

The G8 Foreign Ministers affirmed at their meetings in Miyazaki, that the deployment of UN civilian police (CIVPOL) are a "critical element in conflict prevention as they help indigenous civilian police forces develop the capacity to maintain law and order, and if necessary, can perform this function on an interim basis".¹⁰⁵ Moreover, as a key component of peacekeeping operations and institution building, the G8 acknowledged the important role of civilian police in monitoring local police forces; training a civilian police force to operate within international human rights norms; fostering an environment free from intimidation during elections; monitoring the disarming and demobilization of security forces; and monitoring for human rights violations. Further to this, the Ministers made a number of commitments at Miyazaki, the most resolute of which included:

- (a) "The G8 calls upon the UN and regional organizations to work with member states to explore ways to meet this demand in a timely and effective way".
- (b) "The G8 calls on the UN, in close consultation with member states, to take further steps to improve its international civilian police capabilities. Such steps should include development, on the basis of national contributions, of a reserve list of pre-trained, UN-certified international civilian police officers for possible service".¹⁰⁶

Britain

Further to its commitments reached at Miyazaki aimed at exploring ways to meet the demand and possible deployment of civilian police forces for service, the UK committed 80 British police officers to serve in the International Police Task Force in Bosnia (UNMIBH), where they are charged with monitoring and training local police forces and investigating human rights abuses. A further 130 British officers are currently serving with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) with an additional 14 deployed in East Timor (UNTAET). The British are strong supporters of the UN's Standby Forces Arrangements and are working with the UN Secretariat to help develop the UN's rapid deployment capability. Furthermore, the UK is working with other states, primarily in Africa and the Baltics, to improve their capacity to take part in future UN peacekeeping missions. In cooperation with France and the United States, the UK is also seeking to co-ordinate bilateral training programs more closely with those of other donors through consultation with the UN and African nations.¹⁰⁷

In January 2001, the UK declared that one of the key lessons of Kosovo was that additional thought had to be given to the effects of military involvement in humanitarian support operations, particularly with respect to logistical implications and the manner in which to best coordinate the activities of all military agencies involved, including CIVPOL. One of the key steps taken by the British in this regard was the creation of links between the military and other organizations involved in complex emergencies in which CIVPOL would play an integral role.¹⁰⁸

Given British efforts aimed at exploring ways to meet the demand of an international civilian police force, coupled with the physical deployment of British police forces to countries

¹⁰⁵ G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention, Miyazaki, Japan, 13 July 2000. p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 9.

¹⁰⁷ <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/cgi> (Select Committee Report, 24 January 2001, House of Commons-Defence-Second Special Report)

¹⁰⁸ <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/keythemespage.asp?PageId=139>

including Kosovo and East Timor, the UK is granted a +1 for its Summit commitments reached in this issue area.

Canada

Canada participates in more civilian police operations than any other UN member. As a reflection of this commitment, Canada has established a fund – *the Civilian Police Arrangement* – to facilitate the rapid deployment of up to 50 police officers to multilateral peacekeeping missions. In 2000, Canada continued to fund the training of police in countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Haiti. Earlier this year, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the Solicitor General, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) entered into an administrative arrangement allowing the placement of up to 50 police officers annually in UN peacekeeping and other international missions. Through the *Civilian Police Arrangement* (CPA), officers have been identified to serve in missions in Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala, and Western Sahara. Current missions include those to (UNMIK-Kosovo, UNTAET-East Timor, UNIMB-H-Bosnia & Herzegovina, Haiti and Guatemala).¹⁰⁹ Given these efforts on the part of the government to advance its pledges aimed at enhancing an international police force globally, Canada scores a +1 for both its Miyazaki CIVPOL commitments.

France

Further to its G8 commitments, CIVPOL France deployed in the post-Miyazaki period 191 personnel primarily engaged in peacekeeping operations; 112 of these are currently headquartered in Bosnia-Herzegovina - as part of the MINUBH peace force - with the remaining 79 headquartered in Kosovo - as part of the MINUK peace force. In addition, under the auspices of the UN, France continues to make significant bilateral contributions to the joint initiatives established by the USA, UK and France aimed at strengthening the capacity of African armed forces to participate in peacekeeping operations. Finally, France has established the provision of CIVPOL and Police Monitoring Courses conducted by the Ecole de la Gendarmerie in France and open to international police forces interested in some of CIVPOL's more formal training aspects.¹¹⁰

By developing means by which to meet the demands of an international civilian police force, coupled with the training, education and deployment of CIVPOL forces globally, France is granted at +1 for its Summit commitments in this issue area.

Germany

The German government has been a strong supporter of CIVPOL initiatives in the post-Miyazaki period. German police officers are currently serving with 5 of the UN's 19 ongoing CIVPOL missions internationally¹¹¹. Furthermore, as the third largest donor to the UN in 2001, the German government contributed 9.5% of the UN's total peacekeeping operations budget; a significant portion of which was earmarked by the UN for CIVPOL initiatives.

The funding and development of CIVPOL remains an important issue in German foreign policy. In Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's address to at the Fifty-fifth Session of the United

¹⁰⁹ <http://www.civpol.org/>; <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacebuilding/peace-e.asp>;
http://pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=factsheets&Doc=sftglobally_20010130_e.htm; <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/type13.htm>

¹¹⁰ www.un.int/france/franceonu/francepaix2.htm
<http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/france/gb/politiq/04.html>

¹¹¹ UNOMIG, UNMIK, UNIKOM, UNMIBH, UNTAET.

Nations General Assembly in New York on September 14, 2000, Fischer announced the German Government's plan to offer training for civilian peace-mission personnel and civilian capabilities to the UN stand-by-system. In addition, he confirmed that Germany was in the process of developing a strategic plan to train civilian experts for peace missions thereby creating a pool of qualified personnel who could be deployed at short notice. Likewise, a statement released by Ambassador Dr. Hanns Schumacher, Deputy Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations General Assembly, on September 27 2000, acknowledged that Germany had plans to use its "international training center of civil personnel for deployment in international peace-keeping missions to find solutions to the new multifunctional peacekeeping operations that require an increasing number of qualified police and civilian experts." In addition, Dr. Schumacher announced that the German training center had opened its door "to international participants and NGOs with plans of offering training opportunities to those countries, which do not have their own training centers for civilian personnel. For nationals from countries that would find it difficult to bear the costs of participation, the German government intended to arrange for specific grants." By the end of 2000, 400 officers had undergone civilian police force training at the centre's facilities.¹¹²

Given its strong commitment to furthering efforts at advancing a global international civilian police force, the German government is granted a score of +1 for both of its Miyazaki commitments within this particular issue area.

Italy

Prior to, and following from the Miyazaki Ministerial, Italy had the majority of its international civilian police troops stationed in both Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Kosovo (UNMIK). The Italian position on the issue of CIVPOL has traditionally been to focus the deployment of its forces to Kosovo and the Balkan region. To this end, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lamberto Dini, expressed concern over the level of violence that remained in the region, despite recent efficiencies demonstrated by KFOR. It was Dini's desire to see the deployment of the Italian UNMIK police component completed and the institutional framework enforced.¹¹³

However, as Italy is making important efforts aimed at ensuring that civil and military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo bear positive results through the deployment of military troops and ground force police officers, the Italian government has not taken any additional steps in the post-Miyazaki period to either explore ways of meeting the increased demand in CIVPOL forces or take further actions aimed at improving its own international civilian police capabilities. As such, the Italian government scores a -1 for both of its Miyazaki CIVPOL commitments.

Japan

Despite CIVPOL emerging as a central theme on the Miyazaki G8 Foreign Minister's conflict prevention agenda, CIVPOL issues have received little attention domestically in Japan over the past year. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, neglected to address the issue of CIVPOL both in his Policy Speech To The 149th Session Of The Diet - where he directly discussed the

¹¹² <http://eng.bundesregierung.de/frameset/index.jsp>; http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/infoservice/presse/index_html?bereich_id=11&type_id=3&archiv_id=1045&detail=1&like_str=Fischer; http://www.germany-info.org/UN/schumacher_09_27_00.html

¹¹³ http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/press/january00/c11jan00e.htm
http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/interviews/february00/in23feb00e.htm
http://www.esteri.it/eng/archives/arch_press/notes/february00/n28feb00e.htm

initiatives of the G8 leaders at the Okinawa Summit - and in his statement at the *Millennium Summit of The United Nations* where he noted upcoming Japanese contributions to the United Nations. Likewise, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono, overlooked CIVPOL matters in his Policy Speech to the 151st Session of the Diet, where he too discussed the initiatives of the G8 Summit. Since the Miyazaki Ministerial, Japan has continued to provide substantial financial assistance to UN peacekeeping operations, but has not been an active participant on any current CIVPOL peacekeeping missions.¹¹⁴ As such, the Japanese government receives a score of -1 on both of its G8 CIVPOL commitments.

Russia

Although Russia currently has CIVPOL troops stationed in East Timor (UNTAET), Bosnia & Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and Kosovo (UNMIK), there is no information available on Russia's efforts to improve its international civilian police capabilities. As such, a "not available" (n/a) mark is granted to Russia on this issue.

United States

U.S. involvement in CIVPOL has grown significantly since 1994 with 850 officers presently stationed at numerous missions around the world. The former Clinton administration was very active in taking measures to ensure that there was sustained funding for CIVPOL operations. Recognizing the importance of CIVPOL to American foreign policy, President Clinton signed a presidential directive in February 2000 aimed at enhancing U.S. and international CIVPOL capabilities. To implement this directive, the Department of State began creating more specialized officer selection criteria, working more closely with police departments on recruitment, and providing more extensive pre-mission training. Moreover, although the Clinton administration opposed the lack of funding proposed in the Congressional Foreign Operations bill for requests relating to international civilian police forces, its FY 2001 budget included funding for a Law Enforcement Program for Africa and a CIVPOL Reserve Contingent.¹¹⁵

With the new Bush administration in place, there was no mention of funding for CIVPOL in the FY 2002 Budget. However, a piece of congressional legislation entitled the *Foreign Military Training Responsibility Act* (Bill # H.R. 1594) was introduced to Congress on April 26, 2001. The legislation expressed that the United States: (1) shares a responsibility for actions of those foreign military personnel for which it provides education and training; (2) should evaluate the objectives, methods, and results of such education and training; (3) requires the Secretary of State to prepare and submit to the appropriate congressional committees an annual report on all foreign police training, advice, or financial support provided and; (4) establishes a task force to assess the kind of education and training that is appropriate for the Department of Defense to provide for military personnel in foreign countries.¹¹⁶

Given US initiatives aimed at both exploring ways to meet CIVPOL demands and improving its own international civilian police force capabilities, the US is granted a score of +1 for both of its G8 CIVPOL commitments.

¹¹⁴ <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/summit2000/pmstate.html>
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2001/1/0131-3.html>

¹¹⁵ <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/106-2/s2521-s.html>;
http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/civpol_brochure.html

¹¹⁶ <http://congress.org/congressorg/issues/bills/?billnum=H.R.1594&congress=107>

4. Summary and Conclusions

Table C summarizes the overall Miyazaki G8 conflict prevention compliance scores by country and commitment.

Table C: Compliance with Priority Conflict Prevention Commitments of G8 Foreign Ministers at Miyazaki, July 2000

Commitment	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Russia	U.S.	Total	%
SALW ^a 1	0	+1	0	0	0	+1	0	0	+2/8	+25.0
SALW ^a 2	0	+1	0	0	0	+1	N/A	0	+2/7	+28.5
Diamonds 1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+6/8	+75.0
Diamonds 2	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+6/8	+75.0
Children 1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	+3/8	+37.5
Children 2	-1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+3/7	+42.9
Civ Pol ^b 1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	-1	N/A	+1	+3/7	+42.9
Civ Pol ^b 2	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	-1	N/A	+1	+3/7	+42.9
<i>Average by commitment</i>										+31.6
<i>Average by country</i>	0.25	1.00	0.50	0.75	0	0	0.75 ¹¹⁷	0.625		+25.26

a. SALW = small arms and light weapons

b. Civ Pol = civilian police

Several striking suggestive trends are evident from this data, even though more empirical work (including action by G8 governments in June and July) needs to be added before confident conclusions can be drawn.

First, compliance with the foreign ministers priority conflict prevention commitments, at +52% by country and +47.8% by average is higher than the leaders overall Summit average of +32% for the 1975-89 period, +43% for the 1988-1995 period, and +45% for the “globalization” half-decade of 1996-2001. It was, however, substantially less than the new Summit high of +81.4% for Okinawa by itself.

In the political security domain, however, Okinawa at the leaders level, scored only +64%, compared with +100% for Cologne 1999, -06% for Denver 1997, +39% for Lyon 1996, and an overall 1996-2000 average of 49%. Thus, the Miyazaki foreign ministers did as well with their conflict prevention commitments as their leaders had done with their political security commitments more generally for the previous five years, as far as compliance is concerned.

In the specific area of conflict prevention, however, the Okinawa leaders, at +63% did better than their Miyazaki foreign ministers, at 52%. However, the leaders had the advantage of making fewer conflict prevention commitments, and potentially ones more easy to achieve. In a direct comparison of the leaders and ministers commitment on conflict diamonds, the former’s priority commitment achieved 63% compliance while latter’s achieved 75%. Thus, on the key issue of diamonds, the ministers did better than their leaders acting alone, suggesting that in the field of conflict prevention, the G8 foreign ministers process does indeed add value to the G7/G8 Summit-driven system as a whole. This is consistent with earlier finding by Kokotsis, suggesting that due to the well-established, clearly-defined and more regularized communication structure through the G7/G8 foreign ministers process, compliance is generally higher with issues arising

¹¹⁷ In the absence of full information, the Russian Federation is granted an overall compliance score of 0.75, but only for the 4 commitments assessed, ie --- $[3 \times (+1)] + [1 \times (0)] / 4 = 0.75$. The N/A scores for the remaining 4 compliance issues do not form part of the calculation.

out of foreign ministries than those stemming from departments possessing a less established and bureaucratically less capable process of dealing with the domestic implementation of Summit resolutions.¹¹⁸

Within the Miyazaki foreign ministers conflict prevention process, there is wide variation in compliance by country and issue area. It is the vast variation by country that stands out. Canada, at 100%, completely kept the commitments it made at Miyazaki. Germany, at 75%, also ranks highly. The G8's newest member - Russia - at 75%, also appears to have relatively high compliance, although the lack of data in certain areas makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions¹¹⁹. From the standpoint of compliance, the G8's ministerial-level conflict prevention process appears to be very much a Canadian-German led push.

Also of interest is the relatively high, 63%, compliance score of the United States, a score which comes from American behaviour during both the 2000 Clinton and 2001 initial George W. Bush period. When combined with the high score of America's former fellow "superpower", the remnant Russia, this suggests that G8 foreign ministers action on conflict prevention can be effective in constraining then otherwise autonomous national behaviour of what some would regard by a realist calculus as the "hardest" cases in the world.

It is perhaps surprising that there is rather little difference as a group between those G8 members who are also members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Permanent Five (P5), and those who are not. The P5 members, led by Russia and the US and adding France and Britain, average 60%. In contrast, the non-P5 G8 members, led by Canada and Germany but including Italy and Japan, average only 44%, thanks to the zero's obtained by both Italy and Japan. It is indeed surprising that the two countries that are the past and next future hosts of the G8 foreign ministers process and Summit, should rank at the bottom of the list.

There is also significant variation by issue area. Ranking highest is diamonds, where both commitments secured a 75%. Civilian police at 43%, and Children at an average of 40% also do well. Coming in lowest, at an average of 33%, is small arms and light weapons. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that this is a conflict prevention area closest to the general arms control field. It is also one where the G7 has long been involved, notably at the London Summit of 1991. It also may be that many G8 members are waiting to take compliant action only as a part of a United Nations conference that did not begin until July 9, 2001.

At Okinawa, the leaders made three conflict prevention commitments, all codified in Paragraph 73 of the G8 Communiqué, as follows:

- " We commit ourselves to work for their implementation particularly with respect to economic development and conflict prevention, children in conflict, and international civilian police."
- "We therefore call for an international conference, whose results shall be submitted to the UN, building on the UN Security Council Resolution 1306 and inter alia the "Kimberley" process launched by the Government of South Africa, to consider practical approaches to breaking the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and armed conflict, including consideration of an international agreement on certification for rough diamonds."

¹¹⁸ Departments of Environment, for example, generally possess less of an established process to deal with the implementation of Summit resolutions. This is largely due to the fact that such agencies or departments have been in existence for a relatively shorter period of time, they are bureaucratically less capable of dealing with the domestic implementation of international commitments, they often appear more focused on domestic rather than global environmental concerns, they generally possess less money in overall budgetary terms, and are typically less influential than the older and more established departments of state and treasury. See, Kokotsis, Eleonore. "Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988-1995". NY: Garland Publishing, 1999. P. 271.

¹¹⁹ See footnote 117.

- "We invite the international community to exercise restraint in conventional arms exports, and are committed to work jointly to this end".

They G8 leaders thus covered and hence reinforced, all four areas their ministers did which are also the subject of compliance monitoring and analysis here. Yet it was in the one area of diamonds where the leaders' commitment was the most detailed, most extensive, and most concrete. It was also the one area where the leaders explicitly added weight to a process already underway in, and sanctioned by, both the United Nations Security Council and a leading country from the developing world. Again, this is consistent with earlier findings by Kokotsis suggesting that the G8 tend to stress the salience of implementing commitments embraced through an ongoing, established process, particularly when this process is sanctioned by an international institution such as the United Nations.¹²⁰

This suggests that the conflict prevention commitments of G8 foreign ministers have maximum constraining, compliant effect on the member governments when: (a) they are reinforced by the leaders themselves; (b) leaders do so with clarity and specificity; and (c) the G8's reinforces processes already legitimized and launched by the United Nations and the developing world beyond.

This preliminary analysis thus suggests that in the field of conflict prevention, the G8 at the foreign ministers' level, as at the leaders' level, is indeed a promising forum for advancing and expanding the conflict prevention/human security agenda. It will be up to the leaders at Genoa in 2001, and at the Canadian hosted Summit in 2002, to solidify this newly-created structure in a way which will enable it to contribute more robustly to the global security system.

¹²⁰ Ibid., pg. 275. Kokotsis found that at the time of the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio, Brazil in 1992, the G7 leaders not only endorsed their Rio commitments at the Summit three weeks later in Munich, but demonstrated a higher level of environmental compliance with the agreements reached at Rio and endorsed at the G7 than in any other previous year.