

A Summit of Substantial Success: The Performance of the 2008 G8

John Kirton
Director, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto
August 17, 2008

The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jenilee Guebert, Senior Researcher, Julie Feinberg, Judith Huigens, Sally Elliott and Kathryn Kotris, and the contributions of the other researchers and analysts of the G8 Research Group. Draft of August 17, 2008.

Introduction

On July 7-9, 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) club of major market democracies held its 34th annual summit at Lake Toyako in Hokkaido in northern Japan. In the chair was Japanese prime minister Yasuo Fukuda, attending and hosting the summit for first time. Also coming to their first summit as leaders were British prime minister Gordon Brown and Russian president Dimitry Medvedev. It was the second summit for French president Nicolas Sarkozy, the third for German chancellor Angela Merkel and Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, and the fourth for European Commission president José Manuel Barroso. It was Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi's sixth, and the eighth and last for U.S. president George Bush.

At Toyako these G8 leaders made substantial advances in several very difficult, tightly interconnected fields. On climate change, the defining challenge for the summit, they affirmed an alternative to the failed United Nations (UN) approach in which a little group of rich countries promised to do a little bit for a little while and largely failed to do it. In its place all G8 leaders agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least half by 2050. The G8 affirmed an innovative, bottom-up sectoral strategy to which both the developed and developing world would contribute. They offered major new financing and technology to developing countries and liberalized trade in environmentally enhancing products. All major emitters pledged that all would act to control their carbon, and identified ways in which they would do so in the short and medium term. As a result, the United States, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, at long last and just in time, accepted politically binding commitments to reduce carbon under a now genuinely global and prospectively effective climate control regime.

On the economy, amidst a housing crisis, credit contraction, slowing growth, rising inflation and soaring energy and food prices, G8 leaders, ignored the poor growth in their economies and chose inflation alone as the key concern. They called for imbalances to be reduced but did nothing to stop the dollar's drop. Their treatment of trade and energy was equally mundane. They did set new directions for managing sovereign wealth funds and offered political, if not practical, support for shared and secured innovation and intellectual property rights.

On development, especially in Africa, G8 leaders moved forward on health, water, education and development assistance by reaffirming past commitments, adding mechanisms to monitor their compliance and supporting the healthcare workforce and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They produced innovative medium-term approaches to food security by exploring a G8 strategic grains reserve and asking their agriculture ministers to meet. They further enhanced infrastructure, reduced corruption and built peace-support capabilities in Africa and around the world.

On their pressing political-security agenda, the G8 leaders moved with determination to restore democracy in Zimbabwe through actions set forth in a separate statement. They supported democracy in Afghanistan and their war against terrorism there. They supported sanctions and incentives to stop nuclear proliferation in Iran and offered incentives to do so in North Korea. They further stood up for democracy, the rule of law and human security in Myanmar, Sudan and the Middle East.

On strengthening the G8's own architecture for global governance, its leaders created mechanism to monitor more credibly, and thus help deliver more effectively, their compliance with their many ambitious summit commitments, especially those on health, that come due in 2010. They received an interim report on the Heiligendamm Process (HP) and enthusiastically took the next incremental step toward including those outreach partners who show they are ready to accept the demanding responsibilities of being part of the G8 club. They said a second summit of the Major Economies Meeting 16 (MEM 16) would be held as part of their G8 summit next year, with the Outreach Five (O5) participating for a longer time.

These advances were driven by a Japan that was deeply committed to the G8 and the only member always to have hosted successful summits. Toyako extended this streak to a fifth time. Past successes included Japan's first in 1979, with its historic achievements on climate change and energy, and Japan's most recent in 2000, with its innovations on development and almost complete delivery of the many promises made. For 2008 further momentum came, in the lead-up to Toyako, from a preparatory process featuring strong continuity with the priorities of recent summits, substantial compliance with the commitments made last year, intense bilateral summitry among the G8 members and their O5 partners, an unprecedented sequence of G8 ministerial and broader meetings, and a full set of negotiating sessions by the personal representatives of the leaders.

A push toward high performance flowed from several forces. The first was the shock from oil prices reaching historic highs, from cyclones and floods that showed the costs of uncontrolled climate change, and from bank bankruptcies hurting G8 citizens already suffering from soaring food and gas prices, falling home and stock prices, contracting credit and confidence, and slowing wages and jobs. A second force was the internally equalizing and globally predominant capability among G8 members, thanks to an economically slowing U.S. with its dropping dollar, a rising Japan and Russia, and an expanding European Union (EU)

and strengthening euro. A third force was the common commitment of the G8 countries and all their 16 invited participating countries but China to the G8's core values of open

democracy, individual liberty and social advance, as applied to energy security, African development, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Middle East, North Korea and Iran.

However, several substantial obstacles stood in the way of a strong summit success, with a big breakthrough codified in quantitative targets and timetables on climate change. There were no severe shocks to security, energy supply, national financial systems or health to show the G8 leaders their countries' immediate vulnerability to global threats from outside and propel them into the high performance of past summits such as Japan's first in 1979. Moreover, the UN system had already made promising efforts to respond to clean technology investment, the global food crisis and nuclear proliferation in Iran, if not to human security in Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Sudan. The UN also offered an alluring Kyoto protocol precedent as an alternative process and a 2009 deadline to tempt some G8 and O5 powers to delay acting on climate change at Toyako in the self-interested hope of getting themselves a better deal later on. Many of the most powerful G8 members, including host Japan, sent to the summit leaders who did not firmly control their parties or legislatures, who were deeply unpopular with their voters, and who would not be in office long enough personally to deliver the promises they made. There was a particularly strong temptation to delay doing any big deal on climate change, health, development and trade until 2009, when a new American president and Congress would arrive to fulfill the hope that they would accept and deliver the G8 and O5 partners' most audacious demands. Finally, with eight invited African leaders participating in the summit's first day, and the world's eight other major emitters and emerging economies on the third, there was only one day in the middle for the G8 leaders to be alone to mobilize their collective political will and responsibility to lead the world, on issues as complex as the financial, food and energy crisis, and much else.

In the end, they used their short time to good effect. Their invited partners joined all G8 colleagues in the critical task of controlling climate change, just enough to make the summit a clear success. America's George Bush and China's Hu Jintao showed that they were true statesmen, by making the adjustments needed to produce the badly needed big global deal on climate change. With America, its Congress and Bush himself already moving in this direction, Hu's ecologically vulnerable country assumed a global responsibility commensurate with its global rise. Japan's high-risk summit strategy thus paid off. Despite all the odds, Prime Minister Fukuda as G8 host proved to be a global statesman of the first rank.

The Preparatory Process

Since the very start the preparatory process for the Toyako summit had showed several promising signs for eventual success.

Japan's Approach to G8 Summitry

The first promising push toward high performance came from the summits' long past. Host Japan was the G8's most committed member (Dobson 2007, 2004; Kirton 2004a). It brought to its 2008 summit a proud and proven record of performance, as Appendix A shows. Japan was an experienced host, having mounted four previous summits, in 1979, 1986, 1993 and 2000. It had always hosted successful summits, according to Nicholas

Bayne's (2005) grades. It stood out as the only G8 member to have done do. The scores produced by John Kirton for the six dimensions of summit performance support this view. In particular, Japan's first summit in 1979 produced the historic consensus, fully implemented for the following five years, on the need to stabilize concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at 1979 levels right away (Kirton and Guebert 2008). No other international institution or meeting before or after has ever done nearly as much to control climate change.

Japan's performance at the last summit it hosted, at Okinawa in 2000, offered further hope (Kirton and von Furstenberg 2001; Kirton and Takase 2002). At this first summit of the 20th century G8 leaders had looked back on the failures of global governance in the previous century drenched in depression and war. They reflected on the performance of their own G8 born in 1975 and discussed how it should be strengthened to meet the needs of the international community in the globalized world ahead. Okinawa stood out for its broad and innovative agenda, its many achievements, its production of the G8's highest ever compliance with its commitments in the G8's 34 years and its innovative outreach to other countries and civil society. Japan had delivered this strong success despite suffering from its "lost decade" of growth during the 1990s, from changing its host prime minister suddenly from an internationally oriented Keizo Obuchi to a domestically-oriented Yoshiro Mori during the lead-up year, from having a lame-duck U.S. president, Bill Clinton, arriving at the end of his eight years in office, and from welcoming a brand new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to the summit for the first time.

The Recent Momentum

A second promising push was the rising summit performance over the seven years since Okinawa. Across most dimensions of performance, notably the number of commitments produced, the G8's record had risen to robust levels during this time. It had shown remarkable resilience, recovering rapidly from the dips in 2003 (due to the Iraq war) and in 2006 (when Russia hosted for the first time).

Also promising was the more proximate push coming from compliance by G8 members with their 23 priority commitments from the summit last year. To be sure, as they reached the halfway mark between the 2007 and 2008 summit when Japan settled into the chair, G8 members' compliance had reached only +33 (on a scale where +100 is high or full compliance, 0 is partial compliance or a work in progress, and -100 is no or minimal compliance) (Erdman and Vanderlinden 2008). This was the lowest interim score since Kananaskis in 2002 (+27), well below Evian in 2003 (+43) and Sea Island in 2004 (+39), but about the same as St. Petersburg in 2006 (+35). However, on the eve of the 2008 summit, overall compliance had risen to +52. This was above the summit's post-1996 average of +49%. It was the fifth highest score in the past decade, having been surpassed by the +78 for Okinawa in 2000, the +65 for Gleneagles in 2005, the +54 for Sea Island in 2004 and the +53 for Genoa in 2001. Heiligendamm secured complete compliance in the two areas critical for Toyako — climate change and outreach (measured by the Heiligendamm Process of a structured, official-level dialogue among the G8 and O5).

The Global Agenda and Japanese Host's Plans for 2008

The third promising push came from the close fit between current global challenges and those that the G8 had confronted and conquered in its high performing early years. This gave Toyako's G8 governments some familiarity with these issues and an institutional memory about how to solve them. It also endowed its leaders with an incentive to live up to the high standards of leadership in global governance their predecessors and often domestic political rivals had set.¹

At the Toyako summit G8 leaders faced challenges all too reminiscent of those that had inspired the G8's birth in 1975. In energy, world prices for oil, again driven in part by conflict in the Middle East, surpassed in real terms the previous peaks from the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, placing a new premium on energy conservation, efficiency, alternatives, renewables and climate control. In the political-security sphere, nuclear proliferation, now in North Korea, Iran, Syria, unstable Pakistan and elsewhere, again commanded centre stage, as it had in the wake of India's nuclear explosion in 1974. In the broader Middle East, war was again taking lives on Israel's borders, and Iraq and especially Afghanistan insurgents now killed at will. Here as elsewhere democracy was endangered in fragile states, while other closed countries such as Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Iran awaited its return or its arrival for the first time. It was a compelling call for action from a G8 whose foundational mission was to protect and promote open democracy, individual liberty and social advance worldwide. In finance a made-in-America, globally contagious financial crisis was driving major American banks toward bankruptcy, afflicting credit and currency markets, diminishing global growth, increasing inflation, and assaulting an international financial system still centred on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 1944 and still struggling to cope with a globalized world. In development newly interconnected global financial, energy, food and ecological crises compounded the challenge of bringing the benefits of globalization to Africa, the one region of the world that had largely been left out.

At the Toyako Summit the G8 would confront these challenges head on, based on a plan the Japanese had prepared well over a year before they assumed the chair. It included the four multi-year commitments to be met in 2008 and the five remit mandates from 2007 that Japan had allowed into earlier G8 communiqués (see Appendix C). In keeping with Japan's highly strategic approach to G8 summitry, reaching several years back before it hosts (Dobson 2005), Japan from the start had decided to focus on climate change. By the spring of 2007, African development had been added as a key theme. By October 2007 intellectual property and nuclear safety rounded out the priority list (Guebert 2007).

The key theme of climate change had initially been signaled by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in March 2007. It was continued by his successor, Yasuo Fukuda, after the latter replaced him in September 2007. Here Japan sought ambitious results, in the form of G8

¹ With 1979 as the dominant referent, this meant that Japan's Fukuda wished to surpass China, America's Bush Democrat Jimmy Carter, Germany's Merkel Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt, Britain's Brown Conservative Margaret Thatcher (also at her first summit), France's Sarkozy fellow conservative Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Canada's Harper Progressive Conservative Joe Clark, above all on climate change and energy.

discussions on a “new framework that will ensure participation by the United States and China, the world’s largest greenhouse-gas emitters.”² By this standard, the Toyako Summit would succeed if all major carbon polluters agreed to act to control their carbon. The summit would also receive the report, mandated at Gleneagles in 2005, on how to carry forward the sustainable energy dialogue and the interim report on the Heiligendamm Process, including energy efficiency, as specified in 2007 (see Appendix C).

The second priority, African development, had been publicly indicated even earlier, on November 18, 2006. Then a senior official from Germany announced that its 2007 summit would not focus on debt relief and increased aid to Africa because the 2005 report of the Commission for Africa (CFA) had left the issue to be taken up again by the Japanese G8 presidency in 2008. Following an April 2007 meeting in Tokyo between Italy’s then prime minister Romano Prodi and Abe, the latter stated: “As both our countries will be chairing these summits, co-operation is essential. The issues to be taken up at the G8 summit meeting are long-term issues.” Prodi added: “It is necessary to build a joint policy towards Africa ... Africa is developing economically amid globalization. We have up until now discussed major environmental and human disasters in Africa at our G8 meetings.”³ Also in 2008 Japan planned to hold the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-IV), a gathering of African leaders and their development partners starting in 1993 that had taken place every five years.

The third initial priority of intellectual property flowed from Japan’s 2007 summit success in securing recognition of the need to streamline and harmonize the international patent system, and its failure to get its desired agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of counterfeit and pirated products. Japan sought to build on the 2007 leaders’ statement that “we recognize the need for continued study by national experts of the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to intellectual property rights enforcement.”⁴ Japan hoped to move to the treaty stage at its summit in 2008.

Japan’s fourth initial priority of nuclear safety had appeared in May 2007. A news report noted that “Japan plans to discuss compiling international safety guidelines for nuclear power plants with other members of the G8 nations, with an eye to reaching agreement at next year’s G8 summit in Hokkaido, government sources said ... The guidelines are expected to include assistance from the G8 nations on techniques for safety inspections and maintenance, as well as stipulating training for local staff and unified regulations on management in order to prevent the transfer or leakage of technologies or nuclear-related materials.”⁵ This item would repeat the one area of nuclear power that an otherwise divided G8 could agree on in 2006 and 2007. It also responded directly to the deadly nuclear accidents that Japan had suffered from at home (Donnelly 2001). The most recent

² Agence France Presse (2007). “Japan Aims to Lead Post-Kyoto Climate Change Fight,” March 20.

³ Agence France Presse (2007). “Italy, Japan Say G8 to Focus on Africa, Warming,” April 16.

⁴ Eiji Hirose (2007). “G8 Eyes More Flexible Yuan,” *Daily Yomiuri*, June 9.

⁵ Kyodo News (2007), “Japan Wants to Discuss Nuclear Plant Safety Guidelines at G8,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, May 20.

shock came from a deadly earthquake that had struck Japan in July 2007, damaged a nuclear power plant and produced radiation leaks.

Well before Japan assumed the chair at the start of 2008, these contenders crystallized into three summit priorities: the world economy, climate change and environment, and development and Africa. Japan subsequently added nuclear non-proliferation as the centrepiece subject in the political-security sphere.

These choices reflected a judicious combination of iteration and innovation. The world economy returned G8 leaders' attention to the topic that had dominated the early years of the summit, long before Russia had joined in 1998. But economic and financial issues had been delegated to G7 and G20 finance ministers during the past decade, including at the 2007 summit when the current global financial crisis was starting to erupt (Kirton 2007). Climate change and African development continued to be the G8 leaders' focus, as they had been at Gleneagles in 2005, Heiligendamm in 2007 and, in the form of energy and health, at St. Petersburg in 2006. Nuclear non-proliferation, a classic political-security subject, made it into the summit host's planned top tier in 2008 for the first time. In addition, Japan highlighted North Korea (including nuclear proliferation and abductions) and other Asian issues, which the G8 summit had dealt with before.

Japan was very cautious on G8 expansion. It had an ongoing dispute with Russia over the occupied Northern Territories, and was disappointed with Russia as a G8 member. Japan was reluctant to give a non-democratic neighbouring China a greater place in Japan's G8, while China continued to keep Japan out of a permanent place in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

When Fukuda replaced Abe as prime minister in September 2007, little changed, much like the Obuchi to Mori transition for Okinawa. Japan's agenda was publicly announced by Fukuda (2008) at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 28, 2008. As summarized in Appendix D, it was a wide-ranging, internally interlinked and ambitious agenda that added surging oil prices, terrorism, keeping existing G8 commitments and multi-stakeholder participation to the earlier list. It was also an unusually specific agenda, accompanied by details about the proposals, goals and initiatives Japan would propose and unilaterally take. It clearly steered Toyaka toward using the G8 once again as a great global fundraiser, by identifying several new funding packages, led by a British-initiated, U.S. and Japanese-backed \$10 billion Climate Investment Fund (CIF), that it would launch and ask its G8 and outreach partners (including Australia) to help fund. This agenda proved to be prescient as new global crises came. It served as a stable platform for preparing the summit in the months ahead (see Appendix E). It included boosting agricultural productivity, which became a Toyako priority and a favoured medium-term response when the global food crisis arose in April.

The Sherpa Preparatory Process

The fourth, less promising push was the set of sherpa meetings the Japanese planned to prepare the summit (see Appendix F). The first took place very early, in Tokyo on January 10. Others took place in February and April. The sequence included a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Sous Sherpas (FASS) on May 8-9, a special FASS meeting in Paris in

early June and an overlapping gathering of the sherpas and the FASS at the summit site on June 23-25.

The sherpas were led by Japanese G8 sherpa veteran Masaharu Kohno. But several other countries sent newcomers. Canada's newly appointed (if G8 experienced) Len Edwards went to his first sherpa meeting in April. In mid-May Russia's Dmitri Medvedev announced that Arkady Dvorkovich would replace Putin's Igor Shuvalov, now deputy prime minister in the latter's cabinet, as G8 sherpa. The new Berlusconi government took time to put its sherpa in place.

As of mid-May, some European G8 members felt Japan's preparatory process was about two months behind the pace of recent years. They thought that each sherpa meeting had gone over the same issues, including those of outreach and expansion, where the G8 was badly divided. Some were surprised that the Japanese had not followed the German example and called a special sherpa meeting at an earlier stage.

The G8 Ministerial Meetings

A fifth promising push was the unusually dense series of lead-up ministerial meetings the Japanese planned, as they had in the past (see Appendix F). A draft of the Japanese schedule, unveiled at Heiligendamm on June 6, 2007, contained ministerial meetings on justice and the interior, labour and development, as well as energy and the environment and a meeting of the Gleneagles Dialogue among 20 countries devoted to global warming and clean energy.

This unusually dense web unfolded in the spring of 2008 through G8 meetings of ministers: for finance on February 9 in Tokyo, April 11 in Washington DC and June 13-14 in Osaka; for development on April 5-6 in Tokyo; for labour on May 11-13 in Niigata; for environment on May 24-26 in Kobe; for justice and home affairs on June 11-13 in Tokyo; for energy on June 7-8 in Amori; for science and technology on June 15 in Okinawa; and for foreign affairs on June 26-27 in Kyoto, just before the summit's start. There was also a meeting of G20 environment and energy ministers of the Gleneagles Dialogue on March 14-16 in Chiba, and, innovatively, TICAD IV on May 28-30 in Yokohama. Notably absent, given the evolving agenda, was a meeting for G8 ministers of health, as in 2006, of agriculture and of defence.

At the senior official level, the HP, a structured dialogue of the G8 and O5 members on investment, innovation, development and energy got off to an initially slow but subsequently encouraging start (Kirton 2008). It was on track to produce to G8 leaders and the public at the summit its scheduled interim report, in a document of reasonable length.

The Lead-Up Summitry

The sixth promising sign was the configuration of lead up bilateral visits among G8 leaders (see Appendix G). Despite his domestic political constraints Fukuda took a full scale pre-summit tour of his partners, meeting virtually all his G8 colleagues in the half year before the summit was held. He led off with America's Bush, followed with the visiting EU Commission president and French prime minister, then Russia's leaders and

China's Hu Jintao. He followed with a tour of European capitals in late spring. Left out were Canada's Harper, which owed Japan a bilateral visit that would be given as part of Harper's summit trip just before the summit on July 6 and again just after, on July 10. The sociogram of bilateral lead-up summitry showed that G8 leaders, with a well travelled Bush as another key hub, would largely be familiar with one another when they all met together for the first time at Toyako, at the peak of a summit system designed above all to let real leaders lead.

The Final Pre-Summit Negotiations

Taken together, these six forces were likely to produce a summit of substantial success, both overall and across most of its priority themes and tasks.

Overall Priorities

By mid May, there was much continuity between the predominant global challenges, Japan's longstanding agenda, and Japan's publicly stated goals on the one hand, and the summit agenda and prospects for action on the other. The unanticipated breaking challenges not on the earlier agenda — the food and oil crises and the natural disasters in Myanmar and China — had been easily absorbed. The initial concern with terrorism had faded from the G8's attention and agenda at an equal rate.

Climate Change and Environment

The first priority theme of climate change and environment stood as the make-or-break issue by which the summit as a whole would be judged. Here the first task was to have all G8 members and their O5 partners accept the ominous scientific findings of the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and subsequent reports, to recognize that climate change imperilled both the global environment and world economy, and to agree that major measures on the part of all major emitters were urgently required right now. They then needed to define the essential framework of a beyond-Kyoto climate control regime — one that was effective, inclusive and based on binding targets accepted by all countries that count. To do so they had to conclude their hard bargaining on long-term and medium-term targets, timetables and baselines, and the contribution that Japan's bottom-up sectoral approach would make.

The G8's European and Pacific powers had long been divided here. Both sides showed flexibility. Moreover, the O5 powers, led by China, were also moving to help the summit arrive at a meaningful deal. Part of the solution lay in agreeing on technology development and transfer, forestry, sinks and biodiversity, funding for technology and adaptation, and linkages to the summit's work on development, Africa, food and health. Also relevant was the role of various negotiation fora, notably the UN process, the Gleneagles Dialogue due to end this year and the MEM-16, whose first summit was likely to constitute the concluding climate change session of the G8 summit this year.

Development and Africa

The third priority of development and Africa also built on the G8's recent momentum and added a new emphasis now. The framework for the summit's discussions would be the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan at the summit. G8 leaders plan to hold an accountability

session to review how well they had fulfilled their commitments made in 2002 and after, starting with their most high profile promise to double aid to Africa by 2010. They would review and support the progress Africa was making toward good governance at the national and regional level. Another major focus would be how well the G8 and world was doing at the halfway point on meeting the MDGs. At Toyako pride of place would go to education and especially health, starting with HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and expanding to embrace health systems and the health workforce. Also prominent would be the response to the food crisis especially in its medium-term dimensions, and the tight links of development with climate change, biodiversity and trade.

World Economy

The G8's third priority theme of the world economy began with the dynamics of globalization, as they were currently and dramatically being felt in the areas of finance, energy, investment and food. Here the focus was on stimulating the world economy in response to the current slowdown, asking if more fiscal stimulus was appropriate, or if the recent reductions in interest rates and internationally co-ordinated injections of central bank liquidity had already generated too much present and future inflation in too many parts of the globe. A second concern was coping with the 21st-century style contagious credit crisis that had started with the subprime mortgage problem in the U.S. but had caused a much wider array of credit markets to freeze around the world. Here G8 attention centred on the causes and transmission channels of the crisis, the role of mortgage lenders, commercial and investment banks, hedge and private equity funds, rating agencies and insurers, and what regulatory and supervisory measures should be taken, nationally or internationally, by whom and when.

Also prominent on the G8's economic agenda was trade, where the badly overdue Doha Development Agenda (DDA) of multilateral trade liberalization was in big need of a boost. Equally important was investment protectionism, including the need for internationally harmonized rules for the ever wealthier and more internationally active sovereign wealth funds (SWF). Attention extended to innovation and intellectual property rights, to corruption, corporate social responsibility and natural resource management and to energy security. Here world oil prices spiking to new highs in May threatened to imperil global growth and the political fortunes of most G8 and O5 leaders back home.

Political Security

Beyond this already ambitious agenda was the summit's de facto priority of nuclear non-proliferation. This was a subject of particular importance for Japan as the only G8 member which had experienced first hand the horrors of a nuclear attack and which lived so close to a new, unpredictable nuclear power — a totalitarian North Korea that had invaded South Korea in 1950, shot a missile over Japan more recently, and was evidently exporting nuclear material to other non-democracies such as Syria now. Also of concern was a nuclear committed and non-transparent Iran that supported insurgents and terrorists and a precarious nuclear-armed Pakistan that could still fall further into Al Qaeda and Taliban hands. A central challenge for G8 leaders was preventing these groups from moving easily from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to terrorize and kill innocent civilians and the soldiers of many G8 members now fighting for freedom in Afghanistan. Also

important were strengthening the successful G8's 2002 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in Russia and confronting the conflicts in Sudan, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, Tibet and Myanmar.

Outreach, Expansion and Reform

Perhaps the greatest challenge for Toyako after climate change was the architecture of the G8 summit and system itself. Already a centre of global governance that many national governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society wanted to part of, the G8 had responded at Toyako by inviting an unusually large number of leaders to participate in the summit, in ever changing combinations, through the summit's three days. But G8 members differed about how far, how fast and how the G8 should further integrate its now established O5 partners, or even make them full members of a new G13 as France's Sarkozy and Britain's Brown have publicly proposed or in a G14 with Egypt that Sarkozy had now suggested. G8 leaders also had to decide whether to extend the Gleneagles dialogue beyond 2008 and steer the HP which would issue an interim report to the summit in 2008. And for 2010, the G8 had during the past decade made 23 ambitious commitments to be reached in eight areas, including reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The greatest drama and defining test of Toyako in 2008 was thus whether it could move a reluctant America and the major ecological powers of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa towards accepting binding targets to control their climate changing activity in the years ahead.

After the Paris FASS Meeting

Just before the last sherpa meeting took place on June 23, it was clear that progress was being made in the preparatory process. But it was also evident that it would take the leaders themselves to resolve the large impasses that remained on the central issues.

A FASS meeting in Paris, held on the margins of the spring ministerial meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), had been added to the initial preparatory schedule because there was much to discuss. At this meeting were a mixture of veteran and rookie FASSs, with a strong Japanese chair who was engaged, steered the discussion towards conclusions and offered a fair summary. The meeting went well, with participants agreeing on what the issues were but not on the details of a collective response. With a very co-operative approach they challenged each other on details in a desire to get them right. They discussed the draft communiqués line by line late into night. There was a certain amount of understanding where certain countries had difficult issues. These were handled respectfully. It was much the same at the political directors' sessions.

The Summit Documents

After the special sherpa meeting in Paris, the G8 teams continued to negotiate and draft the documents to be issued in their leaders' names. The Japanese continued to insist very seriously on a tight, short, concise, focused summit document, without a rambling discussion of all the issues their ministers and officials had worked on. The document would highlight climate change, development and economic growth internationally, with Africa being a major component. There would now also be a separate stand-alone document on terrorism, and probably another on food security.

The separate counterterrorism document responded to the very strong desire of the Americans to give this issue prominence in the same way as at every other summit since 2001. The prospective separate food document reflected the decision of the Japanese to respond to the current situation, to ensure the G8 showed leadership on that issue. There would also be a chair's summary that would comment on some of the regional issues

It was not clear how and when the main document would be released during the summit. One possibility was to release each section on a specific subject (such as environment, climate development, investment, the world economy, nonproliferation and peacekeeping) as component packages throughout the summit, to form one package at the end.

Environment and Climate Change

Climate Change

Climate change was still front and centre, and a subject of continuing debate. It was the issue where there was the least consensus, above all on medium and long-term goals. The U.S. very much saw it as a priority in regard to long term and medium term process. But it saw the MEM process as more important. The U.S. wanted to have the G8 endorse an MEM process that would offer long term and medium term targets from all MEM members. The U.S. also sought a strong G8 statement on clean technology.

Members tried to reach consensus that was useful and directive without crossing anyone's red lines. Europe and Japan were very respectful of not prejudging the MEM before its forthcoming meeting in Korea that would be followed by the G8 sherpa meeting on June 23. While the issue was contentious, there was much mutual respect in the room, with attempts from one side or the other to suggest where the targets belonged. There was a good conversation on how the G8 might move forward.

Biodiversity

Biodiversity would be a component of the environment and climate change part of the text. The negotiations on that had not yet begun so there was no draft text.

Development and Africa

On development and Africa in general there would be a continuing focus by the G8 on the issue and the economic situation in Africa. There would be comments on corruption related to economic development. But there would be little new.

Biofuels

Biofuels was a more contentious issue. The U.S. pushed for language on biofuel sustainability. They wanted the subject of biofuels in the energy security portion of the statement, rather than in the food security one. Not everyone agreed. But the conversations went well, with solutions on the language sought.

Health

Health was a key part of the development and Africa theme. The U.S. in particular put a great deal of energy and negotiating power into making sure the statement on health was very strong. Here they focused on outcomes and results on HIV, AIDS, malaria, and polio, including the commitment on polio made at Gleneagles. As no one was performing well, the U.S. challenged its partners to review these commitments, identify what they were doing to meet them and show that action would take place. Another thrust was neglected tropical diseases, where President Bush was passionate. The U.S. was hoping to get the rest of the G8 to contribute the one billion dollars that the World Health Organization (WHO) said would reduce would by 80 to 90 percent the seven major neglected tropical diseases. The U.S. and G8 were also interested in supporting an initiative to increase the number of health workers in Africa, to reach a level of 2.13 workers per 1000 people.

Millennium Development Goals

The MDGs also aroused disagreement. The U.S. saw development as broader than the MDGs. While others generally agreed, they still sought to focus the summit on the MDGs. There was much disagreement on where the G8 was meeting the MDGs and what to do to meet them in the years ahead. Most sought to be more accountable, but faced technical challenges in measuring performance relating to exchange rates, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, and the distinctive disease-specific approach used in the U.S. It was thus hard to compare how all were measuring a specific commitment such as that on HIV/AIDS. The challenge was to find the right balance to properly measure how a specific commitment was being met.

Food Security

On food security there would a strong and comprehensive statement looking at the short term, and what could be done to improve productivity in agriculture and food security and prices over medium- and long-term. The prospective stand-alone statement on food security was not discussed in any detail. But there was great concern about the international crisis currently underway.

There was a relative consensus on food security, as reflected in the statements the leaders had individually released. This consensus covered the short-term needs to be addressed immediately and, as food prices were expected to be high for next decade, longer-term solutions for the G8 and the rest of the world. There could be a plan of action, especially if accountability could be assured. The G8 was thinking hard about how it should make commitments and how it would hold its members accountable for delivering them. The answer was not yet well formed.

World Economy

Finance and Macroeconomics

In the realm of the world economy, issues of finance and exchange rates would be largely left to finance ministers. The U.S. was wary of G8 intrusion into issues, such as the subprime mortgage crisis, that it considered its own domestic affair. But attention to the

macroeconomic situation and the balance between growth and inflation would be hard to avoid.

Open Markets

Open markets was also due for a light touch, in defiance to the World Trade Organization (WTO). It was a priority for Britain and the U.S. But there remained a tendency among the others to leave the reaction to the WTO, whose 40 most relevant ministers would not meet until well after the summit. It was not yet determined what they G8 would say on Doha, as it depended on developments in the WTO.

Open Investment and Sovereign Wealth Funds

Open investment was a very high priority for the US. It sought political, leader-like messages to endorse the open investment that had been good for all the G8 economies. This was generally agreed.

On the more specific issue of sovereign wealth funds all agreed the issue was important given the current climate for leaders to endorse and support steady open investment. But there were different ideas about what to do. One was to use bilateral investment treaties to regulate them.

Corruption and Intellectual Property

Corruption was another concern. It was an issue of important for the U.S., as it had been since 9/11. Despite the Japanese desire to keep the communiqué short and tight, it would probably include highlights of the G8's accomplishments on corruption of the past few years.

On intellectual property the U.S. sought major G8 commitments on Research and Development (R&D), commercialization and fiscal incentives. It pushed for and was very likely to get a strong G8 statement. It would be similar to last year's on the importance of intellectual property but with strong follow-up commitments this time.

Energy

On energy security, the Japanese had broken this issue up to treat it in different parts of text. This was a contrast to the unified treatment it had received at Heiligendamm last year. Energy security was deal with in world economy section and was given strong language here. But there were no reference to oil prices in the draft. Some countries wanted this added, but others did not.

Nuclear Energy

On nuclear energy several countries, including the U.S. sought a stronger endorsement than last year. The Germans continued to resist. But there were some grounds for hope for further cidoances in the eyes of the U.S., if not of the Japanese host.

Political Security

In the political-security domain, the G8 had decided to deal in the leaders' document with the global security issues of nonproliferation, counterterrorism, peace-building, peacekeeping and crime. These themes would provide a frame for many of the regional

issues to be discussed. This list included Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe, the Middle East peace process (MEPP), and the political situation in Lebanon. It might include Sudan, the Caucasus and Kosovo as well.

There would be a specific reference to peace-building and peacekeeping and innocuous comments on crime. These would be followed by text on the regional issues flagged at the summit. There were issues about which countries to discuss and how to report G8 conclusions. But like last year on Kosovo, ways would be found to say something constructive and meaningful.

Terrorism

Counterterrorism and nonproliferation were very important for the U.S. They would be presented as recurring summit themes. Terrorism was particularly important, both for its substance but mostly for ensuring that the leaders stayed strongly and clearly focused on the threat. There was no disagreement among G8 partners here. The U.S. would lead the summit discussion on terrorism and nonproliferation as it usually did.

Proliferation and the Global Partnership

Proliferation also commanded consensus, including on the specific issues of enrichment and reprocessing. On the Global Partnership, the G8 had made good progress in Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). There were issues about nuclear terrorism and expansion. There was a strong desire from some G8 members to expand. There was likely to be agreement in terms of past pledges and the search for opportunities to expand.

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

At Sea Island the G8 had made specific pledge on peace support training and contributions. The U.S. believed it was fulfilling the ambitious commitments made there. It sought to get G8 partners to help more in the cause.

Corruption

On corruption it was agreed the G8 leaders would review the efforts the G8 had committed to over the past six years. These included extractive industries, the UN convention now up for ratification and the kleptocracy initiative from a few years ago.

Iran

Iran would be covered in the nonproliferation statement, as an equal among several concerns. It would not be in the first paragraph. Iran was a particular concern for the U.S. It was pressing the G8 to be clear and consistent in what said about Iran, in that it was not pursuing nuclear weapons capability, and that dialogue and diplomacy, were important, as were and respecting sanctions and living up to what the UN and IAEA were doing.

Afghanistan

On Afghanistan, a particular Canadian priority, G8 foreign ministers at their Kyoto meeting were due to issue a stand-alone statement as a follow-on to recent Paris Afghanistan Compact pledging conference results. The G8 statement would highlight continued support for Afghanistan national development strategy. At Toyako, G8 leaders

would take note of that. In a prospective single page passage or statement on Afghanistan they would recognize there was still much work to do in regard to coordination on the ground. They would focus on border areas and connecting well with Islamabad and Pakistan in support of Afghan President Karzai in that co-ordination. There was no plan to comment on Iraq.

Myanmar

Myanmar would receive comment in the leaders' document in two ways. One was support of the UN-Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) process to get access to Myanmar for the relief effort and a clear assessment of what was needed in terms of disaster relief. The second was a call for more transparency on the regime, but probably not explicitly for human rights.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe would receive attention due to the failure of Robert Mugabe to hold a free and fair election there on June 28.

Kosovo

Kosovo was an issue on which the EU was expected to lead and carry the load. It remained a question mark. Some suggested the G8 had done what it could, that Kosovo was moving in the right direction and that it did not need further comment from the G8. Others argued the Kosovo transition was not done yet and that the international community and the G8 in particular would need to focus on it. It was a difficult issue. For there was a clear divide in the G8 and one outlier – Russia – on what the G8 should say.

The U.S. was prepared to be flexible. The Kosovars would soon endorse their constitution. There would be continued intra-EU discussions on security forces. The U.S. had a strong interest in the state of Kosovo and its independence being secure and internationally recognized. The G8 could call for support for recognition of its independence, for a smooth transition of EU forces and for constructive engagement between Kosovars and Serbs. With Kosovo's independence successfully proclaimed the true tension in the G8 was gone, even if differences of opinion remained.

Caucuses and Georgia

There could be a similar situation with regard to the Caucuses, particularly Georgia, where the G8 might comment. There was a strong effort among the G8 members to collaborate and comment positively on a process for the Caucuses and Georgia and a resolution to the tensions there. The goal was to bring the Georgians and their opponents into a better dialogue.

China

On China, there would probably not be a comment. But the G8 could comment on the Sichuan earthquake, and the G8's strong support for recovery and reconstruction. China's response to their earthquake was seen as a perfect contrast to Myanmar's. The Chinese mounted a rapid response, open to assistance from the international community. They had also been rather transparent in handling the disaster.

Tibet

Tibet was more likely to be taken up at the foreign ministers than the leaders' meeting. It was very important for the U.S. and G8 to discuss and promote positively the outreach the Chinese had made to the Dalai Lama. There were positives to comment on, with the intent to signal support for some of the progress and possibly add an undertone of concern on other issues where there had been less progress. But there was no agreement within the G8 as to whether and how to discuss Tibet.

Summit Process and Architecture

Accountability

In the realm of the summit process and architecture, accountability was a key priority for the U.S. generally and President Bush personally. The U.S. pressed hard for the Toyako documents to include a stocktaking in terms of what had been done since past summits and to make sure there were mechanisms to measure progress now. The US strongly sought to have the G8 show where they had met their commitments. This was above all the case in the area of health, but also on peacekeeping, anticorruption, intellectual property and, indeed, across the board. Such a stocktaking would show the world what the G8 had done and add to the credibility of the G8.

Major Economies Meeting

In regard to outreach and expansion, the MEM would continue on as separate entity on its own after Toyako. The U.S. did not see the MEM as part of the G8. Nor did their colleagues in the G8.

Heiligendamm Process

At Toyako, the HP would provide its scheduled interim report to the leaders, in the form of a public document of some length. The O5 leaders would meet with the G8 for breakfast on the final day of the summit exclusively to discuss the HP. But the O5 as a separate group would have no larger role in the summit.

Expansion

There would be no moves at Toyako to institutionalize outreach, for the O5 or anyone else, let alone to expand the permanent membership of the G8. The Japanese and the U.S. were strongly opposed to expansion. So were the Italians, who would receive the HPs final report at their summit in 2009, and the Canadians who would host in 2010. The U.S. did not only not support G8 expansion, but was not even open to a discussion of it, and would oppose the French in pushing in this direction when they hosted in 2011. The host Japanese calculated that a leader in Europe, France would face demands from its European neighbours such as the Netherlands were it to try to expand by adding only the O5. And it was uncertain how many more summits Gordon Brown, the other expansionist, would attend. As with UNSC reform there was no natural consensus among the G8 about who else to include. And after Toyako, a G8 that continued to deal with climate would have to cope with the precedent of democratic, Asian Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia having come. Raising the issue of expansion would inspire a reflection of likemindedness, raising an inconvenient question that would make Russia resist having such a debate.

The Summit's Eve

On the summit's eve, many of the existing differences had narrowed, so that the G8 leaders and their partners could concentrate their formidable capabilities on only the largest outstanding divides. The very largest of these was climate change, reinforced by the rising challenges of energy and food. On these issues as elsewhere, Toyako was well on track to be a summit of substantial success, but here it needed the personal intervention of the leaders themselves to bring that success to life.

Climate

On the summit's eve, Toyako's biggest achievement was likely on its centrepiece subject of climate change. Here the G8 and their major outreach partners would likely agree on the central architecture of a climate control regime to replace the fundamentally flawed and failed Kyoto approach of old. The Toyako leaders could agree that they all must and would control their carbon. They would endorse the sectoral bottom-up approach that would enable everyone to contribute to carbon control right away, and improve their performance as knowledge, technology and competitive pressures expanded. They would also accept the relevance of carbon sinks, starting with avoided deforestation that would allow the great biodiversity and forestry powers of Brazil, Indonesia, the United States, Canada and Russia to make an enhanced contribution that finally would be counted. Together these new principles of "all in," "bottom up" and "sinks count" would form the foundation of a "beyond Kyoto" regime that promised to cope effectively with the urgent, even existential problem the global community confronted from uncontrolled climate change.

Above all, to provide a common reference point for their long-term efforts, the Toyako leaders needed to signal more clearly than before that they all understand they collectively needed to cut their carbon emissions by at least 50% by 2050. They further needed to signal convergence on common reference points for medium-term targets and timetables in specific sectors, to build on the considerable commonality that already existed. It would be left to the UN process to fill in the details that will help some to contribute to the new architecture for global climate governance that the 2008 G8 at Toyako will create.

To encourage this agreement and its effectiveness, the Toyako leaders would take further steps. They would endorse and fund Climate Investment Funds so that several billion dollars now and at least \$10 billion in the near future would be available to finance the flow of clean technology that China, India and so many other carbon-afflicted countries need. They would further call for freer trade in carbon-reducing products and services, so that these and the technology embedded in them could flow faster, wider and less expensively to benefit all. They would also finally agree, if very cautiously, that they needed nuclear power, with its virtually emission-free performance, as part of the solution, within the G8 and around the world. And they would help those already afflicted by the natural disasters now coming with more frequency and severity due to climate change.

For this package to flow forth, it was necessary for Fukuda as host, the G8 and their MEM partners to get America's George Bush to agree to control U.S. carbon, at least in

the long term by at least a 50% cut. Bush would do so if all his MEM partners at the leaders' level agreed to control their carbon, as their officials had in a painstakingly worded draft communiqué negotiated at the MEM meeting in Seoul. In a series of personal pleas to the Americans, just before the summit began Fukuda and his sherpa got George Bush to adjust just enough for the whole package to flow.

Development and Africa

After the final scheduled sherpa meeting, the new draft communiqué of June 25 showed several advances on the development and Africa agenda. These advances confirmed that Toyako was on track to become a summit of substantial success on this important front. But a few critical issues remained for the leaders to close.

Health

On health, which took seven paragraphs in the draft communiqué on development and Africa, the G8 innovatively added to the earlier G8 agenda paragraph-long treatments of the health workforce and travel restrictions for HIV-positive people, while elaborating elsewhere on integrating health systems and disease-specific approaches. The draft contained 21 commitments on health (compared to 43 in 2007), including one to give all children access to basic health care by 2015. It outlined in detail what it had done to deliver past commitments, promised to deliver the outstanding ones and established a mechanism to monitor compliance with its health commitments this year. However, the list of diseases whose commitments it promised to "honour in full" excluded HIV/AIDS. Here they committed only "working toward" the goal of universal access to HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and care.

Food

On food, the G8 was due to endorse the concept of a new Strategic Grains Reserve. Here all G8 countries, and not just scarcity-haunted Japan and Germany as at present, would stockpile grains in a co-ordinated system that would release stored supplies into the market when scarcity came again. It would thus lower food prices, inflation and stagflation in the G8 and stop starvation, malnutrition and social unrest in the developing world outside. With the world's great grain-producing powers of the U.S., Canada and Russia contributing, such a reserve would create the commodity buffer stocks that the UN system with its diverse north-south confrontation in the 1970s had failed for so long to do.

Elsewhere on food and agriculture several useful advances had been made. One was to restore agriculture, after a long absence, as a priority for development, development institutions and development assistance. Another was to generate a second green revolution, through measures to develop and transfer techniques and agro-biotechnology, including the greater global use of now proven genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

G8 Negotiations at the Summit

Development and Africa

The summit itself opened at noon on Monday, July 7, with the G8 leaders' meeting with their seven invited African counterparts, with Ban Ki-moon of the UN and with Robert Zoellick of the World Bank. They met over lunch for two hours and then had a two-hour working session, for a total of four hours of discussions. They sat interspersed around the table. There was some social discussion over lunch.

TICAD IV

Fukuda, as chair of both G8 and TICAD, led off with a short presentation on the May TICAD meeting. He reported that he had committed Japan to double ODA by 2012, with a focus on agriculture, development and education: Japan also committed to increasing and fully mobilizing its policy tools so this direct investment could be doubled in five years' time. Fukuda spoke as chair of the meeting rather than the prime minister representing the Japanese government. He emphasized that at TICAD there was an agreement to set up a follow-up mechanism to monitor the TICAD process as a whole and its impact on Africa. TICAD had produced the Yokohama declaration and action plan. Several African leaders, including those from Tanzania and Ghana, commented.

The African leaders expressed their gratitude for their invitation to attend the outreach meetings. The consensus was that TICAD was a resounding success. The doubling of ODA in five years and the focus on infrastructure assistance were highly appreciated, as was the doubling of Japanese investment.

Both the African and G8 leaders noted that growth would depend on more than just assistance, and that what was needed was the active participation of private sector and the flow of capital. There was fair discussion on the need for investments. A few African leaders mentioned that, in reference to governance and the effective use of aid, this was a two-way street and that Africa had to meet the G8 countries halfway.

Food

The leaders discussed the recent increases in food and oil prices. The African leaders noted the fact that agriculture in their countries was suffering from the very tight demand-and-supply situation. There was a need to increase the capacity of food production on the African continent. The G8 was expected to help the African side. Fukuda proposed doubling the supply of rice. The G8 would continue to extend agricultural protection and assistance for improving agriculture in general. The African leaders also asked the G8 to provide the appropriate technology in assisting African agriculture, including the provision of seeds and fertilizers. The G8 leaders mentioned that they were prepared to continue to assist the agriculture sector, including support for small-scale firms that were in desperate need of such support and by assisting in water cycle management. Indeed, it was mentioned that in some parts of Africa 90% of the rainwater flows into directly into the ocean without being utilized in any way. There was a discussion that there was still a need for an emergency response. The G8 would continue to respond accordingly.

There was also a discussion of the challenges facing Africa, and indeed the world, as a result of the increased oil and food prices and the consequent difficulties in Africa and with development. The discussion on different food-related issues continued on and off. The emphasis was less on immediate needs, which were being met through the World Food Programme — to which Canada had contributed. No one specifically said the immediate need for food aid had passed. Instead, the emphasis was on ways to revitalize agriculture in Africa. There was special emphasis on increasing food production, opening markets and resolving issues related to trade among developing countries.

Oil

The leaders did not discuss oil prices at any length. They noted the need to get oil producers and oil consumers working together, and referred to the emergency meeting in Jeddah and its importance. The African leaders said their economies were suffering because of increased oil prices, and that countries such as Nigeria and Algeria needed to help their fellow Africans. They recognized the responsibility of oil-producing countries, including themselves, to consider the impacts of high prices. The African leaders said that the dialogue between oil producers and consumers continued to be important. In this regard, they very much expected G8 leaders to show stronger leadership in conducting a dialogue with the Organization of Petroleum Exporter Countries (OPEC).

Climate

On climate change, the leaders did not discuss any long-term targets or commitments to quantified national targets. The African leaders requested that the G8 support African countries in preventing further desertification and in protecting forests and improving access to renewable energy. There was a reference to the Cool Earth partnership. Japan note it was prepared to provide a total of US\$10 billion to support the developing countries that are willing to introduce environmentally friendly technology into their economies.

Trade and Investment

The leaders discussed trade and investment for Africa. They acknowledged that trade and investment were vital for sustained African economic growth. The G8 leaders said an early conclusion of the DDA was important.

Millennium Development Goals and Compliance Monitoring

Some African leaders referred to the several commitments to achieve the MDGs that had been made in past summits. They felt that implementation was not sufficient by itself and that it was necessary to monitor to what extent those commitments had been met and their goals achieved. The G8 leaders responded by saying there were various forums, open to all African leaders, where these issues could be discussed. It was pointed out that the African Partnership Forum has existed since the 2003 Evian Summit, and its fourth meeting was recently hosted in Tokyo.

There was a feeling among all the participants that a better monitoring system should be put in place. Several African leaders suggested that one outcome of the meeting could be an improved monitoring system. This suggestion that picked up by the G8 leaders who asked their sherpas to think about what could be done. The issue might be picked up in

2009 summit to be hosted by Italian government. One leader suggested that they needed to follow how aid was being taken and used. The discussions were very productive, with many two-way exchanges.

One main theme that was brought up at lunch and continued into the afternoon was the necessity of G8 countries as well as other countries meeting their official development assistance (ODA) commitments. Another was that the focus should be less on sending more dollars to Africa but more on implementing existing programs. Several African leaders emphasized that they were not looking for more money and that enough money had already been pledged.

The G8 leaders were unanimous in noting that if things continued as usual it would be difficult for Africa to achieve the MDGs by 2015. They agreed that they must improve the situation. Ban Ki-moon reminded them of the UN MDG summit in New York on September 25, 2008. He looked forward to receiving renewed and new commitments from donor countries there.

Good Governance and Zimbabwe

The subject of Zimbabwe came up during lunch and continued on and off during the afternoon. The G8 leaders said that good governance was generally making steady progress in Africa but that Zimbabwe remained a problem. They did not accept the Mugabe government, whose actions were a strike against the entire African continent. Some G8 leaders emphasized that sanctions should be strengthened. Others called for an early resolution of the current impasse.

The G8 leaders stated strongly to the Africans that the regime of Robert Mugabe was illegitimate and should not be tolerated. The Africans should take whatever steps they deemed necessary to remove Mugabe from power. They said that public opinion in their countries questioned why the world would tolerate such a regime and why. They pointed out that the Mugabe regime reflected poorly on Africa as a whole and thus had links to Africa's economic and social development as a whole. The G8 leaders who spoke recognized that this was something Africans must deal with themselves, as it is in their region. The G8 offered its support. Canada's Stephen Harper intervened strongly, stating that this illegitimate regime could not be tolerated and that there was need for fundamental change in Zimbabwe. He hoped for the restoration of the rule of law in Zimbabwe and a renewed commitment to democratic processes and respect for human rights. This was not something that could wait years or months but must be dealt with immediately.

The G8 leaders stated that unless progress was made very quickly, there would be a call for increased general international sanctions, by the G8 countries and also by the UNSC. There would be a resolution that would oblige all UN members to impose sanctions. The African leaders thus received a strong message from the G8 leaders.

The Africans responded that no one accepted what had happened in Zimbabwe as legitimate. They noted, as had Harper, that three observers from African organizations themselves had recognized that the results were unacceptable. A number of African

leaders said they shared the frustration of their G8 partners. As president of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, in his review of the discussions currently under way following recent African (AU) meeting trying to find a negotiated solution, mentioned the notion of a power-sharing arrangement between the leader of the opposition and Mugabe. He made the point that he had been asked, as the head of SADC, to try to resolve this situation and was doing his best.

The AU had met on June 30 and July 1 to discuss and pass a resolution on Zimbabwe. The G8 leaders were unanimous in their support of that resolution. The AU was playing a mediation role in resolving this issue. G8 leaders also voiced their hope that the issue would be resolved soon. The African leaders explained the essence of AU resolution on Zimbabwe and pointed out that they did not ask the G8 leaders to do anything. Some African leaders suggested that Mugabe would retire in a few years' time. There was concern that putting pressure on Zimbabwe and sanctions might lead to internal conflict in Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe's members of parliament had been elected in March no government had yet been formed. The problem was that no executive government had yet formed. The AU suggested forming a united government but there was no conclusion as such. The G8 would continue to discuss Zimbabwe by themselves the following day. Whether the G8 would issue a separate statement on Zimbabwe was still not decided.

Day Two: The G8 Alone

Day two, July 8 was G8 day.⁶ The leaders met to discuss the issues of the world economy, the environment and climate change, development and Africa, political issues such as North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Sudan, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India and other institutions such as the G11.⁷ They also held discussions on the topics of food security, counter-terrorism and Zimbabwe, where separate statements were issued.

On the world economy, the G8 denied that there was a problem, indicated in the first line of their statement, "We remain positive about the long-term resilience of our economies and future global economic growth." They reiterated the importance of concluding the WTO Doha Round. On energy security, the leaders stated strong concerns about the rising price of oil and that measures needed to be implemented on the supply and demand side. They also emphasized efficient energy technologies and proposed holding an energy forum later in the year on energy efficiency and new technologies. They had nothing, however, to say about energy conservation. They also discussed raw materials, the protection of intellectual property rights, abuses of the financial system and the Heiligendamm Process-where they reiterated their and "commitment to the Process and look forward to receiving a comprehensive concluding report at the G8 Summit in 2009."

⁶ I am indebted to Jenilee Guebert for this material.

⁷ The G-11 movement was launched in 2006 by the heads of state of 'like-minded' Lower-Middle Income Countries such as Croatia, Ecuador, Georgia, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Sri Lanka. They seek to obtain the best possible opportunities in the global economic, investment, aid and trade arena, which they promise to prod with sustained reforms in their economic, political and rule of law spheres. The 2008 Presidency was held by Jordan.

During the discussion on food security, a new type of African-Asian hybrid rice was proposed, which would double rice production. In the document issued, the G8 called on countries with sufficient food stocks to make some available for countries in need, in times of significantly increasing prices and in a way that did not distort trade. They promoted research and development of new technologies that would improve agricultural productivity and efficiency. They moved to ensure that any further production of biofuels would be compatible with food security and tasked a G8 Experts Group to monitor the implementation of their commitments.

On the issue of counter-terrorism the leaders made the social development-terrorism connection; they reiterated the importance of rule of law and international law; and above all they remained committed to their fight against terrorism.

On the topic of Zimbabwe, no direct wording for sanctions was used, but some leaders implied that this was what they were pushing for. Instead the wording in the document on Zimbabwe was much softer than some had anticipated with the statement reading: “We will continue to monitor the situation and work together with the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union, the UN and other relevant organizations for a prompt resolution of the crisis. We recommend the appointment of a special envoy of the UN Secretary-General to report on the political, humanitarian, human rights and security situation and to support regional efforts to take forward mediation between political parties. We will take further steps, inter alia introducing financial and other measures against those individuals responsible for violence.”

Beyond the G8 leaders, the G5 leaders also met on the 8th of July and issued their own statement. Their document focused on the topics of world economy, food security, climate change, energy security, the MDGs and Monterrey consensus, south-south cooperation and the role of the G5. Under the heading of climate change the G5 countries pushed for a target of emissions reductions for developed countries between 80% and 95% as opposed to the 50% ones the G8 had already issued.

Day Three: The O5 and MEM-16

On the last day of the summit the day the G8 leaders met with the G5 leaders to discuss the Heiligendamm Process. Later they were joined by Australia, Indonesia, South Korea, the heads of the United Nation, World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Energy Agency. Here they discussed global issues and the world economy which included rising oil prices, rising food prices and development. They discussed both midterm and long term goals and their determination to operate with and through the UN process.

At the end of the third day, host Fukuda released his chair’s summary of the 2008 G8 summit meetings and several other leaders held press conferences on their views of how the meetings proceeded. All leaders indicated they were happy with how the event proceeded and that progress had been made.

G8 Results

The G8's 2008 Toyako gathering proved to be a summit of substantial success. It deserved a grade of B+, or 78% on the scale pioneered by Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne (Appendix H). It was highlighted by its striking success on its centerpiece subject of climate change, its substantial advances on development and Africa, health, food security, accountability and Zimbabwe, its solid management of its many other issues and its serious failure on the world economy.

Climate Change

On the pre-eminent priority of climate change Toyako produced a full A performance. It affirmed a new set of norms that put in place a new architecture for controlling carbon. It was one of far more prospective effectiveness than the fundamentally flawed and failed Kyoto regime. The G8 with the MEM agreed for the first time that all major carbon polluters must control their carbon, that all G8 members, now including the United States and Russia would do so after 2012, and that the G8's long term goal was a reduction of at least 50% of emissions by 2050.⁸ The G8 declared that midterm targets and national plans were needed, and that the bottom-up sectoral approach pioneered by Japan was a useful tool. G8 members boldly bound themselves to a far reaching midterm target, with the words: "...we acknowledged our leadership role and each of us will implement ambitious economy-wide mid-term goals in order to achieve absolute emissions reductions..." These bold directions and decisions were reinforced by several specific medium- and short-term actions. In the mid term, the summit identified as subjects for action energy efficiency, clean energy, national goals, renewable energy and clean coal, through the broad deployment of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology by 2010. In the short term it specified the aviation, maritime, and sustainable biofuel sectors, a nuclear energy infrastructure initiative and 20 CCS demonstration plants by 2010.

To provide incentives for the other major carbon polluters to agree to this architecture and action plan, the G8 offered abundant finance, technology transfer, trade liberalization, and action on sinks, reduce-reuse-recycle (3R) measures and dialogue. On finance the G8 promised scaled up support for disaster risk reduction, \$10 billion in R&D with \$6 billion so far for the Climate Investment Funds, more for the Global Environmental Facility and a reminder that it was providing more than \$100 billion by 2010 to the Clean Energy Investment Framework (CEIF). On trade it offered free trade in carbon-reducing products, services and remanufactured goods. On sinks it supported Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degrading (REDD), legal logging, forest fire protection and biodiversity co-benefits.

The major developing countries responded, in partnership under the MEM, with just enough commitments to put the new G8-pioneered architecture firmly in place. They said clearly "we will do more" and we "will continue to improve our policies and our performance." They further pledged to control their own carbon with the words "developing major economies will pursue ... nationally appropriate mitigation actions ...

⁸ An alternative view, from an American political partisan, is that "... at the 2008 G-8 summit in Japan, Gerogy W. Bush agreed to a vaguely worded, an essentially meaningless "aspirational" goal on the reduction of carbon emission (Holbrooke, 2008:6).

with a view to achieving a deviation from business as usual emissions.” For the long term they supported a “shared vision” of co-operative action with a “global goal for emissions reductions.” They bluntly affirmed that “deep cuts in global emissions will be necessary” and urged “serious consideration” of “ambitious IPCC scenarios.” They thus made a politically binding commitment to control their own carbon, just as the G8 had asked.

To give life to these commitments, the developing economies through the MEM declaration promised several actions that were highly compatible with the G8’s plan in the short and medium term. In the short term up to 2012, they endorsed the sectoral approach and through it promised to “improve significantly energy efficiency.” In the medium term they emphasized how sinks could help stabilize greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and identified deforestation, forest degradation, forest fires, forest governance and land use and its change.

Most broadly the MEM endorsed an approach that was quite compatible with that of the G8. There was a convergence on the basic principles in both. There were only three major differences: the MEM’s emphasis on the UN process; on financing, technology transfer and capacity building; and its refusal to identify “at least 50% by 2050” as the long-term goal for themselves.

Amidst this major movement there were some missed opportunities to control climate change. First there was only a small step to endorse nuclear energy as a critical zero-emission source. Second, there was no effort to end the use of carbon-saturated coal, beyond the endorsement of the experimental, unproven technology of CCS. Third, there were no specific measures to stimulate renewables such as wind, solar, geothermal and hydro, although second-generation biofuels got a verbal boost. Fourth, energy conservation and the need to reduce received only a passing nod. Fifth, there was no direct affirmation of, or major movement on, the 1997 commitment to reduce greenhouse gases by 2010 — now only two years away.

Criticism came from some that G8 leaders were making their 50-2050 commitment from different base years, rather than from the Europeans’ Kyoto favourite of 1990. This criticism had little merit. There was no scientific rationale for 1990. The increase in emissions between 1990 and 2008 was much smaller than the business-as-usual increase in the 42 years from 2008 to 2050. The promise of “at least 50%” meant in Japan’s case a 60-80% reduction, with the additional cut more than compensating for the 1990 to 2008 change—a 1990 base would mean that countries such as Germany would do less. And there was never any chance that the U.S. or O5 would accept 1990 as the new base year for themselves.

The World Economy and Energy

On the host’s second priority of the world economy and energy, G8 performance was poor, worthy of no more than a grade of C– (62%).

The statement opened with a suggestion that all was well with the global economy at present and that any negatives were merely future risks. It reflected poorly the reality of the voters struggling to pay or secure their mortgages, get or keep their jobs, and

watching all the major world stock markets shrink by about 20% since October, outside of Canada (whose economy had contracted in Q1). Consistent with this view that growth was not a problem, the statement issued tough inflation-fighting words.

This one-paragraph treatment of macroeconomics was followed by a paragraph on finance. It merely endorsed what the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and G7 finance ministers had decided to do some time before. The next morning, the major papers headlined a new round of financial distress, sparked by fears about the creditworthiness of America's leading mortgage lenders, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.

The next paragraph on imbalances was somewhat better, calling on "emerging economies with large and growing current account surpluses" to have "their effective exchange rates move so that necessary adjustments will occur." But it offered no signal that the dropping U.S. dollar would stabilize or rise.

On trade, the G8 called, as always, for the long overdue Doha Development Agenda to finally get here. But it did nothing concrete to help, despite its critical role in this field in the past.

An investment more was done. The G8 specified the narrow criteria that should be used to restrict investment and called for protections to let the rest freely flow. It similarly called for freer capital markets, welcomed properly governed sovereign wealth funds and recognized the need for corporate social responsibility from major firms.

On energy little was said and even less was done. While noting the "sharp rise in oil prices" they called for supply side measures that were well beyond control. On the demand side, there was no call for energy conservation or many of the other effective measures the G8 in 1979 had invented and endorsed.

Development and Africa⁹

Political Security

G8 Reform

The Host's Performance

As the G8 chair, Japan's Fukuda proved to be a genuinely global leader, putting in a performance worthy of a full A grade of 85%. Much like Prime Minister Mori in 2000, the last time Japan hosted, Fukuda arrived late as prime minister, had little experience in international affairs, had never attended a G8 summit or ministerial meeting before and inherited a design for a leaders-driven summit constructed by someone else. On the road to Toyako, he also suffered from losing control of his legislature's upper house and from plunging popularity at home. But he proceeded with a high-risk summit, held hostage on its central climate issue as to whether China and South Korea — hardly Japan's most

⁹ Richard Holbrooke (2008:23) acknowledges that "it was in Africa that President Bush produced his greatest success-his anti-AIDS program, one of the few bipartisan policies of the last eight years."

trusted partners historically — would come through for Fukuda on the summit's final day.

They did, making Fukuda's great gamble pay off, as it had for Canada's Jean Chrétien on Africa in 2002. Fukuda thus showed himself to be a leader in moving the world forward on this genuinely global issue. He expanded his leadership in Asia by having China, South Korea, Indonesia, Australia and more distant Asia follow the path he paved. He extended his leadership in Africa through TICAD-iv, then the African outreach on the summit's opening day and finally by delivering much for Africa on health, food security, compliance monitoring and the breaking crisis in Zimbabwe where democracy and human life were critically at stake.

Dimensions of G8 Performance

The substantial success of Toyako was confirmed by its performance across all of the six performance dimensions by which any international institutions summit can be assessed.

Domestic Political Management

Communiqué Compliments

On the first dimension of domestic political management, the Toyako Summit produced eight communiqué compliments, signaling out individual members for their contribution (Appendix I). Japan lead with two, including for its important Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative. Only Canada and Italy were absent from the compliment list.

Editorial Approval

Editorial approval also made Toyako successful, especially for its host. Japan's elite daily newspaper, the *Asahi Shimbun*, concluded on July 9 that the summit took a "step forward" on climate, with a "significant" request for all to adopt the 50% by 2050 goal and their own adoption of a medium term goal. It also "deserves credit" for addressing finance, fuel, and food, even if there was a "lackluster result" here. On July 8 the *Asahi* called for strong summit action against Mugabe, which came that night. Japan's largest circulation daily, *The Daily Yomiuri*, also concluded on July 10 that the summit was a "significant" event that should continue, with no need to expand. The *Japan Times* on July 10 agreed that Toyako was "significant" and a "modest step forward."

Outside Japan, editorial opinion was mixed. The *International Herald Tribune* on July 10 applauded Bush's effort to offer \$50 billion more for infectious disease. The *Boston Globe* commended Bush's emphasis on accountability. But the *New York Times* on July 13 concluded that Bush was "merely posturing" on climate change, given his subsequent behaviour back home. And the *Financial Times* of London declared that then G8 was all "pipe dreams and cigar smoke," producing only photo ops and bland communiqués, and in need of adding China, India, Brazil and Spain to make it a G12.

Public Opinion

Public opinion also approved of Fukuda's performance. Toyako's long lead-up had helped Fukuda from being eased out as prime minister or being forced to go to the polls before his summit started. The summit itself offered him an opportunity to show his party colleagues, fellow legislators and voters that he was a world leader who could deliver results and thus deserved to stay on as PM or at least depart with dignity at an appropriate time. Indeed, as Fukuda's pre summit tour of Europe ended, and the summit approached, his approval ratings had finally started to rise from near 20% to close to 30%.

During the first poll after the summit, taken by Kyodo news on July 11-12, approval of Fukuda's cabinet rose from 25% in June to 26.8%. The disapproval rate declined 6.7% to 53.5%. But when asked about Fukuda's leadership as G8 chair, 51.4% did not rate it highly, while only 30.3% did. Asked if the summit curbed global warming 56.2% said no while only 37.2% said yes. Support for Japan's opposition parties also increased.

In the U.S., the G8 summit, far more than his many other trips abroad, gave Bush a chance to boost his polling numbers in his last year and burnish his legacy as a global leader. His shifts in American climate change policy on the summit's eve, could help his and the summit reputation on this critical issue for publics in America and elsewhere in the world. Already in America, the G8 had received attention from all three major candidates for the presidency, with the G8 priority issue of energy and the environment being the focus for those on the Democratic side.

In Russia, the summit also offered the new president Medvedev an opportunity to show he was a world leader, just as Putin did in 2000. Yet now Medvedev had the much larger task of establishing his reputation alongside that of a revered Putin with a powerful presence, in contrast to an ailing Yeltsin, who quickly faded away.

Britain's Brown also used the summit to restore his popularity at home. It was he who led the public demands that the G8 add the food and fuel crises to the summit agenda a priority concerns.

Policy Shift

Germany's Merkel used the summit consensus to help her shift policy the way she wanted at home. On the first Sunday after the summit she told the *Bild am Sonntag* newspaper that she would slow Germany's planned phase out of nuclear energy in order to control climate change.

Deliberation

On the second performance dimension, deliberation, the summit was a strong success. G8 leaders alone and with their MEM partners issued a total of six documents containing 16,842 words, the fifth highest in summit history in the latter regard. Development and Africa came first, with 19% of the total, or 27% with the separate statement on Global Food Security added. It was followed by environment and climate change with 16% or 25% with the MEM communiqué added. The world economy received a respectable 13%.

Direction Setting

On the third dimension of direction setting, the summit was also strong success, as measured by the number, breadth, innovativeness and democratic foundation of the principles and norms it set.

A leading indicator here had been the substantial list of principles by which the Japanese would address the agenda, as contained in Fukuda's Davos speech. That speech also identified several interconnections or "crosswalks" among the themes and issues, suggesting the probability of a coherent and consistent package of summit-produced principles and norms.

The summit itself affirmed a large number and range of democratic values (Appendix K).

Decisional Commitment

The number of commitments Made Toyako a strong success, as the many specific and ambitious proposals in Fukuda's Davos speech had suggested it would be. Toyako produced 296 commitments, the third highest in summit history (Appendix L). Development and Africa lead with 70 while Food Security added another 29, for a total of 99. Climate change and the environment received 46 from the G8 alone and a further 30 from the MEM, for a total of 76. The world economy took 49, making Toyako far more of an economic summit than many in the recent past. Political issues received 40, counterterrorism 13, Zimbabwe two, International institutions one and the Chair's Summary 16.

Climate change alone received 54 commitments from the G8 and MEM communiqués and the G8 statement on Food Security. Energy received 26 from the G8 communiqué, Food Security Statement and MEM Statement. Food and agriculture received 27 from two G8 documents. Together these big three issues secured 107 commitments or 36% of the 296 total.

The money mobilized at Toyako also suggested a strong success (Appendix M). These included the \$10 billion CIF, which could be counted as official development assistance (ODA) as outlined by Fukuda at Davos. This British initiative was to be financed by Japan, Britain and the United States, should their legislatures approve. As of mid May, none of their G8 partners had signaled they would join this donors club. But as the summit ended, a total of \$6 billion had been raised.

In addition, health received major new money, with Bush taking the lead. The 2007 Heiligendamm commitment of \$60 billion was now given a timetable for disbursement.

The strong stress at the summit on fulfilling outstanding commitments added more money in practices, especially with the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) numbers showing dropping ODA flows

Delivery through Compliance

On the dimension of delivery, on compliance with commitments, the G8's emphasis on keeping existing commitments suggests that Toyako is likely to perform well, subject to

the cautions identified immediately above. Also suggesting caution is the fact that money mobilized — where momentum is concentrated at the moment — has not proven productive in catalyzing compliance in the past (Kirton et al. 2007b; Kirton 2006). Nor has referring implementation to other international organizations and Toyako is heading toward asking the IEA in energy and the UN on climate to help do its work. However, the G8's prospective reliance on the IMF and World Bank to assist with finance and development, and the invitation for the World Bank to attend the summit are promising, for these are the core international organizations (and G7 controlled ones) in the finance and development field. They have proven their compliance boosting potency before (Kirton 2007b, 2006).

Development of Global Governance

The prospective performance on the development of global governance is also somewhat promising. The MEM-16 formula will be strengthened and Toyako could even produce to a plurilateral summit institution similar to the MEM-16 dedicated to climate change. The Gleneagles Dialogue will be continued in rebranded fashion as the Toyako Dialogue, dedicated to devising a low carbon society. Both legacies will strengthen the principle and practice of a G20, at the level of leaders and ministers alike.

In contrast, there will be no bold moves on the outstanding questions of outreach and expansion. Japan is reluctant and has thus far been increasing outreach at the summit in ways that dilute China's distinctiveness and that could delay and make more difficult any expansion of the G8 toward or into a G13/14.

In regard to civil society, this G8 did well in affirming the multi-stakeholder principle in the host's proclamation at Davos. But beyond there were no new G8-centered civil society institutions that arose in the lead-up to or at the summit itself. With so many invited guests to attend to, the G8 leaders and host would have little time to deal directly with civil society at the summit, especially in ways that repeat Japan's innovation at Okinawa the last time.

The Propellers of Performance

As they approached the final stages of their journey up to the Toyako mountaintop with the slope getting ever steeper, but all still holding hands so that none would fall to their death, G8 leaders were pulled toward success by some of the powerful forces from the outside world that had reliably produced high G8 summit performance in the past (Kirton 2004a).¹⁰

Shock-Activated Equalizing Vulnerability

The first force, pushing for substantial summit success, was the increasing, interconnected, equalizing vulnerability of G8 members to physical assaults from abroad, a vulnerability becoming ever more activated and apparent by severe shocks. These

¹⁰ I am indebted to Japanese Sherpa Masahru Kohno for providing on July 3, 2008 this highly evocative and appropriate metaphor, replacing Putnam and Bayne's 'Hanging Together' from all-American Benjamin Franklin and applied with then summit was in a dark defensive mode, rather than proactively soaring to sunny peaks.

shocks sprung up in energy prices, ecology, food and finance. They spread simultaneously in a complex, closely interconnected cluster among the four.¹¹

In the first and most potent field of security, there were few of the classic old and new shocks of defeat in war, nuclear explosions, terrorist attacks and civil strife to show G8 leaders their countries vulnerabilities and inspire them to co-operate. While all produced attrition events, none generated a single, galvanizing outbreak shock or the sort that the July 7 London subway bombings had in 2005. In Iraq, America and Britain's divisive war was going relatively well, with a surge in U.S. troops that threatened to become permanent — at least until the U.S. presidential and Congressional elections were held five short months hence. In Afghanistan, where all G8 members were at war together against terrorism in its epicentre, the poppies, police and porous border with Pakistan remained serious problems, especially with the approach of summer when Taliban offensives traditionally took place. Here small shocks came from the surprising Taliban jailbreak in Kandahar and the rising allied death toll, led by the 50 American troops killed in the first five months of 2008 — about double the year before. The British and Canadians saw their own body counts rise too. In the Middle East, Hezbollah, considered by many G8 members to be a terrorist organization, threatened to overthrow the western-backed government in Lebanon, if in ways far less dramatic than the conflict in that country at the time of the G8 summit in 2006.

There were also no shocks from nuclear proliferation similar to the galvanizing explosions in 1974 and 1998. Indeed, North Korea's explosion of the cooling tower at its nuclear weapons site on June 26th suggested that non-proliferation might finally be proceeding there. On September 6, 2007, Israel had destroyed a suspected Syrian nuclear weapons site in a decisive strike. And while Iran remained unyielding, it took no major steps toward becoming a nuclear state, even as the UN prepared to impose further sanctions to make it stop. Indeed, on the eve of the summit, it said it would talk to the Europeans about the offer they had made. Further afield India sought with America's help to return to the nuclear control club and Singh seemed to have the domestic political strength to accept the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal.

Terrorist attacks were largely absent from all G8 countries and almost no G8 citizens died from it abroad. Only in June did terrorist again strike Russia's Chechnya, killing six. The terrorists had retreated to more distant places such as Algeria, and returned to the local level of civil strife. It was a far cry from the Al Qaeda-directed terrorism of global reach that had first attacked America and killed its citizens at the World Trade Centre in New York City in 1993. Civil strike more broadly was also subdued within the G8. But rising oil prices sparked labour unrest, strikes and stoppages in Europe and Japan.

The second, highly potent field of energy did feature a real shock, which Britain's Gordon Brown labeled the third energy crisis following those in 1973 and 1979. Steadily soaring energy prices doubled since the last summit to reached historic closing highs of

¹¹ The impact of these vulnerabilities and shocks, both individually and interconnected, as they drive summit performance can be traced in part by identifying explicit references to them in the summit communiqués.

US\$145.20 a barrel for month forward West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude on the NYMEX on June 27, just before the summit's start.¹² As in 1979 this spike led to pocketbook pain at the pump and peaceful political protests in some G8 countries, and most of the O5. It also directly fuelled a food, inflation and stagflation crisis or concern in O5, African and other developing countries, and prospectively within the G8 too. But despite disruptions caused by violent civil strife in Nigeria, price controls in China, and lack of money for imported fuel in the Marshall Islands, there was no state controlled supply shock targeted against the G8, as there had been in 1973 or 1979. Indeed, at a special consumer-produced summit in June, Saudi Arabia — the enemy of 1973 and 1979 — increased its oil production and promised it would further meet whatever global demand arose. The failure of this promise to move markets suggested that for the first time, the world faced a permanent demand-driven shock, and one that only climate friendly measures for conservation, efficiency, alternatives and renewables could meet.

In the third field of ecology, a sequence of shocks arose in the form of deadly water waves. They arrived first in Asia, two months before the summit's start. Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May 2-3, leaving more than 133,000 dead or missing, and endangering up to 2.5 million people due to a regime that refused to let aid in to protect its own citizens lives. The cyclone served as a second shock, especially for those in Asia, of the deadly Asian tsunami of December 2004. Severe flooding in China, which took more lives, followed soon after Myanmar's cyclone. In America deadly floods moved from the Midwest down the Mississippi toward New Orleans, where Hurricane Katrina had recently arrived from the warming waters of the Gulf of Mexico to submerge the city. Deadly earthquakes in China and then in Japan helped show several summit participants, including Indonesia, the frequency, speed and severity of extreme weather and geophysical events and the impact of sea-level rise that would be caused by climate change. It made it more difficult to dismiss them as natural disasters that could not be controlled, rather than deal with them as human-created ones that could be mitigated or at least adapted to.

The fourth field of finance also produced a third shock, in the form of an internationally contagious financial crisis starting in New York City as in 1975.¹³ In contrast to the most recent Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997-99, the sub-prime credit crisis that started in the summer of 2007 started in the most powerful G8 member, America, spread to other G8 countries and then to the rest of the world. This crisis was punctuated by the shock of bank failures (as distinct from the hedge fund collapse of LTCM in America in September 1998) — in America (Bear Stearns), Britain (Northern Rock) and Germany. It came in America with a classic run on the bank, but this time from fellow bankers who

¹² The historic intraday high, also on that day, was \$U.S. 145.85.

¹³ In 1975 the threatened imminent bankruptcy of New York City led it to ask the U.S. government for a bailout. These requests were refused until President Gerald Ford went to the first summit in Rambouillet, France, in November, where his fellow leaders told him that New York's bankruptcy would spark a global dollar crisis. Ford then adjusted America to the preferences of the G8 partners and gave New York the requested U.S. government financial support. This new vulnerability followed the American-initiated, state-created, -controlled and -targeted old vulnerability and shock in finance of August 15, 1971. The most direct comparison is with the collapse of Britain's Baring's Bank in the spring of 1995, a precursor of the death of America's Bear Stearns and Britain's Northern Rock in the spring of 2008.

refused to lend, asked for the return of their money and forced central bankers to take unprecedented steps to bail them out and serves as an ongoing lender of last resort. However as the summit approached, this financial crisis had only caused or threatened the bankruptcy of only banks, rather than of major cities as in 1975 or entire countries as in 1997-1999. But it did produce a bear market in stocks in all G8 countries but Canada and all O5 ones but Brazil.¹⁴

In the fifth field of food there was also a shock. It initially hit hardest in developing Africa, Asia and the Americas, as it had so often before. But it now for the first time erupted simultaneously around the world. It led to rampant inflation and political unrest in the G8's O5 partner of China. It threatened to bring the dreaded stagflation of the 1970s back to the G7 itself, as sharply slowing growth everywhere came with increasing inflation in the U.S., Europe and Britain. But within the G8 it remained primarily a price rather than a supply shock. It was not one awakening 1970's like memories of wartime food shortages in Germany and Japan.

While most of these shocks remained somewhat small and unfolded outside the G8, their tight interconnections were well designed to evoke a governance response from a G8 designed to have its leaders deal with all of the world's problems all at once in a comprehensive, coherent way. The food crisis was fostered by ecological vulnerabilities such as drought in Australia, and the switch from food to clean corn-fed biofuels that soaring energy prices spurred. The ecological shock in Myanmar wiped out an area that produced 65% of the rice in a country that was long the rice bowl of the world but now became an importer and thus a consumer of food security for the first time. It also threatened to bring a health crisis. Two weeks after the strike, the needed relief had not arrived to assist Myanmar's poor and overwhelmed public healthcare system cope with the typhoid, dysentery, diarrhea, cholera and measles epidemics were breaking out.

The Myanmar cyclone also catalyzed a causal sequence that activated some of the other reliable causes of high G8 performance in the past (Kirton 2004a). It showed the failure of the established multilateral organizations to deal with this ecological shock-activated new vulnerability. For the major relief agencies — the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) — remained wedded to their old article 2(7) principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, rather than giving precedence to the newer principles of human security or the responsibility to protect that had been proclaimed by all the leaders of UN member states at their recent world summit in September 2005. The UN agencies were thus unable to get their badly needed personnel and relief supplies into the country over the opposition of its suspicious, recalcitrant, repressive military regime.

The crisis also triggered the equalizing specialized capability of the G8, O5 and other participants invited to the Toyako Summit. The most powerful U.S., France and Britain contemplated unilateral actions, by air dropping relief supplies into Myanmar without the

¹⁴ The classic G8 stock market crash is that of October 1987, coming in the early lead up to the Toronto Summit in June 1988.

host state's permission. But with Myanmar's military likely to use force in response, they chose not to use their already strained military capabilities in this way. Meanwhile, supplies from Myanmar's often poor Asian neighbours such as tsunami-recovering Indonesia, Thailand, China and Japan arrived more rapidly. Indeed, G8 host Japan, the world's second strongest power, was a highly geologically and geographically vulnerable country regularly attacked by typhoons and earthquakes. It was thus in the lead in cyclone monitoring, warning and relief capabilities. These nearby Asian capabilities were allowed into an earthquake overwhelmed China, while those of more distant G8 powers were kept out.

The cyclone further evoked the common democratic purpose of G8 members. The refusal of Myanmar's military junta to allow international relief personnel into the country, coming in the wake of its recent crackdown on its Buddhist monks, defied the values of openness, democracy and human rights that stood at the core of the G8's mission and its citizen's convictions. The assault was compounded by the junta's diversion of relief supplies and dismissal of relief survivors' demands, in order to support a constitutional referendum that it refused to postpone, a referendum designed to cement and legitimize the military's rule. In Myanmar crackdown on Buddhist monks, relief refusal and aid diversion produced three successive shocks in one year to assault the core common principles the G8 held dear.

The cyclone also mobilized global public attention and action for Asia, poverty and disease reduction and, potentially, demands to control climate change and the extreme weather events it bred. Across the globe publics were aroused, supported their government's relief efforts and gave directly themselves to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), all on a scale comparable to the Asian tsunami (when corrected for the number of countries hit, victims, and citizens from G8 and outside countries who had visited and vacationed there).

The Myanmar cyclone further rendered more appropriate the expanded participation at the summit, still done in a constricted, continuous, controlled way. The summit was held in Asia in nearby Japan, with the Asian O5 members of China and India attending for the fifth time in six years and the fourth time in a row. Japan's additional invited participants — South Korea, Australia and Indonesia — were all from Asia and had a habit of working together at the summit level in forums such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Association of South East Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN+3). The participation of tsunami-recovering Indonesia in particular would help Cyclone Nargis get greater attention and action when the summit came.

This second Asian tsunami shock within a three-year interval connected directly with the summit's priority agenda of climate, poverty reduction, health and water, and food. It and the Chinese earthquake pushed the G8 to add natural disaster relief to its agenda in an enhanced way, as part of the G8's climate change discussion and as an item in its own right. This was an issue not in the initial Japanese and G8 plan for 2008 but one that the summit had recently dealt with at Gleneagles in 2005 and St. Petersburg in 2006.

Together with the food agenda it showed the fast flexibility of the G8 in responding to shocks, especially those the new vulnerability bred.

Multilateral Organizational Failure

The second force, both pulling forth and inhibiting substantial summit success, was the performance of the established multilateral organizations most relevant to the rising vulnerabilities, recent shocks and the priority agenda of the summit itself. The UN system failed to prevent or respond effectively to the shocks that arose in energy, ecology and finance. It did initially appear more responsive than it had in the past in nuclear proliferation, food relief, and democratization in Zimbabwe, but quickly came to disappoint yet again. And in the critical field of climate change, the UN's alternative of a north-south ministerial level negotiation at Copenhagen at the end of 2009 threatened to erode G8 action in 2008, even if UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon pleaded for G8 help just before the summit's start.

In the energy field, the multilateral system offered only a very partial International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Bank (dealing with energy poverty) and Atlantic-centric, plurilateral International Energy Agency (IEA). Much like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), these bodies functioned more as a G7 secretariat or platform (with Russia still excluded) than a global governance forum on their own. Nor did the multilateral system contain any established body to deal with the fast emerging renewable, alternative and efficient energy fields. No new or extended institutions or action of any consequence came even as oil prices double to historic highs within a year.

In the closely related climate field, the fragmented, fragile architecture from the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) showed few signs of growing coherence or capability. The UNFCCC continued to focus on emissions sources, with little coordination with a CBD that had expertise in sinks. The UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2007 at Bali added nothing essential to the Heiligendamm framework on long- or medium-term targets to help define a fast-approaching "beyond Kyoto" regime. Its belated recognition of the role of avoided deforestation did not propel it to a broader inclusion of the sinks that the G7 had agreed were equally important at the summit George H. Bush had hosted in Houston, Texas, in 1990.¹⁵ Nor did its two follow on meetings in 2008 advance the likelihood of agreement in Poland at the end of 2008 or Copenhagen at the end of 2009. They and the energetic, G8-centric new plurilateral institutions — the American-pioneered Major Emitters Meeting (MEM) of 16 countries, the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP 7) of now seven countries (with the recent additional of Canada), the ministerial Gleneagles Dialogue and

¹⁵ As measured by deforestation, the greatest contributions to greenhouse gases were the U.S., Brazil and Indonesia, rather than the standard emitters of China, the U.S. and Japan. There was thus a strong logic in having the O5 and additional Asian three at the summit to deal with climate change.

the Heiligendamm Process energy efficiency group — needed the G8 summit if their work was to culminate in the intended way.

The multilateral system was similarly missing in action in coping with the global growth and financial crisis, where its oldest and most powerful body, the IMF, had long claimed centre stage. Thanks to a deal brokered in the finance G20 in November 2007, the IMF had made its first stage of reforms on “voice and vote.” But despite the controversy over Paul Wolfowitz, the IMF and World Bank appointments of their new executive heads still preserved the ancient backroom brokered deal duopoly for the Europeans and Americans, freezing out the rest of the world. While the IMF was assigned a little of the analytic work required to cope with the new financial crisis, on key issues such as creating a regime to regulate sovereign wealth funds, the U.S. preferred an ad hoc coalition of the willing composed of itself and a few small friends such as Kuwait and Singapore. Most critical aspects of the new financial crisis lay beyond the IMF’s mandate, its diminished resources or its professional competence. Its new managing director’s pleas for a Keynesian stimulus package to spur global growth and its gloomy forecasts for American and global growth were widely ignored and the latter soon proved incorrect.

Elsewhere across the agenda there were no signs the multilateral system could cope without the G8’s help. This included the World Bank on African development, the FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the WFP on the food crisis, the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the badly overdue Doha Development Agenda, the IAEA on nuclear proliferation in North Korea, Iran and Syria and the UNSC on Myanmar, Sudan, Afghanistan and securing its porous borders with Pakistan.

Predominant Equalizing Capabilities

The new vulnerabilities and shocks that overwhelmed the established multilateral organizations also increased the collective predominance and internal equality of the capabilities of the G8 and now O5 powers. Rising oil prices empowered the otherwise weakest G8 members of Russia and Canada, while hurting the overall most powerful of America and Japan. Among the O5 they helped smaller Brazil and Mexico while harming China and India. The finance crisis struck hardest in America, Britain and Germany, while Canada and especially Russia largely escaped. The credit crunch in particular called into question America’s historic advantage, as the global reserve currency provider, of having the most liquid capital markets in the world. It put a premium on countries with large hard currency reserves in sovereign wealth funds and elsewhere, notably China, India, Russia and Japan. The food crisis similarly helped Canada and potentially Russia, if not directly harming a long agriculturally protectionist America, Europe and Japan.

The strong equalization of capability was faithfully reflected in and driven by the currency values governing the international worth of the G8 and O5 countries (Appendix J). During the year leading up to the summit the U.S. dollar plummeted, the Japanese yen and British pound remained stable, while the Euro, the Canadian dollar, and the Russian rouble soared. Even the still heavily controlled Chinese Yuan appreciated, breaking historic barriers in the spring.

The equalization of overall capability was also apparent, if less comprehensively, in the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates among G8 and O5 members. U.S. GDP growth plummeted to an initially reported 0.6% in the first quarter of 2008. Japan, which had been growing at 2% for several years, was due to fall back to 1.5% for 2008. Britain and Europe similarly softened but were still stronger than the United States. Only tightly connected Canada plummeted below America, falling into slight negative growth for the first quarter of 2008. Outside the G7, there was still strong growth in Russia, China, India and a now robustly growing Brazil.

The G8's global collective predominance thus increasingly depended on its most recent member Russia if not an O5 that was being increasingly integrated into the G8 club (See Appendix J). And within both the G8 and the O5 capabilities were equalizing. A relatively retracting America increasingly recognized it needed the help its G8 and O5 associates could provide. Their capability configurations pushed them away from repeating the polarized rich North-poor South confrontation of old.

Common Democratic Purposes

These powerful pulls from outside were, however, offset by the weakness in those pushes from inside the summit system that had proven effective in propelling performance in the past. The first was the fragile fit between the summit's priority agenda and the values of open democracy and individual liberty that constituted the G8's foundational *raison d'être*, constitutional charter and ultimate shared social purpose (see Appendix K).

The G8's planned priorities did not directly connect well with these values. Transparency was only a small part of the world economy, financial stability and energy security agenda. Development focused on health, water and education more than on corruption and good governance. And climate change had little direct connection to open democracy in most respects. It was a sharp contrast to the 2004 summit with the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative at its core.

Fukuda in his Davos speech had set forth several principles to explain how Japan would approach its summit priorities. But the speech was largely devoid of direct references to democracy beyond a few civil society and multi-stakeholder participation ones. Openness appeared only in reference to reforming the Japanese economy. Transparency arose only in a technical reference to measuring the 'bottom up' approach to climate control. On development and Africa, infrastructure was highlighted but institutions, good governance, and anti-corruption were notably absent, in sharp contrast the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan's emphasis on them.

Such democratic guides did begin to appear as the G8 agenda took shape by May. But much would depend on what built-in and breaking political security issues the G8 leaders chose to focus on. On Kosovo, Tibet and Zimbabwe, the G8 was somewhat divided among itself and especially with its O5 partners. A discussion here was not destined to put a devotion to democracy in as a powerful performance-inducing force. But the G8 was more united on Myanmar and, above all, Afghanistan. Last year at Heiligendamm the G8 leaders' discussion had led to a rousing dialogue on demonstration of G8 solidarity on the need to fight to defend open democracy, individual liberty and social

advance there. That demonstration of democratic cohesion could appear again at Toyako, for the G8 leaders themselves, and perhaps all the world to see.

A prospective outbreak of a common democratic purpose was heightened by the configuration of players at the summit. Russia would be sending a new president, who was thought by some to be more inherently devoted to open democracy and the rule of law than Putin had been. His presence would at least offer an opportunity to set aside the recent chill surrounding Putin for a while. Moreover, the three additional Asian participants that Japan added were all from democratic polities, meaning that there would be more and more diverse leaders to try to socialize a politically lonely Hu Jintao of China onto a more open democratic path.

Political Control, Capital and Continuity

The fifth force of leaders' political control, capital and continuity at home also largely acted against summit success. The leaders had an unusually low ability to escape and reshape the constraints of their domestic polities so that they could flexibly come to fast, far-reaching consensus and collective action abroad (see Appendix L).

In host Japan, 71-year-old Fukuda had only recently assumed office, had no popular mandate of his own, and had been facing rumors that he would depart soon after the summit, or conceivably even face an election before. His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) did not control the upper house of the Diet. Its candidate overwhelmingly lost a by-election in a previously safe seat in April. Fukuda's approval rating, which had stood at 60% when he assumed office in September 2007, had plunged to 25% by April 2008. It only began to use a bit when Fukuda embarked on his pre-summit G8 summit tour. But the summit designed by his predecessor Shinzo Abe still approached amidst severe political constraints at home.

Elsewhere things were seldom brighter for Fukuda's G8 colleagues. In the U.S. a lame duck president George Bush, who no longer controlled Congress, saw his popularity plunge from its historic high of 90% in the wake of 9/11 to the lowest ever recorded in the 70-year history of polling in the U.S.¹⁶ New historic lows were also reached when Americans were asked if their country was going in the right direction. Bush's Republican party lost a previously safe congressional seat in Mississippi in a special election in the spring.

In Germany, Angela Merkel's approval rating also sagged, as members of her sister party and the Social Democrats in her grand coalition became restive well before the next general election in autumn 2009. The result was a Germany that was reluctant to make an early pledge to a new climate technology fund, to deliver its promised double ODA to Africa or to pledge more to combat infectious disease there. It also refused to remove its

¹⁶ This is an average of ten polls with survey dates beginning April 6, 2008, and ending April 30, 2008. It includes the following polling companies: Gallup, AP/Ipsos, ABC/Washington Post, Newsweek, USA Today/Gallup, Pew, NBC/Wall Street Journal, CBS/New York Times, Fox/Opinion Dynamics and CNN/Opinion Research. President Bush's approval rating for the same period, using the same dates and polling companies is 29%.

veto of any G8-wide endorsement of using nuclear to control climate change. With Germany still using coal but saying no to nuclear energy, it was more difficult for the G8 to persuade the U.S., China and India to do the opposite in the interest of climate change control.

In Britain, Gordon Brown's approval rating plummeted from his majority highs when he took over to new lows by April, in part because he had backed away from going to the polls to get a popular electoral mandate of his own. In early May his Labour party suffered a devastating loss in local elections, as he faced a general election in 2010. Just before the summit he suffered two by-election losses, with the one immediately before the summit reducing his party to fifth place.

In France a similar popularity plunge deflated Nicolas Sarkozy. In Canada, Stephen Harper's minority government remained tied with the opposition in the polls, even as a sagging economy threatened to drag the government down. Only in Italy did Silvio Berlusconi come with a very fresh mandate and honeymoon popularity. So did Dmitry Medvedev, assuming the glow bequeathed by his predecessor and mentor, Vladimir Putin, who was still very much at his side.

The continuity of leaders at the summit and the familiarity with colleagues and the experience it bred were also unpromising. Fukuda, as chair, was attending and hosting the summit for the first time. Brown and Medvedev were also brand new. It was the second summit for Sarkozy, the third for Harper and the fourth for José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission. Bush was at his eighth and last.

The particular combination of ideology and experience these leaders brought also suggested low performance. The most experienced leader, Bush, with his conservative ideology, came from the most powerful member, but had low political capital and control. Most other weighty members were relatively new, ideologically mixed and domestically weak. Only in the weaker members did high political control, with mixed experience, come.

A more promising projection came from an alternative conception of the impact of political control, capital and continuity. Offered by Nicholas Bayne (2008), it argues that summit success comes when leaders are new, anxious to make their mark and determined to deliver abroad to compensate for their poor popularity at home. Toyako was thus blessed with a new generation of many fresh leaders, with Germany's Merkel, and Canada's Harper at only their third, France's Sarkozy at his second, and Britain's Brown, Italy's Berlusconi, Japan's Fukuda and Russia's Medvedev at their first (even though Berlusconi hosted two and attended many before). The low polls that many had would, by this logic, drive them to high ambition and achievement abroad, perhaps led even by a veteran Bush in his legacy year.

In Bush's case, it bears noting that the two previous summits with a two-term lame-duck U.S. president had a solid performance. Ronald Reagan's last summit at Toronto in 1988 performed poorly overall in the Bayne scores and in a quantitative count of results across

the six dimensions of summit governance. But it made substantial advances on climate change and African development (especially debt relief for the poorest and South African apartheid). Bill Clinton's last summit at Okinawa in 2000, the last one Japan hosted, was very successful; it produced, inter alia, the highest compliance record of all time and made notable advances on African development. For 2008, Fukuda, despite his domestic weakness, was willing and able in the spring of 2008 to use his extraordinary powers against his reluctant upper house to have Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) continue to support an America, Britain, Canada and France fighting to defend democracy and defeat terrorism in Afghanistan.

Also promising well for summit success was the strong public support across virtually all G8 and some O5 members for the summit's priority issues, especially the defining one of climate change. In a long skeptical U.S., in 2007 37% of Americans identified environmental problems as a leading global threat, an increase of 61% from 2002 (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007). Consistent with this shift, in mid April Bush declared the U.S. would commit to binding emissions targets by having its greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) peak and decline by 2025. He also signed the first increase in auto efficiency standards since the 1980s and supported alternative fuels. In the year before the summit the environment had become the top issue that concerned Canadians, and remained in a strong third as the economy and gas prices overtook it on the summit eve. In the same 2007 survey 45% to 66% of west Europeans chose environmental issues as a top threat, as did 70% of Chinese and large numbers in India, Brazil and other developing countries.

Among the new leaders attending the summit, Australia's Kevin Rudd had just won his first election, in a landslide after campaigning to ratify the Kyoto protocol. South Korea's new president Lee Myung-bak had become prominent by greening Seoul as mayor from 2002 to 2006. On the eve of the summit he announced, as an energy and climate security measure, that government employees would drive an alternative days and that their air conditioning would be turned down.

Within the G8 family, there was, however, public wariness about member countries, especially where Russia and the U.S. were concerned. In regard to a Russia, a GlobeScan poll taken from October 31, 2007, to January 25, 2008, found G7 citizens judging Putin as a net negative influence on democracy and human rights in Russia (56%-26%), on peace and security in the world (47%-38%), on quality of life in Russia (44%-39%), and on Russia's reliability as an energy partner (41%-37%). But they did feel he had a net positive impact on Russia's overall relations with other countries (40%-45%) and on citizens Russia's overall role in the world (44%-30%). The most negative of the 31 countries' surveyed were the Germans (56%) and the Italians (53%), while the most positive were the Egyptians and (78%) and Chinese (69%). Views of the U.S. were no more flattering.

However, there was strong support for the G8 as an institution, notably in its most powerful member. Bush and virtually all of Congress, backed by a broad bipartisan coalition, prepared to commit \$50 billion in new funds from 2008-13 to combat infectious disease, including through the Global Fund that the G8 had created at Bush's

first G8 summit in 2001. Those looking further into the long shadow of the future beyond November 2008 and Bush's legacy could take hope from the publicly declared G8 proposals of the presidential candidates seeking to succeed him. All had clear G8 institutional reform policies in their campaign platforms. Republican senator John McCain wished to remove the Russians from the G8. Democratic senator Hillary Clinton (2007) promised to use the G8 as a model to create an E8 summit, with an adjusted membership, dedicated to climate change (Clinton 2007). Democratic senator Barack Obama offered a new forum of the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters, composed of the existing G8 and O5, "to focus exclusively on global energy and environmental issues."¹⁷

In the end, G8 leaders were largely able to transcend their domestic political constraints. But one place it took its toll was on health, where a lame duck President Bush was unable to get a small group of senators to give him the \$50 billion dollars he wanted in time to turn Toyako into an historic great global fundraising for health. Another was nuclear energy, where Angela Merkel's coalition government with the SPD and popularity in the polls prevented her, and thus the summit, from giving a green light to nuclear power, as an instrument of energy security and climate control. More broadly, a third area was climate change, where Indian Prime Minister Singh, facing forthcoming elections and using his scarce political capital with his coalition partners on a nuclear deal with the U.S. and Nuclear Safety Group, had none left to produce a particularly forthcoming position on climate change. Gordon Brown's apparent short shelf life also put a brake on his priorities of G8 expansion and energy security, if not Zimbabwe, continuously proved to be a week constraint. Fukuda as rookie host pulled his summit to success in the defining issue of climate change. And Medvedev contributed with proposals on a grains bank, a G8 agriculture meeting and adjustments on Zimbabwe.

Constricted, Controlled, Continuous Participation

The sixth factor of constricted, controlled, continuous participation constituted a drag on summit success. It was comprehensive, rather than constricted, reasonably controlled with considerable global balance, but brought several new countries whose leaders would not participate throughout (see Appendix M). It was a high risk strategy that combined all the right players for producing much on climate change and African development, but gave the outsiders a de facto veto over high G8 achievements, and both sides little time to do the deals needed to pull it off.

For the fourth straight year the G8 heads would meet the O5 leaders of China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa. Also attending were the leaders of Australia, South Korea and Indonesia from democratic Asia, leaders from seven African democracies, and the heads of the multilateral organizations most relevant to the summit's agenda this year. It was one of the largest and most diverse gatherings of leaders in G8 history, rivaled only by the Evian summit in 2003.

The summit itself, at the selective, remote Windsor Hotel Toya Resort and Spa, allows maximum time for the leaders to be alone together, cut off from the world. Indeed, for the first time in many years, all G8 leaders would sleep, edit and work under a single roof,

¹⁷ "White House Set to Go Slightly Green," *New Zealand Herald*, April 10, 2008.

maximizing the time for personal contact and spontaneous encounters to arise. With the invited leaders housed half an hour away by helicopter or two hours by car along a sometimes windy, foggy, windy route, the G8 leaders should have maximum opportunity for spontaneous encounters and conversations among themselves. But they could also have to deal with the psychological dynamic from their outreach guests who could feel like second-class participants who are largely left out.

The summit site would showcase a range of Japan's environmental technologies. The media centre was in the Rusutsu Resort hotel in the village of Rusutsu, a 30-minute drive from the summit site. No plans for civil society consultation or involvement were in the public plan. Both the media and civil society were likely to feel excluded, and underreport the summit's results.

This large number came from a new combination that included leaders of countries that have never attended a G8 summit before. They would meet in changing combinations, depending on the issue under discussion, over the summits three days, with only the G8 leaders there throughout (See Appendix on Summit schedule). The African would come the first day, the G8 meet alone on the second, and the O5 and additional MEM-8 come for the third and final day.

The O5, Africans and Asians had no tradition of coming to a consensus at the end of a G8 summit, either among themselves or with the G8. But this was the fifth time for the O5 to come to the G8, and among Africans had too. Moreover, there was evidence that the O5 were complying well with the key commitments made at the G8 last year.

References

Bayne, Nicholas (2008), *Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century*, 2nd ed. (Ashgate: Aldershot).

Bayne, Nicholas (2005), *Staying Together: The G8 Summit Confronts the 21st Century*, 1st ed. (Ashgate: Aldershot).

BBC World Service (2008), "G7 Citizens Critical of Putin's Impact on Russian Democracy: BBC Poll," February 25.

Clinton, Hilary (2007), "Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-First Century," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December).

Dobson, Hugo (2007), *The Group of 7/8* (London: Routledge).

Dobson, Hugo (2004), *Japan and the G7/8, 1975-2002* (London: RoutledgeCurzon).

Donnelly, Michael (2002), "Nuclear Safety and Criticality at Toaimura: A Failure of Governance," in Kirton, John and Junichi Takase 2002), *New Directions in Global Political Governance: The G8 and International Order in the Twenty-First Century* (Ashgate: Aldershot), pp. 117-140.

Erdman, Michael and Cliff Vanderlinden (2008), *G8 Interim Compliance Report 2007-08* (G8 Research Group: University of Toronto, Toronto).

Fukuda, Yasuo (2008), "Special Address by H. E. Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan On the Occasion of the Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum Congress Centre, Davos, Switzerland," January 26, 2008.

Guebert, Jenilee (2007). Japan's Plans and Prospects. 29 October. <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2008hokkaido/2008plan/2008plan071029.html> (June 2008).

Hajnal, Peter I. (2007), *The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation* (Aldershot: Ashgate).

Holbrooke, Richard (2008), "The Next President: Mastering a Daunting Agenda," *Foreign Affairs* 87(5): 2-24.

Kirton, John (2007), "G8: An Economic Forum of the Enlarged Western Alliance? The Record from Rambouillet 1975 through Heiligendamm 2007 to Canada 2010," Paper prepared for a program on "The Relations Between Europe and North America," at the North American European Summer Academy of le Centre International de Formation Européenne, Nice, and the Zentrum für Wissenschaft und Weiterbildung Schloss Hofen, Lochau, Austria, July 24, 2007.

Kirton, John, and Jenilee Guebert (2008), "Compliance with Climate Change Commitments: The G8 Record, 1975–2007." G8 Research Group <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/compliance-climate_080605.pdf> (June 2008).

Kirton, John, Nikolai Roudev, Laura Sunderland (2007b), "Making G8 Leaders Deliver: An Analysis of Compliance and Health Commitments, 1996–2006," *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 85(3), March 2007.

Kirton, John (2006), "Explaining Compliance with G8 Finance Commitments: Agency, Institutionalization, and Structure," *Open Economies Review*, 17 (4): 459-475.

Kirton, John (2004a), "Japan's Global Leadership through the G8," Paper prepared for the Faculty of Law, Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan, July 13, 2004.

Kirton, John (2004b), "Explaining G8 Effectiveness: A Concert of Vulnerable Equals in a Globalizing World." Paper prepared for a panel on "Explaining G8 Effectiveness" at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, March 17-20, 2004.

Kirton, John and George von Furstenberg, eds. (2001), *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalisation in the Twenty-First Century* (Ashgate: Aldershot).

Kirton, John and Junichi Takase (2002), *New Directions in Global Political Governance: The G8 and International Order in the Twenty-First Century* (Ashgate: Aldershot).

Kohno, Masaharu (2008), Address to the CIPPS Conference, Mandarin Oriental Hotel, Tokyo, Japan, July 3, 2008.

Sustainable Energy Development Centre (2006). Moscow <www.sedc.ru> (June 2008).

Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2007

Year	Bayne Grade	Domestic Political Mgmt		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Dev of Global Governance	Attendees	
		% Mem	Ave # Refs	# Days	# State-ments	# of Words	# Refs to Core Values	# Cmts	Compliance	# Bodies Min/Off	# Mem	# Par
1975	A-	N/A	N/A	3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1	4/6	0
1976	D	N/A	N/A	2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0	7	0
1977	B-	N/A	N/A	2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1	8	0
1978	A	N/A	N/A	2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0	8	0
1979	B+	N/A	N/A	2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	½	8	0
1980	C+	N/A	N/A	2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1	TBC	0
1981	C	N/A	N/A	2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0	TBC	0
1982	C	N/A	N/A	3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3	TBC	0
1983	B	N/A	N/A	3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0	TBC	0
1984	C-	N/A	N/A	3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0	TBC	0
1985	E	N/A	N/A	3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2	TBC	0
1986	B+	N/A	N/A	3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1	TBC	0
1987	D	N/A	N/A	3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2	TBC	0
1988	C-	N/A	N/A	3	3	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0	TBC	0
1989	B+	N/A	N/A	3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1	TBC	0
1990	D	N/A	N/A	3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3	TBC	0
1991	B-	N/A	N/A	3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0	TBC	0
1992	D	N/A	N/A	3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1	TBC	1
1993	C+	N/A	N/A	3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2	TBC	1
1994	C	N/A	N/A	3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0	TBC	1
1995	B+	N/A	N/A	3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2	TBC	1
1996	B	40%	1	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3	TBC	5
1997	C-	40%	1	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3	TBC	1
1998	B+	25%	1	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0	TBC	TBC
1999	B+	80%	1.7	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5	TBC	TBC
2000	B	40%	6.5	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4	TBC	TBC
2001	B	33%	1.5	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	½	TBC	TBC
2002	B+	17%	1	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8	TBC	TBC
2003	C	40%	2.5	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5	TBC	TBC
2004	C+	33%	1	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15	TBC	TBC
2005	A-	40%	1	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5	TBC	TBC
2006	N/A	38.8%	1.8	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4	TBC	TBC
2007	N/A	75%	1	3	8	25,857	651	329	52.0	0/4	TBC	TBC
2008	N/A	TBC	TBC	3	6	16,842	TBC	296	TBC	TBC	9	19
Total	N/A	N/A	21	95	195	313,915	1052	3,118	1386.4	12/80	TBC	TBC
Ave. all	B-	40%	1	2.8	5.7	9,233	31.9	91.7	47.8	0.3/2.4	TBC	TBC
Av. cycle 1	B-	U.S., C	US, C	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.5	0.14/0.71	TBC	TBC
Av. cycle 2	C-	U.S., C	US, C	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.4	0.29/1.14	TBC	TBC
Av. cycle 3	C+	U.S., C	US, C	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.5	0.58/1.29	TBC	TBC
Av. cycle 4	B	29.3%	2	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	40.7	0.58/3.57	TBC	TBC
Av. cycle 5	B-	37.7%	1.5	3	12.5	25,181	177	255.67	58.0	0.00/7.4	TBC	TBC

3118/34

Notes:

N/A=Not Available; TBC=to be calculated; US=United States; C=Canada

*Bayne Grade: the 2005 grade of A- is a confirmed grade.

*Domestic Political Management: % Mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year. Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year.

*Directional: number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or Chair's Summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.

*Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2007 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. *2007 score is Interim score for that year. It is not included in the overall or cycle average.

Appendix B: 2007 Heiligendamm Compliance Scores

A. Interim Compliance

	Commitment	CDA	FRA	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	US	EU	AVE
1	Intellectual Property Protection	-1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.22
2	Fighting Climate Change	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
3	Energy: Technology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.22
4	Energy: Efficiency	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
5	Energy: Diversification	0	1	1	1	1	0	5	5	0	0.67
6	Raw Materials	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.22
7	Corruption	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.22
8	Heiligendamm Process	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.22
9	Africa: Debt Relief	0	0	1	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.22
10	Africa: ODA	1	-1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.44
11	Africa: Financial Markets	0	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	0.44
12	Africa: Education	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1	1	0.11
13	Africa: Peace and Security	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.11
14	Africa: Global Fund	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.44
15	Africa: Sex & Reproductive Education	1	0	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	0.42
16	Africa: Health Systems	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.56
17	Nonproliferation: Fissile Materiel	0	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	-0.22
18	Nonproliferation: Hague Code	-1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
19	Regional Security: Darfur	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
20	Counter-Terrorism: Transport Security	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.22
21	Counter-Terrorism: FATF	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.67
22	Trade	1	-1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.33
23	Global Partnership	0	0	1	0	-1	1	0	1	0	0.22
	2007 Interim Compliance Average	0.22	0.17	0.48	0.13	0.04	0.17	0.61	0.78	0.39	0.33
	2006 Interim Compliance Average	0.45	0.25	0.45	-0.10	0.30	0.25	0.55	0.35	0.53	0.35
	2006 Final Compliance Average	0.60	0.40	0.55	0.05	0.40	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.47
	2006 Interim Compliance Change	+0.15	+0.15	+0.10	+0.15	+0.10	+0.30	+0.05	+0.25	+0.05	+0.12

B. Final Compliance

	Commitment	CDA	FRA	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	US	EU	AVE
1	Intellectual Property Protection	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.44
2	Fighting Climate Change	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
3	Energy: Technology	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.44
4	Energy: Efficiency	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.89
5	Energy: Diversification	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.78
6	Raw Materials	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.11
7	Corruption	1	1	0	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.33
8	Heiligendamm Process	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
9	Africa: Debt Relief	1	0	1	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.33
10	Africa: ODA	1	-1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.44
11	Africa: Financial Markets	0	1	1	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	0.33
12	Africa: Education	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.44
13	Africa: Peace and Security	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.44
14	Africa: Global Fund	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.67
15	Africa: Sex & Reproductive Education	1	1	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	0.33
16	Africa: Health Systems	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.67
17	Nonproliferation: Fissile Materiel	0	0	1	0	1	-1	0	0	0	0.11
18	Nonproliferation: Hague Code	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.56
19	Regional Security: Darfur	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
20	Counter-Terrorism: Transport Security	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.22
21	Counter-Terrorism: FATF	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.78
22	Trade	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.56
23	Global Partnership	0	0	1	0	-1	1	0	1	0	0.22
	2007 Final Compliance Average	0.65	0.57	0.57	0.17	0.30	0.30	0.70	0.91	0.48	0.52
	2007 Interim Compliance Average	0.22	0.17	0.48	0.13	0.04	0.17	0.61	0.78	0.39	0.33
	2007 Interim Compliance Change	+0.43	+0.40	+0.11	+0.04	+0.26	+0.13	+0.09	+0.13	+0.09	+0.19
	2006 Final Compliance Average	0.60	0.40	0.55	0.05	0.40	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.47

Appendix C: Japan's Built-In Agenda

Multiyear Commitments Due in 2008 (4)

2004-2: To ensure that polio does not reemerge, we will work to ensure the full integration of necessary measures in national health strategies and structures in the post-eradication period through 2008. (*Polio*)

2005-10: We welcome Japan's offer to receive a report at the G8 Summit in 2008. (*Gleneagles Dialogue: Climate Change*)

2006-43: We urgently call for mobilization of financial support and will continue to work collectively and with bilateral and multilateral donors to close the funding gap for 2007-2008, and will continue to work with others towards securing the resources necessary to finish the program and declare our planet polio-free in the near future. (*Polio*)

2006-96: We have instructed our relevant ministers to continue the dialogue on climate change, clean energy and sustainable development and report its outcomes to the G8 summit in 2008. (*Climate Change*).

2008 Remit Mandates (5)

2007-22: The progress on these pilot plans will be reviewed by the G8 in 2008 (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: IPP*)

2007-30: [To maintain the momentum of that groundbreaking achievement, we] will prepare national reports, with the assistance of the IEA, evaluating G8 member states' efforts to adhere to those principles, for delivery at the 2008 G8 summit (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: Climate change, energy efficiency and energy security*)

2007-55: We will report on the progress achieved in the areas mentioned above at the G8 Summit in 2008 (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: Adapting to Climate Change*)

2007-63: [To this end, we will] report on progress in the policies and measures on energy efficiency outlined below at the G8 summit in 2008 (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: Energy Efficiency*)

2007-141: The G8 Summit in Japan in 2008 will receive an interim report on the progress made and at the G8 Summit in Italy in 2009 a final report on the outcomes of the Dialogue Process will be presented (*Growth and Responsibility in Africa; Issue-area: Heiligendamm Process*)

Appendix D: Japan's Planned Agenda

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, World Economic Forum, January 26, 2008

World Economy

A1. Global Economy

Downward turn in global economy

(Avoid pessimism, add urgency, coordinated action, domestic responses)

A2. Financial Markets 21st century style crisis

Sub-prime mortgage problem in the U.S.

(swift response, nip credit crunches from diminished capitalization)

Causes of financial turbulence and medium and long term responses

(Advance G7 finance ministers actions)

A3. Reform Japanese Economy

(Advance Market Liberalization)

(Foreign direct investment)

(Trade)

(Financial and capital market liberalization)

A4. Energy: "Surge of petroleum prices to record levels"

Climate Change: "Climate change is top priority"

B1. Post-Kyoto Framework

Targets and Timetables (IPCC): peak 10-20 yrs, cut 50%+ by 2050

(All major emitters participate)

(Fair and equitable emissions target)

(Bottom-up sector approach to energy efficiency per Japan's national target)

(Base year reviewed)

B2. International Economic Co-operation

Technology Transfer

Energy Efficiency (global target of +30% by 2020)

Assistance to developing countries (Cool Earth partnership of \$10 bn)

Adaptation assistance

(Multilateral Fund: Japan, U.S., UK ask others)

B3. Innovation: Development and Diffusion

Technology development: clean coal, rooftop solar, Green IT

International Framework for collaboration with IEA etc.

(Shift Japan to a low carbon society)

(Cool Earth Promotion Program)

Development and Africa: Poverty and the MDGs

C1. Health

Safe motherhood and health of children under five

Human resources in health

(Framework for healthcare system with participation of all)

C2. Water

Effective management of water supply and access

C3. Education

Dakar Education for All goals

(vocational training, secondary and higher education)

C4. Economic Growth

(blueprint for regional wide infrastructure development)

Trade and investment

Agricultural productivity

Peace-building: (African peacekeeping centres to boost Africa's peacekeeping capacity)

Security

D1. Terrorism

D2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

G8 System

E1. Fulfilling existing commitments

E2. Participatory approach: government, business, civil society, academia

Note: Japan's goals, proposals and initiatives are in parentheses.

Appendix E: Japan's Actual Agenda, July 6, 2008

World Economy

- a. Energy Security
- b. Growth, Inflation and Finance
- c. Investment Protectionism
- d. Intellectual Property Rights
- e. Corruption, Corporate Social Responsibility, Natural Resource Management
- f. Trade

Climate Change and Environment

- a. Science (Endorse IPCC, signal urgency)
- b. Beyond Kyoto Framework (by 2009, effective, inclusive, binding)
- c. Technology
- d. Forests, Sinks and Biodiversity
- e. Sectoral Approach
- f. Targets: Medium term; Long Term
- g. Technology Transfer
- h. Adaptation (Fund)
- i. Linkages (to Africa, Development, Food, Health)
- j. Negotiation Forum (UN, Gleneagles Dialogue extension, MEM role)
- k. Biodiversity
- l. Sustainable Growth, Climate Change, Energy Efficiency
- m. Natural Disasters

Development and Africa

- a. Food Security
- b. Health
- c. Water
- d. Education
- e. Africa's G8 Partnership
- f. Development and the Millennium Development Goals

Political-Security

- a. Terrorism
- b. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
- c. Nuclear Safety
- d. Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
- e. North Korea
- f. Afghanistan
- g. Iran
- h. Zimbabwe
- i. The Middle East, Iraq and Lebanon
- j. Haiti
- k. Kosovo
- l. Tibet
- m. Myanmar

Summit Reform

- a. Accountability and Compliance Monitoring
- b. Major Economies Meeting
- c. Gleneagles Dialogue
- d. Heiligendamm Process
- e. Civil Society: Junior Eight

Appendix F: Sherpa and Ministerial Meetings

Ministerial Meetings, 1975-2008

Year	Total Mtgs	Total Mins	Finance	Foreign	Energy	Trade	Environment	Labour	Terrorism/Justice	Development	Glen-eagles	Science & Tech	Agri-culture	G20 Finance
1975	1			1		0						0		0
1976	1			1		0						0		0
1977	1			1		0						0		0
1978	1			1		0						0		0
1979	2			1	1	0						0		0
1980	1			1		0						0		0
1981	2			1		1 ^a						0		0
1982	3			1		2						0		0
1983	3			1		2						0		0
1984	6			2		4						0		0
1985	4			2		2						0		0
1986	3		1			2						0		0
1987	5		4			1						0		0
1988	4		2			2						0		0
1989	4		2			2						0		0
1990	5		3			2						0		0
1991	5		4			1						0		0
1992	7		3			2	2					0		0
1993	4		1	1		2	0					0		0
1994	4		1			1	1	1				0		0
1995	7		2	1		2	1		1			0		0
1996	9		3	1		2	1	1	1			0		0
1997	10		4	1		1	1	1	2			0		0
1998	10		5	2	1	1	1	1	2			0		0
1999	10		4			1	1	1	2			0		1
2000	9		4	1		0	1	1	1			0		1
2001	8		3	1		0	1		2			0		1
2002	11		4	2	1	0	1		1	1		0		1
2003	10		4	1		0	1	1	1	1		0		1
2004	9		4	2		0			2			0		1
2005	14		4	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	0		1
2006	11		4	1	1	0	1	1	1		1	0		1
2007	12		4	2		0	1	1	1	1	1	0		1
2008	14	10	4	2	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1		1
Total			73	32	6	33	16	11	20	5	4	1		9

Notes:

Trade: refers to the trade quadrilateral.

Total mtgs = number of ministerial meetings held during the summit year.

Total mins = Number of ministerial forums that met at least once during the summit year.

^aThe US, EC, and Japan met the margins of the July 1981 G7 summit in Ottawa to discuss a proposal that their trade ministers should regularly hold informal TRILATERAL meetings. After this, the Canadians lobbied to be included in the process. Quad officials also met, often on the margins of other meetings. All information comes from Professor Cohn at Simon Fraser University.

G20 Finance: The G20 finance ministers meeting was created in 1999. The 2008 meeting is on November 8-9, 2008.

The health ministers also met once in 2006.

B. Sherpa/FASS Meetings

-Sherpas on January 10 in Tokyo

-Sherpas in early April

-FASS May 8-9

-FASS early June

-Sherpas and FASS June 23-25 in Toyako

Ministerial Meetings

- Finance: February 9, Tokyo, April 11, Washington, D. C. and June 13-14, Osaka
- Development: April 5-6, Tokyo
- Labour: May 11-13, Niigata
- Environment: May 24-26, Kobe
- Justice and Home Affairs: June 11-13, Tokyo
- Energy: June 7-8, Amori
- Science and Technology: June 15, Okinawa
- Foreign Affairs: June 26-27, Kyoto
- G20 Environment and Energy Ministers (Gleneagles Dialogue): March 14-16, Chiba
- Tokyo International Conference on African Development IV: May 28-30, Yokohama¹⁸

Official Meetings

- G8 Health Experts: February 14-15, April 9-10 and June 11-12
- International Experts Meeting on Illegal Logging (second round), March 3-4, Tokyo

¹⁸ The Tokyo International Conference on African Development is not an actual G8 institution, but happened to coincide with the summit hosted by Japan in 2008.

Appendix G: Lead-Up Summitry

	USA	JAP	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	CAN	RUS	EU	G8 + EU	CHI	IND	BRA	MEX	SA	O5	Total
USA	-	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	11	1		1	2		4	15
JAP	2	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	2				1	3	10
GER	1	1	-				1	2		5	1		1	1		3	8
UK	1	1		-			1			3	1					1	4
FRA	1	1			-		1			3							3
ITA	1	1				-	1			3					1	1	4
CAN	3	1	1	1	1	1	-			7			2			2	9
RUS	2	1	2					-		5	1					1	6
EU	1	1							-	2			1			1	3
G8 + EU	11	9	5	3	3	3	8	5	2	48	6		2	6	2	16	64
CHI	1	2	1	1				1		6	-						6
IND												-					
BRA	1		1							2			-				2
MEX	2		1				2		1	6				-			6
SA		1			1					2					-		2
O5	4	3	3	1	1		2	1	1	16							16
Total	15	10	8	4	4	3	9	6	3	64	6		2	6	2	16	80

Notes: O5 = Outreach Five. Includes leaders bilateral and trilateral meetings that occurred after the G8 summit in June 2007 and before the G8 Summit in July 2008 and excludes plurilateral summits (Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, September 2007; Association of South-East Asian Nations Plus Three, January 2008; Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, November 2007; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 2008) or other such plurilateral meetings such as the East Asian Summit or La Francophonie.

During Summit

Fukuda (Japan) and **Merkel (Germany)** in Japan on July 7.
Fukuda (Japan) and **Brown (Britain)** in Japan on July 7.
Fukuda (Japan) and **Mbeki (South Africa)** in Japan on July 7.
Fukuda (Japan) and **Boutefilka (Algeria)** in Japan on July 7.
Fukuda (Japan) and **Yar'Adua (Nigeria)** in Japan on July 7.
Medvedev (Russia) and **Bush (US)** in Japan on July 7.
Medvedev (Russia) and **Merkel (Germany)** in Japan on July 7.
Medvedev (Russia) and **Sarkozy (France)** in Japan on July 7.
Medvedev (Russia) and **Brown (Britain)** in Japan on July 7.
Rudd (Australia) is planning a separate bilateral visit to **Japan (Fukuda)** after July 7th.
Fukuda (Japan) and **Medvedev (Russia)** in Japan on July 8.
Berlusconi (Italy) and **Medvedev (Russia)** in Japan on July 8.
Bush (US) and **Merkel (Germany)** in Japan on July 8.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Singh (India)** on July 8.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Lula (Brazil)** on July 8.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Calderon (Mexico)** on July 8.
Hu (China), **Lula (Brazil)**, **Singh (India)**, **Calderon (Mexico)** and **Mbeki (South Africa)** on July 8.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Medvedev (Russia)** in Japan on July 9.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Bush (US)** in Japan on July 9.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Rudd (Australia)** in Japan on July 9.
Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Yudhoyono (Indonesia)** in Japan on July 9.
Bush (US) and **Singh (India)** in Japan on July 9.
Medvedev (Russia), **Bush (US)** and **Myung-bak (South Korea)** in Japan on July 9.
Calderon (Mexico) and **Fukuda (Japan)** on July 9.
Medvedev (Russia) and **Hu (China)** in Japan on July 9.
Medvedev (Russia) and **da Silva (Brazil)** in Japan on July 9.
Medvedev (Russia) and **Singh (India)** in Japan on July 9.

Medvedev (Russia) and *Myung-bak (South Korea)* on July 9.

Harper (Canada) and *Singh (India)* in Japan on July 9.

Harper (Canada) and *Hu (China)* in Japan on July 9.

Harper (Canada) and *da Silva (Brazil)* on July 9.

Singh (India) to meet with *Hu (China)*, **Medvedev (Russia)**, **Bush (US)**, *Calderon (Mexico)*, *Myung-bak (South Korea)*, *Yudhoyono (Indonesia)*, **Fukuda (Japan)** and *Rudd (Australia)* on the sidelines of the G8 summit.

Australia (*Rudd*) will visit Indonesia (*Yudhoyono*) (around the summit, perhaps during).

After Summit

Harper (Canada) to **Fukuda (Japan)** on July 10.

Lula da Silva (Brazil) to *Yudhoyono (Indonesia)* after the summit (before July 12).

Putin (Russia) with **Bush (US)** in Beijing in August on the sidelines of the Olympics.

There is a scheduled trilateral meeting in the fall between **Japan**, South Korea and *China*.

Medvedev (Russia) will meet with *Sarkozy (France)* at the Russia-EU summit in France in November.

Mbeki (South Africa) and *Hu (China)* later this year.

Appendix H: 2008 G8 Summit Grades

John Kirton, July 9, 2008

	Hokkaido	Previous Peak
Overall	B+ (78%)	A (1978)
Climate change and environment	A	A+ (1979)
Major Economies Meeting	B	
World economy and energy	C-	A (1975, 1978, 1979)
Development and Africa	A-	A (2005)
Food security	B+	
Political issues	B-	
Zimbabwe	A-	
Counterterrorism	C+	
Reform	B+	
Prime Minister Fukuda as chair	A (85%)	

Graded by John Kirton according to the Putnam-Bayne framework, with added emphasis on declared presidency priorities and the core democratic mission of the G8.

Appendix I: Domestic Political Management – Communiqué Compliments

Compiled by Laura Sunderland, Jenilee Guebert and Judith Huigens, July 9, 2008

I-1 Communiqué Compliments, 1975-2008

Year	Total	USA	JAP	CAN	RUS	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	EU
1975	2	1	0	0	-	0	0	1	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
1977	1	1	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
1978	1	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	1
1979	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
1981	1	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	1
1982	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
1983	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0
1984	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1985	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1986	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1987	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1988	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1989	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1990	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1991	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1992	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1993	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1994	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1995	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1996	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1997	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1998	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
1999	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2000	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2001	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2002	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2003	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2004	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2005	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2006	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC
2007	12	2	1	1	2	2	2	1	0	1
2008	8	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Total	25	5	3	1	3	3	3	3	0	3
Average	2.27	0.45	0.27	0.09	1.5	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.00	0.27

I-2 Communiqué Compliments, 2008

	Total	USA	JAP	CAN	RUS	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	EU
World Economy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Climate Change	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Development & Africa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Food Security	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
International Institutions	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Political Issues	7	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0	1
Counter-Terrorism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	8	1	2	0	1	1	1	1	0	1

I-3 Public Opinion Approval Change, Pre-Post Summit

Yr	USA	JAP	CAN	RUS	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	EU
----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	-----	-----	----

	B	A	D	B	A	D	B	A	D	B	A	D	B	A	D	B	A	D	B	A	D	B	A	D
75	47	45	-2	34	28	-5	-	-	-															
76	72	63	-9	31	32	1																		
77	43	40	-3	28	30	2																		
78	29	32	3	19	21	2																		
79	32	31	-1	38	39	1																		
80				21	38	17 ¹⁹																		
	58	60	2																					
81	44	41	-3	36	40	4																		
82	41	45	4	30	26	-4																		
83	54	52	-2	39	43	4																		
84	56	55	-1	48	47	1																		
85	63	68	5	56	56	0																		
86	48	53	5	56	55	-1																		
87	51	51	0	30	34	4																		
88	70	69	-1	45	43	-2																		
89				23	38	15 ²⁰																		
	65	74	9																					
90	77	71	-6	56	60	4																		
91	40	32	-8	41	42	1																		
92	46	41	-5	35	38	3																		
93	51	42	-9	-	-	-																		
94	47	46	-1	37	37	0																		
95	54	56	2	34	40	6																		
96	58	52	-6	50	50	0																		
97	57	58	1	44	50	6																		
98	69	60	-9	24	27	3																		
99	60	57	-3	39	43	4																		
00	59	57	-2	27	27	0																		
01	57	55	-2	77	69	-8																		
02				40	44	4	4																	
	73	76	3				6																	
03								4																
	64	62	-2				2																	
04								4																
	49	48	-1				1																	
05																								
	46	49	3					5	3	-														
								6	5	2														
06								0	0	1														
	40	37	-3					6	6	0														
								0	0	0														
07									6															
	32	32	0						3															
08																								
	30	30 ²¹	0																					
Average	52.4	51.18	-1.24	38.44	40.63	2.30	5.075	4.75	-1.05															

Notes:
B=Before Summit
A=After Summit
D=Difference between before and after the summit.
Japanese data for 1975-2002 comes from Hugo Dobson (2005).

¹⁹ Change in administration from Ōhira to Suzuki.
²⁰ Change in administration from Uno to Toshiki.
²¹ Average of two polls, 28 and 31.

Appendix J: Deliberation

J-1 Deliberation, 1975-2008

Year	Words	Paragraphs	Documents
1975	1,129	16	1
1976	1,624	26	1
1977	2,669	11	1
1978	2,999	51	2
1979	2,102	37	2
1980	3,996	51	5
1981	3,165	52	4
1982	1,796	19	3
1983	2,156	40	2
1984	3,261	40	5
1985	3,127	33	2
1986	3,582	31	4
1987	5,064	65	7
1988	4,872	60	3
1989	7,125	108	5
1990	7,601	124	4
1991	8,099	139	5
1992	7,528	123	4
1993	3,398	65	3
1994	4,123	82	2
1995	7,250	86	3
1996	15,289	164	5
1997	12,994	141	4
1998	6,092	57	5
1999	10,019	111	4
2000	13,596	145	5
2001	6,214	77	7
2002	11,959	114	7
2003	16,889	78	6
2004	38,517	99	12
2005	22,286	177	13
2006	30,695	224	13
2007	25,857	248	8
2008	16,842	137	6
Total	313,915	3,031	163
Average	9,233	89.15	4.79

Notes: This does not include Actions Plans, Appendices, Annexes, Reports, Ministerial Statements or other such documents released at the G8 summits, unless they are included in the actual leaders declarations. It includes declarations and/or statements released by the G8 leaders as well as the Chair's Summary.

J-2 Deliberation, 2008

	Words	Paragraphs	Statements
Declaration of leaders meeting of major economies on energy security and climate change	1,558	12	1
World Economy	2,107	21	1a
Environment and Climate Change	2,622	18	1b
Development and Africa	3,211	16	1c
G8 Leaders Statement on Global Food Security	1,355	10	1
G8 Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism	722	9	1
G8 Leaders Statement on Zimbabwe	324	6	1
International Institutions	397	1	1d
Political Issues	1,576	15	1e
Chair's summary	2,970	29	1
Total	16,842	137	6*

*Statements marked with a lower case letter are continuations of the same document released separately at the summit.

Appendix K: Direction Setting — Democratic Principles Declared

Compiled by John Kirton and Jenilee Guebert, July 31, 2008

Year	Democratic Principles
2008	33
2007	47

Notes: “Democratic Principles” are defined as statements of fact, causation and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty (but not to social advance), with openness, democracy and individual liberty understood exclusively in a political and civil context rather than economic ones, and consistent with the seminal normative structure of the G8 summit as articulated in the communiqués of the first few summits. These democratic principles are consistent with those identified in the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Dr. Robert Dahl’s definition. The unit of analysis is the sentence. The following list of inclusions and exclusions can help to identify the list of democratic principles present in the G8 Leader’s statements and/or documents: **Inclusions:** the promotion and/or acknowledgement of an individuals’ right to self-determination (freely determine their own status-political, social, religious, etc.); the promotion and/or acknowledgement of constitutional principles, such as separation of church and state; access to the legal rights/courts, independent judiciary; all individuals are given equal consideration; the values of openness and tolerance; rule of law; the promotion and/or acknowledgement of ‘good’ governance; freedom of the media, speech, association; free and fair elections, competitive multiparty system. **Exclusions:** open markets, trade, investment, free trade; good corporate governance (economic advance); good water governance (social advance); property rights; social advance, such as access to health care; peace; corruption or anti-corruption.

Appendix L: Decision Making — Commitments

Compiled by Jenilee M. Guebert, July 22, 2008

A. 2008 G8 Commitments by Document and Issue

<i>Document</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>% of Issue</i>	<i>% of Doc</i>	<i>% Overall</i>
<i>Overall Documents</i>	296	NA	NA	100
<i>Communiqué</i>	206	NA	100	69.59
<u>World Economy</u>	49	100	23.79	16.55
Macroeconomics	7	14.29	3.40	2.36
Finance	6	12.24	2.91	2.03
Trade	8	16.33	3.88	2.70
Microeconomics	5	10.20	2.43	1.69
Energy	13	26.53	6.31	4.39
Information&Communication	4	8.16	1.94	1.35
Good governance	5	10.20	2.43	1.69
Heiligendamm Process	1	2.04	0.49	0.34
<u>Environment and Climate Change</u>	46	100	22.33	15.54
Climate change	26	56.52	12.62	8.78
Energy	9	19.57	4.37	3.04
Environment	1	2.17	0.49	0.34
Forests	3	6.52	1.46	1.01
Biodiversity	2	4.35	1.00	0.68
Recycling	4	8.70	1.94	1.35
Sustainable development	1	2.17	0.49	0.34
<u>Development and Africa</u>	70	100	33.98	23.65
Development	27	38.57	13.11	9.12
Health	19	27.14	9.22	6.42
Human rights	2	2.86	0.97	0.68
Water	6	8.57	2.91	2.03
Sanitation	1	1.43	0.49	0.34
Education	9	12.86	4.37	3.04
Energy	1	1.43	0.49	0.34
Food and Agriculture	1	1.43	0.49	0.34
Trade	3	4.29	1.46	1.01
Conflict Prevention	1	1.43	0.49	0.34
<u>International Institutions</u>	1	100	0.49	0.34
Institutional reform	1	100	0.49	0.34
<u>Political Issues</u>	40	100	19.42	13.51
Nonproliferation	19	47.50	9.22	6.42
Regional security	2	5.00	0.97	.068

Nuclear safety	3	7.50	1.46	1.01
Crime	5	12.50	2.43	1.69
Peace support	10	25.00	4.85	3.38
Human rights	1	2.50	0.49	0.34
<i>Food Security Statement</i>	29	NA	100	9.80
Food and Agriculture	26	89.66	12.62	8.78
Trade	1	3.45	0.49	0.34
Energy	1	3.45	0.49	0.34
Climate change	1	3.45	0.49	0.34
<i>Counter-Terrorism Statement</i>	13	NA	100	4.39
Terrorism	12	NA	92.31	4.05
Regional Security	1	NA	7.69	0.34
<i>Zimbabwe Statement</i>	2	NA	100	0.68
Regional Security	2	NA	100	0.68
<i>MEM Statement</i>	30	NA	100	10.14
Climate change	27	NA	90.00	9.12
Energy	2	NA	6.67	0.68
Forests	1	NA	3.33	0.34
<i>Chair's Summary</i>	16	NA	100	5.41
Finance	1	NA	6.25	0.34
Regional Security	13	NA	81.25	4.39
Peace Support	1	NA	6.25	0.34
Non proliferation	1	NA	6.25	0.34

B. 2008 G8 Summit Commitments by Issue

Issue	Number of Commitments	% Commitments
Macroeconomics	7	2.36
Microeconomics	5	1.69
Finance	7	2.36
Trade	12	4.05
Information & Communication	4	1.35
Good governance	5	1.69
Heiligendamm Process	1	0.34
Energy	26	8.78
Climate Change	54	18.24
Environment	1	0.34
Forests	4	1.35
Biodiversity	2	0.68
Recycling	4	1.35
Sustainable Development	1	0.34
Development	27	9.12
Health	19	6.42

Human Rights	3	1.01
Water	6	2.03
Sanitation	1	0.34
Education	9	3.04
Food and Agriculture	27	9.12
Conflict Prevention	1	0.34
Institutional Reform	1	0.34
Nonproliferation	20	6.76
Regional Security	18	6.08
Nuclear Safety	3	1.01
Crime	5	1.69
Peace Support	11	3.72
Terrorism	12	4.05

Notes:

For the Chair's Summary only new commitments are included. All reiterated commitments that appear in the G8 Communiqué and/or separate documents issued by the G8 leaders are excluded.

Historic Highs: 2007 (329), 2006 (317), 2004 (245).

The communiqué released by the G5 contained 37 commitments. They also made 18 requests for action directed to the G8 leaders.

Appendix M: Decision Making — Money Mobilized

Compiled by Kathryn Kotris, July 9, 2008

Development and Africa

40. We are firmly committed to working to fulfill our commitments on ODA made at Gleneagles, and reaffirmed at Heiligendamm, including increasing, compared to 2004, with other donors, ODA to Africa by US \$25 billion a year by 2010.
46. We reiterate our commitment to continue efforts, to work towards the goals of providing at least a projected US \$60 billion over 5 years, to fight infectious diseases and strengthen health.
49. We remain committed to Education for All (EFA) and the international agencies which implement it and support the efforts of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI) for universal primary education. We, along with other donors, will continue efforts to mobilize bilateral and multilateral resources to meet the shortfalls of FTI — endorsed countries estimated by the FTI Secretariat at around US \$1 billion for 2008, while supporting the improvement of its effectiveness through an external evaluation.
51. (g) facilitation of free and open trade through the multilateral trade system with due consideration of the African situation, effective implementation of the financial commitments regarding spending on Aid for Trade including trade related technical assistance, made at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference, which we expect to increase to US \$4 billion including the support for marketing of African products.

Global Food Security

2. We are determined to take all possible measures in a coordinated manner, and since January 2008 have committed, for short, medium and long-term purposes, over US \$10 billion to support food aid, nutrition interventions, social protection activities and measures to increase agricultural output in affected countries.

Environment and Climate Change

31. We are committed to increasing investment in both basic and applied environmental and clean energy technology research and development (R & D), and the promotion of commercialization including through direct government funding and fiscal measures to encourage private sector investment. In this respect, G8 members have so far pledged over the next several years over US \$10 billion annually in direct government-funded R & D.
32. While the main sources of finance will be the private sector, public resources are essential to help the poorest and to leverage private resources, notably by financing incremental costs and can be very effective in inducing emissions reduction when national policies provide incentives for low carbon investment. In this regard, we welcome and support the establishment of the Climate Investment Funds

(CIF) including the Clean Technology Fund (CTF) and the Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), administered by the World Bank. G8 members have thus far pledged approximately US \$6 billion as an ODA contribution to the funds and welcome commitments from other donors.

Summary

ODA: US \$25 billion a year deployed to Africa by 2010
US \$60 billion to fight infectious diseases
US \$1 billion Fast Track Initiative (FTI)
US \$4 billion Aid for Trade

TOTAL ODA: US \$90 billion

Food Security: US \$10 billion mobilized since January 2008

Climate Change: US \$10 billion for R & D
US \$6 billion CTF and SCF

Total Climate Change: US \$16 billion

TOTAL FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: US \$116 billion

US \$60 billion to fight infectious diseases

Appendix N: Delivery — Compliance Catalysts
JG080729

N-1 1975-2008 Commitment Catalysts that Count

Year	Total	1 Year Timetable	Core Int. Organization	Priority Placement	Past Reference Ministerial	Other Int. Organization
1975						
1976						
1977						
1978						
2008						

N-2 2008 Commitment Catalysts that Count

Document	Name	Total	1 Year Timetable	Core Int. Organization	Priority Placement	Past Reference Ministerial	Other Int. Organization
World Economy							
<i>Global Growth</i>							
2008-1	Growth	0					
2008-2	FSF recommendations	2			1		1
2008-3	FSF recommendations	2				1	1
2008-4	Global imbalances	0					
2008-5	Exchange Rates	0					
2008-6	Growth	1			1		
2008-7	Globalization	0					
2008-8	IO Cooperation	2		1			1
<i>Trade and Investment</i>		0					
2008-9	Protectionist pressures	1			1		
2008-10	Ag and Services	2		1	1		
2008-11	Ministerial meet	0					
2008-12	Conference on Trade	0					
2008-13	Overall balance	0					
2008-14	Open Investment	0					
2008-15	Limited foreign investment restrictions	0					
2008-16	Liberalization standards	0					
2008-17	CSR	0					
2008-18	Good governance	0					
2008-19	Business summit	0					
<i>Energy Security</i>		0					
2008-20	Global energy security principles	0					

2008-21	National reports	2	1	1		
2008-22	Causes for benefit of all	1			1	
2008-23	Energy supply	1			1	
2008-24	Medium Term Energy investment	0			0	
2008-25	Investment environments	1			1	
2008-26	Energy efficiency and diversity	1			1	
2008-27	Dialogue and partnership	0				
2008-28	London meeting	2	1		1	
2008-29	Energy forum	1			1	
2008-30	Reporting and collection of data	0				
2008-31	JODI	0				
2008-32	IEF and JODI	1				1
2008-33	Transparent commodity markets	1			1	
<i>Raw Materials</i>		0				
2008-34	EITI	0				
2008-35	International standards and codes	0				
2008-36	Conflict and post-conflict	2		1		1
2008-37	WTO Rules	1		1		
<i>Protection of IPR</i>		0				
2008-38	Anti-counterfeiting and piracy	1		1		
2008-39	Legal framework	1	1			
2008-40	Cooperation and best practices	0				
2008-41	Software	0				
2008-42	Patent law treaty	0				
<i>Corruption</i>		0				
2008-43	UNCAC	0				
2008-44	Corruption	1				1
2008-45	UNCAC	0				
2008-46	OECD convention on combating bribery	1				1
2008-47	Accountability report	1	1			
<i>Abuses of the Financial System</i>		0				
2008-48	OECD standards of transparency	1				1

<i>Heiligendamm Process</i>		0					
2008-49	HP report	2	1		1		
World Economy Total		32	5	6	12	1	8
Environment and Climate Change							
<i>Climate Change</i>							
2008-50	Combating CC	2	1	1			
2008-51	Avoid consequences of CC	0					
2008-52	50% reduction x 2050	1			1		
2008-53	Innovative technologies	1			1		
2008-54	Mid-term goals	0					
2008-55	Mid-term goals	1			1		
2008-56	Mitigation plans	1			1		
2008-57	Post-2012 regime	2	1		1		
2008-58	GHG in Aviation and Maritime	1					1
2008-59	Energy Efficiency	1		1			
2008-60	Clean energy	0					
2008-61	GBEP	1					1
2008-62	R&D Biofuels	1			1		
2008-63	Nuclear 3S	1			1		
2008-64	Nuclear3s & IAEA	1		1			
2008-65	CC and development	0					
2008-66	Developing country plans	1			1		
2008-67	Developing countries CC	0					
2008-68	Developing countries adaptation policies	0					
2008-69	UNFCCC adaptation fund	0					
2008-70	Technologies and partnerships	2		1	1		
2008-71	Clean energy technologies	0					
2008-72	CCS Projects	0					
2008-73	Clean technology R&D	1			1		
2008-74	R&D	2	1		1		
2008-75	Commercializing technologies	0					
2008-76	Earth observation data	1		1			
2008-77	Developing countries earth observation	0					
2008-78	Finance & Investment	1					1
2008-79	Climate funds	0					
2008-80	Funds	1					1
2008-81	Market Mechanisms	1			1		
2008-82	Environmental tariffs	2			1		1

2008-83	Trade barriers	0					
2008-84	CC Mitigation	0					
2008-85	CEIF	2			1		1
<i>Forests</i>		0					
2008-86	G8 Forest Experts' Report	0					
2008-87	Forest Management	0					
2008-88	Forest fires	0					
<i>Biodiversity</i>		0					
2008-89	Reduce biodiversity loss	1				1	
2008-90	Co-benefits approach	0					
<i>3R</i>		0					
2008-91	3R Action Plan	1				1	
2008-92	Optimize resource cycles	1					1
2008-93	Reduce trade barriers	1					1
2008-94	Basel Convention	0					
<i>Education for Sustainable</i>		0					
2008-95	Education	1					1
<i>Environment and Climate Change Total</i>		33	3	5	14	2	9
<i>Development and Africa</i>							
<i>Development</i>							
2008-96	MDGs	0					
2008-97	ODA	1			1		
2008-98	Replenishment of resources	1					1
2008-99	Good governance	0					
2008-100	MDG Synergies	1			1		
2008-101	Participatory approach	0					
2008-102	Global health priorities	0					
2008-103	Human Security	0					
2008-104	Gender equality	0					
2008-105	Effective aid	0					
2008-106	Private investments	0					
2008-107	Sources for development	0					
2008-108	Conference for Financing on	0					
2008-109	MDG attainment	1					1
2008-110	Global Remittances working group	0					
<i>Health</i>		0					

2008-111	Multiples diseases	0					
2008-112	Infectious diseases	2			1		1
2008-113	Follow-up mechanism	0					
2008-114	Health systems and diseases	0					
2008-115	Health MDGs	0					
2008-116	Health systems	0					
2008-117	Child healthcare	0					
2008-118	Infectious disease	1			1		
2008-119	Health workers	0					
2008-120	Health workforce coverage	2		1	1		
2008-121	Health workforce plans	1					1
2008-122	Child mortality and maternal health	0					
2008-123	Reproductive health	0					
2008-124	HIV/AIDS and Reproductive health	0					
2008-125	Malaria	1			1		
2008-126	Polio	1					1
2008-127	Tropical diseases	2		1	1		
2008-128	HIV travel restrictions	0					
<i>Water and Sanitation</i>		0					
2008-129	Water cycle management	1			1		
2008-130	Implementation strategy	0					
2008-131	Good water governance	1					1
2008-132	Adequate water supplies	0					
2008-133	Access to sanitation	0					
2008-134	African ministers' council on water and	1					1
2008-135	Water and sanitation sector	1					1
<i>Education</i>		0					
2008-136	Universal primary education	0					
2008-137	Teachers in Africa	0					
2008-138	Teaching	0					
2008-139	Teacher training	0					
2008-140	School health and feeding	0					
2008-141	EFA&FTI	1					1
2008-142	FTI	1			1		
2008-143	Marginalized groups	0					
2008-144	FTI	2	1		1		
2008-145	Private Investment	0					
2008-146	G8 Action Plan for private sector led growth	1					1

2008-147	Sustainable growth	0					
2008-148	Business environment	0					
2008-149	Revenue generation capacity	0					
2008-150	Infrastructure	0					
2008-151	Electricity	0					
2008-152	Agriculture	1					1
2008-153	Free and open trade	0					
2008-154	Aid for trade	1		1			
2008-155	Duty-free quota free market access	1					1
2008-156	Integrated Market	0					
2008-157	Companies contribution to poverty reduction	0					
2008-158	Good governance	0					
2008-159	Views of African Partners	1			1		
2008-160	Reporting on progress	0					
<i>Peace and Security</i>		0					
2008-161	Peace and security	1					1
<i>Expanding Partnership for</i>		0					
2008-162	Aid dialogues	0					
2008-163	Good governance	0					
2008-164	Sustainable lending practices	0					
2008-165	Cooperation between developed and	0					
Development and Africa total		28	1	3	11	1	12
International Institutions							
2008-166	International Institutions	1		1			
International Institutions total		1	0	1	0	0	0
Political Issues							
<i>Non Proliferation</i>							
2008-167	WMDs	0					
2008-168	Regional proliferation	0					
2008-169	Six-party process	1			1		
2008-170	Iran	1			1		
2008-171	NPT conference	0					
2008-172	NPT	0					
2008-173	NPT	0					
2008-174	Fissile material cut-off treaty	0					
2008-175	Biological and chemical weapons	0					
2008-176	HCOC	0					

2008-177	Work together	0					
2008-178	1540 committee	1					1
2008-179	Export controls	0					
2008-180	IAEA	1		1			
2008-181	IAEA Code of conduct	1		1			
2008-182	Global Initiative	1					1
2008-183	Global partnership	0					
2008-184	Global partnership	0					
2008-185	NPT	0					
2008-186	3S standards	0					
2008-187	Nuclear fuel cycle	0					
2008-188	Nuclear safety	1	1				
2008-189	NSG	0					
2008-190	Enrichment	1	1				
<i>Transnational Organized Crime</i>		0					
2008-191	TOC	0					
2008-192	Cooperation on TOC	0					
2008-193	Information and communication	0					
2008-194	UNODC	1					1
2008-195	UN convention against TOC	0					
<i>Peacekeeping/Peace building</i>		0					
2008-196	Assistance	0					
2008-197	Peacekeeping and peacebuilding	0					
2008-198	Comprehensive approach	0					
2008-199	Security of civilians	0					
2008-200	Peacebuilding commission	1					1
2008-201	Cooperation with regional organizations	1					1
2008-202	Interlinking areas	0					
2008-203	Peace troops	0					
2008-204	Train police	0					
2008-205	Civilian roles in peacebuilding	0					
2008-206	Experts progress report	2	1				1
<i>Political Issues Total</i>		13	3	2	2	0	6
<i>Communiqué Total</i>		107	12	17	39	4	35
G8 Leaders Statement on Global							
2008-207	Food crisis	0					
2008-208	\$10bn for aid	1			1		
2008-209	Urgent needs	0					

2008-210	Seeds and fertilizer	1					1
2008-211	Local agriculture	0					
2008-212	Global partnership on agriculture and food	1					1
2008-213	FAO effectiveness	1		1			
2008-214	Rome food summit	1		1			
2008-215	Doha Round	0					
2008-216	WTO	1					1
2008-217	Min. volatility	0					
2008-218	Food stocks	0					
2008-219	Stock management	0					
2008-220	CAADP	2			1		1
2008-221	6.2% growth	1					1
2008-222	Agricultural R&D	1					1
2008-223	Infrastructure	0					
2008-224	Warming systems	0					
2008-225	Financial institutions	1					1
2008-226	Technologies	0					
2008-227	Seed varieties	0					
2008-228	Biofuels	0					
2008-229	2nd gen. biofuels	1			1		
2008-230	Biofuels	0					
2008-231	Good governance	0					
2008-232	Paris declaration	1					1
2008-233	G8 experts group	2			1		1
2008-234	Agriculture ministers	1			1		
2008-235	Food security	1			1		
G8 Leaders Statement on Global Food Security Total		17	0	2	6	0	9
G8 Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism							
2008-236	Counter terrorism	0					
2008-237	Countering terrorism	0					
2008-238	G8 experts	0					
2008-239	UN's role	1					1
2008-240	UN measures	1					1
2008-241	International conventions and	0					
2008-242	G8-UN Cooperation	1		1			
2008-243	Regional cooperation	1					1

2008-244	CBRN terrorism	0					
2008-245	Terrorist financing	0					
2008-246	FATF	0					
2008-247	Preventing radicalization	0					
2008-248	Afghanistan-Pakistan border	2			1		1
G8 Leaders Statement on Counter-Terrorism		6	0	1	1	0	4
G8 Leaders Statement on Zimbabwe		0					
2008-249	Monitoring situation	2		1			1
2008-250	Financial measures	1		1			
G8 Leaders Statement on Zimbabwe Total		3	0	2	0	0	1
Declaration of Leader Meeting of Major Economies							
2008-251	Interlinked challenges	0					
2008-252	Article 2	0					
2008-253	Bali Action Plan	0					
2008-254	Long-term emissions reduction	0					
2008-255	Deep cuts	0					
2008-256	Long-term emissions reduction	0					
2008-257	Long-term goal	0					
2008-258	Common principles	0					
2008-259	Mid-term goals	0					
2008-260	Mitigation actions	0					
2008-261	Capacity-building	0					
2008-262	Reduce emissions and increase sinks	0					
2008-263	Methodological issues	0					
2008-264	Forest-related governance	0					
2008-265	Convention commitments	0					
2008-266	Technologies	0					
2008-267	Investment in R&D	0					
2008-268	CCS	0					
2008-269	Technology roadmaps	0					
2008-270	Mitigation technology	0					
2008-271	Mitigation information	0					
2008-272	National technology	0					
2008-273	Sectoral approaches	0					
2008-274	Trade and CC	1					1

2008-275	Mitigation and adaptation	0					
2008-276	Nairobi Work Programme	0					
2008-277	Energy efficiency	0					
2008-278	Montreal Protocol	0					
2008-279	GHG Measurement	0					
2008-280	Copenhagen conference	2	1	1			
Declaration of Leader Meeting of Major Economies on Energy security and Climate Change Total		3	1	1	0	0	1
Chair's Summary							
<i>World Economy</i>							
2008-281	IMF Reform	2		1	1		
<i>Political Issues</i>		0					
2008-282	Iran enrichment	2		1	1		
2008-283	Afghanistan	1			1		
2008-284	Afghanistan UNAMA	2		1	1		
2008-285	Assistance to Afghanistan	2			1		1
2008-286	Afghanistan Aid effectiveness	1			1		
2008-287	Afghanistan Elections	1			1		
2008-288	Iraeili-Palestinian negotiations	2	1		1		
2008-289	assistance to Palestinians	1			1		
2008-290	UNAMID	2			1		1
2008-291	Darfur UNSCR	2		1	1		
2008-292	2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and	2			1		1
2008-293	UN support in Myanmar	2		1	1		
2008-294	Progress in Myanmar	1			1		
2008-295	Nigerian security	1			1		
2008-296	Indian nonproliferation	2		1	1		
Chair's Summary Total		26	1	6	16	0	3
Overall TOTAL		162	14	29	62	4	53

For World Economy, Core International Organization=International Monetary Fund (IMF); For Trade, Core International Organization=World Trade Organization; For Energy, Core International Organization=International Energy Agency; For Customs and IPR, Core International Organization=World Customs Organization; For Development, Core International Organization=World Bank; For Health, Core International Organization=World Health Organization; For Nuclear Power and proliferation, Core International Organization is the International Atomic Energy Agency; For Food and Agriculture, Core International Organization is Food and Agriculture Organization; For Terrorism, Core International Organization is Counter-Terrorism Committee/Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate; For Regional Situations such as Zimbabwe, Core International Organization is United Nations.

Appendix O: Development of Global Governance

Compiled by Jenilee Guebert, July 9, 2008

G8 Institutionalization

Leaders Level Institutionalization

MEM leader meeting in 2008 endorsed

MEM to meet again at G8 2009 lengthened to full day, put in middle of summit

HP/O5 Outreach 2009

Ministerial Meetings Called (1)

Agriculture

Ministerial Institutions Directed

Finance Ministers Action Plan on Climate Change

Gleneagles Dialogue

Official Bodies Created (4)

G8 Experts Group to monitor implementation on food security

Climate Investment Funds (CIF; CTF; SCF)

Energy forum

Global Remittances Working Group

Official Body Tasked

Financial Action Task Force

Global Bioenergy Partnership

GEOSS Accelerated

G8 Forest Expert Report on Illegal Logging

G8 Experts on International Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime

Civil Society

G8 Business Summit

Other

International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC)

Nuclear Energy Infrastructure Initiative (endorse)

International Initiative Roadmaps for Innovative Technology

Clean Energy Investment Framework (CEIF) [agreed at Gleneagles]

International Forest Monitoring Network

London Energy Meeting (follow-up on Jeddah)

Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (new international legal framework)

G8 Technical Assistance Pilot Plans and Joint Outreach Programs Launched

Note: Results of all leaders documents including MEM (Major Economies Meeting).

Appendix P: Vulnerabilities and Shocks

Shocks Activating Vulnerabilities

Security: None (but Afghanistan spike)

- a. War: 0 new invasions, Afghanistan/Iraq (deaths= 914; 2007 = 1,394)
- b. Terrorism: 1 new attack on G8 countries (Chechnya, June 6 dead)
- c. Nuclear Explosions: 0 explosions (Iran, North Korea, Syria)
- d. Civil Strife: 0 deaths in G8 countries from food and fuel riots

Energy: Demand-Driven Price Shock Primarily (cf. 1979, 1990-1, 2006)

- a. Supply: 2 Nigeria, Iraq, (China Marshall Islands) v. Saudi Arabia
- b. Price: +100% to over \$145.00 July 3=historic highs
- c. Transit: 0 blackouts, pipeline closures in G8

Ecology: Small Scale Chronic Shocks in US & Japan

- a. Nuclear: 1 Japan (0 deaths)
- b. Oil/Gas: 0 tanker accidents, pipeline spills
- c. Water: 3 Myanmar's May 3 (78,000), Philippines June, U.S. June, China June
- d. Heat (Air): 0
- e. Land: 1 G8 Japan June (12), 1 China's Sichuan May 12 (80,000)
- f. Wildlife: 0

Finance: Defaults only at Company Level

- a. Country: 0 (Iceland, Argentina)
- b. City: 1 California
- c. Company: 3 UK's Northern Rock, U.S.'s Bear Sterns, Germany
- d. Stock Market: 7 down, one up (Canada)

Health: None (cf SARS 2003)

- a. Infectious: 0 infecting G8 countries (West Nile in U.S.)
- c. Chronic: 0 spikes in G8 countries

Food: Price Shock Only as in 1970s

- a. Supply: 0 famines in G8, several in countries outside
- b. Price: Food inflation, wheat, rice etc. hit historic highs
- c. Safety: U.S. tomatoes, Japan eels

P1-G8 Combat Deaths

Compiled by Julie Feinberg, August 20, 2008

Year	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
2003	298	46	-	-	12	-	-	-	3	359
2004	793	25	3	-	4	-	-	-	3	828
2005	1,171	33	-	2	2	-	2	-	1	1,211
2006	1,039	35	9	5	4	-	3	-	23	1,118
2007	1,215	105	50	2	3	-	3	-	16	1,394
2008	766	72	30	13	4	-	3	-	39	927
Total	5,282	316	92	22	29	-	11	-	85	5,837

From Heiligendamm 2007 to Hokkaido 2008

	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
June 07	108	9	4						4	125
July 07	83	14	6	1					3	107
Aug 07	101	6	4	1	3				2	117
Sep 07	73	9	1	1	1				6	91
Oct 07	48	2					1			51
Nov 07	48	4	2				1		5	60
Dec 07	29	3	1							33
Jan 08	47	1	4						2	52
Feb 08	30	3					1		2	36
Mar 08	47	3	3						6	59
Apr 08	57	2	1						4	64
May 08	37	3	1						2	43
June 08	56	13	2						3	74
July 08	2		1							3
August 08	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	10
Total 07/08	766	72	30	13	4		3		39	927

From St. Petersburg 2006 to Heiligendamm 2007

	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
July 06	49	1	3						3	56
Aug 06	74	9	8	2					1	94
Sep 06	82	22	10				3			114
Oct 06	116	3	5						1	125
Nov 06	77	6	2							85
Dec 06	113	5								118
Jan 07	83	5								88
Feb 07	95	5							1	100
Mar 07	86	5	1		3					95
Apr 07	112	13	9						2	136

May 07	137	8	2						4	151
June 07	108	9	4						4	125
July 07	83	14	6							103
Total 06/07	1,215	105	50	2	3		3		16	1,394

From Gleneagles Summit 2005 to St. Petersburg 2006

	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
June 05	101	1			2					104
July 05	56	3								59
Aug 05	100				1				17	118
Sep 05	60	3		1						64
Oct 05	103	3					1		1	108
Nov 05	87	1	1		1				2	92
Dec 05	71								1	72
Jan 06	63	2								65
Feb 06	72	3								75
Mar 06	38	2	3	1						44
Apr 06	77	1	4							82
May 06	80	9	1	3			2			95
June 06	79	3							1	83
July 06	52	4							1	57
Total 05/06	1,039	35	9	5	4		3		23	1,118

From Sea Island Summit 2004 to Gleneagles 2005

	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
June 04	47	1								48
July 04	56	1								57
Aug 04	69	4								73
Sep 04	84	3								87
Oct 04	69	2		2			1			74
Nov 04	144	4								148
Dec 04	73	1								74
Jan 05	109	10								119
Feb 05	59						1			60
Mar 05	45	1								46
Apr 05	70								1	71
May 05	80	2								82
June 05	105	1			2					108
July 05	56	3								59
Total 04/05	1,171	33		2	2		2		1	1,211

From Evian-les-bains Summit 2003 to Sea Island 2004

	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
June 03	33	6			4					43
July 03	50	1								51
Aug 03	39	6								45
Sep 03	33	1								34
Oct 03	48	1	2							51
Nov 03	88	1							2	91
Dec 03	41									41
Jan 04	56	6	1							63
Feb 04	21	1								22
Mar 04	55									55
Apr 04	138									138
May 04	88								1	89
June 04	47	1								48
July 04	56	1								57
Total 03/04	793	25	3		4				3	828

From Kananaskis Summit 2002 to Evian-les-bains 2003

	US	UK	Canada	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Russia	EU	Total
June 02	3									3
July 02										
Aug 02	1	2								3
Sep 02	1									1
Oct 02	6									6
Nov 02	1									1
Dec 02	1				7					8
Jan 03	4									4
Feb 03	7									7
Mar 03	77	27							3	107
Apr 03	76	6								82
May 03	38	4			1					43
June 03	33	6			4					43
July 03	50	1								51
Total 02/03	298	46			12				3	359

Tables report the combined casualties of the G8 and EU countries in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are the only combat theatres involving the G8.

Source: www.icasualties.org

P-2 G8 Terrorist Deaths

Compiled by Julie Feinberg, July 9, 2008.

	US	UK	Russia	France	Germany	Canada	Japan	Italy	EU	Total
2000										
2001										
2002										
2003										
2004			438 ^a							438
2005	40	61 ^b	30							131
2006	19	3								22
2007	19	4								23
2008										

Notes: Listed by calendar year.

a. Includes approximately 300 Beslan deaths.

b. July bombing in London responsible for most of these statistics.

P-3 Energy Shocks, 1975–2008: Annual Average Domestic Crude Oil Prices

Year	Nominal	Real 2007	Change in Nominal		Change in Real	
1975	\$12.21	\$47.63	+2.86	+31%	+7.86	+20%
1976	\$13.10	\$48.36	+0.89	+07%	+0.73	+02%
1977	\$14.40	\$49.88	+1.30	+10%	+1.52	+03%
1978	\$14.95	\$48.17	+0.55	+04%	-1.71	-03%
1979	\$25.10	\$71.96	+10.15	+68%	+23.79	+49%
1980	\$37.42	\$95.50	+12.65	+49%	+23.54	+33%
1981	\$35.75	\$82.70	-1.67	-04%	-12.8	-13%
1982	\$31.83	\$69.33	-3.92	-11%	-13.37	-16%
1983	\$29.08	\$61.34	-2.75	-09%	-7.99	-12%
1984	\$28.75	\$58.14	-0.33	-01%	-3.20	-05%
1985	\$26.92	\$52.56	-1.83	-06%	-5.58	-10%
1986	\$14.44	\$27.66	-12.48	-46%	-24.90	-47%
1987	\$17.75	\$32.81	+3.31	+23%	+5.15	+19%
1988	\$14.87	\$26.45	-2.88	-16%	-6.36	-19%
1989	\$18.33	\$31.05	+3.46	+23%	+4.60	+17%
1990	\$23.19	\$37.17	+4.86	+27%	+6.12	+20%
1991	\$20.20	\$31.15	-2.99	-13%	-6.02	-16%
1992	\$19.25	\$28.81	-0.95	-05%	-2.34	-08%
1993	\$16.75	\$24.36	-2.50	-13%	-4.45	-15%
1994	\$15.66	\$22.19	-1.09	-07%	-2.17	-09%
1995	\$16.75	\$23.09	+1.09	+07%	+0.90	-04%
1996	\$20.46	\$27.38	+3.71	+22%	+4.29	+19%
1997	\$18.64	\$24.40	-1.82	-09%	-2.98	-11%
1998	\$11.91	\$15.35	-6.73	-37%	-9.05	-37%
1999	\$16.56	\$20.83	+4.65	+39%	+5.48	+36%
2000	\$27.39	\$33.39	+10.83	+65%	+12.56	+60%
2001	\$23.00	\$27.29	-4.39	-16%	-6.10	-18%
2002	\$22.81	\$26.61	-0.19	-01%	-0.68	-02%
2003	\$27.69	\$31.62	+4.88	+21%	+5.01	+19%
2004	\$37.66	\$41.84	+9.97	+36%	+10.22	+32%
2005	\$50.04	\$53.77	+12.38	+33%	+11.93	+29%
2006	\$58.30	\$60.73	+8.26	+17%	+6.96	+13%
2007	\$64.20	\$64.92	+5.90	+10%	+4.19	+07%
2008*	\$144.10	\$144.10	+79.90	+124%	+79.18	+122%

Notes:

Prices are adjusted for Inflation to December 2007 prices using the CPI-U. Although the monthly peak occurred in December 1979 the annual peak did not occur until 1980 since the average of all the monthly prices was higher in 1980. Inflation adjusted prices reached all-time low in 1998 (lower than the price in 1946). Prices are based on historical free market (stripper) prices of Illinois Crude as presented by IOGA. Price controlled prices would be lower during the 1970s but resulted in gas lines and shortages. 2008* refers to the closing price of oil on July 4, 2008.

P-4 Energy Shocks, 2007–08: Oil Prices from Heiligendamm to Hokkaido

Y/M/D	Nominal	Change in Nominal (since last summit)	
07/07/09	72.19	–	–
07/08/14	72.38	+0.19	+0.03%
07/09/07	76.70	+4.32	+06%
07/09/20	83.32	+6.62	+09%
07/09/28	81.66	–1.66	–02%
07/10/15	86.13	+4.47	+06%
07/10/31	94.53	+8.40	+10%
07/11/15	93.43	–1.10	–01%
07/11/23	98.18	+4.75	+05%
07/11/30	88.71	–9.47	–10%
07/12/17	90.63	+1.92	+02%
07/12/27	96.62	+5.99	+07%
07/12/31	95.98	–0.64	–01%
08/01/02	99.62	+3.64	+04%
08/01/15	91.90	–7.72	–08%
08/01/31	91.75	–0.15	–0.02%
08/02/15	95.50	+3.75	+04%
08/02/28	102.59	+7.09	+07%
08/02/29	101.84	–0.75	–01%
08/03/13	110.33	+8.49	+08%
08/03/17	105.68	–4.65	–04%
08/03/31	101.58	–4.10	–04%
08/04/15	113.79	+12.21	+12%
08/04/22	119.37	+5.58	+05%
08/04/30	113.46	–5.91	+05%
08/05/15	124.12	+10.66	+09%
08/05/21	133.17	+9.05	+07%
08/05/30	127.35	–5.82	–04%
08/06/02	127.76	+0.41	+0.03%
08/06/27	140.00		
08/07/04	144.10		

Notes: 2008 monthly prices come from NYMEX. On May 21, 2008, world oil prices reached a new nominal and real closing high of US\$ 133.17. On July 3, they reach a new intraday (\$145.85) and closing day high (\$145.29).

Appendix Q: Global Multilateral Organizational Capacity and Control
JG080721

	Start	Staff	Budget, Sbn, 2007 ²²	What it Does
World Bank	1944	10,000	26.8 ²³	Technical advice, loans, credits and grants for poverty reduction and the improvement of living standards
IMF	1944	2,500	0.9	Monitoring countries' economic and financial development, lending for balance-of-payment difficulties
UN	1945	63,450	15.0	To prevent state-war and promote human rights & humanitarianism
UNICEF	1946	7,200	3.1	Assistance to children and mothers in developing countries
UNHCR	1950	6,300	1.0	Protection of refugees and resolution of refugee problems
WFP	1963	10,600	3.0 ²⁴	Food for emergency needs and economic development
UNCTAD	1964	450	0.1	Integration of developing countries into the world economy
UNDP	1965	5,300	4.9	Helps countries in their economic development
UNEP	1972	890	0.2	Promotes the environment
Specialized Agencies				
WMO	1873	NA	NA	Provides a framework for international cooperation on weather, climate and the water cycle for development of meteorology and operational hydrology
ILO	1919	1,900	0.5	Rights at work and employment opportunities
UNESCO	1942	2,100	0.7	Education, science, culture, communication
ICAO	1944	621	0.22 ²⁵	Development of international civil aviation
FAO	1945	3,600	0.8	Food, agriculture, forestry, fisheries
IMO	1948	300	0.10 ²⁶	Comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping
WHO	1948	8,000	1.6	Health
UNIDO	1966	650	0.2	Promotes growth in small and medium enterprises
IFAD	1977	430	0.1	Rural poverty
Related Organizations				
WTO (GATT)	1948	625	0.2	Trade agreements, negotiations and disputes
IAEA	1957	2,200	0.3	Scientific and technical co-operation in nuclear technologies; nuclear safeguards and inspections
Other organizations				
BIS	1930	578	0.2	Co-operation among central banks, monetary and financial stability
OECD	1961	2,500	0.5	Analyses and forecasts economic development, research on trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxation

Source: *The Economist* (2008).

²² Regular budget and extra budgetary resources.

²³ FY07: administrative budget \$2.1 bn, commitment \$24.7bn.

²⁴ 2005.

²⁵ ICAO 2005-2007 triennium budgetary estimate.

²⁶ IMO 2006-2007 budgetary assessment. Converted from British pounds into U.S. dollars using current exchange rates (July 21, 2008).

Appendix R: Capability

R-1 Relative Capability of G8 Members, 1975–2007

Country	1975	1977	1998	2007
United States	4,311.20	4,750.50	9,066.90	11,545.79
Japan	2,231.53	2,422.10	4,541.27	5,201.02
Germany	1,088.44	1,179.00	1,801.93	2,075.09
United Kingdom	797.44	839.18	1,349.44	1,719.96
France	1,088.44	1,179.00	1,801.93	2,075.09
Italy	594.71	648.48	1,026.11	1,159.75
Canada		373.24	652.00	864.80
Russia			221.90	398.60
Austria			179.34	217.08
Belgium		136.58	123.03	255.52
Bulgaria				17.57
Cyprus				11.42
Czech Republic				74.20
Denmark		105.81	149.92	179.58
Estonia				9.43
Finland			110.35	144.75
Greece			103.77	146.46
Hungary				60.69
Ireland		29.02	77.35	133.21
Latvia				13.56
Lithuania				18.69
Luxembourg		6.45	16.67	24.94
Malta				4.09
Netherlands		210.45	344.46	404.03
Poland				218.23
Portugal			99.21	111.60
Romania				55.21
Slovakia				28.97
Slovenia				24.44
Spain			517.21	719.45
Sweden			219.58	283.82
World Total	14,652.70	15,970.10	29,576.35	38,866.14
G8 Total	10,111.76	11,391.50	20,461.48	25,040.10
G8 as % of World Total	69.01	71.33	69.18	64.43
G8 + EU Total	N/A	11,879.81	22,402.37	28,197.04
G8 + EU as % of World Total	N/A	74.39	75.74	72.55

Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Baseline Countries (in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars)

Notes: The data includes the countries of the European Union represented for the year in question.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, adjusted to 2000 base and estimated and projected values developed by the Economic Research Service.

R-2 Currency Value Changes, 2007–08: Price Watch Indicators

Date	C\$/US\$	US\$/¥	£/US\$	€/US\$	Gold	Oil
2007						
070709M	95.27	121.3404	2.0166	1.3622	662.50	72.19
070814T	93.75	118.1909	2.0003	1.3581	679.70	72.38
070907F	94.83	113.5688	2.0284	1.3772	709.70	76.70
071001M	100.87	115.9216	2.0434	1.4227	754.10	80.24
071101R	105.12	114.8887	2.0819	1.4434	793.70	93.49
071203M	99.98	110.4427	2.0657	1.4657	794.70	89.31
2008:						
080102W	100.73	109.7149	1.9823	1.4738	860.00	99.62
080201F	100.60	106.3081	1.9686	1.4850	913.50	88.96
080303M	101.18	103.5568	1.9848	1.5194	984.20	102.45
080401T	97.88	101.7839	1.9772	1.5614	887.80	100.98
080501R	98.11	104.0437	1.9749	1.5458	850.90	112.52
2008 June:						
080602M	99.88	104.4108	1.9665	1.5549	897.00	127.76
080616M	97.80	108.1903	1.9635	1.5472	886.30	134.61
080617T	98.32	108.0288	1.9542	1.5518	886.90	134.01
080618W	98.22	108.0628	1.9569	1.5500	893.50	136.68
080619R	98.50	107.9595	1.9730	1.5501	904.20	131.93
080620F	98.31	107.4356	1.9734	1.5625	903.70	134.62
080623M	98.40	107.8875	1.9608	1.5491	887.20	136.74
080624T	98.86	107.7725	1.9707	1.5592	891.60	137.00
080626R	98.71	107.2935	1.9872	1.5737	915.10	139.64
080627F	98.95	106.2894	1.9938	1.5748	931.30	140.21
2008 July						
080702W	98.69	105.8744	1.9924	1.5869	946.50	143.57
080703R	98.16	106.8020	1.9825	1.5709	933.60	145.29
080704F	98.04	106.6926	1.9831	1.5710	930.75	144.10
080707M	98.15				928.80	141.37
080708T	98.13				923.30	136.04
080709W	98.90				928.60	136.05

Notes:

In January 2002, Canada needed CA\$1.61 to buy US\$1.

On October 1, 2007, the Canadian dollar reached 1.009 intraday, the highest level since November 22, 1976.

Appendix S: Common Purpose

S-1 Freedom House Scores for Participants in the 2008 G8 Summit

Country	PR	CL	Status	Electoral Process	Political Pluralism and Participation	Functioning of Government	Freedom of Expression and Belief	Associational and Organization Rights	Rule of Law	Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights
Algeria	6	5	NF	4	4	3	7	6	5	7
Australia	1	1	F	12	15	12	16	12	14	15
Brazil	2	2	F	11	14	6	15	10	8	12
Canada	1	1	F	12	16	12	16	12	15	16
China	7	6	NF	0	1	1	4	2	2	7
Egypt	7	6	NF	1	4	2	6	2	5	7
Ethiopia	5	5	PF	5	5	4	7	3	4	6
France	1	1	F	12	15	11	15	12	14	15
Germany	1	1	F	12	15	12	15	12	15	15
Ghana	1	2	F	12	15	10	14	11	12	10
India	2	3	F	11	14	9	13	10	9	10
Indonesia	2	3	F	11	13	6	10	9	7	9
Italy	1	1	F	12	15	11	15	12	12	15
Japan	1	2	F	12	15	10	13	10	15	13
Mexico	2	2	F	10	14	9	14	10	8	11
Nigeria	4	4	PF	6	9	6	11	7	5	7
Russia	6	5	NF	3	5	3	8	4	4	7
Senegal	2	3	F	11	13	9	15	10	9	9
S. Africa	2	2	F	12	14	9	15	12	12	12
Korea	1	2	F	11	15	10	14	12	13	12
Tanzania	4	3	PF	6	10	6	11	7	10	8
UK	1	1	F	12	16	12	16	12	15	15
U.S.	1	1	F	11	16	11	16	10	14	15
G8 Average	1.625	1.625	7F, 1NF	10.75	14.125	10.25	14.25	10.5	13	13.875
O5 Average	3	3	4F, 1NF	8.8	11.4	6.8	12.2	8.8	7.8	10.4
Other Participants Average	2.889	3.111		8.667	11	7.333	11.667	8.556	8.778	9.222
Non-G8 members Average	2.929	3.071		8.714	11.143	7.143	11.857	8.643	8.429	9.643
Difference between G8 and others	-1.30	-1.45		2.036	2.982	3.107	2.393	1.857	4.571	4.232

Notes:

All numbers come from Freedom House and further information about countries and the methodology can be found at www.freedomhouse.org

PR=Political Rights; CL=Civil Liberties; Statuses: F=Free; PF=Partly Free; NF=Not Free

*Represents number of free countries over the total number of countries measured.

S-2 Reference to Democratic Principles in Host's Davos Speech

Appendix T: Political Control, Capital, Capacity

	Total	Average	USA	JAP	GER	BRI	FRA	ITA	CAN	RUS	EU
LE	20 years and 8 months	2 years and 3-4 months	Nov 2004	Sept 2005	Sept 2005	May 2005	April May 2007	April 2008	Jan 2006	March 2008	
NE			Nov 2008	Fall 2008	Sept 2009	Mid 2010	2012	2013	Oct 2009	Mar 2012	N/A
EC											
L C	U H			No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	N/A	
	L H			Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
IC											
SC			No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	
LA			29%	25%	68%	32%	37%	53%	32%	73%	
PA			39%	26%	36%	25%	45.5%	52%	33%	30%	
PP											
IP											
GP											
SE											
ME											
PE											
IE											

LE = Last Election (Year/Month). X=the election must be held by that year. *=according to predictions.

NE = Next Election (rounded in years). If there are no set elections than the last possible date is applied.

EC = Executive Control

LC = Legislative Control

IC = Institutional Control

SC = Sub-federal Unit Control (States/Provinces)

LA = Leaders approval

PA = Governing Party Approval

PP = G8 Partner Country Popularity in G8 Countries

IP = G8 Priority Issues Popularity

GP = G8 Institution's Popularity in Member Countries

SE = Summit experience

ME = Ministerial experience

PE = Professional experience

IE = International experience

Appendix U: Constricted, Controlled, Continuous Participation

	LOC	DAY	OUD	OUN	DIV	CIN
1975	LOD	(6+Min)	0	0		
1976	LOD	(7+Min)	0	0		
1977	CAP	(8+Min)	0	0		
1978	CAP					
1979	CAP					
1980	PRO					
1981	LOD					
1982	CAP					
1983	LOD					
1984	CAP					
1985	CAP					
1986	CAP					
1987	PRO					
1988	PRO					
1989	CAP		0 (Dinner)			
1990	PRO					
1991	CAP					
1992	PRO					
1993	CAP					
1994	PRO					
1995	PRO					
1996	PRO					
1997	PRO					
1998	PRO					
1999	PRO					
2000	LOD					
2001	PRO					
2002	LOD					
2003	LOD					
2004	LOD					
2005	LOD					
2006	PRO					
2007	LOD	(9)				
2008	LOD	1 (9)				

LOC = Location: LOD = Lodge, CAP = Capital City, PRO = Provincial City
 DAY = Days alone at Eight
 OUD = Days with Outreach Participants
 OUN = Number of Outreach Participants in Summit
 DIV = Diversity of Outreach Country Participants
 CIN = Number of Civil Society Persons Around Summit Site

Appendix V: Membership and Participation

V-1 G8 Membership in G8 Summit

1975 United States, Britain, France, Germany
 1975 Japan, Italy
 1976 Canada
 1977 European Community 9
 1981 European Community 10
 1982 Belgium*
 1986 European Community 12, Netherlands*
 1995 European Union 15
 2002 Spain*
 2003 Greece*
 2004 European Union 25, Ireland*
 2006 Finland*
 2007 European Union 27

Total Countries = 32 Members: 9 + 6 European Union outside presidencies + European Union 27

V-2 European Representation Outside of the G8 Euro-Members: Britain, France, Germany and Italy

Year	Country	Total Summits
1982	Belgium	1
1986	Netherlands	1
1987	Belgium	2
1991	Netherlands	2
1993	Belgium	3
1997	Netherlands	3
2001	Belgium	4
2002	Spain	1
2003	Greece	1
2004	Netherlands	4
2006	Finland	1

Notes: For all years that do not appear here, the EU presidency was represented by Germany, Britain, France or Italy.

V-3 European Union Members

Year	Number of EU Members	Additions
1973	9	Britain, Ireland, Denmark
1981	10	Greece
1986	12	Spain, Portugal
1995	15	Finland, Austria, Sweden
2004	25	Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia
2007	27	Romania, Bulgaria

V-4 European Union Legal Policy Competence

Compiled by Judith Huigens, July 9, 2008

	Trade	Of all	Env	Eco & Mon	Foreign Policy	Sec & Def	Empl & Social	Edu	Cust, Union	Immig Policy	Just	Cult	Dev, HR & Aid	Health	Consum Prot & Food Saf	Fish	Int Agr	Welf State	Corp Tax Rates	Agric	Space	Energy
1975	4 ^a		0	0	0	0	0	0	4 ^b	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 ^c	0	0	0	4 ^d	3 ^e	3 ^f
1976	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1977	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1978	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1979	4 ^g		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1980	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1981	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1982	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1983	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1984	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1985	4		0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1986	4 ^h		3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1987	4		3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1988	4		3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1989	4		3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1990	4		3	4 ⁱ	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1991	4		3	4	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	4	3	3
1992	4 ^j		3	4	0	0	0	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1993	4		3	4	2	0	0	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1994	4		3	4	2	0	0	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1995	4		3	4	2	0	0	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1996	4		3	4	2	0	0	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	0	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1997	4		3	4	2	0	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1998	4		3	4	2	0	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
1999	4		3	4 ^k	2	0	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2000	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2001	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2002	4		3	4 ^l	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2003	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2004	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2005	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2006	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2007	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3
2008	4		3	4	2	2	2	2	4	3	3	2	2	0	3	4	4	0	0	4	3	3

Notes:

0=no competence, 5 = full compliance.

2=complementary competence (Action by EU limited to supporting, encouraging, and coordinating action taken by Members.Union-level action cannot supersede competence of Member)

3=shared competence (provisions by Union may limit action of Member States, and the Members cannot implement measures that are not in accordance with the Union's provisions)

4=full competence

a. Since 1957, common ext tariff since 1968.

b. Since 1968.

c. Since 1970.

d. Since 1960.

e. Since 1975: ESA.

f. Since 1951.

g. EMS.

h. SEA.

i. Start development.

j. Maastricht Treaty.

k. Implementation of the euro.

l. Introduction of the euro.

V-5 Participation of Multilateral Organizations in G8 Summits

		1996	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
UN	9	X	X ^a	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
World Bank	7	X	X ^a	X		X		X		X	X
IMF	4	X				X		X		X	X
WTO	4	X	X ^a	X				X			
IEA	3							X	X	X	X
African Union	3							X	X	X	
WHO	3		X ^a	X					X		
IAEA	1								X		
UNESCO	1								X		
OECD	1									X	X
CIS	1									X	
Total	11										

Note: Executive heads of secretariat/organization only. Excludes country chairs.

UN = United Nations; IMF = International Monetary Fund; IEA = International Energy Agency; WHO = World Health Organization; IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency; UNESCO = United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States

V-6 Participating Countries in G8 Summit

South Africa	9	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Nigeria	8	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
Algeria	8	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
Senegal	8	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
China	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
India	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Brazil	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Mexico	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Ghana	4					2004	2005		2007	2008
Egypt	2				2003				2007	
Ethiopia	2						2005			2008
Tanzania	2						2005			2008
Bangladesh	1		2001							
Mali	1		2001							
El Salvador	1		2001							
Morocco ^a	1				2003					
Saudi Arabia	1				2003					
Malaysia	1				2003					
Switzerland	1				2003					
Afghanistan	1					2004				
Bahrain	1					2004				
Iraq	1					2004				
Jordan	1					2004				
Turkey	1					2004				
Yemen	1					2004				
Uganda	1					2004				
Congo ^b	1							2006		
Kazakhstan ^c	1							2006		
Australia	1									2008
Indonesia	1									2008
South Korea	1									2008
Total ^d	35									

a. Representing the G77.

b. Representing the African Union.

c. Representing the Commonwealth of Independent States

d. Does not include outside presidencies of the European Union.

V-7 Outreach Participants: 2000-2008

Okinawa 2000 (4): (Average Experience = 1st) (Experience / Number = 0.25)

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (1)
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1)
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (1)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (1)

Genoa 2001 (4): (Average Experience = 2nd) (Experience / Number = 0.50)

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (2)
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2)
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (2)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (2)

Kananaskis 2002 (4): (Average Experience = 3rd) (Experience / Number = 0.75)

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (3)
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (3)
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (3)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (3)

Evian 2003 (13): (Average Experience = 1.8rst) (Experience / Number = 0.14)

Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (1)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (4)
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (4)
Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (4)
H.M. King Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Chair of the Group of 77 (1)
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (4)
Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States (1)
Pascal Couchepin, President of the Swiss Confederation (1)
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (1)
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (1)
Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (1)
Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia (1)
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (1)

Sea Island 2004 (12): (Average Experience = 2.3nd) (Experience / Number = 0.19)

Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan (1)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria (5)
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, King of Bahrain (1)
Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, President of Iraq (1)
Abdallah II, King of Jordan (1)
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey (1)
Ali Abdallah Salih, President of Yemen (1)
John Agyekum Kufuor, President of Ghana (1)
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria (5)
Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal (5)
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, President of South Africa (5)
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda (1)

Gleneagles 2005 (11): (Average Experience = 3.2rd) (Experience / Number = 0.29)

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (6)
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (2)
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (2)
Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1)
John Agyekum Kufuor, President of the Republic of Ghana (2)
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (1)
Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States (2)
Olusegun Obasanjo GCB, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (6)
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (6)
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa (6)
Benjamin William Mpkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania (1)

St. Petersburg 2006 (5): (Average Experience = 3.6rd) (Experience / Number = 0.72)

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (3)
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (3)
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States (3)
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa (7)
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (2)

Heiligendamm 2007 (10): (Average Experience = 4th) (Experience / Number = 0.40)

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil (4)
Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, Mexico (1)
Hu Jintao, China (4)
Thabo Mbeki, South Africa (8)
Manmohan Singh, India (3)
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, Egypt (2)
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria (7)
Umaru Yar'Adua, Nigeria (1)
Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal (7)
John A. Kufuor, Ghana (3)

Toyako 2008 (14): Average Experience = 3.7th) (Experience/Number=0.27)

Luic Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil (5)
Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, Mexico (2)
Hu Jintao, China (5)
Thabo Mbeki, South Africa (9)
Manmohan Singh, India (4)
Abdelaziz Boutefilka, Algeria (8)
Kevin Rudd, Australia (1)
Meles Zenawi, Ehtiopia (2)
John Agyekum Kufuor, Ghana (4)
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Indonesia (1)
Umaru Yar'Adua, Nigeria (2)
Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal (7)
Lee Myung-bak, South Korea (1)
Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete, Tanzania (1)

Notes:

In 2000, the invited participants met with G8 leaders just prior to the summit in Tokyo, rather than at the summit site in Okinawa itself.

In 1993, the Japanese invited the leader of Indonesia to Tokyo for a pre-summit meeting, where he met with the Japanese chair and US President Clinton, who flew in early for the event.

In 1989, the French President invited to a pre-summit meeting with him the leaders of the following countries: Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cyprus, Gabon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe

The number in brackets after each leader indicates the number of summits he or she attended, including the current one.

V-9 Civil Society Involvement in G8 Summit

- 1984 The Other Economic Summit conference near summit site
- 1988 G8 Research Group: Conferences, Website (1996-), Compliance Report (1996-)
- 1998 Jubilee 2000 ad hoc coalition meets Tony Blair as host during summit
- 2002 Forum International de Montréal starts global civil society-G8 sherpa meetings
- 2002 Legislative Lower House Speakers annual meeting starts
- 2005 Commission for Africa with multi-stakeholder membership
- 2005 Make Poverty History Campaign, Live 8 Concert engage 1 billion citizens
- 2005 Junior 8 (J8) secondary school students meet leaders during summit
- 2005 Religious Leaders Summit starts
- 2006 Civil 8 formed to advise Russian presidency
- 2006 Media news agencies form Moscow Club to meet with G8 minister annually
- 2007 G8 University Summit

Includes collective action by G8 bodies aimed at the G8 itself at the time and place of, or as part of the lead up to, of the summit itself. Excludes activity within member countries or lead up lobbying of host and member governments by international bodies representing business, labour, agriculture, etc.

Appendix W: Constricted Participation: The Physical Summit

Dimension	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Site	Resort	Resort	Resort	Resort	Resort	Resort	ProvCity	Resort	Resort
Length in days	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Length in hours	-	-	-	-	42	48	45	44	-
G8 leaders present	09	10	10	10	10	09	09	09	09
Early departures	00	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	00
Late departures	00	00	00	00	Funeral	01 (Koizumi)	00	00	00
Outside country leaders invited	04	04	04	13	13	12	05	11	15
Outside country leaders attending	04	04	04	13	11	11	05	11	14
Outside heads of IOs invited	04	04	01	03	00	06	07	07	05
Outside heads of IOs attending	04	04	01	03	00	06	07	07	05
On site bilateral	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	17	06	28	28	34
Sessions at eight	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	04	04	04	04	TBC
Hours alone at eight	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	10	06	11	14 (est)	TBC
Hours alone at eight for working sessions	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	09	06	11	10.5 (est)	TBC
Hours of social/ceremonial sessions	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	3	4	4	3.5	TBC
Sessions with outsiders	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	2	2	2	3	TBC
Hours with outsiders	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	5	6.25	4	4.75	TBC
Media accredited ^a	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	3100	3,051	3,107	4,700	4,000
Media attending ^b	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	1492	2,100	3,107	4,700	4,000
Total costs	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC		£90.9m	\$397m	£68m (73.7 mill GBP)	¥60 billion
Security costs	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	\$37 million	£618 million		€12.5 million (\$25 m)	¥30 billion
Economic benefits					\$1 billion				
Security personnel	20,000	18,700	6,800	15,000	20 000	10,000 est. police	-	17, 100	21,000
Civil society activists on site ^c	70,000	100,000-200,000	2,000-3,000	100,000	500	100,000s est.	300-600	100,000 est.	5,000est.
Number of protests								11	
Arrests ^d					15	358 ²⁷	200	138	
Property damage					0			3	
Personal injury					0	20		1, 008	
Deaths					0	0	0	0	0

Notes: Numbers are the most reliable and mean estimates of news accounts or, where possible, direct evidence from G8 officials. All costs are in nominal U.S. dollars at prevailing exchange rates. a. Number of media representatives who successfully completed the accreditation process. b. Number of media representatives who picked up their credentials. c. Includes those at the Summit, the international media centre and nearby major cities, and those taking part in protests and demonstrations and educational forums such as The Other Economic Summit. d. Includes those for minor charges such as blocking a highway or providing a false name. e. Hours: 2004 = 42 hours (from 1800 on 8 June to 1200 on 10 June), 2005 = 48 (from 1700 on 6 July to 1700 on 8 July), 2006 = 45 hours (1800 from 15 July 2006 to 1400 on 17 July).

²⁷ Roger Boyes (May 10, 2007), "Leftist terror groups 'to strike at G8,'" *The Times*.