

# Africa Partnership Forum Evaluation Report

*A Forum Puts Itself to the Test*

Ambassador Patrick Hayford

Mr Adolf Kloke-Lesch

Assisted by Christoph Hosang

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## Preface

The external evaluation of the Africa Partnership Forum (APF) was initiated by the membership of the Forum in 2012 and has been commissioned by the co-chairs of the Forum (2012: Belgium, Benin, Ethiopia, United States). Draft Terms of Reference (ToR) were developed in the run up to the 19<sup>th</sup> APF (Cotonou; 12/2012). In its Joint Statement the meeting welcomed the proposed evaluation in 2013 in the context of its 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The Forum tasked the Joint Evaluation Committee (JEC, composed of the co-chairs) to finalize the ToR on the basis of consensus among the various constituencies comprising the APF.

Due to the delay of the start of the evaluation and with a view to allowing for the widest possible process of consultation, the timetable of the evaluation has been revised by the JEC during the course of the evaluation (see final ToR in Annex 1).

The evaluation is financed from the respective budgets of the APF Support Unit and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), and managed by the JEC, with secretariat support from the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and the APF Support Unit. In January 2013 the composition of the JEC changed with the routine change of the co-chairs of the Forum (2013: Ethiopia, Norway, Senegal, United Kingdom).

By February 2013 the JEC had appointed us as the two independent external consultants (evaluators). In our respective previous capacities, both of us have attended a number of APF meetings. When we began our work in February 2013 we determined to jointly conduct the evaluation of the Forum in a spirit of true partnership and in close consultation with the members of the Forum and the JEC.

The 20<sup>th</sup> APF (London; 4/2013) provided us with the opportunity to deliver an oral interim report based on a background note and supported by a power-point-presentation (Hayford & Kloke-Lesch, 2013a, 2013b). The meeting's discussion on key issues provided very valuable perspectives for the evaluation. The Forum asked the co-chairs in its Joint Statement " ... to report to their respective constituencies when the final report had been received from the evaluators, with the aim to initiate a process of consultations with a view to building consensus among constituencies on the future of the Forum and its secretariat arrangement, and to report to its next meeting on the outcome" (APF, 2013, p. 1).

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Patrick Hayford

Adolf Kloke-Lesch

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**List of Abbreviations**

AEC	Africa Economic Conference
AfDB	African Development Bank
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
APF	Africa Partnership Forum
APR	G8 Africa Personal Representatives
ASC	ASEAN Standing Committee
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AU-PSC	African Union Peace and Security Council
BMENA	Broader Middle East and North Africa
BRICS	Group of five major non-G8 countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme
CIFF	Children's Investment Fund Foundation
CoDA	The Coalition for Dialogue in Africa
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DWG	G20 Development Working Group
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G20	A group of the world's 19 largest economies (plus the European Union)
G8	Group of eight of the world's eleven largest national economies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States (plus the European Union).
G8AAP	G8 Africa Action Plan
GCA	Global Coalition for Africa
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HSGIC	NEPAD Heads of State or Government Implementation Committee
HSGOC	NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JEC	Joint Evaluation Committee
JSSO	Joint Secretariat Support Office
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEF	Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate
MRDE	Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa
NAI	New African Initiative
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NEPAD 16	All African country APF members that do not belong to the group NEPAD 5 (+NEPAD SC Chair).
NEPAD 5 (+SC-Chair)	The five NEPAD founding countries South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal plus the current NEPAD Steering Committee (SC) Chair.
NEPAD SC	NEPAD Steering Committee
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency

OAU	Organization of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OECD 11	All OECD Members of the APF who are not part of the G8
PIDA	Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PR	Personal Representative of Heads of States or Governments
PRC	The Permanent Representatives' Committee of the African Union
REC	Regional Economic Community
SC-Chair (NEPAD)	NEPAD Steering Committee Chair
SDSN	United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDESA	The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	The United Nations Development Programme
UN HLP	United Nations High Level Panel on the Post 2015 development agenda
UNSC	The United Nations Security Council
UNSG	The Secretary-General of the United Nations
WEF	World Economic Forum

## Executive Summary

### *A Forum Puts Itself to the Test*

The Africa Partnership Forum (APF) is a unique intergovernmental arrangement, bringing together twice a year up to sixty senior political representatives of Africa and its main development partners. Established in 2003 in the context of the G8-Africa Partnership and reformed in 2009 the purpose was to catalyse and monitor action, make recommendations to leaders, and impact regional and global processes.

The aim of this evaluation of the Forum is to assess the overall effectiveness of the APF and its secretariat support and to make recommendations on the future.

As the APF emerged as an instrument of the G8-Africa Partnership the evaluation has to assess the Forum's role in this context, without reviewing this partnership at large. The evaluation aims to identify the approaches to strengthen the African voice in today's global governance architecture and to enhance the cooperation between Africa and its partners in pursuing shared objectives.

The evaluation combines an historical and structural analysis of the Forum, a contextualisation within the changing realities, and an assessment of the performance of the Forum. It draws on a document review, a survey questionnaire, and consultations with and beyond the core APF membership.

### *A Successful Forum Becoming Detached from a New World*

With the establishment of the APF, the institutional set-up of the G8-Africa Partnership comprised the triangle of the G8-Africa Summit Outreach, the NEPAD5/G8 Personal Representatives and the APF itself, all of which together served as drivers of a decade of political, economic and social progress in Africa. Many initiatives launched by this triangle are still effectively and positively impacting on the continent. Today, Africa and the world as a whole have changed in significant ways compared to twelve years ago.

Africa's economic growth rates have consistently been above the world average. Per capita incomes, human development, and infrastructure have improved. Yet, the proportion of the absolute poor in Africa's overall population remains exceptionally large and many countries are politically still fragile. With its growing population and its vast natural resources Africa is essential to the global future. The African Union (AU) is widely recognised as the pinnacle of Africa's politics, with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) fully integrated into it.

At the same time the world is witnessing an unprecedented shift of global economic power. G8 countries are losing their preeminent position and are expected to be challenged by the non-G8-G20 countries soon. African trade and external financial flows are shifting accordingly. The establishment of the G20 at leaders' level, the changing nature of the G8, and the emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) signify an ever more multipolar but less multilateral world.

Over the past decade Africa has remarkably broadened its strategic partnerships with other parts of the world. At the same time this proliferation and numerous other fora of dialogue have become a heavy burden on the administrative and diplomatic systems on all sides, but particularly to Africa.

The Rome Reform of the APF in 2009, having been aimed at better aligning the Forum to the changing realities of global and continental processes, did not move the Forum away from its path dependencies. Although incremental improvements have been implemented the overall relevance of the Forum declined further, mainly due to developments beyond its control.

The G8 mainstreamed African issues into their global agendas and Africa organised the issue-specific implementation of and international support to its development agenda. Although G8 members have significantly expanded their bilateral engagement with Africa, the G8-Africa Summit outreach, into which the APF was meant to feed, essentially ended. The G8/NEPAD Personal Representatives system has become dysfunctional. The composition of the Forum's membership has not been adapted to better mirror today's institutional, political and economic realities, neither on the African nor on its partners' side. Channels of interaction between the Forum and the G8- and G20 Sherpa systems have not been established. Presently, the APF cannot be described anymore as key and effective in terms of impacting global or regional processes.

The Forum itself has tried to better focus and align its agenda but has not been sufficiently effective in taking up contentious issues, in launching joint initiatives, and in arriving at forward-looking conclusions. The Forum has not engaged itself in an honest mutual review of commitments although the annual Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness in Africa (MRDE), produced on both sides of the partnership, provides an excellent starting point. The creeping decline of the level of attendance at Forums' meeting is rather a result than a cause of these developments.

On the other hand, the APF has established itself as a relatively efficient arrangement of bringing senior experts concerned with Africa together and hold high-level discussions, with a minimum of bureaucracy. The Forum is efficiently supported by the lean secretariat arrangements. Secretariats' preparation of meetings – including background documentation – has been commendable. The co-chairs function efficiently in their direct preparation and chairing of meetings. Yet, they have not developed sufficiently efficient mechanisms of inter-sessional work, forward planning and establishing links to key regional and global processes. The co-chairs have been supported, effectively as well as efficiently, by the secretariats on both sides, but run the risk of relying too much on them to the detriment of their ownership of the process.

Although the Forum, from its very start, has struggled with its role, objectives, and institutional set-up, it has shown remarkable institutional resilience. This may be due partly to the commitment of some of its members, partly to the smoothly functioning cooperation between the two secretariats. Most importantly, however, the Forum may not be sustainable without a purpose linking it to a higher-level political process like the G8-Africa Summit Outreach in the last decade.

#### *Back to the Roots or Decamping to a New Future*

Key members of the Forum on both sides have to make up their minds on how to best serve their interests and responsibilities with respect to Africa. Neither dragging on with only marginal changes,

nor closing the Forum without taking a look into the future are appropriate and politically wise options.

G8 members have to decide whether they see – as in 2001/2 – value added in having, as a group at leaders' level, a long-term, comprehensive, and structured approach towards Africa besides their substantially increased bilateral partnerships with Africa. In the same way, key African leaders have to come up with a joint position on whether to get back to the roots and to engage again with the G8 as a now sub-group of its diversified strategic partners.

This evaluation has found good reasons for Africa and its international partners to engage each other in a structured and coordinated way: (i) Africa is key to global sustainability and stability; (ii) Africa is insufficiently represented in and linked to the global governance architecture; (iii) Africa is most at risk if and when global and national policies fail to depart from a 'Business-as-Usual Trajectory'.

Global affairs in today's world are largely driven by summits at the highest level. It makes sense and is even necessary for Africa and its strategic partners to underpin their interaction in the same way. A Global Africa Summit (or an equivalent) could position a rising Africa in the world of tomorrow. It is only within such a context that a forum like the APF could thrive and serve a purpose beyond itself.

Given the lessons learned from the first ten years of the Forum, any arrangements on membership and ownership should in the first place ensure that the ones at the Forum's level match those at the higher political level to the greatest possible extent. Secondly, since international relations are mainly shaped by nation states, membership should primarily lie with countries. Thirdly, the institutional set-up should be shaped by the roles and objectives of any arrangement.

This evaluation suggests three different models (with priority on Model 1) of future engagement between Africa and its partners (for details see checklist of recommendations and Table 7.4):

Model 1: The 'Global Africa Strategic Dialogue' should be established and chaired by the AU and follow a broad, strategic approach. The AU should invite a maximum of 20 of Africa's key traditional as well as new strategic partners and on the African side a similar group of countries that are key to its international partners, in both cases based on trade, aid, and security criteria. The 'Global Africa Strategic Dialogue' should build on the APF and incorporate the 'Strategic Partners Dialogue' set up by the African Union Commission (AUC). It should consist of two layers, a high(est)-level dialogue every two or three years and a forum at Director Generals' level convening every six months. It should be chaired by the AU-Chair (along with the AUC Chairperson), supported by a bureau of two countries from each side.

Model 2: The 'AU-OECD Partnership' should be established on the African side by the AU-assembly represented by the AU-Chair and the AUC Chairperson, and on the side of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) by the OECD Ministerial Council represented by its chairmanship and the OECD Secretary General. The 'AU-OECD Partnership' would follow an economic cooperation approach (including development cooperation). Actual membership on the OECD side should follow the same criteria as with Model 1, but limited to OECD members. Also on the African side, the same formula as with Model 1 should be applied (alternatively the Banjul format).

Model 3: The ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ would link Africa to the main global governance arenas in the field of economic cooperation, including development cooperation. It should be convened on the initiative by the AU and be chaired either by the AU itself or jointly with G20-presidencies. Membership on the international partners’ side would be confined to G20 members. Membership on the African side would probably have to follow the Banjul format. The ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ would have to start at Sherpa-level, meeting twice a year to buttress the already existing, though limited African representation at G20 Summits. On the longer term, the feasibility and sustainability of the ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ would depend on the preparedness of the G20 to embark on some form of structured interaction with Africa at leaders’ level.

#### *The Way Forward*

Since the present APF mandate originates from G8- and African leaders and all three models involve, on both sides, countries that are presently not APF members, consultations on the way forward should be designed accordingly. They should be initiated swiftly and most suitably led by the AU, in close contact with the present and the two incoming G8- and G20 presidencies (2014/15). In the meantime the Forum would enter into a transition phase including preparing future arrangements. New, up-to-date, and efficient arrangements for a structured and coordinated engagement between Africa and its partners should be in place when the world enters the post-2015 era.

## Checklist of Recommendations

### **General**

#### **Recommendation 1:**

Africa and the G8 should, in due course, consult with each other at Sherpa level regarding whether and how to (re-)establish a structured partnership between Africa and the G8 as a group. The consultations should be led on the African side by the AU-Chair, the AUC Chairperson, and the NEPAD HSGOC-Chair, and on the G8 side by the present plus the next two incoming G8 presidency/ies (2014/15).

#### **Recommendation 2:**

Africa and its international partners should acknowledge the need to regularly engage each other in a high-level, structured and coordinated way.

#### **Recommendation 3:**

The APF should be tasked by leaders with re-establishing itself in line with the future institutional and thematic arrangements at summit levels.

### **On the thematic approach**

#### **Recommendation 4:**

A future arrangement between Africa and its international partners should link African and global agendas and follow either a 'broad, strategic approach' or an 'economic cooperation approach'.

#### **Recommendation 5:**

Any future structured engagement between Africa and its partners should establish a multi-year work plan linking African and global agendas, and monitor the priorities and initiatives which arise in this context.

### **On membership and ownership**

#### **Recommendation 6:**

Any arrangements on membership and ownership should ensure that the ones at the Forum's level match those at the higher political level to the greatest possible extent and that they are closely linked to the African and international polity around the AU in Addis Ababa.

#### **Recommendation 7:**

Membership should primarily lie with nation states and be limited to a number of twenty on either side. International organisations, civil society, and the private sector should be – depending on the issue – invited on a case-by-case basis.

#### **Recommendation 8:**

Membership should result from invitation and has to be honoured by participation at the appropriate level and a fair financial contribution. These preconditions should be enforced.

**Recommendation 9:**

For countries that would not continue as core member consideration should be given to a grandfathering clause or a mechanism of representation.

**Recommendation 10:**

Africa and its partners should in the first place aim at a 'strategic partners approach', but also consider an 'institutional AU-OECD approach' and 'global governance approach'.

**On basic models****Recommendation 11:**

Africa and its partners should in the first place aim at Model 1 'The Global Africa Strategic Dialogue', but should also consider Model 2 'The AU-OECD Partnership' and Model 3 'The Africa Global Governance Panel' (for a synopsis of the details see the synopsis of core recommendations).

## Synopsis of Core Recommendations

Model	What	Who		Tiers/layers		Co-chair arrangement	Secretariat arrangement
		Africa	Partners	High-level	Intermediate		
‘Back to the roots’ (‘G8-Africa Partnership’)	Long-term, comprehensive, and structured partnership	AU-Chair AU-PSC Chair AUC Chairperson NEPAD5 (e.g.) HSGOC Chair	G8 members (incl. EU)	Summit meetings (annual or every two years)	Personal Representatives (at least twice a year)	AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson) G8 presidency	AUC and G8 presidency
<b>Model 1</b> ‘Global Africa Strategic Dialogue’	Broad and strategic dialogue (political, economic, development)	Twenty key African countries (based on trade, aid, and security criteria; plus AU Chair, AU-PSC Chair, and AUC Chairperson)	Twenty key partners of Africa (based on trade, aid, and security criteria; including EU)	High(est)-level dialogue every two or three years	Forum at DG level (twice a year)	AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson), supported by an elected (two or three year) bureau of two countries from each side	Provided by the African side (aligned with JSSO, supported by partners)
<b>Model 2</b> ‘AU-OECD Partnership’	Economic cooperation (including development)	Twenty key African countries (see Model 1, maybe without security) <u>Or</u> 17 countries according to the Banjul format	18 key OECD partners of Africa (see Model 1, maybe without security)	Joint ministerial meetings every three years	Forum at DG level (at least once a year) <u>and</u> periodic meetings between the OECD Secretariat and the AU Commission (including NPCA)	AU Chair AUC Chairperson Chair OECD Council OECD Secr. Gen.	Joint AUC-OECD secretariat
<b>Model 3</b> ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’	Global economic governance (including development)	17 countries according to the Banjul format	G20 members (incl. EU)	Meetings at leaders’ level every two or three years	Forum at Sherpa level twice a year	AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson) <u>or</u> AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson) G20 presidency (current and incoming)	Provided by the African side (aligned with JSSO, supported by partners)

### **On Co-Chair arrangements and institutional set-up in capitals**

**Recommendation 12:**

Chair- and co-chair arrangements should allow for more permanency, for example by bringing in, alongside the AU-Chair, the AUC Chairperson and including incoming G8- or G20 presidencies.

**Recommendation 13:**

In the preferred case of an African lead the chair (AU-Chair plus AUC Chairperson) should be supported by an (elected) bureau of two African and two partner countries.

**Recommendation 14:**

G8- and G20 Sherpas should acknowledge the chair/co-chairs (as well as all Forum members) as primary interlocutors when it comes to issues related to Africa.

**Recommendation 15:**

In capitals, co-chairs as well as all Forum members should be anchored with those branches of government that are key to the Forums' focus (Model 1: Presidencies or prime ministers offices; Model 2: Ministers of Finance/Economics/Development; Model 3: G20 Sherpas).

**Recommendation 16:**

The respective constituencies should entrust the co-chairs with the necessary room for manoeuvre to jointly lead and represent the Forum, including in between meetings and actively promoting its agenda with key continental and global processes.

### **On preparation, arrangement and follow-up of meetings**

**Recommendation 17:**

The date and agenda of meetings should be set early, at best at the preceding meeting.

**Recommendation 18:**

The Forum should regularly convene at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa (Model 2: alternating with OECD/Paris).

**Recommendation 19:**

Co-chairs should not shy away from taking up contentious issues when setting the agenda of meetings.

**Recommendation 20:**

The Forum should come up with more innovative, creative, and forward-looking conclusions, which reflect the frankness and richness of debates.

**Recommendation 21:**

Co-chairs and Forum members should more actively and widely disseminate and promote the Forums' activities and conclusions, including by putting the Forum on the websites of the AU and the G8- and G20 presidencies and linking it to the existing APF website of the Support Unit.

**Recommendation 22:**

Co-chairs should publish an annual report monitoring the Forums achievements and following through its conclusions.

### On monitoring of commitments

**Recommendation 23:**

The Forum should re-assess the proliferation of monitoring mechanisms and agree on one format in line with the future role and membership of the Forum.

**Recommendation 24:**

The MRDE should form the primary basis of any future joint monitoring system, possibly adapted to future arrangements.

**Recommendation 25:**

The Forum should set up a small inter-sessional task force to jointly work on methodological questions related to monitoring.

**Recommendation 26:**

The Forum should convene a major monitoring event every two or three years, preferably aligned to another important international or continental gathering.

### On secretariat support

**Recommendation 27:**

Any broader structured engagement between Africa and its international partners needs to and should be supported by an integrated, lean secretariat.

**Recommendation 28:**

Any secretariat arrangement should display strong African leadership (Model 2: jointly with OECD) and should be anchored with the AU headquarters, closely aligned to the JSSO.

**Recommendation 29:**

Co-chairs should show joint ownership of the secretariat and actively steer and oversee it.

**Recommendation 30:**

The APF Support Unit, together with AUC and NPCA, should help with the transformation of the Forum and its secretariat arrangements according to the chosen model, with its mandate updated respectively and prolonged for another two years (including the hosting arrangement).

## **1 Introduction: A Forum Puts Itself to the Test**

### **1.1 The Africa Partnership Forum (APF) at a Glance**

The African Partnership Forum (APF) was established in 2003 in the context of the G8-Africa Partnership in order “... to continue and strengthen the partnership ... by way of a broadened structured engagement” (APF, 2005a, p. 1).

Since 2009 the objectives and role of the APF are in particular (APF, 2009, p. 1)

- to catalyse and support action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa’s development,
- to make recommendations to leaders on decisions which need to be taken in key regional and global processes, including the G8 and G20, the AU and the UN, in support of Africa’s development, and
- to play a key role in monitoring the delivery of commitments by both sides of the partnership.

The Forum is designed to combine high-level political representation and a broad range of stakeholders. The 61 members of the Forum are Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government (PR) of 21 African/NEPAD countries and of its 20 main bilateral development partners from the G8 and the OECD as well as the Heads or Chairs of 13 African continental and regional institutions and 7 international institutions (see Table B1 in Appendix B).

The APF meets twice a year, the spring meeting typically being hosted by the G8 presidency and the autumn meeting being held in Africa. The APF is co-chaired on an alternating basis by two African countries (AU Chair, NEPAD HSGOC Chair) and two development partner countries (G8 presidency and one country representing the other 11 OECD countries).

Secretariat support to the APF is provided in partnership by the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and the APF Support Unit housed at the OECD.

### **1.2 Purpose and Context of the Evaluation**

The commissioning of an independent external evaluation by the co-chairs of the Forum constitutes one of the rare examples of an international body to put itself on the test bench. That demonstrates again its repeated preparedness to reorient and readapt itself to shifting conditions. The last review of the Forum took to place in 2009 and led to the ‘Reform of the Africa Partnership Forum’ adopted by the 12<sup>th</sup> APF (Rome; 6/2009) and welcomed by G8 and African leaders at the L’Aquila/Italy Summit (2009). Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing global environment and renewed internal questioning of the performance of the Forum the 19<sup>th</sup> APF (Cotonou; 12/2012) welcomed the proposed evaluation (APF, 2012a).<sup>1</sup> The purpose of the evaluation is to support the Forum and its members in arriving at conclusions on the future of the APF.

According to the ToR the evaluation should:

- Assess the overall effectiveness of the APF in delivering the objectives of catalysing and supporting action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa’s development;

- Assess the work of the NEPAD Agency and APF Support Unit, in providing Secretariat support for APF meetings in partnership, and in monitoring the delivery of commitments and results achieved through the Mutual Reviews of Development Effectiveness undertaken with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA);
- Make recommendations on the future of the Forum and the APF Support Unit.

The ToR address in different ways the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of the Forum. They are geared towards a realignment of the Forum by reviewing its objective and role (the ‘Why’), the themes and their re-prioritization (the ‘What’), the membership and participation (the ‘Who’), and the format, governance and support structures (the ‘How’).

As the APF emerged as a part and instrument of the G8-Africa Partnership the evaluation has to analyse and assess the Forum’s role in this context. However, the evaluation is not tasked with and would be overstrained by assessing the G8-Africa Partnership at large incl. the Africa Outreach at G8 Summits and the system of G8 Africa Personal Representatives (APR). Likewise, neither the achievements of the partnership nor the commitments by both sides are subject of this evaluation. Notwithstanding these limitations, the evaluation would do well to support the Forum members’ efforts to identify the best approach to strengthen the African voice in today’s global governance architecture and to enhance the cooperation between Africa and its partners in pursuing shared objectives.

The evaluation focuses on the period from July 2009 (when the Rome Reform was adopted) up to June 2013. It draws on experiences and lessons learned since the establishment of the Forum in 2003 as well as during the early years of the G8-Africa Partnership (2000-2003).

### 1.3 Methods and Limitations

Methodologically, the evaluation starts by an historical and structural analysis of the evolution of the Forum and its interaction with other institutional set-ups in the broader G8-Africa Partnership (Chapter 2).<sup>2</sup> This is followed by a contextualisation of the Forum within the changing realities in Africa and the world (Chapter 3) as well as the shifts in continental and global governance (Chapter 4). The ensuing assessment of the current performance of the Forum itself in particular incorporates the views expressed by the members themselves (Chapter 5). Building on the main findings of these chapters, key conclusions on the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability of the Forum are drawn (Chapter 6). The following recommendations distinguish between those on the basic tenets of the Forum (Chapter 7), the functioning of and technical support to the Forum (Chapter 8) and on the possible next steps (Chapter 9).

The methodological instruments stipulated by the ToR (i.e. a combination of individual interviews and background discussions, a survey questionnaire, and a document review) supported each other and contributed in different ways to all the steps of the evaluation. It is important to mention that the assessments, opinions, and suggestions by the members of the Forum themselves constitute a major and necessary component of the whole exercise. The response rates to the questionnaire vary – in parts considerably – between the different groups and types of membership. At the 20<sup>th</sup> APF the evaluators have been encouraged in their approach to not base their findings solely on the questionnaire exercise.

In this respect the discussions at the 20<sup>th</sup> APF and the several constituencies' meetings at its margins as well as further bilateral interviews have been very useful. All in all, the evaluators conducted – mainly jointly – more than 20 bilateral consultations inter alia in Addis Ababa, Berlin, Cotonou, London, New York, and Paris. Nevertheless, it has to be kept in mind that the views expressed by members on these occasions as well as the responses to the questionnaire might at times mirror mainly the views of the persons and branches of governments involved in the Forum. It has therefore been indispensable to match the views of the Forums' members with the findings from the document review, the views by third parties beyond the APF community, and by the evaluators' own observations (not least at the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> APF).

## **2 Political Roots and Institutional Evolution of the APF**

### **2.1 NEPAD, the G8-Africa Partnership and the Emergence of the Africa Partnership Forum (2000 - 2003)**

At the turn of the millennium a group of committed African leaders took up the initiative of presenting a fresh blueprint in order to put the continent onto a new trajectory of sustained economic growth and political reform. They initiated NEPAD and introduced their concept to the G8 Leaders on the eve of the G8 Summit in Okinawa/Japan in July 2000 (Rukato, 2010). This meeting on 20 July 2000 in Tokyo brought together for the first time G8 leaders with African and developing countries leaders for a dialogue at the highest political level.<sup>3</sup> The representatives of the developing countries expressed their sincere desire to continue the dialogue with the G8 at the next summit in Genoa, Italy (2001).<sup>4</sup>

The Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Summit in Lusaka (Zambia; 7/2001) saw the adoption of NEPAD and the official approval of the transformation of the OAU into a new ‘African Union’ (AU).<sup>5</sup> NEPAD was – under the auspices of the OAU/AU – spearheaded by the ‘five initiating countries’ (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa) whose leaders were tasked to engage the international community in supporting the initiative. The initiating Presidents focused their advocacy on the leadership of the G8, a group of eight democratic market economy countries, which accounted for more than 70% of official development assistance (ODA) to Africa as well as for more than 70% of trade and investment.<sup>6</sup> They were seen as the epicentre of the then global governance architecture and recognized – together with the wider OECD community – as Africa’s primary partners of choice (Rukato, 2010).


Upon the invitation by the Italian G8 Presidency the presidents of Algeria, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa presented NEPAD to G8 Leaders in Genoa in July 2001. The G8 Leaders responded by adopting the ‘Genoa Plan for Africa’. They welcomed NEPAD “... which is based on the principles of responsibility and ownership, with an emphasis on democracy, transparency, good governance, rule of law and human rights as fundamental factors of development” and agreed “... to support African efforts to solve African problems” (G8, 2011a). G8 Leaders resolved to “... designate high level personal representative(s) to liaise with committed African Leaders on the development of a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the G8 Summit next year under the leadership of Canada” (G8, 2011a).

The G8 APRs constituted a very diverse group of distinguished personalities, the majority of them not primarily concerned with development cooperation. The group of the Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government (PR) of the ‘five initiating countries’ of NEPAD were similarly leading personalities in their own countries and close to their heads of state or government (see Table B2 in Appendix B). The NEPAD PRs reported to the NEPAD Heads of State or Government Implementing Committee (HSGIC) and through it to the AU Assembly.

In the wake of the Genoa Summit 2001 the G8 APRs worked closely with the NEPAD PRs and developed the G8 Africa Action Plan (G8AAP) within less than a year. Out of the six APR meetings five had been joint ones with the NEPAD PRs and four had been held on the African continent (Rukato, 2010). The meetings were chaired by the Canadian APR who at the same time was the Canadian G8 Sherpa.

In June 2002 the G8 Summit in Kananaskis/Canada discussed the G8AAP in the presence of the Presidents of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa and adopted it as a framework for action in support of the NEPAD. G8 Leaders accepted the invitation from African Leaders "... to build a new partnership between the countries of Africa and (their) own, based on mutual responsibility and respect" (G8, 2002b). The adoption of the G8AAP exemplified a step well beyond traditional paradigms of aid and development by including, inter alia, issues of peace and security.

Figure 2.1. Institutional Set-Up 2001-2003: G8 / NEPAD Personal Representatives



Source: Own compilation

G8 Leaders committed to continue the dialogue with their African partners and to review – at their next Summit – progress on the implementation of the G8AAP on the basis of a final report from their APRs. There was an informal agreement on the G8 side that Africa should continue to be a topic on the G8 Summit Agenda until 2010 (Eid, 2012).<sup>7</sup> The G8 APRs and the NEPAD PRs participated in the Kananaskis Summit alongside with the G8 Sherpas and took up the task to underpin this partnership by a sustained dialogue. In addition, there was a strong and continued recognition of NEPAD and the new partnerships supporting it in the UN-system.<sup>8</sup>

The first G8 APRs' Implementation Report to the G8 Summit in Evian/France (6/2003) illustrated the thrust of the G8 response in support of NEPAD and outlined efforts for implementation in the next years (G8 APR, 2003). The Summit, after having discussed it in the presence of the key NEPAD Leaders, endorsed the report, launched several substantial initiatives within the framework of the G8AAP and resolved "... to review progress on our Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report" (G8, 2003).<sup>9</sup> Africa felt that at last it was receiving the respect, recognition, and engagement it deserved. The G8 felt that they were acknowledging that Africa was accepting responsibility for its future, and putting its house in order.


In addition, the Evian Summit laid the foundation for the APF by inviting interested countries and relevant international institutions to appoint senior representatives to join this partnership. The 1<sup>st</sup> APF convened in Paris on 10 November 2003 and was addressed by the French President Jacques Chirac.<sup>10</sup> The Forum brought together the then 19 members of the NEPAD HSGIC, Africa's principal bilateral development partners, the main African organisations at continental or regional level, and the main

international organisations (see Table B1 in Appendix B). The bilateral development partners included all G8 members (incl. the European Union (EU)) and nine other OECD members with bilateral ODA programs for Africa exceeding 100 Mio. USD (APF, 2012b).

## 2.2 From the First Meetings of the Forum in 2003/2004 to its Reform in 2009

The establishment of the APF introduced a third format into the architecture of the G8-Africa Partnership. From 2003 onwards its institutional set-up was made up mainly by the triangle of (i) Africa outreach sessions at G8 summits, (ii) PRs of the NEPAD5 (+SC Chair) and the G8 APRs, and (iii) the APF (see figure 2.1).

Figure 2.2. Triangle – Africa Outreach / Personal Representatives / APF



Source: Own compilation

The first years after the establishment of the APF saw a sustained momentum by political leaders on both sides to follow through initiatives and commitments focusing – for example – on African capabilities to undertake peace keeping and peace support operations, on pressing health issues (especially HIV/Aids), on infrastructure (i.e. establishment of the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa) as well as on agriculture and food security (in support of the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP)).


Almost all G8 Summits in these years prominently addressed African issues and saw substantial involvement of African Leaders in the regular Africa outreach.<sup>11</sup> However, the G8 Leaders' desire to further strengthen the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the G8 process led to a proliferation of outreach formats. Leaders from emerging economies participated from 2003 onwards in a special outreach leading up to the Heiligendamm-L'Aquila-Process (G8, 2009a). In addition, leaders representing the Broader Middle East (BMENA) were present in 2004. Leaders from the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) attended the L'Aquila Summit in Italy in 2009. Against this backdrop the G8-Africa Outreach lost its exclusivity.

The G8 APRs continued to press ahead with the implementation of the G8AAP, met regularly, and stayed committed "... to strengthen ... collective action to fulfil the potential of the G8-Africa dialogue" (G8 APR, 2007). From the preparations of the Summit 2002 in Kananaskis/Canada through

to the Summit 2007 in Heiligendamm/Germany APRs worked independently of and in parallel to the Sherpas.<sup>12</sup> They prepared their leaders for the Africa Agenda of the Summits and participated in the respective sessions, including the Africa Outreach. The G8 APRs also delivered biennial Progress Reports to G8 Leaders ahead of Summits (2003, 2005, 2007 and – for the last time – 2008) (G8 APR, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008). However, since there had not been any updating neither of NEPAD nor of the G8AAP, those Progress Reports turned into a routine.<sup>13</sup> On the African side it was only in 2011 that the ‘Accountability Report on Africa-G8 Commitments: 2001-2010’ was issued by the African Union Commission (AUC) and the NEPAD Agency (AU & NEPAD, 2011).

Through the years the G8 Africa agenda went beyond the unique G8AAP of the G8 Summit in Kananaskis/Canada 2002 and became more intertwined with or embedded into the sectoral G8 agenda items. Consequently, the institutional centre of gravity slowly shifted from the APR-system to the Sherpa-system without clear arrangements on how the APRs would contribute to this agenda. Also the composition of the G8 APR group and their actual participation in meetings changed over the decade. By the fifth year after the Kananaskis Summit (2002) all of the initial G8 APRs had changed. These changes did not immediately lead to a lowering of the (political) level of APRs (in some cases it was even elevated to cabinet level ministers). However, the participation of APRs in Forum meetings slowly abated towards the end of the decade and APRs were increasingly represented by senior officials mainly from the realm of development cooperation. It was from this period that concerns, in particular from the African side, began to be expressed about the level of representation. On the NEPAD side the composition of the PRs remained comparatively stable. The interaction between G8 APRs and the NEPAD PRs became at times sporadic although several G8 presidencies tried to revitalize that format. In addition, the G8 approach to monitoring and accountability became more horizontally integrated when G8 leaders at the L’Aquila/Italy Summit (2009) resolved to adopt “... a full and comprehensive accountability mechanism by 2010 ...” (G8, 2009b) going well beyond Africa related issues.

Figure 2.3. Institutional Set-Up 2003-2009: Africa Partnership Forum after its Inception



Source: Own compilation

It was against this backdrop that the APF had to find and develop its role within the institutional set-up of the partnership. During the first two years of the Forum the role of the APF itself had been a central topic at meetings indicating different views among members at the time and a genuine need for debate.

It is interesting to observe similar discussions a decade later.<sup>14</sup> The debate on the role of the Forum came to a temporary end by an initiative from G8 Leaders (Gleneagles/UK; 7/2005). The 5<sup>th</sup> APF (London; 10/2005) agreed on ‘Revised Terms of Reference for the Africa Partnership Forum’ which stressed that “... the Africa Partnership Forum is a key forum for discussion and monitoring at a senior political level of policy issues, strategy and priorities in support of Africa’s development” (APF, 2005a, p. 2) (see Annex 2). With respect to the Personal Representatives (PR) the Revised Terms of Reference stipulated that they are “... expected to be appointed by and report directly to their Heads of State or Government or Heads of Institution as appropriate” and that they “... should be in a position to speak on behalf of their national administrations or institutions overall” (APF, 2005a, p. 1) (see Annex 2).

The uniqueness of the APF as a Forum jointly owned by both sides of the partnership found its expression through the respective co-chair arrangements. In the first years the Forum had only two co-chairs (one African partner and one development partner).<sup>15</sup> From the 5<sup>th</sup> APF (London; 10/2005) onwards there have been four co-chairs bringing together the countries holding the AU-Chair, the NEPAD Steering Committee (SC) Chair and the G8 presidency as well as the country representing the OECD11 group. Already the 3<sup>rd</sup> APF (Washington; 10/2004) had tasked co-chairs with consultations amongst themselves in between meetings, and with “... identifying issues for intervention by the Forum” as well as consulting and detecting “... key issues for practical follow up” (ECA, 2004, p. 59).

The London ToR also arranged for the secretariat support to the Forum consisting of the AU/NEPAD Secretariat working together with a small Support Unit directed by and jointly accountable to the APF through the co-chairs. They were supposed to be “... responsible for preparing and keeping up to date the Joint Action Plan, for tracking progress overall, and for drafting the annual report” (APF, 2005a) (see Annex 2).

APF meetings took place twice a year, until 2006 in the first half of the year on the African continent and in the second half in the country of the G8 presidency. From 2007 this arrangement turned the other way around – i.e. first meeting in the G8 country and second meeting in Africa – with the aim to better support the political momentum in the run-up to the G8 Summits. Most of the APFs in those years had been addressed by the Heads of State or Government of the host countries. In the first years the level of representation on both sides was quite high. It sometimes even went beyond the Personal Representatives (PRs) to cabinet level ministers or heads of African and international organisations. However, towards the end of the decade a creeping decline of the level of participation was recorded.

Between 2003 and 2009 most meetings addressed three to five agenda items, mainly sectoral in nature. Surprisingly, mutual accountability, although called for by Leaders, did not evolve as a strong and recurring topic and was not successfully dealt with. In 2005 a NEPAD Progress Report (AU/NEPAD Secretariat, 2005) and in 2006 and 2007 the so-called APF Progress Reports were issued and put on the APF agenda (APF Support Uni & NEPAD Secretariat, 2006; AU/NEPAD Secretariat, 2005).

However, neither the APR Progress reports nor the ‘Mutual Review of Development Effectiveness’ (MRDE) reports – which are jointly produced by ECA and OECD on the request of the NEPAD HSGIC – have become regular APF agenda items.<sup>16</sup> The suggestion by the 5<sup>th</sup> APF that the Forum “... has a particularly important role in ensuring progress on cross-border, regional and continental priorities and mechanisms” (APF, 2005c, p. 1) was not taken up until the 14<sup>th</sup> APF (Toronto;

04/2010). One particularly contentious issue over the years was the question how to link the AU/NEPAD Action Plan and the G8AAP. The 5<sup>th</sup> APF in London in October 2005 had "... agreed that there should be one Joint Action Plan bringing together the commitments that Africa and its development partners have both made" (APF, 2005c, p. 1). However, this ambitious goal of a Joint Action Plan, although included in the London ToR (APF, 2005a), was not followed up in the subsequent meetings of the Forum.

Up until 2009, G8 Summit declarations as well as G8 APR Progress Reports regularly recognized the APF and its work. In 2005 at Gleneagles/UK G8 Leaders acknowledged "... the productive role played by the Africa Personal Representatives and the Africa Partnership Forum (and) agree(d) that the APF should be strengthened" (G8, 2005, p. 13). In 2007 in Heiligendamm/Germany G8 Leaders suggested that the APF could provide a good platform for the involvement of emerging donors (G8, 2007).<sup>17</sup> However, while G8 Summit Declarations and G8 APR Progress Reports regularly made reference to the APF, the Forum itself never referred to the G8 APR Progress Reports nor did it mention the role of the APRs within the partnership at all.<sup>18</sup>

AU Summits between 2003 and 2009 increasingly recognized the G8-Africa partnership and the G8 Africa outreach. In 2008 (Sharm El-Sheikh/Egypt) the Summit called for an reactivation of the G8/NEPAD follow-up mechanism as agreed upon at the G8 Heiligendamm Summit of 2007 and underscored the need for early preparations by Africa for the 2009 G8 Summit in Italy and the 2010 G8 Summit in Canada (AU, 2008).

Faced with difficulties in implementing its mandate, in maintaining the required political level of participation, and in focussing topics as well as to better adapt itself to a changing global landscape the 12<sup>th</sup> APF (Rome; 6/2009) agreed on a reform of the APF which subsequently was welcomed by G8 and African leaders at the L'Aquila/Italy Summit (2009) (G8, 2009c). Already in the run-up to the G8 Summit the AU Summit in Syrte/Libya (6/2009) had taken note of the efforts to reform the Africa Partnership Forum (APF) and urged stronger commitment by development partners to make the APF more effective and responsive to African concerns and interests (AU, 2009).

### 2.3 The Reform of the Forum and its Implementation (2009-2013)

Whilst the Rome Reform (see Annex 3) confirmed central tenets of the Forum, it brought about some significant changes:


- It strengthened the key role of the Forum to catalyse and support action on both sides of the partnerships and to make recommendations to leaders.
- It explicitly geared the Forum towards a broader array of key regional and global processes, including the G8 and G20, the AU and the UN.
- It enhanced the role of co-chairs between meetings (two preparatory meetings before each plenary; advocacy and communication including on feeding Forum's conclusions into the political process).

At the same time the reform implicitly dropped the idea of a Joint Action Plan and respective annual progress reports. It underlined the spring meeting to be held at political level while allowing for appropriate senior level representation at the autumn meeting. It considered the possible participation

of the private sector (in addition to civil society) as well as the possibility of broadening the APF to include the emerging economies. The reform also called for more effective ways of recording and disseminating the conclusions of meetings.

With respect to the secretariat support the reform confirmed in principle the London ToR. Yet the reform stated that the AU/NEPAD institutions (which is less clear a term than AU/NEPAD Secretariat as used in the London ToR) and the Support Unit were allotted to the respective sides of the partnership. There has been further consideration on whether the Secretariats might be asked to prepare a concise annual report on APF issues and proposed courses of action.

Figure 2.4. Institutional Set-Up 2009-2013: Africa Partnership Forum after the Rome Reform



Source: Own compilation

As the Rome Reform tried to adapt the Forum to shifts in global governance it could not foresee how fundamental these were to become, impacting key pillars of the partnership's architecture. The G8 Summit in L'Aquila/Italy in July 2009 – which welcomed this reform – turned out as the last one with the traditional elaborated outreach architecture. Already before the L'Aquila Summit (2009) the G20 have met twice at leaders level (Washington 11/2008, and London, 04/2009) to address the financial and economic crisis. In September 2009, at the Pittsburgh Summit, the G20 established itself as "... the premier forum for our international economic cooperation" (G20, 2009, p. 2) insofar replacing the G8.<sup>19</sup> Since then G8 Summits have become more informal, shorter and limited in issues and outreach.

Nevertheless, the G8 Summits in 2010 and 2011 sustained the G8-Africa Outreach with the core NEPAD/AU Leaders.<sup>20</sup> The Muskoka Summit (Canada; 6/2010) reaffirmed "... the commitment to continued collaboration between G8 and African partners" (G8, 2010, p. 5). The Deauville Summit (France; 5/2011) even saw the first ever G8-Africa Joint Declaration ("Shared Values, Shared Responsibilities") which highlighted "... the importance of an enhanced partnership between the G8 and Africa" (G8, 2011b, p. 1) and focused on 'Peace, Security and Governance', 'Economic Development and Environment', and 'Mutual accountability'.

The G8 Summits in 2012 (Camp David/USA) and 2013 (Lough Erne/UK) changed the way of the Africa outreach, moving from the traditional NEPAD formula to a more issue driven approach. In

2012 the focus was on the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. Selected African leaders, amongst them the AU- and NEPAD Chairs, have been invited to a working lunch with G8 Leaders and the New Alliance was launched in a separate event (bringing together G8 nations, African countries and private sector partners)<sup>21</sup>. In 2013 the Lough Erne Summit (UK; 6/2013) was preceded by two high level events with significant African involvement: (i) The ‘Nutrition for Growth: Beating Hunger through Business and Science’ event hosted by the UK government, the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF), and the Government of Brazil; (ii) The pre-summit ‘Open for Growth’ event which encompassed a broad set of issues and facilitated discussion on trade, tax and transparency with business, civil society and governments. The Summit itself recognized Africa as the next emerging continent, reaffirmed the G8 commitment to further engage with the continent in a number of initiatives, inter alia, launched by the AU and NEPAD, and recognised the work being done by the G20 on financing for infrastructure in Africa (G8, 2013). Although the only outreach session of the 2013 G8 Summit (G8 Lunch) was not Africa-specific it saw significant African Leaders’ participation (including AU-Chair, NEPAD-Chair, AUC Chairperson) alongside heads of key international organisations and leaders from two other countries.<sup>22</sup>

The G8/G20 reconfiguration brought about also a shift within the Sherpa system, which subsequently further affected the role of the G8 APRs (on African representation in the G20 process see Chapter 4.2). The former G8 Sherpa process was split up into two systems, one serving the G8 Summits, the other the G20 Summits. The majority of G8 countries have appointed different persons for the two systems.<sup>23</sup> The role of the G8 Financial Sous-Sherpas was rendered irrelevant by the relocation of the financial and economic agenda (which includes central development policy issues incl. those of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI)) to the G20 while the Foreign Affairs Sous-Sherpas continued their work on political, peace and security issues under the G8 Sherpas. G8 APRs became confined to a subordinate role around the remaining issues and processes of the G8 without developing systematic links to the G20 system. Since 2009 changes in the composition of the G8 APR group have led to a lowering of the (political) level of APRs who are nowadays composed mainly of senior officials. Since 2008 G8 APRs have not issued any further Progress Reports whilst at different stages and places within the G8- as well as in the G20-processes comprehensive accountability reports have been submitted. The G8 APRs did not play any noticeable role in preparing and drafting these reports. Although their habitual presence at G8 Summits was occasionally revived, formal G8 APR meetings – and especially those with their NEPAD peers – lost regularity depending on the initiative of the respective G8 presidency. The special role of the G8/NEPAD PRs in the preparation of the G8/Africa Joint Declaration in Deauville (2011) was a rare exception.

#### *The APF in the Institutional Set-Up between 2009 and 2013*

The APF, after the Rome Reform, at first looked slightly reenergised. In September 2009 (Addis Ababa, ECA) the Forum came together for its first and for now only extraordinary meeting, the Special Session on Climate Change, addressed by the Prime Minister of Ethiopia. Since then only the 19<sup>th</sup> APF in Cotonou (12/2012) was addressed by a Head of State or Government. The 13<sup>th</sup> APF in January 2010 (representing actually the 2009 autumn meeting; Addis Ababa) saw the virtual closure of the long lasting controversy on the ‘AU/NEPAD African Action Plan (AAP) 2010-2015’ without giving the Forum itself a major further role on it. Depending on the topics, there was private sector participation in several meetings since 2009 whilst civil society representation abated to close to zero. No decision was taken on broadening the APF to include the emerging economies. The agendas of the

meetings have mirrored main themes of African and global processes although more frequently those of the respective G8 summits (e.g. the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> APF). On substance the wording of meetings' communiqués rather rendered the impression of mainly echoing what was going on in other fora instead of catalysing action and making recommendations to leaders. Despite the fact that APF meetings recognized the increased role of the G20 the Forum limited itself more or less to calling for appropriate African representation. With respect to the co-chairs, there is little evidence of intensified inter-sessional work and strengthened advocacy/communication regarding political processes. This however should not come as a surprise since the enhanced role of co-chairs called for by the Rome Reform (as well as by APF Communiqués) was not matched by the necessary institutional arrangements, e.g. between co-chairs and G8- as well as G20 Sherpas or with key stakeholders like G20 presidencies or chairs of G20 working groups. The participation of the AU- and NEPAD Chairs as invitees at G20 Summits could have actually benefitted from those arrangements if supported by the ten APF members (on both sides), which are at the same time G20 members.

Between 2009 and 2013 the recognition by G8 Summits of the APF as well as of the APR system declined to almost insignificance. Only the G8/Africa Joint Declaration at the Deauville Summit (2011) recognized the APF by welcoming the conclusions of the 16<sup>th</sup> (Paris, 4/2011) and by resolving to "... establish a dialogue within the APF, involving business, to increase momentum and help remove obstacles to business environment reform" (G8, 2011b, p. 4). However, this joint call was not taken up by the Forum – at least not explicitly – and at best mirrored by private sector participation in its two subsequent meetings (17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> APF). Whilst the APF, as in the years 2003-2009, continued in not referring to the G8 APR-system it also did not take up the first AU and NEPAD Accountability Report on the G8-Africa Partnership (for the years 2001-2010) (AU & NEPAD, 2011).<sup>24</sup> Since no APR Progress Reports have been issued after 2008 little evidence is publicly available on how the APR-system itself views its role at the interface between APF and G8. It is also striking that since 2011 the G8 Accountability Reports – although highlighting Africa when dealing with the different sectorial commitments – have never referred to the G8-Africa Partnership at large nor to the APR system and the APF.

On the African side, between 2009 and 2013 there has been continued recognition of the G8-Africa partnership by the AU Assembly (Summit), at times mentioning the G8 APR system and the APF. In 2012 the Summit called for deeper engagement and increased level of interaction between African and G8 leaders at G8/Africa Outreach Sessions, adequate consultations amongst invited African leaders prior to these Sessions and appropriate preparations through the APF to assure its value addition as platform for dialoguing on the Continent's priorities for the G8 partnership process (AU, 2012). The 2013 AU accountability report on Africa-G8 partnership commitments (focussing on AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) recalled the early years of the partnership with the establishment of the G8 APR system and the APF, suggested a joint mutual accountability review on commitments in 2015 and to expand the partnership to include the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and the broader G20 (AU & NEPAD, 2013). The AU Summit in May 2013 welcomed the key outcomes of the 5<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit and reiterated the need for Africa's partnership engagement with the G8 and G20 to remain focused on the continent's development priorities especially in agriculture and infrastructure development (AU, 2013b).

## 2.4 Main Findings around the Institutional Evolution

- The G8-Africa Partnership was forged by a small group of committed political leaders within a period of just two years (2001/2), supported by an informal, lean and efficient structure of Personal Representatives on both sides. In 2003, the APF was established to strengthen the partnership by way of a broadened structured engagement. Since then the institutional set-up was made mainly by the triangle of the G8-Africa Summit outreach, the NEPAD5/G8 Personal Representatives and the APF. By the Rome Reform (2009) the focus of the Forum was virtually moved from implementing and monitoring action plans to impacting key regional and global processes.
- Well into the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the last decade the Forum played a significant role in addressing topical themes and in rallying support behind Africa's development. Although the Forum, from its very start, has struggled with its role, objectives and institutional set-up it thrived fostered by strong political leadership and a conducive global political environment. Meeting regularly twice a year ever since 2003, the APF, as the only genuinely joint structure of the triangle, has shown significant institutional resilience. It has provided a space for open and frank debate as well as for networking but could not arrive at joint action plans or joint monitoring structures, nor has it taken up some of the calls from leaders to address specific issues.
- Through the years the institutional weaknesses on all sides of the triangle and their interrelation became apparent. The NEPAD5/G8 PR system has ceased to work regularly. The G8 APRs' role compared to the G8 Sherpa system has declined significantly. Role assignments between APRs, the APF and APF co-chairs have been volatile and opaque. The involvement of the NEPAD16 and the OECD11 into the APF added valuable perspectives to the partnership but could not help with institutional weaknesses beyond their reach. APF co-chairs did not compensate for the declining role of the G8 APRs. While G8 Summits have stopped recognizing or tasking the APF as well as the NEPAD5/G8 PR system, AU Summits have continued to refer to them. Without a formalized G8-Africa Summit Outreach, the APF as well as the NEPAD5/G8 PR system have lost their original and primary anchor and purpose. The Rome Reform updated the mandate of the APF but did not provide for the necessary institutional arrangements e.g. with respect to co-chairs and G8- and G20 Sherpas.


### 3 Africa's Trajectory in a Changing World

#### 3.1 A Continent on the Move

Africa's current population of more than one billion (15% of world population) is expected to double to around 2.4 billion (25% of world population) in 2050.<sup>25</sup> By then two of the ten most populous countries of the world will be African (UNDESA, 2013). A particular feature of Africa's population profile is the large and growing proportion of young people.

During the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Africa's economy has been continuously growing above world average after two decades marked by stagnation. Now, 13 out of the 20 fastest growing economies of the world are in Africa (AfDB, 2013). By an average real 'Gross Domestic Product' (GDP) growth rate of 5.2% between 2001-2011 the size of the African economy more than tripled (see Fig. 3.1 and 3.2). Africa's medium-term growth projections remain strong with an average growth rate of around 5% in 2013-2014. African economies show high resilience to internal and external shocks and prove to be a growth pole in the global economy (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, & ECA, 2011, 2012; ECA, 2012, 2013a; McKinsey, 2010).


Figure 3.1. Africa's Economic Growth in the World Economy (2011-2014p)



Source: African Economic Outlook, 2013; African Development Bank (Data Portal Statistical Unit African Development Bank: <http://www.afdb.org/en/knowledge/statistics/data-portal/>); UN DESA, IMF World Economic Outlook. Note: Data - Real GDP Growth (annual, %); (e) Estimates, (p) Projections.

Trade and external financial flows have been key drivers of African economic growth. Merchandise export and import value rose to an all time high in 2012 amounting to 626 and 604 billion USD (UNCTADstat, 2013). External financial flows into Africa significantly increased over the last decade. They are expected to reach another record high of above 200 billion USD in 2013 (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, & ECA, 2013) (see Fig. 1.3).<sup>26</sup> Billions of dollars of remittances from Africans in the diaspora are now making a major impact in many African countries. Global Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows to Africa rose notably since the beginning of the new millennium. Overall FDI inflows and stock more than quadrupled since 2000. Yet, during the global financial and economic crisis global FDI flows to Africa have fallen considerably.<sup>27</sup> They are expected to increase by 10% in 2013, reaching again pre-crisis level at 57 billion USD (AfDB et al., 2012, 2013; UNCTAD, 2012). In this context the increased illicit flows out of Africa have to be noted. In the period from 2005 to 2010 they reached an all-time high of 202,4 billion USD from 33 sub-Saharan countries (Boyce & Ndikumana, 2012).<sup>28</sup>

Figure 3.2. External Financial Flows to Africa (2001-2013p) (Billion USD, current prices)



Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012; IMF World Economic Outlook 2012; OECD/DAC; World Bank (as shown in the African Economic Outlook, 2013).

ODA to Africa increased markedly over the last decade from 15 billion USD in 2000 to 52 billion USD in 2011 and represents close to 40% of global ODA (OECD, 2013a).<sup>29</sup> ODA to Africa remained resilient during the global economic and financial crisis and continued to provide stable development finance. Its relative weight, compared to Africa's GDP, has declined gradually but still lies significantly above developing countries' average and more than half of African countries still rely on aid as their main external source of finance (AfDB et al., 2013).

The growth period of the last decade certainly led to and was accompanied by a set of significant positive developments in Africa. Average per capita incomes in Africa have increased, human development as well as infrastructure have improved and progress towards attaining the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has been made (AfDB et al., 2012).<sup>30</sup> However, the recent economic growth was not sufficiently inclusive as it did not lead to enough economic diversification, employment generation for the fast growing and predominantly young population, improved social conditions and poverty reduction (AfDB et al., 2012; ECA, 2013a).<sup>31</sup> The share of the absolute poor in Africa's population might not fall below one third of all Africans over the next decades (AfDB, 2011). Projections of the current shifts expect global poverty to turn overwhelmingly into an African rather than an Asian problem (Kharas & Rogerson, 2012). At the same time, the expansion of the African middle class has been a major feature of the recent growth. 350 millions Africans currently earn between 2 and 20 USD per day and are increasingly joining the ranks of Africa's middle-class (AfDB, 2013). Much of Africa's recent strong economic growth has been fuelled by rising demand for its natural resources from the emerging markets. It is not clear to what extent this pillar can be sustained.

In the political realm Africa has witnessed encouraging progress in the opening up of the political space, in the promotion of the rule of law, in constitutional and democratic rule, and in human rights. The number of African countries suffering from violent conflict has significantly decreased, while many countries remain politically fragile. Furthermore, although the main geopolitical fault lines run outside of Africa, fundamentalist and terrorist threats on the continent as well as organized crime and piracy are issues of growing urgency for Africa as well as the international community.

As the African continent holds huge agricultural, mineral, and hydrocarbon reserves it has already become recognized as crucial both to the world economy and to global sustainability. Africa has a key role to play in global efforts to tackle climate change, especially as it is severely affected although having contributed the least to the problem. In the future Africa's global carbon sinks and its


biodiversity as well as the rising per capita incomes and related increased consumption of its growing population will have to become an essential part of any global sustainability equation.

The Africa of today, after a decade of sustained progress, holds all the potential for a prosperous and peaceful future. At the same time Africa is the continent most at risk in every dimension if global cooperation and national policy frameworks fail to depart from a ‘Business-as-Usual Trajectory’ and to embark on a ‘Sustainable Development Path’ (SDSN, 2013).

### 3.2 Global Shifts and Changing Patterns of Relations

The past two decades – and especially the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century – have seen an unprecedented shift of global economic power and the emergence of a multipolar world economy (UNDP, 2013). The total share of G8 countries in global economic output decreased from 52% in 2000 to 41% in 2011 and is expected to fall to 37% in 2017. In contrast, all non-G8-G20 countries increased their share in global economic output from 24% in 2000 to 33% in 2011 and are projected to acquire 38% in 2017 (see Figure 3.3) (IMF, 2013).<sup>32</sup> These shifts have been vividly exemplified during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008/2009 as large parts of the emerging world kept on growing and led the global recovery. Despite the recently slightly lower growth of some emerging economies, there is still a growing sense that the momentum of the global economy is shifting eastwards.


Figure 3.3. Shifting Shares of World GDP (1995-2017p)



Source: UNCTAD, 2013. Trade Statistics, <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>

As African trade and external financial flows have been key drivers of Africa’s recent economic growth their changing patterns reflect the shift in the world economy. Africa heavily diversified its trade relationships towards emerging markets. The G8 countries – the traditional main trade partners of Africa – saw their share of Africa’s total trade reduced from 49% in 2000 to 35% in 2012.<sup>33</sup> On the other hand, the share of the main emerging markets – the non-G8-G20 – in Africa’s total trade rose from 18% in 2000 to 29% in 2012 (see Fig. 3.4) (UNCTADstat, 2013).<sup>34</sup>

Figure 3.4. Shifting Shares of Total Trade with Africa (1995-2012)



Source: UNCTAD, 2013. Trade Statistics, <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx>

In addition, an increasing share of African FDI originates in emerging markets.<sup>35</sup> Until 2008, OECD countries dominated the investment landscape by accounting for about 80% of FDI flows to Africa. Yet, non-OECD countries slowly but surely increased their share of FDI inflows to Africa from “... an average 18% in 1995-99 to 21% for 2000-08” (AfDB et al., 2011, p. 100). The shift accelerated in the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis. According to the African Economic Outlook of 2012 OECD countries accounted for merely 40%, obviously overtaken by non-OECD countries (AfDB et al., 2012). Recent data show that emerging economies continue to hold their strong investment position in Africa. Their share in total announced greenfield investment in 2012 is estimated to be 60% (AfDB et al., 2013; Ernst&Young, 2013). It remains to be seen whether and when FDI from OECD countries will recover. Also with respect to the provision of concessional development finance, emerging economies have increased over the last decade their efforts in Africa and some reached – according to different estimates – levels comparable to some of the APF members (Africa Progress Panel, 2012; Brautigam, 2011; ECA, 2013b) (see also Table C4 and C5 in Appendix C). Most DAC (Development Assistance Committee) donor countries are experiencing fiscal pressure due to the economic crisis and therefore overall ODA volumes to Africa are not expected to increase significantly within the near future. As with trade and FDI, emerging markets will most likely gain a continuously higher share of total concessional development finance in Africa over the coming decade.

### 3.3 Main Findings around Africa and the World

- In recent years, Africa’s economic growth rates have consistently been above the world average. FDI, remittances and ODA to Africa, all have about quadrupled since 2001. Per capita incomes, human development, and infrastructure have improved. Yet, the proportion of the absolute poor in Africa’s overall population remains exceptionally large. Also in the political realm Africa has witnessed encouraging progress, but many countries remain politically fragile and the institutions of these young democracies are largely untested. With its young and growing population and its vast natural resources Africa is key to global sustainability. At the same time Africa is most at risk if and when global and national policies fail to depart from a ‘Business-as-Usual Trajectory’.

- The first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has seen an unprecedented shift of global economic power mainly to the east. G8 countries are losing their preeminent position in global economic output and are expected to be challenged by the non-G8-G20 countries soon. African trade and external financial flows are shifting accordingly towards emerging markets. The latter have already surpassed FDI from traditional partners and are about to match them in trade. Emerging markets are also likely to contribute a higher share of concessional development finance to Africa.

## **4 Shifting Continental and Global Governance Architectures**

### **4.1 The African Union, NEPAD and the RECs: Consolidation and Integration**

At the beginning of the new millennium the advent of NEPAD and the AU signified a determination on behalf of African countries to accept primary responsibility for the continent's future and acknowledgement of the mistakes of the past. Over the ensuing decade, Africa and the international community have been and continue to witness to this day the evolution and transformation of the institutional architecture on the continent progressing at an enormous pace.

Today, the AU is recognised as the pinnacle of Africa's politics. The semi-annual meetings of the AU Assembly (composed of Heads of State and Government) have become events of global recognition. They are prepared by the AU's Executive Council, which also promotes the coordination with the Regional Economic Communities (REC), the AfDB, and ECA and determines policies for cooperation between the Union and Africa's partners. The AU's Permanent Representatives' Committee (PRC; composed of Permanent Representatives of Member States accredited to the Union in Addis Ababa) acts as an advisory body to the Executive Council. Amongst the specialised AU organisations the Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC, made up of fifteen member states) stands out.<sup>36</sup> The AUC as the Secretariat of the Union is entrusted with executive functions under the auspices of the AU Assembly as well as the Executive Committee.<sup>37</sup>

NEPAD was opened to all AU members shortly after its inception (see Chapter 2) and evolved from a small 'club' of forward looking African countries into a continent wide program of the AU. NEPAD eventually became a fully-fledged part of the AU alongside its other organs and institutions by the integration of its governing bodies and its secretariat into the broader settings of the AU in 2010 (AU, 2010b). The HSGIC was transformed into the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) which today functions as a sub-Committee of the Assembly. Furthermore, the NEPAD SC was turned into an intermediary body to interface between the HSGOC and the new NPCA that evolved from the NEPAD Secretariat. The NPCA of today is a technical body of the AU financed first and foremost from the statutory sources of the AUC. The AUC Chairperson exercises supervisory authority over the NPCA and the HSGOC provides, through the NEPAD SC, policy guidance and strategic advice to the NPCA. Since 2010 successive AU Summits have reaffirmed NEPAD as the flagship programme of the AU and recalled the decision on the new NEPAD governance structures. In addition, AU Summits addressed the continued harmonization efforts between the Commission and the NPCA towards strengthening coordination and coherence in programme implementation in line with the integration of NEPAD into the structures and processes of the AU (AU, 2013a).


Clearly, Africa has experienced a significant evolution in its institutional architecture over the past decade. Yet, challenges of capacity and effectiveness remain as well as those of coordination and coherence. With respect to governance the centre of gravity has moved discernibly to the AU Assembly, the AU Chair and the AUC (including the AUC Chairperson). This development needs to be fully recognized when it comes to engagement with the international community. In this context there is still a lack of clarity regarding the role of the HSGOC in engaging the international community vs. guiding the NPCA. Moreover, in this context the roles of and links to the RECs –

which were understood as building blocs of what is to become an African Economic Community – have to be clarified and strengthened.<sup>38</sup>

Another cornerstone towards more cohesion on the continent is the intensified partnership between the three main continental organisations, AUC, AfDB, and ECA. In 2006 their Joint Secretariat was revitalised, composed of their Chief Executives (AUC, 2006). In 2011 they launched the Joint Secretariat Support Office (JSSO) to underpin their cooperation. The JSSO is also supposed to help (together with the NPCA) in the development of a common African policy position vis-à-vis the donor community as well as to provide support to harmonise common positions vis-à-vis global fora (ECA, 2011).

The establishment, expansion and consolidation of this complex architecture of African institutions have been one of the most significant changes on the African continent in recent years. Broadly speaking, this development has enabled Africa to engage with the international community in a range of issue areas in new ways and to a much more substantive degree. However, it must be acknowledged that this new complex institutional architecture is also posing major challenges, not only for Africa's international partners, but particularly for Africa itself.

Figure 4.1. Overview of Africa's Continental Governance Architecture including Interface with International Partners



Source: Own compilation

#### 4.2 The Emergence of the G20, the Future of the G8 and the Impact on Africa's Role in Global Governance

In response to the global financial crisis of 1997-99 G7 finance ministers took the initiative to create the new Group of Twenty (G20) as a forum of finance ministers and central bank governors from the systemically significant economies of the world, including, for the first time, those from emerging economies. Since then there have been finance ministerial meetings every fall (Kirton, 1999). The first ever G20 summit at Leaders' level was convened in November 2008 in Washington DC to coordinate the global response to the aftermath of the global financial crisis (leading to the establishment of the G20, in 2009, as the premier forum for international economic cooperation at leaders' level (G20,

2009)). In 2010 (Canada) and 2011 (France) the G8 and the G20 presidencies laid with the same countries. Since then G8 and G20 presidencies as well as summits were disentangled. Now, G8 summits are held in spring and G20 summits in autumn.<sup>39</sup> G20 Summits are prepared by the G20 finance ministers and central bank governors ('financial track') and by the G20 Sherpas ('Sherpa's Track', dealing inter alia with development and energy sustainability).

The G20 Seoul Summit (2010) formalized the participation ('invitees') of at least two African non-member countries that attend the leaders' meetings.<sup>40</sup> They can also get involved in the drafting of summit decisions, in working group discussions, and in Sherpas' and Finance Ministers' meetings. In 2013 Russia invited Ethiopia (AU Chair) and Senegal (NEPAD HSGOC Chair). Yet, Africa with its concerns feels underrepresented in G20 meetings since South Africa is the only African member of the G20 and the role of non-permanent invitees has so far been rather marginal not least when compared to African representation at G8 discussions on Africa in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. In addition to fixing the invitee formula, the G20 Seoul Summit (2010) also set the G20 Development Consensus and established the G20 Development Working Group (DWG), which focuses on low-income countries, incl. in Africa (G20, 2013).

So far there is no clear evidence on the future trajectory of both the G8 and the G20 and their relation to each other. Although the G20 became the premier forum for international economic cooperation the G8 returned to addressing global economic issues with a focus on getting their own house in order. Both the G8 and the G20 are now working on development issues. A unique selling point of the G8 resides in the realm of political issues including peace and security, even though common ground may be shrinking as political crises have shown. Both the G8 and G20 struggle in effectively addressing issues like climate change. Currently neither the G8 nor the G20 run an Africa or another region specific agenda instead they rather mainstream regional concerns across their global agendas.<sup>41</sup> It remains to be seen whether the proposition to convene Africa Retreats similar to the one at the 5<sup>th</sup> BRICS Summit (Durban, South Africa; 3/2013) during the upcoming BRICS and G20 summits to be hosted by Brazil and Russia respectively (see AU, 2013) is going to change this (see list of up-coming G8-, G20-, and BRICS presidencies in Table C3 in Appendix C).

Today, neither the G8 nor the G20 can rightfully claim to be the epicentre of global governance as the G8 used to do a decade ago. At the same time it seems unlikely that the G8 and the BRICS become (more or less) homogeneous sub-groups of the G20. Members of all groups rather tend to use the different formats to pursue their national interest and to form issue-specific coalitions. As the world becomes ever more multipolar it is turning less multilateral.

On the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the apex of the United Nations (UN) system, three of the ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly regularly come from and are proposed by the group of African members.<sup>42</sup> The issue of the extension of permanent membership to inter alia one or more African countries is still to be resolved. Although time and again it has struggled to arrive at common positions, the UNSC remains key when it comes to peace and security in Africa. Currently the UN manages and oversees eight UN peacekeeping missions on the continent of around 80.000 personnel (including the new mission to Mali, MINUSMA).


All in all, Africa still remains underrepresented in the main global governance arenas. With the by now lesser role of the G8 and the G8 Summits' return to more informal, smaller and flexible meetings without formalised outreach mechanisms, Africa has lost an important channel to the global governance system. This loss of access to the global governance arena via the G8 cannot be compensated for by the formal G20 membership of South Africa or by the participation of the AU Chair and the NEPAD HSGOC Chair as invitees at G20 and G8 Summits. However, overcoming Africa's marginalisation in global affairs is not only an issue of formal representation but at the same time one of effective leadership, thorough preparation, and development of joint positions in order to make use of the opportunities already at hand. It is obviously easier for Africa to do so within more formalised settings like the UN compared to systems of 'club governance' as the G8 and the G20.<sup>43</sup> The APF (as well as the G8/NEPAD Personal Representatives' system) was inter alia designed to support Africa in tackling these challenges (see Chapter 2). Another attempt has been made by setting up the Joint Secretariat of the CEO's of AUC, AfDB, and ECA (see Chapter 4.1).

#### 4.3 Africa and its Partnerships: Diversification and Reassessment

Over the past decade there has been a quite remarkable proliferation of strategic partnerships between Africa and other parts of the world, reflecting the growing acknowledgement of not only Africa's progress in terms of political and economic reform, but also of its vast potential in terms of natural resources and a rapidly growing population. This also reflects Africa's growing self-confidence and assertiveness, and its determination to become a full participant in the global economy as well as in world affairs more generally. Africa has developed or enhanced more than ten formalized 'Continent to Continent' and 'Continent to Country' 'Strategic Partnerships' as well as five 'Institution to Institution Partnerships/Relations' (see Table C1 in Appendix C and chart 4.3) (AU, 2013a). The G8-Africa Partnership and the newly launched BRICS-Africa Partnership so far do not feature as formalized partnership on the African side. In addition to the strategic and institutional partnerships there is the whole set of bilateral partnerships, altogether 37 alone with the AUC.<sup>44</sup>

Although the characteristics of the partnerships sometimes differ significantly, there are also common features. Most of the strategic partnerships are marked by highly visible events at leaders' or ministerial level. Many have developed multi-year action plans. They are characterized, inter alia, by good bilateral relations, steady expansion in economic ties, growing exchanges of students, and strengthening of cultural cooperation. Some partnerships are mainly anchored with the international partner while others have become jointly owned. Some are characterized by events without strong follow up mechanisms, others have established elaborate joint working machineries. While some of the strategic partnerships are represented in the APF (i.e. EU, France, Japan, and USA) the more recent ones remain outside of the Forum (i.e. China, India, Korea, Turkey, and South America). In the context of this evaluation it should also be mentioned that the G8-Africa Partnership and the APF themselves have launched and supported several new issue oriented partnerships which have worked successfully within their own structures and processes.<sup>45</sup>

Figure 4.2. Africa's Partnerships



Source: Information taken from the AU Website (<http://www.au.int/en/partnerships>)

Africa has recognized the many challenges arising out of the proliferation of its strategic partnerships.<sup>46</sup> In an effort to achieve a certain degree of rationalization with regard to representation, the AU in its Banjul Summit (7/2006) decided to come up with a formula/format to designate which African countries should formally represent the continent at these partnership summits/conferences.<sup>47</sup> The implementation of the Banjul format continues to be difficult, e.g. because some inviting countries still want to choose whom to invite and many African countries and their leaders do not want to miss new opportunities. However, the challenges of the proliferation of partnerships go well beyond the issue of representation. African countries as a group still need a much more co-ordinated, well thought out, strategic overall policy towards their strategic partners. As the proliferation of partnership arrangements continues, this lack of an African strategy or policy could be the source and cause of serious damage to the continent's long-term vital interests.<sup>48</sup>

Fragmentation, high transaction costs, lack of transparency, harmonisation and coordination, and last but not least lack of ownership – features well known from bilateral development cooperation at country level – get multiplied at the international level. The burden on the administrative and diplomatic systems on all sides becomes hardly bearable while serious concerns are expressed in a number of African countries whether some of these dialogues turn out to be all talk and no real follow up action. Also some of Africa's new – and old – strategic partners have started to review their cooperation with the continent in order to take a more systematic and sustainable approach.

The AU is now seriously considering issuing a call for a halt to this proliferation, and is debating how best to rationalize and streamline the various partnerships.<sup>49</sup> The formal review is about to start and first findings are expected to be ready early 2014. So far the focus of this review is still taking shape but will most likely address the contribution of the different partnerships to Africa's development as well as to Africa's voice on the global stage, and better ways of arriving at clear priorities and common positions of the AU.<sup>50</sup>

However, not only Africa has significantly broadened and intensified the cooperation with third partners but also non-African members of the APF. The OECD continues to enlarge its membership, incl. emerging economies.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, it has developed an 'Enhanced Engagement' with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa (since 2007).<sup>52</sup> Asian and Pacific APF members are pivoting

towards the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC; with leaders' meetings since 1993). Since December 2010 two APF members, from both sides, are also members of the BRICS. The EU-ACP partnership in its present form (Cotonou Agreement) is expiring by 2020 and a fundamental debate on how to move on has only started (European Parliament, 2013). At the same time the EU has intensified its Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood Policies and is, together with its North American partners, embracing the idea of a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.

#### 4.4 Proliferating Fora of Dialogue between Africa and the World

The APF has not only underpinned the G8-Africa Partnership (see Chapter 2) but was also conceived as an important forum of dialogue between Africa and the international community. In its early years it had served also this latter function quite significantly. Yet, even in those years and increasingly more recently a multiplicity of other fora and events on Africa has attracted attention (see Table C1 in Appendix C). There are the formal settings like the UN General Assembly which, for example in 2008, convened for an 'High Level Meeting on Africa's Development needs' or the Annual Meetings of the AfDB which have become highly visible and substantive gatherings with numerous side events and dialogue fora.

Beyond these exemplary institutional settings various flagship fora and conferences organized by or in collaboration with the ECA, AUC and AfDB have emerged, for example ECA's biennial African Development Forum, the annual Africa Economic Conference (AEC; AfDB, ECA, UNDP), and the Annual International Economic Forum on Africa (OECD). They all aim, in different ways, to convene key African and international policy, business, academia, and civil society stakeholders up to the highest level in order to debate current research and policies, and to formulate shared priorities and programs. In addition to these conferences there have been repeated initiatives to establish more policy oriented high level dialogue fora on Africa's development. In 2009 the Coalition for Dialogue on Africa (CoDA) was launched as a successor forum to the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA, anchored with the World Bank) and the Big Table (Africa – OECD).<sup>53</sup> CoDA is sponsored by, but not a program of, the AUC, ECA and AfDB. As an independent, international, African-owned 'think tank' at the highest level, CoDA is to identify and discuss issues of importance to Africa's development within a global context. The first highly visible CoDA meeting in Tunis (10/2009) focussed on the global financial crisis and its impact on the African economy. Recent meetings took place at the margins of other events and addressed more specific issues.

Other fora as the World Economic Forum (WEF) on Africa, the Ibrahim Forum or the Africa Progress Panel are not anchored with regional or international organisations, but are likewise aiming to discuss and promote specific policy challenges and initiatives. The newly established Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa addresses African-led solutions to security challenges by discussions free of formal structure or protocol.

The Strategic Partners Dialogue, sponsored by the AUC, ECA, and AfDB in collaboration with the RECs was launched in December 2009 as a forum for all partners to engage with the key Pan-African institutions under one roof and under the leadership of the AU as the principal interlocutor for Africa. It should bring together inter alia the Leadership of AUC, ECA, AfDB, and the RECs, strategic partner representatives from headquarters (at level of policy formulation) as well as African member states through the chairs of the RECs. It aims at building momentum with partners for optimizing Africa's

potential and setting the tone for deepening and redefining Africa's strategic and complementary roles in global affairs over the medium to long term. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Strategic Partners Dialogue took place in April 2011 in Addis Ababa under the theme 'African Integration and Cooperation'. In order to sustain this format participation at political level (e.g. cabinet ministers instead of Permanent Representatives or senior official) has to be ensured and the forum needs to be strategic also in terms of subjects.

A more continuous forum for dialogue between the AU and its partners is provided by the AU Partnership Group composed of the development and strategic partners' Permanent Representatives to the AU in Addis Ababa. The group meets with the AUC Leadership about five to ten times per year and provides an open market for ideas and initiatives.

#### 4.5 Main Findings on Continental and Global Governance

- Today, the AU is widely recognised as the pinnacle of Africa's politics. NEPAD is becoming fully integrated into the AU. Its HSGOC reports to the AU Assembly and the NPCA answers to the AUC Chairperson. The cooperation between AUC, AfDB and ECA is gaining momentum. Yet, there are still serious challenges especially of capacity and effectiveness of Africa's continental institutions. Coordination between AUC and NPCA, strengthening the links to the RECs, and clarifying the respective roles when engaging Africa's international partners, still require more attention.
- The establishment of the G20 at leaders' level, the changing nature of the G8, and the emergence of the BRICS signify an ever more multipolar but less multilateral world. The changes to the G8 outreach formats have taken away an important channel for Africa into the global governance system. Overcoming Africa's marginalisation in global affairs requires also making use of the opportunities already at hand by strong leadership and better joint preparation.
- Over the past decade Africa has remarkably broadened its strategic partnerships with other parts of the world. The more recent partnerships have remained outside of the APF. The proliferation of strategic partnerships has become a heavy burden on the administrative and diplomatic systems on all sides, but particularly to Africa. Africa is now beginning to look for a more systematic approach and reviewing the formats and merits of all its partnerships.
- Beyond the APF numerous global fora of dialogue on and with Africa have sprouted through the last twelve years. Repeated attempts to establish regular high level political dialogues have fizzled out. Only fora that have emerged in recent years around the AU and its commission match the uniqueness of the APF as an intergovernmental forum.


## 5 Views on the Current Performance of the Forum

### Box 5.1. General Information on the Questionnaire

The Terms of Reference (ToR) of the APF evaluation have called for a survey questionnaire and outlined the set of questions to address. Accordingly, the evaluation designed a questionnaire that incorporated closed- and open-ended questions. The answers to the closed-ended questions were analysed using descriptive statistics. Some answers of the closed-ended questions are presented in form of figures in the text. All answers to the closed-ended questionnaire and the descriptive statistical analysis are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. Information extracted from the answers to the open-ended questions have been incorporated in and led to the main text of the report.

The questionnaire was sent (and re-sent) to the then 60 Personal Representatives of APF member states and organisations by different ways. The evaluators received a total response rate to the questionnaire of 40% (50% from member states and 20% from member organisations; see Figure 1; the response rate was highest with member states on the development partners' side, also mirrored in Figure 1). Despite the different response rates the evaluation found the data sufficiently representative because they are supported by the findings from the extensive interviews on both sides.

Box 5.1 Figure 1. Response Rate to the Questionnaire by Group



Source: Own data

### 5.1 Format of Meetings and Participation


#### *Composition of the Forum, Attendance and Level of Participation*

The level of attendance and active participation are important indicators on whether members consider the Forum relevant and useful. In order to compile a more complete picture of the current condition of the Forum the indicators have to be complemented by the respective views of the different Forum members. The evaluation identified the views by means of a questionnaire, personal consultations as well as processing and analysing relevant findings.

Ensuring high-level attendance has been an utmost concern ever since the foundation of the Forum and a key element of the Rome Reform in 2009. On average, 70% of the 61 (2009-2012: 60) Forum members have attended meetings since the Rome Reform albeit with a negative trend in recent years

(i.e. around 60% at the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> APF). Although on first sight average attendance is not particularly bad, it falls short of the expectations and the attendance levels reported from earlier years. More importantly, average attendance at the required political level (i.e. Ministers or Personal Representatives) reached only 25% and is characterised by a negative trend line. This figure increases to 43% when including senior officials. Yet, attendance of senior officials is also characterised by a negative trend line (see Figure 5.1 + 5.2).


Figure 5.1. APF Attendance (2009-2013)<sup>54</sup>



Source: APF meeting documents; own calculation.

Note: Total number of APF members: 2009-2012: 60 // 2013: 61; average attendance is 70%.

Figure 5.2. APF Attendance by Political Level (2009-2013)




Source: APF meeting documents (own calculation).

Note: **Level 1** – Minister OR Personal Representative of Head of State or Government (or Head/Chair of institution); **Level 2** – Senior Official; **Level 3** – Other; Level 1 and Level 2 are representatives from the respective countries' capitals; the percentages for Level 1 and 2 are drawn from the total number of APF members, i.e. 2009-2012: 60 // 2013: 61.

On the one hand, the level of attendance of the core groups NEPAD5 (+ SC Chair) and G8 was notably strong. Political level attendance of NEPAD5 (+SC Chair) and G8 was close to 60% and 50% respectively. On the other hand, attendance by NEPAD16 and OECD11 and in particular by international and African organisations was weak to very weak. The low interest shown by the institutional members is also reflected by their meagre response rate of 20% to the questionnaire compared to a 50% response rate of country members (see Box 5.1). Attendance and level of

participation tend to be slightly above average at the first meeting of the Forum in the calendar year, which – according to the Rome Reform (2009) – is to be held at political level. Meetings in the second half of the calendar year (‘monitoring in character’) suffered not only from below average attendance and level of participation but also from senior officials failing to step in for the political level (see Figure 5.3). Interestingly, of those who attended the last two meetings 75% (on both sides of the partnership) actively contributed to debates at least once, 50% even twice and more.<sup>55</sup> However, this – on average – fairly active participation of the attending members is not mirrored by a broad and clear positive assessment of the overall usefulness of participating in APF meetings (see Figure 5.4). The responding membership quite unanimously holds the view that the level of representation has not been adequate to enable the Forum to play its intended role (see question 2 in Table A1 of Appendix A).

Figure 5.3. Average APF Attendance by Group and Political Level (2010-2013)<sup>56</sup>




Source: APF meeting documents (own calculation)

Note: **Level 1** – Minister OR Personal Representative of Head of State or Government (or Head/Chair of institution); **Level 2** – Senior Official; **Level 3** – Other; Level 1 and Level 2 are representatives from the respective countries' capitals; the percentages for Level 1 and 2 are drawn from the total number of APF members, i.e. 2009-2012: 60 // 2013: 61; please see for a definition of the groups endnote 56.

Surprisingly, the majority of the respondents do not explicitly relate these weaknesses to the size and format of the meetings, which they still view as appropriate for the role of the Forum (see question 25a in Table A1 in Appendix A). There are in particular strong, but not unanimous views not to reduce the number of participants (see question 27c in Table A1 in Appendix A). However, adherence to the present size, composition and format may obviously reflect to some extent merely the interest of members to retain their position in the Forum rather than a thorough assessment of structural shortcomings. For example, weak attendance and level of participation on a regular basis by a set of members negatively impacts the attendance and level of participation by others. Since the Forum has shied away from restricting participation to political or senior official level some high-level representatives have simply walked away from the Forum as they do not see added value in debates with significantly less senior participants. The lack of clarification as well as of enforcement of attendance of all members at the appropriate level has triggered a downward spiral.

Figure 5.4. Usefulness of Meetings



Source: Questionnaire


A number of members – in particular on the development partners’ side – attribute the Forums’ weaknesses partly to the composition of the Forum. Many on both sides point out that the APF is first and foremost a forum composed of countries. Thus, they implicitly question the role of institutions as fully-fledged members and attribute to them more of an advising and supporting role. Some call for limiting membership (e.g. on the G8/OECD side to the most important partners of Africa), others argue in favour of broadening country membership (e.g. by including more or other populous and economically striving African countries or by opening the Forum to the main emerging economies). Some question the current anchoring of the Forum on the African side and call for using the AU more directly as the primary entry point. Others (on both sides) prefer to maintain the arrangements that have prevailed up to now.

#### *Participation of the Private Sector and Civil Society*

The Rome Reform of 2009 stated that “civil society will continue to be represented at meetings of the Forum, and consideration will be given to the possible participation of the private sector” (APF, 2009, p. 2). However, since the reform in 2009 civil society representatives only attended in significant numbers the 14<sup>th</sup> APF (2010; Toronto), which focused on the progress towards the MDGs. Significant private sector representation is recorded for the 16<sup>th</sup> (2011; Paris) and the 17<sup>th</sup> (2011; Addis Ababa) APF. Both meetings focused on issues related to promoting economic growth. Recent meetings have not seen any civil society nor private sector presence. Overall, the responding membership takes a neutral to positive view with respect to opening the APF to the private sector and civil society. Development partners assess the issue of civil society and private sector participation slightly more positively than their African counterparts (see Figure 5.5). There is a broad consensus among members that the Forum serves, first and foremost, as an opportunity for governments to meet. Nevertheless, debates can and should be enriched by bringing in the perspectives and views of the civil society and the private sector. While most members have the opinion that invitations to civil society and private sector representatives should be issue driven, some call for a more systematic approach on how to select invitees (also in order to ensure e.g. sufficient African civil society being present). The evidence of the last five years clearly shows that without a systematic and transparent approach the involvement of civil society and private sector remains accidentally and arbitrary which in turn does not contribute to successfully position the Forum in the global and continental public. So

far there is no evidence that civil society or the private sector regard the Forum as a means to engage with G8- and/or AU/NEPAD-policies relevant to African development.<sup>57</sup>

Figure 5.5. Opening to Private Sector and Civil Society



Source: Questionnaire

## 5.2 Impact and Value

### *Relevance and Alignment of Themes*


From 2003 to 2009 it was envisaged that the APF agenda would focus on “... strategic, political and socio-economic issues related to African development and the implementation of NEPAD programmes ...” (APF, 2005a, p. 2) (see Annex 2). In 2009 the Rome Reform brought about a significant shift by urging that the themes of the Forum should be strongly aligned to the main themes of key regional and global processes, including the G8 and G20, the AU and the UN, in order to catalyse and support action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa’s development (APF, 2009) (see Annex 3). Although the themes chosen since 2009 seem to follow this provision (four times: climate change, incl. a special session; two times each: economic crisis, food security, health, and issues of commercial transparency) they are mainly geared towards some G8- and UN- (climate change) but less to G20- and AU- themes / processes.

It is noteworthy that over the last five years neither politically contentious issues of peace and security, governance and human rights, and international jurisdiction nor specific African concerns like trade or regional integration, have prominently emerged as topics on the APF agenda. This development is rather surprising since these issues used to belong to the core of the earlier G8-Africa Partnership agenda and contributed to the uniqueness of the Forum as a political space encompassing a broad range of socio-economic as well as political and security issues. It is also striking that the Forum has so far not considered the emerging post2015 framework and Africa’s role within it as a possible agenda item.

The responding membership of the Forum give an all in all positive judgement as to the relevance of the themes and their alignment to regional and global processes, albeit with more caution on the African side (see Figure 5.6). However, members believe that there is still room for improving the inputs of the APF to international processes and policies. Some respondents specifically appreciate the

more focused agenda of the recent meetings and their alignment to the G8 summit agenda. Others raise the question whether this simply constitutes a one-way road leaving little room for African partners to propose their own priority issues and – as a consequence – exerting impact on the G8 agenda. In addition, there is also little evidence of APF meetings feeding into African regional or continental agendas and processes. After the previous G8-Africa Partnership agenda ceased to be the formative factor of the APF the Forum was faced with changing priorities of successive G8 presidencies. Some members, in particular the African side, bemoan the ensuing discontinuity and call for a strong alignment of the Forum to the African agenda. They propose, inter alia, a three-year work plan and a moratorium on new issues as long as old ones have not been satisfyingly concluded.

Figure 5.6. Relevance of Themes



Source: Questionnaire

Defining an organizing principle and a proper process to jointly select APF agenda items becomes even more important as it is obviously very challenging to reconcile the priorities of African and global agendas.


### *The Monitoring Role*

Partnership, mutual accountability and shared responsibility were intended to belong to the APFs core added values in relation to other fora. The Rome Reform (2009) confirmed that the Forum “... has a key role to play in monitoring the delivery of commitments by both sides of the partnership” (APF, 2009, p. 1) and stipulated that the second meeting of the Forum in the calendar year should be ‘monitoring in character’. However, ‘monitoring the delivery of commitments’ was only explicitly put on the Agenda at the 15<sup>th</sup> APF in Lilongwe (2010), using the 2010 MRDE as the background document (ECA & OECD, 2010). ECA and OECD published the first MRDE in 2005 at the request of the NEPAD HSGIC (ECA & OECD, 2005). Annual MRDE reports have been issued by ECA and OECD since 2009, facilitated – with the consent of APF co-chairs – by the APF Support Unit (ECA & OECD, 2013). Although the MRDE is the only joint monitoring report prepared on both sides of the partnership it has not been placed on the APF agenda since 2010. The same applies to monitoring reports by the African side, by the G8, and by the G20 (see Chapters 2.2 and 2.3). This explicit reluctance appears to reflect problems and difficulties experienced during the first and only discussion regarding monitoring the delivery of commitments at the 15<sup>th</sup> APF in Lilongwe/Malawi (October 2010). Members seem to shy away from having an open and frank debate, tend to showcase their own

activities and feel mutually lectured. Particularly the African side has become more and more vocal in its complaint that the APF has not fulfilled one of its core mandates, namely a proper review of implementation of commitments while development partners bemoan that African commitments have not been scrutinized by the Forum. This is a major concern on both sides reflecting a fundamental difference of view on what should constitute monitoring commitments.

As a result, a majority of the responding membership on both sides of the partnership take only a neutral to slightly positive view on the monitoring role of the Forum (this includes monitoring efforts via the G8-Africa Outreach and the MRDE; see Figure 5.7). The quality of the MRDE is highly appreciated by all Forum members, but the report is more explicitly praised as important and helpful on the development partners' side. Comments from members of both sides, while confirming their interest in the topic, reinforce the impression that there is no systematic approach by the Forum on monitoring. This applies, for example, to the following questions: (i) Which documents should support the monitoring? (ii) How to link the monitoring exercise to other accountability processes on both sides? (iii) Should the Forum come up with concrete conclusions and recommendations and follow-up on them? Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of joint work between the Forums' meetings (including on methodological issues), which could prepare and support APF monitoring sessions. However, the relevance of the monitoring role of the Forum is primarily challenged by two facts: First, the original G8/NEPAD commitments have barely been updated since 2001. Second, the APFs link to the G8 has become weaker over recent years due to changes to the G8 outreach processes. Without strong political links and a clear mandate the monitoring effort runs the risk of being perceived as a hollow routine.

Figure 5.7. Monitoring Role of the Forum




Source: Questionnaire

In this context the evaluation notes the multiplicity of Africa-related monitoring arrangements within the international community as described in the Report of the UN Secretary-General on monitoring commitments towards Africa's development needs (UNGA, 2010). On the APF, the report acknowledges its relative legitimacy, given the stronger African participation, while also referring to its limitations by not including non-DAC donors. On the basis of the report the UN General Assembly, in 2012, decided to establish a United Nations monitoring mechanism to review commitments made towards Africa's development (UNGA, 2012).

*Impact on Political Processes*


Strengthening the links to and impacting on key continental and global processes has been a central element of the Rome Reform (2009). A narrow majority on both sides of the responding membership still takes a positive view on the usefulness of the Forum as part of the wider political relationship between Africa and its development partners (see Figure 5.8). However, views are more muted or even negative when it comes to specifics of the Forums’ function. The role of the Forum in promoting the partnership between Africa and the G8/OECD is overall seen as neutral to slightly positive with a majority of the African respondents taking a more negative view (see Figure 5.9). The direct impact of the Forum’s conclusions on Africa’s development aspirations and the partnership as a whole is seen with even more caution by both sides (see Figure 5.10). Less than a quarter of the responding membership sees an impact of APF discussions on political processes in capitals or wider regional and international processes as in the AU, the G8 and particularly the G20 (see Figure 5.11).

Figure 5.8. The Forum as part of the wider Political Relationship




Source: Questionnaire

Figure 5.9. The Forum and the Partnership between Africa and G8/OECD Countries




Source: Questionnaire

Figure 5.10. Impact of the Forum on Africa’s Development Aspirations



Source: Questionnaire

Figure 5.11. The Forum and wider Regional and International Processes



Source: Questionnaire

The sceptical self-assessment by the membership mirrors the findings and conclusions on the institutional evolution of the Forum (e.g. discontinued recognition by G8 leaders, structural disjuncture between the APF and G8 Summits, low attendance rate of regional African institutions; see Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.1). In addition, other political formats and processes (e.g. the G20) as well as African and international think tanks, civil society and private sector are too often not aware of the Forum. Some members strongly believe that the sustainability of the Forum could have benefitted from linkages and partnerships forged with, for example, African research institutions. With regard to Africa’s development aspirations it is obvious that more specific, issue driven initiatives gain greater attention, many of them – like CAADP and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA) – having emerged from the broader NEPAD/G8 context.

Concluding, despite the presently limited impact on political processes responding members continue to appreciate the Forum. One reason could be that the Forum offers some members the opportunity to strengthen their visibility and links to global processes. This applies, for example, to development partners without their own strong bilateral Africa dialogue as well as to some NEPAD SC members.


5.3 Governance and Technical Support

*Co-chair Arrangements*

The co-chair arrangements for the Forum have been in place since 2005 (see ToR in Annex 1). The Rome Reform (2009) strengthened their role (actually: their mission) though without altering the composition and institutional arrangements. Given the declining relevance of the G8/NEPAD-Personal Representatives, an effectively functioning APF co-chair system became even more relevant (see Chapter 2). Since 2005 three out of the four co-chairs have rotated annually (i.e. AU-Chair, G8 presidency, OECD11 representative) while the NEPAD SC-Chair remained the same until Senegal took over for a two-year term from Ethiopia in 2013. Ethiopia, however, continues to function in 2013 as an APF co-chair in its capacity as AU Chair. Amongst the rotating co-chairs there is multiyear predictability only with the G8 presidency as the others (AU- and NEPAD Chairs, OECD11 representative) are selected on shorter notice.


The responding membership takes an all in all positive view on the effectiveness of the current co-chair arrangements in preparing and managing APF meetings (see Figure 5.12). Comments are more sceptical when it comes to the second role of the co-chairs, namely advocacy and communication, including feeding joint conclusions of meetings into political processes (see Chapter 5.b). A great majority of members value the experience of co-chairs working with the Support Unit and the NPCA as positive to strongly positive (see Figure 5.13). Many development partner members even argue (and bemoan) that the present co-chair arrangements would not be workable without the secretariat support. In particular development partners highlight the secretariat support of the Support Unit to the G8 presidencies.

Figure 5.12. Effectiveness of Co-chair Arrangements



Source: Questionnaire

Figure 5.13. Cooperation between Co-chairs and Support Unit as well as NPCA



Source: Questionnaire

The smoothly functioning co-operation between the two secretariats seems to sustain at least some communication amongst co-chairs when it is often practically not possible to arrange a working meeting. In particular, it has been increasingly difficult in recent years to maintain a significant level of inter-sessional work by co-chairs as stipulated by the Rome Reform (i.e. ‘two preparatory co-chair meetings before each plenary’). There is a risk that co-chairs rely too much on the intermediary secretariat support, thereby reducing their interaction and undermining their proper ownership of the process. Although a majority of the responding membership back the present system of rotating co-chairs, many take a critical view on the ensuing lack of thematic continuity in particular with respect to the changing priorities of successive G8 presidencies. They also question whether co-chairs make enough of an effort in engaging their respective communities and linking up with other processes on the continent (e.g. with the AU and the RECs) and at the international level (e.g. to G8/NEPAD-PRs, to G8 Sous-Sherpas and Sherpas, and particularly to the G20).

While most members of the Forum appreciate the present composition of co-chairs allowing for a buy in of different constituencies and theirs functioning as equals, they seem to close their eyes to its structural weaknesses. Besides the challenging rotation system there are the usual problems with large co-chair groups: blurred ownership and indistinct responsibilities, in particular if co-chairs have all-too limited room of manoeuvre with regard to their constituencies.

Having two co-chairs on both sides of the partnership also raises the question of the respective roles e.g. of the AU-Chair vs. the NEPAD SC-Chair or of the OECD11-representative vs. the G8 presidency. On the other hand one can guess that the meagre role of international organisation in the APF as well as the weak impact of the Forum on G20 processes result from the absence of a link or buy in to the co-chair arrangements.

*Technical Support through the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency*

## Box 5.2. The Support Unit

The APF Support Unit was established by the 5<sup>th</sup> APF (London, 10/2005) in order to underpin the revised APF mandate (APF, 2005). It became operational in July 2006 after a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the OECD and the members of the Forum had been signed specifying the hosting arrangement of the APF Support Unit by the OECD and after the necessary financial commitments by a number of Forum members had been made.

Although there may have been slight changes over time and with the evolution of the Forum, the core tasks of the Support Unit have remained basically the same:

- Preparation, arrangement and follow-up of APF meetings together with co-chairs and the NPCA (settling date, venue, agenda and speakers; drafting of analytical background papers; drafting and finalising the joint statements agreed at the meetings; making the practical arrangements including constituencies meetings like NEPAD SC; any follow up mandated by co-chairs).
- Producing the MRDE jointly with ECA as initially requested by the NEPAD HSGOC and endorsed by the AU Assembly (AU, 2010a) including circulating and presenting it at major international fora.
- Working across OECD directorates (well beyond the Development Cluster) in the context of the APF, the MRDE and general Africa related issues via, for example, facilitating lesson-learning arrangements and information sharing.<sup>58</sup>

The Support Unit also facilitates the APF website, the one and only internet presence of the Forum. The website provides a useful electronic archive of APF meeting documents and many interesting links to related institutions and reports on Africa (<http://www.africapartnershipforum.org>). It could be more interactive and would benefit from better updating of the websites of related institutions. A substantial redesign of the website is underway and will go ‘live’ after consultations with the NPCA.


The Unit was designed small and flexible while maintaining the essential critical mass of expertise and capacity needed to accomplish its work (OECD, 2005). Since its inception, the Support Unit’s expenditures have remained well below the first provisional cost estimates of EUR 2 million annually. Average annual expenditure declined from more than EUR 1.5 million between 2006 and 2010 to close to EUR 1.2 million in the following years up to 2013.<sup>59</sup> Over time all bilateral development partners in the APF have contributed at least once to the financing of the Support Unit, although in a very unequal way. The sheer range of contributions has been between less than EUR 30.000 and close to EUR 1.9 million. In both periods, G8 members accounted for 57% and the OECD11 for a remarkable 43% of the overall contribution.

The Support Unit is headed at Director’s level to “...interact effectively with high-level policy makers” (OECD, 2005) and staffed with a Personal Assistant to the Director, a Financial and Administrative Officer, a Communications Co-ordinator and an Economist. Staff salary accounts for just 60% of total expenditure (2010-2013). The Support Unit actively draws on the expertise of the various OECD directorates and contracts consultants for intellectual services, for example regarding the MRDE or meeting documents. The Support Unit issues regular activity reports to the APF members (by midyear) and to the OECD Council (by year-end).


The current hosting agreement with the OECD runs until end of June 2014. The available financial contributions will be able to cover the cost only until then. A prolongation of the hosting arrangement as well as obtaining the necessary financing of EUR 1 million annually would require various political and administrative processes which would have to be initiated early 2014 at the latest.

The secretariat support to the APF as arranged for by the London ToR (2005; see chapter 2.b) and confirmed by the Rome Reform (2009; see chapter 2.c) receives a quite positive overall rating by the responding membership, in particular with respect to the preparation of APF meetings. Around 60% have a positive or strongly positive attitude to the Support Unit. Development partners have an even more positive view of the Support Unit than the African side (see Figure 5.14).

Figure 5.14. Perception of the Support Unit (Question 14a/b)



Source: Questionnaire



Source: Questionnaire

The evolution of the partnership between the NPCA and the Support Unit is perceived as slightly positive, with a more positive view on the African side (see question 16a in Table A1 in Appendix A). In addition, the extent to which both entities have drawn on the expertise of other NPCA and OECD directorates is regarded very positively (see question 17a in Table A1 in Appendix A). The support of other NPCA and OECD directorates has become evident, for example, during the preparation of the thematic issues of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> APF. Furthermore, the annual activity and financial reports from the Support Unit are judged helpful by a majority of the development partners even if some would like to see more information on the Unit’s activities and more detailed interim and projected financial statements (see questions 19a and 19b in Table A1 in Appendix A). Moreover, some members on both sides bemoan a lack of specified tasks for the secretariats formulated by the Forum and/or its co-chairs.

It seems evident that without the strong, efficient and high-quality support by the Support Unit on the G8/OECD side as well as by the NPCA on the African side and the resulting continuity the APF would hardly have been sustained over the years (see also the paragraph on monitoring - incl. the MRDE - as well as the next on APF meetings). This good performance is remarkable given the lingering reservations by members with respect to the ambiguity of institutional and hosting arrangements. A part of the explanation obviously lies in the continuity of leadership on both sides of secretariat support including their dedicated and trustful cooperation. The structural problems of the secretariat arrangements are threefold. (i) There is no single or formally leading secretariat although the APF itself as well as its co-chairs function as unified formats. Earlier suggestions that the AU/NEPAD Secretariat takes the lead, working together with a Support Unit, have not materialized. (ii) Allotting the secretariat function on the African side to NEPAD seemed natural during the first years of the G8/NEPAD partnership and the APFs focus on the respective action plans. With the emergence of the AU and the transformation of NEPAD into its implementing agency (i.e. NPCA) as well as with the shifting APF focus towards continental and global political processes (Rome Reform 2009) a number of members on both sides see an increased role of the AU and its commission. For them, the institutional developments obviously raise the question of the functioning of the AU and its commission within the specific arrangements of the secretariats. In addition, there is the role of ECA as it partners with the OECD (and the Support Unit) in issuing the MRDE. (iii) Unlike African partners, development partners in the APF do not have institutions of their own (as a distinct group) at their disposal that could provide secretariat support. Although all development partners are members of the OECD, the membership of the OECD goes well beyond AFP members.<sup>60</sup> At the same time the OECD itself, as an international institution like others, is a member to the APF. Hence, it is important to understand that the OECD only hosts the Support Unit and this role should not be confounded with the other roles of the OECD.

On both sides of the partnership there is a broad consensus that the African role and representation in the secretariat arrangements needs to be strong and equal, with quite a number expressing regret that the African side has not yet taken the lead.


#### *Preparation, Arrangement and Follow-Up of Meetings*

The Rome Reform (2009) called on co-chairs to identify the main strategic issues well in advance of the plenary. This has proven increasingly challenging due, inter alia, to disjunctures between preparations for the APF and the G8-Africa Outreach (see Section 5.2), difficulties in aligning African, development partners' and global priorities, and sometimes cumbersome processes amongst co-chairs (and secretariats). Shedding the cycle of a first political and a second monitoring meeting every calendar year as well as lack of synchronisation between APF- and other processes added to the challenge.

As a result there is, for example, generally no predefinition of the agenda of the next meeting at the end of the preceding one. It is only around two to three months before the next APF that date, venue and agenda of the meeting are communicated to the Forums' members. Some members would have preferred earlier confirmations to ensure their high-level participation and proper preparation. Some also argue that convening the first meeting earlier in the year (February or March) would have helped with better impacting the G8 processes. However, despite the complexities of setting the substantial

agenda in good time there is a broad and strong consensus on both sides that the background documentation prepared by the Support Unit, the NPCA, and the AUC have been useful and the practical arrangements for meetings satisfactory (see Figure 5.15; see question 15b in Table A1 in Appendix A). Members are also quite pleased with the plenary format and see little advantage compared to other possible formats (e.g. in breakout sessions; see question 25d in Table A1 in Appendix A). Yet some believe that more inter-sessional work, for example through (virtual) working groups, would have benefitted the quality of APF discussions. A clear majority is also in favour of holding two meetings a year (see question 25b in Table A1 in Appendix A). With respect to the venue most members seem to be content with the current alternating formula: 1<sup>st</sup> meeting in the country of the G8 presidency and 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting in Africa (normally in the country of the AU- or NEPAD SC-Chair). There are, however, also suggestions for giving non-G8 development partners the opportunity of hosting or for holding all meetings on an alternating basis in Addis Ababa and Paris.


Figure 5.15. Usefulness of Background Documentation



Source: Questionnaire

It was only in 2009 that the adoption of a communiqué or joint conclusions was agreed upon as one of the ways to more effective recording and disseminating the conclusions of meetings (Rome Reform; APF, 2009). Since then all APF meetings have adopted joint statements or communiqués. After many years and meetings without proper conclusions this is quite an achievement, even if these in the eyes of some – to a certain extent rightly – have been too broad and declaratory, and not sufficiently reflecting the debates' richness. The majority of the responding membership (with a bit more caution on the African side) takes a more or less positive view on the recording and dissemination of the conclusions (see Figure 5.16) whilst at the same time many of them on both sides call for doing more on dissemination and particularly on follow-up of meetings.

Figure 5.16. Recording and Dissemination of Conclusions



Source: Questionnaire

Obviously dissemination of conclusions amongst the members is efficiently organised by the secretariats on both sides. In addition conclusions are made publicly available through the APF website run by the Support Unit. Surprisingly, neither the websites of the NPCA, the AU or the ECA nor the ones of the recent G8 presidencies display the APF and its conclusions, raising questions of relevance and ownership. However, making conclusions electronically available is only a means. What really counts is whether co-chairs and members of the Forum make it their business to actively promote them in capitals and other fora. Unfortunately there is little evidence of this actually being done effectively (see paragraph on impact). The argument that the Support Unit (and the NPCA) could have played a greater role misses the point since both lack proper political mandate as well as access. There are different views on whether monitoring or evaluating the follow-up of meetings (e.g. by an APF-owned evaluation mechanism) would have helped with better follow-up. Finally, it has to be kept in mind that it is in the first place the quality and persuasiveness of the conclusions' substance, which can propel their dissemination.

#### 5.4 Main Findings on the Performance of the Forum

- Ownership of the Forum, measured by attendance and level of representation, is significantly higher with countries' membership (in particular NEPAD5 and G8) than with organizations' membership. Yet, overall attendance rates and levels of participation have been constantly declining since 2010. They are no longer adequate to the Forums' intended role and have impacted negatively on the usefulness of participating. The weaker performance of the Forum in recent years may also be attributed to a failure in adapting and/or limiting its membership. Private sector and civil society participation - as invitees - has been unsystematic but useful where issue specific.
- The themes chosen for APF meetings have been mainly geared towards the G8-, but less to G20 and AU-agendas. There is a lack of forward planning and a sense of African concerns being not fully reflected. The Forum shied away from taking up politically contentious issues as well as from pursuing its monitoring role. With the Rome Reform's attempted shift to key regional and global processes, the impact of the Forum on Africa's development aspirations became more

indirect. At the same time however, the Forum's impact on, and recognition by, regional and global processes has become almost insignificant.

- The Rome Reform's strengthened role of the co-chairs could not be adequately put into effect, partly due to arrangements being insufficient, e.g. with respect to regional and global processes. Co-chairs have been effectively supported by the secretariats on both sides. Preparation and format of meetings as well as background material have been satisfactory. Inter-sessional work, however, has been missing. Conclusions of meetings have been rather broad and declaratory. Their dissemination and promotion beyond the 'APF community' has been largely unsatisfactory. The smoothly functioning cooperation between the two secretariats has been essential for sustaining the Forum. The African role within the secretariat arrangements could have been stronger and eventually even a leading one.

## **6 Conclusion**

### **6.1 Relevance**

The African Partnership Forum was a significant component of the G8-Africa Partnership until well into the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the last decade. In substance, the Forum focused predominantly on the NEPAD- and G8 Africa action plans. Institutionally, the Forum represented one of the sides of the key ‘triangle’ of the partnership: the G8 Africa Summit Outreach, the G8/NEPAD Personal Representatives system, and the APF itself. In those years, the partnership between Africa and the G8 as a group was one of the drivers of a vibrant decade of political, economic and social progress in Africa.

As the G8 mainstreamed African issues into their global agendas and Africa organised the issue-specific implementation of and international support to its development agenda, the Forum, partly as a result of its own success, became less relevant in this regard. The Rome Reform (2009) steered the Forum to a new, highly relevant focus: impacting key regional and global processes.

From an institutional perspective, the Forum has lost much of its original relevance and did not adapt itself to the new focus and environment. The G8-Africa outreach, into which the APF was meant to feed, essentially ended. The G8/NEPAD Personal Representatives system has become dysfunctional. The present composition of the Forum’s membership does not mirror today’s institutional, political and economic realities, neither on the African nor on its partners’ side. On the African side, the Forum is not sufficiently anchored within the new AU institutional architecture, while on the side of some of Africa’s partners there are similar challenges, for instance in the wake of the EU’s new diplomatic architecture. The links to the AU polity in Addis Ababa are weak. Channels of interaction between the Forum and the G8-/G20 Sherpa systems as well as the new strategic partners of Africa have not been established. Still, only fora that have emerged in recent years around the AU and its commission match the uniqueness of the APF as an intergovernmental forum.

### **6.2 Effectiveness and Impact**

At the time of a good functioning institutional triangle (Outreach, Personal Representatives, and APF), the Forum made an effective contribution to rallying support behind Africa’s development, buttressed by strong political leadership at the highest level. A number of significant issue-specific processes have been launched by the triangle. Many of these are still effectively and positively impacting on the continent.

Presently, the APF cannot be described anymore as key and effective in terms of impacting global or even regional processes. In today’s ever more multipolar but less multilateral world the Forum is not recognized as an important point of reference. This is due to the Forum’s failure to adapt to the dramatically changed times and circumstances, and partly to internal weaknesses. Although the Forum provides a space for open and frank debate, it has not been sufficiently effective in taking up contentious issues, in launching joint initiatives, and arriving at forward driving conclusions. Dissemination and promotion of the Forum’s concerns beyond the ‘APF community’ have been largely ineffective.

The Forum has not been able to engage itself in an honest mutual review of commitments. Particularly the African side has become more and more vocal in its complaint that the APF has not fulfilled this part of its core mandate, while development partners bemoan that the Forum has not scrutinized African commitments. The annual MRDE, the only and exemplary monitoring report jointly produced on both sides, has only once been put on the Forums' agenda. Drawing on the vast experience and knowledge of ECA and OECD, and with its concise and focussed analysis and recommendations, the MRDE could have provided an effective means for joint monitoring debates. Instead one could witness, on both sides, a proliferation of monitoring mechanisms with other processes and fora.

Particularly in recent years, the Forum has not been effective in ensuring the required political level of attendance and is rather adding to the burden weighing upon senior officials on both sides. In a way, it augments the complexity of arrangements in the global scene as well as of Africa's partnership mechanisms, while having relatively little impact on, for example, overcoming Africa's marginalisation in global affairs.

### 6.3 Efficiency and Sustainability

The APF is a quite efficient way of bringing people concerned with Africa together and hold high-level discussions, with a minimum of bureaucracy. The Forum is efficiently supported by the lean secretariats arrangements. Secretariats' preparation of meetings including background documentation has been commendable, though the African role in this context could have been stronger.

Co-chairs function efficiently their direct preparation and chairing of meetings. Yet, co-chairs have not developed sufficiently efficient mechanisms of inter-sessional work and communication, inter alia with respect to forward planning and establishing links to key regional and global processes. Co-chairs have been supported, effectively as well as efficiently, by the secretariats on both sides – up to the risk that co-chairs rely too much on the intermediary secretariat support, thereby reducing their interaction and undermining their proper ownership of the process.

Although the Forum, from its very start, has struggled with its role, objectives and institutional set-up, it has shown remarkable institutional resilience. This may be due partly to the commitment of some of its members, partly to the smoothly functioning cooperation between the two secretariats. Most importantly, however, the Forum may not be sustainable without a purpose linking it to a high-level political process like the G8-Africa Summit Outreach used to be in the earlier years of the last decade.

## 7 Recommendations on the Basic Tenets of the Forum in the Future

### 7.1 Back to the Roots or Decamping to something New?

As the Forum in its present form is not sustainable within today's continental and global landscape its members face fundamental choices. Neither dragging on with only some marginal changes, nor closing the Forum without taking a look into the future are sensible and politically wise options. Therefore key members to the Forum on both sides have to make up their minds on how to serve best their interests and responsibilities with respect to the future of Africa.

#### *'Back to the Roots' Scenario*

G8 members have to decide whether they see – as in 2001/2 – value added in having, as a group at leaders' level, a long-term, comprehensive, and structured approach towards Africa besides their substantially increased bilateral (including European) partnerships with Africa. In the same way, key African leaders have to come up with a joint position on whether and to what extent it makes sense to engage with the G8 as a sub-group of its diversified strategic partners.

Although this evaluation has not found evident pointers concerning the likeliness of the (re)emergence of such a long-term, comprehensive, and structured approach, it deems it necessary to highlight the option of a 'back to the roots' scenario. A new, structured G8-Africa engagement could be composed of a two-tiered institutional set-up: an annual (or every two years) meeting at leaders' level supported by Personal Representatives on both sides who meet at least twice a year. While the G8 membership is given, the composition on the African side should clearly reflect the enhanced role of the AU. A formula could read as follows: AU-Chair, AU-PSC Chair, Chairperson of the AUC, five key African countries (e.g. the NEPAD5 plus HSGOC Chair; or a new configuration of countries which share the G8 commitment to democratic, market-economy societies; see also Chapter 7.4). The overall membership would be less than twenty.

The Personal Representatives on both sides should be nominated at a level comparable to Director General and be anchored with the Heads' of States or Government offices. On the G8 side, they should be integrated into the Sherpa system, for example in the form of Africa Sous-Sherpas reporting to leaders through the G8 Sherpa. This lean structure would require neither specific secretariat's arrangements nor a broader forum like the APF to underpin it.


#### **Recommendation 1:**

Africa and the G8 should, in due course, consult with each other at Sherpa level regarding whether and how to (re-)establish a structured partnership between Africa and the G8 as a group. The consultations should be led on the African side by the AU-Chair, the AUC Chairperson, and the NEPAD HSGOC-Chair, and on the G8 side by the present plus the next two incoming G8 presidency/ies (2014/15).

### *Decamping to a Future Forum*

As this evaluation is tasked with making recommendations on the future of the APF going well beyond the G8, it has to take a broader look at possible options and scenarios. This is broadly supported by the findings from the evaluators' consultations and by the views expressed by the members who responded to the questionnaire. Recognizing the new international architecture, close to two thirds of the responding membership no longer take a positive view on the relevance and appropriateness of the Forum as of today (see Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1. Relevance of the Forum in the World of Today



Source: Questionnaire

In order to arrive at recommendations on the basic tenets of the Forum, three key questions need to be addressed:

- Why should there be a Forum in the future?
- What issues should the Forum be about?
- Who should be the members and owners of the Forum?

The answers to these questions lead to a matrix of options for a future Forum. The recommendations will then focus on three different options (with the usual grey zones between them).

### 7.2 Why should there be a Forum in the Future?

Africa, straddling two oceans, is neither part of the North-Atlantic nor of the Asia-Pacific community. At the turn of the Millennium Africa was considered as a continent requiring a special approach by the international community (as put forward in the UN Millennium Declaration and reflected in the G8-Africa Partnership and the APF). That certainly did highlight and help Africa over the course of the ensuing decade, but bore the risk of stigmatizing and ghettoizing a diverse continent (Cargill, 2010). Today, Africa is widely considered as the "... next emerging continent" (G8, 2013, p. 5). While the AU is developing a 50-year African Agenda 2063 to be adopted by the AU in 2014 (AU, 2013b) there is no clear evidence that the post2015 agenda will have a special African pillar.<sup>61</sup>

However, irrespective of whether a new global agenda on Africa is necessary or likely to emerge, this evaluation has found good reasons for Africa and its international partners to engage each other in a structured or even coordinated way: (i) Africa is key to global sustainability and stability. (ii) Africa is insufficiently represented in and linked to the global governance architecture. (iii) Africa is most at risk if and when global and national policies fail to depart from a ‘Business-as-Usual Trajectory’.

Global affairs in today’s world are to a large extent driven by summits at the highest level. Thus, it makes sense and is even necessary for Africa and its global partners to underpin their interaction in the same way. A regular Global Africa Summit could position a rising Africa in the world of tomorrow (see Figure 7.2). Alternatively, a structured high-level engagement could be aligned to existing global or continental arrangements (e.g. G20 or AU Summits). It is only within such a context that a forum like the APF could thrive and serve a purpose beyond itself, for example by preparing summits and initiatives, and by helping with implementation and monitoring.

Figure 7.2. Positioning Africa



Source: Own compilation

**Recommendation 2:**

Africa and its international partners should acknowledge the need to regularly engage each other in a high-level, structured and coordinated way.

**Recommendation 3:**

The APF should be tasked by leaders with re-establishing itself in line with the future institutional and thematic arrangements at summit levels.

**7.3 What Issues should the Forum be about?**

The case for a forum like the APF can only be made if all sides agree that it is unique in providing for cross-cutting discussions covering a broad gamut of issues, in linking African and global agendas, and in feeding into higher-level arrangements. But even when following this reasoning there is a need to determine in principle the breadth and depth of issues to be addressed at the Forums’ as well as at the higher political level. Out of a continuum of options, particular attention should be given to three ‘what – approaches’ (the first ones encompassing the latter):

- i. A ‘broad, strategic approach’ should in principle span issues of peace and security, governance and human rights, socio-economics and environment, and address global and continental public goods.
- ii. An ‘economic cooperation approach’ could focus on issues like (green) growth, energy and infrastructure as well as trade, FDI, ODA, and domestic resource mobilization, including the continental and global processes governing these issues.
- iii. A ‘development cooperation approach’ would focus on achieving the MDGs and any comparable post2015 development agenda, with ODA and the development effectiveness agenda as the main transmission belts of the partnership.

As Africa and its partners are broadening their cooperation and head towards a post-ODA era the third option (‘development cooperation approach’) seems too narrow, not least because an elaborate institutional machinery is already governing these issues. In contrast, the ‘broad, strategic approach’ as well as the ‘economic cooperation approach’ would meet significant interest and attraction from Africa and its partners. The specific issues and themes to be taken up at a time should reflect shared priorities and be set out with a medium-term perspective.

**Recommendation 4:**

A future arrangement between Africa and its international partners should link African and global agendas and follow either a ‘broad, strategic approach’ or an ‘economic cooperation approach’.

**Recommendation 5:**


Any future structured engagement between Africa and its partners should establish a multi-year work plan linking African and global agendas, and monitor the priorities and initiatives which arise in this context.

#### 7.4 Who should be the Members and Owners of the Forum?

Given the lessons learned from the first ten years of the Forum, any arrangements on member- and ownership should in the first place ensure that the ones at the Forum’s level match those at the higher political level to the greatest possible extent. Secondly, since international relations are mainly shaped by nation states, membership should primarily lie with countries (including their supranational bodies). Thirdly, the institutional set-up should result from the roles and objectives of any arrangement.

The issues of membership and ownership have to be addressed with respect to both Africa and its partners. They are particularly complex and politically sensitive. A clear majority on both sides of the responding membership is in favour of reconsidering an expansion of the Forum to involve emerging countries like China, Brazil, and India (see Figure 7.3). At the same time there are calls to restrict the membership, to reconfigure also the representation on the African side, and to better link the Forum to the emerging African and international polity around the AU in Addis Ababa (see Chapter 5.1 and 5.3).

Figure 7.3. Involvement of G20 Members



Source: Questionnaire

This evaluation suggests, again out of a certain continuum, three basically different ‘who – approaches’ with respect to the member- and ownership issue:

- i. A ‘strategic partners approach’ should aim at bringing together Africa’s main trade, aid, and security partners with those African countries that are key to the continent and its international partners. The criteria to be applied should reflect all three dimensions and limit the membership on either side to a maximum of twenty and provide some permanency.
- ii. An ‘institutional AU-OECD approach’ would still build on the primacy of nation states but embed the partnership in the institutional context of the organisations on both sides. Membership would be limited to those AU- and OECD-countries that meet the same criteria specified in the first approach. Alternatively, representation on the African side could be aligned to the Banjul format (see endnote 48).
- iii. A ‘global governance approach’ would limit the membership on the partners’ side to the G20 members. This approach includes all G8- and BRICS countries. The composition on the African side should probably follow the Banjul format.

A common feature to all three ‘who-approaches’ is that they refrain from including international and regional organisations as well as civil society and private sector in the formal membership. These actors should be – depending on the issue – invited on a case-by-case basis. As some countries on both sides would not continue as core members of the Forum consideration could be given (except for the third approach) to a grandfathering clause or representation, for example through the EU or the NEDAP SC Chair.

However, the ‘who – question’ goes far beyond the issue of formal, quasi-automatic membership. Being invited to the partnership and its forum is, in the first place, a privilege that needs to be honoured by participation at the appropriate level, by a fair financial contribution, and by promoting the joint objectives at home in capitals and in other fora.

This evaluation suggests that Africa and its partners should in the first place aim at a ‘strategic partners approach’, but principally consider all three approaches. The pros and cons of the ‘who-approaches’ are discussed in connection with the ‘what-approaches’ in Chapter 7.5.

<p><b><u>Recommendation 6:</u></b></p> <p>Any arrangements on member- and ownership should ensure that the ones at the Forum’s level match those at the higher political level to the greatest possible extent and that they are closely linked to the African and international polity around the AU in Addis Ababa.</p>
<p><b><u>Recommendation 7:</u></b></p> <p>Membership should primarily lie with nation states and be limited to a number of twenty on either side. International organisations, civil society, and the private sector should be – depending on the issue – invited on a case-by-case basis.</p>
<p><b><u>Recommendation 8:</u></b></p> <p>Membership should result from invitation and has to be honoured by participation at the appropriate level and a fair financial contribution. These preconditions should be enforced.</p>
<p><b><u>Recommendation 9:</u></b></p> <p>For countries that would not continue as core member consideration should be given to a grandfathering clause or a mechanism of representation.</p>
<p><b><u>Recommendation 10:</u></b></p> <p>Africa and its partners should in the first place aim at a ‘strategic partners approach’, but also consider an ‘institutional AU-OECD approach’ and ‘global governance approach’.</p>

### 7.5 A Matrix of Options

When connecting the three ‘what-approaches’ and the three ‘who-approaches’, a matrix of options for a future partnership and a respective forum emerges.

Table 7.1. Matrix of Options – Who and What?

<i>Who</i> \ <i>What</i>	Strategic Partners Approach	Institutional AU-OECD Approach	Global Governance Approach
Broad & Strategic Approach	A1 Model 1: Global Africa Strategic Dialogue	B1	C1
Economic Cooperation Approach	A2	B2 Model 2: AU-OECD Partnership	C2 Model 3: Africa Global Governance Panel
Development Cooperation Approach	A3	B3	C3

Source: Own compilation

Options following the ‘Development Cooperation Approach’ (A3, B3, and C3) do not attract enough support on both sides. A ‘Broad & Strategic Approach’ is unlikely to work within an ‘Institutional


AU-OECD’ (B1) or a ‘Global Global Governance Approach’ (C1), since the OECD and the G20 as respective key actors lack an explicit mandate with political issues like peace and security. An ‘Economic Cooperation Approach’ would work with a ‘Strategic Partners Approach’ (A2) but fail in tapping the full potential of the latter. Therefore, this evaluation recommends considering in more depth three models for a future partnership arrangement and a respective forum which could probably combine the ‘What’ and the ‘Who’ in a very productive manner:

*Model 1: The Global Africa Strategic Dialogue*

The ‘Global Africa Strategic Dialogue’ should be established and chaired by the AU. The AU should invite a maximum of 20 of Africa’s key traditional as well as new strategic partners and on the African side a similar group of countries that are key to its international partners. Determining the members is primarily a political issue to which this evaluation can only provide assessment and recommendations. Given the nature of Model 1, spanning political, economic and other development issues, a case can be made in favour of applying a pertinent quantitative, criteria based approach to both sides.

Table 7.2 shows Africa’s top 20 partners (plus EU). The list comprises all strategic and other partners with more than 20 billion USD of trade with Africa (2011), or more than 1 billion USD of aid to Africa (2011), or at least 2% financial contribution to UN peacekeeping on the continent (2013). The criteria are used as proxies to best capture the most relevant partners.<sup>62</sup> The listed countries represent 80% of Africa’s trade with the rest of the world (excl. African countries), 92% of ODA to Africa<sup>63</sup> as well as 90% of financing peacekeeping in Africa. Figure 7.4 compares this group to the present development partners’ APF country membership as well as to the other possible configurations (Models 2 and 3).

Figure 7.4. Africa’s Partners



Source: Own compilation

Table 7.3 shows the international community’s top 20 African partners in terms of trade (more than 25 billion USD), aid (more than 1.5 billion USD), and security (UN peacekeeping; consideration could also be given to the AU-PSC Chair and the three African UNSC members). Countries which are for example not a member of the AU or whose membership is suspended are not marked but might stay away from any arrangement. The listed countries represent more than 85% of Africa’s total trade with the rest of the world in 2012, more than 80% of FDI stock in Africa in 2012, 70% of total net ODA to

Africa in 2011, and all UN peacekeeping missions to Africa.<sup>64</sup> Figure 7.5 relates this group to the present African APF membership and the more politically defined configuration of the Banjul format.

Table 7.2. Africa's main Trade, Aid and Security Partners

	Country	Trade 2011 (Billion USD)	ODA 2011 (Million USD)	Budget (Million USD) and Personnel of UN Operations
1	China	142.1	(2300)	6.6 / 1433
2	United States	130.7	10690	28.4 / 42
3	France	75.8	6900	7.2 / 50
4	Italy	58.8	2029	4.4 / 6
5	India	58.7	(400)	0.1 / 6319
6	Germany	50.9	5101	7.1 / 38
7	Spain	41.4	1546	3.0 / 0
8	United Kingdom	38.4	5936	6.7 / 9
9	Netherlands	34.9	1835	1.7 / 29
10	Brazil	29.0	(96)	0.6 / 40
11	Japan	28.3	3393	10.8 / 271
12	Belgium	21.4	1338	1.0 / 24
13	Turkey	17.6	286.84	0.3 / 134
14	Canada	17.4	2148	3.0 / 26
15	Korea, Republic of	17.0	301	2.0 / 285
16	Russia	8.8	121	3.1 / 86
17	Australia	7.7	605	2.1 / 26
18	Sweden	6.9	2292	1.0 / 40
19	Norway	3.1	1607	0.9 / 43
20	Denmark	2.1	1331	0.7 / 19
	<i>EU</i>	377.9	30977	30.4 / 310

Source: (ECA, 2013b; Erikson, Biswas, Dubey, Eggen, & Qobo, 2012; OECDstat, 2013; UN, 2013; UNCTADstat, 2013)

Note: Please see Table C7 in the Appendix C for further explanatory notes


Table 7.3. Main African Countries in Trade, Aid and Security

	Country	Trade 2012 (Billion USD)	ODA Average 2009-2011 (Million USD)	Budget (Million USD) and Personnel of UN Operations
1	South Africa	163.0	1168	
2	Nigeria	162.5	1832	
3	Algeria	114.6	238	
4	Egypt	93.6	668	
5	Angola	87.8	226	
6	Libya	78.2	231	
7	Morocco	61.3	1116	
8	Tunisia	36.7	657	
9	Ghana	25.3	1691	
10	Sudan	18.9	1123	1149 / 19703
11	South Sudan	see Note III	1087	830 / 7590
12	Kenya	17.2	1963	
13	Cote d'Ivoire	15.7	1561	575 / 10201
14	Tanzania	14.1	2776	
15	Ethiopia	13.4	3625	
16	Congo, Dem. Rep.	8.9	3811	1347 / 20438
17	Mozambique	7.3	2012	
18	Senegal	6.6	998	
19	Uganda	5.8	1697	
20	Mali	2.8	1114	n/a / 12640
21	Liberia	1.5	899	496 / 7368

Source: (OECDstat, 2013; UN, 2013; UNCTADstat, 2013)

Note: Please see Table C1 in the Appendix C for further explanatory notes.

Figure 7.5. Possible Configurations for African Representation



Source: Own Compilation

- Note:
- AMU - The Arab Maghreb Union
  - CEN-SAD - The Community of Sahel-Saharan States
  - COMESA - The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
  - EAC - The East African Community
  - ECCAS - The Economic Community of Central African States
  - ECOWAS - The Economic Community Of West African States
  - IGAD - The Intergovernmental Authority on Development
  - SADC - The Southern African Development Community

The ‘Global Africa Strategic Dialogue’ should build on the APF and incorporate the ‘Strategic Partners Dialogue’ set up by the AUC in collaboration with ECA and AfDB. It should consist of two layers, a high(est)-level dialogue every two or three years and a forum at Director Generals’ level convening every six months. It should be chaired by the AU-Chair (along with the AUC Chairperson), supported by a bureau of two countries from each side. These could be elected by the membership for a two or three year term, taking into account G8- and G20 presidencies and AU-, NEPAD HSGOC- and AU-PSC Chairs (including, on both sides, incoming ones).

Secretariat arrangements to the ‘Dialogue’ should be provided by the African side, supported by its partners. The secretariat should be aligned with the JSSO of AUC, ECA, and AfDB.

*Model 2: The AU-OECD Partnership*

The ‘AU-OECD Partnership’ should be established on the African side by the AU-Assembly represented by the AU-Chair and the AUC Chairperson, and on the OECD side by the OECD Ministerial Council represented by its chairmanship and the OECD Secretary General. The ‘AU-OECD Partnership’ would follow an economic cooperation approach (including development cooperation), given the OECD’s mandate. Although under an ‘AU-OECD Partnership’ all AU- and OECD countries would be basically included, actual membership on the OECD side should follow the same criteria as with Model 1, but limited to OECD members (including e.g. Korea and Turkey). Brazil, China, and India, which met the criteria under Model 1 but are not members to the OECD, could be invited to join as partners to the OECD’s Enhanced Engagement (there is, however, no evidence on the likeliness of theirs’ acceptance). Also on the African side, the same formula as with Model 1 (optionally without the security dimension) should be applied. Alternatively the Banjul format could be applied to define African membership.

The ‘AU-OECD Partnership’ could easily build on the APF and various already existing links between the OECD and Africa. These links increasingly go beyond narrower development cooperation and need to be managed more coherently.<sup>65</sup> On the political level a joint ministerial meeting could convene every three years. An ‘AU-OECD partnership’ forum at Director Generals’ level should meet at least once a year. Meetings on both levels should be co-chaired by the AU-Chair and the AUC Chairperson, and on the OECD side by the chair of the Council and the Secretary General. These meetings would be buttressed and flanked by regular exchange and cooperation between the OECD Secretariat and the AUC (including the NPCA). The partnership could also be tasked with G8 and African leaders’ initiatives as they emerge.

The ‘AU-OECD Partnership’ should be supported by a joint secretariat, based in equal measure with the AUC and the OECD.

*Model 3: The Africa Global Governance Panel*

The ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ would link Africa to the main global governance arenas in the field of economic cooperation, including development cooperation. It should be convened on the initiative by the AU and be chaired either by the AU itself or jointly with G20- (and possibly G8- and BRICS-) presidencies. Membership on the international partners’ side would be confined to G20 members thereby excluding some of Africa’s relevant traditional development partners. Membership on the African side would probably have to follow the Banjul format, which would exclude some African countries of particular economic or security relevance.

The ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ would have to start at Sherpa-level, meeting twice a year to buttress the already existing, though limited African representation at G20 Summits. It should provide an Africa-perspective on the G20 agenda at large, not confined to or as a sub-theme of the G20 Development Working Group (DWG). On the longer term, the feasibility and sustainability of the ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ would very much depend on the preparedness of the G20 to embark on some form of structured interaction (possibly every two or three years) with Africa at leaders’ level as proposed in the context of the BRICS Africa Retreat (see chapter 4.3).

The secretariat support to and thematic preparation of the ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’ should be provided for by the JSSO of the AUC, the ECA and the AfDB.

**Recommendation 11:**

Africa and its partners should in the first place aim at Model 1 ‘The Global Africa Strategic Dialogue’, but should also consider Model 2 ‘The AU-OECD Partnership’ and Model 3 ‘The Africa Global Governance Panel’ (for a synopsis of the details see Table 7.4).


Table 7.4. Synopsis of Core Recommendations

Model	What	Who		Tiers/layers		Co-chair arrangement	Secretariat arrangement
		Africa	Partners	High-level	Intermediate		
‘Back to the roots’ (‘G8-Africa Partnership’)	Long-term, comprehensive, and structured partnership	AU-Chair AU-PSC Chair AUC Chairperson NEPAD5 (e.g.) HSGOC Chair	G8 members (incl. EU)	Summit meetings (annual or every two years)	Personal Representatives (at least twice a year)	AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson) G8 presidency	AUC and G8 presidency
<b>Model 1</b> ‘Global Africa Strategic Dialogue’	Broad and strategic dialogue (political, economic, development)	Twenty key African countries (based on trade, aid, and security criteria; plus AU Chair, AU-PSC Chair, and AUC Chairperson)	Twenty key partners of Africa (based on trade, aid, and security criteria; including EU)	High(est)-level dialogue every two or three years	Forum at DG level (twice a year)	AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson), supported by an elected (two or three year) bureau of two countries from each side	Provided by the African side (aligned with JSSO, supported by partners)
<b>Model 2</b> ‘AU-OECD Partnership’	Economic cooperation (including development)	Twenty key African countries (see Model 1, maybe without security) <u>Or</u> 17 countries according to the Banjul format	18 key OECD partners of Africa (see Model 1, maybe without security)	Joint ministerial meetings every three years	Forum at DG level (at least once a year) <u>and</u> periodic meetings between the OECD Secretariat and the AUC (including NPCA)	AU Chair AUC Chairperson Chair OECD Council OECD Secr. Gen.	Joint AUC-OECD secretariat
<b>Model 3</b> ‘Africa Global Governance Panel’	Global economic governance (including development)	17 countries according to the Banjul format	G20 members (incl. EU)	Meetings at leaders’ level every two or three years	Forum at Sherpa level twice a year	AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson) <u>or</u> AU Chair (plus AUC Chairperson) G20 presidency (current and incoming)	Provided by the African side (aligned with JSSO, supported by partners)

## 8 Recommendations on the Functioning of and the Technical Support to the Forum


Recommendations on the functioning of and the technical support to any future format have to flow, in the first place, from the chosen model. However, there are lessons learned from the past of the Forum, suggestions conveyed to the evaluators, and findings from the evaluation that should be taken into account when designing any future arrangement. A narrow majority of all (and all African) respondents to the questionnaire is in favour of retaining the present co-chair arrangements (see Figure 8.1). A strong majority on both sides sees a need to maintain the APF Support Unit beyond end-June 2014 (see Figure 8.2).

Figure 8.1. Future of the Co-Chair Arrangement



Source: Questionnaire

Figure 8.2. Future of the Support Unit



Source: Questionnaire

The following recommendations focus on those this evaluation deems key for success. The case for them is mainly made in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5.

### **On Co-Chair arrangements and institutional set-up in capitals**

**Recommendation 12:**

Chair- and co-chair arrangements should allow for more permanency, for example by bringing in, alongside the AU-Chair, the AUC Chairperson and including incoming G8- or G20 presidencies.

**Recommendation 13:**

In the preferred case of an African lead the chair (AU-Chair plus AUC Chairperson) should be supported by an (elected) bureau of two African and two partner countries.

**Recommendation 14:**

G8- and G20 Sherpas should acknowledge the chair/co-chairs (as well as all Forum members) as primary interlocutors when it comes to issues related to Africa.

**Recommendation 15:**

In capitals, co-chairs as well as all Forum members should be anchored with those branches of government that are key to the Forums' focus (Model 1: Presidencies or prime ministers offices; Model 2: Ministers of Finance/Economics/Development; Model 3: G20 Sherpas).

**Recommendation 16:**

The respective constituencies should entrust the co-chairs with the necessary room for manoeuvre to jointly lead and represent the Forum, including in between meetings and actively promoting its agenda with key continental and global processes.

### **On preparation, arrangement and follow-up of meetings**

**Recommendation 17:**

The date and agenda of meetings should be set early, at best at the preceding meeting.

**Recommendation 18:**

The Forum should regularly convene at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa (Model 2: alternating with OECD/Paris).

**Recommendation 19:**

Co-chairs should not shy away from taking up contentious issues when setting the agenda of meetings.

**Recommendation 20:**

The Forum should come up with more innovative, creative, and forward-looking conclusions, which reflect the frankness and richness of debates.

**Recommendation 21:**

Co-chairs and Forum members should more actively and widely disseminate and promote the Forums' activities and conclusions, including by putting the Forum on the websites of the AU and the G8/G20 presidencies and linking it to the existing APF website of the Support Unit.

**Recommendation 22:**

Co-chairs should publish an annual report monitoring the Forums achievements and following through its conclusions.

### On monitoring of commitments

**Recommendation 23:**

The Forum should re-assess the proliferation of monitoring mechanisms and agree on one format in line with the future role and membership of the Forum.

**Recommendation 24:**

The MRDE should form the primary basis of any future joint monitoring system, possibly adapted to future arrangements.

**Recommendation 25:**

The Forum should set up a small inter-sessional task force to jointly work on methodological questions related to monitoring.

**Recommendation 26:**

The Forum should convene a major monitoring event every two or three years, preferably aligned to another important international or continental gathering.

### On secretariat support

**Recommendation 27:**

Any broader structured engagement between Africa and its international partners needs to and should be supported by an integrated, lean secretariat.

**Recommendation 28:**

Any secretariat arrangement should display strong African leadership (Model 2: jointly with OECD) and should be anchored with the AU headquarters, closely aligned to the JSSO.

**Recommendation 29:**

Co-chairs should show joint ownership of the secretariat and actively steer and oversee it.

**Recommendation 30:**

The APF Support Unit, together with AUC and NPCA, should help with the transformation of the Forum and its secretariat arrangements according to the chosen model, with its mandate updated respectively and prolonged for another two years (including the hosting arrangement).

## **9 The Way Forward**

Since the present APF mandate originates from G8- and African leaders and the recommended models for the future involve, on both sides, countries that presently are not APF members, consultations on the way forward should be designed accordingly. That implies on the one hand to follow through, under the guidance of co-chairs, the consultation process within and between APF constituencies as stipulated by the 20<sup>th</sup> APF in London. On the other hand it is recommended to involve, and reach out, to countries, institutions, and processes beyond the core membership of the Forum. That should be initiated swiftly and most suitably led by the AU at the highest level, in close contact with the present and the two incoming G8- and G20 presidencies at Sherpa level (G8: UK 2013, Russia 2014, and Germany 2015; G20: Russia 2013, Australia 2014, and Turkey 2015).

The leadership by the AU is critical because it is only Africa which can drive these issues beyond given path dependencies and entrenched communities on both sides. First findings from the current reassessment of Africa's strategic partnerships, commissioned by the AU Assembly, might feed into the process from early 2014. The AU-, G8- and G20 Summits in 2014 will provide an opportunity to set out a trajectory for future arrangements and to task the APF or any equivalent configuration accordingly.

Over the next two years, the Forum and its secretariat arrangements will probably undergo a transition phase, helping with its own transformation by providing lessons learned, networks, and strong secretariat support.

New, up-to-date, and efficient arrangements for a structured and coordinated engagement between Africa and its partners should be in place when the world enters the post-2015 era.

## Notes

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- <sup>1</sup> The evaluation of the APF also has been noted by 20<sup>th</sup> AU Summit (Addis Abeba; 01/2013) (AU, 2013a).
- <sup>2</sup> Although a high-level policy dialogue forum as the APF is a quite unusual evaluation object to which the applicability of standard evaluation methodologies is limited, this evaluation tried to follow these standards, incl. the respective terminology, as far as possible (IEG & OECD, 2007; OECD, 2010).
- <sup>3</sup> President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (at the time also Chairman of the G77), President Thabo Mbeki of the Republic of South Africa (at the time also Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement), President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of the Democratic People's Republic of Algeria (at the time also Chairman of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)) and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai of the Kingdom of Thailand (at the time also Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) and Chairman of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)) (G8, 2000).
- <sup>4</sup> Although there was no immediate concrete response by the G8 to the proposed continuation of the initial meeting, Leaders recognized the significance of the meeting and applauded its positive nature (G8, 2000).
- <sup>5</sup> NEPAD was then still known under the working title 'A New African Initiative' (NAI) (Rukato, 2010).
- <sup>6</sup> In the middle of the 1970s the then main democratic market economies formed the informal group of seven (G7) in order to address, in more or less private meetings at leaders' level, key global economic and financial issues (e.g. collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the 1973 oil crisis). The agenda swiftly broadened and included major economic and political issues facing their domestic societies and the international community as a whole. Russia had been invited to G7 Summits since 1994 and became a full member in 2002, transforming the G7 into the G8 (G8, 2002a).
- <sup>7</sup> In 2005 the Revised Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Africa Partnership Forum (APF) made reference to an agreement between G8 and African leaders at the 2003 G8 Summit (Evian/France). The agreement made clear "... that NEPAD is a long-term programme of between 15 and 20 years" (APF, 2005a, p. 1) (see Annex 2).
- <sup>8</sup> The UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 recognized the special needs of Africa and resolved to "... support the consolidation of democracy in Africa and assist Africans in their struggle for lasting peace, poverty eradication and sustainable development, thereby bringing Africa into the mainstream of the world economy" (UN, 2000). In September 2002 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted its Declaration on the New Partnership for Africa's Development, welcoming the NEPAD and urging the United Nations (UN) system and the international community, in particular donor countries, to assist with the implementation of the New Partnership (UN, 2002). This was mirrored and welcomed by the G8 APR's Implementation Report to the G8 Summit in Evian/France in 2003 (G8 APR, 2003).
- <sup>9</sup> Examples of substantial initiatives within the framework of the G8AAP: (1) Action Against Famine Especially in Africa – A G8 Action Plan; (2) Joint Africa/G8 Plan to enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations.
- <sup>10</sup> Address by President Chirac: [http://www.un.int/france/documents\\_francais/031110\\_mae\\_chirac\\_afrique.htm](http://www.un.int/france/documents_francais/031110_mae_chirac_afrique.htm)
- <sup>11</sup> The only exception was in 2006 (St Petersburg) when Africa was represented by the Chair of the AU; South Africa participated as 'emerging economy' alongside Brazil, China, India, and Mexico.
- <sup>12</sup> This development was mirrored, for example, in the Summit Participants Lists where they were listed alongside G8 Sherpas.
- <sup>13</sup> It was only in 2010 that the 'AU/NEPAD African Action Plan (AAP) 2010-2015' was issued (AU & NEPAD, 2009).
- <sup>14</sup> For example, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Forum "... was reminded that the APF is not an implementing or pledging forum" and that its role should rather be "... to focus on identifying strategic issues that have impact on the accelerated implementation of NEPAD" (ECA, 2004). The 4th APF (April 2005, Abuja) "... agreed that the APF is a valuable forum to enhance mutual accountability, and that it's added value was in taking forward NEPAD objectives based on high-level, political dialogue. There was broad support for the notion that agenda setting and monitoring should form the main basis of the APF" (APF, 2005b, p. 9). There was also agreement "... that the APF could be strengthened through high-level representation as well as better preparations for meetings and more follow-up on issues in between meetings" (APF, 2005b, p. 9).
- <sup>15</sup> Confirmed by the 4<sup>th</sup> APF in Abuja in April 2005 (No. 64 of the Report). <http://www.oecd.org/site/africapartnershipforum/meetingdocuments/38984542.pdf>.
- <sup>16</sup> It was only at the 15<sup>th</sup> APF (Lilongwe/Malawi, October 2010) that the 2010 MRDE was put on the agenda.
- <sup>17</sup> This suggestion, even after echoed in the Rome Reform, has not been met by a consensus from constituencies.
- <sup>18</sup> Only in the context of the 8<sup>th</sup> APF in Berlin in May 2007 the APF website reported that "... through the intensive dialogue between the G8 Africa Personal Representatives (APR) and the African partners in preparing the APF, this year's APF developed substantive recommendations for the G8 summit as well as for the AU summit, thus following up the joint work on the G8 Africa Action Plan adopted in Kananaskis in 2002" (APF, 2007).
- <sup>19</sup> With respect to the G20 see chapter 4.2.

- <sup>20</sup> In 2011, there was an additional outreach session with North African Leaders on the Arab Spring. The meeting led to the Deauville Partnership.
- <sup>21</sup> Please see the following link for more detailed information:  
<http://transition.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2012/fs120518.html> .
- <sup>22</sup> Besides the G8 Leaders (incl. EU) the lunch was attended by Leaders/Heads from/of Ireland, Mexico, Senegal, Liberia, Ethiopia, Libya, AU Commission, IMF, World Bank, and OECD.
- <sup>23</sup> Currently (May 2013) only Germany, Japan and USA run the two systems in personal union.
- <sup>24</sup> The AU/NEPAD Accountability Report on the G8-Africa Partnership had been commissioned by the July 2010 AU Summit (Kampala/Uganda) for presentation by African Leaders at the 2011 G8/Africa Outreach. Although, in this context, the AU Summit had emphasized that the MRDE should form the primary basis of Africa's monitoring of G8 partnership commitments, it remained unresolved how the two reports relate to each other (AU, 2010a).
- <sup>25</sup> The estimation is based upon the median variant scenario.
- <sup>26</sup> External financial flows are made up of (1) foreign direct investment (FDI), (2) portfolio investment, (3) official development assistance (ODA) and (4) remittances.
- <sup>27</sup> Overall Inward FDI Stock (annual) at current prices and current exchange rate amounted to \$629,7 billion in 2000. In comparison, Inward FDI Stock (annual) at current prices and current exchange rate amounted to \$153,7 billion in 2012. Global FDI inflows fell by 9% and 33% in 2008 and 2009 respectively. All three major economic groupings – developed, developing, and the transition economies – witnessed a decline of FDI inflows in 2009 of 41%, 20% and 40% respectively (UNCTADstat, 2013).
- <sup>28</sup> The APF addressed the issue at its 19th and 20th meeting.
- <sup>29</sup> ODA numbers refer to total net-ODA (current prices; Bilateral Official Development Assistance by types of aid) from all donors (total). ODA data includes both bilateral and multilateral flows from countries (and institutions) reporting to OECD DAC.
- <sup>30</sup> According to ECA (2013a) progress has been made especially in the areas education, child and maternal mortality rates, and gender equality.
- <sup>31</sup> Inclusive growth is defined here as broad based, shared and pro-poor growth.
- <sup>32</sup> Data: Gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) share of world total. Data is expressed in % of world GDP in PPP dollars. Data from 2011 onwards is based on IMF Staff estimates.
- <sup>33</sup> Total trade is defined as export plus import (Africa is the base economy).
- <sup>34</sup> China is at the forefront of the development: the total trade volume between China and Africa rose from 10.6 billion USD in 2000 to 160.0 billion USD in 2011 making China Africa's largest bilateral trading partner (Deogratias, 2012; FOCAC, 2010).
- <sup>35</sup> Developing and transition economies increased their share in Greenfield FDI projects in Africa from 45% in 2010 to 53% in 2011 (UNCTAD, 2012, p. xvi). The 2011 Ernst and Young 'Africa Attractiveness Survey' shows that annual investment from emerging partners grew on average 13% annually between 2003-2010 (Ernst&Young, 2011).
- <sup>36</sup> The AU has established, for example, the Pan-African Parliament and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. On sector level there are seven Specialised Technical Committees whose membership is unlimited; The PSC can make use of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), an 'Early Warning System', a 'Panel of the Wise', and the build-up of an 'African Standby Force' to be composed of brigades from each region of the continent.
- <sup>37</sup> The AUC is composed of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson, and eight Commissioners. The AUCs portfolios are: Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; Rural Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources, Science and Technology; and Economic Affairs.
- <sup>38</sup> Also the (draft) Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017 for the African Union Commission (AUC) bemoans the duplication of effort within the Commission and with NEPAD and RECs, while at the same time referring to the NEPAD both as an external partner and as a cooperating department (AU, 2013c).
- <sup>39</sup> With the exception of the Los Cabos/Mexico Summit on 18-19 June 2012.
- <sup>40</sup> The Seoul Summit Document: "74. Bearing in mind the importance of the G20 being both representative and effective as the premier forum for our international economic cooperation, we reached a broad consensus on a set of principles for non-member invitations to Summits, including that we will invite no more than five non-member invitees, of which at least two will be countries in Africa" (G20, 2010, p. 17).
- <sup>41</sup> With the exception of the G8 Deauville Partnership established in 2011 (Deauville/France; 5/2011).
- <sup>42</sup> Presently it is: Morocco (2012/2013), Rwanda (2013/2014), and Togo (2012/2013) (UN Security Council, 2013).
- <sup>43</sup> See for example the development of joint positions on climate change or on the post2015 agenda.
- <sup>44</sup> Verbal information provided to the evaluators by the AUC.
- <sup>45</sup> Examples: The Joint Africa/G8 Plan on Peace Support Operations (2003), the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA) (2005), the Investment Climate Facility for Africa (2006), the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative (2009), and The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (2012). Furthermore, APF members work together in global initiatives, for example, the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (New Deal, 2013), the Busan Partnership for Effective

Development Co-operation (The Busan, 2012) and the Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness by AU/NEPAD (<http://www.nepad.org/crosscuttingissues/africa-platform-development-effectiveness>).

46 The need to carry out an evaluation of the partnerships was inter alia highlighted by an AU Executive Council in July 2012 (<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/EX%20CL%20Dec%20696-725%20%28XXI%29%20 E Final.pdf>).

47 The African Union (AU) adopted the Banjul format in 2006 at its Summit in Banjul, Gambia. Following the Banjul format, participants of the African side at such events shall include the Chairperson of the AU, the Chairperson of the AU in the preceding year, the Chairperson of the AUC, the five initiating countries of NEPAD, the Chair of the Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee (HSGOC) and the Chairs of the 8 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) (Erikson, Biswas, Dubey, Eggen, & Qobo, 2012).

48 A recent ECA Report on Africa-BRICS cooperation called on Africa and its individual countries to rectify deficits in their capacity to understand the issues at hand, to coordinate among themselves, to negotiate and handle complex deals effectively, to monitor ensuing financial flows, and to be competitive in its own private sector (ECA, 2013b).

49 See, for example, also the AU Summit (1/2013) decision on Africa's strategic partnerships (<http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2013/au-summit-decision-africa-s-strategic-partnerships>).

50 See, for example, the 'Welcome Remarks' by AUC Chairperson at the 22<sup>nd</sup> Ordinary Session of the AU Executive Council (24 January 2013) (<http://appablog.wordpress.com/2013/01/24/welcome-remarks-by-he-dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-of-the-african-union-commission-opening-session-of-the-22nd-ordinary-session-of-the-executive-council-addis-ababa-january-24-2013/>) and at the 26<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the PRC (19 May 2013) (<http://summits.au.int/en/21stsummit/speeches/welcome-remarks-he-dr-nkosazana-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-african-union-commissio>) as well as Output 7.2 of the AUC Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017 ("...3. Develop and rigorously monitor strategic Partnerships to ensure attainment of the AU Vision and the Third Strategic Plan of the Commission ...") (AU, 2013c).

51 For example Turkey joined 1961, Mexico in 1994, Korea in 1996, Chile in 2010, and Russia is in an accession process since 2007; some of them also joined or are joining the DAC.

52 The OECD, in addition to its close relationship with the G8, has served as an active participant in G20 meetings and summits since 2008 and worked closely with the successive G20 presidencies (OECD, 2013b).

53 For more information on the GCA see:

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20267207~menuPK:538667~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:258644,00.h>; For more information on the Big Table see for example: <http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/files/attachments/other/Managing%20Africas%20Natural%20Resources%20for%20Growth%20and%20Poverty%20Reduction.pdf>.

54 Note: The African Union Presidency (AU Chair) is as an African institution a full member of the African Partnership Forum (APF). The African Union Presidency is represented at the Forum by the respective country holding the presidency at the time of the Forum meeting. As a consequence the respective country is double counted.

55 Data derived from the observation of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> APF.

56 Definition of the different groups: **NEPAD 5 (+NEPAD SC Chair):** The group is comprised of the five NEPAD founding countries South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt and Senegal as well as the current NEPAD Steering Committee (SC) Chair. In the period 2009-2012 Ethiopia was the NEPAD SC Chair and the group consisted of 6 members. In the 2013 Senegal took over the NEPAD SC Chair and the group currently consists of 5 members; **G8 (incl. EU):** The group is comprised of all G8 countries as well as representation of the EU; **NEPAD 16:** The group is comprised of all African country APF members that do not belong to the group NEPAD 5 (+NEPAD SC Chair). Currently (i.e. year 2013) there are 21 African NEPAD countries part of the APF. As the group NEPAD 5 (+NEPAD SC Chair) presently consists of 5 members, there are 16 other African NEPAD countries left in the APF. During the period 2009-2012 there were 20 African NEPAD countries part of the APF. The group NEPAD 5 (+NEPAD SC Chair) consisted of 6 members (Ethiopia was NEPAD SC Chair). Thus, there were 14 other African NEPAD countries left in the APF; **African Organisations:** The group consists of 13 members; **OECD 11:** The group is comprised of all OECD countries that are members to the APF and do not belong to the G8 (incl. EU) group. This group consists of 11 members; **International Organisation:** This group consists of 7 members (see also Table B1 in Appendix B).

57 There is, however, a set of issues that could be debated at this interface. For example, the critical comments of African farmers' movements as well as G8-civil society groups on the 'New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition' (Misereor, 2013).

58 The contribution of the Support Unit to the OECD's work of Africa and development was evaluated in 2009/2010 (McGill, 2010). On OECD's work with Africa see (OECD, 2011).

59 Own calculations on the basis of the annual financial reports of the Support Unit.

60 Russia is in a process of accession to the OECD. List of OECD members: <http://www.oecd.org/general/listofocdmemberscountries-ratificationoftheconventionontheoecd.htm>

61 Neither the United Nations High Level Panel (UN HLP) Report on the Post-2015 Development Agenda (UN HLP, 2013) nor the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network (SDSN) Report for the Secretary-General of the United Nations (UNSG) (SDSN, 2013) have addressed this question explicitly.

62 The different criteria are used as proxies for three important dimensions of the partnership: (i) economic cooperation and integration, (ii) aid and (iii) security. Trade functions as a proxy for economic cooperation and integration. FDI is another important proxy. However, due to the lack of bilateral data FDI could not be used as a second proxy for

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economic cooperation and integration. In addition, ODA functions as a proxy for the aid relationship between the different countries and Africa. Moreover, financial contribution to peacekeeping missions in Africa functions as a proxy for the security dimension of the partnership. The contribution of personnel to the different missions is noted.

<sup>63</sup> The aid percentage data contains total bilateral net and imputed multilateral ODA in millions (current prices) in 2011. It includes total all donors reporting to OECD DAC. It excludes the aid data from emerging markets (e.g. China). The trade data refers to total merchandise trade (i.e. Total All Products; Standard International Trade Classification).

<sup>64</sup> The number illustrating the percentage of total African trade of the listed countries for 2012 excludes the trade data from Sudan (no data is available so far). The Aid data includes total all donors reporting to OECD DAC.

<sup>65</sup> For an overview of the OECD's work with Africa see (OECD, 2011).

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## Appendix

### Appendix A: Questionnaire

Table A1. Questionnaire

Nr.	Question
<b><u>Section A: Format of Meetings and Participation</u></b>	
1	Have the themes since 2003 and more particularly since June 2009 been relevant, and aligned to the main themes of regional and global development processes?
2	Has the level of official representation at APF meetings been adequate to enable the Forum to play its intended role as set out in the London Revised Terms of Reference of October 2005 and the Rome reform document of June 2009?
3	Are there disjunctures between preparations for the APF and G8-Africa Outreach, as a key component of the Forum, particularly in relation to selected themes?
4a	Has it been useful to open the APF to the private sector and civil society?
4b	What are the advantages and disadvantages?
5	Have the current co-chair arrangements been effective as a way of preparing and managing meetings?
6	Have the conclusions of the meetings been adequately recorded and disseminated?
Section A	General comments on questions/issues in section A
<b><u>Section B: Impact and Value</u></b>	
7a	Has participation in APF meetings since the 12th APF in Rome in 2009 been useful?
7b	... and if so, why?
8a	Have discussions in the APF been useful as a way of sharing policy experience and lessons?
8b	Have they fed into the policy processes in capitals, both in Africa and its development partners?
9a	Have APF discussions fed into wider regional and international processes...
9b	particularly in the AU,
9c	the G8?
9d	the G20?
10	Has the Forum played its intended monitoring role, including through the G8-Africa Outreach and Mutual Reviews of Development Effectiveness in Africa (MRDE)?
11	Are meetings of the Forum a useful part of the wider political relationship between Africa and its development partners?
12	What role has the APF played in promoting the partnership between African and G8/OECD countries?
13	What has been the direct impact of the APF conclusions on Africa's development aspirations and the partnership as a whole?
Section B	General comments on questions/issues in section B
<b><u>Section C: Technical Support to the APF through the support unit and NEPAD agency</u></b>	
14a	How is the Support Unit perceived by African and development partners, and ...
14b	... to what extent has its work evolved in compliance with its mandate?
15a	Has the background documentation, prepared by the Support Unit and the NEPAD Agency and AU Commission, been useful?
15b	Have the practical arrangements for meetings been satisfactory?
16a	How has the partnership between the NEPAD Agency and the Support Unit evolved over this period, and ...
16b	...is it valued by the NEPAD Agency?
17a	To what extent have the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency been able to draw on the expertise of other NPCA and OECD Directorates in these tasks?
17b	Has this been useful?
18	What has been the experience of co-chairs in working with the Support Unit and

	NEPAD Agency over this period?
19a	<i>(For development partners)</i> Has it been helpful to have the annual activity and financial reports from the Unit in their current form?
19b	Would you like any changes?
Section C	General comments on questions/issues in section C
<b><u>Section D: Future of the Forum</u></b>	
20a	Do the objectives and role of the APF agreed in 2009 remain relevant and appropriate given the new international architecture which has emerged since then, and ...
20b	... what role should it play in the future?
21	What is its added value in relation to the various other fora that exist for dialogue on development issues in Africa?
22	What can be done to increase the impact of the Forum, including by sharing policy experience and feeding into policy processes in capitals. How might this be done?
23	What can be done to optimise linkages with preparations for the G8 – Africa Outreach as a key component of the Forum, particularly in relation to selected themes?
24	Is it time for the Forum to reconsider membership expansion to involve G20 members who currently are not APF members, such as China, Brazil, India?
25a	Is the size and format of the meeting appropriate for the role of the Forum?
25b	Specifically, is it useful to continue to hold 2 meetings a year, and ...
25 c	... if so, how should the Spring (April-June) and Autumn (October-November) meetings be structured?
25d	Should additions to the main plenary format be considered?
26	How should the thematic development issues discussed at the APF meetings be prioritized? How to best address the monitoring of conclusions of the Forum for greater impact?
27a	How could APF members ensure the participation needed to deliver the Forum's objectives?
27b	What kind of actors should be invited to participate?
27c	Should the number of participants be reduced?
28a	Should the current co-chair arrangements be retained ...
28b	or modified?
28c	What are the possible options?
Section D	General comments on questions/issues in section D
<b><u>Section E: Future of the Support Unit</u></b>	
29	Is there a need to maintain the APF Support Unit beyond end-June 2014?
30	If so, should the current working arrangements between the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency be maintained?
31a	<i>(For development partner)</i> Do the current governance and hosting arrangements for the APF SU remain appropriate?
31b	Do other suitable options for hosting the APF SU exist?
32a	If hosting the Unit within the OECD is the most suitable arrangement, should it be integrated more closely into the permanent OECD structures?
32b	Are there any other suitable options?
Section E	General comments on questions/issues in section E
<b><u>Section F: Extra Comment</u></b>	
Section E	Extra Comment Field

Table A2. Quantitative – descriptive statistical – analyses of the questionnaire

Nr.	Question	Partner	n	Strongly Positive	Positive	Neutral	Negative	Strongly Negative	Total	Mode	Median	Range
<b>Section A: Format of Meetings and Participation</b>												
1	Have the themes since 2003 and more particularly since June 2009 been relevant, and aligned to the main themes of regional and global development processes?	African Partners	7	14.3%	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	100.0%	2.0	3.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	17	17.6%	52.9%	17.6%	11.8%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>45.8%</b>	<b>20.8%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
2	Has the level of official representation at APF meetings been adequate to enable the Forum to play its intended role as set out in the London Revised Terms of Reference of October 2005	African Partners	7	0.0%	0.0%	57.1%	28.6%	14.3%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	17	0.0%	17.6%	41.2%	41.2%	0.0%	100.0%	4.0	3.0	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>45.8%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
3	Are there disjunctures between preparations for the APF and G8-Africa Outreach, as a key component of the Forum, particularly in relation to selected themes?	African Partners	7	0.0%	0.0%	71.4%	28.6%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	1.0
		Dev. Partners	15	0.0%	13.3%	60.0%	26.7%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>	<b>63.6%</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>
4a	Has it been useful to open the APF to the private sector and civil society?	African Partners	7	14.3%	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%	14.3%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	16	31.3%	25.0%	37.5%	6.3%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>26.1%</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>39.1%</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>4.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
5	Have the current co-chair arrangements been effective as a way of preparing and managing meetings?	African Partners	7	28.6%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	17	17.6%	23.5%	41.2%	11.8%	5.9%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20.8%</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
6	Have the conclusions of the meetings been adequately recorded and disseminated?	African Partners	7	0.0%	42.9%	28.6%	28.6%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	3.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	17	11.8%	47.1%	17.6%	5.9%	17.6%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>45.8%</b>	<b>20.8%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
<b>Section B: Impact and Value</b>												
7	Has participation in APF meetings since the 12th APF in Rome in 2009 been useful?	African Partners	6	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	16.7%	16.7%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	16	12.5%	25.0%	50.0%	12.5%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>18.2%</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	<b>36.4%</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
8a	Have discussions in the APF been useful as a way of sharing policy experience and lessons?	African Partners	7	14.3%	42.9%	28.6%	0.0%	14.3%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	17	11.8%	47.1%	35.3%	5.9%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>45.8%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
8b	Have they fed into the policy processes in capitals, both in Africa and its development partners?	African Partners	7	0.0%	42.9%	14.3%	42.9%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	3.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	16	6.3%	0.0%	68.8%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>4.3%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>	<b>52.2%</b>	<b>30.4%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
9a	Have APF discussions fed into wider regional and international processes...	African Partners	5	20.0%	20.0%	20.0%	40.0%	0.0%	100.0%	4.0	3.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	13	7.7%	7.7%	46.2%	38.5%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>38.9%</b>	<b>38.9%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
9b	particularly in the AU,	African Partners	6	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	50.0%	16.7%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	12	0.0%	25.0%	41.7%	25.0%	8.3%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>5.6%</b>	<b>22.2%</b>	<b>27.8%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>11.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
9c	the G8?	African Partners	5	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	0.0%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	15	6.7%	6.7%	60.0%	26.7%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>5.0%</b>	<b>10.0%</b>	<b>50.0%</b>	<b>35.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
9d	the G20?	African Partners	5	0.0%	20.0%	20.0%	60.0%	0.0%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	15	0.0%	13.3%	26.7%	33.3%	26.7%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>15.0%</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>40.0%</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>

10	Has the Forum played its intended monitoring role, including through the G8-Africa Outreach and Mutual Reviews of Development	African Partners	7	0.0%	42.9%	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	16	0.0%	37.5%	43.8%	12.5%	6.3%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>39.1%</b>	<b>43.5%</b>	<b>13.0%</b>	<b>4.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
11	Are meetings of the Forum a useful part of the wider political relationship between Africa and its development partners?	African Partners	7	14.3%	42.9%	28.6%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	17	11.8%	41.2%	47.1%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	2.0	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>41.7%</b>	<b>41.7%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
12	What role has the APF played in promoting the partnership between African and G8/OECD countries?	African Partners	7	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%	57.1%	0.0%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	16	18.8%	25.0%	56.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>17.4%</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>43.5%</b>	<b>17.4%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
13	What has been the direct impact of the APF conclusions on Africa's development aspirations and the partnership as a whole?	African Partners	7	0.0%	14.3%	28.6%	57.1%	0.0%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	2.0
		Dev. Partners	14	7.1%	14.3%	57.1%	14.3%	7.1%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>4.8%</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	<b>47.6%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>4.8%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
<b>Section C: Technical Support to the APF through the support unit and NEPAD agency</b>												
14a	How is the Support Unit perceived by African and development partners, and ...	African Partners	7	28.6%	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	15	33.3%	33.3%	26.7%	6.7%	0.0%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>31.8%</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	<b>31.8%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
14b	... to what extent has its work evolved in compliance with its mandate?	African Partners	6	16.7%	16.7%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	15	33.3%	40.0%	13.3%	13.3%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>23.8%</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
15a	Has the background documentation, prepared by the Support Unit and the NEPAD Agency and AU Commission, been useful?	African Partners	7	42.9%	28.6%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	16	50.0%	31.3%	6.3%	6.3%	6.3%	100.0%	1.0	1.5	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>47.8%</b>	<b>30.4%</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>4.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
15b	Have the practical arrangements for meetings been satisfactory?	African Partners	7	14.3%	57.1%	14.3%	14.3%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	17	41.2%	35.3%	17.6%	0.0%	5.9%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>41.7%</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
16a	How has the partnership between the NEPAD Agency and the Support Unit evolved over this period, and ...	African Partners	5	0.0%	60.0%	20.0%	0.0%	20.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	10	20.0%	20.0%	50.0%	10.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>13.3%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>40.0%</b>	<b>6.7%</b>	<b>6.7%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
16b	...is it valued by the NEPAD Agency?	African Partners	3	0.0%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	1.0
		Dev. Partners	4	25.0%	0.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>57.1%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>
17a	To what extent have the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency been able to draw on the expertise of other NPCA and OECD Directorates	African Partners	4	25.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	1.0
		Dev. Partners	6	50.0%	16.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	1.0	1.5	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>40.0%</b>	<b>40.0%</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>
17b	Has this been useful?	African Partners	4	25.0%	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	1.0
		Dev. Partners	6	33.3%	16.7%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	2.5	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>30.0%</b>	<b>40.0%</b>	<b>30.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>
18	What has been the experience of co-chairs in working with the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency over this period?	African Partners	5	20.0%	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	11	45.5%	45.5%	0.0%	9.1%	0.0%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>50.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>

19a	Has it been helpful to have the annual activity and financial reports from the Unit in their current form?	African Partners	2	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%		2.5	1.0
		Dev. Partners	13	30.8%	23.1%	30.8%	15.4%	0.0%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>26.7%</b>	<b>26.7%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>13.3%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
19b	Would you like any changes?	African Partners	1	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%		2.0	0.0
		Dev. Partners	5	20.0%	40.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	2.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>50.0%</b>	<b>33.3%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>
<b>Section D: Future of the Forum</b>												
20a	Do the objectives and role of the APF agreed in 2009 remain relevant and appropriate given the new international architecture which has emerged since then, and ...	African Partners	7	14.3%	0.0%	42.9%	42.9%	0.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	17	5.9%	41.2%	35.3%	17.6%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>8.3%</b>	<b>29.2%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
24	Is it time for the Forum to reconsider membership expansion to involve G20 members who currently are not APF members, such as	African Partners	7	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%	28.6%	100.0%	1.0	2.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	17	58.8%	17.6%	17.6%	0.0%	5.9%	100.0%	1.0	1.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>54.2%</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>4.2%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
25a	Is the size and format of the meeting appropriate for the role of the Forum?	African Partners	7	14.3%	42.9%	14.3%	28.6%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		Dev. Partners	17	11.8%	47.1%	17.6%	23.5%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>45.8%</b>	<b>16.7%</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
25b	Specifically, is it useful to continue to hold 2 meetings a year, and ...	African Partners	6	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%	0.0%	33.3%	100.0%	5.0	2.5	4.0
		Dev. Partners	17	17.6%	29.4%	23.5%	11.8%	17.6%	100.0%	2.0	3.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>26.1%</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>8.7%</b>	<b>21.7%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
25d	Should additions to the main plenary format be considered?	African Partners	4	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	100.0%	5.0	3.5	3.0
		Dev. Partners	10	10.0%	10.0%	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%	100.0%	4.0	4.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>7.1%</b>	<b>21.4%</b>	<b>14.3%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>28.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
27c	Should the number of participants be reduced?	African Partners	3	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%	5.0	5.0	1.0
		Dev. Partners	16	0.0%	18.8%	31.3%	25.0%	25.0%	100.0%	3.0	3.5	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>15.8%</b>	<b>26.3%</b>	<b>26.3%</b>	<b>31.6%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>5.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
28a	Should the current co-chair arrangements be retained ...	African Partners	5	80.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	1.0	1.0	1.0
		Dev. Partners	15	20.0%	26.7%	33.3%	13.3%	6.7%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>35.0%</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>25.0%</b>	<b>10.0%</b>	<b>5.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
28b	or modified?	African Partners	1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%		5.0	0.0
		Dev. Partners	9	0.0%	22.2%	44.4%	22.2%	11.1%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>40.0%</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>20.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>
<b>Section E: Future of the Support Unit</b>												
29	Is there a need to maintain the APF Support Unit beyond end-June 2014?	African Partners	7	28.6%	42.9%	14.3%	0.0%	14.3%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	4.0
		Dev. Partners	15	26.7%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	6.7%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	<b>36.4%</b>	<b>27.3%</b>	<b>0.0%</b>	<b>9.1%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
30	If so, should the current working arrangements between the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency be maintained?	African Partners	6	16.7%	33.3%	16.7%	16.7%	16.7%	100.0%	2.0	2.5	4.0
		Dev. Partners	16	25.0%	37.5%	12.5%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	3.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>22.7%</b>	<b>36.4%</b>	<b>13.6%</b>	<b>22.7%</b>	<b>4.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
31a	Do the current governance and hosting arrangements for the APF SU remain appropriate?	African Partners	1	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%		4.0	0.0
		Dev. Partners	15	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%	13.3%	6.7%	100.0%	2.0	2.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18.8%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>18.8%</b>	<b>18.8%</b>	<b>6.3%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>
32a	If hosting the Unit within the OECD is the most suitable arrangement, should it be integrated more closely into the permanent OECD structures?	African Partners	2	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%		4.5	1.0
		Dev. Partners	14	14.3%	21.4%	42.9%	14.3%	7.1%	100.0%	3.0	3.0	4.0
		<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>18.8%</b>	<b>37.5%</b>	<b>18.8%</b>	<b>12.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>4.0</b>

**Note:**

The questionnaire is comprised of closed-ended questions (40) and open-ended questions (15). For the closed-ended questions a so-called 'Likert Scale' was applied. The 'Likert Scale' is used to measure the respondents' attitudes by asking them to respond to a statement or questions positively or negatively. In this questionnaire the scale ranges from 'Strongly Positive' to 'Strongly Negative'.

The Table A2 shows a descriptive statistical analysis of the responses by 'Groups' (i.e. African and Development Partners) and 'Total' (i.e. all responses from African as well as development partners combined). Due to higher number of responses to the questionnaire, development partners are more strongly represented in the 'Total'-Category.

Due to the sampling procedure (i.e. convenience sampling) and in one aspect a small sample size, one cannot simply generalise the results from the questionnaire. In other words, one cannot attribute the results to all members of the APF. The results can be considered indicative, but not definite. The evaluators kept this limitation in mind while making their assessment.

Please see definitions for Median, Mode and Range:

Mode - The "mode" refers to the number that occurs most frequently in a list of numbers. It is, however, prone to outliers.

Median - The "median" is the "middle" value in a list of numbers. It is not as influenced by outliers as the mean.

Range - The "range" is the difference between the largest and smallest value. The range is a good method to get a very basic understanding of how spread out the data is.

Appendix B: Africa Partnership Forum (APF)

Table B1. Membership of the APF (2013)

<b><u>African Partnership Forum (61)</u></b>		
<b>African Partners (34)*</b>		
NEPAD 5 (5)		
Algeria	Nigeria	South Africa
Egypt	Senegal	
NEPAD 16 (16)		
Benin	Malawi	Zambia
Cameroon	Mali	Zimbabwe
Chad	Mauritania	<i>Democratic Republic of Congo</i>
Congo Republic	Rwanda	<i>Lesotho</i>
Ethiopia	Sudan	<i>Madagascar</i>
Gabon	Tanzania	<i>Namibia</i>
Libya	Uganda	<i>Tunisia</i>
African Organisations (13)		
African Union Presidency	ECCAS	EAC
AU Commission	ECOWAS	AfDB
NPCA	IGAD	ECA
COMESA	SADC	
CEN-SAD	AMU	
<b>Development Partners (27)</b>		
G8 (9)		
Canada	Germany	Russia
EU	Italy	Unites States
France	Japan	United Kingdom
Non-G8/OECD (11)		
Austria	Ireland	Spain
Belgium	Netherlands	Sweden
Denmark	Norway	Switzerland
Finland	Portugal	
International Organisations (7)		
ICA	UNDP	WTO
IMF	UN-OSAA	
OECD	World Bank	

\*Note: The African membership changed in 2013. The African countries written in Italic are currently not members of the APF. However, they have been members between 2009-2012.

Source: APF Website (<http://www.africapartnershipforum.org/aboutapf/>)

Table B2. Original G8 Africa Personal Representatives and NEPAD 5 Personal Representatives (2001-2002)

Country	Representative
<b>NEPAD 5 Personal Representatives</b>	
Algeria	M'hamed Achache
Egypt	Ibrahim Hassan
Nigeria	Dr. Tunji Olagunju
Senegal	Dr. Cherif Salif Sy
South Africa	Prof. Dr. Wiseman Nkuhlu
<b>G8 Africa Personal Representatives</b>	
Canada	Robert Fowler
USA	Walter Kantsteiner
Japan	Hedeaki Domichi
France	Michel Camdessus
UK	Baroness Valerie Amos
Italy	Alberto Michelini
Russia	Nodari Simonia
EU	Giorgio Bonacci
Germany	Uschi Eid

Source: Eid, U. (2012). NEPAD und die G8-Afrikapolitik – Ein Werkstattbericht. In Deutsche Afrikapolitik - Akteure und Konzepte. Deutsche Afrika Stiftung e.V. Retrieved from [http://www.deutsche-afrika-stiftung.de/download/SR%2082\\_Deutsche%20Afrikapolitik\\_Bildschirm.pdf](http://www.deutsche-afrika-stiftung.de/download/SR%2082_Deutsche%20Afrikapolitik_Bildschirm.pdf)

Table B3. Main APF Focus Areas (2003-2013)

<u>APF</u>	<u>Main Focus</u>
1, Paris 2003	-
2, Mozambique 2004	-
3, Washington 2004	(i) Food Security; (ii) Peace and Security; (iii) Private Sector Growth.
4, Abuja 2005	(i) NEPAD Progress Report; (ii) G8 Africa Action Plan and Commission for Africa Reports; (iii) Peace and Security; (iv) Mutual Accountability and Future Role of the APF.
5, London 2005	(i) Role of APF; (ii) Joint Action Plan; (iii) Support Unit; (iv) Africa Peer Review Mechanism.
6, Maputo 2006	-
7, Moscow 2007	(i) Infrastructure; (ii) HIV/AIDS; (iii) Agriculture; (iv) Energy Poverty; (v) Infectious Diseases; (vi) Africa Action Plan; (vii) Resources for Development in Africa.
8, Berlin 2007	(i) Investment; (ii) Peace and Security in Africa; (iii) Gender and Economic Empowerment in Africa; (iv) Climate Change; (vii) African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).
9, Algiers 2007	(i) Finance for Development in Africa; (ii) Investment; (iii) Africa and International Trade; (iv) Infrastructure; (v) Agriculture.
10, Tokyo 2008	(i) Environmental Issues and Climate Change; (ii) Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction: Agriculture, Infrastructure, ICT, and Gender; (iii) AU/NEPAD African Action Plan.
11, Addis Ababa 2008	(i) Emerging Governance Issues in the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Process; (ii) Development Finance in Africa; (iii) AU/NEPAD African Action Plan; (iv) Report on Carbon Finance.
12, Rome 2009	(i) Impact of the economic crisis on Africa; (ii) Peace and Security: Drug Trafficking, Piracy and Money Laundering - The International Dimension of Organised Crime; (iii) climate change.
Special Session	Climate change (Special Session held in run-up to UNFCCC Conference in Copenhagen).
13, Addis Ababa 2010	(i) Climate change; (ii) Food Security; (iii) Impact of and response to the crisis; (iv) Impact of the crisis on health.
14, Toronto 2010	(i) Health MDGs – particularly maternal and child health; (ii) MDG 1 and Food Security.
15, Lilongwe 2010	(i) Outcome of recent international meetings; (ii) Climate Change; (iii) Monitoring the Delivery of Commitments.
16, Paris 2011	(i) Economic Growth; (ii) Private investment and job creation; (iii) Key preconditions for successful economic growth including: regional and market integration, development of infrastructure.
17, Addis Ababa 2011	<u>Promoting economic growth:</u> (i) Regulatory Framework for the Private Sector; (ii) Responsible and Value-Added Investment; (iii) Infrastructure; (iv) Climate Change.
18, Paris 2012	<u>Energy for Africa:</u> (i) Global Energy Outlook and the Implications for Africa; (ii) Energy for all: the challenge in Africa; (iii) Low carbon and climate resilient energy; (iv) Africa's Energy Priorities in the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), and the MDB Infrastructure Action Plan.
19, Cotonou 2012	<u>Illicit Financial Flows:</u> (i) Combating tax evasion; (ii) Increasing commercial transparency; (iii) Tackling money laundering; (iv) Asset recovery.
20, London 2013	(i) Transparency and inclusive growth in the Natural Resources Sector; (ii) Transparency in Government; (iii) APF Evaluation.

Source: APF Website (<http://www.africapartnershipforum.org/meetingdocuments/>)

## Appendix C: Africa in the Global Governance Arena

Table C1. Africa's Partnerships

Country/ Continent/ Organisation	Label	Year of Inception	Formats	Features
<b>Strategic Partnerships</b>				
<b>EU</b>	Africa-EU Strategic Partnership	2000/2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits at Leaders Level (every seven years; next 2014)</li> <li>- Commission to Commission Dialogue</li> <li>- Troika meetings</li> <li>- Joint Expert Groups</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)</li> <li>- Action Plans (2<sup>nd</sup> Action Plan 2011-2013)</li> </ul>
<b>South America</b>	The Africa-South America Summit (ASA)	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits at Leaders Level</li> </ul>	
<b>Asia<sup>i</sup></b>	The Africa/Asia Sub regional Organisations Conference (AASROC)	2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Inter-Governmental Forum</li> <li>- Sub-regional Organisations</li> <li>- People-to People interaction (Business, academia, civil society)</li> </ul>	Three broad areas of cooperation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political;</li> <li>- Economic; and</li> <li>- Social and Cultural.</li> </ul>
<b>China</b>	China-Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC)	2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits (since 2006) and Ministerial Conferences (every three years)</li> <li>- AUC became FOCAC member in 2011</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- FOCAC Action Plan (2013-2015)</li> </ul>
<b>Japan</b>	Africa-Japan (TICAD) Process / 1993	1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- TICAD meetings at Leaders Level (every five years)</li> <li>- AUC co-organiser since 2012</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Yokohama Action Plan 2013-2017</li> </ul>
<b>France*</b>	Africa-France	Long-standing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits (e.g. 6/7 December 2013)</li> </ul>	Manifold
<b>US*</b>	AGOA and Co-operation between the AUC and US Dep. of State	2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Regular meetings at various levels;</li> <li>- Four Technical Working Groups under the MoU.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Act of the US Congress (AGOA)</li> <li>- Memorandum of Understanding (MoU; 2013)</li> </ul>
<b>Arab World</b>	Partnership between Africa and the Arab World	1977	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits (2<sup>nd</sup> in Syrte/Libya 10/2010)</li> </ul>	Joint Africa-Arab Action Plan 2011-2016
<b>India</b>	Africa-India Partnership Forum / 2008	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits (2<sup>nd</sup> in Addis Ababa 5/2011)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Africa-India Plan of Action (2010-2013)</li> <li>- Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation</li> </ul>
<b>Turkey</b>	Africa-Turkey Partnership / 2008	2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Summits</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Implementation Plan 2010-2014</li> </ul>
<b>Korea, Rep. of</b>	Africa-Korea Partnership	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Korea-Africa Forum at Ministerial Level (3<sup>rd</sup> 10/2012 in Seoul); co-organised by AUC</li> </ul>	Action plan under preparation
<b>Institution to Institution Partnerships/Relationships (through the AU Commission)</b>				
<b>Arab States*</b>	The League of Arab States (LAS)			
<b>America (North and South)*</b>	The Organization of American States (OAS)			
<b>Islamic World*</b>	The Organization of Islamic Cooperation			
<b>Commonwealth*</b>	The Commonwealth			

<b>Francophonie*</b>	La Francophonie			
<b><u>Not formalised Partnerships</u></b>				
<b>G8**</b>	G8-Africa Partnership (G8/NEPAD)	2001	- Summit Africa outreach (2001 until 2011) - Africa Partnership Forum (APF)	- G8 Africa Action Plan (2002) - Issue specific initiatives
<b>BRICS**</b>	BRICS Leaders-Africa Dialogue Forum	2013	- Summit Africa Retreat (1 <sup>st</sup> in 2013)	

\* No further details provided on the AU website.

\*\* Not mentioned on the AU website.

Source: African Union (<http://www.au.int/en/partnerships>) and own research.

Note: This table only shows those partnerships featured on the AU-website plus G8 and BRICS. All in all, there are 37 bilateral partnerships between the AUC and its development and strategic partners (according to AUC sources).

<sup>i</sup> See <http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2004/aasroc0324.htm>

Table C2. Global Fora on Africa

Name	Organiser / Frequency (Last meeting)	Objective	Participants
UN Assembly High Level Meeting on Africa's Development needs	United Nations / Irregular (08/2008)	Statutory body	Heads of State and Government; Ministers; Representatives of Member States.
Annual Meetings of the AfDB Group	AfDB / Annually (05/2013)	Statutory body	Ministers of Finance or Development.
African Development Forum (ADF)	ECA + AUC / Biennial (10/2012)	The aim of ADF is to present the key stakeholders in Africa's development with the results of current research and opinions on key development issues in order to formulate shared goals, priorities and programmes, and define the environment that will enable African countries to implement these programmes.	Heads of State and Government, African member States policymakers, development partners, other United Nations agencies, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (IGOs/NGOs), academia, practitioners, civil society organizations (CSOs), the private sector, eminent policy and opinion leaders and other concerned stakeholders.
Africa Economic Conference (AEC)	AfDB, ECA and UNDP/ Annually (10/2012)	The main objectives of the African Economic Conference series are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- to promote knowledge management;</li> <li>- to foster dialogue;</li> <li>- to encourage and enhance research on economic and policy issues related to the development of African economies;</li> <li>- to provide an opportunity to disseminate research findings as well as share information.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Outstanding academics and development practitioners in the field of economics.</li> <li>- Panellists include Heads of State or Government and of International/Continental Organisations, as well as Ministers for Economics or Development.</li> </ul>
Annual International Economic Forum on Africa	OECD in collaboration with AfDB, ECA, UNDP, France / Annually (10/2012)	Largest annual public event on Africa in Europe. Participants come together to hear and engage with a panel of experts discussing the findings of the African Economic Outlook (AEO).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- European and African policy-makers, economists and academics working on and with Africa.</li> <li>- Panellists include Heads of State or Government and of International/Continental Organisations, Ministers of different portfolios, CEOs from private sector and civil society.</li> </ul>
World Economic Forum on Africa	World Economic Forum / Annually (05/2013)	Platform for regional and global leaders from business, government and civil society to deepen the continent's integration agenda and renew commitment to a sustainable path of growth and development.	Regional and global leaders from business, government and civil society.
Coalition for Dialogue on Africa (CoDA)	AfDB, AUC and ECA (Joint Venture) / Irregular (10/2012)	CoDA was established as a successor forum to the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), the Big Table (Africa –OECD) and the African Development Forum. The Forum identifies and discusses issues of importance to Africa's development within a global context (i.e. Africa's security, peace, governance and development).	Board formed by eminent African and international Leaders.
Strategic Partners Dialogue	Sponsored by AUC, ECA, AfDB in collaboration with	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Forum for all partners to engage with the key Pan-African institutions under one roof.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Leadership of AUC, ECA &amp; AfDB, RECs;</li> <li>- Private sector actors</li> </ul>

	RECs / Annually (04/2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Build momentum with partners for optimizing Africa's potential and set the tone for deepening and redefining Africa's strategic and complementary roles in global affairs over the medium to long term.</li> <li>- Take stock of progress in continental and regional integration and cooperation programmes and explore ways along with Africa's partners, to provide the strategic and capacity support to the key Pan-African institutions.</li> </ul>	<p>represented by the business councils from the RECs, and the Africa Business Roundtable (and individually invited investors);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Strategic partner representatives from head quarters (at level of policy formulation); and</li> <li>- African Member States through the chairs of the RECs and representation from the Permanent Representatives Council (Bureau).</li> </ul>
Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa	The Institute of Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia / Annually (04/2013)	The Tana High-Level Forum on Security in Africa is a platform for African leaders, key stakeholders, and pro-active strategists to collaboratively engage in exploring and exchanging ideas on African-led solutions to security challenges.	African leaders, key stakeholders, and pro-active strategists (all at the highest level).
Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness	AUC + NEPAD Agency / Convenes issue-specific (07/2013)	The Africa Platform on Development aims at developing a common voice to Africa's development perspectives, strategies and policies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political and senior official representatives from Africa.</li> <li>- Panellists include Ministers and Commissioners and speakers from international partners' side.</li> </ul>
AU Partnership Group	Currently chaired by Norway and Germany / Irregular (5-10 times per year)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Forum for dialogue between the AU and its partners; and</li> <li>- Market of ideas and initiatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- AUC (Chairperson, Dep. Chairperson, Commissioners, AU-PSC Chair)</li> <li>- Development and strategic partners' Permanent Representatives to the AU.</li> </ul>
Africa Progress Panel	Convenes regularly, inter alia at the margins of major international fora.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Connecting the influence of Panel members with cutting edge policy analysis to advocate for equitable and sustainable development in Africa.</li> <li>- Leverage and broker knowledge, innovations and collaborations for action.</li> </ul>	Ten eminent personalities, in particular from Africa.
Africa Partnership Forum (APF)	AU/NEPAD/G8/OECD / twice a year (4/2013)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Catalyse and support action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa's development.</li> <li>- Make recommendations to leaders (G8, G20, AU, UN).</li> <li>- Monitor the delivery of commitments by both sides of the partnership.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Personal Representatives of Heads of State or Government and of African and international organisations.</li> <li>- Senior officials.</li> </ul>

Sources:

- UN Assembly High Level Meeting on Africa's Development needs: <http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/OSAA%20Resolutions/a-res-63-1eng.pdf>
- Annual Meetings of the AfDB Group: <http://www.afdb.org/en/annual-meetings/>
- African Development Forum (ADF): <http://www.uneca.org/adf>
- Africa Economic Conference (AEC): <http://www.africaneconomicconference.org/2012/index.htm/>  
<http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/african-economic-conference-2013-call-for-papers-12008/>
- Annual International Economic Forum on Africa: <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/12th-international-economic-forum-on-africa-strengthen-inclusive-and-sustainable-growth-policies-9817/>
- World Economic Forum on Africa: <http://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-africa>

- Coalition for Dialogue on Africa (CoDA): <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/meeting-of-the-coalition-for-dialogue-on-africa-coda-5417> // [http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/adfviii/Documents/Pre-ADF/Pre-ADF-CoDA\\_LPI\\_FORUM\\_221012\\_ConceptNote-FR.pdf](http://www1.uneca.org/Portals/adfviii/Documents/Pre-ADF/Pre-ADF-CoDA_LPI_FORUM_221012_ConceptNote-FR.pdf) // [http://www1.uneca.org/coda/home\\_coda.aspx](http://www1.uneca.org/coda/home_coda.aspx)
- Strategic Partners Dialogue : <http://www.au.int/en/content/second-strategic-partners-dialogue>
- Tana High Level Forum on Security in Africa: <http://www.tanaforum.org/>
- Africa Platform for Development Effectiveness: <http://www.africa-platform.org/>
- Africa Progress Panel: <http://www.africaprogresspanel.org/>

Table C3. Incoming G8, G20 and BRICS presidencies

<b>Year</b>	<b>G8 Presidency</b>	<b>G20 Presidency</b>	<b>BRICS Presidency*</b>
2013	United Kingdom	Russia	South Africa
2014	Russia	Australia	Brazil
2015	Germany	Turkey	Russia
2016	Japan	Asian Group	India
2017	Italy	European Group	China
2018	Canada	Latin American Group	South Africa

\* According to the eThekweni Declaration (Durban/South Africa; 3/2013)

Table C4. Africa's main Trade, Aid and Security Partners

Rank	Country	Trade with Africa		Aid to Africa		Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa	
	Country	Trade 2011 (Billion USD)	Trade Rank	ODA 2011 (Million USD)	Rank in Aid	Financial contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (Effective Rates 2013 in %)	Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping (June 2013)
1	China	142.1	1	(2300)	6	6.6454	1433
2	United States	130.7	2	10690	1	28.3993	42
3	France	75.8	3	6900	2	7.2199	50
4	Italy	58.8	4	2029	9	4.4480	6
5	India	58.7	5	(400)	21	0.1332	6319
6	Germany	50.9	6	5101	4	7.1410	38
7	Spain	41.4	7	1546	12	2.9730	0
8	United Kingdom	38.4	8	5936	3	6.6854	9
9	Netherlands	34.9	9	1835	10	1.6540	29
10	Brazil	29.0	10	(96)	30	0.5868	40
11	Japan	28.3	11	3393	5	10.8330	271
12	Belgium	21.4	12	1338	13	0.9980	24
13	Turkey	17.6	13	287	23	0.2656	134
14	Canada	17.4	15	2148	8	2.9840	26
15	Korea, Republic of	17.0	16	301	22	1.9940	285
16	Russia	8.8	23	121	29	3.1472	86
17	Australia	7.7	25	605	16	2.0740	26
18	Sweden	6.9	26	2292	7	0.9600	40
19	Norway	3.1	35	1607	11	0.8510	43
20	Denmark	2.1	45	1331	14	0.6750	19
	<i>EU</i>	377.9		30977		30.3876	310

Source: (ECA, 2013b; Erikson et al., 2012; OECDstat, 2013; UN, 2013; UNCTADstat, 2013)

**Note I:** Chosen Criteria for the three different variables – Trade: >20 Billion USD; Aid: > 1 Billion USD; Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa: > 2.0 Effective Rate.

**Note II:** Countries are ranked according to their trade figure. The first 12 countries meet the 'Trade' criterion. The rest of the countries (13-20) meet the 'Aid' and/or 'Security' criterion. The different colours per criterion indicate whether a country meets the respective criterion.

**Note III:** **Trade** - The trade data refers to total merchandise trade (i.e. Total All Products; Standard International Trade Classification). The 'Trade Rank' excludes African countries; **Aid** - The aid ranking includes all DAC members and all non-DAC countries reporting to OECD DAC plus data for the emerging economies Brazil, India and China. Data from the OECD DAC refers to net bilateral ODA plus imputed ODA in million USD at current prices. The data for Brazil and China is from the year 2006 and taken from ECA (2013b) (see source in bibliography). The data for India is taken from Erikson et al. (2012) and refers to the year 2009 (the report bases its number on the data base 'AidData'). It is hard to pin down credible ODA data from emerging economies. Many countries do not report to the OECD DAC. Hence, the ODA data for emerging economies to Africa should be interpreted with caution. Data for Brazil, India and China might present bilateral ODA (excl. imputed multilateral ODA); **Peace and Security** - Numbers for 'Personnel' are from June 2013. Korea, Rep. of, meets the security criterion as its effective rate of financial contributions in 2013 of 1.994 (in %) is very close to the criterion of 2.0.

**Note IV:** Turkey is integrated in the Table (marked in grey). Turkey does not meet the criteria in the field of trade, aid and security. However, Turkey is an official strategic partner of Africa (see Appendix C1).

Table C5. Africa's main OECD Partners in Trade, Aid and Security

Rank	Country	Trade with Africa		Aid to Africa		Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa	
		Trade 2011 (Billion USD)	Trade Rank	ODA 2011 (Million USD)	Rank in Aid	Financial contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (Effective Rates 2013 in %)	Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping (June 2013)
1	United States	130.7	2	10690	1	28.3993	42
2	France	75.8	2	6900	2	7.2199	50
3	Italy	58.8	3	2029	8	4.4480	6
4	Germany	50.9	4	5101	4	7.1410	38
5	Spain	41.4	5	1546	11	2.9730	0
6	United Kingdom	38.4	6	5936	3	6.6854	9
7	Netherlands	34.9	7	1835	9	1.6540	29
8	Japan	28.3	8	3393	5	10.8330	271
9	Belgium	21.4	9	1338	12	0.9980	24
10	Turkey	17.6	10	287	21	0.2656	134
11	Canada	17.4	11	2148	7	2.9840	26
12	Korea, Republic of	17.0	12	301	20	1.9940	285
13	Russia	8.8	n/a	33	26	3.1472	86
14	Australia	7.7	15	605	16	15.0000	26
15	Sweden	6.9	16	2292	6	0.9600	40
16	Norway	3.1	19	1607	10	0.8510	43
17	Denmark	2.1	25	1331	13	0.6750	19
	Portugal	15.0	13	418	19	0.4740	0
	Switzerland	11.5	14	875	14	1.0470	14
	Austria	4.1	17	423	18	0.7980	2
	Ireland	2.9	21	527	17	0.4180	8
	Finland	2.6	22	580	16	0.5190	3
	<i>EU</i>	377.9		30977		30.3876	310

Source: (OECDstat, 2013; UN, 2013; UNCTADstat, 2013)

**Note I:** The list only contains OECD members plus Russia. Russia is listed in the Table since it is a member of the G8 and an OECD accession country.

**Note II:** Countries are ranked according to their trade figure. All G8/OECD members of the APF are listed. The colours indicate whether the country meets the following criteria: Trade: >20bn USD; Aid: > 1bn USD; Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa: > 2.0 Effective Rate. Korea (Republic, of) and Australia meet at least one of the criteria. But they are not full member of the APF, only observer. The APF members Portugal, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and Finland are full APF members but do not meet at least one of the criteria. Turkey is integrated in the Table as an OECD country (marked in grey). Turkey does not meet the criteria in the field of trade, aid and security. However, Turkey is an official strategic partner of Africa (see Table C1 in Appendix C).

**Note III:** **Trade:** The trade data refers to total merchandise trade (i.e. Total All Products; Standard International Trade Classification). The 'Trade Rank' includes all OECD countries; **Aid** – The 'Aid Rank' ranking includes all OECD members reporting to OECD DAC plus data for Russia. Aid data from the OECD DAC refers to net bilateral ODA plus imputed ODA in million USD at current prices; **Peace and Security** - Numbers for 'Personnel' are from June 2013. Korea, Rep. of, meets the security criterion as its effective rate of financial contributions in 2013 of 1.994 (in %) is very close to 2.

Table C6. G20 Countries and Africa: Trade, Aid and Security Presence on the African Continent

Rank	Country	Trade with Africa		Aid to Africa		Contribution to Peace and Security in Africa	
	Country	Trade 2011 (Billion USD)	Trade Rank	ODA 2011 (Million USD)	Rank in Aid	Financial contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (Effective Rates 2013 in %)	Personnel Contributions to UN Peacekeeping (June 2013)
1	China	142.1	1	(2300)	6	6.6454	1433
2	United States	130.7	2	10690	1	28.3993	42
3	France	75.8	3	6900	2	7.2199	50
4	Italy	58.8	4	2029	8	4.4480	6
5	India	58.7	5	(400)	10	0.1332	6319
6	Germany	50.9	6	5101	4	7.1410	38
7	United Kingdom	38.4	7	5936	3	6.6854	9
8	South Africa	36.5	8	(60)		0.0744	2080
9	Brazil	29.0	9	(96)	14	0.5868	40
10	Japan	28.3	10	3393	5	10.8330	271
11	Turkey	17.6	11	287	12	0.2656	134
12	Saudi Arabia	17.5	12	15	15	0.5184	0
13	Canada	17.3	13	2148	7	2.9840	26
14	Korea, Republic of	17.0	14	301	11	1.9940	285
15	Indonesia	9.0	15	n/a	n/a	0.0692	360
16	Russia	8.8	16	121	13	3.1472	86
17	Australia	7.7	17	605	9	2.0740	26
18	Argentina	6.7	18	n/a	n/a	0.0864	17
19	Mexico	2.4	19	n/a	n/a	0.3684	0
	<i>EU</i>	377.9		30977		30.3876	310

Source: (ECA, 2013b; Erikson et al., 2012; OECDstat, 2013; UN, 2013; UNCTADstat, 2013)

**Note I:** Chosen Criteria – Members of the G20 Group.

**Note II:** Countries are ranked according to their trade figure.

**Note III: Trade:** The trade data refers total merchandise trade (i.e. Total All Products; Standard International Trade Classification). The 'Trade Rank' excludes African countries; **Aid** - The 'Aid Rank' excludes African countries. The ranking includes all G20 countries reporting to OECD DAC plus data for Brazil, India, and China. Data from the OECD DAC refers to net bilateral ODA plus imputed ODA in million USD at current prices. The data for Brazil and China is from the year 2006 and taken from ECA (2013b) (see source in bibliography). The data for India is taken from Erikson et al. (2012) and refers to the year 2009 (the report bases its number on the data base 'AidData'). The data for South Africa is from 2008 and also taken from ECA (2013b). It is hard to pin down credible ODA data from emerging economies. Many countries do not report to the OECD DAC. Hence, the ODA data for emerging economies to Africa should be interpreted with caution. Data for Brazil, India, China and South Africa might present bilateral ODA (excl. imputed ODA).

Table C7. Main African countries in Trade, Aid and Security

Rank	Country	Trade		Aid (Main Receivers)		Peace and Security (UN Operations)		
		Trade 2012 (Billion USD)	Trade Rank	ODA Average 2009-2011 (Million USD)	Rank in Aid	Mission*	Personnel (June 2013)	Financial Resources June 2012 - July 2013 (in Million USD)
1	South Africa	163.0	1	1168	11			
2	Nigeria	162.5	2	1832	7			
3	Algeria	114.6	3	238	39			
4	Egypt	93.6	4	668	24			
5	Angola	87.8	5	226	41			
6	Libya	78.2	6	231	40			
7	Morocco	61.3	7	1116	12			
8	Tunisia	36.7	8	657	25			
9	Ghana	25.3	9	1691	8			
10	Sudan**	18.9		1123	11	UNAMID	19703	1449
11	South Sudan**	see Note III	n/a	1087	14	UNMISS	7590	839
12	Kenya	17.2	11	1963	5			
13	Cote d'Ivoire	15.7	13	1561	9	UNOCI	10201	575
14	Tanzania	14.1	15	2776	3			
15	Ethiopia	13.4	16	3625	2			
16	Congo, Dem. Rep.	8.9	19	3811	1	MONUSCO	20438	1347
17	Mozambique	7.3	21	2012	4			
18	Senegal	6.6	22	998	18			
19	Uganda	5.8	25	1697	7			
20	Mali	2.8	35	1114	13	MINUSMA	12640	/
21	Liberia	1.5	40	899	19	UNMIL	7368	496

Source: (OECDstat, 2013; UN, 2013; UNCTADstat, 2013)

Note I: Chosen Criteria for the three different variables – Trade: >25bn USD; Aid: > 1.5bn USD.

Note II: Countries are ranked according to their trade figure. The first 9 countries meet the 'Trade' criterion. Trade functions as a proxy for economic exchange and activity. FDI is another additional relevant variable. The top 9 African trade countries account for 78% of total African trade in 2012 and 68% of total FDI inward stock in 2012. The rest of the countries (10-21) meet the 'Aid' and/or Security criterion. The different colours per criterion indicate whether a country meets the respective criterion.

Note III: Trade: The trade data refers to total merchandise trade (i.e. Import – Exports; Total All Products; Standard International Trade Classification). Trade data shows the trade of the respective country with the rest of the world (excl. African countries). Trade data for Sudan and South Sudan in 2012 is not yet available. The presented trade data refers to Sudan and South Sudan in 2011 before the split-up; Aid: ODA reports net bilateral ODA plus imputed ODA from total all donors in million USA at current prices. ODA data includes all total donors reporting to DAC OECD; Peace and Security: Numbers for the mission MINUSMA is taken from UN resolution 2100. The specific numbers for the rest of the mission are taken from the UN Peacekeeping Operations Website (<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/-contributors.shtml>).

Note IV: Senegal is integrated in the Table (marked in grey). Senegal does not meet the criteria in the field of trade and/or aid. However, Senegal is a founding member of NEPAD (see Table B1 in Appendix B).

\* The mission MINURSO (UN peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara region) is not listed.

\*\* The mission UNISFA (UN peacekeeping force in Abyei) is not listed.

## Annexes

### Annex 1: APF Evaluation: Revised Terms of Reference (July 2013)

The Africa Partnership Forum (APF) was established in 2003. Secretariat support is provided jointly by the NEPAD Agency and a Support Unit established in 2006 and housed at the OECD. The role and objectives of the Forum were reviewed in 2009. Against this background, the co-chairs of the Forum have decided to commission an external evaluation in the first quarter of 2013 to:

- (i) Assess the overall effectiveness of the APF in delivering the objectives of catalysing and supporting action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa's development, as set out in the document 'Reform of the Africa Partnership Forum' agreed at the 12<sup>th</sup> meeting of the APF in Rome in June 2009;
- (ii) Assess the work of the NEPAD Agency and APF Support Unit, in providing Secretariat support for APF meetings in partnership, and in monitoring the delivery of commitments and results achieved through the Mutual Reviews of Development Effectiveness undertaken with UNECA;
- (iii) Make recommendations on the future of the Forum and the APF Support Unit.

2. A number of specific questions to be addressed are set out at para 9 below.

#### Period to be covered

3. The evaluation will focus on the period from July 2009 to June 2013, up to and including the 20<sup>th</sup> meeting of the APF. The evaluation will draw on experiences and lessons learned over the 10 year period since the establishment of the Forum in 2003.

#### Management and conduct of the evaluation

4. The evaluation will be managed by a Joint Committee composed of APF co-chairs, with Secretariat support from the NEPAD Agency and the APF Support Unit. The terms of reference will be approved by the Joint Evaluation Committee. Two independent external consultants will be appointed by the Joint Committee to undertake the evaluation. The two consultants will serve both sides of the partnership. The costs will be limited to a ceiling to be financed from the budget of the APF Support Unit and UNECA, and specified separately.

5. The final report shall include

- (i) an Executive Summary (maximum 3 pages);
- (ii) a checklist of recommendations;
- (iii) a main report (maximum 20 pages).

#### Time frame

6. The evaluation will be conducted on the following time-frame:

- (i) The terms of reference will be approved by the Joint Evaluation Committee and consultants will be appointed by December 2012, following the 19<sup>th</sup> APF meeting, and with due consultations with the African and development partners' constituencies;
- (ii) The consultants will begin work no later than March 2013;
- (iii) The consultants will provide an interim report by the end of April 2013;
- (iv) The final report and recommendations will be considered by the Joint Evaluation Committee in September 2013 and presented to the African and Development Partners' sides;
- (v) Co-chairs will present and comment on the final recommendations at the 21st APF meeting.

#### Consultation

7. Those to be consulted shall include;

Africa

Dr. Newai Gebreab, Co-Chair of the NEPAD Steering Committee and APF co-chair  
 Ambassador Mariam Diallo, Co-Chair of the NEPAD Steering Committee and APF co-chair  
 Dr. Ibrahim Mayaki, CEO of the NEPAD Agency  
 Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, Deputy Executive Secretary, UN Economic Commission for Africa, and the NEPAD Section at UNECA  
 Incoming Representative of country chairing AU in 2013  
 The African Union Commission

And other APF members including the NEPAD Steering Committee, or other parties.

Development partners

G8 co-chairs 2010-2014 (Canada, France, US, UK, Russia)  
 Non-G8 co-chairs 2010-2013 (Austria, Finland, Belgium and the incoming 2013 co-chair)  
 Other interested APF members or accredited observers

Other

Relevant multilateral and regional bodies, including both those directly involved in the APF, and those involved in other processes who can comment on the added value of the APF,  
 Director, APF Support Unit

Methodology

8. The consultants will use a combination of:

- (i) individual interviews and background discussions, in person or by phone or correspondence;
- (ii) a survey questionnaire, addressed more widely and using the questions below;
- (iii) document review.

Specific questions to be addressed

9. The questions to be addressed shall include:

*A : Format of Meetings and participation*

- (i) Have the themes since 2003 and more particularly since June 2009 been relevant, and aligned to the main themes of regional and global development processes?
- (ii) Has the level of official representation at APF meetings been adequate to enable the Forum to play its intended role as set out in the London Revised Terms of Reference of October 2005 and the Rome reform document of June 2009?
- (iii) Are there disjunctures between preparations for the APF and G8-Africa Outreach, as a key component of the Forum, particularly in relation to selected themes?
- (iv) Has it been useful to open the APF to the private sector and civil society? What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- (v) Have the current co-chair arrangements been effective as a way of preparing and managing meetings?
- (vi) Have the conclusions of the meetings been adequately recorded and disseminated?

*B : Impact and value*

- (vii) Has participation in APF meetings since the 12th APF in Rome in 2009 been useful and why?
- (viii) Have discussions in the APF been useful as a way of sharing policy experience and lessons? Have they fed into the policy processes in capitals, both in Africa and its development partners?
- (ix) Have APF discussions fed into wider regional and international processes particularly in the AU, G8 and G20?
- (x) Has the Forum played its intended monitoring role, including through the G8-Africa Outreach and Mutual Reviews of Development Effectiveness in Africa (MRDE)?
- (xi) Are meetings of the Forum a useful part of the wider political relationship between Africa and its development partners?
- (xii) What role has the APF played in promoting the partnership between African and G8/OECD countries?
- (xiii) What has been the direct impact of the APF conclusions on Africa's development aspirations and the partnership as a whole?

*C : Technical support to the APF through the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency*

- (xiv) How is the Support Unit perceived by African and development partners, and to what extent has its work evolved in compliance with its mandate?
- (xv) Has the background documentation prepared by the Support Unit and the NEPAD Agency and AU Commission, been useful? Have the practical arrangements for meetings been satisfactory?
- (xvi) How has the partnership between the NEPAD Agency and the Support Unit evolved over this period, and is it valued by the NEPAD Agency?
- (xvii) Has it been useful for the Support Unit to monitor the delivery of commitments, in partnership with UNECA, through the Mutual Reviews of Development Effectiveness? What measures could be put in place to improve on the MRDE process?
- (xviii) To what extent has the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency been able to draw on the expertise of other NPCA and OECD Directorates in these tasks? Has this been useful?
- (xix) What has been the experience of co-chairs in working with the Unit and NEPAD Agency over this period?
- (xx) (for development partners) Has it been helpful to have the annual activity and financial reports from the Unit in their current form? Would you like any changes?

*D : Future of the Forum*

- (i) Do the objectives and role of the APF agreed in 2009 remain relevant and appropriate given the new international architecture which has emerged since then, and what role should it play in the future?
- (ii) What is its added value in relation to the various other fora which exist for dialogue on development issues in Africa?
- (iii) What can be done to increase the impact of the Forum, including by sharing policy experience and feeding into policy processes in capitals. How might this be done?
- (iv) What can be done to optimise linkages with preparations for the G8 – Africa Outreach as a key component of the Forum, particularly in relation to selected themes?
- (v) Is it time for the Forum to re-consider membership expansion to involve G20 members who currently not APF members, such as China, Brazil, India?
- (vi) Is the size and format of the meetings appropriate for the role of the Forum? Specifically, is it useful to continue to hold 2 meetings a year, and if so how should the Spring (April-June) and Autumn (October-November) meetings be structured? Should additions to the main plenary format be considered?
- (vii) How do we re-prioritize the thematic development issues discussed at the APF meetings? How best do we address the monitoring of conclusions of the Forum for greater impact?
- (viii) How can we ensure the participation needed to deliver the Forum's objectives? What kind of actors should be invited to participate? Should the number be reduced?
- (ix) Should the current co-chair arrangements be retained or modified? What are the possible options?

*E : Future of the Support Unit*

- (x) Is there a need to maintain the APF Support Unit beyond end-June 2014?

- (xi) If so, should the current working arrangements between the Support Unit and NEPAD Agency be maintained?

For development partners

- (xii) Do the current governance and hosting arrangements for the APF SU remain appropriate? Do other suitable options for hosting the APF SU exist?
- (xiii) If hosting the Unit within the OECD is the most suitable arrangement, should it be integrated more closely into the permanent OECD structures?? Are there any other suitable options?

Background documents (to be supplied)

10. These will include:

- (i) Rome reform agreement of June 2009;
- (ii) Fact-sheet on APF;
- (iii) London Revised Terms of Reference of the APF of 2005
- (iv) Meeting documentation (including background analytical papers and joint statements) for Special Session on Climate Change (September 2009) and 13<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> regular meetings of APF;
- (v) Compendium of NEPAD Steering Committee conclusions on the APF and relevant background documents;
- (vi) Mutual Reviews of Development Effectiveness in Africa: 2010, 2011 (interim report), 2011 (main report). 2012;
- (vii) Activity and financial reports prepared by APF Support Unit (July 2010, 2011, 2012);
- (viii) A summary note on other fora on development issues in Africa, including the Africa Development Forum, the Africa Economic Conference, and the Leadership Council on food security issues established at the G8 Camp David Summit.

Annex 2: Revised Terms of Reference for the Africa Partnership Forum (2005)

*Reference Link: <http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/APF-TORS-051005.PDF>*

1. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was adopted as the socio-economic development programme of the African Union (AU) at the OAU/AU Summit of July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia. The initiating African Heads of State presented the initiative to the G8 at the Genoa Summit of July 2001 where it received support. The G8 leaders then decided to appoint a committee of high-level personal representatives to work with the NEPAD Steering Committee to develop a detailed, implementable Plan of Action in support of the implementation of NEPAD. This resulted in the G8 Africa Action Plan. The Plan was presented at the G8 Summit on 27 June 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada and represents the G8 response to the offer of partnership extended by Africa. The Africa Personal Representatives and the Steering Committee continued to meet between Kananaskis and the next Summit in June 2003 in Evian, France, at which the first Report on Implementation of the Africa Action Plan was presented. The second Report on Implementation was presented at the G8 Summit in Gleneagles in 2005.
2. In Evian, there was agreement between the G8 and African leaders that NEPAD is a long-term programme of between 15 and 20 years. Therefore, there was agreement as to the need to continue and strengthen the partnership between Africa and the developed world by way of a broadened structured engagement to include other development partners. This is the Africa Partnership Forum. At the 4th meeting of the Forum in Abuja in April 2005, members agreed that the Forum should be strengthened by developing a mutual monitoring process with clearly developed benchmarks to measure progress. G8 and African Leaders meeting at Gleneagles in July 2005 acknowledged the productive role played by the Africa Personal Representatives and the Africa Partnership Forum and agreed that it should be strengthened.
3. The Africa Partnership Forum is a key forum for discussion and monitoring at a senior political level of policy issues, strategy and priorities in support of Africa's development. Its members – Africa, G8, OECD and other development partners all work together as equals in the forum – and ensure synergies and coherence with other international fora.
4. The Africa Partnership Forum shall be comprised of the Personal Representatives of the Heads of State or Government of the members of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, of the Heads of the eight African Union recognized regional economic communities (EAC, SADC, COMESA, ECOWAS, ECCAS, AMU, IGAD, CEN-SAD), of the Head of the African Development Bank, of the Heads of State or Government of Africa's principal industrialized-country development partners, of the President of the European Commission and of the Heads of selected international institutions, including the United Nations and its United Nations Development Programme and Economic Commission for Africa, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Changes in membership, beyond those Governments and Organizations invited to participate in the inaugural meeting on 10 November 2003, are to be agreed by consensus.
5. Personal Representatives are expected to be appointed by and report directly to their Heads of State or Government or Heads of Institution as appropriate. They should be in a position to speak on behalf of their national administrations or institutions overall.
6. The Forum is not a pledging forum. It will focus on strategic, political and socio-economic issues related to African development and the implementation of NEPAD programmes given the overarching objective of the Millennium Development Goals. It should serve as a venue for information sharing between Africa and its development partners. The Forum should not duplicate the work of other fora.

7. The Forum shall avoid setting up any new bureaucracy or institutions. It shall instead invite analysis and other support from participating institutions. The Forum will be supported by the AU/NEPAD Secretariat working together with a small Support Unit. Working through joint task teams they will be responsible for preparing and keeping up to date the Joint Action Plan, for tracking progress overall, and for drafting the annual report. For these purposes they will be directed by and be accountable jointly to the APF through the Co-Chairs.

8. Consistent with members' commitment to mutual accountability, the Forum shall establish a Joint Action Plan bringing together the commitments that African countries and Africa's development partners have made to address the continent's development needs, including the NEPAD and AU programmes, the G8 Africa Action Plan and commitments made at Gleneagles and the Millennium Review Summit. This Plan will make clear how these are being taken forward and will set out associated outcomes against which progress can be tracked. An annual report on progress against the Plan, with a particular focus on issues identified as priorities for the year concerned and highlighting lessons learned, will be prepared jointly by the Support Unit and the AU/NEPAD Secretariat for the October meeting of the Forum.

9. Informed by the Joint Action Plan, the Forum will monitor progress and identify priorities for action as well as who will be responsible for implementation to facilitate delivery of the commitments made. The role of the Forum is to catalyse action and to coordinate support behind African priorities and NEPAD. The Forum may choose to make additional proposals and recommendations to participating Governments and Organizations.

10. The AU/NEPAD Secretariat and the Support Unit will together be responsible also for the timely presentation of papers to the members of the Forum, for circulating background analysis and statistical data required to inform and progress discussions, including on the Joint Action Plan. The Forum shall invite analysis and other support from participating institutions as necessary, including through development of virtual outreach and coordination. The Support Unit will work closely with and may request support or advice from other countries or international organizations, programmes, institutions or agencies.

11. The Forum shall be guided by 4 co-chairs on an annual basis: by two representatives from Africa, one of whom should represent the AU, and two representatives from the development partners, one of whom will be the chair of the G8. Each Forum meeting will be chaired by 2 of the co-chairs (one from Africa).

12. The Forum shall convene twice a year with one meeting being in Africa. The April meeting will discuss priorities and future challenges. The October meeting will discuss progress against the Joint Action Plan on the basis of the Progress Report focusing on the key policy or performance issues identified and on where action is required.

### Annex 3: Rome Document on the ‘Reform of the Africa Partnership Forum (2009)

*The document is part of the Annex of the Communiqué of the 12<sup>th</sup> meeting of the African Partnership Forum in Rome at the 10. June 2009  
(<http://www.africapartnershipforum.org/meetingdocuments/43062830.pdf>).*

#### **Introduction**

Members of the Africa Partnership Forum, have reviewed the role and functioning of the Forum in accordance with the mandate given by leaders. They have re-affirmed the importance and value of the APF as a unique Forum combining high level political representation and a broad range of stakeholders, and as a means of catalyzing and supporting action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa’s development. This paper sets out their joint conclusions and recommendations.

#### **Objectives and role of the Africa Partnership Forum (APF)**

- (i) The objective of the Forum is to catalyze and support action on both sides of the partnership in support of Africa’s development;
- (ii) The role of the Forum is to make recommendations to leaders on decisions which need to be taken in key regional and global processes, including the G8 and G20, the AU and the UN, in support of Africa’s development. The themes of the Forum should be strongly aligned to the main themes of these regional and global processes;
- (iii) The Forum also has a key role to play in monitoring the delivery of commitments by both sides of the partnership;
- (iv) Both sides of the partnership reaffirm their willingness and determination to strengthen their dialogue in support of the common principles, priorities and objectives in particular those set out in the African Union’s socio-economic programme, namely the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), and the attainment in Africa of the Millennium Development Goals. Both sides of the partnership will reflect and consult further on the AU/NEPAD African Action Plan on the occasion of its presentation to the Forum.

#### **Level of Representation and participation at APF meetings**

2. The APF is a unique mechanism combining high-level political representation and a broad range of stakeholders:

- (v) The strengthened and active participation of Personal Representatives of Heads of State or Government, or their equivalents, from both sides, is essential to enable the Forum to play the role identified above;
- (vi) Other members of the Forum include Personal Representatives of the Heads of African continental and regional organizations, and relevant international development institutions;
- (vii) Civil society will continue to be represented at meetings of the Forum, and consideration will be given to the possible participation of the private sector;
- (viii) The possibility of broadening the APF to include the emerging economies will be evaluated on the basis of consensus from constituencies.

#### **Nature and format of meetings**

3. Improvements to the way that meetings are organized and conducted will be introduced:

- (ix) There will continue to be two meetings of the APF a year, with the first of these in the calendar year focused primarily on the main political issues to be discussed in key regional and global processes, and the second focused primarily on the monitoring and evaluation of commitments;
- (x) The first meeting will be held at political level, with the participation of Personal Representatives of Heads of State or Government, or their equivalents, and of the Heads of African continental and regional organizations, and relevant international development institutions;
- (xi) The second meeting will typically be monitoring in character. If there are cases where it is more effective for members of the Forum, to be represented at an appropriate senior level, those members of the Forum who choose to be represented at this level will nonetheless ensure that the conclusions are fed back into the political process;
- (xii) More effective ways of recording and disseminating the conclusions of meetings will be introduced, including through the adoption of a communiqué or joint conclusions based on a draft checklist of key action points prepared in advance and enriched by the discussion;
- (xiii) Possible additions to the main plenary format will be kept under review, including ad hoc working groups to examine issues in greater detail between plenary meetings, and break-out sessions during the plenary itself to discuss specific issues.

#### **Strengthening the role of co-chairs**

4. The role of co-chairs will be strengthened to improving the effectiveness of the Forum. This is not limited to the chairing of sessions and reaching of conclusions.

- (xiv) There will be close consultation between co-chairs to identify the main strategic issues well in advance of plenary meetings, and to prepare and manage these meetings, with two preparatory co-chair meetings before each plenary meeting;
- (xv) The co-chairs will also play a strengthened role in advocacy and communication in between plenary meetings, including in ensuring that the joint conclusions of meetings are fed into the political process.

#### **Secretariat arrangements**

5. Secretariat support will be provided jointly by the AU/NEPAD institutions on the African side, and a Support Unit on the G8/OECD side, with a sharing of responsibilities under the direction of co-chairs. Further consideration will be given to whether the Secretariats might be asked to prepare a concise annual report on APF issues and proposed courses of action.