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G7 AI Governance: Past, Present and Future
John Kirton, G7 Research Group
December 8, 2025
Paper prepared for the lunch round table discussion on “G7 Cooperation on AI Adoption and Infrastructure: The Road Behind and Ahead,” held alongside the G7 Industry, Digital, and Technology Ministers’ Meeting in Montréal, organized by Amazon Web Services (AWS), the AI Adoption Initiative (AIAI) and the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), on Monday, December 8, 2025, at Bar George, Le Mount Stephen, 1440 Drummond, Montreal.
What work has been done by the G7 to address issues relating to artificial intelligence (AI) and what is the way ahead?
A great deal – in the past, at present, and in the years ahead.
Canada has led the G7’s and thus the global governance of AI since its start in 2018, has done so as the G7 presidency in 2025, and can, should and will do so at the G7 under France in 2026 and the United States in 2027.
In the past, a Canadian invented AI – my colleague Geoffrey Hinton at the University of Toronto, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in physics in 2024 for doing so (Criddle 2025a). Another Canadian pioneer was Yoshua Bengio (2025) at the Université de Montréal (Criddle 2025b).
The Canadian government invented the G7’s and thus the global governance of AI when it hosted the G7’s Charlevoix Summit in 2018 (Scott 2025). Before then, G7 leaders had made no commitments on AI (see Appendix A). But at Charlevoix, with Donald Trump fully on board, they made 24. Of the 24, 21(88%) dealt with the risks. Eight of the 24 – one third – promoted gender equality.
Then G7 summit AI commitments virtually disappeared for four years, with only one made at Biarritz in 2019, none at Washington in 2020, one at Cornwall in 2021, and none at Elmau in 2022. It revived when Hiroshima in 2023 produced six and Apulia in 2024 made 25.
In 2025, Canada’s G7 leadership continued, when it designed and delivered the Kananaskis Summit in June (see Appendix B). G7 leaders, again with Donald Trump fully on board, produced the “G7 Leaders’ Statement on AI for Prosperity” (see Appendix C). Its 47 commitments, for 36% of the summit’s total, deliberately shifted Charlevoix’s emphasis on AI’s risks to its present and potential rewards. Only eight of the 49 (17%) recognized any risks. One promoted gender equality.
The Kananaskis leaders also led on the next frontier of quantum computing, when all agreed on the “Kananaskis Common Vision for the Future of Quantum Technologies” (Smith 2025). Its 21 commitments, for 16% of the summit’s total, were the first G7 summits had ever made on quantum. The summit’s agreed Chair’s Summary added another commitment on AI and another on quantum technology, bringing the Kananaskis total to 70. AI and quantum thus took almost half of the Kananaskis commitments. Together with Charlevoix’s 24 AI commitments, Canada’s two G7 summits produced three quarters of the AI and quantum commitments that G7 summits have ever made on those subjects so far.
Moreover, since 2018 G7 members have complied highly with the assessed priority commitments on AI, at an average of 92%, considerably higher than the G7 summits’ all-time, all-subject average of 78% (see Appendix A). So, what G7 leaders promise together at their summits, their governments then do back home.
Canada’s G7 AI leadership expanded at its meeting for ministers of energy and the environment in Toronto on October 30–31 (see Appendix D). There G7 ministers, including their American colleagues, produced the “G7 Energy and AI Work Plan.” It contained 21 commitments, the second highest number in the nine outcome documents they produced.
More broadly, throughout 2025, Canada worked closely with South Africa as host of the bigger, broader G20 that year. Just before its Johannesburg Summit on November 22–23, without Donald Trump or the US government there, its chair Cyril Ramaphosa, with Lula da Silva and Pedro Sanchez (2025), wrote: “Inequality not only undermines economic performance but threatens democracy itself. Too much wealth and power in the hands of a few – as monopolists reign over entire industries, including much of the media and the 21st-century town square of social media. Artificial intelligence, even with all its potential benefits, risks deepening these inequalities still further.” But their G20 summit made only five commitments on AI, among its 195 in all. Most of the five were unambitious and focused on Africa.
Global AI governance at the highest level thus depends on the G7 and Canada’s leadership there (Kirton and Warren 2021).
At present, the G7 Industry, Digital, and Technology Ministers’ Meeting in Montreal on December 8–9 – the last in-person meeting during Canada’s 2025 presidency – will again lead on AI.
The meeting is designed to “discuss priorities on industrial competitiveness [and] how to support the transition to a resilient digital economy while upholding our economic and national security priorities and international commitments” (Canada 2025).
It will build on the firm foundation laid by the three digital ministerial meetings that Italy mounted in 2024. The first meeting, assembling G7 industry, technology and digital ministers in Verona and Trento on March 14–15, 2024, produced 31 commitments on AI, or 70% of the 44 it made overall. Ministers committed “to continue building” on the outcomes of Italy’s G7 presidency during Canada’s G7 presidency in 2025.
In 2025, the Kananaskis leaders also declared “Building on the 2024 Italian Presidency’s Report on Driving Factors and Challenges of AI Adoption and Development among companies, especially micro and small enterprises, we commit to … help businesses … integrate AI technologies … [and] respect intellectual property rights … [and] move from AI experimentation to impact.” The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2025) is now helping to implement the commitment on AI adoption by small and medium-sized enterprises.
The Montreal meeting will also implement the two explicit AI mandates leaders gave their ministers at Kananaskis in June on public sector adoption and energy. Leaders made the following commitments: “We task relevant Ministers to explore strategic investments for accelerating public sector AI adoption in transformative ways, including for large language models and digital infrastructure” and “we task relevant Ministers to advance these commitments by delivering a workplan on AI and energy, before the end of this year, including working with international and industry partners to provide ongoing data analysis.”
The Montreal ministers will also address the new issues that have developed since. These begin with the expanding AI competition and challenges from three sources.
The first source is from individual members, which are mounting international meetings to advance their claims to leadership, based on their distinctive approaches. Here, on the three key dimensions of regulatory structures, institutional oversight and ethical principles, the US “innovation-first” approach favours US global dominance through “whatever it takes,” market-driven self-regulation with limited ethical constraints, and single national government control which is now contested by Make-America-Great-Again stalwarts and Republican and other states (Shribman 2025; Chan and Alden 2025; Thornhill 2025; Miller 2025).
The European “ethics first” approach, prioritized by Commission president Ursula von der Leyen in 2019, was embedded in its AI Act created in December 2023 and entered into force in August 2024 (Moens and Heikkila 2025). It prefers heavy regulations, emphasizing individual rights and AI risks. But on November 19, 2025, its further implementation was delayed, even though Google promised to adopt its code of practice in July 2025 (Hancock 2005).
The second source of competition is from China, which is now challenging and some say overtaking the initial US and G7 lead in AI, both in its expanding capabilities and its centralized, state-controlled governance approach (Takach 2025; Chan and Alden 2025).
The third source is the United Nations and its International Telecommunication Union (ITU), seeking to secure the leading global governance role (Bogdan-Martin 2025). They claim to uniquely represent all the countries and peoples in the world, and thus to make AI work for all, including those in the global south that are increasingly left far behind.
The Montreal ministers will shape a path among these competing approaches, based on their 2023 Hiroshima AI process, and their three converging principles of risk-based regulation, trustworthiness and responsibility, and greater transparency and collaboration (Chan and Alden 2025).
The prospects for Canada’s future AI leadership are also promising when the G7 presidency passes to Canada’s neighbours – Emmanuel Macron’s France in 2026 and Donald Trump’s US in 2027.
To be sure, the French-hosted Paris Action Summit in February 2025 saw the US and UK reject the resulting “Statement on Inclusive and Sustainable Artificial Intelligence for People and Planet” that was accepted by the European Union, African Union and 62 countries.
But then Trump, Macron, the UK’s Kier Starmer and the EU’s von der Leyen and their ministers fully agreed to the many AI and quantum agreements made at the G7 in 2025. While they see their countries as potential global leaders in AI, based on Mistral and Chat GPT and its US-based competitors, they increasingly know that they lack the capabilities to do this alone. And all are concerned about the rising AI competition from an authoritarian, expansionist China and the best way to counter it.
And at their meeting in Beijing on December 4, Macron and Xi Jinping agreed to cooperate on AI, as well as nuclear energy, biodiversity, biopharmaceuticals and global governance as a whole (Klasa and Leahy 2025). These subjects will appear on the agenda of Macron’s G7 Evian Summit on June 14–16, 2026, as part of his related priorities of global economic imbalances, including those on trade and investment, the current US-initiated tariff war, and rare earth and other critical minerals.
Trump and the US have now assumed the G20’s presidency for 2026. He has made technology one of his three priorities, along with energy and the economy for the Miami Summit on December 13–14, 2026. Technology, with AI at its core and energy, will remain his and others’ central priorities for the G7 summit he will host the following year.
And the private sector, investors and governments in all G7 members and closely linked partners such as Taiwan will continue to worry about if, when and how much, the current AI bubble in markets will burst, devastating their economies and allowing China to take the global lead.
Yet amid the challenging context and promising prospects, three proposals for action at Montreal stand out. They flow from ITU secretary general Doreen Bogdan-Martin’s (2025) important reminder that “AI breakthroughs are now unlocking the ability to detect diseases earlier, personalize learning, mitigate disaster risks, optimise agriculture and energy systems, and strengthen water and food security.” These are the immediate personal priorities for all citizens and thus their governments in all G7 democracies.
Thus, the first proposal is to finally link AI to health, for drug discovery and treatment and much else. Rapid, effective, personally targeted, affordable health care is key to keeping people alive and controlling soaring government deficits and debts.
The second proposal is to act on AI for the environment, starting with wildfire detection and response, and forecasting for other extreme weather events.
The third proposal is AI for defence, especially in regard to Ukraine and Taiwan (Moens and Foy 2025). This is particularly important, as Canada did not follow Italy’s initiative in 2024 in mounting the first G7 meeting for ministers of defence by holding a second one this year. And Japan and the US must be brought fully on board, which only the G7 can do.
Finally, AI should also be used to improve G7 and global governance themselves, starting with improving members compliance with the summit commitments their leaders make (Rapson and Kirton 2021).
Bengio, Yoshua (2025), “AI advances are shifting the balance between opportunities and risks,” in John Kirton and Madeline Koch, eds. (2025), G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit (GT Media: London), pp. 68–69. https://bit.ly/g7Canada.
Bogdan-Martin, Doreen (2025, “Collaboration creates breakthroughs for a better world,” in John Kirton and Madeline Koch, eds. (2025), G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit (GT Media: London), pp. 64-65. https://bit.ly/g7Canada.
Canada (2025), “G7 Industry, Digital and Technology Ministers’ Meeting, Montreal, Quebec, December 8–9, 2025, Media Circular.” December 7.
Chan, Kenddrick and Chris Alden (2025), “The G7 and the future of AI governance,” in John Kirton and Madeline Koch, eds. (2025), G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit (GT Media: London), pp. 66–67. https://bit.ly/g7Canada
Criddle, Cristina (2025a), “Lunch with the FT Geoffrey Hinton: ‘AI will make most people poorer’,” Financial Times, September 6–7, p. 3.
Criddle, Cristina (2025b), “‘Godfather’ of AI says latest models are lying to users,” Financial Times, June 4, p. 5.
Hancock, Alice (2025), “Google vows to sign EU code of practice on AI development om boost to bloc,” Financial Times, July 31, p. 6.
Kirton, John and Brittaney Warren (2021), “From Silos to Synergies: G20 Governance of the SDGs, Climate Change and Digitalization,” International Organizations Research Journal, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 20–54. https://iorj.hse.ru/en/2021-16-2/484824920.html.
Kirton, John and Madeline Koch, eds. (2025), G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit (GT Media: London). https://bit.ly/g7Canada.
Klasa, Adrienne and Jow Leahy (2025), “Macron warns Xi of dangers to world orders,” Financial Times, December 5, p. 2.
Miller, Joe (2025), “Trump faces Maga backlash over AI laws,” Financial Times, November 21, p. 4.
Moens, Barbara and Henry Foy (2025), “European defence must fund AI, official says,” Financial Times, p. 4.
Moens, Barbara and Melissa Heikkila (2025), “Can the RU fix its landmark EU rules?” Financial Times, November 20, p. 17.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2025), “AI adoption by small and medium-sized enterprises: OECD discussion paper for the G7,” to be released on December 9, 2025. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/2025/12/ai-adoption-by-small-and-medium-sized-enterprises_9c48eae6.html.
Rapson, Jessica and John Kirton (2022), “AI for Global Governance: Using Predictive Machine Learning to Improve the Efficiency of G7 and G20 Summits,” Global Solutions Journal, no. 10. https://www.global-solutions-initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/GS_journal_10_Rapson_Kirton.pdf.
Scott, Nancy (2025), “G7 performance on artificial intelligence, ICT and digitalisation,” in John Kirton and Madeline Koch, eds. (2025), G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit (GT Media: London), pp. 62–64. https://bit.ly/g7Canada.
Shribman, David (2025), “Trump becomes an AI evangelist,” Globe and Mail, July 16, A7.
Smith, Tim (2025), “Shaping the global governance of quantum technology for sustainable development,” in John Kirton and Madeline Koch, eds. (2025), G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit (GT Media: London), pp. 70–71. https://bit.ly/g7Canada.
Takach George S. (2025), Cold War 2.0: Artificial Intelligence in the New Battle Between China, Russia, and America (Pegasus Books: New York).
Thornhill, John (2025), “The US may be running the wrong AI race,” Financial Times, December 5, p. 17
| Summit | All commitments | Digital committments | Artificial intelligence commitments | Artificial intelligence compliance (no. assessments) Average |
2011 Deauville |
5 | 0 | - | |
2012 Camp David |
0 | 0 | - | |
2013 Lough Erne |
7 | 0 | - | |
2014 Brussels |
0 | 0 | - | |
2015 Elmau |
0 | 0 | - | |
2016 Ise-Shima |
342 | 30 | 0 | - |
2017 Taormina |
180 | 11 | 0 | - |
2018 Charlevoix |
315 | 24 | 24 | (1) 75% |
2019 Biarritz |
22 | 1 | (1) 100% | |
2020 USA |
5 | 0 | 0 | - |
2021 Cornwall |
11 | 1 | (1) 94% | |
2022 Elmau |
23 | 0 | ||
2023 Hiroshima |
653 | 54 | 6 | (1) 100% |
2024 Apulia |
465 | 33 | 25 | |
2025 Kananaskis |
149 | 70* | ||
Total |
127 | |||
Average |
(4) 92% |
*2025 AI commitments include Quantum commitments and the two on AI and quantum in the agreed Chair’s Summary.
Charlevoix Common Vision for the Future of Artificial Intelligence N=23
We, the Leaders of the G7, commit to:
Endeavour to promote human-centric AI and commercial adoption of AI, and continue to advance appropriate technical, ethical and technologically neutral approaches by:
2018-140: safeguarding privacy including through the development of appropriate legal regimes; (ICT-digital)
2018-141: investing in cybersecurity, the appropriate enforcement of applicable privacy legislation and communication of enforcement decisions; (ICT)
2018-142: informing individuals about existing national bodies of law, including in relation to how their personal data may be used by AI systems; (ICT)
2018-143: promoting research and development by industry in safety, assurance, data quality, and data security; (ICT)
2018-144: exploring the use of other transformative technologies to protect personal privacy and transparency. (ICT)
2018-145: Promote investment in research and development in AI that generates public trust in new technologies (ICT)
2018-146: encourage industry to invest in developing and deploying AI that supports economic growth and women’s economic empowerment while addressing issues related to accountability, assurance, liability, security, safety, gender and other biases and potential misuse. (ICT) (economy-related) (gender-related)
2018-147: Support lifelong learning, education, training and reskilling, on workforce development for AI skills, including apprenticeships, computer science and STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) education, especially for women, girls and those at risk of being left behind. (ICT) (gender-related) (education-related) (labour-related)
2018-148: exchange information on workforce development [for AI skills, including apprenticeships, computer science and STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) education, especially for women, girls and those at risk of being left behind.] (ICT) (gender-related) (education-related) (labour-related)
2018-149: Support and involve women as creators, stakeholders, leaders and decision-makers at all stages of the development and implementation of AI applications. (ICT) (gender-related)
2018-150: underrepresented populations [as creators, stakeholders, leaders and decision-makers at all stages of the development and implementation of AI applications.] (ICT)
2018-151: marginalized individuals [as creators, stakeholders, leaders and decision-makers at all stages of the development and implementation of AI applications.] (ICT)
2018-152: Facilitate multistakeholder dialogue on how to advance AI innovation to increase trust and adoption and to inform future policy discussions. (ICT)
2018-153: Support efforts to promote trust in the development and adoption of AI systems with particular attention to countering harmful stereotypes and fostering gender equality. (ICT) (gender-related)
2018-154: Foster initiatives that promote safety and transparency (ICT)
2018-155: provide guidance on human intervention in AI decision-making processes. (ICT)
2018-156: Promote the use of AI applications by companies, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises and companies from non-tech sectors. (ICT)
2018-157: Promote active labour market policies to develop the skills needed for new jobs and for those at risk of being left out, including policies specifically targeting the needs of women and underrepresented populations in order to increase labour participation rates for those groups. (ICT) (labour-related) (gender-related). Assigned to Maira Ejaz by JJK on January 2, 2025, due January 16, 2025.
2018-158: [Promote] workforce development and reskilling programs to develop the skills needed for new jobs and for those at risk of being left out, including policies specifically targeting the needs of women and underrepresented populations in order to increase labour participation rates for those groups. (ICT) (labour-related) (gender-related) Compliance = 75%
2018-159: Encourage investment in AI technology and innovation to create new opportunities for all people, especially to give greater support and options for unpaid caregivers, the majority of whom today are women. (ICT) (gender-related)
2018-160: Encourage initiatives, including those led by industry, to improve digital security in AI and developing technologies, such as the Internet of Things and cloud services, through the development of voluntary codes of conduct, standards or guidelines and the sharing of best practices. (ICT)
2018-161: Ensure AI design and implementation respect and promote applicable frameworks for privacy and personal data protection. (ICT)
2018-162: Support an open and fair market environment including the free flow of information, while respecting applicable frameworks for privacy and data protection for AI innovation by addressing discriminatory trade practices, such as forced technology transfer, unjustified data localization requirements and source code disclosure, and recognizing the need for effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. (ICT) (trade related)
Risks = 21, Gender equaliy = 8
2019-71: We will continue to explore ways to advance our work on AI to understand and share, on a regular basis, multidisciplinary research results on artificial intelligence issues and best practices, as well as bringing together international artificial intelligence initiatives. (digital economy). Compliance = 100%
2021-123: Building on the work of the Global Partnership for Artificial Intelligence (GPAI) advanced by the Canadian and French G7 Presidencies in 2018 and 2019, we will aim to rally all partners around our open and human centric approach to artificial intelligence looking forward to the GPAI Summit in Paris in November 2021. (digital economy). Compliance = 94%
[We commit to] advance international discussions on inclusive artificial intelligence (AI) governance and interoperability to achieve our common vision and goal of trustworthy AI, in line with our shared democratic values. (ICT/digital) (democracy-related)
We commit to further advancing multi-stakeholder approaches to the development of standards for AI, respectful of legally binding frameworks, and recognize the importance of procedures that advance transparency, openness, fair processes, impartiality, privacy and inclusiveness to promote responsible AI. (ICT/digital)
We support the development of tools for trustworthy AI through multi-stakeholder international organizations (ICT/digital)
2023-295. We recognize the need to immediately take stock of the opportunities and challenges of generative AI, which is increasingly prominent across countries and sectors (ICT/digital)
In this respect, we task relevant ministers to establish the Hiroshima AI process, through a G7 working group, in an inclusive manner and in cooperation with the OECD and GPAI, for discussions on generative AI by the end of this year. (ICT/digital). Compliance 100%.
We task our relevant Ministers to consider collective approaches in this area, including in terms of interoperability, portability and standards, with the support of the OECD. (ICT/digital, AI) Confirmed as an AI commitment by BW and JJK 240109
G7 2024- 21 Deepening our cooperation to harness the benefits and manage the risks of Artificial Intelligence (AI). (digital economy)
G7 2024- 22 We will launch an action plan on the use of AI in the world of work (digital economy)
G7 2024- 23 [We will]…develop a brand to support the implementation of the International Code of Conduct for Organizations Developing Advanced AI Systems. (digital economy)
Artificial Intelligence, Science, Technology, and Innovation (N=29 - digital economy/AI)
G7 2024-240 In this regard, we recognize the need for approaches to AI governance that foster inclusion, to help us harness the potential of AI in a way that reflects these values and promotes its development while mitigating risks, including with respect to human rights and avoiding governance fragmentation. (AI)
G7 2024-241 We will work toward these objectives by actively cooperating with other stakeholders, organizations and initiatives as relevant, such as the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI) and the OECD. (AI) (education-related) (labour-related)
G7 2024-242 We will build on the outcomes of the AI Seoul Summit and upcoming milestones, including this year’s UN Summit of the Future and the AI Action Summit in 2025. (AI)
G7 2024-243 We will step up our efforts to enhance interoperability amongst our AI governance approaches to promote greater certainty, transparency and accountability while recognizing that approaches and policy instruments may vary across G7 members. (AI)
G7 2024-244 We will take a risk-based approach in these efforts as we seek to foster innovation and strong, inclusive, and sustainable growth. To achieve this goal, we will step up our coordination around the evolution of our governance and regulatory frameworks, including by sharing best practices.
G7 2024-245 We will enhance our regular consultations. (AI)
G7 2024-246 We are also committed to deepening coordination between our respective institutes and offices focused on AI, to work towards shared understanding of risk management and advance international standards for AI development and deployment. (AI)
G7 2024-247 We will work towards developing a brand that can be used to identify organizations that are voluntarily participating in and implementing the Code’s forthcoming reporting framework. (AI)
G7 2024-248 We will work to ensure that AI enables increased productivity, quality jobs, and decent work; (AI)
G7 2024-249 [We will work to ensure that AI]…empowers workers; (AI)
G7 2024-250 [We will work to ensure that AI]…fosters inclusiveness and equal opportunities in the world of work; (AI)
G7 2024-251 [We will work to ensure that AI]…enhances active labor market policies, including by fostering dialogue and transparency with workers organizations. (AI)
G7 2024-252 To achieve these goals, we will launch an action plan on the use of AI in the world of work. (AI)
G7 2024-253 We ask our Labor Ministers to develop the action plan, envisaging concrete actions to fully leverage the potential of AI to enable decent work and workers’ rights and full access to adequate reskilling and upskilling, while addressing potential challenges and risks to our labor markets. (AI)
G7 2024-254 We emphasize the need to anticipate future skills needs, provide higher education opportunities and equip workers and employers with the skills and competencies needed to design, adopt, and work with a human-centric, safe, secure and trustworthy AI. (AI)
G7 2024-255 Acknowledging the key role that emerging technologies can play in economic growth, we commit to enhancing cooperation to bolster the adoption and development of new technologies, including AI, among micro, small, and medium enterprises, thereby fostering inclusive economic growth. (AI)
G7 2024-256 As we look to the future of emerging technologies, we encourage transparency and adherence to international workers’ rights and labor standards at each stage of the AI supply chain. (AI)
G7 2024-257 We also encourage our competition authorities to monitor the development of the AI industry, with a view to addressing potential competition issues, and prevent adverse effects at an early stage. (AI)
G7 2024-258 We will also work, including with developing countries and emerging economies, towards closing digital divides, including the gender digital divide, and achieving digital inclusion. (AI) (development-related) (gender-related)
G7 2024-259 We will leverage the benefits of AI for SDGs by closing gaps in technologies for development, and by strengthening research and development ecosystems. (AI) (development-related)
G7 2024-260 To this end, G7 countries seek to promote safe, secure and inclusive practices, tools and solutions to make the benefits of AI and advanced computing available to partners to advance their development. (AI) (development-related)
G7 2024-263 We also affirm our commitment to promoting responsible innovation of biotechnology, including its convergence with AI.
Communiqué |
Compliments |
Words |
Direction Setting |
Commitments |
Development of Global Governance |
|||
Democracy |
Human rights |
Number |
Percentage |
Inside G7 |
Outside G7 |
|||
Israel-Iran war |
0 | 131 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2% | 0 | 0 |
Wildfire charter |
0 | 536 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 15% | 0 | 2 |
AI for prosperity |
2 | 1,804 | 0 | 1 | 47 | 36% | 8 | 4 |
Critical minerals |
0 | 974 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 16% | 3 | 3 |
Quantum technology |
0 | 519 | 1 | 1 | 21 | 16% | 0 | 1 |
Migrant smuggling |
0 | 408 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 8% | 4 | 0 |
Transnational repression |
0 | 558 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 6% | 4 | 0 |
Subtotal |
2 | 4,930 | 2 | 7 | 130 | 100% | 10 | 10 |
Chair’s summary |
1 | 1,202 | 2 | 3 | 18 | 18% | 2 | 2 |
Total |
3 | 6,132 | 4 | 10 | 148 | 21 | 12 | |
G7 average 1975-2024 |
4 | 19,936 | 33 | 151 | ||||
Subject |
Number of Commitments |
Percentage of Commitments |
Digital economy |
70 |
47% |
Climate – Disasters/Wildfires |
21 |
14% |
Migration and refugees |
13 |
9% |
Development |
13 |
9% |
Democracy – TNR |
9 |
6% |
Regional security |
8 |
5% |
Trade |
7 |
5% |
Energy |
2 |
1% |
Gender |
1 |
0.7% |
Environment |
1 |
0.7% |
Infrastructure |
1 |
0.7% |
Gender |
1 |
0.7% |
Environment |
1 |
0.7% |
Community safety general |
1 |
0.7% |
International cooperation |
1 |
0.7% |
Total |
148 |
100% |
Issue area = digital economy ALL N=47
2025-4: To realize this potential, we must better drive innovation and adoption of secure, responsible, and trustworthy AI that benefits people, mitigates negative externalities, and promotes our national security. (risks)
2025-5: We will power AI now and into the future.
2025-6: And we will work with emerging market and developing country partners to close digital divides, in line with the United Nations Global Digital Compact.
2025-7: We must seize the potential of AI in our public sectors to drive efficiency and better serve our publics.
To fully realize the potential of AI for our publics and our partners, we commit to:
2025-8: Work together to accelerate adoption of AI in the public sector to enhance the quality of public services for both citizens and businesses and increase government efficiency while respecting human rights and privacy, as well as promoting transparency, fairness, and accountability. (risks)
2025-9: To this end, Canada as G7 presidency is launching the G7 GovAI Grand Challenge and will host a series of “Rapid Solution Labs” to develop innovative and scalable solutions to the barriers we face in adopting AI in the public sector. [country-specific commitment]
2025-10: We will leverage our existing government AI expertise to establish a G7 AI Network (GAIN) to advance the Grand Challenge; develop a roadmap to scale successful AI projects; and create a catalogue of open-source and shareable AI solutions for members. GAIN will collaborate to ensure that AI solutions in government have measurable and real benefits for our communities.
2025-11: We task relevant Ministers to explore strategic investments for accelerating public sector AI adoption in transformative ways, including for large language models and digital infrastructure.
2025-12: Promote economic prosperity by supporting SMEs to adopt and develop AI that respects personal data and intellectual property rights, and strengthen their readiness, efficiency, productivity and competitiveness. (risks)
We launch the G7 AI Adoption Roadmap, which provides clear, actionable pathways for companies to adopt AI and scale their businesses. Through this Roadmap, we commit to:
2025-13: sustain investments in AI adoption programs for SMEs, including supporting access to compute and digital infrastructure;
2025-14: publish a common blueprint for AI adoption by SMEs underpinned by proven use-cases from G7 economies;
2025-15: deepen our cooperation on talent exchange to integrate AI skills within businesses looking to scale;
2025-16: develop tools that grow business and consumer confidence and trust in AI adoption including by leveraging the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process.
2025-17: We will collaborate with international partners, like the Global Partnership on AI, to advance this work.
2025-18: We will build resilient future workforces by preparing workers for AI-driven transitions. To do so, we will advance implementation of the 2024 G7 Action Plan for a human-centered adoption of safe, secure and trustworthy AI in the world of work, including by developing a voluntary compendium of best practices. (risks)
2025-19: We will drive economic growth, address talent shortages, and ensure equal opportunity, by encouraging girls, as well as members of communities left behind by globalization, to pursue science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education and increasing women’s representation in the AI talent pool at all levels. (gender)
2025-20: We will cooperate on innovative solutions to address energy challenges across our economies, including for AI and data centres, that support our respective national and international commitments.
2025-21: We will also support innovation that improves the energy and resource efficiency of AI models and optimizes data centre operations.
2025-22: We will advance AI solutions to unlock energy innovation and breakthrough discoveries, including optimization of energy use,
2025-23: [We will]…adopt AI to help build secure, resilient, and affordable energy systems and supply chains.
2025-24: We will strive to identify solutions that mitigate negative externalities and generate benefits for people and preserve our natural resources. (environment) (risks)
2025-25: We will cooperate on knowledge-building and sharing with trusted international partners and promote AI skills and talent development in the energy sector.
2025-26: We task relevant Ministers to advance these commitments by delivering a workplan on AI and energy, before the end of this year, including working with international and industry partners to provide ongoing data analysis.
2025-27: We will harness trusted and secure AI technology to promote growth and enable partners to tackle the unique challenges they face. To do this, we will leverage our combined expertise, resources and networks to bridge gaps in AI infrastructure and capacity, invest in locally led AI-enabled innovations, and voluntarily collaborate with local universities to share knowledge and access to AI on mutually agreed terms. (risks)
2025-28: We will deliver this by aligning our efforts through initiatives including AI for Development, AI Hub for Sustainable Development, Current AI, FAIR Forward, Hiroshima AI Process Friends Group, AI for Public Good, and others.
2025-29: Interested G7 members plan to strengthen the AI for Development Funders Collaborative.
2025-30: We seek to further promote secure, responsible, and trustworthy AI that benefits people, mitigates negative externalities, and promotes our national security. We will do this through advanced AI research, world-class commercial applications, and deep business and policy expertise. (risks)
2025-31: We plan to create the conditions for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including micro-enterprises—the engine of our economies— to access, understand, and adopt AI in ways that drive value and productivity.
Building on the 2024 Italian Presidency’s report on Driving factors and challenges of AI Adoption and Development among companies, especially micro and small enterprises, we commit to:
2025-32: We intend to double down on AI adoption efforts that connect research to practical applications, helping businesses—especially SMEs—integrate AI technologies that drive productivity, growth and competitiveness.
2025-33: We recognize the need to respect intellectual property rights in enabling these efforts.
2025-34: While we have already taken steps to promote AI adoption, scaling these efforts remains essential, including access to computing resources, expertise, and partnerships to move from AI experimentation to impact.
We intend to promote AI adoption programs that, in particular, focus on:
2025-35: Commercialization support for SMEs and startups, including access to advanced computing infrastructure connectivity and computing resources, facilitating effective use of open and closed source AI models, business mentorship, and targeted support to bridge the gap between academic breakthroughs and industry implementation in order to bring AI-enabled products and services to market;
2025-36: Cross-sector collaboration to facilitate adoption, connecting businesses with AI solutions providers, national AI research institutes, academia, innovation hubs, and clusters to accelerate deployment of AI across the economy;
2025-37: Practical use case development, including easy to implement and existing solutions, showcasing successful applications of AI across sectors and by SMEs to demonstrate return on investment and stimulate wider industry demand; and
2025-38: AI literacy and skills development, ensuring businesses—especially SMEs—have access to the tools and skilled workforce needed to adopt AI confidently and effectively.
2025-39: We intend to deliver an AI Adoption Blueprint that equips governments and businesses with practical tools, evidence-based policy options, and real-world examples to accelerate SME AI integration.
2025-40: The Blueprint will: Present actionable policy recommendations that governments can choose to implement to lower barriers and build enabling ecosystems for SME AI adoption; and
2025-41: The Blueprint will: Provide case studies of successful AI integration, offering concrete examples that businesses across sectors and countries can choose to replicate.
2025-42: We intend to expand G7 cross-border talent exchanges to connect AI expertise with businesses—including SMEs—accelerating adoption and building a future-ready workforce.
2025-43: We expect to encourage a focus in our initiatives that matches sectoral expertise with the AI competencies needed for impactful adoption.
2025-44: We look to further our cooperation on talent exchange to connect emerging AI research and commercialization expertise from across our world-class talent pool with real-world business needs.
2025-45: To do so, we plan to: Support AI-focused talent exchanges, including with students from G7 members, specifically targeting Al adoption projects, to bridge research with practical application, developing high-level expertise in critical areas; and,
2025-46: To do so, we plan to: Connect SMEs with AI skilled workers so that they have access to AI capabilities and tools to enhance their operational efficiency and competitiveness.
2025-47: We plan to build on progress achieved under the Japanese and Italian presidencies and leverage the outcomes of the Hiroshima AI Process (HAIP) to foster trust.
2025-48: We will now translate shared principles into concrete tools for SMEs, with the aim of enabling responsible AI deployment across all sectors and business sizes in a manner that fosters consumer trust and unlocks market opportunities. (risks)
2025-49: We will: Lead multi-stakeholder efforts to identify opportunities and challenges in deploying AI, aligned with the Hiroshima AI Process, in collaboration with SMEs, AI developers, international standards-setting organizations, and Global Partnership on AI members;
2025-50: We will: Publish a toolkit to identify and explain relevant resources for AI deployers;
2025-51: We will: Raise awareness of the HAIP Code of Conduct Reporting Framework that the OECD is implementing.
Gender equality = 1/47; Environment = 1/47; Security = 2/47; Risks recognized = 8/47
Issue area = digital economy ALL N=21
2025-52: We acknowledge that achieving quantum technologies’ full potential will require international collaboration between governments, researchers and industry to mobilize investments and optimize resources; advance research and commercialization;
2025-53: [We acknowledge that achieving quantum technologies’ full potential will require]… secure supply chains;
2025-54: [We acknowledge that achieving quantum technologies’ full potential will require]… facilitate access to infrastructure, talent and markets;
2025-55: [We acknowledge that achieving quantum technologies’ full potential will require]… align adoption with shared interests and values;
2025-56: [We acknowledge that achieving quantum technologies’ full potential will require]… create a trusted ecosystem to manage risks and unleash innovation.
To this end, we commit to:
2025-57: Promote public and private investment in quantum science and technology R&D, responsible innovation and commercialization;
2025-58: support partnerships between researchers, industry and other stakeholders to accelerate commercialization and attract private investment.
2025-59: Promote the development and adoption of beneficial applications of quantum technologies in a variety of sectors, including those developed by small and medium sized enterprises.
2025-60: Support opportunities for all stakeholders to meaningfully participate as creators, stakeholders, leaders and decision-makers at all stages of the research, development and implementation of quantum technologies.
2025-61: Support initiatives, exchange best practices and promote workforce development policies for all, including women as well as communities left behind by globalization, to equip individuals with the skills needed for new jobs in the quantum sector. These include apprenticeships; science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and computer science education; and mentorship. (gender)
2025-62: Support an open and fair market environment and trusted ecosystem among like-minded partners through measures such as international exchanges between academia and industry, preventing the leakage of sensitive technologies, protecting intellectual property rights, and promoting greater interoperability.
2025-63: Promote trust in quantum technologies through public and international dialogues, based on scientific expertise and aligned with democratic values, freedom and fundamental rights, recognizing that, at this early stage of innovation, a global regulatory framework is not yet appropriate.
2025-64: Increase understanding of risks associated with quantum technologies across different sectors;
2025-65: secure quantum supply chains; (security)
2025-66: ensure the security and integrity of research; (security)
2025-67: promote the timely adoption of quantum-resilient security measures and solutions for protecting data and communications networks. (security)
2025-68: Intensify collaboration between trusted national measurement institutes, including via the NMI-Q initiative, to drive forward essential measurement and testing work amongst likeminded partners.
2025-69: Collaborate through a G7 Joint Working Group on Quantum Technologies, with industry, experts and academia to inform cooperation on research, development and commercialization including through voluntary joint calls for projects between different members;
2025-70: advance policy dialogues on approaches to innovation and adoption;
2025-71: assess the potential societal impacts of these technologies as they progress towards commercial and defense applications. (security)
2025-72: In this International Year of Quantum Science and Technology, we will work together and with likeminded partners to make concrete progress on this agenda.
Gender = 1/21; Security 4/21
| Document | Words | Commitments | Development of Global Governance | References to Climate Change | |
| Inside the G7 | Outside the G7 | ||||
| Energy Total | 5,771 | 118 | 7 | 18 | 0 |
| Energy Security | 1,830 | 33 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Critical Minerals Markets | 1,573 | 32 | 1 | 8 | 0 |
| Energy and AI | 1,197 | 21 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Nuclear and Fusion Energy | 659 | 18 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| Ukraine’s Energy Security | 512 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Environment Total | 3,367 | 37 | 27 | 6 | 1 |
| Circular Economy | 1,526 | 29 | 18 | 5 | 0 |
| Water Coalition Workplan | 1,071 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 0 |
| Extreme Weather | 770 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Chairs’ Summary | 1,506 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 7 |
| Overall Total | 10,644 | 169 | 40 | 30 | 8 |