Summits |  Meetings |  Publications |  Research |  Search |  Home |  About the G7 Research Group

Analytical Studies > Analysis on the 2026 Evian Summit
G7 Summits > 2026 Evian Summit > Road to the 2026 Evian Summit

Promising but Precarious Prospects for the G7 Evian Summit’s Significant Performance

John Kirton, G7 Research Group
June 7, 2026
[pdf]

On June 17, 2025, at the end of the G7’s 51st summit, held in Kananaskis, Canada, French president Emmanuel Macron announced that the 2026 summit, which he will host, would be held in Evian-les-Bains in mid-June 2026. It will be a memorable place and time. Like Kananaskis in Canada’s Rocky Mountains, the leaders will return to a previous location, the historic Hôtel Royal that France used in 2003, near a real physical summit, this time in the French Alps. The second Evian Summit will take place 37 years after the G7’s historic Paris Summit of the Arch on July 14–16, 1989, to which Mikhail Gorbachev sent his de facto surrender letter on behalf of the Soviet Union, bloc and system – marking the moment when the West and the world won the Cold War.

At the Evian Summit on June 15–17, 2026, most G7 leaders will be veterans of G7 summits. Macron will be at his tenth summit, since becoming president in May 2017, and will be hosting his second summit, after Biarritz in 2019. He will again welcome US president Donald Trump, coming to his sixth summit, including Biarritz, and his second during his return to the presidency in January 2025. EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen will be at her sixth, and Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni at her third, since she started as host of Apulia in 2024. Coming to their second summit will be the newcomers at Kananaskis: Canadian prime minister Mark Carney, the 2025 host; German chancellor Friedrich Merz; EU Council president António Costa; and UK prime minister Keir Starmer, due to host in 2027. Japanese prime minister Takaichi Sanae will be at her first summit. Thus there will likely be only one newcomer in Evian, with most leaders having tackled Trump before in this unique club.

The Debate

By January 2026, as France assumed the presidency, the debate had begun about the prospective performance and propellors of the Evian Summit (see Appendix A).
 
The first school of thought saw leaders needing to reform the G7 to make global governance survive, due to Trump’s distain for it. Victor Cha, John Hamre and John Ikenberry (2025) argued that the G7 could sustain the rules-based international order if it filled the current void in global governance and leadership, through bolstering its ranks by adding Australia, South Korea and perhaps Spain as members, streamlining its procedures by creating a troika of presidencies and a permanent secretariat, and strengthening its legitimacy by involving international organizations and emerging and middle powers more. This need was due to the current crisis in global governance and the inability of the United Nations, World Trade Organization (WTO), G20, BRICS or newer institutions to fill the gap, along with declining G7 relative capability, and G7 members’ shared trust and strong track record, now facing a new assault by Trump.

In a similar spirit, Creon Butler (2025) identified an option for Evian unfolding as a Kananaskis-like private discussion on a few issues, or a separate “G6 plus” without the United States and with a separate agenda. But he recommended a full “G7 plus” including Australia and South Korea participating in most of the summit, and including Trump only on a few subjects where he was prepared to engage. This was consistent with Macron’s declared desire for a more independent and innovative approach.

The second school saw the need for the G7 to replace the G20 as the centre of global economic governance, due to the G20 summit’s decline. The Financial Times editorial (2025) argued that in 2009 the G20 had “seemed poised to supplant the G8, declaring itself ‘the premier forum for international economic co-operation’. In recent years, it has often struggled even to agree a closing statement.”

The third school saw continuity in G7 summit governance of artificial intelligence (AI). Federica Marconi (2025) saw the need for “continuous and structured engagement with all main actors of the digital ecosystem … [on] AI safety, cloud infrastructure, data governance and cybersecurity,” due to the speed, complexity, transnational nature and risks of digital technology. She thus recommended that in 2026, the G7 “should continue supporting solutions that – also by taking market considerations into account – ensure trustworthy adoption, resilient compute infrastructures and effective mitigation of risks posed by frontier technologies such as quantum computing, while preserving the competitive dynamics that drive innovation.”

The fourth school saw a prospective G7-US coalition of the willing creating new global governance on trade, investment, macroeconomic policy and, especially, climate change, disease management and development, if the European Union led and China cooperated. The Financial Times editorial (2026) on January 29 noted the global trade initiatives of the EU, the United Kingdom and Canada, and the prospect of a tie between the EU and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, concluding that “this year’s agenda of the G7 group of large economies, under France’s presidency, is focused on global macroeconomic imbalances. The unspoken intention is a common front against China’s surpluses. But forcing Beijing to change policy is easier said than done, and in any case the EU, too, runs large external surpluses … [so] success will often depend on Europe’s and China’s ability to work together.”

The fifth school saw the Evian Summit produce a “nothing burger.” Mark Sobel (2026) said there would be “rhetoric on global imbalances, highlighting what we already know. But the US and China, and many in Europe, are unlikely to budge on their policies that cause excessive imbalances, any more than they have over the last two decades.” He said this is because no US president “can make credible fiscal commitments, even if sensible, without Congressional support, and … few in the G7, let alone the G20, are willing to trust the Trump administration.” He pointed out that Macron was near the end of his tenure as president, and his domestic support was weak.

The sixth school saw the French presidency’s focus on global macroeconomic imbalances being caused by “a transparent attempt to find common cause with the US against China’s booming exports” (Sandbu 2026). This school was skeptical of the economic rationale, as there was no lack of global aggregate demand and Chinese overcapacity, but there was poor German and European demand.

For the seventh school Evian was providing the perfect platform for coordinating G7 action against China, if all G7 partners and their guests acted together on this (García Herrero 2026). A variant suggested they would do so, because the US needed the G7 to counter a China that was reducing its rare earth exports to the US but raising them for the rest of the G7 (CE NoticiasFinancieras 2026)

The eighth school saw a G-Zero world due to Donald Trump. Ian Bremmer (2026) saw a “G zero world, not a G seven, not a G20, an absence of global leadership with the United States pulling back, and no other country or group of countries able to take its place.” As seen in Trump’s attack on Venezuela as January 2026 began, this absence was caused by Trump’s “America first” unilateralism and his withdrawal from already weakened multilateral organizations, with no American allies sufficiently pushing back or filling the gap.

The Argument

However, the Evian Summit is likely to produce a significant performance, although its prospects are still somewhat precarious due to the high unpredictability of US president Donald Trump. The summit promises to make small advances on its initial presidency-produced priorities of macroeconomic policy, trade and investment, development, and outreach to consequential partners, and more on the digital economy, childhood safety from online threats, and even aspects of environmental protection. More unpredictable but possible is its performance on the now dominating priorities of the US-led war against Iran and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, and their impact on G7 and global energy, trade and financial security. This significant performance will be driven by strong shock-activated vulnerabilities in the security and thus energy and economy fields, strong multilateral organizational failure in response, the significant predominant, equalizing capabilities of G7 members and their participating democratic partners, the constraints from their diverging principles due to Trump and their leaders’ largely poor domestic political support, and, above all, by the significant value that the leaders place on the G7 as their club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance.

Plans and Priorities

At his closing press scrum at the G7 Kananaskis Summit on June 17, 2025, Macron (2025a) announced that “la France accueillera l’année prochaine à Évian le G7 … Ça sera pour nous une manière comme nous l’avions fait à Biarritz en 2019 de poursuivre ce travail avec des formats qui changeront mais j’aurai l’occasion de revenir” (“Next year France will welcome the G7 to Evian, and this will be a way for us to continue the G7’s work … As we did in Biarritz in 2019, this will be a way to continue this work in different formats, but I will have a chance to come back to that later”).

Macron thus signalled nothing about the Evian Summit’s policy priorities and its preparatory and production process, although he hinted at possible reforms to the format.

In his address to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2025, Macron signalled his top priorities on Evian’s policy and process (see Appendix B). He said:

Let us stare straight in the face of global imbalances, all economies affected, all economies – and I’m speaking as one of the richest among them – but also middle-income countries, developing countries and, of course, the poorest nations among us. All of us, if we can’t have organized international debate on major global imbalances, if our response is a fragmented one and we don’t work together, we exacerbate these problems. Today our challenge is to look at how we can help China to develop the internal demand that it really needs. How can we ensure the productive capacities that China has been able to develop in recent years (these technological capacities)? Sometimes there’s technological transfer, and that’s good, but [it needs] to be conducted hand in hand with harmonious development and respect for the environment. How can we correct US trade imbalances? How can we do that through corrective measures, not through tariffs that take the rug out from under international trade? There’s Europe that needs to respond to collective needs for collective investment and we need to shoulder that responsibility.

These challenges mean that we need to cooperate. There needs to be cooperation between major economies. But we can’t pit the G7 against the BRICs – and that’s the very rationale behind the French G7 of 2026. Of course, we’ll work with the Canadian presidency of G7 and the coming presidency of G20. We need to return to that spirit of cooperation that is vital because that is what will allow us to have a common agenda to finance our global challenges. Let’s take a look at things today. Everywhere we are reducing and eroding our common ambitions to finance major global challenges. Collective financing for health care is plummeting as is financing for food security, as is financing for education. These challenges are, however, our challenges even more than they were before the pandemic, the Covid-19 pandemic, and so it is absolutely pivotal that together we prove ourselves able to develop concrete solutions and find new financing to address our challenges … Together we need to work together better to address global economic imbalances. We must develop an agenda of growth everywhere, but we must do that to also help countries to finance education, health care, stabilization of food security, and help them to address challenges of biodiversity and the climate (Macron 2025b).

By December 15, French priorities had expanded. The Evian Summit would build on many of the lessons of the Canadian presidency, as both presidencies supported multilateralism, a rules-based order, the G7’s response to economic and energy crises, and now Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The current economic challenges were excessive macroeconomic imbalances, trade tensions, illicit flows and financial crime, increasing inequalities, technological disruptions, and an unprecedented level of armed conflicts.

As the G7 had a key role to play, France would focus first on macroeconomic imbalances, due to Chinese overcapacity, American overconsumption and European underinvestment, which were increased by trade-distorting practices, requiring sustainable growth models and more international partnerships. France sought a common diagnosis of these imbalances, common definitions, solutions and follow-up mechanisms, to set the tone for a wider group.

Its second priority was reforming the traditional system of development aid, through more effective international partnerships reforms within key international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee and the UN development system. This included channelling funds to those who most need it through less fragmented aid, attracting more private capital and enhancing the complementarity of public and private financing, reforming key financial and economic institutions such as the WTO, and mobilizing G7 instruments such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As some countries of the Global South were now as rich as some G7 members – which could no longer be the sole aid donors – France would try to bridge the gaps.

Although the G7 was a very good forum for frank discussions among G7 members, France fully recognized that other forums, such as the G20 and BRICS, played a greater role, so G7 members must enhance their dialogue with these forums, notably the BRICS. France would coordinate its presidency with the US presidency of the G20 in 2026 and try to strengthen the dialogue between the G7 and G20.

France would mount seven ministerial tracks, with at least one physical meeting per track. The foreign affairs track would address global crises, drug smuggling and critical minerals. There would be an important finance track, a trade track, a development track, a digital track with a significant focus in AI (following France’s Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in February 2025), an environment track and a track for interior affairs. Their efforts would be supported by almost 60 working groups, including participants from beyond the G7, working throughout the year.

There would also be the track for the sherpas and the track for policy planners, to provide coordination. France would also depend on the ideas from 13 engagement groups, including the traditional Business 7, Civil 7, Labour 7, Science 7, Women 7, Youth 7 and Think Tank 7, as well as the University 7+, Urban 7, Pride 7 and Lawyers 7, plus the G7 parliamentarians’ annual meeting.

The G7 would be enriched by other important events, notably the AI Summit in India in February, the One Health Summit in Lyon in April and the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi in May.

France sought to build on previous presidencies on drug smuggling, migrant smuggling, and AI, with a very efficient, operational, results-oriented focus that would create consensus, set the tone for wider conversations and ensure complementarity with the American G20. Discussions on critical minerals would include raw materials and rare earths, and nuclear energy and nuclear waste were also on the G7 agenda.

Writing in the Financial Times on December 17, Macron (2025c) started by noting that “China’s trade surplus with the rest of the world now stands at a whopping $1tn.” He ended by declaring “resolving global imbalances will be at the heart of the G7 French Presidency agenda next year. Major and emerging economies alike will be invited to join forces. For this rebalancing to succeed for all, we need immediate and co-ordinated action.” In between he identified US tariffs, subdued Chinese consumption, weak EU productivity, and the issues of innovation, energy, health, digital, critical materials, automobiles, energy, health care, investment, defence, and “an international macroeconomic agenda that will benefit us all.”

On December 19, Macron and Canadian prime minister Mark Carney highlighted macroeconomic stability, critical minerals, AI and energy as G7 priorities (Office of the Prime Minister of Canada 2025).

On January 20, in his address to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Macron (2026) emphasized four familiar priorities: addressing global economic imbalances; addressing development, beyond aid, that delivers results; restoring multilateral frameworks; and building bridges and cooperation with emerging countries, the BRICS and the G20.

After the sherpas’ first meeting, on January 20–22 in Versailles, the French G7 presidency identified eight priorities on their website (France’s G7 Presidency 2026a). The top three were the familiar ones of economic imbalances, new partnerships for development finance and critical minerals supply chain resilience. But now in a new second tier came resolving global geopolitical crises, notably through support for Ukraine; protecting children by supporting development and countering online assaults; countering organized crime and illicit flows; establishing new rules for global governance; and, once again, engaging in dialogue with major emerging countries. The timing suggested that all G7 members, including Trump’s US, had agreed.

Summit, Ministerial and Sherpa Meetings

The G7 got off to a very strong, strong swift start, with one foreign ministers’ and two finance ministers’ meetings or statements during the first month of 2026 (see Appendix C).

On January 6, the G7-centred Coalition of the Willing leaders met in person in Paris, with 35 countries including 27 leaders attending. They discussed security guarantees for Ukraine against Russia’s aggression and issued a declaration (Coalition of the Willing, Ukraine and the United States 2026).

On January 6, in a 45-minute phone call, G7 foreign ministers discussed Russia-Ukraine, Venezuela and the Caribbean. The press release issued on January 7 also said: “France will go on working with its partners to respond to crises, fight against major imbalance and rebuild international partnerships” (Ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères de la République française 2026).

On January 12, G7 finance ministers met in person in Washington DC where they discussed “solutions to secure and diversify supply chains for critical minerals, especially rare earth elements” (US Treasury 2026).

On January 14, G7 foreign ministers (2026b) issued a “Joint G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on Iran,” containing one commitment: “The members of the G7 remain prepared to impose additional restrictive measures if Iran continues to crack down on protests and dissent in violation of international human rights violations.”

On January 21–22, sherpas held their first meeting, in Versailles. They focused on preparation for the summit and its priorities of solidarity, international partnerships and global macroeconomic imbalances. France said it wanted to focus on economic issues, and bring major emerging economies, regional partners and Africa into the G7’s work (France’s G7 Presidency 2026a).

On January 23, the G7+ coordination group for energy met, at the request of Ukraine, to reinforce support for Ukraine’s energy system, to provide electricity, water and heating and counter the humanitarian crisis caused by Russia’s recent attacks. Members provided material and financial support, led by France, the EU and the US, which gave over USD 400 million (France’s G7 Presidency 2026l).

On January 27, Roland Lescure, France’s finance minister, hosted a videoconference with his G7 colleagues to discuss the presidency’s priorities of global macroeconomic imbalances, international partnerships with developing countries, stable and sustainable growth, and supply chain diversification, particularly for critical minerals and rare earths (France’s G7 Presidency 2026g). They also discussed support for Ukraine.

On February 14, G7 foreign ministers met informally in Munich, on the margins of the annual Munich Security Conference. Their press release, updated on February 19, contained two commitments, both affirming the G7’s support for Ukraine (France’s G7 Presidency 2026e). Ministers discussed the current crises in Gaza, Iran, Venezuela, the Indo-Pacific, Sudan and Haiti. With their invited Indian colleague, they also noted their desire to address drug trafficking and organized crime.

On February 23, G7 trade ministers held their first meeting in 2026. They addressed the four priorities of the French presidency: excess industrial capacity and non-market practices; resilience of value chains; modernizing the multilateral tar system; and safer, sustainable cross-border electronic trade (France’s G7 Presidency 2026b). They focused on securing mineral and critical-metal supply chains and the 14th WTO ministerial conference on March 26–29. They sought to improve coordination on small parcel flows and their environmental implications, and e-commerce. They would meet again in Paris on May 5–6.

On February 24, the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, G7 leaders issued a “Statement on the War in Ukraine.” They made seven commitments. One was an ambitious highly binding one and six were low binding ones. Three were on support for Ukraine’s security, and one each on financial support for Ukraine, nuclear safety, the return of Ukraine’s children and humanitarian aid. The one on nuclear safety spoke of the “environmental consequences for the entire continent [of Europe]” (G7 2026).

On March 1, G7 foreign ministers held a half-hour telephone call on the situation in Iran, following the US and Israeli attack on Iran on February 28. The US provided an update and its outlook. G7 members confirmed that they would “continue to coordinate closely on various challenges the international community faces” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2026).

On March 10, G7 energy ministers held a virtual meeting, with Fatih Birol, the executive director of the International Energy Agency (IEA). They discussed the war in the Middle East, its impact on global energy, oil and gas supply security, and energy prices. They made five commitments, by agreeing to monitor energy markets, to coordinate within the G7 and beyond, to support “the implementation of proactive measures to address the situation, including the use of strategic reserves,” to carefully consider the resulting recommendations, and “to stand ready to take all necessary measures in coordination with IEA members” (Ministère chargé de l’Industrie 2026).

On March 11, in their first gathering of the French presidency, G7 leaders met by videoconference to discuss the economic consequences of the war in the Middle East. As recorded in the “Statement by the G7 Presidency,” they made eight commitments, three of which were ambitious and five of which were not. Three were on energy, two on regional security and freedom of navigation in the Gulf, and one each on trade and export restrictions, one on macroeconomic impacts, and one on food and agriculture. They noted the need to reduce their dependence on “geopolitical shocks” (France’s G7 Presidency 2026i). Notably, they offered no support for the United States in its war against Iran, not specifically providing military assistance of any sort, but only agreed “to establish coordination to prepare for the restoration of freedom of navigation in the region. In this regard, work has been launched to explore the possibility of escorting vessels when security conditions allow.”

The leaders discussed the escalating situation in the Middle East, condemned Iran’s attacks on civilians and their installations, emphasized the need to prevent regional escalation, and pledged to support partners in the region and open secure access through the Strait of Hormuz. They supported the IEA’s collective action, announced that day, to release 400 barrels of oil from its emergency reserves. They condemned Hezbollah’s attacks and reaffirmed their support for Lebanon and its sovereignty and territorial integrity. They agreed to remain in close contacts and speak again soon.

The meeting was opened by Macron, who said the focus was on the economic costs of Iran’s war and the Hormuz Strait. He then handed over to Trump, who said “I think we are having a tremendous impact – unbelievable actually” (Élysée 2026). Leaders discussed the current situation in the Middle East, its impacts on the world economy and financial and energy markets, and discussed supporting regional partners and ensuring safe maritime transit in the Strait of Hormuz. Takaichi expressed concern about the attacks on ships in the Strait and promised to make diplomatic moves for de-escalation. Starmer said Iran must abandon its nuclear ambitions, that the UK had let the US use British bases for defensive operations to target Iranian missiles at source, and described how the UK was working with regional partners in defensive operations to protect its people and deter Iran, bolstered with new defensive capabilities; he emphasized the importance of working together for freedom of navigation in the Strait, and said Russian president Vladimir Putin must not take advantage of the situation and called for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. Starmer also said the UK would try to de-escalate the situation. Carney emphasized Canada’s support for safeguarding international shipping and freedom of navigation.

On March 13, Merz said “We discussed Russian oil and gas deliveries with the US President in the G7 this week. Six members clearly said this sends the wrong signal. This morning we learned the US government apparently decided otherwise. We think this is wrong – there’s a price issue, not a supply shortage. I’d like to know what other motives are behind this temporary decision” (Bohuslavska 2026).

On March 21, G7 foreign ministers (2026a) issued a G7 statement on support to partners in the Middle East. Its 304 words contained four commitments, all on regional security on the Middle East on Iran (see Appendix D).

On March 26–27, G7 foreign ministers met for their first formal meeting under the French presidency at the Abbaye Vaux-de-Cernay. The foreign ministers from Ukraine, Brazil, India, Korea and Saudi Arabia were present throughout the two-day meeting, which covered a full range of issue including Sudan, Venezuela, Haiti and the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific (France’s G7 Presidency 2026c). US secretary of state Marco Rubio arrived only for the second day.

The only statement issued in the ministers’ name was the “Joint Statement of G7 Foreign Ministers on Iran,” released on March 27, and contained three commitments (G7 Foreign Ministers 2026c). It contained three commitments, all unambitious, on coordinating humanitarian efforts, and immediate end to hostilities, and the need to restore “safe and toll free freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.” It also spoke of mitigating “global economic shocks, such as disruptions to economic, energy, fertilizer and commercial supply chains.” A statement released by the French chair contained another 11 commitments, with seven on reginal security, three on health (drugs) and one on terrorism.

On March 30, G7 energy and finance ministers and central bank governors met virtually to discuss the implications of the situation in the Middle East on energy markets, the global economy and financial stability. Their communiqué contained 18 commitments, with two ambitious ones (G7 Energy and Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 2026). They included six on energy, five on macroeconomic policy, two on financial regulation, two on regional security (Ukraine), and one each of trade and food-agriculture.

On April 15, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors met in Washington, on the margins of the spring semi-annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank. They were joined by the heads of the IMF, World Bank, OECD, Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the chief economist of the IEA. The press released issue by the French hosts, finance minister Roland Lescure and Banque de France governor Villeroy de Galhai, contained 10 commitments (Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté industrielle, énergetique et numérique de la République française 2026d). Regional Security in Ukraine had four, energy three, the economy two, regional security in the Middle East one, and development one (with one containing both the economy and energy). Only one, on the economy, was an ambitious one.

On April 17, Lescure issued a press release describing how G7 colleagues and 11 partners from multilateral development banks (MDBs) had addressed critical minerals (Ministère de l’Économie 2026b). They made three commitments, including one to secure their supply chains. The MDB heads in a declaration of their own made more.

On April 23–24, G7 environment ministers met in Paris. They made 47 commitments. They launched two French presidency initiatives: a Nature and People Finance Alliance; and a Real Estate Resilience for Prosperity Partnership. They also established a management alliance on marine-protected areas; deepened collaboration on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing; advanced the protection and restoration of land and ecosystems to address desertification, land degradation and drought; and affirmed their determination to conserve, protect, sustainably manage and restore water resources, particularly by detecting and addressing water pollutants. They issued six documents, one on each of these subjects.

On April 30, ministers of development and international partnerships met in Paris. They produced a total of 99 commitments, with 40 on health alone. Their overall ministerial communiqué contained 31 commitments, of which 16 were ambitious and 15 unambitious ones (G7 Development Ministers 2026d). Their declaration in support of an ambitious review of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee had 13 commitments, with four ambitious and nine unambitious ones (2026b). The Declaration of Ministers of Development and Ministers of Finance on Domestic Resource Mobilization had nine, all unambitious ones (2026c). Their G7 Financing for Development Framework for Promoting Health Sovereignty Financing and Seld-Reliance has 40 commitments, with only one ambitious one (2026c). Their New G7 Approach to Economic Corridors had six commitments, with one ambitious one (2026f).

On May 6, trade ministers met in Paris. They made 14 commitments, with two ambitious ones, in their communiqué (G7 Trade Ministers 2026).

On May 7, G7 ministers responsible for critical minerals, and their counterparts from Australia, South Korea, the IEA and the OECD met, with their results recorded in a chair’s press release on May 10 Ministère de l’Économie 2026c). It contained two commitments, with one ambitious one. G7 ministers agreed to “reduce their dependency and guarantee the industrial and energy sovereignty of each.” The G7 partners “confirmed the importance to them of cooperation with thein the G7 in the area of critical minerals and metals.”

On May 18 in Paris, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors met, along with the heads of the IMF, World Bank, OECD and FSB, and joined at times by Ukraine’s finance minister and the heads of the IEA, Financial Action Task Force and Asian Development Bank as chair of the MDBs’ Heads Group as well as G7 development ministers. The communiqué issued by the finance ministers and central bank governors on May 19 contained 81 commitments, with 63 in the main communiqué and another 18 in the annexed declaration (Ministère de l’Économie 2026a ). The 81 commitments had 11 ambitious and 70 unambitious ones. The main communiqué’s 63 commitments were led by those on Ukraine with 15 and critical minerals with nine. The 10 commitments in the section on emerging new technologies in the financial sector had three on AI and two on quantum technologies. There were seven commitments on development and developing countries debt. The natural environment appeared, with the section on risks related to extreme weather events and the two commitments there.

On May 19 G7 ministers of education met to address “Education: A Safer Digital Space for Minors.” The communique issued by the French presidency, prepared before the meeting and published on May 20, contained six commitments, with the ambitious and three unambitious ones (France’s G7 Presidency 2026f).
 
On May 29, G7 digital and technology ministers met in Paris. Their Ministerial Declaration on Digital and Technology contained 22 commitments, with eight ambitious and 14 unambitious ones (G7 Digital and Technology Ministers 2026). By section, the introduction had eight commitments, secure AI five, adoption and economic growth four, resource efficiency three, minors online one and the conclusion one. The ministers thus related digital technology to energy and the environment through resource efficiency, and to health through minors online.

By the end of May G7 leaders had met twice and made 15 public commitments. There had also been 15 meetings of ministers responsible for nine difference subjects, who made a total of 317 commitments. In both cases, Donald Trump’s United States had agreed with all.

Sherpa Meetings

The first sherpa meeting, held at the Elysée for three days beginning on January 20, focused on the two French priorities of solidarity and the renewal of international partnerships, and the reduction of global macroeconomic imbalances (France’s G7 Presidency 2026a). France sought to refocus the G7 leaders’ conversations on economic issues, tangible solutions and bringing together major emerging economies and regional partners with the G7’s work. It thus added the One Health Summit in Lyon in April and the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi in May.

The second sherpa meeting took place in Aix-en-Provence from March 22 to 24. It sought to agree on the summit agenda and on concrete policy initiatives for the leaders to take (France’s G7 Presidency 2026h).

The third sherpa meeting took place in Toulouse from May 19 to 22. Sherpas sought to finalize policy drafts and agreements on economic security by reducing global macroeconomic imbalances and building resilient supply chains, especially for critical minerals; digital sovereignty by constructing a safe digital space and protecting minors online; and global partnerships by rebuilding mutually beneficial development partnerships with developing countries (France’s G7 Presidency 2026k ).

The final G7 sherpa meeting would be held in Evian on the eve of the summit, will finalize the leaders’ agenda and texts. Sherpas will focus on the four priorities of:

1. equitable and sustainable growth by reforming international partnerships and reducing macroeconomic imbalances;
2. critical minerals by strengthening the resilience of their value chains;
3. digitalization by building a safe digital environment for minors; and
4. foreign and security policy, by containing damage from geopolitical conflicts, including the war in Ukraine and tensions involving Iran and China (France’s G7 Presidency 2026k).

Compliance Momentum

A strong momentum for summit performance came from members’ preliminary final compliance with 20 selected priority commitments made at the G7’s Kananaskis Summit in June 2025. By May 1 it was a strong 80%. This was a 5% advance from its interim score of 75% on December 18, 2025 (G7 Research Group 2026a). The preliminary final compliance finding of 80% was slightly above the all-time, all-subject average of 78%. Preliminary final compliance for 2025 was led, as usual, by the EU at 95%, Kananaskis host Canada at 93% and the UK at 90%, followed by Germany and Trump’s US at 78%, 2026 host France and Italy at 73%. Japan, whose previous leader had been at Kananaskis to help craft its commitments, had 65%.

By subject, full compliance of 100% came on three commitments: one on quality infrastructure, one on quantum investment and commercialization, and one on biodiversity. Preliminary compliance of 94% came on digital divides and border management; 88% came on commitments on AI for small and medium-sized enterprises, data and communications security, workforce preparedness, AI-enhanced energy supply chains, and transnational crime; and 82% on commitments on Middle East security, pressure on Russia, and critical minerals.

For the preliminary final findings, below the 80% average were the assessed commitments on land loss at 75%, wildfire mitigation and adaptation and the health impacts of wildfires at 69%, debt challenges and transnational repression at 57%, and a roadmap for a standards-based approach to the critical minerals market at 25%.

To be sure, Kananaskis’s overall compliance of 80% was on track to be well below its predecessors: 92% for the 2024 Apulia Summit, 96% for the 2023 Hiroshima Summit, 90% for the 2022 Elmau Summit and 90% for the 2021 Cornwall Summit. But its commitments had the first full compliance period since 2020 with Donald Trump as US president and had so many geopolitical tensions and wars constraining international cooperation to a very strong degree. Indeed, the United States fully complied with the commitments on digital divides, quantum investment and commercialization, data and communication security, AI-enhanced energy supply chains, wildfire impacts on human health, biodiversity, critical minerals projects, border management, transnational crime, understanding transnational repression, combatting transnational repression, and standards-based critical minerals markets.

Policy Priorities

As a result of the French plan, the preparatory process and the shock-activated vulnerabilities in the world, the first de facto policy priority for the 2026 Evian Summit is now containing the damage done by the US-led war against Iran to global security, trade, energy, economic growth and safety.

The second priority is stopping Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This involves discussing the cost of doing so, what economic security meant to protect Europeans and the rest of the world, sanctioning Russia, continuing to support Ukraine and the formidable cost of rebuilding a post-war Ukraine.

The third priority, flowing directly from the first two, is energy security and resilience. It also relates to the high energy consumption of AI data centres and servers. This would build on and broaden the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan from Kananaskis. It would add a new emphasis on building the defence industrial base of and among G7 members in more coordinated ways.

The fourth priority is countering China, the central source of global economic imbalances and whose steady expansion increasingly threatens G7 members’ security, economy, technology, democracy and ecology. Other security priorities include the conflicts in the Middle East beyond Iran, in the Indo-Pacific region as a whole and in North Africa and the Caribbean.

The fifth priority is trade, led by opening and securing supply chains and taming and trying to terminate Trump’s tariff war against his G7 partners and much of the world beyond. His broad 10% minimum tariff could remain, even if his additional sector-specific and country-specific tariffs may have been negotiated down or off. The US, Canada and Mexico are due to renegotiate their trade agreement (referred to by the Americans as USCMA) in 2026. Evian’s trade agenda will see members continue to seek economic diversification with other G7 partners, and to counter the non-market practices of China and other states.

The sixth priority is strengthening economic prosperity, especially given slowing or even falling economic growth and rising inflation in the United States and the other G7 members. Already in the spring and summer of 2025 the IMF and OECD has been forecasting declining economic growth for G7 members in 2026.

The seventh priority is managing AI and quantum technology for society. The generative AI programming interface is growing, requiring managing and protections again deep fakes and other harms. Issues such as who owns the data stored on servers physically located in one country or another may be contentious. France is seeking to become a global AI leader and, although the US continues to resist digital regulation and taxation, alliances may be possible. Regulating internet assaults on child safety is an important component.

The eighth priority, still small and specialized, is the environment and even climate change itself. They will be on the agenda, more broadly and likely more directly than with the Kananaskis Wildfire Charter in 2025. That charter requires implementation and extension to other actions and countries. But the key question will again be how to advance attention to and action on climate change with Trump as US president for two more years. Candidate issues for attention and action are adding forest protection as a whole, heat waves from which all G7 citizens increasingly suffer (including the many who died in 2003 from one in southern France the last time the G7 met in Evian), and oceans, which border France in the Atlantic, Caribbean and Pacific. Canada’s Carney has long advocated acting on climate change. The pressure to do so at Macron’s European summit in 2026 will be stronger than it was in North America in 2025.

Gender equality and human rights will only appear in selective ways with little visibility. G7 negotiators may not purge all references to women, rights, minority groups or equality in order to ensure the wording is acceptable to Trump’s US. But as equality and individual liberty are central to the French identity and image, and as Macron’s France in 2019 had joined Canada’s Justin Trudeau as the G7 leader on gender equality in 2018, Evian should do more than Kananaskis here.

Process

G7 Unity

On the G7 process, the overriding priority once again will be preserving the unity of the G7, by keeping Trump on board. He will be at G7 summits until 2028, and will host in 2027, so G7 leaders must do business with him. They are rapidly learning how to get along with him, so he will work with them.

Summit Site

The summit site of the Hôtel Royal, set on the grounds of a small park, allows for the nine G7 leaders and their guests to meet safely and informally. French summit planners were preparing the options of having Trump come for a private dinner with Macron at the Palace of Versailles immediately following the summit or playing a round of golf with him (Caulcutt and de Saint Remy 2026).

Communiqués

The emphasis at Evian will again be on private, open, frank conversations among leaders, rather than negotiating lengthy, comprehensive communiqués read only by a few. Macron will likely repeat the formula he used at the Biarritz Summit, producing several declarations from different groups on specific subject subjects, with 10 or 15 paragraphs each, and a similarly short, crisp overall summary that he, as a former G7 sherpa, will write on the spot himself.

Guests

Invited guests will be the leaders of Brazil, India, Kenya, Korea and Ukraine. This set is similar to Kananaskis and many fewer than the 20 guests from 12 countries and 8 international organizations that Macron had invited to Biarritz.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has participated in G7 summits since Biarritz in 2019. India is a major partner of France, with huge economic and strategic importance, including with regard to China. Modi co-hosted the Summit on the Impact of Artificial Intelligence with Macron in Delhi in February. Brazil’s President Lula da Silva has also participated in every G7 summit since 2023. Korea’s President Lee Jae Myung attended the 2025 Kananaskis Summit. Kenya’s President William Ruto and Macron co-hosted the Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi in May.

The Final Approach

As the summit approached, its great gravitational pull acquired greater force. On June 3, just 12 days before the summit start, four key leaders confirmed that they would attend. Trump himself wrote on his Truth Social platform that he would come right after the UFC match on the White House Lawn, celebrating his 80th birthday on July 14. Ukraine’s Zelensky said he would come, after Macron had resisted inviting but relented, presumably with Trump’s acquiescence and given Ukrainian advances in its war with Russia. Brazil’s Lula, who had earlier declined the invitation to come as a guest, changed his mind because he needed to be there promote multilateralism, democracy and international institutions. He also hoped to meet bilaterally with Trump to convince him to remove his new tariffs on Brazil’s exports to the US. And India’s Modi said he would come, hoping he could add his first bilateral meeting with Trump since visiting the White House in February 2025 and could advance negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement between them.

Among G7 leaders, there was now much agreement that would lead to G7 advances in global governance at Evian.

There was much agreement on the policy priorities among Macron, the others and Trump. Trump wanted the summit to help develop America’s AI technology, expand US exports, lessen reliance on China for critical minerals, counter drug trafficking and illegal immigration and expand energy production, above all from fossil fuels (New Voice of Ukraine 2026).

On the first declared priority of global economic imbalances caused by China’s unfair trade, all G7 leaders will agree that they must stand together to protect their economies and industries from China’s invasion of low-cost goods. This agreement was strengthened because the US now knew that it needed help from a united front of all its G7 friends, after China was reducing its critical rare earth exports to the US, while increasing them to Europe and Japan, and after Trump’s bilateral summit with Xi Jinping in Beijing in May had produced very little of what Trump had sought.

On the war in Ukraine, G7 leaders will pledge more financial, material and political support, including agreeing that Ukraine should begin the process of becoming a member of the EU.

On technology, they will all agree on the need for AI innovation, but with key common regulations in a G7-centered global governance approach, both to stay ahead of China in the security, economic and digital domains, and to reduce their vulnerability to the cyber security shock that the Mythos tool had just exposed.

On critical minerals and rare earths, similar agreements and advances will come, to protect them from their dependence on the global stranglehold that China now has and selectively uses against them.

On strengthening child safety from the threats posed by digital screens, G7 leaders will agree to stop the resulting sexual exploitation and recruitment for terrorism, through limits on children’s use of their screens, with their parents and the platforms and their highly profitable owners playing their part.

On health, leaders will agree to protect all their citizens by measures such as stopping fentanyl, opioids and other deadly addictive drugs from being shipped in uninspected small packages into their homes, reducing their firms’ dependence on Chinese components to produce the pharmaceuticals they need, and closing their borders to travellers from countries where the new Ebola virus infects and kills people the most.

Still uncertain are G7 agreements and global advances on some other important issues.

On raising real defence spending soon, with better burden sharing on spending and deployments to counter the rise from authoritarian Russia and China, the difficult debate and any big decisions will be left to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s summit in Ankara, Turkey, on July 7–8, even if Japan’s leader will not be there.

On international partnerships to reduce the reliance on rapidly reducing official development assistance, the result will depend by the G7’s meeting with its outreach partners. They are preoccupied with Trump’s new tariffs on their exports and other things. And there is now no shock from contagious debt defaults from the Global South, as there was in the Asian-turned-global shock erupting in 1997.
 
There will also be enough disagreements to disappoint those who want the Evian Summit to do more.

G7 leaders are unlikely to bring a durable peace to the war in Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East, and to make the Strait of Hormuz as open as it was before this closure began, in reality and in the minds of all those who depend on, desire and can trust the durability of such a result.

On the proposed ban on the shadow fleets illegally exporting Russia’s sanctioned oil, which is designed to replace the G7-general price cap on Russian oil exports, no real progress will come. Here the oil shock caused by war against Iran and its consequent closure of the Strait will see some G7 leaders, whose countries depend on imported oil, resist efforts to reduce the supply and thus raise the price from another – especially a superpower – source.

On gender equality, there is will be very little, despite France’s longstanding leadership, along with Canada’s.

On climate change – the only genuinely existential threat – there will be little to directly tackle the core source of the problem, namely the continuing use of polluting fossil fuels to produce the power than all G7 and global citizens need. Here Trump, who does not believe that climate change is real, will veto any ambitious proposal that any of his G7 colleagues produce.

Although new shocks can arise to divert or diminish as well as deepen this unity on the road to or during the Evian Summit itself, present prospects are more promising than precarious for G7 leaders to produce a significant performance there.

Propellors of Performance

Shock-Activated Vulnerability

The first propellor of Evian’s prospective significant performance is the strong shock-activated vulnerability harming G7 members and their democratic partners’ countries in 2026.

Those shocks erupted in full force on February 28, 2026, with the US attack, supported by Israel, on Iran. It sparked an escalating conflict that by March 21 had spread to over a dozen countries, created an energy crisis in all G7 members and many others, with serious fertilizer, food, inflationary and economic costs flowing in its wake.

This diversionary shock will likely reduce Evian’s performance on its first two initial priorities of global economic imbalances and development partnerships. But as Macron swiftly pivoted to focus on the war, it should increase Evian’s performance on regional security in the Middle East, Ukraine and China, and on energy and the economy writ large.

Twelve days before the summit came a small, subsequent trade shock, as Trump unilaterally raised US tariffs against all G7 and more than 50 other countries, on the grounds that their supply chains were supporting forced labour in China. This prompted Lula to accept his invitation to the summit to make the case to Trump that this was a bad idea and to promote multilateralism, democracy and international institutions too.

The Iran war confirmed the results of the Global Risks Report 2026, published by the World Economic Forum (WEF) on January 14, 2026. The report identified the top risks for 2026 as 1) geoeconomic confrontation (selected by 18% of respondents) and 2) state-based armed conflict (14%), followed well behind by 3) extreme weather events (8%), 4) societal polarization (7%), and 5) Misinformation and disinformation (7%) (World Economic Forum 2026). These top five, taking 54% of the total, coincided partially with Macron’s summit priorities, with geoeconomic confrontation covering macroeconomic balances and state-based armed conflicts covering the wars in Europe and the Middle East, and possibly the Indo-Pacific and the western hemisphere. However, third-ranked extreme weather events and fifth-ranked misinformation and disinformation were absent from Macron’s declared priorities, and his priority of development was nowhere on WEF’s list.

Macron’s first initial priority of the economy was supported by the WEF’s risks: 6) economic downturn (5%), 11) unemployment (2%), 16) asset bubble burst (2%), 17) debt (2%), 18) supply chain disruptions (1%) and 23) inflation (1%).

Multilateral Organizational Response

The second propellor of Evian’s significant performance is the strong multilateral organizational failure in response to these shocks. This failure is driven by the retreat of the US and other G7 members from many central multilateral organizations, except for the UN, IMF, World Bank, the OECD and IEA. Badly weakened institutions include UN Climate, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Green Climate Fund and the World Health Organization.

Predominant, Equalizing Capability

Propelling Evian’s significant performance is also the mixed predominant, equalizing capability of G7 members. The war in Iran has enhanced G7 predominance, as it as it primarily harms the overall gross domestic product of energy-dependent non-G7 members, led by China, India and Saudi Arabia. However, it marginally reduces the equalizing capability within the G7, as the US and Canada have surplus fossil fuel energy, while Japan, Germany, Italy and the UK depend on fossil fuels, even if nuclear-reliant France has a highly secure nuclear energy supply.
 
On the most critical military capabilities, the war initially reinforced US predominance. But by the third week of the war in Iran, the US was asking its G7 partners to provide the naval capabilities, including minesweepers, that the US lacked, to open the Strait of Hormuz. And in the Arctic theatre, where Russia threatens, Russia has the global lead on icebreakers, while Canada ranks second and the US had very few.

Converging Principles

Reducing Evian’s performance is the plunging common and converging principles of US members, led by Trump’s decline on the core ones still shared by all the others. The core principles are devotion to democracy and human rights, especially as the G7’s distinctive foundational mission, proclaimed in its first summit communiqué at Rambouillet in November 1975, is to preserve within its own members and promote globally open democracy and individual liberty. In 2026, in the US, the practice of democracy and the preference of its president for it have plunged, but remained high in all other G7 members.

Domestic Political Support

By January 21, G7 leaders’ domestic political support was largely low. It ranged from very low for Trump, Macron, Merz and Starmer to positive for Meloni and very high for Carney and Takaichi.

In the US, Trump’s approval rating in January declined to a low level. An Economist/YouGov poll among US adults showed that by February 9, 2026, 57% disapproved of his performance, while only 40% approved, for a net rating of −17% (YouGov 2026). The New York Times (2026) aggregated polls showed 56% disapproved and 40% approved on February 14. CNN’s Poll of Polls (2026) showed 59% disapproved and 39% approved on February 11. Both the Economist/YouGov and New York Times reported similar findings of around 44% approved and 54% disapproved in mid January; CNN’s findings were 57% disapproved and 39% approved on January 14. At the start of his presidential term, 50% had approved and 46% disapproved for a net rating of +4% (YouGov 2026). By late March, driven by Trump’s war of choice against Iran on February 28, his approval rating remained among the lowest in US polling history – as low as 37% approval and 61% disapproval on March 30 according to CNN (2026) – and his Republican Party was due to lose control of the House of Representatives and perhaps the Senate in the mid-term elections on November 6. This trend continued as the summit approached.

In France, municipal elections in late March showed the mainstream parties, including Macron’s doing well against those on the far right and left, although the mainstream socialist party’s candidates won Paris and did best. However, Macron himself was a lame duck, as his presidential term will end in 2027. In January 2026, at 16% his approval rating was the lowest of the three G7 European leaders, although by April it had risen to 23% (Smith 2026a, 2026b).

In Germany, Merz’s CDU/CSU party, in a traffic-light coalition with the Greens and the AFD, had 26% in January 2026 (Smith 2026b). By June 1, CDU support had dropped to 22% (Politico 2026b).

In the United Kingdom, Starmer’s Labour Party, with its majority in Parliament after its landslide victory in July 2024, had by March 27, only 16% of voter support where it remained through to June, the lowest for a governing party and tied with the centre-right Conservates, while the far-right Reform UK led with about 25% (Politico 2026d). By April it has risen to 24% (Smith 2026a).

However, in Italy, on February 26, Italy’s YouTrend polling institute showed Meloni’s party, Fratelli d’Italia, maintained 29.1% of voting intentions, above its 26% in the 2022 legislative elections and 28% in the 2024 European elections (YouTrend 2026; Politico 2026c). Meloni has the highest approval of the three European leaders: by April it had risen to 35% (Smith 2026a).

In Canada, by March 29, Carney’s Liberal Party, with a strong parliamentary minority secured in 2025 for a four-year mandate, had steadily risen in voters’ satisfaction, with 59% approval and 32% disapproval, along with support for him as leader at 58% approval compared to 33% disapproval (338Canada 2026; Ipsos 2026). By May 31, Carney’s approval rating had dropped to 55% (338Canada 2026).
 
In Japan, the second most powerful G7 member, in January Takaichi’s cabinet had over 70% approval. She called a general election for the lower house of the Diet for February 8, where her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won an overwhelming majority. On March 30, following Takaichi’s meeting with Trump at the White House on March 19, her cabinet approval had risen to 72% although support for the LDP remained at 41% (Nikkei Staff Writers 2026).

Club at the Hub

Propelling Evian’s significant performance is the strong position of the G7 as the leaders’ valued club at the centre of a network of global summit governance. Unlike the G20, BRICS, other plurilateral summit institutions or the UN, all members’ leaders have always attended all annual G7 summits since the start in 1975 – a striking contrast with the most recent G20 summit, in Johannesburg in November 2025, which was skipped by six leaders including Trump as well as Chinese president Xi Jinping and Russian president Vladimir Putin.

By March 30, the G20, under its 2026 US presidency, had mounted no special summits or issued any leaders’ statements. The US planned and was producing a stripped-down summit, with few ministerial meetings and agenda items, for its summit in Miami to be held unusually late in mid-December. In sharp contrast, the G7 had produced a leaders’ statement on February 24 on the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and held a virtual summit on March 11 in response to the outbreak of the Middle East war on February 28. The G7 had also mounted several meetings virtually or in person for its foreign, finance and energy ministers as well as trade ministers, and issued multiple statements.

These comprehensive collective G7 meetings were supported by a dense array of partial, trilateral and bilateral visits among and between G7 leaders. They began with a meeting of the 34-member Coalition of the Willing of Ukraine in Paris on January 6, hosted by Macron and Starmer and attended by Carney, along with representatives of Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States. The coalition’s Paris Declaration contained 12 commitments (Coalition of the Willing, Ukraine and the United States 2026). The interactions continued with Macron’s meetings with Carney and other G7 leaders at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 20.

Another strong propellor was the extensive experience of the summit’s host, Emannuel Macron. He served as G7 sherpa for François Hollande from 2012 to 2014, and later as minister of the economy before his election as president. He was previously a banker at Rothschild and knew Carney from that period, when the Canadian prime minister was at Goldman Sachs.

Macron also has the respect of Trump, despite the US president’s Truth Social outburst against him just after Trump left Kananaskis. And Macron is close to all the other European leaders, including the UK’s Starmer.

Conclusion

Taken together, these propellors suggest that the Evian Summit will produce a significant performance, although its prospects are precarious due to the poor domestic political position and high unpredictability of US president Donald Trump.

Evian promises to make small advances on its initial presidency-produced priorities macroeconomic policy, trade and investment, and development, and more on its outreach to consequential partners, the digital economy, children’s safety and aspects of environmental protection. More unpredictable is its performance on the now dominating priorities of the US-led war against Iran and Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine, and their impact on G7 and global energy, trade and financial security. This performance will be driven by strong shock-activated vulnerabilities in security and thus the economy fields, by strong multilateral organizational failure in response, by the significant predominant, equalizing capabilities of G7 members and their participating democratic partners, by the constraints of their diverging principles due to Trump and their leaders poor domestic political support, and, above all, by the significant value their leaders place on the G7 as their club at the hub of a growing network of global summit governance.

[back to top]

References

338Canada (2026). “338Canada Government Approval Tracker,” last visited June 7. https://338canada.com/approval.htm.

Bohuslavska, Kate (@BohuslavskaKate) (2026). “Merz: We discussed Russian oil and gas deliveries with the US President in the G7 this week. Six members clearly said this sends the wrong signal,” X, March 13. https://x.com/bohuslavskakate/status/2032456353608872304?s=43&t=N2StdAlKBEHirwlllCQt9w.

Bremmer, Ian (2026). “US Raid on Maduro Signals G-Zero World Shift: Ian Bremmer interview full transcript,” India Today Online, 7 January. https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/us-raid-on-maduro-signals-g-zero-world-shift-ian-bremmer-interview-full-transcript-2847781-2026-01-07.

Butler, Creon (2025). “It’s Time to Rethink the G7,” Chatham House, June 18. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/its-time-rethink-g7.

Caulcutt, Clea, and Pauline de Saint Remy (2026). “Macron Weighs His Options for Wooing Trump at G7: Dinner at Versailles, or Maybe Golf,” Politico, June 5. https://www.politico.eu/article/macron-weighs-options-woo-trump-g7-dinner-versailles-golf-diplomacy/ .

Cha, Victor, John Hamre and John Ikenberry (2025). “How Global Governance Can Survive: With the Right reforms, the G-7 Can Sustain the Rules-Based Order,” Foreign Affairs, June 11. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-global-governance-can-survive.

CNN (2026). “CNN Poll of Polls: Trump Approval Rating,” last visited March 30. https://www.cnn.com/polling/approval/trump-cnn-poll-of-polls.

Coalition of the Willing, Ukraine and the United States (2026). “Paris Declaration – Robust Security Guarantees for a Solid and Lasting Peace in Ukraine,” Élysée, January 6. https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2026/01/06/robust-security-guarantees-for-a-solid-and-lasting-peace-in-ukraine.

CE NoticiasFinancieras (2026), “China Is Retaliating Against the U.S. and Prioritizing Europe for Its Rare Earth Exports,” June 2.

Élysée (2026). “Visioconférence du G7 sur les conséquences économiques de la guerre au Moyen Orient.” Video, March 11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DcsJQ1O4qqA.

Europe Elects (2026). “Germany: National Poll Average,” visited March 30. https://europeelects.eu/germany/.

Financial Times (2025). “The Malaise of Multilateralism,” editorial, December 26. https://www.ft.com/content/2d82e88f-e714-42eb-b4dd-e3749097c0dd?syn-25a6b1a6=1.

Financial Times (2026). “A Rescue Mission for the Rules-Based Order,” editorial, January 29. https://www.ft.com/content/2907bc3e-9492-4218-9186-0586daffe7b4?syn-25a6b1a6=1

France’s G7 Presidency (2026a). “First Meeting of the Sherpas,” Paris, January 23. https://www.elysee.fr/en/G7evian/2026/01/24/first-meeting-of-the-sherpas.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026b). “First Ministerial Meeting of the Trade Track under the French G7 Presidency,” Paris, February 26. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/trade/260223-news-release-update.html.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026c). “Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of G7 Member States at the Abbaye des Vaux-de-Cernay,” March 27. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260327-press-release.html.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026d). “G7 Agenda,” Élysée, last visited March 26. https://www.elysee.fr/en/G7evian/diary.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026e). “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meet on the Sidelines of the Munich Security Conference,” February 19. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260214-munich-update.html.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026f). “G7 France – Education: A Safer Digital Space for Minors,” May 20. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/education/260520-communique.html.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026g). “Minister Roland Lescure Convenes the First G7 Finance Ministers’ Meeting under France’s 2026 G7 Presidency,” January 27. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260127-press-release.html.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026h). “Second Sherpas Meeting in Aix-en-Provence,” March 31. https://www.elysee.fr/en/G7evian/2026/03/31/second-sherpas-meeting-in-aix-en-provence.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026i). “Statement by the G7 Presidency,” March 11. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2026evian/260311-middle-east.html.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026j). “The G7 Priorities,” Élysée, January 23. https://www.elysee.fr/en/G7evian/2026/01/23/the-g7-priorities.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026k). “Third Sherpa Meeting in Toulouse,” June 1. https://www.elysee.fr/en/G7evian/2026/06/01/third-sherpa-meeting-in-toulouse.

France’s G7 Presidency (2026l). “Ukraine – Le Groupe de coordination du G7+ pour l’énergie prend des engagements concrets en soutien à l’Ukraine,” January 23. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7plus/260123-press-release.html.

García Herrero, Alicia (2026). “The Looming EU-China Trade Clash: Why the Commission Must Not Go It Alone,” EurActiv.com, June 2. https://www.euractiv.com/opinion/the-looming-eu-china-trade-clash-why-the-commission-must-not-go-it-alone/.

G7 (2026). “G7 Leaders’ Statement on the War in Ukraine,” February 24. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2026evian/260224-ukraine.html.

G7 Development Ministers (2026a). “Declaration of Ministers of Development and Ministers of Finance on Domestic Resource Mobilization,” April 30, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/dev/260430-domestic-resource-mobilization.html

G7 Development Ministers (2026b). “G7 Declaration in Support of an Ambitious DAC Review,” April 30, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/dev/260430-dac-review.html.

G7 Development Ministers (2026c). “G7 Financing for Development: Framework for Promoting Health Sovereignty Financing and Self-Reliance,” April 30, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/dev/260430-financing-for-development.html.

G7 Development Ministers (2026d). “Ministerial Communiqué,” April 30, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/dev/260430-communique.html.

G7 Development Ministers (2026f). “New G7 Approach to Economic Corridors,” April 30, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/dev/260430-economic-corridors.html.

G7 Digital and Technology Ministers (2026). “G7 Ministerial Declaration on Digital & Technology,” May 29, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/ict/260529-declaration.html.

G7 Energy and Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (2026). “G7 Energy and Finance Ministers' and Central Bank Governors’ Communiqué,” March 30. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260330-communique.html.

G7 Environment Ministers (2026)

G7 Foreign Ministers (2026a). “G7 Statement on Support to Partners in the Middle East,” March 21. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260321-middle-east.html.

G7 Foreign Ministers (2026b). “Joint G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement,” January 14. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260114-iran.html.

G7 Foreign Ministers (2026c). “Joint Statement of G7 Foreign Ministers on Iran,” Vaux-de-Cernay, March 27. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260327-iran.html.

G7 Trade Ministers (2026). “G7 Trade Ministers Communiqué,” May 6, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/trade/260506-communique.html.

G7 Research Group (2026a). “2025 G7 Kananaskis Summit Interim Compliance Report,” March 12. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025compliance-interim/index.html.

G7 Research Group (2026b). “The Road to France’s 2026 Evian Summit,” Last visited June 7. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2026evian/road.html.

Ipsos (2026). “Carney Approval Climbs After One Year, Outpacing Poilievre Support Momentum,” March 4. https://www.ipsos.com/en-ca/carney-approval-climbs-after-one-year-outpacing-poilievre-support-momentum.

Macron, Emmanuel (2025a). “2025 G7 Leaders’ Summit – Emmanuel Macron Speaks with Reporters,” CPAC, June 17. Video. https://www.cpac.ca/headline-politics/episode/2025-g7-leaders-summit--emmanuel-macron-speaks-with-reporters?id=dc6fdc93-6428-479b-b6be-1d7671a538fc.

Macron, Emmanuel (2025b). “France – General Debate, 80th Session,” United Nations General Assembly, September 23. Video, transcription of English audio. https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k1l/k1lrs9bac6.

Macron, Emmanuel (2025c). “We Urgently Need to Rebalance EU-China Relations,” Financial Times, December 16. https://www.ft.com/content/c8fdf1b0-7330-491e-a8b4-f4b29f6a3cd0.

Macron, Emmanuel (2026). “Address by the French President of the Republic at the World Economic Forum in Davos,” Élysée, January 20. https://www.elysee.fr/front/pdf/elysee-module-25861-en.pdf.

Marconi, Federica (2025). “Taking Stock of Canada’s 2025 G7 Presidency in the Digital Domain,” International Spectator, December 6. https://www.iai.it/en/publications/c41/taking-stock-canadas-2025-g7-presidency-digital-domain.

Ministère chargé de l’Industrie (2026). “G7 Energy Ministers’ Communiqué,” Paris, March 11. https://g7.utoronto.ca/energy/260311-communique.html.

Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté industrielle, énergetique et numérique de la République française (2026a). “G7 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ Communiqué,” May 19, Paris. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260519-communique.html.

Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté industrielle, énergetique et numérique de la République française (2026b). “Minerais critiques : la France impulse un dialogue inédit entre les membres du G7 et les banques multilatérales de développement pour renforcer les partenariats internationaux,” April 17, Washington DC. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260417-press-release.html.

Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté industrielle, énergetique et numérique de la République française (2026c). “Minerais critiques : la France réunit les ministres du G7 et ses partenaires pour accélérer la sécurisation des approvisionnements,” May 10. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260510-press-release.html.

Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de la Souveraineté industrielle, énergetique et numérique de la République française (2026d). “Press release,” April 16, Washington DC. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260416-press-release.html.

Ministère de l’Europe et des affaires étrangères de la République française (2026). “G7 – Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Calls His G7 Counterparts,” Paris, January 7. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260106-telephone.html.

Ministères économiques et financiers de la République française (2026). “Le G7 à Bercy,” Paris. Last visited March 26. https://www.economie.gouv.fr/g7-bercy-2026.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2026). “G7 Foreign Ministers Discuss Situation in Iran,” Tokyo, March 1. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/foreign/260301-iran.html.

New Voice of Ukraine (2026) “Macron weighs Versailles dinner or golf to keep Trump engaged at G7,” The New Voice of Ukraine (NY), June 5.

New York Times (2026). “President Trump’s Approval Rating: Latest Polls,” last updated June 7. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/polls/donald-trump-approval-rating-polls.html.

Nikkei Staff Writers (2026). “Japan PM’s Approval Rises After Meeting with Trump: Nikkei Poll,” Nikkei Asia Review, March 30. https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/japan-pm-s-approval-rises-after-meeting-with-trump-nikkei-poll.

Office of the Prime Minister of Canada (2025). “Prime Minister Carney speaks with President of France Emmanuel Macron,” Ottawa, December 19. https://www.pm.gc.ca/en/news/readouts/2025/12/19/prime-minister-carney-speaks-president-france-emmanuel-macron.

Politico (2026a). “France — National Parliament Voting Intention,” visited June 7. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/france/.

Politico (2026b). “Germany — National Parliament Voting Intention,” visited June 7. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/.

Politico (2026c). “Italy — National Parliament Voting Intention,” visited March 30. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/italy/.

Politico (2026d). “United Kingdom — Parliament Voting Intention,” visited March 30. https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/united-kingdom/.

Sandbu, Martin (2026). “Europe Is Running from a Phantom China Threat,” Financial Times, June 1. https://www.ft.com/content/340750b3-172d-4bcc-94bd-375c01c46dbc?syn-25a6b1a6=1.

Smith, Matthew (2026a). “How Popular Are National Leaders in Europe? April 2026,” YouGov, May 5. https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/54665-how-popular-are-national-leaders-in-europe-april-2026.

Smith, Matthew (2026b). “How Popular Are National Leaders in Europe? January 2026,” YouGov, February 3. https://yougov.com/en-gb/articles/54020-how-popular-are-national-leaders-in-europe-january-2026.

Sobel, Mark (2026). “Global Imbalance: Grandeur and a ‘Nothingburger,” OMFIF, March 3. https://www.omfif.org/2026/03/global-imbalances-grandeur-and-a-nothingburger/.

US Treasury (2026). “Secretary Bessent Convenes Finance Ministerial on Securing Critical Minerals Supply Chains,” Washington, January 12. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/finance/260126-press-release.html.

World Economic Forum (2026). Global Risks Report 2026, January 14. https://www.weforum.org/publications/global-risks-report-2026/.

YouGov (2026). “President Trump’s Second-Term Job Approval Rating.” Weekly tracker, last updated June 1. https://yougov.com/en-us/trackers/donald-trump-approval.

YouTrend (2026). “Supermedia Youtrend/Agi: si riduce il vantaggio del Sì,” February 27. https://www.youtrend.it/2026/02/27/supermedia-youtrend-agi-si-riduce-il-vantaggio-del-si/.

[back to top]

Appendix A: G7 Summit Performance, 1975–2025 ↩

Updated: Brittaney Warren, October 14, 2023, John Kirton, June 17, 2024, June 6, 2025, updated compliance scores.

Notes: n/a = not available.

Grade: Kirton scale is A+ Extremely Strong, Striking, Standout, Historic; A Very Strong; A− Strong; B+ Significant; B Substantial; B− Solid; C Small; D Very Small; F Failure (including made things worse).

Domestic political management: # communiqué compliments = the number of favourable references to G7/G8 members by name. Spread = number of G7/G8 members complimented.

Deliberation: # days = the duration of the summit; # statements = number of official statements issued in the leaders’ name; # words = number of words contained in the official statements.

Direction setting: # affirmations of G7/G8 core values of open democracy, individual liberty and human rights contained in official documents.

Decision making: # commitments contained in the official documents.

Delivery: Compliance: compliance with selected commitments assessed as follows: 1975–1989 assessed elsewhere by George von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels; 1990–1995 assessed elsewhere by Ella Kokotsis; 1996– assessed by the G7 Research Group. # commitments: number of commitments assessed.

Development of global governance: # ministerials created = number of institutions at the ministerial level created; # official-level groups created = number of institutions at the officials-level created. Institutions created at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place.

Participation: # members = number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start; Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998 until its last participation in 2013; the G4 met in 1974 without Japan and Italy and later that year the G6 (without Canada) met. # participating countries = number of full members plus number of leaders from other countries. # participating international organizations

[back to top]

Appendix B: Macron’s Address to the United Nations General Assembly, September 2025 ↩

Major transformation is also underway for us all across the globe. Climate change is not under control, biodiversity is collapsing, efforts that the majority of us are ready to make are coming up against the obstacles of the cynicism of a few that can make a difference but refuse to do just that. And we see technology picking up pace, they pave the way to horizons of opportunity, but they also pave the way for dangerous forces, dangerous because they are not regulated. Global trade is weathering tariff wars, and that’s another form of imbalance globally speaking. Alarm bells are ringing out loud, but that doesn’t extinguish hope …

Ukraine is staying the course, and peace is possible in the Great Lakes region. We’ve also adopted treaties – ambitious agreements – that some people thought were impossible: a treaty on pandemics, a treaty to protect the high seas, another to finance development. The world’s complexities is not a reason to throw in the towel on our principles and our ambitions …

Let us stare straight in the face of global imbalances, all economies affected, all economies – and I’m speaking as one of the richest among them – but also middle-income countries, developing countries and, of course, the poorest nations among us. All of us, if we can’t have organized international debate on major global imbalances, if our response is a fragmented one and we don’t work together, we exacerbate these problems. Today our challenge is to look at how we can help China to develop the internal demand that it really needs. How can we ensure the productive capacities that China has been able to develop in recent years (these technological capacities)? Sometimes there’s technological transfer, and that’s good, but [it needs] to be conducted hand in hand with harmonious development and respect for the environment. How can we correct US trade imbalances? How can we do that through corrective measures, not through tariffs that take the rug out from under international trade? There’s Europe that needs to respond to collective needs for collective investment and we need to shoulder that responsibility.

These challenges mean that we need to cooperate. There needs to be cooperation between major economies. But we can’t pit the G7 against the BRICs – and that’s the very rationale behind the French G7 of 2026. Of course, we’ll work with the Canadian presidency of G7 and the coming presidency of G20. We need to return to that spirit of cooperation that is vital because that is what will allow us to have a common agenda to finance our global challenges. Let’s take a look at things today. Everywhere we are reducing and eroding our common ambitions to finance major global challenges. Collective financing for health care is plummeting as is financing for food security, as is financing for education. These challenges are, however, our challenges even more than they were before the pandemic, the Covid-19 pandemic, and so it is absolutely pivotal that together we prove ourselves able to develop concrete solutions and find new financing to address our challenges … Together we need to work together better to address global economic imbalances. We must develop an agenda of growth everywhere, but we must do that to also help countries to finance education, health care, stabilization of food security, and help them to address challenges of biodiversity and the climate.

Let us come off the horns of a dilemma. We don’t need to choose between growth, climate change and biodiversity – we can do everything if we mobilize private and public financing within a framework that brings together, reconciles west, east, north and south … We need to mobilize more private financing to accompany transitions in middle-income countries, developing countries and the poorest nations. We must develop guarantee mechanisms [so] that losses will be covered, and we need to mobilize more private financing to help those countries and help them to grow. That is vital.

Whatever the ill winds that blow, continue to mobilize to stop biodiversity loss, and help the climate. As I was saying, together we were able to notch up victories recently: The Nice Treaty that entered into force – through collective rallying we finally have a regulation framework for our oceans. That was something we’d been waiting for, for decades. The same collective mobilization is what we must see on plastic. We need to develop an international treaty that aims to put an end to plastic pollution. The same mobilization is what we need to have to mobilize biodiversity credits and give more consistency to our carbon credits … France and Europe will be at that meeting and we will be in step with the 2030 goals. We will mobilize all financing necessary to usher in this transition, whether that be public or private financing. We have no right to turn away, stray from the course and the goals we set ourselves. We have no right to simply crumble and become isolated. As you’ve seen: education, health care, agriculture, food security, biodiversity, climate, the fight ultimately against all inequalities that destabilize our global order, require the same spirit of cooperation, the same spirit that I talked about, the spirit that we showed in the face of war and destabilization.

Source: Macron (2025b).

[back to top]

Appendix C: G7 Leaders, Ministers and Sherpa Meetings, 2026 ↩

As of March 31, 2026

Note: Bold indicates leaders; italics indicates G7-related high-level meeting.

Sources: France’s G7 Presidency (2026d), Ministères économiques et financiers de la République française (2026); G7 Research Group (2026b).

[back to top]

Appendix D: Commitments Made by G7 Foreign Ministers on March 21, 2026 ↩

G7 Statement on Support to Partners in the Middle East

Words = 304, Commitments = 4 (regional security–Middle East–Iran)

We, the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, [1] express support to our partners in the region in the face of the unjustifiable attacks by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies.

We condemn in the strongest terms the regime’s reckless attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Iraq, in line with UNSC Resolution 2817. The Iranian regime’s unjustifiable attacks against these states also threaten regional and global security. We call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of all attacks by the Iranian regime. We reaffirm the importance of safeguarding maritime routes, and safety of navigation, including in the Strait of Hormuz and all associated critical waterways, as well as the safety and security of supply chains and the stability of energy markets. [2] We stand ready to take necessary measures to support global supply of energy such as the stockpile release decided by International Energy Agency members on March 11.

The G7 has repeatedly stated that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon and that it must halt its ballistic missile program, end its destabilizing activities in the region and around the globe, and cease the appalling violence and repression against its own people.

[3] We support the right of the countries unjustifiably attacked by Iran or by Iranian proxies to defend their territories and protect their citizens. [4] We reaffirm our unwavering support for their security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

We condemn the brazen attacks in Iraq by Iran and its militias against diplomatic facilities and energy infrastructure, particularly in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, and against U.S. and Counter ISIS Coalition forces, and the Iraqi people.

[back to top]

—	This Information System is provided by the University of Toronto Libraries and the G7 Research Group at the University of Toronto.
	Please send comments to: g7@utoronto.ca This page was last updated June 08, 2026.

All contents copyright © 2026. University of Toronto unless otherwise stated. All rights reserved.