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Prospects for the G7 Niagara Foreign Ministers’ Meeting
John Kirton, G7 Research Group, November 10, 2025
On November 11–12, 2025, G7 foreign ministers will gather in Canada’s Niagara region for their second major, stand-alone, in-person ministerial meeting, this time with Canada’s foreign minister, Anita Anand, in the chair. They will assemble almost six months after their leaders met for their annual summit at Kananaskis, Alberta, on June 15–17 and eight months after their meeting in Charlevoix, Quebec, on March 12–14, hosted by then foreign minister Mélanie Joly. Most G7 foreign ministers are expected to attend the Niagara meeting (see Appendix A). Their guests will include the foreign ministers of Ukraine, and the G20 members of Australia, Brazil, India, Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
It is a very important meeting. It marks the culminating gathering of G7 foreign ministers during Canada’s presidency in 2025. It is the first G7 meeting that Anand will host at home as foreign minister since assuming the role in May, and the first G7 meeting for Japan’s new foreign minister Motegi Toshimitsu. It will receive US secretary of state Marco Rubio just a few days after President Donald Trump said no US official will attend the G20 summit in Johannesburg Summit on November 22–23. It comes when many violent conflicts persist around the world, notably in Ukraine and the Middle East, and imminent military threats to Taiwan, Iran and Venezuela, and from Iran, North Korea and the United States itself.
The Niagara foreign ministers’ meeting will thus have an unusually comprehensive, interconnected agenda, starting with its focus on “global economic and security challenges, including maritime security and prosperity, economic resilience, energy security and critical minerals (Global Affairs Canada 2025b).
The G7 foreign ministers are due to produce a significant performance. They are likely to make many more commitments on direct foreign policy subjects than their predecessors had made before Kananaskis, than their leaders had made at Kananaskis and that they themselves had made in all their several meetings since (Kirton 2025a, c) (see Appendix B and Appendix C). They will probably do more on their broad security agenda than their leaders will at their forthcoming G20 summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, on November 22–23, from which the United States has now withdrawn.
The G7 foreign ministers’ first task is to build on the significant performance their leaders produced at Kananaskis. By the end of the Kananaskis Summit, G7 leaders had issued seven communiqués, with all agreed to by all leaders, including US president Donald Trump, in addition to the chair’s summary issued by Canadian prime minister Mark Carney’s at the end of the summit (Kirton 2025b). Six communiqués – on wildfires, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, quantum technology, migrant smuggling and transnational repression – were prepared in advance, with the seventh negotiated at the summit in response to the Israel-Iran war. It was the first time G7 leaders had acted spontaneously on the Israel-Iran war in such a direct, comprehensive and ambitious way.
Together the leaders’ eight outcome documents contained 148 collective, precise, future-oriented, politically obligatory commitments. This was almost as many as the average of 151 at each of the 50 G7 summits since 1975 (see Appendix D).
Carney’s seven invited guest country leaders were Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Australia’s Anthony Albanese, Korea’s Lee Jae Myung, Mexico’s Claudia Sheinbaum, India’s Narendra Modi, South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa and Brazil’s Lula da Silva, all of whose foreign ministers have been invited to the Niagara meeting. Three Kananaskis invitees declined Carney’s invitation: Saudi Arabia, also invited to Niagara, Indonesia and the United Arab Emirates. The heads of two international organizations also attended the Kananaskis Summit: Mark Rutte, secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and United Nations secretary general António Guterres, making nine guest leaders in all. A few of these leaders’ countries were included by name in the G7’s communiqués released on the second day of the Kananaskis Summit.
Carney’s nine guests were all from democracies, and from the most powerful ones in the G20. Kananaskis thus was a de facto summit of the democratic G20, whose members possessed about 75% of the economic capability in the world.
Yet they issued no separate statement on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the major issue the Niagara foreign ministers would address.
After the summit, in the final six and a half months of Canada’s 2025 G7 presidency, further performance came.
At the leaders’ level, Carney as chair was unusually active in his summit diplomacy abroad with his G7 partners, to advance many of the subjects that Kananaskis leaders had discussed and agreed.
In the 20 weeks between the Kananaskis and Niagara meetings, Carney made 11 overseas visits, for an average of more than one every two weeks week (see Appendix E). Seven were to Europe, two to the US in Washington DC and to the United Nations, one to Mexico in the Americas, one to Egypt in the Middle East, and one to Malaysia, Singapore and Korea in Asia, for a total of 14 countries. At the multilateral UN in New York, Carney discussed energy, Ukraine and the Middle East. By November 10, Carney had thus met all his fellow G7 leaders and many more G20 ones.
After Kananaskis, G7 leaders, ministers and officials also made several collective statements and mounted several ministerial meetings to help implement, extend and supplement the Kananaskis results (see Appendix F).
The 13 ministerial meetings held or scheduled after the summit were led by foreign affairs with five and finance with four. There was one for development ministers, one for energy and environment ministers, one for interior and security and one for industry, digital and technology. Political-security issues thus came first, overwhelmingly, as the finance and other ministers also addressed and made commitments on security. Together they covered Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Middle East, Iran, Israel, Gaza, North Korea, Haiti, Sudan, energy and critical minerals security.
After the Kananaskis Summit, foreign ministers met on June 25 in the Hague to discuss Iran and the Middle East. In the statement they issued on June 30, they made four commitments: one each on Israel-Iran, Qatar, the Middle East and Israel.
Foreign ministers met virtually on August 24 to commemorate the Independence Day of Ukraine. The chair’s statement issued on August 25 made one commitment, which was on Ukraine.
Finance ministers, who had met on the margins of the G20 finance ministerial meeting in Durban, South Africa on July 18 but issued no statement, discussed Ukraine on September 12. According to the readout issued after the meeting, they made two commitments, both on Russia’s war against Ukraine, including one to accelerate discussions to use Russia’s frozen assets for Ukraine.
Foreign ministers met on September 23 in New York on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly meetings. Their statement contained four commitments, once each on Ukraine, Gaza, North Korea and UN reform.
On October 1, G7 foreign ministers issued a Statement on the Iran Sanctions Snapback. It contained three commitments, all on Iran’s nuclear program.
On October 1, G7 finance ministers also met virtually to discuss increasing pressure on Russia to end its war in Ukraine. They issued a statement on October 2 that contained 13 commitments: Russia had eight and Ukraine four.
On October 16, G7 finance ministers and central bank governors met in Washington, on the margins of the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Svyrdenko attended as a guest. Although no statement was issued, finance minister François-Philippe Champagne, as host, reported that Svyrdenko updated G7 members on Ukraine current financial state and needs, and they discussed global growth challenges, ways to promote inter-G7 trade, imbalances and critical minerals (Department of Finance 2025). His summary contained two commitments. One said: “we are each taking bold steps to increase the economic costs of Russia’s war efforts by imposing restrictive measures on key sectors and supporters of the Russian economy such as energy … We agreed that now is the time to maximize pressure on Russia’s oil exports.” Another stated: “We will take concrete measures to significantly reduce, with the object of phasing out our remaining imports from Russia, including on hydrocarbon imports.”
While in Washington, G7 finance ministers also participated in the G20 finance ministers meeting, a roundtable on support for Ukraine and cooperation on its economic recovery, and an outreach event with colleagues from developing and emerging economies on Africa, the Pacific and Caribbean on debt sustainability and crisis resilience.
On October 17, G7 development ministers met in Washington, with guest colleagues from Indonesia, Peru, Qatar and South Africa, the World Bank and FinDev Canada. They issued a statement that was published several days after the meeting. Randeep Singh, minister for state responsible for development, emphasized partnerships to mobilize sustainable investments, and Canada’s “announcement of up to $544 million in portfolio guarantees at the Kananaskis Summit (Global Affairs Canada 2025c). development ministers discussed “opportunities related to Canada’s G7 presidency priorities of fostering mutual economic growth and security, strengthening global supply chains, and developing quality infrastructure” and reforming the international aid system. They also discussed the plan to end the Gaza conflict, Russia’s war against Ukraine, Haiti, Sudan and humanitarian assistance.
On October 30–31, G7 energy and environment ministers met in Toronto and issued nine documents, including one on Ukraine and one on critical minerals. In total they made 169 commitments (see below).
By November 10, foreign ministers had met four times and issued four outcome documents, and finance ministers had met four times and issued three outcome documents. Together they had made 29 commitments. Russia and Ukraine each had eight. The Middle East had 10.
The G7 ministers for energy and the environment (EEMM) met on October 30-31 in Toronto, as announced on September 9 (Environment and Climate Change Canada [ECCC] 2025).
This EEMM, co-hosted by Canada’s minister of energy and natural resources Tim Hodgson and minister of environment and climate change Julie Dabrusin, was designed to build on the Kananaskis Summit’s achievements on critical minerals and its production alliance, and artificial intelligence (AI) for prosperity. It would also address “energy security and affordability, building resilient supply chains, and the role of innovation and emerging technologies (ECCC 2025).
Environment ministers would advance “G7 leadership on … extreme weather prediction, preparedness and response, advancing the Kananaskis Wildfire Charter; driving a circular economy for priority and emerging sectors; international freshwater co-ordination and conserving and protecting oceans” (ECCC 2025). This was a notable expansion of the Kananaskis energy and environment agenda and outcomes.
By September 18, the agenda had expanded further, entering more directly into the political security domain. The agenda included:
By October 22, critical minerals supply chains and electricity were due to top the agenda (Graney 2025). The aim was swift action to develop a critical minerals supply chain, for diversified and strengthened sources of these essential inputs for the global economy, prompted by recent Chinse moves to restrict their exports of critical minerals. Also important now was electricity prices and policy, with growing demand fuelled by data centres for AI, air conditioning and electric vehicles. Ministers were also due to discuss oil, given the looming supply glut, slowing demand and strong supply increases from the US, Canada and Brazil.
This agenda was a follow-up to and extension of the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan and Critical Minerals Production Alliance, which had been announced at Kananaskis (G7 2025) (see Appendix G).
On October 14–17, Minister Hodgson travelled to London, UK, to secure critical minerals supply chains and energy security, investments, market access and nuclear energy and to address the production alliance envoys.
On the eve of the Toronto ministerial, Canadian G7 sherpa Cindy Termorshsuisan, speaking at the IEA innovation roundtable, reinforced Hodgson’s opening address to the roundtable that morning. She stated that Canada’s priorities for the EEMM were critical minerals, strengthening and diversifying their supply chains, the costs and benefits for energy security, efficiency and innovation of AI and quantum technology, bridging the north-south AI divide.
The following morning, Germany’s energy minister Katherina Reiche stated that her priorities for the EEMM began with Ukraine, and ensuring its energy security during the coming winter, in the midst of Russia’s attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Her second priority was critical minerals. She welcomed Trump’s deal with Xi to lessen the tension over China’s critical mineral export cutbacks, noted that the EU had a fund of €1 billion to develop its critical mineral capacity and she looked forward the EEMM discussions on which projects to invest in to diversify EU imports of critical minerals.
That afternoon, Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), attending as a guest, indicated the EEMM would discuss the AI-nuclear energy interface, nuclear energy security in Ukraine in the face of Russia’s attacks on its reactor, nuclear capacity in Iran and the promising potential of fusion energy. He was pleased that the US had not cut its funding to the IAEA.
Midway through its second morning the EEMM was on track to take several strong steps forward on the critical issues it focused on.
The first was helping to win Russia’s war against Ukraine by moving to replace Europe’s imports from Russia – which were financing President Vladimir Putin’s war machine – with US and Canadian gas and oil. The highly engaged and articulate US secretary of energy Chris Wright emphasized the US determination to win the war, in this and other ways. The war was front and centre throughout the meeting as Svitlana Grynchuk, Ukraine’s minister of environmental protection and natural resources, was participating as a guest in all the sessions over the two days. Canada’s foreign minister Anita Anand joined Hodgson and Dabrusin to reinforce the G7’s determination to win the war through stronger action in several ways. That action included announcing new financing for a joint venture between a Canadian firm and a Ukrainian partner to develop critical minerals.
The second step was an advance on the G7’s Critical Minerals Action Plan and Production Alliance, which would be reinforced, rather than reduced by the October 29 announcement from US president Donald Trump and Chinese president Xi Jinping that China would suspend the new export restrictions on rare earths for a year. Wright made it clear that neither the US nor the G7 could count on the Chinese to sell them the rare earths needed to fuel their defence, energy systems and economies as a whole. Rather, the G7 must come together, and with other partners, to build an alternative that it controlled. And unlike liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil supplies to Europe, where the US alone could supply all that Europe now got from Russia, he recognised that the US needed its G7 partners in the rare earths and critical minerals field.
The G7 energy and environment ministers at Toronto produced a significant performance. It was led by their major advances on critical minerals and support for Ukraine’s energy system. Their nine communiqués, agreed to by all G7 members, contained 169 commitments, led by 118 on energy, with 37 on the environment. They mobilized new money of $6.4 billion to back their energy commitments, involved the private sector in advancing their critical minerals security, and signed deals with partners in six of the 26 projects on their initial list.
The major advance came on the G7’s Critical Minerals Action Plan and Production Alliance, created at the Kananaskis Summit in June.
Attendance by the G7 members’ top-tier ministers at Toronto was strong: 11 of the 15 G7 ministers responsible for energy and the environment came, with others represented by senior officials. Participants included both the US secretary of state for energy Chris Wright and EPA administrator Lee Zelden.
The guests featured Ukraine’s energy minister, Svitlana Grynchuk, who participated in all sessions. At dinner on the first day, she frequently checked her phone to update her fellow ministers on how many Russia missiles were landing and destroying Ukrainian energy facilities, as well as killing and wounding Ukrainians. The meeting announced new financing for a joint venture between a Canadian firm and a Ukrainian partner to develop critical minerals.
The IAEA’s Grossi also updated ministers on Russian attacks on Ukraine’s major nuclear reactor, and G7 work on nuclear energy, and interest in nuclear fusion.
Anand’s announcements included Canada’s decision and legal moves to seize a Ukrainian aircraft in Toronto that had been taken by Russia but impounded in Canada when Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began. She also announced the accelerated release of $10 million of the $70 million Canada had promised Ukraine.
Canada and other members announced that they had started to stockpile critical minerals, with Canada now invoking its Defence Production Act to acquire three critical minerals.
The Toronto EEMM’s significant performance was also seen in its results on the major dimensions by which such meetings outputs can be carefully and comparatively assessed (see Appendix H).
Its 169 commitments consisted of 118 in the energy documents, 37 in the environment ones and 14 in the Chairs’ Summary. Those commitments were led by those in the document on energy security with 33 and critical minerals markets with 32, followed by the circular economy with 29, energy and AI workplan 21, nuclear and fusion energy 18, the Chairs’ Summary and Ukraine’s energy security 14 each, the water coalition workplan with seven and extreme weather events with one.
The Toronto energy and environment ministers thus laid a very firm foundation for fast follow-up by their colleagues at the Niagara meeting. There G7 foreign ministers would discuss “global challenges and strengthen international collaboration” on issues including “security and prosperity, as well as important work on economic resilience,” following discussions held by their leaders at Kananaskis (Global Affairs Canada 2025b). Ministers would “work toward coordinated G7 responses to pressing international challenges, emphasizing cooperation with partners across regions and sectors.”
This represented an expansion into economic issues, a synergy with security ones and an emphasis on the concept of economic resilience. The focus on Russia, Ukraine, the Middle East and China built directly on the advances made by the energy and environment ministers on energy security, critical minerals and Ukraine at Toronto.
By November 6, the agenda has expanded to focus on the “global economic and security challenges, including maritime security and prosperity, economic resilience, energy security and critical minerals (Global Affairs Canada 2025a)
Also on the Niagara agenda would be the issues addressed at the Charlevoix foreign ministers’ meeting: Russia’s war against Ukraine, the Middle East, Iran, Israel, Gaza, North Korea, Haiti and Sudan.
G7 foreign ministers could also address many recent developments, such as transnational repression, human rights, UN reform, Taiwan, North Korea’s nuclear and missile advances and abduction of Japanese citizens, Iran’s money laundering and terrorist finance, Nigeria’s treatment of its Christian citizens, Venezuela, the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan, the Panama Canal and the Chinese-owned port facilities there, and Syria, where the US wants to open a military base.
On the eve of the meeting, the prospects were promising. Anand said all G7 members were “coming to the table in good faith” (Malone 2025). She noted that despite the tensions between Canada and the US over Trump’s tariffs and threats to annex Canada, and his suspension of trade negotiations after the province of Ontario ran a television ad viewed throughout the US featuring former president Ronald Regan criticizing tariffs. According to Anand, Rubio’s dealings with his G7 colleagues are “respectful” and he engages “substantively.”
The performance produced by the foreign ministers at Niagara will be assessed on several dimensions, including domestic political management and deliberation.
The Niagara meeting’s anticipated significant performance starts with the first dimension of domestic political management, measured by the attendance by G7 members and their guests. All G7 foreign ministers are due to attend – with those of the US and Germany participating for at least a day and Japan’s for the full two days.
G7 foreign ministers are expected to issue several public outcome documents to codify what they discuss and agree to. Within the broad agenda identified, Japan’s Motegi (2025) described the current security environment as “severe,” with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Middle East, the Indo-Pacific region, and “China’s diplomatic posture and military movements, North Korea’s nuclear and missile development, and the strengthening co-operation among China, Russia and North Korea.”
Korean foreign minister Cho Hyun will speak at two expanded sessions during the meeting on maritime security, prosperity, energy security and critical minerals (Kim 2025).
The performance of the foreign ministers’ meeting will be propelled by the current state of the six proven propellors of G7 summit performance: shock-activated vulnerability, multilateral organizational failure, members’ globally predominant and internally equalizing capabilities, their common and converging principles, domestic political support, and value of the G7 as the club at the hub of an expanding network of global governance.
The most important propellors are Russia’s military advances in Ukraine and escalating attacks on Ukraine’s energy system as winter began, and the geopolitical shocks of China’s refusal to end its restrictions on all its critical mineral exports to G7 members and of. With no international organizations able to stop Russia’s, China’s and their ally North Korea’s assaults on the democracies’ security, the G7 members would mobilize their own formidable, specialized capabilities to do the job themselves. Despite US president Donald Trump’s instinct to trust Russia’s Putin and China’s Xi, all G7 members strongly agree they need to act together on their shared national interests of security. Led by their Canadian hosts, they have enough domestic political support, largely on a bipartisan basis, to do so, especially after the US state and local election results on November 4 saw surging support for the Democratic Party. The attendance of the G7 foreign ministers, especially the US secretary of state, would show that they value their G7 club as the best place to act together.
The major current, most visible and direct shocks were Russian military advances in Ukraine and its attacks on the energy system there, and the disappointing results of the Trump-Xi critical minerals deal on October 30.
Russian military advances in Ukraine, combined with recent G7 sanctions on Russian energy firms, have raised energy prices in G7 members. This led the Toronto ministers and would lead their Niagara colleagues to support Ukraine and its energy systems, including its nuclear energy ones, and to act more against rising energy prices, by increasing their alternative sources (including from one another) and domestic supply (including from nuclear energy and small nuclear reactors), but not on renewable energy (which also requires critical minerals).
The Trump-Xi deal on critical minerals in Korea on October 30 produced disappointing results – only a one-year truce to allow the latest Chinese restrictions to resume. This did not reduce G7 action to diversify from and defend its members from an authoritarian China. Rather, it reinforced the G7’s determination to increase its leverage to ensure China complied with the deal or secure its own supply of critical minerals if China did not.
Subsequent security shocks came from Trump’s declared intention to resume US nuclear testing to match Russia and China’s advances, his preparation for military action against Venezuela, and threats against Colombia and Nigeria.
As the ministers prepare to meet in Niagara, the most directly relevant failures of multilateral organizations are the inability of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council to stop Russian advances in Ukraine, China’s expansion in the South China Sea and against Taiwan, and North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear programs. The IAEA, still receiving US funding, has limited power to stop Russian attacks on Ukraine’s reactor infrastructure and Iran’s nuclear program. The IEA and NATO also have limited capacity. There is no multilateral body dedicated to ensuring a secure supply of critical minerals, not even a plurilateral one such as the IEA to do so for oil.
G7 members’ overall globally predominant capability has declined, but their internally equalizing capability has risen, both due to the decline in 2025 of the value of the US dollar by about 9% against the basket of key currencies.
However, in terms of the specialized capabilities most needed, G7 members are globally predominant: in military spending and in the energy assets required to replace those destroyed by Russian attacks on Ukraine and all the Europeans’ oil and gas imports from Russia that finance Putin’s war machine.
Although Canada has the lowest overall gross domestic product in the G7, it is – as Prime Minister Carney claims – a genuine “energy superpower.” It is one of the world’s largest LNG exporters and holders of oil and gas reserves. It is in the top five of ten countries with the most important critical minerals, and ranks third in the uranium it possessed. Of the world’s listed mining companies, 40% are in Canada, and 85% of its energy comes from clean sources. It is the largest per capita donor of financial support to Ukraine.
G7 members’ common and converging principles are substantial. Centre-right leaders and thus their ministers are in place in the US, Japan, Germany, Italy and France, and centre-left ones come from only host Canada and the UK. However, the coalition governments in Germany and Italy provide more commonality, even as the Trump administration’s unprecedented anti-democratic actions provide a countervailing constraint. And all are united in defending their national interest of security against the energy threats and attacks from authoritarian China and Russia.
G7 ministers came from governments with solid political control of their domestic politics. None is likely to face an election that would replace them during the following year, even if their legislative control is uncertain in France and Japan. But their leaders are popular only in Japan, Canada and Italy. They are very unpopular in Germany, the UK, US and, especially, France. This will provide an important constraint on their performance at Toronto.
The members and their leaders value the G7 as the club at the hub of an expanding network of global governance is difficult to assess. Most ministers are new to G7 meetings in 2025, notably those from the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK and Canada. Veterans come from Italy. However, all G7 members, including the US, are expected to send their top-tier ministers to Toronto.
Taken together, these six propellors promise to push G7 foreign ministers to produce a significant B+ performance at Niagara. They are likely to make many more commitments on direct foreign policy subjects than their leaders did at Kananaskis and that they have made in total at their several meetings since.
Department of Finance (2025). “Minister Champagne Concludes International Meetings in D.C., Advancing Global Economic Resilience,” October 16. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/news/2025/10/minister-champagne-concludes-international-meetings-in-dc-advancing-global-economic-resilience.html.
Environment and Climate Change Canada (2025), “Canada to Host G7 Energy and Environment Ministers’ Meeting in Toronto, Ontario,” September 9. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/news/2025/09/canada-to-host-g7-energy-and-environment-ministers-meeting-in-toronto-ontario.html.
G7 (2025). “Chair’s Summary,” Kananaskis, June 17. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2025kananaskis/250617-summary.html.
Global Affairs Canada (2025a). “Minister Anand Announces Participants for G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Niagara,” November 6. https://g7.canada.ca/en/news-and-media/news/minister-anand-announces-participants-for-g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-niagara.
Global Affairs Canada (2025b). “Minister Anand to Host G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in the Niagara Region, in Ontario,” October 3. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/10/minister-anand-to-host-g7-foreign-ministers-meeting-in-the-niagara-region-in-ontario.html.
Global Affairs Canada (2025c). “Secretary of State Sarai Hosts G7 Development Ministers’ Meeting and Participates in 2025 Annual Meetings of World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund,” October 18. https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2025/10/secretary-of-state-sarai-hosts-g7-development-ministers-meeting-and-participates-in-2025-annual-meetings-of-world-bank-group-and-international-mone.html.
Graney, Emma (2025), “Critical Minerals Supply Chain, Electricity Top of Agenda at G7 Energy Meeting, IEA Head Says,” Globe and Mail, October 22, 2025. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-critical-minerals-electricity-g7-energy-meeting-iea/.
Kirton, John (2025a). “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Significant Performance at Charlevoix,” March 18. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-foreign-ministers-charlevoix.html.
Kirton, John (2025b), “The Significant Performance of the G7’s 2025 Kananaskis Summit,” June 17. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-day-two.html.
Kirton, John (2025c). “A Strong Start to G7 Global Security Governance at Its Munich Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” February 15. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-foreign-ministers-munich.html.
Malone, Geraldine (2025). “Anand Says U.S. Secretary Rubio Has Avoided ‘51st State’ Chatter as G7 Meeting Looms,” Canadian Press, November 10. https://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/article/anand-says-us-secretary-rubio-has-avoided-51st-state-chatter-as-g7-meeting-looms.
Motegi, Toshimitsu (2025). “Japan and Canada Are Key Pillars of a Free and Fair International Economic Order,” Globe and Mail, November 10. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/article-japan-canada-pillars-free-fair-international-economic-order.
Kim, Sung-hyun (2025). “FM Cho to Attend Expanded G7 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Canada Next Week,” Global Korea Post, November 8. https://www.globalkoreapost.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=90249.
| G7 member | Foreign minister | Assumed Office |
| Canada | Anita Anand | May 2025 |
| United States | Marco Rubio | February 2025 |
| Japan | Motegi Toshimitsu | October 2025 |
| German | Johann Wadephul | May 2025 |
| France | Jean-Noël Barrot | September 2024 |
| United Kingdom | Yvette Cooper | September 2025 |
| Italy | Antonio Tajani | October 2022 |
| European Union | Kaja Kallas | December 2024 |
| Guest country | Foreign minister |
| Australia | Penny Wong |
| Brazil | Mauro Vieira |
| India | S Jaishankar |
| Korea | Cho Hyun |
| Mexico | Juan Ramón de la Fuente |
| Saudi Arabia | Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud |
| South Africa | Ronald Lamola |
| Ukraine | Andrii Sybiha |
| Date | Portfolio | Location | Outcome document | Decisions | Tax | Iran | Israel | Middle East | Ukraine | Russia | Gaza | Korea | United Nations |
| Jun 25 | Foreign | The Hague | Joint statement on Iran and the Middle East | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Jun 28 | Finance | n/a | G7 Statement on Global Minimum Taxes | 2 | 2 | ||||||||
| Jul 18 | Finance | Durban | None | ||||||||||
| Aug 24 | Foreign | Virtual | Chair’s statement (Ukraine independence day) | 1 | 1 | 1 | |||||||
| Sep 12 | Finance | Virtual | Readout on increasing pressure on Russia to end its war against Ukraine | 2 | 1 | 1 | |||||||
| Sep 23 | Foreign | UN General Assembly | Joint G7 Foreign Ministers Statement | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | ||||||
| Oct 1 | Foreign | Virtual | Statement on Iran sanctions snapback | 3 | 3 | ||||||||
| Oct 1 | Finance | Virtual | G7 Finance Ministers Statement | 13 | 4 | 8 | |||||||
| Oct 16 | Finance | Washington | None | ||||||||||
| Oct 17 | Development | Washington | Chair’s summary | tbd | |||||||||
| Oct 30–31 | Energy and environment | Toronto | Chairs’ Summary; Water Coalition Work Plan; Toronto Action Plan on Circular Economy and Resource Efficiency; Chair's Statement on Extreme Weather Prediction, Preparedness, and Response; Roadmap to Promote Standards-based Markets for Critical Minerals; G7 Energy and AI Work Plan; Statement on Ukraine's Energy Security; Statement on Nuclear and Fusion Energy; G7 Call to Action on Enhancing Energy Security |
169 | |||||||||
| Total | 198 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 6 | 10 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
Note: tbd = to be determined.
| Communiqué | Compliments | Words | Direction Setting | Commitments | Development of Global Governance | |||
| Democracy | Human Rights | Number | Percentage | Inside G7 | Outside G7 | |||
| Israel-Iran war | 0 | 131 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2% | 0 | 0 |
| Wildfire charter | 0 | 536 | 0 | 0 | 19 | 15% | 0 | 2 |
| AI for prosperity | 2 | 1,804 | 0 | 1 | 47 | 36% | 8 | 4 |
| Critical minerals | 0 | 974 | 0 | 0 | 21 | 16% | 3 | 3 |
| Quantum technology | 0 | 519 | 1 | 1 | 21 | 16% | 0 | 1 |
| Migrant smuggling | 0 | 408 | 0 | 1 | 11 | 8% | 4 | 0 |
| Transnational repression | 0 | 558 | 1 | 4 | 8 | 6% | 4 | 0 |
| Subtotal | 2 | 4,930 | 2 | 7 | 130 | 100% | 10 | 10 |
| Chair’s summary | 1 | 1,202 | 2 | 3 | 18 | 18% | 2 | 2 |
| Total | 3 | 6,132 | 4 | 10 | 148 | 21 | 12 | |
| G7 average, 1975–2024 | 4 | 19,936 | 33 | 151 | ||||
| Year | Grade | Domestic political management | Deliberation | Direction setting | Decision making | Delivery | Development of global governance | Participation | |||||||
| # communiqué compliments | Spread | # days | # statements | # words | # references to core values | # commitments | Compliance | # assessed | # ministerials created | # official-level groups created | # members | # participating countries | # participating international organizations | ||
| 1975 | A− | 2 | 29% | 3 | 1 | 1,129 | 5 | 15 | 54% | 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
| 1976 | D | 0 | 0% | 2 | 1 | 1,624 | 0 | 10 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 |
| 1977 | B− | 1 | 13% | 2 | 6 | 2,669 | 0 | 55 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1978 | A | 1 | 13% | 2 | 2 | 2,999 | 0 | 50 | 57% | 3 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1979 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 2 | 2,102 | 0 | 55 | n/a | n/a | 1 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1980 | C+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 5 | 3,996 | 3 | 54 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1981 | C | 1 | 13% | 2 | 3 | 3,165 | 0 | 48 | 50% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1982 | C | 0 | 0% | 3 | 2 | 1,796 | 0 | 39 | 15% | 1 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 1983 | B | 0 | 0% | 3 | 2 | 2,156 | 7 | 39 | 22% | 2 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1984 | C− | 1 | 13% | 3 | 5 | 3,261 | 0 | 31 | 27% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1985 | E | 4 | 50% | 3 | 2 | 3,127 | 1 | 24 | 64% | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1986 | B+ | 3 | 25% | 3 | 4 | 3,582 | 1 | 39 | 29% | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 1987 | D | 2 | 13% | 3 | 7 | 5,064 | 0 | 53 | 65% | 1 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 1988 | C− | 3 | 25% | 3 | 3 | 4,872 | 0 | 27 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1989 | B+ | 3 | 38% | 3 | 11 | 7,125 | 1 | 61 | 47% | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| Average/ Total |
600/ 40 |
43% | 20 | ||||||||||||
| 1990 | D | 3 | 38% | 3 | 3 | 7,601 | 10 | 78 | 45% | 4 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1991 | B− | 1 | 13% | 3 | 3 | 8,099 | 8 | 53 | 69% | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 0 |
| 1992 | D | 1 | 13% | 3 | 4 | 7,528 | 5 | 41 | 86% | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
| 1993 | C+ | 0 | 0% | 3 | 2 | 3,398 | 2 | 29 | 79% | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
| 1994 | C | 1 | 13% | 3 | 2 | 4,123 | 5 | 53 | 86% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
| 1995 | B+ | 3 | 25% | 3 | 3 | 7,250 | 0 | 78 | 65% | 1 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
| 1996 | B | 1 | 13% | 3 | 5 | 15,289 | 6 | 128 | 71% | 23 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 4 |
| 1997 | C− | 16 | 88% | 3 | 4 | 12,994 | 6 | 145 | 63% | 11 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 |
| Average/ Total |
606/ 76 |
71% | |||||||||||||
| 1998 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 3 | 4 | 6,092 | 5 | 73 | 71% | 13 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 1999 | B+ | 4 | 22% | 3 | 4 | 10,019 | 4 | 46 | 73% | 10 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 2000 | B | 1 | 11% | 3 | 5 | 13,596 | 6 | 105 | 87% | 29 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
| 2001 | B | 1 | 11% | 3 | 7 | 6,214 | 3 | 58 | 74% | 20 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 2002 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 18 | 11,959 | 10 | 187 | 68% | 24 | 1 | 8 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| 2003 | C | 0 | 0% | 3 | 14 | 16,889 | 17 | 206 | 81% | 20 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 5 |
| 2004 | C+ | 0 | 0% | 3 | 16 | 38,517 | 11 | 245 | 77% | 33 | 0 | 15 | 10 | 12 | 0 |
| 2005 | A− | 8 | 67% | 3 | 16 | 22,286 | 29 | 212 | 83% | 28 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 11 | 6 |
| 2006 | B+ | 6 | 44% | 3 | 15 | 30,695 | 256 | 317 | 70% | 28 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 5 | 9 |
| 2007 | B+ | 12 | 100% | 3 | 8 | 25,857 | 86 | 329 | 77% | 31 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
| 2008 | B+ | 8 | 78% | 3 | 6 | 16,842 | 33 | 296 | 73% | 29 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 15 | 6 |
| 2009 | B | 13 | 67% | 3 | 10 | 31,167 | 62 | 254 | 77% | 27 | 2 | 9 | 10 | 28 | 10 |
| 2010 | C | 10 | 89% | 2 | 2 | 7,161 | 32 | 44 | 75% | 21 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 9 | 0 |
| 2011 | B+ | 14 | 67% | 2 | 5 | 19,071 | 172 | 196 | 78% | 18 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 7 | 4 |
| 2012 | B+ | 7 | 67% | 2 | 2 | 3,640 | 42 | 81 | 78% | 22 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 4 | 1 |
| 2013 | B+ | 13 | 60% | 2 | 4 | 13,494 | 71 | 214 | 79% | 27 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 6 | 1 |
| Average/ Total 1998–2013 |
2,863/ 179 |
76% | |||||||||||||
| Average/ Total 1990–2013 |
3,446/ 144 |
74% | |||||||||||||
| 2014 | B | 6 | 44% | 2 | 1 | 5,106 | 42 | 141 | 85% | 24 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
| 2015 | B+ | 2 | 25% | 2 | 2 | 12,674 | 20 | 376 | 79% | 35 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 6 |
| 2016 | B− | 22 | 63% | 2 | 7 | 23,052 | 95 | 342 | 69% | 28 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 7 | 5 |
| 2017 | B | 2 | 25% | 2 | 4 | 8,614 | 158 | 180 | 79% | 22 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
| 2018 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 8 | 11,224 | 56 | 315 | 78% | 42 | 1 | 9 | 12 | 4 | |
| 2019 | B− | 6 | 57% | 3 | 10 | 7,202 | 71 | 76% | 27 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 8 | 8 | |
| 2020 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 1 | 1 | 795 | 0 | 25 | 94% | 20 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | n/a |
| 2021 | A− | 4 | 50% | 3 | 3 | 20,677 | 130 | 429 | 89% | 29 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
| 2022 | A− | 1 | 13% | 3 | 8 | 19,179 | 118 | 545 | 92% | 21 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 6 | 9 |
| 2023 | A | 17 | 75% | 3 | 6 | 30,046 | 57 | 698 | 95% | - | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
| Average/ Total 2014–2023 |
60/ 6 |
23 | 50/ 5 |
138,587/ 13,858 |
676/ 75 |
3,122/ 312 |
82% | 248/ 28 |
6 | 7 | 9 | 61/ 6 |
48/ 5 |
||
| Total | 204 | 27.57 | 129 | 268 | 527,017 | 1,575 | 7,093 | - | 696 | 21 | 102 | 429 | 189 | 106 | |
| Average | 4.2 | 0.6 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 10,755.4 | 32.8 | 147.8 | 78% | 16.5 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 8.8 | 3.9 | 2.2 | |
| 2024 Apulia | A- | 14 | 75% | 3 | 1 | 19,795 | 81 (30+51) | 469 | 92% | 20 | 1 | 9 | |||
| 2025 Kanana’s | B+ | 3 | 3 | 8 | 6,123 | 14 | 148 | 0 | |||||||
Notes: n/a = not available.
Grade: Kirton scale is A+ Extremely Strong, Striking, Standout, Historic; A Very Strong; A− Strong; B+ Significant; B Substantial; B− Solid; C Small; D Very Small; F Failure (including made things worse).
Domestic political management: # communiqué compliments = the number of favourable references to G7/G8 members by name. Spread = number of G7/G8 members complimented.
Deliberation: # days = the duration of the summit; # statements = number of official statements issued in the leaders’ name; # words = number of words contained in the official statements.
Direction setting: # affirmations of G7/G8 core values of open democracy, individual liberty and human rights contained in official documents.
Decision making: # commitments contained in the official documents.
Delivery: Compliance: compliance with selected commitments assessed as follows: 1975–1989 assessed elsewhere by George von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels; 1990–1995 assessed elsewhere by Ella Kokotsis; 1996– assessed by the G7 Research Group. # commitments: number of commitments assessed.
Development of global governance: # ministerial meetings created = number of institutions at the ministerial level created; # official-level groups created = number of institutions at the officials-level created. Institutions created at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place.
Participation: # members = number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start; Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998 until its last participation in 2013; the G4 met in 1974 without Japan and Italy and later that year the G6 (without Canada) met. # participating countries = number of full members plus number of leaders from other countries. # participating international organizations = number of heads of international organizations.
| Country | Location | Date | Details | |
| 1 | Belgium | Brussels, Antwerp | June 22–24 | Canada-European Union Summit |
| Netherlands | The Hague | June 24–25 | 2025 North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit | |
| 2 | Ukraine | Kyiv | August 24 | Meeting with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko |
| Poland | Warsaw, Rzeszow | August 23–25 | Meetings with Prime Minister Donald Tusk and President Karol Nawrocki | |
| Germany | Berlin, Kiel | August 25–26 | Meeting with Chancellor Friedrich Merz and visit to a defence manufacturing facility in Kiel | |
| Latvia | Riga, Adazi | August 26–27 | Meetings with Prime Minister Evika Silina, with Canadian troops stationed at Adazi Military Camp and announcement of extension of Canada’s peacekeeping mission in Latvia to 2029 | |
| 3 | Mexico | Mexico City | September 17–18 | Meeting with President Claudia Sheinbaum and launch of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership |
| 4 | United States | New York | September 21–24 | United Nations General Assembly, including High-Level Segment of the International Conference for the Peaceful Settlement on the Question of Palestine and the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, session on Restoring Childhood and Humanity: Advancing Peace in Ukraine Through the Return of Deported Children (co-hosted with Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy), First Biennial Summit for a Sustainable, Inclusive and Resilient Global Economy: Implementing commitments on financing development, and speech at the Council for Foreign Relations |
| 5 | United Kingdom | London | September 26–28 | Meeting with Prime Minister Keir Starmer and participation in the Global Progress Action Summit |
| 9 | United States | Washington DC | October 7–8 | Meeting with President Donald Trump |
| 10 | Egypt | Sharm El-Sheikh | October 12–13 | Middle East Peace Plan |
| 11 | Malaysia | Kuala Lumpur | October 24–27 | Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit |
| Singapore | Singapore | October 28 | Meetings with government and business leaders | |
| Korea | Gyeongju | October 31–November 1 | Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit | |
| 12 | South Africa | Johannesburg | November 22–23 | G20 Johannesburg Summit |
| 13 | Dominican Republic | Punta Cana | December 5 | Summit of the Americas |
The G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan and Critical Minerals Production Alliance, announced at the Kananaskis Summit in June 2025, represented “a shared commitment by G7 partners to diversify the responsible production and supply of critical minerals, encourage investments in critical mineral projects and local value creation and promote innovation. In line with this commitment, the Critical Minerals Production Alliance will work with trusted international partners to guarantee supply for advanced manufacturing and defence” (Natural Resources Canada 2025a).
Each member of the G7 named an envoy to lead the work of the Critical Minerals Production Alliance:
| Document | Words | Commitments | Development of Global Governance | References to Climate Change | |
| Inside the G7 | Outside the G7 | ||||
| Energy Total | 5,771 | 118 | 7 | 18 | 0 |
| Energy Security | 1,830 | 33 | 3 | 2 | 0 |
| Critical Minerals Markets | 1,573 | 32 | 1 | 8 | 0 |
| Energy and AI | 1,197 | 21 | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Nuclear and Fusion Energy | 659 | 18 | 1 | 5 | 0 |
| Ukraine’s Energy Security | 512 | 14 | 1 | 2 | 0 |
| Environment Total | 3,367 | 37 | 27 | 6 | 1 |
| Circular Economy | 1,526 | 29 | 18 | 5 | 0 |
| Water Coalition Workplan | 1,071 | 7 | 7 | 1 | 0 |
| Extreme Weather | 770 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Chairs’ Summary | 1,506 | 14 | 6 | 6 | 7 |
| Overall Total | 10,644 | 169 | 40 | 30 | 8 |
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