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Looking Back at Canada's 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit
John Kirton, G7 Research Group
May 30, 2025
With the approach of the G7’s Kananaskis Summit on June 15–17, 2025, there is growing interest in what it is likely to produce. Here a useful baseline for judging its performance, and insights into what it might do and why, is the first Kananaskis Summit, held as a G8 with Russian president Vladimir Putin participating as a full member, in June 2002. While much has changed since then, several key things have not. It is thus important to reflect on the highlights and causes of the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit’s significant success.
The year before the first Kananaskis Summit, Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda terrorist network had planned, but failed, to kill all the G8 leaders assembled at the Palazzo Ducale during the Genoa Summit on July 20–22, 2001. The plan was to fly a commandeered civilian aircraft into the building at known time when the leaders were all conveniently assembled for one of their summit sessions. Seven weeks later, on September 11, 2001, al Qaeda succeeded with a similar plan in striking the Pentagon and World Trade Center, if not Congress and the White House, in the United States.
Canada’s immediate reaction was to mobilize the G8 to deliver a compelling collective response. As John Gray (2003, 214–15) describes it, at the finance ministers’ level “in the hours after the attack, [Paul] Martin was on the phone to the finance ministers of the G7 leading industrial countries and they agreed that there should be a statement saying they had confidence in the world’s financial system; the statement was duly drafted in the finance department at Esplanade Laurier. But the prime minister’s office suddenly announced that Martin would not be speaking on such matters, so the statement drafted in Ottawa was issued in Italy,” which was still the G7 chair.
The next day, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, along with Italian chair Silvio Berlusconi and Russia’s Putin, publicly called for the G8 to define the American and allied response. Martin’s finance department mobilized the G8 to fight terrorist financing, building on the 1989 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), where implementation had been sluggish (Scherrer 2006). By mid December 2001, 196 countries and other jurisdictions had expressed support for the campaign against terrorist financing, 139 had issued blocking orders, and the United States had expressed satisfaction for the efforts of the G8 and G20 – which at the time was made up of finance ministers and central bank governors – to share financial intelligence (Dam 2001).
Shortly after, G7 finance ministers met in Washington, even though the old multilateral organizations of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank had cancelled most of their major events. On November 16–17, Martin hosted the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors in Ottawa, which would have otherwise been cancelled, as well as those of the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee and the IMF–World Bank’s Development Committee. The G20 meeting produced a strong consensus on combating terrorist finance, which was then approved in the broader forums of the IMF and World Bank. It also endorsed Canada’s preferred themes for the Kananaskis G8 of global growth and poverty reduction.
G8 foreign ministers met in New York on November 11, on the eve of the delayed opening of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). They considered how to put al Qaeda leaders on trial when they were captured. At the end of December, under Russian leadership, they called on India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in the face of a looming war sparked by a terrorist incident.
At the violence-scarred 2021 summit in Genoa, Italy, Chrétien announced that Kananaskis would be the site of his 2002 summit. It was chosen as the site “because of its extraordinary natural beauty – and because the demonstrations could be kept far outside the security perimeter” (Graham 2015, 257–58).
After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US, Alberta’s Conservative premier Ralph Klein proposed that June summit be cancelled or moved. Chrétien brushed aside this suggestion. He was in tune with his citizens, as public opinions polls wanted the summit to be held there, and were proud that it would be.
Canada assumed the G8 chair on January 1, 2002. It mounted many ministerial meetings to help prepare the path to the Kananaskis mountaintop. They consisted of those for finance in Ottawa on February 7–8, labour in Montreal on April 25–27, environment in Banff on April 12–14, energy in Detroit, Michigan, on May 2–3, foreign affairs in Whistler on June 12–13 and finance in Halifax on June 14–15 as the summit drew near. They would deal with issues beyond the three priorities chosen for the leaders to address at Kananaskis itself.
In the security sphere, Canada suggested that it host a G8 meeting to bring together solicitors general, ministers responsible for the RCMP and foreign ministers. While the suggestion was not taken up, the G8’s group on terrorism met. The group was now fused with the Lyon Group. It and the G8 group on non-proliferation were charged with determining how they could contribute to the antiterrorism campaign.
G8 environment ministers met on Banff, Alberta, on April 12–14 to help prepare the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa, from August 26 to September 4, 2002 (Risbud 2006). They thus focused on environment and development, but also the environment and health, and environmental governance.
At the meetings end they issued the Banff Ministerial Statement on the World Summit on Sustainable Development on 14 April. Its 2,149 words contained 25 commitments (see Appendix A). Sustainable development had nine, environmental governance seven, environment and health six and environment and development three.
G8 foreign ministers met in Whistler on June 12–13, just two weeks before the start of their leaders’ Kananaskis Summit on June 26–27. The foreign ministers discussed “the situation in the Middle East, the conflict in Afghanistan, the crisis in the Balkans, the threat of a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan, arms control, and the safe disposal of Soviet chemical, nuclear and biological weapons in the wake of the end of the cold war” (Graham 2015, 254). Other issues were addressed. During the meeting, Canadian foreign minister Bill Graham said to his US counterpart Colin Powell “your sugar tariffs are insane. They’re designed to protect a few wealthy guys in Florida” (Graham 2015, 255).
To keep a reluctant Powell coming to such meetings, who had been frustrated by the time spent drafting a consensus communiqué the previous year, Graham decided to issue only a chair’s statement instead.
The Canadian Chair’s Statement of 1,175 words, issued on June 13, contained 15 commitments (see Appendix B). Counter-terrorism and non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament had three each. India and Pakistan, the Balkans, and the Korean peninsula had two each. Afghanistan, the Middle East and the ministers’ next meeting at UNGA in September had one each. The day before they had issued a separate statement on Afghanistan. Four accompanying documents were issued: G8 Initiative on Conflict and Development, G8 Conflict Prevention: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, G8 Recommendations on Counter-Terrorism and a Progress Report on the Fight Against Terrorism.
After the summit, Canada created the G8 development ministers’ institution, by holding its first meeting in Windsor, Ontario, on September 26–27. It focused on building momentum for Africa from the Kananaskis Summit, aid effectiveness and its effect on education, trade and follow-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, and how the G8 could contribute to development cooperation.
At its end, the development ministers produced a consensus communiqué of 1,103 words, containing 21 commitments (see Appendix C). They included four each related to official development assistance (ODA) and to trade, and two each related to the environment and to education.
As Kananaskis approached, Canada worked to make broad linkages in finance, global growth, the natural environment, African poverty reduction, post-conflict reconstruction and democratic development that would address root causes and prevent the terrorist threat from recurring once the current antiterrorism campaign was won. At the same time, Chrétien remained determined that the September 11 terrorists would not hijack the G8 summit agenda agreed to at Genoa, and that Kananaskis would unfold the way he had long felt it should.
As chair of the Kananaskis Summit, Chrétien as host stuck to the agreed-upon agenda of poverty reduction in Africa (Kirton 2002). He sought to deliver a Montebello in the mountains – an informal gathering of leaders in a secluded setting, with minimum ceremony, small delegations, no surrounding media and civil society, and no elaborately negotiated final communiqué. At the final sherpa meeting of the Italian presidency in December 2001, Canada had proposed an agenda for Kananaskis that focused tightly on terrorism, growth and Africa.
Canada had three major objectives for Kananaskis: to deliver a new paradigm for development in which recipient governments, the private sector and civil society were full partners; to strengthen the good global growth prospects through structural reforms that enhanced productivity and were tailored to local circumstances; and to have existing commitments against terrorism fully implemented, made comprehensive and reinforced by new capacity.
To help mobilize the money required to realize its first objective of African development, Canada added $1 billion in ODA in its budget of December 10, 2001, and created the Canada Fund for Africa with another $500 million to be disbursed over three years. With this down payment, it catalyzed major new pledges from the United States, Europe and Japan at the March 2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development. It also looked for a compromise between the US desire to have the International Development Association (IDA) give money as grants rather than concessional loans on the one hand and, on the other, a European concern that such a shift would soon deplete the resources of the IDA should no new money be raised. Canada also continued its campaign for greater private sector participation in responding to financial crises, a thrust that secured greater support when Argentina created the world’s largest default ever in December 2001.
In its second priority of sustaining global growth, Canada emphasized greater productivity as key to overcome the costs of terrorism being priced into G7 economies, and to resolve the debate between an America preferring fiscal stimulus and a Europe favouring fiscal restraint. Canada saw the Doha Development Agenda, newly launched by the World Trade Organization (WTO), as an important instrument to generate productivity-led global growth.
To secure its third objective of combating terrorism, Canada sought G8 agreement to implement and render comprehensive and global the G20’s Action Plan on Terrorist Financing. With Commonwealth Caribbean countries in its constituency in the IMF, and with recent lengthy experience in instituting its own system for financial tracking, Canada sought an endorsement for capacity building, unlike France and Italy, which thought sanctions alone would work.
The Kananaskis Summit on June 26–28 turned out to be the most successful summit to that time (Fowler 2003; Langdon 2003). It produced a historically high 188 commitments. It made 56% of them on development, for an all-time high through to 2024 (Dobson 2025; Kirton 2025).
It launched the Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, in which the Russian government allowed personnel from its former Cold War enemies to inspect its long top-secret security sites for nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons, to help dismantle and remove many of the weapons and materials there.
Kananaskis and its lead-up events mobilized close to $50 billion in new monies for global public goods – US$20 billion for the Global Partnership, up to US$6 billion for African development, US$1 billion to top up the trust fund for heavily indebted poor countries and US$28 billion for the 13th replenishment of the IDA fund. Only in the traditional finance field were there few results (Kirton and Kokotsis 2003).
In addition, Canada’s Kananaskis served as a G8 summit system builder. Four leaders from Africa’s leading democratic middle powers – Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Thabo Mbeki of South Africa – participated as equals in the G8’s final summit session. Furthermore, the. G8 agreed that Russia would host the summit in 2006, when Germany delayed its place in the established hosting order so that Putin could host then. Kananaskis also did much to make the G8 a permanent body by defining the hosting order for the next eight years.
The significant performance of the G8 Kananaskis Summit is shown by its actions on the major dimensions of governance by which such summits are usually judged.
In its public deliberation, its full consensus communiqué with 11,959 words had the fourth highest number of words of the 28 summits to that time.
In its decision making, measured by the number of precise, future-oriented, politically obligatory commitments the summit produced, the 181 made at Kananaskis on 2002 was the highest to that time (see Appendix D).
In its delivery of these decisions, measured by the member governments’ compliance with the commitments during the year until the next summit took place, Kananaskis averaged 68%, based on the 24 priority commitments assessed for compliance by the G7 Research Group. On many of its priority subjects, compliance was much higher. On terrorism it was 100%, on the environment and climate change 95%, on food and agriculture and on education 79%, and on health 72%. Yet on conflict prevention it was only 69%, on non-proliferation 63%, and on development and on trade 50%. On all subjects, compliance was in the positive range.
By member, compliance was led by the European Union at 100% and Canada at 88%, followed by France at 76%, the United Kingdom 74%, and the United States 69%. Below the 68% all-member average came Germany at 63%, Japan at 54%, Italy at 55% and Russia, the newest member, at 53%. All members complied in the positive range, above 50%.
The environment ministers’ 10th meeting since 1992, held 10 weeks before the summit with extensive civil society engaged, made 25 commitments, and their leaders two assessed commitments on the environment and climate change averaged 90%. The foreign ministers’ 17th meeting since 1993, held two weeks before the summit, made 15 commitments, and their leaders’ five assessed commitments on non-proliferation, terrorism, crime and conflict prevention averaged compliance of 74%. The development ministers’ first ever meeting, held 12 weeks after the summit, produced 21 commitments, and their leaders’ five assessed development commitments averaged compliance of only 55%.
In its institutional development of global governance outside the G8, its four invited leaders, all coming from Africa, was the most to that time.
The physical summit, along with the policy summit, was a great success, with none of the violent protests that had afflicted the G8 in Genoa, the WTO ministerial in Seattle just before (Kirton 2001-2). Bill Graham attended the large citizens’ forum in Calgary to hear the views and receive the recommendations of the non-governmental organizations and protesters, and passed them on to the prime minister (Graham 2015, 258).
Unlike Genoa, where one protester died, there was only death in Kananaskis, and it was a bear who had climbed a tree too close to where the leaders were meeting. He was shot with a tranquilizer to fall into a net and be safely moved further away. But he sadly fell to the ground instead and died there.
Dam, Kenneth (2001). “Hunting Down Dirty Cash.” Financial Times (December 12), p. 17.
Dobson, Sonja (2025). “G7 Performance on Development.” In John Kirton and Madeline Koch, eds., G7 Canada: The 2025 Kananaskis Summit, pp. 80–81 (London: GT Media). https://www.g7g20.utoronto.ca/books/g7.html.
Fowler, Robert (2003). “Canadian Leadership and the Kananaskis G8 Summit: Toward a Less Self-Centred Policy.” In David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer, eds., Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, pp. 219–41 (Toronto: Oxford University Press).
Gray, John (2003). Paul Martin: The Politics of Ambition (Toronto: Key Porter).
Graham, Bill (2015). The Call of the World: A Political Memoir (Vancouver: UBC Press).
Kirton, John (2001-2). “Guess Who is Coming to Kananaskis: Civil Society and the G8 in Canada’s Year as Host,” International Journal 57 (Winter 2001-2). https://g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2002/020507.pdf.
Kirton, John (2002). “Canada as a Principal Summit Power: G-7/8 Concert Diplomacy from Halifax 1995 to Kananaskis 2002,” in Norman Hillmer and Maureen Molot, eds., A Fading Power: Canada Among Nations 2002, pp. 209–32 (Toronto: Oxford University Press).
Kirton, John (2025). “From Afterthought to Action: Making the 2025 G7 Kananaskis Summit Work for Africa.” Presentation to the Africa Study Group at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, April 17, 2025. Draft of April 24, 2025. https://g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2025kananaskis/kirton-kananaskis-africa.html
Kirton, John, and Ella Kokotsis (2003). “The G7/8 Contribution at Kananaskis and Beyond.” In Michele Fratianni, Paolo Savona and John Kirton, eds., Sustaining Global Growth and Development: G7 and IMF Governance, pp. 207–28 (Aldershot: Ashgate).
Langdon, Steven (2003). “NEPAD and the Renaissance of Africa.” In David Carment, Fen Osler Hampson and Norman Hillmer, eds., Canada Among Nations 2003: Coping with the American Colossus, pp. 242–55 (Toronto: Oxford University Press).
Risbud, Sheila (2006). “Civil Society Engagement: A Case Study of the 2002 G8 Environment Ministers Meeting,” in John J. Kirton and Peter I. Hajnal, eds., Sustainability, Civil Society and International Governance: Local, North Americans and Global Contributions (Ashgate: Aldershot),pp. 337–42.
Scherrer, Amandine (2006). “Explaining Compliance with International Commitments to Combat Financial Crime, the G8, and FATF.” Paper presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, March 22–25. https://www.g7.utoronto.ca/scholar/scherrer.pdf.
Year | Grade | Domestic political management | Deliberation | Direction setting | Decision making | Delivery | Development of global governance | Participation | |||||||
# communiqué compliments | Spread | # days | # statements | # words | # references to core values | # commitments | Compliance | # assessed | # ministerials created | # official-level groups created | # members | # participating countries | # participating international organizations | ||
1975 | A− | 2 | 29% | 3 | 1 | 1,129 | 5 | 15 | 54% | 2 | 0 | 1 | 6 | 0 | 0 |
1976 | D | 0 | 0% | 2 | 1 | 1,624 | 0 | 10 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 |
1977 | B− | 1 | 13% | 2 | 6 | 2,669 | 0 | 55 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1978 | A | 1 | 13% | 2 | 2 | 2,999 | 0 | 50 | 57% | 3 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1979 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 2 | 2,102 | 0 | 55 | n/a | n/a | 1 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1980 | C+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 5 | 3,996 | 3 | 54 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1981 | C | 1 | 13% | 2 | 3 | 3,165 | 0 | 48 | 50% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1982 | C | 0 | 0% | 3 | 2 | 1,796 | 0 | 39 | 15% | 1 | 0 | 3 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
1983 | B | 0 | 0% | 3 | 2 | 2,156 | 7 | 39 | 22% | 2 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1984 | C− | 1 | 13% | 3 | 5 | 3,261 | 0 | 31 | 27% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1985 | E | 4 | 50% | 3 | 2 | 3,127 | 1 | 24 | 64% | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1986 | B+ | 3 | 25% | 3 | 4 | 3,582 | 1 | 39 | 29% | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
1987 | D | 2 | 13% | 3 | 7 | 5,064 | 0 | 53 | 65% | 1 | 0 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
1988 | C− | 3 | 25% | 3 | 3 | 4,872 | 0 | 27 | n/a | n/a | 0 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1989 | B+ | 3 | 38% | 3 | 11 | 7,125 | 1 | 61 | 47% | 4 | 0 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
Average/ Total |
600/ 40 |
43% | 20 | ||||||||||||
1990 | D | 3 | 38% | 3 | 3 | 7,601 | 10 | 78 | 45% | 4 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1991 | B− | 1 | 13% | 3 | 3 | 8,099 | 8 | 53 | 69% | 2 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 1 | 0 |
1992 | D | 1 | 13% | 3 | 4 | 7,528 | 5 | 41 | 86% | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 0 | 0 |
1993 | C+ | 0 | 0% | 3 | 2 | 3,398 | 2 | 29 | 79% | 2 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
1994 | C | 1 | 13% | 3 | 2 | 4,123 | 5 | 53 | 86% | 2 | 1 | 0 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
1995 | B+ | 3 | 25% | 3 | 3 | 7,250 | 0 | 78 | 65% | 1 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 |
1996 | B | 1 | 13% | 3 | 5 | 15,289 | 6 | 128 | 71% | 23 | 0 | 3 | 8 | 1 | 4 |
1997 | C− | 16 | 88% | 3 | 4 | 12,994 | 6 | 145 | 63% | 11 | 1 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 0 |
Average/ Total |
606/ 76 |
71% | |||||||||||||
1998 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 3 | 4 | 6,092 | 5 | 73 | 71% | 13 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
1999 | B+ | 4 | 22% | 3 | 4 | 10,019 | 4 | 46 | 73% | 10 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
2000 | B | 1 | 11% | 3 | 5 | 13,596 | 6 | 105 | 87% | 29 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
2001 | B | 1 | 11% | 3 | 7 | 6,214 | 3 | 58 | 74% | 20 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
2002 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 18 | 11,959 | 10 | 187 | 68% | 24 | 1 | 8 | 10 | 4 | 0 |
2003 | C | 0 | 0% | 3 | 14 | 16,889 | 17 | 206 | 81% | 20 | 0 | 5 | 10 | 12 | 5 |
2004 | C+ | 0 | 0% | 3 | 16 | 38,517 | 11 | 245 | 77% | 33 | 0 | 15 | 10 | 12 | 0 |
2005 | A− | 8 | 67% | 3 | 16 | 22,286 | 29 | 212 | 83% | 28 | 0 | 5 | 9 | 11 | 6 |
2006 | B+ | 6 | 44% | 3 | 15 | 30,695 | 256 | 317 | 70% | 28 | 0 | 4 | 10 | 5 | 9 |
2007 | B+ | 12 | 100% | 3 | 8 | 25,857 | 86 | 329 | 77% | 31 | 0 | 4 | 9 | 9 | 9 |
2008 | B+ | 8 | 78% | 3 | 6 | 16,842 | 33 | 296 | 73% | 29 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 15 | 6 |
2009 | B | 13 | 67% | 3 | 10 | 31,167 | 62 | 254 | 77% | 27 | 2 | 9 | 10 | 28 | 10 |
2010 | C | 10 | 89% | 2 | 2 | 7,161 | 32 | 44 | 75% | 21 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 9 | 0 |
2011 | B+ | 14 | 67% | 2 | 5 | 19,071 | 172 | 196 | 78% | 18 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 7 | 4 |
2012 | B+ | 7 | 67% | 2 | 2 | 3,640 | 42 | 81 | 78% | 22 | 0 | 1 | 10 | 4 | 1 |
2013 | B+ | 13 | 60% | 2 | 4 | 13,494 | 71 | 214 | 79% | 27 | 0 | 0 | 10 | 6 | 1 |
Average/ Total 1998–2013 |
2,863/ 179 |
76% | |||||||||||||
Average/ Total 1990–2013 |
3,446/ 144 |
74% | |||||||||||||
2014 | B | 6 | 44% | 2 | 1 | 5,106 | 42 | 141 | 85% | 24 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 0 | 0 |
2015 | B+ | 2 | 25% | 2 | 2 | 12,674 | 20 | 376 | 79% | 35 | 1 | 4 | 9 | 6 | 6 |
2016 | B− | 22 | 63% | 2 | 7 | 23,052 | 95 | 342 | 69% | 28 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 7 | 5 |
2017 | B | 2 | 25% | 2 | 4 | 8,614 | 158 | 180 | 79% | 22 | 1 | 2 | 9 | 5 | 6 |
2018 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 2 | 8 | 11,224 | 56 | 315 | 78% | 42 | 1 | 9 | 12 | 4 | |
2019 | B− | 6 | 57% | 3 | 10 | 7,202 | 71 | 76% | 27 | 1 | 0 | 9 | 8 | 8 | |
2020 | B+ | 0 | 0% | 1 | 1 | 795 | 0 | 25 | 94% | 20 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | n/a |
2021 | A− | 4 | 50% | 3 | 3 | 20,677 | 130 | 429 | 89% | 29 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 4 | 3 |
2022 | A− | 1 | 13% | 3 | 8 | 19,179 | 118 | 545 | 92% | 21 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 6 | 9 |
2023 | A | 17 | 75% | 3 | 6 | 30,046 | 57 | 698 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 7 |
Average/ Total 2014–2023 |
60/ 6 |
23 | 50/ 5 |
138,587/ 13,858 |
676/ 75 |
3,122/ 312 |
82% | 248/ 28 |
6 | 7 | 9 | 61/ 6 |
48/ 5 |
||
Total | 204 | 27.57 | 129 | 268 | 527,017 | 1,575 | 7,093 | 15.98 | 696 | 21 | 102 | 429 | 193 | 106 | |
Average | 4.2 | 0.6 | 2.6 | 5.5 | 10,755.4 | 32.8 | 147.8 | 0.4 | 16.5 | 0.4 | 2.1 | 8.8 | 3.9 | 2.2 | |
2024 | A− | 14 | 75% | 3 | 1 | 19,795 | 81 (30+51) | 469 | 9 |
Updated: Brittaney Warren, October 14, 2023, John Kirton, June 17, 2024.
Notes: n/a = not available.
Grade: Kirton scale is A+ Extremely Strong, Striking, Standout, Historic; A Very Strong; A− Strong; B+ Significant; B Substantial; B− Solid; C Small; D Very Small; F Failure (including made things worse).
Domestic political management: # communiqué compliments = the number of favourable references to G7/G8 members by name. Spread = number of G7/G8 members complimented.
Deliberation: # days = the duration of the summit; # statements = number of official statements issued in the leaders’ name; # words = number of words contained in the official statements.
Direction setting: # affirmations of G7/G8 core values of open democracy, individual liberty and human rights contained in official documents.
Decision making: # commitments contained in the official documents.
Delivery: Compliance: compliance with selected commitments assessed as follows: 1975–1989 assessed elsewhere by George von Furstenberg and Joseph Daniels; 1990–1995 assessed elsewhere by Ella Kokotsis; 1996– assessed by the G7 Research Group. # commitments: number of commitments assessed.
Development of global governance: # ministerials created = number of institutions at the ministerial level created; # official-level groups created = number of institutions at the officials-level created. Institutions created at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place.
Participation: # members = number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start; Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998 until its last participation in 2013; the G4 met in 1974 without Japan and Italy and later that year the G6 (without Canada) met. # participating countries = number of full members plus number of leaders from other countries. # participating international organizations = number of heads of international organizations.
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