

The
G7 Research Group
at the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at Trinity College
in the University of Toronto presents the

2019 G7 Biarritz Summit Second Interim Compliance Report

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“We have meanwhile set up a process and there are also independent institutions monitoring which objectives of our G7 meetings we actually achieve. When it comes to these goals we have a compliance rate of about 80%, according to the University of Toronto. Germany, with its 87%, comes off pretty well. That means that next year too, under the Japanese G7 presidency, we are going to check where we stand in comparison to what we have discussed with each other now. So a lot of what we have resolved to do here together is something that we are going to have to work very hard at over the next few months. But I think that it has become apparent that we, as the G7, want to assume responsibility far beyond the prosperity in our own countries. That’s why today’s outreach meetings, that is the meetings with our guests, were also of great importance.”

Chancellor Angela Merkel, Schloss Elmau, 8 June 2015

G7 summits are a moment for people to judge whether aspirational intent is met by concrete commitments. The G7 Research Group provides a report card on the implementation of G7 and G20 commitments. It is a good moment for the public to interact with leaders and say, you took a leadership position on these issues — a year later, or three years later, what have you accomplished?

Achim Steiner, Administrator, United Nations Development Programme,
in G7 Canada: The 2018 Charlevoix Summit



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2. Digital Economy: Digital Democracy

“We are determined to work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behavior and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.”

Biarritz Strategy for an Open, Free and Secure Digital Transformation

Assessment

	Lack of Compliance	Work in Progress	Full Compliance
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
United Kingdom			+1
United States			+1
European Union			+1
Overall Score		+1.00 (100%)	

Background

The relatively recent introduction of digital issues into the G7 agenda began with a variety of commitments that sought to harness the power of the digital transformation to improve governance and accountability, most notably in the G8 Open Data Charter adopted at the 2013 Lough Erne Summit.⁹³

The first discussion of the problems that the digital transformation posed for democratic institutions was introduced with the G7 Principles and Actions on Cyber adopted the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, which included a pledge to “take decisive and robust measures in close cooperation against malicious use of cyberspace both by states and non-state actors, including terrorists.”⁹⁴ Further commitments include both national and international cooperation to maintain the security and resilience of cyberspace.⁹⁵

At the 2017 Taormina Summit, the G7 committed to combatting the “misuse of the Internet by terrorists” in the G7 Taormina Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism.⁹⁶ Part of this commitment emphasized increased engagement with civil society, youth and others at risk of radicalization.⁹⁷

The 2018 Charlevoix Summit addressed the issues of this commitment feature in its Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats, which committed to “strengthen G7 cooperation to prevent, thwart and respond to malign interference by foreign actors aimed at

⁹³ G8 Open Data Charter, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 18 June 2013. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2013lougherne/lough-erne-open-data.html>.

⁹⁴ G7 Principles and Actions on Cyber, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 May 2016. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2016shima/cyber.html>.

⁹⁵ G7 Principles and Actions on Cyber, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 27 May 2016. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2016shima/cyber.html>.

⁹⁶ G7 Taormina Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 May 2017. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2017taormina/statement-on-terrorism-and-extremism.html>.

⁹⁷ G7 Taormina Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 May 2017. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2017taormina/statement-on-terrorism-and-extremism.html>.

undermining the democratic processes and the national interests of a G7 member.⁹⁸ A key commitment in that document was the establishment of a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to increase international coordination in the face of threats to democracy.⁹⁹

The 2019 Biarritz Summit outlined its commitments on digital democracy in the wide-ranging Biarritz Strategy for an Open, Free and Secure Digital Transformation.¹⁰⁰ The commitments in that document include upholding freedom of opinion and expression, the privacy and data protection issues raised by the digital transformation, and the potential of artificial intelligence to generate innovation and growth.¹⁰¹ The document also takes note of the work done by the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism established at the 2018 Charlevoix Summit.¹⁰²

Commitment Features

At the 2019 Biarritz Summit the G7 members committed to “work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behavior and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.” This commitment should be interpreted as having two dimensions required for compliance: domestic versus international actions, and reinforcing against hostile interference by state versus non-state actors.

A domestic action is an action that a G7 member undertakes to reinforce its own institutions against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference while respecting the rights of freedom of opinion and expression. Relevant actions can include the promotion of positive narratives surrounding institutions and democracy. An international action is an action that a G7 member undertakes to reinforce global institutions or the institutions of their global partners against illicit and malign behavior and foreign hostile interference while respecting relevant international law and the laws of other jurisdictions.

Reinforcing against hostile interference by state actors involves the use of diplomacy, stronger security measures, and potentially sanctions against other states whose actions are undermining democratic institutions. Such actions could include the deliberate spread of misinformation, the infiltration of political institutions (including political parties), and attempts to use state resources to influence the outcomes of decision-making processes. Reinforcing against hostile interference by non-state actors includes the strengthening of anti-terrorism measures, the promotion of positive narratives surrounding democratic institutions, and cooperation with other states who are facing threats from similar or identical non-state actors.

As examples, an action taken by a country to regulate political advertising on social media during election campaigns would count as a domestic action that reinforces against non-state actors, whereas

⁹⁸ Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 9 June 2018. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/democracy-commitment.html>.

⁹⁹ Charlevoix Commitment on Defending Democracy from Foreign Threats, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 9 June 2018. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2018charlevoix/democracy-commitment.html>.

¹⁰⁰ Biarritz Strategy for an Open, Free and Secure Digital Transformation, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 August 2019. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2019biarritz/biarritz-strategy-for-digital-transformation.html>.

¹⁰¹ Biarritz Strategy for an Open, Free and Secure Digital Transformation, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 August 2019. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2019biarritz/biarritz-strategy-for-digital-transformation.html>.

¹⁰² Biarritz Strategy for an Open, Free and Secure Digital Transformation, G7 Information Centre (Toronto) 26 August 2019. Access Date: 12 October 2019. <http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2019biarritz/biarritz-strategy-for-digital-transformation.html>.

an action taken to create a multilateral protocol to respond to attempted state-based interference in democratic institutions would count as an international action that reinforces against state actors.

Thus, to receive a score of full compliance, G7 members must take substantial action in three or four dimensions, including multiple actions in at least two dimensions to reinforce democracies against illicit and malign behaviour, as well as foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.

If action is only taken in two dimensions to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour, as well as foreign and hostile interferences by state and non-state actors, a score of partial compliance, or 0 will be assigned.

A score of -1, or no compliance, will be assigned if the G7 member exemplifies demonstrable action in one or fewer dimensions to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour, and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.

Note: Actions taken between 13 April and 3 June 2020 have been included in this report but were not included in the version sent out for stakeholder feedback.

Scoring Guidelines

-1	G7 member takes action in ONE or fewer dimensions to reinforce democracy against illicit and malign behaviour, and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.
0	G7 member takes action in at least TWO dimensions to reinforce democracy against illicit and malign behaviour, and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.
+1	G7 member takes substantial action in THREE OR FOUR dimensions, including multiple action in at least two dimensions to reinforce democracy against illicit and malign behaviour, and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.

*Compliance Director: Christopher Sims
Lead Analyst: Emily Eng*

Canada: +1

Canada has fully complied with its commitment to “work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.”

Throughout September 2019, the Government of Canada launched programs as part of Canadian Heritage’s Digital Citizen Initiative.¹⁰³ The Government of Canada has invested almost CAD7 million in programs teaching citizens to think critically and recognize fake news.¹⁰⁴ This initiative protects citizens from being susceptible to disinformation.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰³ Backgrounder – Helping Citizens Critically Assess and Become Resilient Against Harmful Online Disinformation, Government of Canada (Ottawa) 21 August 2019. Access Date: 4 December 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2019/07/backgrounder--helping-citizens-critically-assess-and-become-resilient-against-harmful-online-disinformation.html>.

¹⁰⁴ Backgrounder – Helping Citizens Critically Assess and Become Resilient Against Harmful Online Disinformation, Government of Canada (Ottawa) 21 August 2019. Access Date: 4 December 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2019/07/backgrounder--helping-citizens-critically-assess-and-become-resilient-against-harmful-online-disinformation.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Backgrounder – Helping Citizens Critically Assess and Become Resilient Against Harmful Online Disinformation, Government of Canada (Ottawa) 21 August 2019. Access Date: 4 December 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/news/2019/07/backgrounder--helping-citizens-critically-assess-and-become-resilient-against-harmful-online-disinformation.html>.

On 26 September 2019, the Government of Canada announced the Joint Initiative for Digital Citizen Research.¹⁰⁶ Canadian Heritage will partner with and provide funding to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, with the goal of better understanding the effects of online disinformation and finding the most effective programs and policies to counter online disinformation.¹⁰⁷

From 6 November to 9 November 2019, Canadian law makers represented Canada at the third meeting of the International Grand Committee on Disinformation and “Fake News” in Dublin, Ireland.¹⁰⁸ The goal of this meeting was to discuss how to collaboratively regulate the spread of disinformation on social media platforms.¹⁰⁹

On 12 March 2020, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICP) Annual Report 2019 was tabled.¹¹⁰ This report examined threats posed by state and non-state actors against Canada’s democracy, and proposed recommendations to reduce threats.¹¹¹ These recommendations included “develop[ing] practical, whole-of-government operational and policy mechanisms to identify and respond to the activities of hostile states” and “updat[ing] existing legislation, such as the Security of Information Act or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.”¹¹² The NSICP suggested using a sustained central leadership and coordination to implement these changes.¹¹³

Canada has taken both domestic and international actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. Canada has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against state and non-state actors. These actions fulfil all four components of the commitment.

Thus, Canada receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Isabelle Buchanan

¹⁰⁶ Joint Initiative for Digital Citizen Research, Government of Canada (Ottawa) 26 September 2019. Access Date: 4 December 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-disinformation/joint-initiative-digital-citizen-research.html>.

¹⁰⁷ Joint Initiative for Digital Citizen Research, Government of Canada (Ottawa) 26 September 2019. Access Date: 4 December 2019. <https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/online-disinformation/joint-initiative-digital-citizen-research.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Update: International Grand Committee on Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Dublin, Ireland – Wednesday 6 and Thursday 7 November 2019, Houses of the Oireachtas (Dublin) 6 November 2019. Access Date: 19 December 2019. <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/press-releases/20191106-update-international-grand-committee-on-disinformation-and-fake-news-dublin-ireland-wednesday-6-and-thursday-7-november-2019/>.

¹⁰⁹ Update: International Grand Committee on Disinformation and ‘Fake News’ Dublin, Ireland – Wednesday 6 and Thursday 7 November 2019, Houses of the Oireachtas (Dublin) 6 November 2019. Access Date: 19 December 2019. <https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/press-centre/press-releases/20191106-update-international-grand-committee-on-disinformation-and-fake-news-dublin-ireland-wednesday-6-and-thursday-7-november-2019/>.

¹¹⁰ National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (Ottawa) 12 March 2010. Access Date: 5 April 2020. https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf.

¹¹¹ National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (Ottawa) 12 March 2010. Access Date: 5 April 2020. https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf.

¹¹² National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (Ottawa) 12 March 2010. Access Date: 5 April 2020. https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf.

¹¹³ National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019, National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (Ottawa) 12 March 2010. Access Date: 5 April 2020. https://www.nsicop-cpsnr.ca/reports/rp-2020-03-12-ar/annual_report_2019_public_en.pdf.

France: +1

France has fully complied with its commitment to “work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.” It has exemplified progress in three of the four dimensions, only failing to act in a multilateral fashion against state actors specifically.

On 31 August 2019, the Government of France officially accepted French translations of terms such as “data privacy” and “cyber espionage” for use in government and legislative contexts.¹¹⁴

On 28 November 2019, President Emmanuel Macron, speaking alongside NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, said he “requested [France’s government] services to work on [cybersecurity]” though never pointing out a particular operator or a particular actor to defend against.¹¹⁵

On 3 December 2019, the Government of France put out a news release regarding President Emmanuel Macron’s agenda at the NATO summit.¹¹⁶ Within the second priority issue, regarding a “common enemy,” France called on members to address “new security challenges, such as cybersecurity.”¹¹⁷

On 22 January 2020, the French Government’s Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (ANSSI) published its strategic direction “manifesto” for the next ten years, which places emphasis on national cybersecurity partnerships as well as strengthening its European commitments.¹¹⁸

On 29 January 2020, France developed a “5G Toolbox” following discussions with the European Commission and the European Agency for Cybersecurity. A 5G Toolbox identifies strategic measures to enhance cybersecurity including by diversifying network supply needs across multiple providers, and conducting risk assessments of such suppliers.¹¹⁹

On 29 January 2020, the ANSSI published a report on the subject of ransomware, which consists of malware attacks in which files or system access can be held hostage by an intervening third party.¹²⁰ Ransomware is considered “the most serious current IT [information technology] threat for

¹¹⁴ Vocabulaire du droit (liste de termes, expressions et définitions adoptés), Government of France (Paris) 31 August 2019. Access date: 16 December 2019.

<https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000039002295&categorieLien=id>.

¹¹⁵ Joint press point with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and the President of France Emmanuel Macron, NATO (Paris) 28 November 2019. Access date: 14 December 2019.

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_170790.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹¹⁶ NATO Summit, Government of France (Paris) 3 December 2019. Access date: 16 December 2019.

<https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/nato-summit>.

¹¹⁷ NATO Summit, Government of France (Paris) 3 December 2019. Access date: 16 December 2019.

<https://www.gouvernement.fr/en/nato-summit>.

¹¹⁸ L’ANSSI Dévoile ses Nouvelles Orientations Stratégiques pour les Années à Venir, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des systèmes d’information (Paris) 22 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/lanssi-devoile-ses-nouvelles-orientations-strategiques-pour-les-annees-a-venir/>.

¹¹⁹ La France Accueille Favorablement La Publication de la « Boîte à outils 5G », Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/la-france-accueille-favorablement-la-publication-de-la-boite-a-outils-5g/>.

¹²⁰ Rançongiciels - L’ANSSI Livre Son Analyse de la Menace pour les Entreprises et les Institutions, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/ranconciels-lanssi-livre-son-analyse-de-la-menace-pour-les-entreprises-et-les-institutions/>.

businesses and institutions.”¹²¹ The report examined techniques of the perpetrators alongside costs of the victims, to provide more information about the threat and prevention efforts.¹²²

On 29 January 2020, ANSSI participated in the 12th Forum International de la Cybersécurité (FIC).¹²³ It used such a forum to call on the European Union to develop sovereignty in matters of “autonomy and leadership in cybersecurity” and to support European citizens and institutions in threat prevention.¹²⁴ For ANSSI, this “European sovereignty” will require “renewed efforts in terms of capacity developments, regulations, industrial policy, as well as governance adapted to the challenges.”¹²⁵ At the FIC, ANSSI expressed its interest in “cooperation with its European partners” and wants to “make this common set of rules operational” throughout the EU.¹²⁶

France has taken both domestic and international actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. France has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against non-state actors. These actions fulfil three of the four components of the commitment.

Thus, France receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Alex Erickson

Germany: +1

Germany has fully complied with its commitment to “work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.”

On 12 September 2019, German lawmakers introduced a new cloud-computing project, Gaia-X.¹²⁷ The cloud-computing platform was designed for European companies to store, process, exchange

¹²¹ Rançongiciels - L'ANSSI Livre Son Analyse de la Menace pour les Entreprises et les Institutions, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/rancongiels-lanssi-livre-son-analyse-de-la-menace-pour-les-entreprises-et-les-institutions/>.

¹²² Rançongiciels - L'ANSSI Livre Son Analyse de la Menace pour les Entreprises et les Institutions, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/rancongiels-lanssi-livre-son-analyse-de-la-menace-pour-les-entreprises-et-les-institutions/>.

¹²³ FIC 2020: L'ANSSI Plaide pour une Souveraineté Européenne en Matière de Cybersécurité, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des systèmes d'information, (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/fic-2020-lanssi-plaide-pour-une-souverainete-europeenne-en-matiere-de-cybersecurite/>.

¹²⁴ FIC 2020: L'ANSSI Plaide pour une Souveraineté Européenne en Matière de Cybersécurité, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des systèmes d'information, (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/fic-2020-lanssi-plaide-pour-une-souverainete-europeenne-en-matiere-de-cybersecurite/>.

¹²⁵ FIC 2020: L'ANSSI Plaide pour une Souveraineté Européenne en Matière de Cybersécurité, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des systèmes d'information, (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/fic-2020-lanssi-plaide-pour-une-souverainete-europeenne-en-matiere-de-cybersecurite/>.

¹²⁶ FIC 2020: L'ANSSI Plaide pour une Souveraineté Européenne en Matière de Cybersécurité, Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des systèmes d'information, (Paris) 29 January 2020. Access date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.ssi.gouv.fr/actualite/fic-2020-lanssi-plaide-pour-une-souverainete-europeenne-en-matiere-de-cybersecurite/>.

¹²⁷ Germany's Plan to Control its own Data, Politico (Berlin) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-plan-to-control-its-own-data-digital-infrastructure/>.

data, and cooperate on developing products.¹²⁸ The idea of the project came over fears of heavy reliance of foreign-owned cloud platforms which have been known for data interference practices.¹²⁹ German lawmakers claim that Gaia-X will not cut the country off from the global-supply chain or end divisions of labour, but instead will enable Germany's "digital infrastructures to run independently if they were ever to be cut off from foreign cloud providers."¹³⁰

On 8 November 2019, German Data Protection Authorities released new temporary guidelines for fining companies that violate the regulations set out by the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).¹³¹ The fines are classified as minor, moderate, severe and very severe.¹³² Following the announcement of the new enforcement procedures on online platforms, the Berlin Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information issued a EUR14.5 million fine against a real estate agency for unjustified retention of customer data.¹³³

On 18 November 2019, the Bundestag Budget Committee approved 67 new posts to the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information.¹³⁴ The federal supervisory authority plans to push the implementation of the GDPR by imposing new regulations that will limit and block tracking across all devices and platforms, and curtailing insufficient technical protection of data.¹³⁵

Germany took actions to strengthen cybersecurity through domestic policy changes, thus fulfilling the domestic dimension. Germany took actions to reinforce democratic institutions against both state and non-state actors. These actions fulfill three of the four dimensions of the commitment.

Thus, Germany receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Yousef Choudhri

Italy: +1

Italy has fully complied with its commitment to "work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors."

¹²⁸ Germany's Plan to Control its own Data, Politico (Berlin) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-plan-to-control-its-own-data-digital-infrastructure/>.

¹²⁹ Germany's Plan to Control its own Data, Politico (Berlin) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-plan-to-control-its-own-data-digital-infrastructure/>.

¹³⁰ Germany's Plan to Control its own Data, Politico (Berlin) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/germanys-plan-to-control-its-own-data-digital-infrastructure/>.

¹³¹ How are German Data Protection Authorities going to determine a fine? / EUR 14.5 million fine imposed by Berlin DPA, Baker McKenzie (Berlin) November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.bakermckenzie.com//media/files/insight/publications/2019/11/client-alert-dpa-concept-for-fines-final.pdf>.

¹³² How are German Data Protection Authorities going to determine a fine? / EUR 14.5 million fine imposed by Berlin DPA, Baker McKenzie (Berlin) November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.bakermckenzie.com//media/files/insight/publications/2019/11/client-alert-dpa-concept-for-fines-final.pdf>.

¹³³ How are German Data Protection Authorities going to determine a fine? / EUR 14.5 million fine imposed by Berlin DPA, Baker McKenzie (Berlin) November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.bakermckenzie.com//media/files/insight/publications/2019/11/client-alert-dpa-concept-for-fines-final.pdf>.

¹³⁴ The Bundestag strengthens the data protection supervisory authority, Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Berlin) 18 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. https://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/Home/Press_Release/2019/28_Budget-BfDI.html.

¹³⁵ The Bundestag strengthens the data protection supervisory authority, Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (Berlin) 18 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. https://www.bfdi.bund.de/EN/Home/Press_Release/2019/28_Budget-BfDI.html.

On 21 September 2019, the Italian Government adopted the Law Decree n. 105 as part of the implementation of a comprehensive national cybersecurity framework.¹³⁶ The decree requires that individuals in the public and private sectors, who serve functions that are key components of the national security system, disclose relevant information to the Council of Ministers and the Minister of Economic Development and comply with measures aimed at upholding a high level of national security.¹³⁷

On 22 December 2019, Industry Minister Stefano Patuanelli announced that Chinese telecommunication firm Huawei, should be allowed to participate in the development of Italy's future 5G network.¹³⁸ The announcement was released after the parliamentary security committee, Copasir, stated that the government should consider preventing Huawei from participating in the development of a future 5G network.¹³⁹

Italy has taken domestic actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. Italy has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against state and non-state actors. These actions fulfil three of the four components of the commitment.

Thus, Italy receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Eunice Yong

Japan: +1

Japan has fully complied with its commitment to “work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.”

On 9 to 13 September 2019, a Japanese delegation, which included Japanese Deputy Assistant Minister Satoshi Akahori, Foreign Policy Bureau, attended the first meeting of the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on Cybersecurity held in New York.¹⁴⁰ On 9 September 2019, Akahori stated that Japan increased its international collaboration in three areas: “promotion of the rule of law, confidence-building measures, and capacity-building.”¹⁴¹ He reaffirmed Japan's position that “existing international law applies in cyberspace” and expressed Japanese support for the upcoming Group of Governmental Experts on cybersecurity.¹⁴²

¹³⁶ Italy towards an effective National Cyber Security Strategy, Lexology (Rome) 26 September 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bfe7f1d9-d5ea-4126-adf6-e74a58096249>.

¹³⁷ Italy towards an effective National Cyber Security Strategy, Lexology (Rome) 26 September 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bfe7f1d9-d5ea-4126-adf6-e74a58096249>.

¹³⁸ Huawei should be allowed 5G role in Italy: Industry minister, Reuters (Rome) 22 December 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-5g-security-patuanelli/huawei-should-be-allowed-5g-role-in-italy-industry-minister-idUSKBN1YQ0D7>.

¹³⁹ Huawei should be allowed 5G role in Italy: Industry minister, Reuters (Rome) 22 December 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-5g-security-patuanelli/huawei-should-be-allowed-5g-role-in-italy-industry-minister-idUSKBN1YQ0D7>.

¹⁴⁰ The UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on Cybersecurity 1st Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 10 September 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002616.html.

¹⁴¹ Statement by H.E. Mr. Takeshi Akahori, Ambassador in charge of Cyber Policy, Deputy Assistant Minister, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, At the Open Ended Working Group on Information and Communications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 9 September 2019. Access Date: 18 December 2019. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000515730.pdf>.

¹⁴² Statement by H.E. Mr. Takeshi Akahori, Ambassador in charge of Cyber Policy, Deputy Assistant Minister, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, At the Open Ended Working Group on Information and Communications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 9 September 2019. Access Date: 18 December 2019. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000515730.pdf>.

On 9 to 12 September 2019, Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence (ICSCoE) under the information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), hosted the Japan-US Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training in Tokyo.¹⁴³ American and Japanese experts delivered lectures on the security of control systems of critical infrastructure.¹⁴⁴ Attendees were from 14 countries and regions in the Indo-Pacific region.¹⁴⁵

On 9 October 2019, Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), held defence staff talks on cybersecurity to assess current cyber threats and policies.¹⁴⁶ Officials compared notes on current efforts in strengthening cyber defence.¹⁴⁷ They also affirmed commitment in “[supporting] a norms-based, predictable, and secure cyberspace.”¹⁴⁸ Japanese Director of Strategic Planning Division at the Ministry of Defence Kyosuke Matsumoto, said Japan gave priority to “strengthening our cyber defence capability” and Japan valued “effectively cooperate with other like-minded countries to take prompt and appropriate actions against cyberattacks.”¹⁴⁹

On 11 October 2019, Japan hosted the 7th US-Japan Cyber Dialogue in Tokyo.¹⁵⁰ Representatives of both countries reaffirmed their commitment in confronting emerging cyber challenges, including “shared commitment to deter cyber adversaries and malicious cyber activities, to protect the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, to enhance information sharing, to improve military-to-military cyber cooperation, and to address international security issues in cyberspace.”¹⁵¹

On 18 October 2019, the Japanese government increased the budget for cybersecurity from JPY71.29 billion to JPY88.11 billion.¹⁵² The new budget distributed more fundings for unauthorized communication monitoring, operation cost of the Cyber Security Council, cyber security awareness-raising projects, and international collaboration.¹⁵³

On 29 October 2019, Japan and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held the 12th Policy Conference on Cyber Security. These countries affirmed commitments on “strengthening information sharing systems and response systems in the event of cyber incidents, promoting

¹⁴³ Japan - US Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training for Indo-Pacific Region Held, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Tokyo) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019.

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/0912_002.html.

¹⁴⁴ Japan - US Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training for Indo-Pacific Region Held, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Tokyo) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019.

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/0912_002.html.

¹⁴⁵ Japan - US Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training for Indo-Pacific Region Held, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (Tokyo) 12 September 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019.

https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2019/0912_002.html.

¹⁴⁶ NATO and Japan Intensify Dialogue on Cyber Defence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 9 October 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169493.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁴⁷ NATO and Japan Intensify Dialogue on Cyber Defence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 9 October 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169493.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁴⁸ NATO and Japan Intensify Dialogue on Cyber Defence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 9 October 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169493.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁴⁹ NATO and Japan Intensify Dialogue on Cyber Defence, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Brussels) 9 October 2019. Access Date: 2 December 2019. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169493.htm?selectedLocale=en.

¹⁵⁰ The 7th Japan-US Cyber Dialogue, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 10 October 2019. Access Date: 26 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002646.html.

¹⁵¹ The 7th Japan-US Cyber Dialogue, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 10 October 2019. Access Date: 26 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002646.html.

¹⁵² Government Cybersecurity Budget, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 18 October 2019. Access Date: 18 December 2019. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/yosan2020.pdf>.

¹⁵³ Government Cybersecurity Budget, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 18 October 2019. Access Date: 18 December 2019. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/yosan2020.pdf>.

initiatives related to protection of critical infrastructure, and [promoting cooperation] in capacity building and awareness awareness.”¹⁵⁴

On 4 November 2019, Japan and ASEAN issued the Joint Statement of the 22nd ASEAN-Japan Summit on connectivity.¹⁵⁵ These countries declared to “[enhance] cybersecurity capacity building for ASEAN through the ASEAN-Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre and the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence.”¹⁵⁶

On 18 November 2019, Ambassador in Charge of Cyber Security Akahori Takeshi attended the 4th Trilateral Cyber Policy Consultation between Japan, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea.¹⁵⁷ They discussed the current environment in the field of cyber affairs, each country’s policies on cyber issues, and future cooperation on cyber issues.¹⁵⁸

On 18 November 2019, Deputy Director General of the National Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) Tomoo Yamauchi issued a document on 2020 Cyber Security Month.¹⁵⁹ The government planned to raise public awareness on cybersecurity through various public activities during the Cyber Security Month (1 February 2020 to 18 March 2020). Governmental agencies will collaborate with awareness-raising organizations for this event.¹⁶⁰

On 19 November 2019, Minister for Foreign Affairs Motegi Toshimitsu met with Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Chair of Rasmussen Global and former NATO secretary general.¹⁶¹ Rasmussen acknowledged Japan as “an important partner for Europe in a global battle for freedom and

¹⁵⁴ Results of the Japan-ASEAN Cybersecurity Policy Conference, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 19 November 2019. Access Date: 15 December 2019.

https://www.nisc.go.jp/press/pdf/aseanj_meeting20191119.pdf.

¹⁵⁵ Joint Statement of the 22nd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Connectivity, ASEAN Thailand 2019 (Bangkok) 4 November 2019. Access Date: 18 December 2019. <https://www.asean2019.go.th/en/news/joint-statement-of-the-22nd-asean-japan-summit-on-connectivity-2/>.

¹⁵⁶ Joint Statement of the 22 nd ASEAN-Japan Summit on Connectivity, ASEAN Thailand 2019 (Bangkok) 4 November 2019. Access Date: 18 December 2019. <https://www.asean2019.go.th/en/news/joint-statement-of-the-22nd-asean-japan-summit-on-connectivity-2/>.

¹⁵⁷ The 4th Trilateral Cyber Policy Consultation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 18 November 2019. Access Date: 18 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002682.html.

¹⁵⁸ The 4th Trilateral Cyber Policy Consultation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 18 November 2019. Access Date: 18 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002682.html.

¹⁵⁹ With the implementation of Cybersecurity Month 2020 Recruitment of related events, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 18 November 2019. Access Date: 30 December 2019. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/csm2020kanren.pdf>.

¹⁶⁰ With the implementation of Cybersecurity Month 2020 Recruitment of related events, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 18 November 2019. Access Date: 30 December 2019. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/pdf/csm2020kanren.pdf>.

¹⁶¹ Meeting between Foreign Minister Motegi and Mr. Rasmussen Chairman of Rasmussen Global (former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), former Prime Minister of Denmark), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 19 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002688.html.

democracy.”¹⁶² He also invited Japan to attend a democracy summit meeting next June in Copenhagen.¹⁶³

On 20 November 2019, Japan hosted the 4th Japan-Russia Cyber Security Consultation in Tokyo.¹⁶⁴ The representatives discussed the current landscape in cyberspace, and strategies and policies each country’s strategies and policies on cyber issues.¹⁶⁵ They also discussed the issues of cybersecurity in multilateral and regional context and security of critical information infrastructure.¹⁶⁶

On 16 January 2020, Japan, represented by Isamu Yamaguchi, the director of Emerging Security Challenges Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, co-chaired the fifth open-ended study group of Asean Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meeting on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) on Confidence Building Measures, with Malaysia and Singapore.¹⁶⁷ The participating experts discussed proposals on a whole range of ICT security issues, including confidence building measures.¹⁶⁸

On 21 January 2020, the Management Committee of ICT Information Sharing and Analysis Centre, headed by Management Committee Chair Satoru Koyama, discussed information sharing initiatives, including collaborations with domestic and international working groups.¹⁶⁹ The committee also discussed the private sector’s expectation and issues regarding public-private information sharing.¹⁷⁰

On 23 January 2020, NISC collaborated with “Sword Art Online Alicization War of Underworld” project to create a tie-up poster and a web banner using characters from the aforementioned animation, to disseminate knowledge and raise awareness about cyber security, especially toward the younger demographic.¹⁷¹

On 27 January 2020, Japan Internet Providers Association and Japan Network Information Center organized a brief session for the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) 2019 report, “Is One World,

¹⁶² Meeting between Foreign Minister Motegi and Mr. Rasmussen Chairman of Rasmussen Global (former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), former Prime Minister of Denmark), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 19 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002688.html.

¹⁶³ Meeting between Foreign Minister Motegi and Mr. Rasmussen Chairman of Rasmussen Global (former Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), former Prime Minister of Denmark), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 19 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002688.html.

¹⁶⁴ The 3rd Japan-Russia Cyber Policy Consultation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 20 November 2019. Access Date: 26 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002687.html.

¹⁶⁵ The 3rd Japan-Russia Cyber Policy Consultation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 20 November 2019. Access Date: 26 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002687.html.

¹⁶⁶ The 3rd Japan-Russia Cyber Policy Consultation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 20 November 2019. Access Date: 26 November 2019. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002687.html.

¹⁶⁷ ARF-ISM on ICTs Security 5th SG, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 January 2020. Access Date: 23 March 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002757.html.

¹⁶⁸ ARF-ISM on ICTs Security 5th SG, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 January 2020. Access Date: 23 March 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002757.html.

¹⁶⁹ ICT-ISAC Initiatives, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 23 January 2020. Access Date: 1 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/ciip/dai21/pdf/21shiryuu04.pdf>.

¹⁷⁰ ICT-ISAC Initiatives, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 23 January 2020. Access Date: 1 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/ciip/dai21/pdf/21shiryuu04.pdf>.

¹⁷¹ Tie-up with Sword Art Online Alicization War of the Underworld. National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 23 January 2020. Access Date: 1 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/security-site/month/sao.html>.

One Net, One Vision Possible?”¹⁷² The event planned to discuss “the main agenda items at IGF2019” and the development of Internet governance in Japan.¹⁷³

On 29 January 2020, NISC issued a quarterly situation analysis of critical infrastructure.¹⁷⁴ The report acknowledged the importance of exchanging values and sharing information regarding critical infrastructure and analysis of cybersecurity incidents with stakeholders.¹⁷⁵ The report also suggested cybersecurity policies, such as implementing multifaceted defence, designing countermeasures based on thorough understanding of current attacks, using external services if necessary, and reviewing supply chain risks.¹⁷⁶

On 30 January 2020, NISC Deputy Director General Tomoo Yamauchi discussed the formulation of the 2020 cyber security annual plan.¹⁷⁷ The centre asked for the public’s input on necessary measures for cyber security.¹⁷⁸

On 31 January 2020, the Fifth Japan-UK Bilateral Consultation on Cyberspace, chaired by Ambassador Akahori Takeshi and Dr. Alexandre Evans, took place in Tokyo.¹⁷⁹ At this meeting, the participants discussed “the latest cybersecurity strategy and efforts,” bilateral cooperation on capacity building, and multilateral cooperation in the United Nations.¹⁸⁰

On 7 February 2020, the 13th meeting of the Cyber Security Strategy Division Research and Development Strategy Expert Committee took place in Tokyo.¹⁸¹ The participants discussed initiatives of ministries and agencies based on “Cyber Security Research and Technology Development Policy” and community formation through industry-academia-government collaboration.¹⁸²

¹⁷² Announcement of IGE2019 Report Session-Is One World, One Net, One Vision Possible? Access Date: March 2020. https://japanigf.jp/topics/igf2019_readout.

¹⁷³ Announcement of IGE2019 Report Session-Is One World, One Net, One Vision Possible? Access Date: March 2020. https://japanigf.jp/topics/igf2019_readout.

¹⁷⁴ Situation surrounding critical infrastructure. National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 29 January 2020. Access Date: 1 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/ciip/dai21/pdf/21shiryuu05.pdf>.

¹⁷⁵ Situation surrounding critical infrastructure. National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 29 January 2020. Access Date: 1 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/ciip/dai21/pdf/21shiryuu05.pdf>.

¹⁷⁶ Situation surrounding critical infrastructure. National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 29 January 2020. Access Date: 1 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/ciip/dai21/pdf/21shiryuu05.pdf>.

¹⁷⁷ Call for opinions on measures to be implemented in 2020 based on the Cyber Security Strategy (closed), National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 30 January 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/cyber-security2020.html>.

¹⁷⁸ Call for opinions on measures to be implemented in 2020 based on the Cyber Security Strategy (closed), National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 30 January 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/active/kihon/cyber-security2020.html>.

¹⁷⁹ The 5th Japan-UK Consultations on Cyberspace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 31 January 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002766.html.

¹⁸⁰ The 5th Japan-UK Consultations on Cyberspace, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 31 January 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002766.html.

¹⁸¹ Cyber Security Strategy Division Research and Development Strategy Expert Committee, the 13th Meeting Agenda, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 7 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/kenkyu/dai13/pdf/13gijishidai.pdf>.

¹⁸² Cyber Security Strategy Division Research and Development Strategy Expert Committee, the 13th Meeting Agenda, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 7 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/kenkyu/dai13/pdf/13gijishidai.pdf>.

On 10 February 2020, the Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting took place in Tokyo.¹⁸³ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe mentioned a previous collaboration with Estonia regarding ICT.¹⁸⁴ He also discussed Japanese participation in NATO cyber defence exercises, and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence hosted by Estonia.¹⁸⁵

On 2 March 2020, NISC released a Cyber Security Law Q and A Handbook, aimed at informing businesses on “legal issues concerning information handling” and laws “related to cyber security measures and response to incidents.”¹⁸⁶

On 2 March 2020, the 12th meeting of the Cyber Security Strategy Headquarters Awareness Promotion/Human Resource Development Special Investigation Committee took place in Tokyo.¹⁸⁷ The participants discussed the approaches of the Cyber Security Awareness and Action Enhancement Program, the overview of development of strategic management, the cyber security laws and regulations sub-workings, and to report on group study results.¹⁸⁸

Japan has taken both domestic and international actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. Japan has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against state and non-state actors. These actions fulfil all four components of the commitment.

Thus, Japan receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Zihan (Alison) Pang

United Kingdom: +1

The United Kingdom has fully complied with its commitment to “work collaboratively to reinforce G7 democracies against illicit and malign behavior and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.”

From 3 September 2019 to 17 March 2020, the Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee convened 16 times to converse with witnesses about the reconciliation of democracy and digital technologies.¹⁸⁹ Ranging from government officials to industry experts, these witnesses answered various inquiries that the committee may have about misinformation, cybersecurity, digital campaigning, etc.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸³ Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 18 April 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/ee/page4e_001177.html.

¹⁸⁴ Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 18 April 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/ee/page4e_001177.html.

¹⁸⁵ Japan-Estonia Summit Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 18 April 2020. https://www.mofa.go.jp/erp/we/ee/page4e_001177.html.

¹⁸⁶ About "Cyber Security Law Q & A Handbook," National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 2 March 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. https://www.nisc.go.jp/security-site/law_handbook/index.html.

¹⁸⁷ Cyber Security Strategy Headquarters Awareness Promotion / Human Resource Development Special Investigation Committee, the 12th meeting agenda, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 2 March 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/jinzai/dai12/pdf/12gijishidai.pdf>.

¹⁸⁸ Cyber Security Strategy Headquarters Awareness Promotion / Human Resource Development Special Investigation Committee, the 12th meeting agenda, National Centre of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (Tokyo) 2 March 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://www.nisc.go.jp/conference/cs/jinzai/dai12/pdf/12gijishidai.pdf>.

¹⁸⁹ All events, UK Parliament Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee (London) 17 March 2020. Access Date: 4 April 2020. <https://committees.parliament.uk/work/5/democracy-and-digital-technologies/events/all/?SessionId=0&SortBy=StartDateAscending>.

¹⁹⁰ Committee news, UK Parliament Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee (London) 17 March 2020. Access Date: 4 April 2020. <https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/407/democracy-and-digital-technologies-committee/news/>.

On 18 October 2019, Business Secretary Andrea Leadsom announced that the UK government will be partnering with technology firm ARM, by providing GBP36 million toward a new project to develop computer hardware that is more resistant to cyber attacks.¹⁹¹ This is the next phase of the UK government's Digital Security by Design initiative.¹⁹²

In November 2019, Politico reported that the UK's electoral laws were insufficient in addressing "clandestine digital political interference."¹⁹³ In the article, Politico quotes special advisor to the UK House of Lords committee on democracy and digital technologies Kate Dommett, who expressed that existing laws have loopholes regarding the verification of "online campaign material," and that "voters are ... at risk" of manipulation and can expect "limited, if any, responses from both regulators and politicians to protect them."¹⁹⁴

On 4 November 2019, Digital Minister Matt Warman launched a "call for evidence" to seek views from across the digital sector on how the government can help organizations improve their cybersecurity measures.¹⁹⁵ Minister Warman stated that overcoming barriers to improving cybersecurity "can help make the UK the safest place to live and do business online."¹⁹⁶

On 5 November 2019, Minister for the Cabinet Office Oliver Dowden updated Parliament on numerous actions that the government took "to tackle intimidation" online, especially in relation to electoral matters.¹⁹⁷ In this update, the Minister spoke about the Online Harms White Paper, intended to make online platforms responsible for their user's illegal activities; to legalize "undue influence of" a voter during elections; to "introduce a digital imprints regime"; and to introduce the Defending Democracy Programme, which aims to "protect ... UK democratic processes ... from interference, including from cyber ... threats."¹⁹⁸

On 25 November 2019, the Ministry of Justice announced that it was inviting bids for the creation of a centralized cybersecurity log collection and aggregation platform.¹⁹⁹ A spokesperson for the Ministry of Justice stated that the objective of the project is to resolve the Ministry's inability to

¹⁹¹ Confronting cyber threats to businesses and personal data, Government of the UK (London) 18 October 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/confronting-cyber-threats-to-businesses-and-personal-data>.

¹⁹² Confronting cyber threats to businesses and personal data, Government of the UK (London) 18 October 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/confronting-cyber-threats-to-businesses-and-personal-data>.

¹⁹³ UK ignores warnings of digital election interference, Politico (Brussels) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 11 December 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-general-election-facebook-misinformation-boris-johnson-interference-russia/>.

¹⁹⁴ UK ignores warnings of digital election interference, Politico (Brussels) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 11 December 2019. <https://www.politico.eu/article/uk-general-election-facebook-misinformation-boris-johnson-interference-russia/>.

¹⁹⁵ Call for evidence launched on improving cyber security across the UK economy, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 4 November 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/call-for-evidence-launched-on-improving-cyber-security-across-the-uk-economy>.

¹⁹⁶ Call for evidence launched on improving cyber security across the UK economy, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 4 November 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/call-for-evidence-launched-on-improving-cyber-security-across-the-uk-economy>.

¹⁹⁷ Update on tackling intimidation in public life, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/update-on-tackling-intimidation-in-public-life>.

¹⁹⁸ Update on tackling intimidation in public life, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/update-on-tackling-intimidation-in-public-life>.

¹⁹⁹ UK Government Invites Bids for New Cybersecurity Platform, Infosecurity Magazine (London) 25 November 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/uk-invites-bids-for-cybersecurity/>.

“understand the cybersecurity posture of its current estates due to security logs being held in multiple systems.”²⁰⁰

On 16 December 2019, Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced that his government will release an Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament report on Russian interference during the 2016 UK European Union membership referendum in 2020.²⁰¹

On 15 January 2020, then Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Baroness Nicky Morgan revealed that the government had invested “1.9 billion pounds to protect the nation online” through the National Cyber Security Strategy.²⁰²

On 3 February 2020, Baroness Nicky Morgan disclosed that the government committed GBP 2 million “for the pilot of the Future News Fund”²⁰³. According to the innovation charity Nesta, who is responsible for the pilot, the project gives “communities in England ... access to reliable ... news” to protect the UK’s democracy.²⁰⁴

On 12 February 2020, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport revised the Online Harms White Paper²⁰⁵. This report addresses the “real danger that hostile actors” online can have on the UK’s “democratic values and principles” and outlines the UK government’s intention to establish a “duty of care to make companies ... tackle harm caused by content or activity on their services,” invest in new technologies in the field of cybersecurity, and inform citizens about online safety.²⁰⁶

The UK has taken domestic actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. The UK has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against state and non-state actors. These actions fulfil three of the four components of the commitment.

Thus, the United Kingdom receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Kevin Zuo

United States: +1

The United States has fully complied with its commitment to reinforce democratic institutions against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.

²⁰⁰ UK Government Invites Bids for New Cybersecurity Platform, Infosecurity Magazine (London) 25 November 2019. Access Date: 3 January 2020. <https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/uk-invites-bids-for-cybersecurity/>.

²⁰¹ Boris Johnson approves release of Russian interference report following election win, Independent (London) 17 December 2019. Access Date: 19 December 2019. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-russia-report-brexite-interference-general-election-release-a9248446.html>.

²⁰² Baroness Morgan speaking on how we can make technology work for everyone, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 15 January 2020. Access Date: 12 April 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/baroness-morgan-speaking-on-how-we-can-make-technology-work-for-everyone>.

²⁰³ Letter from Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Rt Hon Baroness Morgan of Cotes to the Chair, UK Parliament Democracy and Digital Technologies Committee (London) 11 March 2020. Access Date: 12 April 2020. <https://committees.parliament.uk/committee/407/democracy-and-digital-technologies-committee/publications/3/correspondence/>.

²⁰⁴ Government-backed pilot fund to innovate public interest news to protect democracy, Nesta (London) 4 November 2019. Access Date: 12 April 2020. <https://www.nesta.org.uk/news/government-backed-pilot-fund-innovate-public-interest-news-protect-democracy/>

²⁰⁵ Online Harms White Paper, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 12 February 2020. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-white-paper>.

²⁰⁶ Online Harms White Paper, Government of the United Kingdom (London) 12 February 2020. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/online-harms-white-paper/online-harms-white-paper>.

On 4 September 2019, US government officials met with representatives of major American technological companies, such as Microsoft, Facebook, Google and Twitter, to discuss strategies for securing the upcoming American election from the kind of foreign interference associated with the 2016 election.²⁰⁷ The discussion revolved around potential threats and threat detection, effective information sharing methods, as well as prevention of disinformation and foreign interference via social media.²⁰⁸ An FBI official stated that the agency, along with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Homeland Security, attended this meeting to explore ways of “protecting democracy and securing the 2020 U.S. state, federal and presidential elections.”²⁰⁹

From 9 to 13 September 2019, the United States hosted the first meeting of the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on Cybersecurity in New York City. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs Ambassador Atul Keshap promised to continue offering cybersecurity, digital economy, and cybercrime workshops for the benefit of many Indo-Pacific nations.²¹⁰ He has also stated that one of the key goals of this initiative is to ensure that the US and its partners maintain secure networks as well as information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains to reduce the risk of unauthorized access and malicious cyber activity.²¹¹

On 24 September 2019, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released an updated National Emergency Communications Plan aimed at improving the U.S. emergency communications capabilities at all levels of government.²¹² The update includes the addition of a cybersecurity goal and a focus on integrating new technologies which would improve the U.S. first responders’ ability to effectively communicate in real time.²¹³ This public safety development will prevent the exacerbation of internal emergencies within the United States due to malign interference in the communications system.²¹⁴

On 30 September 2019, the United States imposed sanctions on four entities and seven individuals associated with the Russian Internet Research Agency and its financier, Yevgeniy Prigozhin.²¹⁵ The

²⁰⁷ Big Tech Companies Meeting With U.S. Officials on 2020 Election Security, The New York Times (New York City) 4 September 2019. Access Date: 16 December 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/2020-election-facebook-google.html>.

²⁰⁸ Big Tech Companies Meeting With U.S. Officials on 2020 Election Security, The New York Times (New York City) 4 September 2019. Access Date: 16 December 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/2020-election-facebook-google.html>.

²⁰⁹ Big Tech Companies Meeting With U.S. Officials on 2020 Election Security, The New York Times (New York City) 4 September 2019. Access Date: 16 December 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/technology/2020-election-facebook-google.html>.

²¹⁰ Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 11 September 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/industrial-control-systems-cybersecurity-training/>.

²¹¹ Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 11 September 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/industrial-control-systems-cybersecurity-training/>.

²¹² CISA Releases the Updated National Emergency Communications Plan, CISA (Washington) 25 September 2019. Access Date: 10 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/09/24/cisa-releases-updated-national-emergency-communications-plan>.

²¹³ CISA Releases the Updated National Emergency Communications Plan, CISA (Washington) 25 September 2019. Access Date: 10 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/09/24/cisa-releases-updated-national-emergency-communications-plan>.

²¹⁴ CISA Releases the Updated National Emergency Communications Plan, CISA (Washington) 25 September 2019. Access Date: 10 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/09/24/cisa-releases-updated-national-emergency-communications-plan>.

²¹⁵ U.S. Targets Russian Actors Involved in Efforts to Influence U.S. Elections, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 September 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-targets-russian-actors-involved-in-efforts-to-influence-u-s-elections/>.

government of the United States promised to ensure that people who “carry out destabilizing activities that threaten the interests of the United States and its allies and partners” are subject to sanctions.²¹⁶ Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State, also stated that the US will continue fighting against malign actors who seek to subvert American democratic processes and will impose further punishment on Russian Federation for “its destabilizing and unacceptable activities” because the US will not tolerate foreign interference in its elections.²¹⁷

On 3 October 2019, an inaugural US-ASEAN Cyber Policy Dialogue was held in Singapore. The Statement of the Co-chairs — the United States and Laos — supported the 2015 Report of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security and emphasized the recommended voluntary norms of behaviour in cyberspace.²¹⁸ Participating delegations, including that of the US, highlighted the importance of capacity building as well as initiatives and programmes related to “the protection of the critical infrastructure, combating cybercrime and terrorist use of ICT.”²¹⁹

On 16 October 2019, Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs David R. Stilwell appeared before the American Senate to discuss the US policy in the Indo-Pacific region.²²⁰ As part of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, the US is providing increased support to its Indo-Pacific partners to help defend their networks from cyber threats, improve the resilience of critical infrastructure, and “counter malicious cyber activities by North Korea, China, cyber criminals, and other state and non-state cyber actors that seek to steal ... sensitive information.”²²¹

On 28 October 2019, the United States formalized a contribution of USD639,015 to the Organization of American States (OAS) Cybercrime Program, which is a training and technical assistance program to train judges, law enforcement, and prosecutors “the admissibility of electronic and digital evidence,” among other purposes.²²² Since 2015, this is the third such contribution made by the government of the United States to support the work of the OAS as a shared regional

²¹⁶ U.S. Targets Russian Actors Involved in Efforts to Influence U.S. Elections, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 September 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-targets-russian-actors-involved-in-efforts-to-influence-u-s-elections/>.

²¹⁷ U.S. Targets Russian Actors Involved in Efforts to Influence U.S. Elections, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 September 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/u-s-targets-russian-actors-involved-in-efforts-to-influence-u-s-elections/>.

²¹⁸ ASEAN-US Cyber Policy Dialogue Initiated, GIP Digital Watch Observatory (Geneva) 3 October 2019. Access Date: 7 December 2019. <https://dig.watch/updates/asean-us-cyber-policy-dialogue-initiated>.

²¹⁹ ASEAN-US Cyber Policy Dialogue Initiated, GIP Digital Watch Observatory (Geneva) 3 October 2019. Access Date: 7 December 2019. <https://dig.watch/updates/asean-us-cyber-policy-dialogue-initiated>.

²²⁰ Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 16 October 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/statement-before-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-subcommittee-on-east-asia-the-pacific-and-international-cybersecurity-policy/>.

²²¹ Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 16 October 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/statement-before-the-senate-foreign-relations-committee-subcommittee-on-east-asia-the-pacific-and-international-cybersecurity-policy/>.

²²² United States Fights Cybercrime With Contribution to Organization of American States Program, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 29 October 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-fights-cybercrime-with-contribution-to-organization-of-american-states-program/>.

commitment to protect individuals and businesses across the Western Hemisphere from cybercrime and transnational crime.²²³

On 5 November 2019, CISA released a joint statement from a number of US government agencies concerning the 2020 election security.²²⁴ It stated that the federal government prioritizes the sharing of threat intelligence and providing services that improve the security of election infrastructure.²²⁵ The US government is cooperating with all 50 states to identify threats, safely share information, and protect the democratic process.²²⁶ The statement also assures that, despite the current absence of threats to the US elections, the FBI, Department of Homeland Security and other agencies are monitoring cyberspace for suspicious social media campaigns, disinformation operations, or disruptive and/or destructive cyber attacks on state and local infrastructure.²²⁷

On 5 December 2019, the United States and co-host Jamaica completed a three-day cyber capacity development workshop which included 12 Caribbean and Latin American countries.²²⁸ This innovative workshop, organized by the US, was the first such event in the region and designed to enhance local cybersecurity and combat cybercrime.²²⁹

On 5 December 2019, the US Department of State's Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) Rewards Program announced a USD5 million reward offer for information that could lead to the arrest and/or conviction of Russian cybercriminal Maksim Yakubets, following the Department of Justice's issue of federal indictments against him.²³⁰ Yakubets was involved with several computer malware conspiracies that caused significant damage to the US as well as international financial institutions in both North America and Europe.²³¹ The TOC Rewards Program is one of the tools used by US

²²³ United States Fights Cybercrime With Contribution to Organization of American States Program, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 29 October 2019. Access Date: 6 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-fights-cybercrime-with-contribution-to-organization-of-american-states-program/>.

²²⁴ Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, AND CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections, CISA (Washington) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/11/05/joint-statement-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-ensuring-security-2020>.

²²⁵ Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, AND CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections, CISA (Washington) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/11/05/joint-statement-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-ensuring-security-2020>.

²²⁶ Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, AND CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections, CISA (Washington) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/11/05/joint-statement-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-ensuring-security-2020>.

²²⁷ Joint Statement from DOJ, DOD, DHS, DNI, FBI, NSA, AND CISA on Ensuring Security of 2020 Elections, CISA (Washington) 5 November 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.cisa.gov/cisa/news/2019/11/05/joint-statement-doj-dod-dhs-dni-fbi-nsa-and-cisa-ensuring-security-2020>.

²²⁸ The United States Holds Inaugural Cyber Capacity Building Workshop for the Caribbean and Latin America, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 5 December 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-holds-inaugural-cyber-capacity-building-workshop-for-the-caribbean-and-latin-america/>.

²²⁹ The United States Holds Inaugural Cyber Capacity Building Workshop for the Caribbean and Latin America, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 5 December 2019. Access Date: 17 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-holds-inaugural-cyber-capacity-building-workshop-for-the-caribbean-and-latin-america/>.

²³⁰ Reward Offer for Information on Russian Cybercriminal Maksim Yakubets, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 5 December 2019. Access Date: 15 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/reward-offer-for-information-on-russian-cybercriminal-maksim-yakubets/>.

²³¹ Reward Offer for Information on Russian Cybercriminal Maksim Yakubets, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 5 December 2019. Access Date: 15 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/reward-offer-for-information-on-russian-cybercriminal-maksim-yakubets/>.

authorities to bring major cybercriminals like Yakubets, who pose a national security threat, to justice.²³²

On 16 January 2020, Bill S.3207, titled Cybersecurity State Coordinator Act of 2020, was introduced to the US Senate.²³³ This bill would obligate the Department of Homeland Security to appoint a Cybersecurity State Coordinator in each state, who would be responsible for advising on the development of secure infrastructure, serving as the main federal cybersecurity risk advisor, and facilitating the transmission of cyberthreat information between federal and non-federal entities.²³⁴

On 29 January 2020, Bill H.R.5680, titled the Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and Notification Act of 2020, passed the House Committee on Homeland Security.²³⁵ This bill proposes to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by granting the CISA subpoena authority to compel internet service providers to disclose the identity of owners of critical infrastructure whose devices the agency cannot identify otherwise.²³⁶ This information would be used to notify critical infrastructure entities of vulnerabilities in their systems.²³⁷

On 30 January 2020, the US expressed its support for a Toolbox developed by the European Union Network Information Security Cooperation Group.²³⁸ This toolbox includes an acknowledgment of risks posed by 5G suppliers based in authoritarian countries with previous history of malign cyber behaviour and a recommendation for EU Member States to exclude such companies from critical parts of their 5G networks.²³⁹ The US welcomed this action by the EU; however, it added that all parts of 5G networks must be viewed as “critical infrastructure” that every country should take steps to protect.²⁴⁰ The US called upon its European allies to implement EU recommendations, referencing its own measures taken to secure American 5G networks, mainly prohibiting “untrusted suppliers” such as Huawei and ZTE.²⁴¹

²³² Reward Offer for Information on Russian Cybercriminal Maksim Yakubets, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 5 December 2019. Access Date: 15 December 2019. <https://www.state.gov/reward-offer-for-information-on-russian-cybercriminal-maksim-yakubets/>.

²³³ S. 3207 - Cybersecurity State Coordinator Act of 2020, Congress.gov (Washington) 11 March 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3207>.

²³⁴ S. 3207 - Cybersecurity State Coordinator Act of 2020, Congress.gov (Washington) 11 March 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3207>.

²³⁵ H.R.5680 - Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and Notification Act of 2020, Congress.gov (Washington) 29 January 2020. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5680/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22HR+1%22%5D%7D&r=17&s=1>.

²³⁶ H.R.5680 - Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and Notification Act of 2020, Congress.gov (Washington) 29 January 2020. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5680/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22HR+1%22%5D%7D&r=17&s=1>.

²³⁷ H.R.5680 - Cybersecurity Vulnerability Identification and Notification Act of 2020, Congress.gov (Washington) 29 January 2020. Access Date: 9 April 2020. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/5680/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22HR+1%22%5D%7D&r=17&s=1>.

²³⁸ United States Welcomes the EU’s Acknowledgement of the Unacceptable Risks Posed by Untrusted 5G Suppliers, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 January 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-welcomes-the-eus-acknowledgement-of-the-unacceptable-risks-posed-by-untrusted-5g-suppliers/>.

²³⁹ United States Welcomes the EU’s Acknowledgement of the Unacceptable Risks Posed by Untrusted 5G Suppliers, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 January 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-welcomes-the-eus-acknowledgement-of-the-unacceptable-risks-posed-by-untrusted-5g-suppliers/>.

²⁴⁰ United States Welcomes the EU’s Acknowledgement of the Unacceptable Risks Posed by Untrusted 5G Suppliers, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 January 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-welcomes-the-eus-acknowledgement-of-the-unacceptable-risks-posed-by-untrusted-5g-suppliers/>.

²⁴¹ United States Welcomes the EU’s Acknowledgement of the Unacceptable Risks Posed by Untrusted 5G Suppliers, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 30 January 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/united-states-welcomes-the-eus-acknowledgement-of-the-unacceptable-risks-posed-by-untrusted-5g-suppliers/>.

On 10 February 2020, the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) released a report, concluding that the US is facing espionage threats from state adversaries, namely China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, the Lebanese Hizballah, ISIS and al-Qaeda.²⁴² This report, titled the National Counterintelligence Strategy for 2020-2022, warns against artificial intelligence, advanced encryption, and the Internet, as the aforementioned adversaries are increasingly using emerging technologies to attack the US private sector and democratic institutions.²⁴³ The objectives outlined in this document include “countering cyber and other technological espionage” as well as defending the democratic tradition from covert media campaigns designed to sway Americans’ public opinion against the US government and toward foreign agendas.²⁴⁴

On 10 February 2020, the Department of Justice issued charges against four members of China’s People’s Liberation Army who stole personal data of millions of American citizens from the US credit agency, Equifax, in 2017.²⁴⁵ Their action was labelled as a “counterintelligence attack” on the US.²⁴⁶ During a subsequent briefing for reporters, NCSC Director William Evanina stated that the diversity and intensity of cyber attacks against the US are increasing, so any individuals involved in them will face severe legal consequences.²⁴⁷

On 11 February 2020, Republican Senators rejected three election-security bills.²⁴⁸ The first one was the Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act designed to disincentivize Russia from interfering in the US elections via sanctions.²⁴⁹ The second one was the Securing America’s Federal Elections Act that required voting systems to use backup paper ballots and technological safeguards.²⁵⁰ The last one was the Stopping Harmful Interference in Elections for a Lasting Democracy Act mandating candidates to inform law enforcement officials about a foreign power’s offer of campaign assistance.²⁵¹ The rejection of these bills blocks US efforts to strengthen cybersecurity in the upcoming presidential elections.²⁵²

²⁴² U.S. Counterintelligence Chief Warns of Broadening Spy Threat, CBS News (New York City) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-counterintelligence-chief-warns-of-broadening-spy-threat/>.

²⁴³ U.S. Counterintelligence Chief Warns of Broadening Spy Threat, CBS News (New York City) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-counterintelligence-chief-warns-of-broadening-spy-threat/>.

²⁴⁴ U.S. Counterintelligence Chief Warns of Broadening Spy Threat, CBS News (New York City) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-counterintelligence-chief-warns-of-broadening-spy-threat/>.

²⁴⁵ U.S. Counterintelligence Chief Warns of Broadening Spy Threat, CBS News (New York City) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-counterintelligence-chief-warns-of-broadening-spy-threat/>.

²⁴⁶ U.S. Counterintelligence Chief Warns of Broadening Spy Threat, CBS News (New York City) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-counterintelligence-chief-warns-of-broadening-spy-threat/>.

²⁴⁷ U.S. Counterintelligence Chief Warns of Broadening Spy Threat, CBS News (New York City) 10 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-s-counterintelligence-chief-warns-of-broadening-spy-threat/>.

²⁴⁸ Senate GOP Rejects Election-Security Measures (Yes, Again), MSNBC (New York City) 11 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April, 2020. <https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-gop-rejects-election-security-measures-yes-again-n1135221>.

²⁴⁹ Senate GOP Rejects Election-Security Measures (Yes, Again), MSNBC (New York City) 11 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April, 2020. <https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-gop-rejects-election-security-measures-yes-again-n1135221>.

²⁵⁰ Senate GOP Rejects Election-Security Measures (Yes, Again), MSNBC (New York City) 11 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April, 2020. <https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-gop-rejects-election-security-measures-yes-again-n1135221>.

²⁵¹ Senate GOP Rejects Election-Security Measures (Yes, Again), MSNBC (New York City) 11 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April, 2020. <https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-gop-rejects-election-security-measures-yes-again-n1135221>.

²⁵² Senate GOP Rejects Election-Security Measures (Yes, Again), MSNBC (New York City) 11 February 2020. Access Date: 11 April, 2020. <https://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/senate-gop-rejects-election-security-measures-yes-again-n1135221>.

On 20 February 2020, the US government condemned a cyber attack against the country of Georgia. This attack was carried out by Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate and disrupted the operation of several thousand Georgian government and private websites as well as interrupting the broadcasts of two television stations.²⁵³ The US called on Russia to discontinue its behaviour in Georgia as it undermines democratic institutions and creates uncertainty.²⁵⁴ The US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo reiterated that responsible behaviour of countries is key to stable international cyberspace, which the US will continue to uphold.²⁵⁵ Furthermore, the US pledged to support Georgia in improving their cybersecurity by providing technical assistance to strengthen the country's public institutions.²⁵⁶

On 11 March 2020, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission published a report that presented a strategic approach to protecting the security of American cyberspace against cyber attacks.²⁵⁷ The Commission proposed “a strategy of layered cyber deterrence,” which consisted of more than 80 recommendations.²⁵⁸ These recommendations include reforming the federal government's structure and organization for cyberspace, strengthening non-military cyber tools, promoting national resilience, and enhancing cybersecurity cooperation with the private sector.²⁵⁹

The US has taken domestic and international actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. The US has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against state and non-state actors. These actions fulfil all four components of the commitment.

Thus, the United States receives a score of +1.

Analyst: Nadiya Kovalenko

European Union: +1

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to “work collaboratively to reinforce our democracies against illicit and malign behaviour and foreign hostile interference by state and non-state actors.”

On 19 February 2020, the EU Commission released a white paper on artificial intelligence (AI).²⁶⁰ The white paper aims to support Europe's core values of openness, diversity and democracy.²⁶¹

²⁵³ The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 20 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/>.

²⁵⁴ The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 20 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/>.

²⁵⁵ The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 20 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/>.

²⁵⁶ The United States Condemns Russian Cyber Attack Against the Country of Georgia, U.S. Department of State (Washington) 20 February 2020. Access Date: 10 April 2020. <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-condemns-russian-cyber-attack-against-the-country-of-georgia/>.

²⁵⁷ CSC Executive Summary, United States of America Cyberspace Solarium Commission (Washington) 11 March 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c1UQI74Js6vkfjUowl598NjwaHD1YtIY/view>.

²⁵⁸ CSC Executive Summary, United States of America Cyberspace Solarium Commission (Washington) 11 March 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c1UQI74Js6vkfjUowl598NjwaHD1YtIY/view>.

²⁵⁹ CSC Executive Summary, United States of America Cyberspace Solarium Commission (Washington) 11 March 2020. Access Date: 11 April 2020. <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c1UQI74Js6vkfjUowl598NjwaHD1YtIY/view>.

²⁶⁰ The European Commission has Released their White Paper on Artificial Intelligence today as Promise, Patently Apple (Brussels) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2020/02/the-european-commission-has-released-their-white-paper-on-artificial-intelligence-today-as-promised.html>.

President of the EU Commission Ursula von der Leyen outlined the intentions of the “White Paper,” which cover areas including cybersecurity, critical digital infrastructure, democracy and media.²⁶²

On 19 February 2020, Politico released an article stating that the EU Commission intends on delivering a concrete data strategy framework by the end of 2020.²⁶³ The framework would be applied toward “common European data spaces” which could be implemented as early as 2022.²⁶⁴ The report also mentions the Commission’s goal to implement the Data Act by 2021.²⁶⁵ This new policy would seek to remove existing barriers and introduce rules for business-to-business as well as business-to-government data sharing.²⁶⁶

The EU has taken domestic actions toward reinforcing democratic institutions. The EU has acted to reinforce democratic institutions against state and non-state actors. These actions fulfil three of the four components of the commitment.

Thus, The European Union has received a score of +1.

Analyst: Yousef Choudhri

²⁶¹ The European Commission has Released their White Paper on Artificial Intelligence today as Promise, Patently Apple (Brussels) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2020/02/the-european-commission-has-released-their-white-paper-on-artificial-intelligence-today-as-promised.html>.

²⁶² The European Commission has Released their White Paper on Artificial Intelligence today as Promise, Patently Apple (Brussels) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2020/02/the-european-commission-has-released-their-white-paper-on-artificial-intelligence-today-as-promised.html>.

²⁶³ Europe’s digital vision, explain, Politico (Arlington) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-digital-vision-explained/>.

²⁶⁴ Europe’s digital vision, explain, Politico (Arlington) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-digital-vision-explained/>.

²⁶⁵ Europe’s digital vision, explain, Politico (Arlington) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-digital-vision-explained/>.

²⁶⁶ Europe’s digital vision, explain, Politico (Arlington) 19 February 2020. Access Date: 13 April 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-digital-vision-explained/>.