

# **The G8 and Conflict Prevention: Commitment, Compliance and Systemic Contribution**

JOHN KIRTON, ELEONORE KOKOTSIS AND GINA STEPHENS with DIANA JURICEVIC

## **Introduction**

During the past two years, the G8 has moved rapidly to focus on conflict prevention as a new and substantial component of its agenda and action. Starting essentially with the 1999 Cologne Summit and surrounding foreign ministers meetings, the momentum built through the December 1999 Berlin foreign ministers meeting, the first such ever in G8 history devoted to a single thematic area. The process culminated in 2000, when the foreign minister at Miyazaki and the leaders at Okinawa in July moved from agenda setting to action, authorizing concrete measures in five core areas. It is on this promising beginning that many look to Genoa 2001, and the Canadian hosted Summit the following year, to build an edifice that will change the international security system as a whole.

Whether the G8 can and will make this large systemic contribution depends critically on just how potent it has been as a international institution in advancing conflict prevention in the few short years that it has focused on it. There is room for considerable doubt, on several grounds. Many argue that the venerable, established United Nations, replete within a formal charter, big budget and massive bureaucracy all its own should be and will be the dominant actor in conflict prevention as in all other peace and security fields, and that the powerful Permanent Five (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will kill any effort to dilute their special status through the construction of a separate centre outside. Many critics of the G8 charge it with having only an episodic interest in most subjects, implying that the Kosovo and German driven concern will conflict prevention will quickly pass as other hosts and political priorities exert their pull. Many see the G7/G8 as essentially an economic institution with a claim to newer global/transnational issues, and thus relatively poorly equipped, intellectually and institutionally to deal with any field and security subject. And even those who credit the G7/G8 system with considerable ability to arrive at timely, well tailored commitments across a comprehensive array of issue areas, still call into question how ambitious and significant those collective commitments are, and whether members countries, beginning with the United States and France, will comply with them in the months and years that follow.

In order to assess the potential of the G8 as a productive forum to advance the conflict prevention agenda, and before crafting conflict initiatives to feed into and through it, it is thus important to take a detailed look at its recent record in generating commitments and compliance in the conflict prevention issue area specifically, in the political security domain more generally, and in its agenda as a whole. This paper begins that process through a systematic evaluation of the commitments made at the leaders level at Okinawa, and the compliance of members with them, in comparison with their compliance record in the previous years. Employing a method for identifying commitments and assessing compliance developed by Eleonore Kokotsis, a method for assessing the ambition and significance of those commitments created by Diana Juricevic, and data produced by the G8 Research group under the co-ordination of Gina Stephens, this paper first examines the number and ambition-significance of the Okinawa commitments as a whole, in

the peace and security domain, and in the specific conflict prevention area. It then assesses how much G8 members complied with their Okinawa commitments, how this record compares to that of the previous five and twenty-five years, and whether they actually comply with the particular commitments that count. Only on this foundation can analysts and policymaker alike proceed to ask why and how the G8 institution works to make and keep meaningful promises, and thus how it can best be used and reformed to promote the cause of conflict prevention in the wider world.

This study offers three tentative conclusions for policymakers wishing to take up this important task. First, the G7/G8 Summit, especially from its Okinawa platform, has been a productive institution for having the world's most powerful countries generate ambitious and significant collective *commitments* on core conflict prevention issues. Second, it has done less well, if adequately, in *complying* with the priority conflict prevention commitments it has made. That is, the leaders' G7/G8 gets higher marks for "promises made" than "promises kept" in the conflict prevention field. Third, given the recent commitment-compliance record of the G7/G8 Summit, both overall and in the global-transnational field so closely related to conflict prevention, the G7/G8 is, going forward, a promising institution through which to forward the conflict prevention cause. The policy challenge is to devise ways to strengthen the institution so it can more fully live up to this potential and contribute more robustly to meeting this pressing global need.

### **The Okinawa 2000 Commitment Record**

To what extent did the 2000 G7/G8 Summit held in Okinawa, Japan, which was only the second such summit to deal directly with conflict prevention, produce timely, well tailored and ambition collective decisions, or "commitments" in this field, as part of its overall work? In making such judgments, it is important to recall that the Summits perform many valuable functions, with their core being their deliberative, directional and decisional role. Indeed, at their early stages of dealing with new issue areas, such as conflict prevention, their most important one can be the deliberative one of educating their peers about the subject, its importance, and need for attention and the decisional one of establishing and legitimizing the issue area, identifying its priority, and establishing the principles that will and should guide its treatment and those of related areas. Making actual collective decisions, through the declaration of identifiable, specific, future-oriented commitments in the concluding communiqué, is thus not the only, or even them most important of the recent G7/G8's contribution to the conflict prevention cause. However in an international political world awash in high-level rhetoric, and badly in need of real action on conflict prevention, the G7/G8's decisional record, even at this early stage of its conflict prevention agenda, is of important concern.

In overall terms, the 2000 G7/G8 Summits proved to be a most productive meeting, judged by the number and range of decisional "commitments" made by the leaders in their concluding communiqués.<sup>i</sup> Together the five documents issued by the leaders at Okinawa offered 169 such commitments. Of these, 12 came in the G7 communiqué, 97 in the G8 communiqué (when Russia joined the original seven), 54 in the G8's separate Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, and 6 in the G8 Statement on Regional Issues. The fifth document issued by the leaders, the G8 Statement on the Korean peninsula, contained no actual "commitments".

In the four documents containing actual commitments, the commitments were distributed across 18 issue areas, as follows:

<b><i>G7 Communiqué:</i></b>	12
International Financial Architecture	3
Enhanced HIPC Initiative	4
Abuse of Global Financial System	3
Nuclear Safety/Ukraine	2
 <b><i>G8 Communiqué</i></b>	 97
World Economy	1
Information/Communications Technology	3
Development	15
Debt	5
Health	15
Trade	4
Cultural Diversity	2
Crime and Drugs	18
Ageing	6
Biotechnology/Food Safety	3
Human Genome/Environment	11
Conflict Prevention	3
Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Arms Control	7
Terrorism	4
 <b><i>Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society</i></b>	 54
Introduction	1
Seizing Digital Opportunities	14
Bridging the Digital Divide	11
The Way Forward	7
Fostering Policy Regulatory and	6

## Network Readiness

Improving Connectivity and Access, 7  
Lowering Cost

Building Human Capacity 5

Encouraging Participation in Global 3  
ECommerce Nets

## ***G8 Statement on Regional Issues*** 6

Middle East Peace Process 2

Balkans 2

Africa 2

The number of commitments by issue area in the two main G7 and G8 communiqués suggests that the Okinawa Summit had as its main focus and legacy cooperative achievements in the areas of crime and drugs, development, and health (particularly infectious disease). Combining the last two areas, it was thus genuinely a development-oriented summit.

The 54 commitments in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, especially when combined with the three ICT commitments in the G8 communiqué, suggest it was also the first G7 “digital summit.” Yet the heavy emphasis in this separate charter on “Bridging the Digital Divide,” led by the 11 commitments specifically under this heading, suggests that development was a primary focus and one well integrated into and supported by the second major theme.

The 14 commitments in the G8 communiqué on conflict prevention, disarmament, nonproliferation, arms control, and terrorism, together with the six commitments in the Statement on Regional Security, suggest that the Okinawa was also genuinely a political-security summit. It contained a total of 20 commitments in this realm. Political-security commitments thus took 12% of the total. While this may appear to be a small share, it is significant for a G7/8 that developed its formal political-security agenda and supporting process later than others, and that has seen some of its members, notably France, insist that the prerogatives of the UNSC should not be infringed on in this domain. The 2000 Okinawa’s commitments on the particular issues areas relating to regional security notably embraced equally the three regions of the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. Perhaps due to the sensitivities of Japan’s regional neighbours, no commitments were made on the Korean peninsula, either in these documents or in the separate statement issued on this subject.

It is difficult to assess whether the 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Summit was more productive than G7/G8 summits in earlier years, as a similarly comprehensive assessment of commitments has not been conducted for those earlier years. However, a partial estimate is available by comparing those issue areas where commitment data in the main G7 and G8 communiqués, produced by the same methodology, do exist. This information exists in earlier work by Ella Kokotsis, detailed in *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility, and the G7, 1988–1995* (Garland Publishing, New York, 1999). This work has shown that the summits from

1989 to 1995 produced a yearly average of 4.8 commitments on climate change, 2.1 in biodiversity, 1.6 on developing country debt (from 1988 to 1995), and 3.5 on assistance to Russia (from 1990 to 1995). A comparison of similar issue areas at Okinawa suggests that the G7/G8 in 2000 was considerably more productive on developing country debt, much less productive on assistance to Russia (whose economy was then doing relatively well), and somewhat less productive on climate change and biodiversity. This confirms the development focus of Okinawa. Given the variable pattern and limited number of issue areas for comparison, it is not possible to offer even a suggestion about how productive Okinawa was overall compared to summits of previous years.

Okinawa's political-security agenda offered commitments arranged by issues area as follows: disarmament 7, terrorism 4, conflict prevention 3, and nuclear safety/Ukraine, Mid East peace process, Balkans, and Africa each with two each. Only five non-political-security issue areas secured more than the top-ranked one of disarmament. It is understandable that a Summit held in Asia, where the cold war continued and where the May 1998 Indian and Pakistani nuclear explosions and North Korea's recent launch of a missile over Japan has brought arms control issues to the fore, would wish to highlight this issue area, as well as the imminent regional question of stability and political change on the Korean peninsula.

With these preoccupations in the traditional G7/G8 political-security realms of disarmament and regional security, it is significant that conflict prevention at the leader's level came in third place, in the middle of the range. The leader's decisions to highlight three particular conflict prevention issues, from three different subjects areas (children, diamonds and small arms) and move them from being a matter of concern into action, was an important investment in this new cause. Moreover, these three commitments were arguably at the centre of the global conflict prevention agenda as it then stood. They were (in the G8 Communiqué):

- Para 73: “ We commit ourselves to work for their implementation particularly with respect to economic development and conflict prevent, children in conflict, and international civilian police.”
- Para 73: “We therefore call for an international conference, whose results shall be submitted to the UN, building on the UN Security Council Resolution 1306 and inter alia the "Kimberley" process launched by the Government of South Africa, to consider practical approaches to breaking the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and armed conflict, including consideration of an international agreement on certification for rough diamonds.”
- Para 73: “We invite the international community to exercise restraint in conventional arms exports, and are committed to work jointly to this end”.

### **The Ambition-Significance of the Okinawa Commitments**

In order to secure a more refined understanding of how productive the Okinawa Summit was in its overall, political-security and conflict prevention commitments, it is important to assess not only the overall number and range, but also the ambition and significance, of each individual commitment the Summit generated.

An evolving framework, developed by Diana Juricevic working with the G8 Research Group, allows for such a ranking of commitments according to their level of ambition-significance. An ambitious commitment is one that clearly identifies a goal, clearly identifies

measures to attain that goal, and clearly identifies a target date at which time that goal is to be completed. A significant commitment is one that is timely, novel, and has appropriate scope. A commitment that is both “ambitious” and “significant” satisfies the above six criteria. The ambition-significance ranking is scored out of a possible six points corresponding to the six criteria. A score of 6 entails both a high level of ambition and a high level of significance. A score of 3 entails a high level of ambition but has no level of significance. A score of 0 entails no level of ambition and no level of significance. (For further details see Appendix A).

The results are listed immediately below.

### Commitments Ranked by Ambition-Significance: G7 Communiqué 2000

	Goal	Measure	Target Date	Novelty/ Timeliness	Scope	Content	Total
International Financial Architecture							
7	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
8(a)	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
8(b)	1	1	0	0	1	1	4
HIPC							
20(a)	1	0	0	0	1	1	3
20(b)	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
22	1	1	0	0	1	1	4
23	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Global Financial System							
26(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
26(b)	1	1	0	1	0	1	4
26(c)	1	0	0	1	0	1	3
Nuclear Safety							
29	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
30	1	1	0	0	0	0	2

### Commitments Ranked by Ambition-Significance: G8 Communiqué 2000

	Goal	Measure	Target Date	Novelty/ Timeliness	Scope	Content	Total (score=6)
World Economy							
9	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Information and Communications Technology							

11	1	0	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>
12(a)	1	1	0	1	0	0	<b>3</b>
12(b)	1	1	1	1	1	0	<b>5</b>
Development							
13	1	0	1	1	0	0	<b>3</b>
15	1	0	0	1	1	0	<b>3</b>
17	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
19	1	1	1	1	1	1	<b>6</b>
20(a)	1	1	0	1	0	0	<b>3</b>
20(b)	1	0	1	1	0	0	<b>3</b>
20(c)	1	1	1	0	1	1	<b>5</b>
20(d)	1	1	0	0	0	0	<b>2</b>
Debt							
24(a)	1	0	0	0	1	0	<b>2</b>
24(b)	1	1	0	0	1	0	<b>3</b>
24(c)	1	1	1	0	1	1	<b>5</b>
24(d)	1	1	0	0	0	0	<b>2</b>
25	1	0	0	1	0	0	<b>2</b>
Health							
29	1	1	1	1	1	1	<b>6</b>
30	1	1	1	1	1	1	<b>6</b>
31(a)	1	1	1	1	0	0	<b>4</b>
31(b)	1	0	1	1	1	1	<b>5</b>
Trade							
35	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
36(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>
36(b)	1	0	1	0	1	0	<b>3</b>
38	1	0	0	0	0	0	<b>1</b>



Cultural Diversity							
41	1	1	0	1	0	1	4
42	1	1	1	1	0	1	5
Crime and Drugs							
43(a)	1	1	1	1	0	1	5
43(b)	1	0	1	0	1	0	3
43(c)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
44	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
45(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
45(b)	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
45(c)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
45(d)	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
46	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
47(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
47(b)	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
47(c)	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
49	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
50	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Aging							
52	1	1	0	1	0	1	4
Life science							
55	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
58	1	1	0	1	0	1	4
59	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
Human Genome							
62(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
62(b)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
63	1	0	0	1	1	0	3
64	1	0	0	0	0	0	1

65(a)	1	0	1	1	0	0	3
65(b)	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
66	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
67	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
68	1	1	1	0	0	0	3
69(a)	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
69(b)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Conflict Prevention							
73(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
73(b)	1	1	0	1	1	0	4
73(c)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
Arms Control							
74(a)	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
74(b)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
77(a)	1	1	1	1	0	0	4
77(b)	1	0	0	0	1	0	2
78(a)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
78(b)	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
78(c)	1	0	1	1	0	1	4
Terrorism							
79(a)	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
79(b)	1	1	0	1	0	0	3
80	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
81	1	0	0	0	0	0	1

The average scores, arranged by issue area, by communiqué, and overall, are listed immediately below.

## The 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Commitments Ranked by Average Ambition-Significance

### *G7 Communiqué*

International Financial Architecture	2.67
HIPC	2.75
Global Financial System	2.67
Nuclear Safety	2.00
Average by Equally Weighted Issue Area	2.52
Average by Individual Commitments (N12)	2.6

### *G8 Communiqué*

World Economy	1.00
Information and Communications Technology	3.33
Development	3.25
Debt	2.80
Health	5.25
Trade	1.50
Cultural Diversity	4.50
Crime and Drugs	2.21
Aging	4.00
Life Science	3.33
Human Genome	2.18
Conflict Prevention	2.67
Arms Control	2.29
Terrorism	2.00
Average by Equally-Weighted Issue Area	2.88
Average by Individual Commitments (N70)	2.69
Average of G7+G8 by Equally Weighted Issue Areas (N18)	2.80

Average of G7+G8 by Individual 2.67  
Commitments (N82)

These figures indicate that the Okinawa Summit, with an average score of 2.8 by equally weighted issue areas and 2.69 by individual commitments, came close to the midpoint of the scale of 0–6 for assessing the ambition-significance of a summit’s commitments. These scores are consistent with qualitative judgments, issued at the immediate conclusion of the Summit, that Okinawa was a summit of “solid achievement” (Kirton 2000).

It is notable that both the G7 and G8 Summits score in this midpoint range. While the G8 scores slightly higher on the measure of equally weighted issue areas, the variation is sufficiently slight to make interpretations based on this difference hazardous. The pattern does suggest, however, that the presence of Russia may marginally help and at a minimum does not harm G7/G8 performance (although the different set of issue areas dealt with in each forum is the critical factor). This suggestion is reinforced by a direct comparison of G7 versus G8 in those issue areas (the G7’s HIPC versus the G8’s debt, the G7’s nuclear safety versus the G8’s arms control) that are to some degree similar. By this standard only the G8’s low score on world economy supports the case for caution in allowing Russia more of a place in the G7’s economic/financial domain.

As suggested by the table below (which combines the G7 and G8 issues areas in a single scaled ranked by their ambition-significance score), there is a wide variation by issue area in the performance of the Summit.

### **G7/G8 2000 Issue Areas Ranked by Ambition-Significance of Commitments**

Health	5.25
Cultural Diversity	4.50
Aging	4.00
Information and Communications Technology	3.33
Life Science	3.33
Development	3.25
Debt	2.80
Average by Equally Weighted Issue Areas	2.80
HIPC (G7)	2.75
Conflict Prevention	2.67
International Financial Architecture (G7)	2.67
Global Financial System (G7)	2.67
Average by Individual Commitments	2.67
Arms Control	2.29
Crime and Drugs	2.21
Human Genome	2.18
Terrorism	2.00
Nuclear Safety (G7)	2.00
Trade	1.50
World Economy	1.00

There are several striking patterns in this data. First, issue areas from the G8 rather than the G7 tend to dominate the list. In fact, no issue area from the G7 ranked above the overall average by equally weighted issue areas. This suggests that the innovative dynamism of the G7/G8 system has passed decisively from the G7 to the G8.

Second, the highest scoring issue areas are those that are relatively new to the G7/G8 agenda, and in at least one case (cultural diversity) are entirely new. Leading the list are health, cultural diversity, aging, information and communications technology, and life science, followed by development, debt, and HIPC. This suggests that Okinawa was indeed a development summit, as its producers had planned. But in some ways the competing theme of information technology

in the end took precedence (especially if one adds the results of the commitments in the separate Okinawa Charter on Information Technology that is not included in this analysis). Even more importantly, Okinawa was marked by its domestic intrusiveness, through its ambitious and significant commitment in areas long the preserve of domestic politics, and ones where often state-provincial and local governments as well as national ones have significant responsibilities. Given this strong performance in regard to the new areas, the novelty of conflict prevention on the G8's agenda provides no excuse for any poor performance there.

The Okinawa G7/G8's premium on innovation is also evident in the political-security domain. Here conflict prevention itself ranks first as the most ambitious-significant issue area in the political security domain, and eighth among the Summit's issue areas overall. More venerable subjects, even those featured at recent summits, such as arms control, crime and drugs, terrorism, and nuclear safety, rank well down on the list. (The regional security commitments issued in a separate declaration are not included in this analysis. They all received rather low ambition-significance scores). The low ranking of nuclear safety is somewhat of a surprise, given how large the 1999 criticality accident at Tokaimura loomed in Japanese political life. It is also worth noting that of the three individual conflict prevention commitments, that dealing with diamonds, scored 4 out of 6, ranks in the top half of the scale.

This solid conflict prevention performance takes on more significance, given the low ranking for those issue areas where the G7/G8 summits, and especially Japanese-hosted G7 summits, have traditionally excelled. Trade stands out, with a very low score that confirms the harsh judgement of informed observers about the Okinawa Summit's performance in this domain (Bayne 2001, Ullrich 2001). Moreover the low score for world economy, delivered by a G8 that was about to go into sharply slower growth in the coming months, and at a summit hosted in a long stagnant Japan suggests that complacency rather than prescience and prevention was the dominant approach.

At first glance, this overall pattern lends support to those who criticize the summit for its episodic focus on an ever-changing array of issues, rather than praise it for its persistent iteration on the most difficult but central issues in the world (Bayne 1999). Yet the solid scores on development, debt and HIPC, and the international financial architecture and the global financial system belie this criticism, and suggest a good balance between the new and the old. While Okinawa was thus at its most productive as an agenda-setting summit for the new century, it also "hung in there" (Bayne 2000) to make progress on some persistent problems left over from the old one.

### **Promises Kept: Compliance with the Okinawa Commitments**

It makes little sense for the leaders of the G7/G8 countries to invest their time, reputations, and other resources to generate ambitious-significant collective commitments at their annual summits, or for citizens to take these commitments seriously, if the institution's members do not comply with them in the following year.<sup>ii</sup> Before judging the G7/G8 Summit's performance and potential as a conflict prevention institution, it is thus important to assess the actual compliance the leaders boldly articulated commitments of Okinawa actually secured in the following 10 months. This task begins, modestly, with an examination of "first order" compliance – are member governments at least trying by actually deploying instruments to implement their commitments, even if they have not yet succeeded in securing the intended outcomes that ensure a better world. The analytic framework and method developed by Eleonore Kokotsis provides a way of

systematically assessing this first-order, instruments-focused compliance record. (compliance is assessed in the following application not in regard to all 169 commitments but against the 12 specific commitments judged to be the most important priority commitments, in each of the major issues areas treated in the comprehensive G7 and G8 Communiqué).

By these standards, the Okinawa G7/G8 Summit was a highly credible Summit, indeed perhaps the most credible G7/G8 summit ever held. G7/G8 members complied with during the following ten months the priority commitments made in the 12 major issue areas 81.4% of the time (see Table A). This 81.4% takes on added force when it is recalled that it comes from a scale where 100% equals perfect compliance, but where –100% is also possible for situations in which all members doing the opposite of what they had pledged.

As Table B shows, this 81.4% compliance record compares very favourably with the 39% compliance record with the priority commitments of the 1999 Cologne Summit, the 45% compliance record of the 1998 Birmingham Summit, the 27% of Denver 1997, and the 36% of Lyon 1996. Whereas the four summits prior to Okinawa yielded an average compliance score of 37%, Okinawa itself soared to register an 80% Okinawa’s exceptional status is confirmed by Kokotsis’ compliance studies from 1988 to 1995, which yielded scores of 43% for the United States and Canada on all their commitments in the four issue areas of “sustainable development” and to “aid to Russia.” It is also confirmed by the score of 32% (found by von Furstenberg and Daniels using different methodology) for the compliance of all members with all the economic and energy commitments made at the summits from 1975 to 1988.

Compliance with Okinawa’s priority commitments was particularly high in the issue areas of information technology, health, and trade, where the Summit secured a perfect score. The highest complying members were Germany and Britain, the immediately prior hosts. They each had a perfect compliance score. They were followed by France with 92%; Italy with 89%, Canada with 83%, Japan with 82%, the United States with 67%, and the newest G8 member, Russia, with only 14%.

#### **Table A: Summary Scores**

<b>Issue Area</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Japan</b>	<b>United States</b>	<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>Average Score by Issue Area</b>
<b>1. World Economy</b>	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+1	+1	0	<b>.86</b>
<b>2. ICT</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	<b>1.0</b>
<b>3. Health</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	<b>1.0</b>
<b>4. Trade</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	<b>1.0</b>
<b>5. Cultural Diversity</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	<b>.63</b>
<b>6. Crime and Drugs</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	<b>.88</b>
<b>7. Aging</b>	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	<b>.86</b>
<b>8. Biotech</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	<b>.75</b>
<b>9. Human Genome</b>	+1	+1	+1	N/A	N/A	0	+1	N/A	<b>.80</b>
<b>10. Conflict Prevention</b>	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	<b>.63</b>
<b>11. Arms Control</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	<b>.88</b>
<b>12. Terrorism</b>	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+1	N/A	<b>.40</b>
<b>Average Score by Country</b>	<b>.83</b>	<b>.92</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>.89</b>	<b>.82</b>	<b>.67</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>.14</b>	<b>1) .808 2) .784 3) .814</b>

Notes<sup>iii</sup>:

(i) N/A indicates that information is not available and no compliance score has been awarded.

(ii) TBD indicates that information is forthcoming.

(iii) Development was separated into two sections: (a) debt, and (b) health. Compliance with debt commitments was assessed at the institutional level and examines the extent to which the IMO and World Bank complied with the directives issued to them by the G8 at Okinawa.

1. Overall Average (based on 86 individual scores): 81.4%

2. Overall Average Compliance Score by Country: 80.4%

3. Overall Average Compliance Score by Issue Area: 78.1%

Note: Slight variation due to differential equalization weightings.

### **Okinawa's Compliance Compared to the 1996–2000 “Globalization Era”**

The outstandingly high compliance rate with the Okinawa commitments can be seen through a more direct comparison with the compliance record of the G7/G8 in the preceding five years.



This was the time when the G7/G8, starting at its 1996 Lyon Summit, directly and consciously addressed the process of “globalization.” (It is also the time when the G8 Research Group began its annual compliance studies. The following tables report the results, by country, of the compliance of G8 members with their priority commitments at the Summit from Lyon 1996 to Okinawa 2000 (with the latter’s compliance assessed through to May 2001).

**Table B: G8 Compliance Assessments by Country, 1996–2001a**

	<b>1996–1997b</b>	<b>1997–1998c</b>	<b>1998–1999d</b>	<b>1999–2000e</b>	<b>2000–2001f</b>
<b>France</b>	+0.26	0	+0.25	+0.34	+0.92
<b>United States</b>	+0.42	+0.34	+0.6	+0.5	+0.67
<b>United Kingdom</b>	+0.42	+0.5	+0.75	+0.5	+1.0
<b>Germany</b>	+0.58	+0.17	+0.25	+0.17	+1.0
<b>Japan</b>	+0.21	+0.50	+0.2	+0.67	+0.82
<b>Italy</b>	+0.16	+0.50	+0.67	+0.34	+0.89
<b>Canada</b>	+0.47	+0.17	+0.5	+0.67	+0.83
<b>Russia</b>	N/A	0	+0.34	+0.17	+0.14
<b>European Union</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	+0.17	N/A
<b>Average</b>	<b>+0.36</b>	<b>+0.27</b>	<b>+0.45</b>	<b>+0.39</b>	<b>+0.80</b>

Notes:

a: Scores are an equally weighted average of a country’s compliance to commitments made at the summit.

b: Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

c: Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

d: Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (illegal trafficking of human beings).

e: Applies to six priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).

f: Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (conflict prevention, arms control, terrorism).

**Table C: Compliance Scores by Country**

	<b>1996–2001 Average</b>	<b>1988–1995</b>	<b>1975–1989</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	+63%	N/A	+41.3%
<b>Canada</b>	+53%	+53%	+40.9%
<b>United States</b>	+51%	+34%	+24.6%
<b>Italy</b>	+51%	N/A	+27.4%
<b>Japan</b>	+48%	N/A	+26.2%
<b><i>Average of G8</i></b>	<b>+45%</b>	<b>+43%</b>	<b>+30.7%</b>
<b>Germany</b>	+43%	N/A	+34.6%
<b>France</b>	+35%	N/A	+24.0%
<b>Russia</b>	+22%	N/A	N/A

During the first half decade of the “globalization era” (1996–2001), the average compliance score was 45%. This is slightly higher than the 43% for the 1988–1995 period identified by Kokotsis for the U.S. and Canada alone on four issues areas (Kokotsis 1999). It is notably higher than the 31% discovered by von Furstenberg and Daniels (1992) for all members on all commitments for the 1975–1989 period. (They found the 1975–1988 average of the U.S. and Canada alone to be 33%). This data thus confirms the portrait offered by Kokotsis on the basis of much more limited evidence. It also suggests that the post cold war years — begun with the Gorbachev letter to the G7 at Paris 1989 — have made the Summits more credible than they were before.

In some ways, this data for the first half decade of the “globalization era” (1996–2001) confirms the pattern of compliance by country first identified by von Furstenberg and Daniels for the initial 1975–1989 period. Britain continues to rank first on compliance, followed closely by second-place Canada. France continues to rank near or at the bottom.

But there are some notable changes. Most strikingly, the United States has risen from second last in 1975–1989 to a strong third-highest in 1996–2001. This is consistent with the higher scores Kokotsis found for the U.S. on four issue areas for the period 1988–1995 (Kokotsis 1999). Italy has risen somewhat in the ranking and substantially in the percentage score. Moreover the newest G8 member, Russia comes in last place. This is perhaps due to the slow process of socializing a new member, but more likely due to limitations on the capacity of the Russian government to implement G7/G8 commitments. These often require more adjustment on even a reforming Russia’s part than they do for other G8 members.

The data in Table B, while slender, are inductively suggestive of one possible pattern. In the year leading up to a country hosting a G7/G8 summit, that country will comply with its commitments from the previous year’s summit at a higher level than it did in the immediately earlier year. The prospective new host thus appears to take its G7/G8 responsibility seriously and make the G7/G8 system appear credible, by leading through example, with a higher-than-usual compliance record. (We are indebted to Caroline Konrad for this point.)

Even with its much higher overall compliance scores, Okinawa showed considerable variation by subject domain, issue area, and issue. As Table D shows, as against an overall compliance score of 78%, Okinawa scored 81% in the global/transnational domain, 74% in the economic domain, and 64% in the political security domain. This pattern suggests that the recent G7/8 as an institution requires improvement, from political will through to institutional development, in the political security sphere to bring its performance here up to the Summit normal. Moreover, as conflict prevention issues may be more akin to, and closely related to, transnational/global ones that many others in the political-security sphere, the high G7/G8

compliance scores in the global/transnational domain suggests that the Summit, once improved, could be a very effective vehicle for advancing the conflict prevention cause.

Among individual issues, Okinawa received a perfect compliance score in IT, trade, and health. Its lowest scores came in terrorism (40%), conflict prevention (63%), and cultural diversity (63%). This suggests that the above improvement could usefully be targeted at the conflict prevention domain.

The relatively poor Okinawa compliance performance on conflict prevention is highlighted by the fact that, when compared to the 1996–2001 average, or to any individual year within this period, Okinawa had a higher (or an equal) score on virtually every priority commitment measured for 2000–2001. The only areas where it under-performed were macroeconomics and, especially, terrorism. (There is no data on conflict prevention from previous years).

In a longer term comparison, the “globalization era” summits of 1996–2001 had remarkably high compliance in several domains and issue areas. For this half-decade, the average compliance level was 39%, but 59% in the global/transnational domain, 37% in the economic domain, and only 33% in the political-security domain. The Okinawa cross-policy domain pattern was thus consistent with the Summit’s compliance performance in recent years. The increase in compliance for the globalization half-decade was thus driven almost entirely by the global transnational/domain and it in turn was driven by the heavy investment in this domain at Okinawa. Nonetheless, it is clear that the age of social globalization has arrived and that the G8 has moved sharply to mount an approach of socially sensitive governance in response.

Comparisons over a longer period by issue area are possible only in three issue areas. Here it is clear the summit has suffered a sharp decline in its performance in the trade field and, less dramatically, in development assistance/aid. Conversely, in the field of exchange rates, it has experienced a sharp increase, despite the onset of intense financial globalization. While limited data make any conclusions, hazardous, this finding does suggest that G7/8 governments are by no means powerless in the face of the most globalized of economic markets, and by no means cowering in self imposed fear from intervention in the belief that they can no longer win. If they are willing and able to confront such difficult-to-control societal actors and forces in the economic domain, it is reasonable to call on them to be equally bold in the political-security domain and its conflict prevention component.

**Table D: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1996–2001**

<b>Issue Area</b>	<b>1996–1997</b>	<b>1997–1998</b>	<b>1998–1999</b>	<b>1999–2000</b>	<b>2000–2001</b>	<b>Average 1996–2001</b>
<b>TOTAL (based on average <i>n</i>)</b>	+36.2% (22)	+12.8% (6)	+31.8% (6)	+38.2% (6)	+78.1% (12)	+39.42
<b>Economic Issues</b>						
<i>Average Economic</i>	+39%	+19%	+17%	32%	+74%	+37%
<b>Economic Issues</b>	+0.31	–	–	–	–	+0.31
<i>IFI Reform</i>	+0.29c	–	–	–	–	+0.29

<b>Exchange Rate</b>	–	–	–	0	–	0
<i>Macroeconomics/ World Economy</i>	+1.00	–	–	+1.0	+0.86d	+0.95
<i>Microeconomics</i>	+0.29d	–	–	–	–	+0.29
<b>Employment</b>	–	+0.375e	0f	–	–	+0.19
<b>Aging</b>	–	–	+0.33g	–	+0.86n	+0.60
<b>GIS/ICT</b>	+0.57d	–	–	–	+1.0	+0.79
<b>Trade</b>	+0.29d	–	0.33h	–0.57	+1.0n	+0.26
<b>Development</b>	0d	0	–	–	0	0
<b>Debt of Poorest</b>	–	–	0	+0.86	–	+0.43
<b>Global/Transnational Issues</b>						
<i>Average Global</i>	+34%	+25%	+63%	+0%	+81%	+41%
<b>Transnational General</b>	+0.48	–	–	–	–	+0.48
<b>Environment</b>	+0.14	+0.5e	–	–	–	+0.32
<b>Climate Change</b>	–	–	+1.0j	–	–	+1.0
<b>Nuclear Safety</b>	+0.29	–	–	–	–	+0.29
<b>Health/Disease</b>	–	–	–	–	+1.0n	+1.0
<b>Biotech</b>	–	–	–	–	+0.75	+0.75
<b>Human Genome</b>	–	–	–	–	+0.80	+0.80
<b>Crime</b>	+0.43d	0e	–	0k	+0.88 (includes drugs)	+0.33
<b>Human Trafficking</b>	–	–	+0.25	–	–	+0.25
<b>Cultural Diversity</b>	–	–	–	–	+0.63	+0.63

<b>Political Security Issues</b>						
<b>Average Political–Sec’y</b>	+39%	–06%	–	+100%	+64%	+49%
<b>East/West Relations</b>	+0.80d	–	–	–	–	+0.80
<b>Terrorism</b>	+0.71d	–	–	+1.0	+0.40o	+0.70
<b>Arms Control</b>	+0.29	–	–	–	+0.88	+0.59
<b>Landmines</b>	+0.71	+0.75e	–	–	–	+0.73
<b>Human Rights</b>	+0.71d	–	–	–	–	+0.71
<b>Security Issues</b>	+0.31	–	–	–	–	+0.31
<b>Regional Security</b>	–0.43d	–	–	–	–	–0.43
<b>Asia</b>						
<b>Europe</b>	+0.86m	–	–	–	–	+0.86
<b>Middle East</b>	–0.43d	–	–	–	–	–0.43
<b>Russia</b>	–	–0.86	–	–	–	–0.86
<b>Conflict Prevention</b>	–	–	–	–	0.63	+0.63
<b>Governance Issues</b>						
<b>UN Reform Financing</b>	+0.14	–	–	–	–	+0.14
<b>UN Reform Develop’t</b>	+0.14	–	–	–	–	+0.14

Notes:

a: Data refer to members’ compliance to commitments expressed in the Communiqué, as evaluated immediately prior to the next summit (i.e., 1996–1997 data refer to commitments made at the Lyon Summit in 1996 and assessed on the eve of the 1997 Denver Summit).

b: Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to all G7/G8 countries.

c: Excludes Italy and France.

d: Excludes Italy.

e: Refers to G8 (includes Russia).

f: Refers only to Japan, UK, Russia.

g: Refers only Canada, Germany, U.S.

h: Excludes Germany.

i: Refers to debt of the poorest and the Cologne Debt Initiative.

j: Refers to G8 countries (includes Russia); is average of data for two commitment referring to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.

k: Refers specifically to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.

l: Refers only to France, Germany, Japan.

m: Excludes Japan.

n: Excludes Russia.

o: Excludes Germany, Italy, Russia.

**Table E: Compliance Scores by Issue, 1975–2001**

<b>Issue Area</b>	<b>1996–2001 Average</b>	<b>1988–1996</b>	<b>1975–1989</b>
<b>Total (per average <i>n</i>)</b>	+39%	43% (C+US)	31%
<b>Economic Issues</b>			
<b>Macro/World Economy</b>	+95%		
<b>GIS/IT</b>	+79%		
<b>Aging</b>	+60%		
<b>Debt of the Poorest</b>	+43%	+73%a	
<i>Average of G8 All</i>	+39%		
<i>Average of G8 Economy</i>	+37%		
<b>Economic Issues</b>	+31%		
<b>IFI Reform</b>	+29%		
<b>Microeconomics</b>	+29%		
<b>Trade</b>	+26%		+73%
<b>Employment</b>	+19%		
<b>Development/Aid</b>	0		+27%
<b>Exchange Rate</b>	0		–70%
<b>Demand Composition</b>			+23%
<b>Real GNP Growth</b>			+40%
<b>Fiscal Adjustments</b>			+26%
<b>Interest Rate</b>			+22%
<b>Inflation Rate</b>			+22%
<b>Energy</b>			+66%
<b>Global/Transnational Issues</b>			
<b>Climate Change</b>	+100%	+34%a	
<b>Health/Disease</b>	+100%		
<b>Human Genome</b>	+80%		
<b>Biotech</b>	+75%		
<b>Cultural Diversity</b>	+63%		
<i>Average of G8 on Global/Transnational Issues</i>	+59%		
<b>Transnational General</b>	+48%		
<i>Average of G8</i>	+39%		

<b>Crime</b>	+33%		
<b>Environment</b>	+32%		
<b>Nuclear Safety</b>	+29%		
<b>Human Trafficking</b>	+25%		
<b>Political/Regional Security Issues</b>			
<b>Europe</b>	+86%		
<b>East/West Relations</b>	+80%		
<b>Landmines</b>	+73%		
<b>Human Rights</b>	+71%		
<b>Terrorism</b>	+70%		
<b>Conflict Prevention</b>	+63%		
<b>Arms Control</b>	+59%		
<b>Average of G8</b>	+39%		
<b>Average of G8 on Political/Regional Security</b>	+33%		
<b>Security Issues</b>	+31%		
<b>Asia</b>	-43%		
<b>Middle East</b>	-43%		
<b>Russia</b>	-86%	+81% <sup>a</sup>	
<b>Governance Issues</b>			
<b>Average of G8</b>	+39%		
<b>Average of G8 on Governance Issues</b>	+14%		
<b>UN Reform Financial</b>	+14%		
<b>UN Reform Development</b>	+14%		

Note:

a: Includes only Canada and the United States.

Source: Ella Kokotsis and Joseph Daniels (1999), "G8 Summits and Compliance," in Michael Hodges, John Kirton, and Joseph Daniels, eds., *The G8's Role in the New Millennium* (Aldershot, Ashgate), pp. 75–94.

### **The Okinawa Compliance Record Corrected for Priority Commitment Ambition-Significance**

This comparison of the Okinawa compliance record with that of the summit in previous years highlights just how exceptionally high Okinawa was. This may well be an accurate reflection of reality. Japan traditionally takes the Summit and its role as host more seriously than virtually any other country. It devoted large sums of money, highest-level political management, and domestic political attention to Okinawa. And the mounting G7/G8 involvement of civil society actors, and their protests at other major international fora, may well have led Japan and its G7/G8 partners to be exceptionally vigilant in keeping the faith with their Okinawa pledges.

However, another possibility is that the particular commitments selected by the G8 Research Group in 2000 to monitor compliance against were unusually low in ambition and significance, making it very easy for G8 members to comply and thus generate these uniquely

high compliance scores for 2000. However checking the individual priority Commitments selected for compliance monitoring, against the average level of ambition-significance for all commitments in their issue area, suggests that the particular commitments selected for compliance monitoring were not unusually “easy” commitments to comply with.

A second way of checking and controlling for the possibility of “easy commitment selection bias” is to take the set of selected priority commitments as given, but weight them according to their level of ambition and significance, and use these weights in the compliance analysis<sup>iv</sup>

As the results in Table F indicate, applying this individual ambition-significance weighting control does reduce substantially Okinawa’s overall very high compliance scores. Yet it still leaves Okinawa as the most credible G7/G8 Summit ever. By this weighted ranking, G7/8 members complied with the priority commitments across the 12 major issue areas of the Okinawa Summit during the following ten months 59.2% of the time. This 59.2% compliance record still compares very favourably with the unweighted scores of 39% for Cologne 1999, the 45% for Birmingham 1998, the 27% of Denver 1997, and the 36% of Lyon 1996.

Compliance with Okinawa’s priority commitments remained particularly high in the issue area of health where the Summit secured a perfect score. The highest complying members were again Germany and Britain. Each had a compliance score of 72%. They were followed by France with 66%, Italy with 64%, Canada with 60%, Japan with 59%, the United States with 48% and the newest G8 member Russia, with only 10%.

## Conclusion

It is clear that there is a pressing need for further work on the G7/G8’s commitment and compliance record in regard to its overall, political-security and conflict prevention agenda.<sup>v</sup> In addition to empirically reinforcing and analytically refining the above analysis, there is a need to explain the actual processes through which and causes from which members countries ambitiously commit and faithfully comply. There is equally a need to explore the commitment-compliance record and process on conflict prevention at the G8’s ministerial as well as leaders level, but it is the foreign ministers that have devoted much more attention to this subject and who may be closer to commanding some of the conventional instruments required to ensure that their country complies.

As a foundation for this further work, this study offers three tentative conclusions. First, the G7/G8 Summit, especially from its Okinawa platform, has been a productive institution for having the world’s most powerful countries generate ambitious and significant collective *commitments* on core conflict prevention issues. Second, it has done less well, if adequately, in *complying* with the priority conflict prevention commitments it has made. That is, the leaders’ G7/G8 gets higher marks for “promises made” than “promises kept” in the conflict prevention field. Third, given the recent commitment-compliance record of the G7/G8 Summit, both overall and in the global-transnational field so closely related to conflict prevention, the G7/G8 is, going forward, a promising institution through which to forward the conflict prevention cause. The policy challenge is to devise ways to strengthen the institution so it can more fully live up to this potential and contribute more robustly to meeting this pressing global need.

## Table F: Weighted Summary Scores



Issue Area	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	United Kingdom	Russia	Weight	Weighted Average Score (by Issue Area)
<b>1. World Economy</b>	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+1	+1	0	0.667	<b>0.57</b>
<b>2. ICT</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0.833	<b>0.83</b>
<b>3. Health</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	1.00	<b>1.0</b>
<b>4. Trade</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	0.500	<b>0.5</b>
<b>5. Cultural Diversity</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	0.833	<b>0.52</b>
<b>6. Crime and Drugs</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0.833	<b>0.73</b>
<b>7. Aging</b>	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	0.667	<b>0.57</b>
<b>8. Biotech</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0.667	<b>0.50</b>
<b>9. Human Genome</b>	+1	+1	+1	N/A	N/A	0	+1	N/A	0.833	<b>0.67</b>
<b>10. Conflict Prevention</b>	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0.667	<b>0.42</b>
<b>11. Arms Control</b>	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0.667	<b>0.59</b>
<b>12. Terrorism</b>	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+1	N/A	0.500	<b>0.20</b>
<b>Weight</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	<b>0.722</b>	
<b>Weighted Average Score (by country)</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.66</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.64</b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.10</b>		<b>1) 0.578 2) 0.564 3) 0.592</b>

Notes<sup>vi</sup>:

(i) N/A indicates that information is not available, and that no compliance score has been awarded

(ii) TBD indicates that information is forthcoming

(iii) Development was separated into two sections: (a) debt, and (b) health. Compliance with debt commitments was assessed at the institutional level and examines the extent to which the IMO and World Bank complied with the directives issued to them by the G8 at Okinawa. See attached Development Compliance Report.

(iv) The weights are calculated using the ambition-significance ranking. A commitment in a given issue area that has a higher ambition-significance ranking has a correspondingly higher weight score. See attached note on compliance for further details.

1. Overall Average (based on 86 individual scores): 57.8%

2. Overall Average Compliance Score by Country: 56.4%

3. Overall Average Compliance Score by Issue Area: 59.2%

Note: Slight variation due to differential equalization weightings

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## Appendices

The coding manual for assessing the ambition-significance of each individual commitment is presented immediately below.

### A. Ambition

1. <![endif]>Does the commitment identify a **goal**?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

2. <![endif]>Does the commitment identify **measures** to attain the goal?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

3. <![endif]>Does the commitment identify a **target date** at which time the goal is to be completed?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

### B. Significance

4. Timeliness\*

Is the purpose of the commitment to respond to a current crisis?

Is the purpose of the commitment to prevent/address a future crisis/issue?

(1 point)

5. <![endif]>Scope\*

Is the commitment directed only at G8 countries?

Is the commitment directed at countries outside G8 membership?

(1 point)

6. <![endif]>Novelty\*

Is the commitment referring to an issue that was addressed in previous summits?

Is the commitment referring to an issue that has not been addressed in previous summits?

(1 point)

\* Note that the scoring criteria for (4), (5), and (6) is specific to the particular commitment to be ranked. Take the issue of scope, for example: at times, it is appropriate for a particular commitment to be directed only at G8 countries (in this case, a score of 0 would be allocated), while at other times it is appropriate for the commitment to be directed outside G8 membership (in this case, a score of 1 would be allocated). Every effort has been taken by the Research G8 Group to minimize the measurement error associated with this ranking process, including the implementation of a two-stage verification process to ensure that, if there is a bias in the ranking, this bias is applied consistently across all commitments and across all issue areas.

Taken together, these criteria suggest that each individual commitment, and through normal or weighted averages an entire summit, can be judged as follows:

Ambition-Significance Ranking

**0** = No Ambition, No Significance

**1** = Low Ambition, No Significance

**2** = Moderate Ambition, No Significance

**3** = High Ambition, No Significance

**4** = High Ambition, Low Significance

**5** = High Ambition, Moderate Significance

**6** = High Ambition, High Significance

Before applying this framework to the entire set of 169 commitments, it must be noted that ranking commitments by ambition-significance is an arduous task involving several methodological challenges. In this exercise, the G8 Research Group is attempting to quantify an essentially qualitative enterprise. Every effort has been made to reduce the level of measurement error and simultaneity bias. Nevertheless, these two problems still exist. As a result, there tends to be a systematic overstatement of the level of ambition-significance for each commitment as well as a systematic overstatement of the level of compliance. Given the fact that the G8 Research Group has been examining this issue from a political science perspective and not from an

economics perspective, no regressions have been employed and the corresponding economic techniques to correct for simultaneity bias have not been used.

With these caveats, the ambition-significance framework specified above has been applied, on a trial basis, to the 12 commitments in the G7 Communiqué and to the 97 commitments in the G8 Communiqué, as noted above. For this exercise, however, the individual subcommitments listed above have been amalgamated into a single commitment, thus reducing the overall number of commitments from 109 (12+97) to 82 (12+70). (This comes from the consolidation in the G8 Communiqué of commitments in development from 15 to 8, health from 15 to 4, crime and drugs from 18 to 14, and aging from 6 to 1.).

## Notes

<sup>i</sup> The precise commitments identified and the method and coding instructions for identifying individual commitments are available on the G8 Information Centre at <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca>. Note that commitments that contain subheadings with further commitments are counted separately, with one number assigned to the main heading and separate number for each of the individual commitments listed below.

<sup>ii</sup> This study is based on the revised version of the G8 Research Group's Compliance Assessment, as of July 7, 2001.

<sup>iii</sup> The average score by issue area is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The average score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country's compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column and no score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column (e.g., no score was awarded to Italy in issue no. 1, "World Economy." Hence Italy is excluded from the average score by issue area result of 0.85 for issue no. 1. Also, Italy's average score by country excludes issue no. 1 from the result of 0.89.

<sup>iv</sup> Consider a commitment on trade that has a compliance rate of 100%, but an ambition-significance ranking of only  $3/6 = 50\%$ . Consider another commitment on the environment that has a compliance rate of 80%, but an ambition-significance ranking of  $6/6 = 100\%$ . In the previous analysis, the commitment on trade would be deemed more successful than the commitment on the environment because it has a higher compliance score. This compliance score, however, is misleading since it does not take into account how difficult the commitment is to comply with. The difficulty of complying with a commitment is measured through the ambition-significance ranking. Coming back to the example, the trade commitment with an ambition-significance ranking of 50% is much easier to comply with than the environment commitment that has an ambition-significance ranking of 100%. To account for the difficulty of complying, the ambition-significance ranking is used as a weight in the compliance analysis. A given commitment would now have a weighted compliance score that is the product of its original compliance score multiplied by its ambition-significance ranking. In the example, the trade commitment would now have a weighted compliance score of 50% while the environment commitment would have a weighted compliance score of 80%, derived once again by multiplying their original compliance scores by their respective ambition-significance rankings.

<sup>v</sup> The current analysis itself is offered with an invitation for others to challenge, confirm, enrich and supplement them. Contributions are particularly welcome if they are:

- a. Empirical: Are there additional or alternative data that would adjust the scores?
- b. Methodological: Have the existing data been correctly applied to the first-order, instrumental compliance criteria employed in this study?
- c. Analytical: Is there any systematic bias in the selection of the priority commitments or the 12 issue areas chosen for assessment this year?

For additional material see the analytical studies listed at [www.g8.utoronto.ca](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca).

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<sup>vi</sup> The “average score by issue area” is the average of all countries’ compliance scores for that issue. The “average score by country” is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country’s compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol “N/A” appears in the respective score column and no score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol “N/A” appears in the respective score column (e.g. No score was awarded to Italy in issue #1, “World Economy”. Hence Italy is excluded from the “average score by issue area” result of 0.57 for issue #1. Also, Italy’s “average score by country” excludes issue #1 from the result of 0.64).