

Canada as a G8 and G20 Principal Power

Lecture 24

POL 312Y Canadian Foreign Policy

Professor John Kirton

University of Toronto

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Introduction

A key test of whether Canada is becoming, or has become, a principal power in a rapidly changing world comes from its behaviour in the Group of Eight (G8) and Group of Twenty (G20) international institutions. Canada's mere membership in these exclusive summit clubs, containing the most powerful leaders of the most powerful countries, strongly suggests that Canada has asserted its position and acquired an acknowledged status as a principal power. But to be a principal power, Canada must also take initiatives according to its national interests, distinctive national values and preferences, align with any coalition of countries to secure its desired outcomes, and have the G8 and G20 effectively shape world order as a result.

Canadian prime ministers suggest this happens. In his definitive doctrine on Canadian foreign policy in February 1995, Jean Chrétien claimed: "Canada can further its global interests better than any other country through its active membership in key international groupings, for example, hosting the G7 Summit this year" (Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 1995). In 2004, Paul Martin (2008) proposed that the broader G20 systemically significant countries, which had been meeting at the finance ministers' level since 1999, should assemble at the leaders' level, which they subsequently did in 2008. Stephen Harper, on the way to his first G8 summit, in Russia in July 2006, spoke of Canada as an emerging energy superpower, devoted to providing global leadership abroad.

The Debate

Such far-reaching claims contradict the views of the first school of scholars who see **Canada constrained** by an American-dominated, neoliberal G8 that constantly diverts Canada from the United Nations-based multilateral institutions so loved by liberal internationalism (LI) (Helleiner 1995; Lovbraek 1990; Keating 1993, 2002). They argue that America uses the "G's" to have Canada adopt policies of free market fundamentalism, or neo-liberal corporate globalization, instead of its humane middle power internationalism of old.

A second school sees Canada as a "**sensationalist**" using the summits as "global hot tub party," with Canada "being there" merely to bask in the reflected glory of the great (Keating 1993; Wood 1988). This school suggests that "the summits provided a sensation of power without its reality" while Canadian attempts to influence the agenda "resulted in little, if any, success" (Keating 1993, 196).

A third school of **declinists** portrays an initially deserving Canada no longer important enough economically to qualify for membership in the 1990s. Robert Bothwell (2006: 516) writes that in the 1970s “Canada qualified to be a member of the Group of Seven industrialized nations’ forum because it had, in fact, the world’s sixth or seventh largest economy. By the mid-1990s that was no longer the case.”

A fourth school portrays Canada as an **ineffective activist** (David and Roussel 1998). Andrew F. Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim Nossal (1993) conclude that Pierre Trudeau “did get North-South issues onto the agenda” at his 1981 Montebello Summit, took “advantage of the manoeuvrability that its economic capabilities allowed” on agricultural subsidies, and that “the willingness of the Canadian government to move out well in front of its G7 partners was designed to move these states into adopting a more coercive policy towards South Africa.” But these Canadian actions failed to influence summit outcomes or shape world order beyond.

A fifth school sees Canada role as a **bridge** between Africa and the donors Canada plays the role to set the needed new rules of the game (Culpeper, Emelifeonwu, and Scarpa de Masellis 2003).

A sixth school presents the G8 as an institution **increasing influence** for Canada. Offered largely by Canadian G8 practitioners, it sees a significant Canadian role in, and successes from, the G8 (Gotlieb 1987; Clark 1988; Artis and Ostry 1988; Ostry 1986, 1990; Summit Reform Study Group 1991; Dobson 1991a, 1991b; Macmillan and Delvoie 1999; Fowler 2003; Axworthy 2003; Haynal 2005; Bartleman 2005; Burney 2005; Mulroney 2007; Chrétien 2007; Martin 2008).

A seventh school claims that Canada exercises **selective leadership** at the G8 on particular issues such as African development, finance, landmines, nuclear disarmament, and HIV/AIDS, and at selected summits, notably as host of Halifax in 1995 and Kananaskis in 2002 (Gordon 2005; Rioux 2006; Tomlin, Hillmer, and Hampson 2008; Press 2008). David Black (2005, 1) argues that Canada’s approach “has been on balance, ‘good enough’ to sustain Canadian leadership claims, at least in relation to other rich countries, but it has fallen short of genuine leadership in relation to the real needs of African countries and people.” Duncan Wood (2006) credits Canada with several forms of leadership in finance, persevering with innovations based on Canadian values and preferences, to some success in the end.

Canada’s Diplomacy of Concert

The evidence, however, supports an eighth argument highlighting Canada’s effective global leadership through its **diplomacy of concert** in the G8. Indeed, the G8 and G20 are emerging as effective centers of global governance, enabling a principal power to Canadianize the global order according to its national interests and distinctive national values (Dewitt and Kirton 1983; Kirton 2007a, 2007b, 413–430). Since the G8’s 1975 origins with France, the United States, Britain, Germany, Japan, and Italy as the initial attendees, the G8 has moved Canada from the old, UN-centred “diplomacy of constraint” to the new, G8-focused diplomacy of concert (Stairs 1974; Kirton 1994). Canada no

longer concentrates on using likeminded middle power coalitions in the multilateral UN to constrain a much more powerful America from pursuing its preferred unilateral, military path. Instead, Canada increasingly creates issue- and interest-specific groupings of principal powers in a flexible, leaders-driven G8 concert and G20 companion to infuse Canadian interests and values into the global order, even without an initially supportive United States. Canada accordingly expands the summit's agenda, pioneers innovative principles and agreements on key issues, complies with G8 commitments and induces its G8 colleagues to do so, and develops the G8 system for global governance as a whole. This behaviour arose early, strengthened over time, and pushed Canada over the principal power threshold at Harper's first G8 summit in St. Petersburg in 2006. It has now reached a new stage, with Canada chosen to co-host the first institutionalized G20 summit with Korea, in Toronto, in tandem with Canada's fifth G8 summit in Muskoka, in June 2010.

Canada's successful diplomacy of concert is **caused** by the G8-G20 systems emergence as a centre of global governance, reinforcing and replacing the order long provided by the older UN and North Atlantic institutions, and changing how its members and outsiders behave. As a **modern concert**, the G8 and the G20 offer the concerted power, common principles, political control, and controlled participation needed to address the systemic and state-specific shocks brought by the new vulnerability, at a time when the old multilateral organizations and America alone can no longer cope. Canada enjoys a **relatively invulnerable** position, especially on the key new security threats of energy, terrorism, finance, the environment, and health. Its resulting major power presence allows it to reap domestic acclaim and advance national interests, distinctive values, and preferences. It can forge fluid partnerships and secure its preferred policy agenda, principles, and positions, and also catalyze international compliance and develop supportive global governance. Backed by a domestic public united on the values of globalism, international institutionalism, openness, anti-militarism, multiculturalism, and environmentalism, Canada increasingly leads in shaping and securing the G8- and G20-centred global order it prefers.

An Overview of Canada's G8 Summit Performance

Canada's successful diplomacy of concert is evident in an **overview** of Canada's performance since it first arrived physically at the G7 summit in 1976.

Overall Grades

In its overall performance Canada has been an **increasingly successful host** (see Appendix A). Canadian-hosted summits earned, from the leading summit scholar, Nicholas Bayne, **grades** of C for Montebello in 1981, C- for Toronto in 1988, and B+ for both Halifax in 1995 and Kananaskis in 2002 (Bayne 2000, 2003). Canada's resulting B-average is higher than the overall summit average of C+ during this time. It puts Canada in third place as a successful summit host. The B+ for Halifax and Kananaskis are the third highest grades up to that time and the highest since the Cold War ended in 1989 (Bayne 2005).

The overall assessment is supported by a closer look at Canada's performance on the six specific tasks the G8 has.

Domestic Political Management

First, Canadians have used the summits for **domestic political management**.

The G8 summit, and Canada's behaviour within it, have consistently secured domestic public acclaim. Canadians have supported the summit and Canada's participation, and seen it bring favourable media coverage, improved government approval ratings, re-election prospects, national unity, and national pride (Kirton 2007b). Mulroney as host shaped Toronto in 1988 to help secure a second majority mandate. Chretien used Halifax 1995 to help win the October 1995 referendum and defeat the separatist threat.

As the post-Cold War, globalizing era began, in spring 1993, the polls showed 71 percent of Canadians thought the summit meetings were important. In spring 1994, with Chrétien's Liberals now in power, 72 percent thought that "participating in the Summit gives Canada an opportunity to influence events in ways that are good for this country" (Kirton 1995). In November 2001, 77 percent wanted the forthcoming Kananaskis Summit — the first since September 11, 2001 — to take place (*Maclean's* 2001).

Among the **editorialists** of the elite newspapers in both anglophone and francophone Canada, the summit has been seen as a success. The first two summits hosted by Canada, under Trudeau in 1981 in Quebec and under Mulroney in 1988 in Ontario, generated particularly warm remarks. Not surprisingly, Canada's prime ministers have occasionally referred to the G8 and G20 in their national policy addresses, Speeches from the Throne. And the G8 has also complimented Canada by name in its communiqués.

Deliberation: Canada's G8 Agenda

Second, Canada has expanded the summit **deliberations**, particularly by giving it an explicit, comprehensive political security agenda. Canada has consistently and successfully pressed its preferred issues of political security, North-South development, human rights, the environment, and trade.

In 1976, Canada was assigned the lead on the important issue of energy, where Canada's specialized capabilities loomed large (Eayrs 1975; Von Riekhoff 1974). Trudeau sought to broaden the G7's treatment of this issue from oil and gas to nuclear energy and its political-security extension, nuclear proliferation. He succeeded in 1977. He helped put East-West **political-security** issues on the agenda, most clearly when he hosted in 1981 (Burney 2005, 57–62).

Canada quickly took the lead on **North-South** issues, sympathetically raising southern concerns. Canada made North-South relations the centrepiece theme of Montebello in 1981, its first summit as host. It followed with the first G7 initiative on debt relief for the poorest when it next hosted, at Toronto in 1988.

Brian Mulroney encouraged the summit to take up issues of **democratization and human rights**. He alone put apartheid in South Africa on the table, starting in 1986. At

Paris in 1989, Canada joined France to have the summit sanction China over its murder of unarmed students in Tiananmen Square.

From 1979 onward, Canada, along with Germany and Italy, emphasized the **environment**. In 1979, it supported Germany in producing, through the G7, the world's first, highly ambitious, and effective action to control climate change (Kirton 2008/09). Since 1989, Canada led to control overfishing of high seas and straddling stocks.

Canada, as the G7's most export-dependent economy, has consistently concentrated on **trade**. It used the G7 for promoting multilateral trade liberalization, reducing export subsidies and protectionism, and building strong multilateral rules-based trade institutions and regimes (Burney 2005, 126–127).

Canada has sought to transform the summit agenda from dealing with limited economic issues within the G7 and industrialized North to including once domestic issues within the North and the North's economic, political, and security issues with the long communist East and the developing South. From the start, it has worked strategically to make the G8 a forum not just for G8 governance but for global governance as a whole.

Direction Setting: Canada's Convictions about Principles and Norms

Third, Canada has used the summit to set new **directions** by pioneering innovative principles and norms. The campaign against South African apartheid from 1986, against using development assistance for excessive military expenditure in 1995 and for the concept of sustainable development stand out.

Decision Making: Commitments from Canada's G8 Diplomacy

Fourth, the number of specific, actionable, future-oriented collective **decisional commitments** produced by each summit confirms Canada's success as host (Kokotsis 1999). Montebello produced 40 such commitments, and Toronto only 27. But Halifax in 1995 generated 76, and Kananaskis in 2002, produced 188, the highest ever to that time.

To secure such commitments, Canada has aligned itself with and against all the principal powers there. Even when the U.S. and Canada were tightly aligned, as from 1985 to discipline on agricultural trade subsidies, leadership was shared between the two. Canada's alignment flowed directly from its interests and included Britain as a co-equal in this liberalization bloc.

Canada more often secured U.S. support for its initiatives and then broadened the coalition. It started with nuclear nonproliferation and food. In the months before the 1994 Naples Summit, the Canadians developed support for some trade liberalization and management ideas in Washington, which the Americans then adopted, in amplified and adjusted fashion, and unveiled at Naples. On the road to Tokyo in 1993, the U.S. initially resisted Canada's proposal to use the summit to secure a market access agreement that would lead to the long-awaited conclusion of the Uruguay Round. Yet Canada persisted and ultimately prevailed. Initial or early U.S. support for Canadian initiatives is thus not necessary for Canadian summit success.

The diplomacy of **constraint** within the concert has been rare. During Ronald Reagan's time, in the face of the soaring U.S. dollar and high U.S. interest rates, Canada joined with the other G7 members to seek an alteration in U.S. macroeconomic and exchange rate policy. The effort enjoyed little success until the U.S. dollar was brought down by the G5 finance ministers' Plaza Accord in September 1985.

The diplomacy of **compromise** within the concert, while more frequent, has enjoyed limited success. Created with two alternative and competing poles of leadership — the U.S. and France — the summit provides ample opportunities for Canadian mediation. But Mulroney's efforts to bridge Franco-American differences at the 1985 Bonn Summit were unsuccessful. And Canadian mediation leading up to the 1989 Paris Summit, on a French initiative to have the G7 meet with developing country leaders, also failed.

More frequently, Canada has practised the diplomacy of **coalition**, advocating positions based on its national interests, distinctive national values, and preferences and backed by an ad hoc coalition of countries in each case. Within this fluid array Canada has combined less frequently with historical partners and powers — notably the U.S., Britain, and even France — and more frequently with the rising powers Germany, Italy, and Japan, all also excluded from the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC).

The classic **North Atlantic** “Anglo-Saxon” triumvirate of America-Britain-Canada did arise on trade liberalization issues. Yet Canada and Britain more typically joined with France, against the U.S., in a **Commonwealth-Francophonie** coalition on development, debt, African, and North-South issues. The arrival of France's François Mitterrand in 1981 permitted the “**francophone twins**” to ally on political issues, notably East-West security in 1983 (with quiet German encouragement) and strong sanctions against China in 1989 and 1990.

Canada's alignment with the rising powers of Italy, Germany, and Japan grew. **Italy** and Canada came together as the “**outer two**,” against the inner five, over agenda and membership issues, notably on the production of a formal political declaration in 1980–81, enlargement of the G5 finance ministers group in 1986, a statement on South Africa in 1987, and membership in the Bosnian Contact Group in 1994.

Canada and **Germany** led on political issues, from skyjacking in 1978, to East-West reassurance in 1983–84 and assistance to the former USSR and Central and Eastern Europe after 1990. Germany, Canada, and, at times, Italy (with French support in 1989) formed the vanguard **ecological triumvirate** within the G8. They created the G7 environment ministers forum in 1992, 1994, and 1995.

The Canadian-**Japanese** partnership started to develop from the start (Kirton 1998). The civilian power coalition of Canada, Germany, Italy, and Japan — all excluded from the P5 — sprung to life with the Cold War's end. Since 1999, the four were the pioneers of the G8's conflict prevention agenda, over the resistance of the Russians and, above all, the French (Kirton and Stefanova 2003). The latter feared the G8 would replace the

UNSC, where they enjoyed a more secure P5 position, as the effective centre of global security governance (Kirton 2000b). At Genoa in 2001 Canada joined with Japan and Russia to agree to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and bring it into legal force, even though the U.S. stayed out.

Through these fluid partnerships with rising G8 partners, Canada increasingly prevailed. In 1977, Trudeau put nuclear proliferation on the table and enlarged the agenda to embrace North-South relations and human rights. Canada worked with host Germany at Bonn in 1978 to combat terrorist aircraft hijackings, and at Tokyo in 1979 to control climate change. Building on earlier Japanese and Italian advances, as host in 1981 Canada had the G7 produce its first ever “Chairman’s Summary of Political Issues” (Hajnal 1999). Trudeau also persuaded the new, reluctant, right-wing U.S. president Reagan to go with his G7 colleagues to the 1981 Cancun Summit on International Cooperation and Development to negotiate a new North-South deal.

In some cases, Canada stood **alone** at the start, ultimately to prevail. At Williamsburg in 1983, Trudeau, with overt support from only France’s Mitterrand, forced an initially reluctant Reagan, backed by Britain’s Thatcher, to produce a separate political declaration that included a passage adjusting the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and authorizing the **peace initiative** Trudeau subsequently undertook. At the Venice Summit in 1987, Mulroney demanded and got a statement condemning **apartheid in South Africa**, which successive summits strengthened until a transformed South Africa arrived.

Delivery; Canada’s Compliance

Fifth, Canada has long **delivered** these decisions by **complying** highly with its summit commitments, and increasingly induced its more powerful G8 partners to do so too. From 1975 to 1989, Canada ranked **second** in compliance (von Furstenberg and Daniels 1991). From 1988 to 1995, its compliance with the G7’s commitments on sustainable development, debt relief for the poorest, and Russian assistance **rose**, as did that of the G8’s most powerful member, the United States (Kokotsis 1999). From 1996 to 2008, Canada ranked **first**, while most of the other members continued to comply quite well. The G8 club had come to constrain its members more equally, including its most powerful one.

With regard to **climate change**, Canadian compliance is higher when the core international organization is included in the commitment, when commitments are given priority placement, and when international law is not invoked. On health, Canadian compliance decreases when past promises are cited and when a specific agent is indicated. A large number of total catalysts raises Canada’s compliance (Kirton and Guebert in press).

Developing Global Governance

Sixth, Canada has **developed global governance** by institutionalizing the G8. Canada has permanently secured a full, top-tier, equal presence in every part of a rapidly expanding G8 system that now includes the G20 at the summit level. In the G8, despite

resistance from France as host of the first summit, Canada asserted its desire for membership. Even before the first gathering at Rambouillet in 1975, Canada secured a promise from Henry Kissinger, on behalf of U.S. president Gerald Ford, that there would be another summit, that the U.S. would host it, and that Canada attend. Kissinger did so as the result of a rational calculation of Canada's globally ranking energy and commodity power, and America's need for it, in a crisis-ridden world (Eayrs 1975; von Riekhoff 1974; Kissinger 1979). All other summit members save France agreed. Thus as the G7 moved from being an ad hoc gathering first conceived on the margins of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1974, through Rambouillet, to become an institutionalized annual gathering at Puerto Rico in 1976, Canada's full membership was quickly achieved. Since 1982, there has been no serious sign that any G8 member government has ever sought to reduce or remove Canada's presence or remove it; nor has the G8 been replaced or reinforced by a similar institution with Canada left out.

At the ministerial level, Canada created bodies on subjects of its concern. It was a charter member of the Quad, created at Montebello in 1981 as the first G7 stand-alone ministerial forum, it comprised a smaller group of much bigger powers — the U.S., Japan, and the European Union (Kirton 2007a, 2007b). Canada was also there from the 1984 start of the annual G7 foreign ministers' meeting, held at the September opening of the UN General Assembly. In 1986, at Italian initiative and with the support of U.S. treasury secretary James Baker, Canada secured membership in the G7 finance ministers' forum that soon replaced the pre-existing G5. In 1986, Canada and Italy transformed the G5 finance ministers club into a G7 one. In Winnipeg in 1994, Canada hosted a G7 ministerial conference on financial assistance for Ukraine. As the G7/8 subsequently spawned many more ministerial forums, Canada was automatically in, even over Kosovo in 1999, as the G8 itself took control (Heinbecker and McRae 2001). At the ministerial level, the Montebello Summit created the Trade Ministers Quadrilateral (Quad), the first stand-alone G7 forum for ministers not regularly involved in the summit itself (Cohn 2002). In Ottawa in 1995, Canada held the first G7 ministerial meeting on terrorism, in response to the fusion of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction with the sarin gas attacks on Tokyo's subway. In late 2001, following the anthrax attacks in the U.S., Canada hosted the first meeting of the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI), which gathered the ministers of the G7 and Mexico. In Windsor, Ontario, in September 2002, Canada founded the G8 ministerial forum for development co-operation.

In helping to create G8 institutions for terrorism, where no UN body existed, and for health and development, where the World Health Organization (WHO) and International Labour Organization (ILO) had long operated, Canada was reinforcing and even replacing the UN as the effective governance centre. These post-Cold War creations followed Canada's ambitious, but unsuccessful effort to reform the UN and Bretton Woods institutions at the 1995 G7 Halifax Summit.

More expansively, since 1999 Canada has done much to found, chair, and shape the G8-incubated **G20** forum of finance ministers and central banker governors. Paul Martin led in creating the club, in response to the Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997-99

(Kirton 2001; Summers 2008). Martin hosted the second meeting in Montreal in 2000. He also hosted the third in Ottawa in November 2001, when the September 11 terrorist attacks meant that the designated host no longer could (Kirton 2005). It was the successful performance of the G20 finance forum that led George W. Bush to choose this group to be elevated to the leaders level in November 2008, to respond to the American-turned-global financial crisis then (Price 2009).

Canada's emergence as an influential principal power in the G8 can be seen by charting Canada's summit diplomacy along five dimensions: presence as a full member of all G8 groups; public acclaim at home for its G8 diplomacy, participation in asserting agenda items, positions, principles, and initiatives based on national interest, values, and preferences; partnerships in coalitions with any other member, against any other member, as Canadian interests, values and preferences direct; and prevailing in producing the summit's collective directions and decisions. At one end of the spectrum lies the **diplomacy of support**, where Canada is present in G8 forums through American sponsorship alone, relies on American initiative, supports American-led coalitions, and acquiesces in and adjusts to American-generated G8 decisions, in ways the Canadian public and media recognize and dislike. At the other end lies the **diplomacy of concert** where Canada participates over American opposition, joins or initiates coalitions against America, and secures collective endorsements in ways that are applauded at home.¹

During the first two seven-year cycles of G8 summitry, the diplomacy of concert increasingly prevailed.

Canada as a Successful Summiteer, 1975–94

Canada was not present at the first G8 summit, at **Rambouillet, France in November 1975**. It was called when a previously anti-American France and Germany came under new leadership as the veteran Library Group finance ministers, Valery Giscard D'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt took the top jobs. They called a one-off G5 Summit in Rambouillet, France in November 1975. Kissinger agreed that the United States would go, and in order to bring his new concert to life. To this gathering Japan as a G5 member was invited. At American insistence, Italy was a last minute addition to the club. Left out was Canada, a country which former French President Charles De Gaulle had recently sought to destroy.²

Before the Rambouillet Summit had even started, Kissinger had concluded that the world needed this concert of democratic major powers as a permanent international institution, and that the Group, and America, needed Canada inside. Canada was America's leading trading partner, a good NATO ally, a next door neighbour to America's new accidental President Ford from Michigan, and a loyal North American partner that could balance the Europeans that numerically dominated the new club. Far more importantly Canada had

¹ In between these poles lie the diplomacy of constraint within the concert, where Canada assembles coalitions of lesser major powers to adjust the behaviour of the predominant and unilateral America, and the diplomacy of compromise within the concert, where Canada mediates between America and a ranking rival, often the G8's co-founder, France.

² It was Japan which told Canada what happened at Rambouillet (Kirton 1998, Kirton and Kurosawa 1995).

the capability America needed – a leading global rank in oil, gas, uranium and the other resources needed to save America and the democratic world from economic strangulation and political blackmail by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and all the other copycat commodity cartels that were sure to come (Kirton 1995, Kissinger 1999).³ It also helped that Canada, in words of high praise in the Kissingerian lexicon, conducted a “global foreign policy” (Kissinger 1980).

As a traditional realist, Kissinger was much less concerned about Canada’s particular distinctive national values, and how well they fit with the particular shared social purpose of the new Group. Canada’s mutually reinforcing array of distinctive national values consist of anti-militarism (especially an antipathy to nuclear weapons), openness (in economic, social, cultural, demographic and political life), globalism (in its foreign policy vision and international institutional affiliations), multiculturalism (especially in regard to the rights of minorities), environmentalism (as custodian of the physically fragile global commons) and egalitarianism (including income redistribution among regions and individuals and, since the 1960’s. the provision of high quality, publicly funded health care for all regardless of their individual ability to pay). At their constitutional core lie Canada’s collective ideals of “peace, order, and good governance”, a sharp contrast with the individualistic American equivalents of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”

With these ideals Canada arrived at the second, now G7, Summit at **San Juan, Puerto Rico in June 1976**. It was hosted at a luxury seaside hotel on America’s Atlantic Seaboard at San Juan Puerto Rico, by a Republican Party U. S. President facing re-election in six months. Not surprisingly given the calculus of capability, Kissinger had Ford ask Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau to lead off the Summit’s discussion on energy. Not surprisingly Trudeau, knowing that his G8 partners needed Canada’s energy capabilities, felt free to pursue the calculus of shared social purpose, based on Canada’s distinctive national values of environmentalism and anti-militarism. From the need to secure the supply and price of oil, he sought to draw the link to the need for energy conservation. From the need to develop alternative energy sources by building civilian nuclear power within oil-deprived G7 countries, he sought to draw the link to the need to prevent nuclear proliferation in the military field. This was an acute concern for both Canada and the United States, given India’s nuclear explosion, using Canadian and American nuclear technology and materials, in May 1974 –ending the first long decade of nuclear non-proliferation since China had exploded in 1964. The shock of the Indian nuclear explosion showed how once pacifist polities would deceive, would use the pretext of the oil crisis to justify an aggressive nuclear program, and how the realms of economics and energy on the one hand, and politics and military security on the other, were indivisibly linked. It also dramatically demonstrated how much the multilateral UN system, from its legalized nuclear non-proliferation regime to its heavily organized functional International Atomic Energy Agency or central Security Council, had failed.

³ Kissinger’s concerns about copycat commodity cartels and Canada’s temptation to join them were not merely theoretical. For Canada formed a cartel with France, South Africa and the Soviet Union to control the global supply and price of uranium, which was, after oil, the next important internationally trade energy commodity.

In the face of such a systemic shock an international institutional failure, the G7, led by anti nuclear crusader Pierre Trudeau and former nuclear submarine engineer Jimmy Carter were forced to act. The next year, at London 1977, Canada succeeded in forging the epistemic link and giving birth to the first G8-created institution, the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), to give it international political effect.

At **Bonn 1978** Canada moved from energy to terrorism as its major contribution. It joined with the Germans to invent spontaneously at the Summit a new, effective G8 anti-terrorism regime to combat an epidemic of “skyjacking.” Terrorist skyjacking constituted a new, far less controllable kind of shock. It came directly from inside G8 polities, from disaffected domestic groups who deliberately killed, at times in league with loosely organized transnational networks and with support from rogue states. It was inspired by a desire, not to change a particular policy, political regime or even individual polity, but to destroy an entire way of life defined by secular democratic market principles. Exploiting the technological advances of modernity, it used many low cost methods to disproportionate deadly effect. And it deliberately targeted not only state agents but also innocent civilians, making it the first, intentionally designed by indiscriminately deadly, human security threat. Skyjacking was a subject where the UN Security Council, General Assembly or International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) responded formal multilateral organizations filled with Westphalian charters silent on such subjects and with many sovereign state members who saw terrorists as “freedom fighters.” They were thus unable and unwilling to react. The G8 and Canada were. Germany and Europe were the immediate vulnerable victims. Canada was the country at the Summit with the correct specialized capability to stop the threat, thanks to a geographically great Canada’s top global rank as a civil aviation power, and its institutional expertise and connections as the home of ICAO, headquartered in Montreal.

At the **Tokyo in 1979**, the Iranian revolution brought another shock. It was in part a second oil shock, but one now fused with domestic Islamic fundamentalist revolution in a power long a loyal American partner in the Middle East, and one that brought state sponsored terrorism in its wake. As a good environmentalist and globalist, Canada’s new Prime Minister Joe Clark, leading a Progressive Conservative minority government, faithfully accepted the Summit’s agreed-upon oil conservation targets, implemented them by dramatically raising Canadian gasoline prices, and was driven to defeat in Parliament and the ensuing election as a result. As a good multiculturalist, Canada also strongly supported Tokyo’s initiative to protect the largely francophone Indochinese refugees.

At the **Venice in 1980**, as a good globalist, Canada supported the Italians, over the resistance of France and other UNSC permanent five veto powers, in the successful effort to make the G7 an overt political security forum.

At **Montebello, Quebec in 1981**, when Canada hosted its first Summit, it sought and secured the extended expressions of these priority pursuits. In its pursuit of anti-militarism and good governance, it transformed the G7 into a prominent self professed political-security institution by issuing the G7’s first stand alone comprehensive political declaration. As an egalitarian, Canada focused its Summit on North-South relations, and

secured the agreement of the new U. S. right wing Republican President Ronald Reagan to attend the Cancun Summit of a G20-like group of leaders – for a dialogue to pave the way for the global negotiations demanded by the commodity empowered emerging South. As a globalist committed to anti-militarism and openness, Canada used Montebello to pave the way for the birth of two new G8-centered institutions – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that expanded to include other countries, and a smaller Trade Ministers Quadrilateral that included only the U.S., Japan, Canada and the European Union as one.

During the second, seven year cycle of Summitry, Canada at first served as the loyal opposition, with Pierre Trudeau joining fellow francophone France and Social democrat-led German to affirm the values of egalitarianism, against the market fundamentalism, or emerging Washington Consensus, favoured by America's Ronald Reagan and Britain's Margaret Thatcher. Canada's greatest success came at the U.S. hosted **Williamsburg Summit in 1983**, where Canada secured an addition to the Political Declaration committing leaders to high level dialogue with a Soviet Union within whom the U.S. did not hold a bilateral Summit for five years. At **London in 1984** a globalist Canada secured a stand alone Group of Seven Foreign ministers, meeting for dinner at the opening of the UNGA each September. At **Bonn in 1985**, with Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney replacing Trudeau, Canada's emphasis shifted to openness in trade, resulting in the launch of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations launched over French objections in September 1986, as an institutional building globalist, a new Group of Seven Finance Ministers forum at the Tokyo Summit of 1986. At **Venice in 1987**, a multicultural, egalitarian globalist, Mulroney, over Thatcher's adamant opposition, hijacked the Summit to start the G7's long and ultimately successful campaign against apartheid and for real democracy in Commonwealth South Africa.

At **Toronto in June 1988**, Mulroney hosted Canada's second Summit six months before the general election over Canada's highly controversial new bilateral free trade agreement with the United States took place. Openness, egalitarianism and environmentalism took centre stage. Mulroney made modest international policy gains in moving the multilateral Uruguay Round forward and major domestic political gains in securing G7 endorsement for his bilateral free trade agreement, paving the way for his majority electoral victory in the fall. But the most durable achievement at Toronto was the start of debt relief for the world's poorest countries, most of whom were Canada's compatriots in the Commonwealth and la Francophonie, above all in Africa which, linguistically and culturally, is a Canada writ large on a continental scale. Mulroney also has the Summit focus on long term issues, such as the environment, education and literacy.

During the Summits of the third cycle from 1989 to 1995, Canada's G7 diplomacy flourished, as the post cold war order was shaped by G7 collectively, rather than by a victorious U.S. now devoid of a "superpower" rival, acting alone (cf. Ikenberry 2001). Canada's leadership was evident as an environmentalist on a broad array of sustainable development issues. At **Paris 1989** and **Houston 1990** Canada helped convince President Bush to attend the 1992 Rio Conference on the Environment and Development, and thus

allowed the Conventions on Climate Change and Biodiversity to be born. At **London 1991** an anti-militarist Canada pushed the Summit into stronger action against the conventional arms trade. At **Bonn 1992** a multicultural Canada committed to protect minorities led the charge in getting the G7 to promise to take all necessary means to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. At **Tokyo 1993** a Canada committed to openness under Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Kim Campbell led the Summit in forging the critical market access agreement that ensured to long overdue completion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) Uruguay Round. At **Naples in 1994**, the new Liberal Government of Jean Chretien, in the spirit of inclusive democratic globalism, helped bring a reforming Russia into the G7's new Political Eight (P8).

Canada's Summit Leadership, 1995–2001

Since 1995, this pattern intensified. Canada increasingly acted as a G8 leader and delivered results that shaped the G8 system and global order as a whole.

At **Halifax in 1995**, when Chretien hosted the G8, he put globalism at the centre, in the form of a comprehensive focus on the needs of the global community in the twenty first century, and how the United Nations institutions bred in 1994-5 could be reformed to meet these needs. Substantial reform was the result, especially in regard to the international financial system where, in a spirit of openness, new principles were put in place prior to the Asian-turned global financial crisis that erupted from 1997-1999. But openness was limited by egalitarianism. For led by its Finance Minister Paul Martin within the G7 finance ministers forums, Canada successfully resisted the otherwise unanimous effort to affirm the principle of full capital account liberalism in an amended Articles of Agreement of the IMF, and pressed for an emergency escaped clause mechanism that eventually yields a less destructive solution for countries facing bankruptcy. Moreover, Canada as a globalist and G7 host gave birth to a new G8 ministerial forum on counter-terrorism, which, in response to the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway and assaults on American forces in the Middle East, held its first meeting in Ottawa on December 12th. As Appendix B shows, Canada in 1995 was able to host its most successful Summit and one of the most successful ever, with new highs in the number of concrete commitments, compliance with them during the following year, G8 ministerial bodies created, and remit mandates that bound the agenda and work of the Summit the following year.

For Halifax, the leaders focused on the challenges of the fast approaching 21st century, and the reform of the current multilateral organizations needed to meet these needs (Fréchette 1995). American president Bill Clinton had proposed at Naples in 1994 that this topic serve as next year's theme at Halifax. Chrétien agreed, and found a formula to make this a wide-ranging, action-oriented review. The results seemed substantial when the summit ended. But they were only partly implemented by the slow-moving multilateral organizations under scrutiny, and proved inadequate to prevent the crises of globalization that quickly came.

Canada succeeded more durably in encouraging Russia's participation, in advancing the principles of sustainable development, in curtailing development assistance to recipients with excessive military expenditures, and in fostering a report on the implementation of G7 commitments (Bartleman 2005; Bayne 2000; Smith 1996; Boehm 1996). Canada also staved off an ill-prepared American initiative to launch a neoliberal "Open Markets 2000" round of trade liberalization immediately after the Uruguay round had successfully concluded. In December, as its hosting ended, Canada presciently helped create a G7 ministerial forum for counterterrorism.

Canada's greatest success came in using the summit for domestic political management, to defend its deepest national interest of survival. Chrétien chose to hold the 1995 summit at the time the separatists in Quebec had selected for their referendum on secession. He moved the location, originally set for Quebec City, to Halifax to remind France that Canada's military had shipped out from there twice in the 20th century to fight and die for freedom with, for, and in France. Chrétien also reminded his fellow Quebecers that a separate Quebec would be physically cut off from so much, including the G7 summit system, should they vote the wrong way. On the summit's opening night Chrétien changed the carefully prepared summit schedule to accommodate the last-minute political needs of France's Jacques Chirac. Chrétien had the summit issue a special G7 statement on Bosnia, where Canadian and French forces had arrived in the G7 vanguard in 1992. With the leaders of France and a united G7 all showing support for a united Canada, the separatist leaders in Quebec postponed their referendum until the fall, when they narrowly lost.

At **Lyon in 1996**, Canada was eager to show that it, as the only other francophone G7 power, was a full partner of France as host. Both were enthusiastic about the summit's priorities of development, debt relief for the poorest, development assistance, and Africa. Canada also helped the summit support the democratic forces in Russia in securing their electoral victory and reassure Ukraine, and the many Canadians who could trace their origins there, that they would not be forgotten. Chrétien also helped show that the nuclear plant at Chernobyl would be closed, that nuclear proliferation would be stopped, and that Canada's CANDU program was safe. Canada worked with France and Russia to host a special Political Eight (P8) nuclear safety summit in Moscow prior to Lyon, and strengthen Canada's distinctive national values of anti-nuclear weapons and environmentalism as a result (Bartleman 2005). Canada also helped a newly vulnerable America, just hit by a new deadly attack from terrorists in Saudi Arabia, by extending the new G8 counterterrorism ministerial forum into the Lyon Group.

At the **Denver Summit of the Eight in 1997**, Chrétien worked with Clinton to welcome Russia as a virtually full participant, and to advance climate change and African development. Chrétien also secured from the previously reluctant G8 leaders support for the Ottawa process on landmines. He helped save the summit when already frustrated European leaders, asked by Clinton to wear a cowboy costume to the evening's entertainment, were on the point of walking out. Chrétien intervened to say that he would attend in his own cowboy outfit, but an all-Canadian one from the Calgary Stampede.

The **Birmingham Summit in 1998** was the first since the financial crisis that erupted three weeks after Denver had infected many countries in Asia (Kirton 1999, 2000a). It delivered Canada's earlier preferences for a new summit format, one that included Russia as a full, permanent member and had G8 leaders meet alone to address informally a few major themes. With Britain and France, Canada extended debt relief for the poorest. When a nuclear explosion by India interrupted the summit, Chrétien was asked to contact rival Pakistan on behalf of the G8 to urge restraint. He did so to no avail.

At **Cologne in 1999**, Canada joined with the German host, with its "red-green" coalition government, to produce a new "Cologne consensus" on socially sustainable globalization. (Kirton, Daniels, and Freytag 2001). Along with Britain and France, Canada advanced debt relief for the poorest. With Britain it pushed to inject ground forces for combat into Kosovo, leading the Yugoslav forces to withdraw voluntarily and stop the emerging genocide. At Cologne and afterward, Canada joined with Germany and Italy to mount a major G8 conflict prevention program (Kirton and Stefanova 2004).

At **Okinawa in 2000**, Canada's supported host Japan's desire to focus on information technology for development across the growing digital divide, rather than just for economic liberalization in the rich North (Kirton and von Furstenberg 2001). Canada helped the G8 adopt the principle of cultural diversity, infusing Canada's distinctive national value of multiculturalism into the 21st-century world order. Canada also helped move the G8 foreign ministers' agreement in principle on conflict prevention into five specific items, mostly in areas that Canada's human security initiative had pioneered (Kirton and Takase 2002; Lamy 2002). However, Canada failed to get much on debt relief for the poorest or on a food safety regime that respected Canada's use of genetically modified organisms.

For **Genoa on July 20-22, 2001**, Canada and host Italy collaborated on a strategy that would extend into Canada's hosting the next year. Canada's sought to have the summit reduce poverty, provide debt relief, control infectious disease, close the digital divide, link trade and development, and prevent conflict. It succeeded in having the summit focus on Africa, establish the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and recognize that multilateral trade liberalization should support development. It also saw the summit appoint special African personal representatives (APRs), with Canada's in the chair from the start, to help develop an action plan for Africa for the Canadian-hosted summit the following year.

Canada, Italy, and Germany broadened the G8's **conflict prevention** program into the environmental and gender domains. Canada agreed with Japan and Russia that all three would ratify the **Kyoto** protocol, renounced by America's Bush, and thus bring the protocol into international legal force. Yet the innovative Canadian-supported Renewable Energies Task Force and the Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOT Force), created at Okinawa, but disliked by Bush, did not have their mandates renewed (Stephens 2006; Hart 2005).

Canada's Leadership: Kananaskis 2002 to Gleneagles 2005

Al Qaeda was thwarted in its plans to kill the G8 leaders assembled at the Palazzo Ducale in Genoa by flying hijacking a commandeered civilian aircraft into the building. Seven weeks later, on September 11, 2001, it succeeded in striking the Pentagon and World Trade Center in the same way. Canada's immediate reaction was to mobilize the G8 to deliver a compelling collective response.

Finance minister Paul Martin immediately phoned his G7 colleagues, who agreed there should be a statement that they had confidence in the world's financial system. The statement, drafted by Canada's finance officials, immediately was issued in Italy, as the G8 host (Gray 2003, 214–15). The next day, Chrétien, along with Italian chair Silvio Berlusconi and Russia's Vladimir Putin, publicly called for the G8 to define the American and allied response. Chrétien rejected Alberta's premier Ralph Klein's suggestion that Canada's G8 in Alberta 2002 be cancelled or moved. Martin's finance department mobilized the G7/8's to fight terrorist financing, building on the work of the 1989 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), where implementation had been sluggish (Scherrer 2006). By mid December 2001, 196 countries and other jurisdictions had expressed support for the campaign against terrorist financing, 139 had issued blocking orders, and the U.S. had expressed satisfaction with G8 and G20 - members shared financial intelligence (Dam 2001).

G7 finance ministers met in Washington soon after the attack, even though most multilateral organizations stayed closed. In November in Ottawa, Martin hosted the G20 ministerial, which would have otherwise been cancelled, as well as the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the IMF–World Bank's Development Committee (Kirton 2001b). The G20 meeting produced a strong consensus on combating terrorist finance, which was endorsed by the IMF and World Bank. It also endorsed Canada's preferred themes for the Kananaskis G8 of global growth and poverty reduction.

G8 foreign ministers met in New York in November, on the eve of UNGA's delayed opening. They considered how to put al Qaeda leaders on trial when they were captured. At the end of December, under Russian leadership, they called on India and Pakistan to exercise restraint in the face of a looming war sparked by a terrorist incident. The G8's group on terrorism, now fused with the Lyon Group, and the G8 group on nonproliferation were charged with contributing to the antiterrorism campaign.

As Canada's 2002 Kananaskis Summit approached, Chrétien remained determined that the September 11 terrorists would not hijack the G8 summit agenda agreed to at Genoa, and that the summit would unfold the way he had long felt it should (Kirton 2002b; Smith 2001-02). He sought to deliver a Montebello in the mountain — an informal gathering of leaders in a secluded setting, with minimum ceremony, small delegations, no surrounding media and civil society, and no elaborately negotiated final communiqué. At the final sherpa meeting of the Italian presidency in December 2001, Canada proposed an agenda for Kananaskis that focused tightly on Africa, growth and terrorism. Canada sought to deliver a new paradigm for development in which recipient governments, the private

sector, and civil society were full partners. It sought to strengthen the good global growth prospects through structural reforms that enhanced productivity and were tailored to local circumstances. It sought to have existing commitments against terrorism fully implemented, made comprehensive, and reinforced by new capacity.

To help realize its core objective of **African development** Canada added \$1 billion in official development assistance (ODA) in its December 2001 budget, and created the Canada Fund for Africa with another \$500 million to be disbursed over three years. This down payment helped catalyze major new pledges from the U.S., Europe, and Japan at the 2002 UN Conference on Financing for Development in Monterey. Canada also looked for a compromise between the Americans' desire for the International Development Association (IDA) to give money as grants rather than concessional loans and the Europeans' concern that such a shift would soon deplete the IDA's resources without new money. Canada also continued its campaign for greater private sector participation in responding to financial crises, securing greater support after Argentina produced the world's largest default ever in 2001.

On sustaining **global growth**, Canada emphasized greater productivity as key to overcome the costs of terrorism being priced into G7 economies, and to resolve the debate between an America preferring fiscal stimulus and a Europe favouring fiscal restraint. Canada saw the launch of Doha Development Agenda by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as helping generate productivity-led global growth.

On terrorism, Canada sought to implement and render comprehensive and global the G20's Action Plan on Terrorist Financing. With Commonwealth Caribbean countries in its constituency in the IMF, and with experience in instituting its own system for financial tracking, Canada sought an endorsement for capacity building, unlike France and Italy, which thought sanctions alone would work.

Kananaskis turned out to be the **most successful** summit to that time (Fowler 2003; Langdon 2003; Kirton and Kokotsis 2003). It produced a historically high 188 commitments. It mobilized close to \$50 billion in new monies for global public goods — \$20 billion for the Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, up to \$6 billion for African development, \$1 billion to top up the trust fund for heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), and \$28 billion for the 13th replenishment of IDA funds. Only in finance were there few results.

At Kananaskis, four leaders from **Africa's** leading democratic middle powers participated as equals in the final summit session. The G8 further agreed that **Russia** would host the summit for the first time, in 2006. They did much to make the G8 a permanent body by defining the **hosting** order for the next eight years.

The French-hosted **Evian Summit in June 2003** was held amidst severe transatlantic tension, between France and the U.S. over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March. Canada's objectives were to preserve the Kananaskis legacy and ensure its commitments were implemented. Canada succeeded, both in the substance of the 206 commitments

made at Evian and in the participation of the African leaders once again. Canada, with the world's longest coastline, also strongly and successfully supported a European initiative, resisted by Japan, to tighten rules on maritime tanker safety. Canada's environmental values were further advanced by the Evian commitments on water and on science and technology for sustainable development. Evian started rising power outreach welcoming the leaders of India, China, Brazil, Mexico, and other emerging economies. Their session with G8 leaders, judged productive by all, provided a precedent that Canada's next prime minister — Paul Martin — could use as he sought to realize his vision of having the G8 summit broadened into a G20 one.

The U.S.-hosted **Sea Island Summit in June 2004** was the first for Paul Martin as prime minister. It was held on the eve of the election campaign he had called for June 28. Canada's priority was to preserve and extend the Kananaskis legacy (Kirton 2005a). This it did with further action on the transport security component of counterterrorism, supporting the launch of the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI). On the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Canada helped add a newly converted Libya and still conflict-ridden Iraq to the list of eligible recipients of support. And Canada sought and secured, over U.S. reluctance, money for Africa as well as participation from Africa.

Canada helped lead in controlling polio and the proliferation of HIV/AIDS. Using the UN report written by Paul Martin and former Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo, Martin also led on private sector-led development (Commission on the Private Sector and Development 2003). A multicultural Canada concerned about national unity had the G8 spontaneously include **Haiti** in its discussions of security issues on the summit's second night. Most broadly, a globalist Canada succeeded in having a skeptical George Bush produce a full-strength, highly successful summit with a very broad range of subjects reflecting the priorities of both America as host as well as its G8 partners (Kirton 2005a; Bayne 2005). Martin's performance earned him a badly needed bounce in his sagging popularity back home.

At the British-hosted **Gleneagles Summit in July 2005**, Canada again advanced its interests and values. It did so without much initiative from a prime minister constrained by a minority government and a Liberal Party-generated national unity scandal at home. The two British priorities of African development and climate change were tailor made for Canada. Early on Canada helped stop some ill-conceived British initiatives to have G8 leaders commit to 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to ODA and to mount a massive international finance facility. Paul Martin worked successfully with host Tony Blair to eliminate the debt of the poorest, double ODA, and involve America and others outside the Kyoto protocol's cutback commitments in a new dialogue on climate change.

Stephen Harper's Summits

St. Petersburg 2006

The St. Petersburg Summit in 2006 marked the first outing on the world stage for Prime Minister Stephen Harper, elected with a minority government on January 23. It was the

second time in G8 history that Canada was represented at a summit focused on energy security by a young Albertan with little previous interest or involvement in international affairs, no ministerial experience, and leading a new Conservative party, a minority government, and a cabinet with virtually no foreign policy experience at all.

Harper immediately sent his new ministers to Moscow for G8 meetings. From his Liberal predecessors, Harper inherited Canadian responses to the initial Russian concept papers on energy security, health, and education. Canada sought to make the Russian concept of energy security much more market friendly. On education, Canada had provinces jealous of their constitutional responsibility for this subject, and no federal education department. It also sought to accommodate Quebec over all and in the education field (by allowing Quebec participation at the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization [UNESCO]).

Harper held several bilateral summit meetings on the way to the summit. At St. Petersburg, he met with host Putin, and held a Canada–European Union trilateral. By the time he sat down at the G8 table, he had met six of the fellow leaders assembling there. Harper participated substantially, speaking French half the time. He intervened on several issues, helping the summit set new market-friendly and environmentally sensitive directions on energy security (Kirton, Larionova, and Savona 2010).

Harper's major contribution came on the **Middle East**. When Hamas and Hezbollah attacked Israel just before the summit, Canada ensured that the G8's recently forged consensus on Iran's nuclear program extended to the war against terrorists in Lebanon as well. The Russians, as host, had drafted a four-paragraph statement on the Middle East that reflected their standard UN-based approach. Canada, despite summit protocol, immediately circulated an alternative, longer draft. It infuriated the Russians but secured the support of the Americans. Harper emphasized that the G8 had to consider how this crisis started, with the attacks on Israel. The leaders decided on the three outstanding issues, in the way the Russian host wanted, and then largely accepted the Canadian draft. In the outreach session the following day, UN secretary general Kofi Annan said he would ask for a UN resolution based on the G8 text. The balance and substance of the G8 statement were well reflected in UNSC Resolution 1701 that August. Due to the presence at St. Petersburg of Annan as well as the P5 veto power of China and the other members of the G8's Plus Five, the G8 directions and decisions were directly accepted by the much broader UN and due to Harper's leadership, by the Francophone Summit in the fall. Harper's initiative and the Canadian draft flowed from his own commitment to democracy and anti-terrorism. Canada also worked closely with Nicholas Burns, the U.S. under secretary of state for political affairs, in producing the successful statement.

On **energy**, Canada's stress on the core principle of open markets, shared by the U.S. and Britain, prevailed. The statist concept of "security of demand" was not endorsed. On **education**, Canada's effort to reframe the priority as human capital and innovation was supported by a U.S. focused on the knowledge economy. It was successful in avoiding separatist resistance in Quebec even if areas of provincial jurisdiction remained in the G8 text.

Heiligendamm 2007

At the German hosted Heiligendamm Summit in 2007, Germans were pushing for a hard target and timetable in the communiqué for controlling **climate change**. With the failure of Kyoto in mind, Harper was reluctant to sign on. After several sherpa meetings and a phone call with Chancellor Angela Merkel, however, Harper adjusted. By May 31, Canada agreed that it would accept the proposed reduction target of 50 percent by 2050. On June 4, at a Canada-EU summit, Canada confirmed its support for tackling greenhouse gas emissions and committed to building an effective post-Kyoto framework. For Canada, this meant getting the Americans, and emerging economies — particularly China and India — on board. The Germans and Europeans were very pleased with Canada's shift. Canada thus became the bridge between the hesitant United States and the aggressive Europeans. In the lead-up to the G8 environment ministers' meeting, John Baird announced that Canada was working hard to include the United States and the emerging economies in the climate change discussions. By the end of the summit, Harper had helped bring Bush's America, along with China's Hu Jintao and India's Manmohan Singh, into a converging climate change consensus.

On G8 outreach, Heiligendamm was the fourth summit known as the Group of Five (G5, Outreach Five and Plus Five — China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa) had been invited to since 2003. Whether they should be included more substantially sparked a debate. The Japanese, Canadians, Germans, and Russians were reluctant to expand. Harper understood the importance of having these emerging powers included in discussions on climate change and the economy. But the democratic values that the G8 was founded on and that Harper was keen to promote were not shared with all G5 members, most importantly China. In the end, Harper and the others compromised. The G8 established the Heiligendamm Process of a two-year, official-level dialogue on designated topics among the two groups as equals (Kirton 2008). The process would give the G5 a more concrete, but still partial, role in the G8 club, and give the reluctant G8 members time to test the waters and see what full expansion might entail in the future.

Within in the G8, many leaders, including Harper, were concerned about **Russia's** democratic deficit. The summit gave Harper a chance to express his concerns directly to Putin and for the G8 to reaffirm the democratic principles that pervaded their communiqués.

On **development**, Canada was reluctant to commit more money. Instead, it emphasized the need to strengthen aid effectiveness. Harper received much criticism for this stance. Celebrity activist Bono called Canada a “laggard” on African aid and accused Canada of blocking G8 progress in the area (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2007).

On Afghanistan, Harper continued to lead. Canada pledged \$200 million for reconstruction efforts. It continued to encourage fellow members to help promote democracy in the region by sending troops.

Toyako 2008

At the Japanese-hosted Hokkaido-Toyako Summit in July 2008, leaders convened just as the world **economy** was about to enter its biggest downturn since the Great Depression. However, despite skyrocketing oil prices and warnings from the IMF and Financial Stability Forum (FSF) that things were about to get very ugly, G8 leaders continued to declare that their economies were strong. They confidently proclaimed: “We remain positive about the long-term resilience of our economies and future global economic growth” (G8 2008).

The summit’s biggest achievement was on **climate** change where several new agreements represented a striking acceptance of Harper’s core approach. The G8 and their major outreach partners agreed that they must and would control their carbon. They endorsed a sectoral, bottom-up approach that enabled everyone to contribute to carbon control right away, and improve their performance as knowledge, technology and competitive pressures grew. They also accepted the relevance of carbon **sinks**, starting with avoiding deforestation that would allow the biologically diverse powers of Brazil, Indonesia, the U.S. and Russia to make an enhanced contribution that was finally counted. Together these new principles of “**all in**,” “**bottom up**,” and “**sinks count**” formed the foundation for a “beyond Kyoto” regime that promised to cope effectively with the urgent and existential problem of climate change. All leaders also agreed to cut their carbon emissions by at least 50 percent by 2050. They also agreed on the importance of setting **medium-term targets** and timetables, which would build on the considerable commonality that already existed.

On **food**, the G8 endorsed a strategic grains reserve, where countries promised in a coordinated manner to stockpile grains that would be released into the market when scarcity arose. This would help lower food prices, inflation, and stagflation in the G8 and stop starvation, malnutrition, and social unrest in the developing world. As one of the world’s great grain-producing powers, Canada, along with the U.S. and Russia, contributed substantially to the reserve. Canada also urged the G8 to invest in innovative agriculture technologies for Africa, to help improve food production there.

On **Zimbabwe**, in response to the failure of Robert Mugabe to hold a free and fair election just before the summit, the G8 stated that his regime was illegitimate and would not be tolerated. Harper intervened strongly in the discussions including those with the African outreach partners, stating that Mugabe’s regime could not be tolerated and that there was need for fundamental change. Harper sought the restoration of the rule of law and a renewed commitment to democratic processes and respect for human rights. Although other members were less willing to question the clearly undemocratic government, Canada pushed for immediate sanctions.

On Myanmar, Canada and the G8 also pushed for a more democratic and transparent regime. The population, devastated by a recent cyclone, desperately needed aid. The G8 was willing to provide it, but the government was denying its entry.

On **Afghanistan**, which remained a Canadian priority, the G8 foreign ministers issued a stand-alone statement that highlighted continued support for Afghanistan's national development strategy. At the summit, the G8 leaders reiterated their support. They recognized that there was still much work to do in regard to coordination on the ground.

On G8 expansion, there was no further move to expand the G5's role in the G8. As host the most reluctant Japan did not place the issue on their agenda. The interim report on the Heiligendamm Process was delivered at the summit and received a warm welcome there.

Harper used the summit to reinforce Canada's **bilateral relationship** with Japan. As Canada owed Japan a bilateral visit Harper met with Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in Tokyo one day after the summit ended. The two discussed the Japanese abduction issue, intervention in Myanmar, and other issues discussed at the summit.

L'Aquila 2009

The Italian-hosted L'Aquila Summit in 2009 was more flexible and fluid than many summits in the past. It involved a huge number of participants and a wide range of topics on the leaders' agenda.

On G8 **architecture**, the G8 strengthened its internal operations and external credibility by putting in place the first serious process of **accountability**. Led by Canada, Britain, the U.S. and the EU — the G8's leading compliers with their commitments — it centered on identifying the meaning of the many commitments the G8 leaders collectively made at L'Aquila and previous summits and G8 members' compliance with them. It released preliminary accountability reports on five subjects.

With Canada as host the following year, the G8 and G5 extended the Heiligendamm Process by two years and renamed it the Heiligendamm L'Aquila Process (**HAP**). They broadened its mandate to include any subject and to allow other countries to join on a case-by-case basis. They agreed that this increased inclusiveness would take place at "all levels."

The many references to the **G20** in the communiqués issued by the G8 and others at L'Aquila offered both guidance and support to the new summit institution. They showed that G8 leaders wanted the G20 to reinforce rather than rival or replace the G8, and they suggested that the G8 would continue to be the sole source of leadership within and for the wider G20. Above all, the G8 alone, as well as with the G5, repeatedly agreed in writing that the G8 summit would take place in France in 2011 — the normal time and place for a new cycle of G8 summitry to begin.

On aid to Africa Harper led. Canada was the first member to keep its 2005 commitment to double aid to Africa. It did so by 2010. In the spring of 2009, one year ahead of time. Canada was also an early supporter of and contributor to a new initiative on **food security**, where Barak Obama took the lead at the summit itself. Harper, personally moved by the devastation of the **earthquake** in L'Aquila, had Canada donate to the rebuilding effort there.

G20 Summitry

As Canada looked forward to the G8 summit it would host in Huntsville in June 2010, it did so knowing a key question was how to coordinate the summit with the new G20 summits. They had been produced by the American-turned-global financial and economic crisis that erupted had with full force with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. A decade earlier, the Asian-turned-global financial crisis had led Paul Martin as finance minister to create the G20 club where the finance ministers and central bankers of systemically significant countries could gather every autumn to consider and come to consensus on ways to strengthen financial stability and make globalization work for all (Kirton 2001b). During the following decade, the G20 had proven its worth (Kirton 2005b; Kirton and Koch 2008). It was thus rational for U.S. President George Bush, who had earlier resisted Martin's pleas to elevate the G20 to the leaders' level, to do just that when the new financial crisis struck (Price 2009).

The first G20 summit was held in **Washington on November 14-15, 2008**, to help create it, Canada helped bridge the differences between Bush and France's Nicolas Sarkozy, who had very different views of where the summit would take place, who would be invited, and who would host. While Bush won on these issues, Canada successfully supported France's desire to invite its fellow Europeans Spain and the Netherlands. In the preparations for the G20 summit Harper gave the lead to his personal representative for the G8 to facilitate coordination between the two clubs.

At Washington, Canada sought an agreement on coordinated fiscal and monetary **stimulus**. But a fiscally conservative Harper was the first to say that leaders must start to plan **exit** strategies at the same time. Canada also asked the leaders to foster open **trade** through. On these priorities Canada succeeded, even if the stimulus was implemented more reliably than open trade. Canada strongly supported implementing the principles on domestic financial regulation with a firm deadline, through work done by the G20 finance ministers and the FSF.

Harper also went along with Sarkozy's crusade to crack down on **tax havens**, although at the IMF Canada represents some Commonwealth Caribbean countries whose status as offshore financial centres was important as the rest of their economy was badly hit.

Canada continued to promote these priorities at the second G20 summit, held in **London on April 1-2, 2009** (Kirton and Koch 2009a). On trade its credibility was enhanced by the unilateral tariff reductions Canada had introduced in its budget of January 29, 2009. Canada succeeded in securing a stronger version of the anti-protectionist pledge, with a commitment to redress protectionist measures taken in the recent past. As this was the first G20 summit attended by the new U.S. President Barak Obama, whose preferences and instincts on trade were uncertain, it was important to have Obama accept this pledge. It was also important to have him buy into the value of such summitry, which he clearly did. Canada also supported the summit's signature accomplishment of raising \$1.1 trillion in new money to support global stimulus and development. As its contribution, Canada gave the International Monetary Fund another \$10 billion dollars, in accordance with its relative weight there.

At the third G20 summit, held in **Pittsburgh on September 24–25, 2009**, Canada again succeeded in advancing these priorities, and played a key part in institutionalizing the summit in the desired way as a permanent global governance forum (Kirton and Koch 2009c). Canada secured a strong summit message to stay the course on stimulus until recovery was assured, and to start designing the smart strategies that would be needed when the stimulus could be taken off. To support the stimulus message it maintained its Bank of Canada program that offered \$1.25 billion in mortgage support. On financial regulation, ahead of the summit Harper said Canada would accept whatever consensus emerged on banking capital, although it had no problems with its regulatory system at home. On trade, just before the summit, Canada reinforced its open markets message by again unilaterally cutting tariffs on imported machinery and equipment. And as the summit opened, Canada announced that it would offer \$2.6 billion in callable capital to African Development Bank to support development on the continent. This added to its status as the first G8 country to meet its Gleneagles commitment to double aid to Africa by 2010.

Canada's Summits, 2010

G8 Muskoka, June 25-26, 2010

For the G8 Summit it would host in Huntsville on June 25-26, 2010, Canada had started to plan at an early stage. It began to consider potential themes as early as the autumn of 2007. In the summer of 2008, Harper strategically announced the location, in Huntsville, Muskoka, and the priority agenda, signaling that open markets, global warming, democracy, and the rule of the law would form the foundation of his approach.

In July 2009 he expanded his agenda to the four pillars of economic management, climate change through clean energy technology and the Major Economies Forum, development, and democracy (Kirton and Koch 2009a). The economic pillar now embraced as focused on exit strategies and employment. The subsequent assumption of these topics by the tandem G20 summit in Toronto gave the G8 and its invited partners more time to focus on the remaining pillars. Here the big winner was the new pillar of development, which was added to the 2008 trilogy. It was given detailed definition with the choice of ODA, infectious disease, health, education, and maternal and childhood well-being as the issues within.

After formally assuming the chair of the G8 on January 1, 2010, Harper presented his more detail agenda in late January, both through articles in newspapers at home and in a speech to the World Economic Forum in Davos abroad. He followed up in his Speech from the Throne on March 3rd and the Budget on March 4th.

Accountability, the first and oldest priority, was declared as the “defining feature” of the summit as a whole. It flowed from a desire to put first things first, to have all members deliver the many promises the G8 had made in the past, and thus to enhance the credibility of the forum, before adding a new set of expensive promises to those from the past.

Maternal and child health came second, labeled as the “top priority” for the summit itself. Here the government sought to meet Millennium Development Goals four and five, those furthest behind from meeting their 2015 target, by using proven techniques for health care worker training, vaccines, nutrition, and clean water. Canada sought to raise new money to meet these goals.

Food security was the third priority, building on Canada’s leadership at the summits in 2009 and 2008. **Haiti’s reconstruction** in the immediate and longer term was the fourth priority, flowing from Canada’s lead in hosting the first donors conference in Montreal.

In the **political security** realm, three more key agenda items arose, both for the summit itself and for the preparatory G8 foreign ministers’ meeting that Foreign Affairs minister Lawrence Cannon would host in his home riding of Gatineau, Quebec on March 28-29th. They were nuclear proliferation, assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and security vulnerabilities from conflict, terrorism, crime and trafficking.

G20 Toronto, June 26-27, 2010

Canada’s greatest success at the Pittsburgh G20 summit had come in securing the status of co-host for the next G20 summit, and in doing so helping to institutionalize G20 summitry and strengthen global governance as a whole. Knowing that Korea would chair the G20 finance ministers’ forum in 2010, when Canada served as G8 host, Canada started at an early stage to discuss with Korea how best to coordinate the two events. Harper sent his sherpa to Seoul and spoke with Lee Myung-bak directly at the G8 L’Aquila Summit. While the Koreans had hoped to host the next G20 summit in Korea in April 2010, the encounter had to be deferred when Obama scheduled his desired nuclear summit in Washington in late March. Harper and Lee then agreed that they would co-chair the next G20 summit and hold it in June in tandem with the G8 summit Harper would host then in Canada. Korea would host a stand-alone G20 summit in Korea in November, the traditional time when the annual G20 finance ministers meeting was held. All G20 leaders agreed to institutionalize the G20 as the primary forum for global economic governance, and to start the process in Canada, with Canada as co-chair, and as a coordinated addition to the G8 summit that Canada would host. This result was especially favourable for Canada, as the addition of the G20 fit well with the priorities and agenda Canada had constructed for its G8.

For the **Toronto G20 Summit on June 26-27, 2010**, Harper chose as his priorities accountability, effective and sustainable monetary and fiscal measures, sound and well-regulated financial institutions, and open and competitive trade flows (Cannon, March 22, 2010).

Causes of Canada's Summit Success

External Determinants

Canada's increasingly energetic and effective leadership was driven by several forces. At the systemic level, the advent of the post-Cold War, rapidly globalizing, post-September 11 world increased America's new non-state vulnerability reinforced by a succession of ever stronger shocks.

American vulnerability to state and then non-state forces soared, in energy after 1973, in civilian nuclear power after 1979, in terrorism after 1979, and in finance after 1998. In each case, a relatively invulnerable Canada stood out among the G8 partners with the relevant specialized capabilities to help.

In energy, despite the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, American dependence on imported oil rose from 35 percent of its national requirement in the late 1970s to more than 50 percent by 2004. During this time energy-rich Canada became America's secure Saudi Arabia right next door, while energy-rich Russia joined the G8 club.⁴ The solution to America's growing energy security vulnerability lay within the G8 and with its two otherwise weakest members.

In civilian nuclear power, the shocks of America's Three Mile Island explosion in 1979, Chernobyl in the USSR in 1986, and the nuclear accident at Japan's Tokaimura plant in 1999 reduced the easy availability of the first alternative energy source for first-ranked America and second-ranked Japan (Donnelly 2002). Canada remained an accident-free, civilian nuclear power.

In terrorism, the threat soon spread from skyjacking in Germany in 1978 to the U.S., starting in Iran in 1979, then Lebanon in 1983, the Persian Gulf in 1996, Africa in the late 1990s, and America itself in 1993 and 2001. Canada remained the only G8 member without an international terrorist death on or over its own soil since 1975.

In finance, the 1998 collapse of American hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) during the 1997-99 financial crisis transformed America from a producer to a consumer of financial security. Even though Canada had a smaller, more open economy, it escaped unscathed. Its growing fiscal surplus allowed it to provide financial support to afflicted countries around the world, even when America could not. This difference was magnified in 2008 when the American-turned-global financial crisis did much to constrain America's economic capability, while a financially unscarred Canada led the G8 in having the lowest projected government debt as a share of GDP from 2009 to 2014.

⁴ Canada was included in the G7 in 1975 not primarily because the U.S. wanted or needed another North American neighbour to balance the Europeans, or because former Michigan congressman Gerald Ford liked his Canadian neighbours. It was included because Henry Kissinger knew that an oil- and resource-dependent America needed the first-tier capabilities of a foremost nation — Canada — within the new central governance club (von Reikhsch 1974).

In the environment, the 2005 devastation of New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina dramatically showed America its vulnerability to sea-level rise from climate change, especially as its political capital, economic capital, and most of its major cities lay on coastlines. Despite the potential problems of a melting Arctic, Canada was the G8 country least vulnerable to uncontrolled climate change.

In social cohesion, where America had been vulnerable to civil strife since the Watts riots of 1964, the 21st century brought a more pervasive threat. The 2005 hurricane attack on New Orleans exposed the entrenched racial divisions there. Elsewhere, the home-grown terrorist attacks in London in 2005, the riots around Paris, and racially motivated murders in Russia showed a threat throughout the G8. Yet Canada, once the October 1995 Quebec referendum on separatism was won, stood apart with a high relative multi-cultural capability rank (Culpeper, Emelifeonwu and Scarpa de Masellis 2003).

Furthermore, the G8 institutionally thickened as an informal, leaders-driven concert, where the smallest number of democratically committed major powers could efficiently and cohesively decide how best to combine the maximum amount of predominant capability to shape global governance and provide global public goods. The addition of only democratic powers, the EU in 1977 and Russia in 1998, and the expansion of the EU to include 25 countries by 2004, kept the small size, expanded the combined capabilities, and reduced the number of outside rivals in the world.

At the same time, only democratic polities were allowed in. In its 2003 rankings, Freedom House gave its highest grade of 1 on a 1–7 scale to Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the U.S., and Britain, 1.5 to Japan, and 5.0 to Russia, for an average score of 1.6. The G8 also became more of a leaders-driven body after 1998, when the finance and foreign ministers stopped joining their leaders at the summit itself.

The arrival of the supplementary G20 summit in 2008 continued this pattern of controlled participation as an overwhelmingly democratic foundation, especially as the democratic Netherlands and Spain were added, offset the G20's Chinese and Saudi Arabian authoritarian regimes. The arrival of the G20 summit alongside the G8 showed the deep failure of the old multilateral organizations, since their birth at San Francisco in 1945 and Bretton Woods in 1944.

Societal Determinants

At the societal level, the Canadian public consistently supported the G8 summit as an institution and the particular priorities that Canada brought there. This deep supportive consensus survived the delegitimizing violence of the 2001 G8 Summit and the distraction of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Most Canadians consistently recognized that the G8 bestowed on their country principal power status, helped it preserve its national unity and security, and allowed it effectively to advance its distinctive national values in the world. Even as the G8 and G20 took up deeply domestic subjects, such as education and securities regulation respectively, Canada's provincial governments were decreasingly able to inhibit the federal government's diplomacy in the summit clubs. Moreover, Canadian interest groups became increasingly involved directly in G8

governance, through the many civil society G8 institutions that arose at the beginning of the 21st century.

Governmental Determinants

At the top level of the federal government, Canada usually sent highly experienced leaders to the summit, notably Trudeau from 1976 to 1984 (save for 1979), Mulroney from 1984 to 1992, Chrétien from 1994 to 2003, Martin in 2004 and 2005, and Harper from 2006 on.

Moreover, Chrétien had been involved in the G7 as Trudeau's finance minister, and Martin had nine years of G7/8 experience, as Chrétien's minister of finance.

At the official level, Canada's G8 and G20 participation was usually led by the prime minister's group or the foreign affairs deputy minister, simultaneously serving as the prime minister's personal representative, or sherpa. That individual was supported by a permanent, well-resourced office within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Kokotsis 1999).

Conclusion

In order to behave as a principal power, Canada must have a continuing, comprehensive effectiveness in shaping world order in Canada's image through the ideas and institutions that dominate global governance as a whole. Through, and due to, the G8 and G20 summits, Canada has. Since the 1975 start of the G8 summit-centred system, Canada secured a first-tier place as an equal in all its institutions. It used its position to advance its interests, values, and preferences, to assemble partners that supported them, to prevail in summit outcomes, and to have all ranking members comply with them to a high degree. Canada helped the G8 and G20 develop as effective institutionalized centres of global governance, with summits that together innovatively integrate all of the world's economic, social, and political security priorities, and with a ministerial and official-level system that operates on a daily basis in support. Canadian leadership has helped the G8 develop as the effective ideational centre of global governance. Through its war in Kosovo in 1999, the G8 produced the practice and precedent of the international responsibility to protect that the UN was to accept in principle in 2005.

In 1975, Canada began to emerge as a principal power when America — affected by its defeat in Vietnam, its energy vulnerability in the 1973 oil shock, and the collapse of its old multilateral regimes for nuclear non-proliferation, finance, trade, and democratization — reached out to Canada and America's other ranking allies to create the G8. By 2008, far more vulnerable to new, often non-state threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, and from now globalized terrorism, WMD, energy, the environment, health, and finance, a declining America reached out to create a summit of the G20 that Canada had pioneered, in order to defend America and shape global order as a whole. As a result, Canada finally attained the position of a principal power in a much changed world that would be guided by both a G8 and G20 club with Canada inside.

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Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2009

Year	Site ^a	# of Days	Bayne Grade	Recognition	# of Statements	# of Words	# of Commitments	Compliance ^b			# of Bodies Created	
								Score	Canada's score	Difference between Canada and overall	Ministerials	Officials
1975	L	3	A-	0	1	1,129	14	(+57.1)	(NA)	(NA)	0	1
1976	R	2	D	0	1	1,624	7	(+08.9)	(NA)	(NA)	0	0
1977	C	2	B-	0	6	2,669	29	(+08.4)	(NA)	(NA)	0	1
1978	C	2	A	4	2	2,999	35	(+36.3)	(NA)	(NA)	0	0
1979	C	2	B+	0	2	2,102	34	(+82.3)	(NA)	(NA)	0	3
1980	P	2	C+	0	5	3,996	55	(+07.6)	(NA)	(NA)	0	2
1981	L	2	C	0	3	3,165	40	(+26.6)	(NA)	(NA)	1	1
1982	L	3	C	0	2	1,796	23	(+84.0)	(NA)	(NA)	0	4
1983	R	3	B	0	2	2,156	38	(-10.9) {+100.0}	(NA) {+100.0}	(NA) {0.00}	0	0
1984	C	3	C-	0	5	3,261	31	(+48.8)	(NA)	(NA)	1	0
1985	C	3	E	0	2	3,127	24	(+01.0) {+50.0}	(NA) {0.00}	(NA) {- 50.0}	0	3
1986	C	3	B+	1	4	3,582	39	(+58.3)	(NA)	(NA)	1	1
1987	P	3	D	0	6	5,064	53	(+93.3) {+29.0}	(NA) {+100.0}	(NA) {+71.0}	0	1
1988	P	3	C-	0	2	4,872	27	(-47.8) [0.00]	(NA) [+100.0]	(NA) [+100.0]	0	0
1989	C	3	B+	1	11	7,125	61	(+07.8) [-30.0] {-10.0}	{NA} [+20.0] {-33.0}	(NA) [+50.0] {- 23.0}	0	2
<i>1990</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>7,601</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>[0.00]</i> <i>{43.0}</i>	<i>[-5.6]</i> <i>{100.0}</i>	<i>[-5.6]</i> <i>{+67.0}</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>
1991	C	3	B-	0	3	8,099	53	[+27.3] {+38.0}	[+36.4] {+100.0}	[+9.1] {+62.0}	0	0
1992	P	3	D	0	4	7,528	41	[+73.5] {+71.0}	[+88.2] {+100.0}	[+14.7] {+29.0}	1	2
1993	C	3	C+	0	2	3,398	29	[+70.8] {+57.0}	[+75.0] {+100.0}	[+4.2] {+43.0}	0	2
1994	P	3	C	0	2	4,123	53	[+77.8] {+71.0}	[+77.7] {+100.0}	[0.0] (+29.0)	1	0
1995	P	3	B+	0	3	7,250	78	[+72.7] {+29.0}	[+77.8] {+100.0}	[+5.1] {+71.0}	2	4
1996	P	3	B	1	5	15,289	128	+42.0	+52.0	+10.0	0	2
<i>1997</i>	<i>P</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>C-</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>4</i>	<i>12,994</i>	<i>145</i>	+22.0	+10.0	-12.0	<i>1</i>	<i>3</i>
1998	P	3	B+	0	4	6,092	73	+44.0	+71.0	+27.0	0	0
1999	P	3	B+	1	4	10,019	46	+43.0	+64.0	+11.0	1	0
2000	R	3	B	0	5	13,596	105	+76.0	+83.0	+7.0	0	4
2001	P	3	B	2	7	6,214	58	+47.0	+74.0	+27.0	0	2
2002	R	2	B+	0	18	11,959	187	+35.0	+62.0	+27.0	1	5
2003	P	3	C	0	14	16,889	206	+63.0	+78.0	+15.0	0	8
2004	R	3	C+	1	16	38,517	253	+53.0	+60.0	+7.0	0	16
2005	R	3	A-	0	16	22,286	212	+65.0	+70.0	+5.0	1	5
2006	P	3	NA	0	15	30,695	317	+40.0	+44.0	+4.0	1	4
2007	R	3	NA	1	8	25,857	329	+55.0	+69.0	+14.0	0	4
2008	R	3	NA	NA	6	16,842	296	+47.0	+75.0	+28.0	1	4
2009	R	3	NA	NA	10	31,167	254	NA	NA	NA	1	TBD
Av. All	3L	2.8	C+/	0.35	5.8	9,859	99	(+28.81)	(NA)	(NA)	.40	1.14

	9R 9C 14P		B-					[+36.51] {+47.8} +48.62	[+59.94] {+76.7} +62.46	[+22.19] {+29.9} +13.08		
Av. Cycle 1	2L 1R 3C 1P	2.14	B-	0.57	2.86	2,526	31	(+32.46)	(NA)	(NA)	.14	1.29
Av. Cycle 2	1L 1R3 C 2P	3.0	C/C+	0.14	3.29	3,408	34	(+28.07) [0.00] {+75.0}	(NA) [+100.0] {+66.7}	(NA) [+100.0] {+7.0}	.29	2.00
Av. Cycle 3	3C 4P	3.0	C/C+	0.14	4.0	6,446	56	(+7.8) [+41.73] {+51.5}	(NA) [+54.21] {81.0}	(NA) [+11.07] {+39.7}	.57	2.29
Av. Cycle 4	2R 5P	2.86	B	0.57	6.71	10,880	106	+44.14	+59.43	+13.86	.43	3.17
Av. Cycle 5	5R 2P	3.0	B-	0.33	12.14	26,036	267	+53.83	+66.0	+12.17	.57	2.59

Notes:

Canadian-hosted summits are in bold and U.S.-hosted summits are in italics.

a. Location: L = lodge on outskirts of capital city; R = remote resort; C = capital city; P = provincial (not capital) city.

b. Compliance scores without parentheses or brackets come from the annual reports produced by the G8 Research Group (1996–). Parentheses () indicate scores from von Furstenberg and Daniels (1991). Square brackets [] indicate scores from Kokotsis (1999). Curly brackets {} indicate special scores compiled by the G8 Research Group apart from their annual compliance report.