

Social Determinants

Lecture 14

POL 312Y Canadian Foreign Policy

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Societal Determinants Assessed

It is tempting to believe that societal determinants matter much in the making of Canadian foreign policy. The norms of democratic governance demand it. Each of us, as citizens, wants our governments to be responsive to our will. Civil society actors and other interest groups around us visibly push the government to act in their preferred ways. And Canada contains powerful provincial governments, many federal political parties, and often minority governments in Parliament trying to shape what Ottawa's executive branch does abroad as well as at home. The analytic challenge is to determine how much these many societal actors actually matter, how many and which ones matter, and what foreign policy flows as a result.

The Debate among Competing Schools

These key questions have long given rise to a great debate among several competing schools of thought which focus on the determinants of Canadian foreign policy in the space between international fate and individual will. The first school sees foreign policy as domestic policy in the way that both are made (Tomlin et al. 2008). In this view societal determinants dominate a messy process, with external determinants being merely one more and rather minor factor in a process driven and defined overwhelmingly at home. Thus Brian Tomlin, Norman Hillmer and Fen Hampson argue...

A second school sees Canadian foreign policy driven by a dominant class based at home, but with consequential allies and common interest with similar elites abroad (Pratt 1983-1984, Neufeld). Through the dynamics of class, ideology, political culture and the social construction of knowledge, Canada's foreign policy has a "bias to business" and is less ethical and redistributive than it otherwise would be. Thus societal sources are highly salient but from a narrow scope of actors, as big business, the organized aim of the upper classes is where the locus of power lies.

A third school sees instead a bias to Quebec in Canadian foreign policy across the board (Granstein 2004, Munton 2003, Pacquin 2007, Hebert 2007).

A fourth school sees a bias toward the Canadian Jewish community in the making of Canadian foreign policy toward the Middle East and more broadly toward the Canadian diaspora or linguistic community most concerned with a particular region of the world (Norton).

A fifth school sees small societal salience, especially when the classic issues of high politics, and not the low politics elevated by globalization are concerned (Nossal 1983-1984).

The Complex Neo-Realist Prediction

In order to systematically and comprehensively arbitrate these claims to find answers, the three theoretical perspectives provide good guidance. For if Canada is emerging as a principal power in

a more diffuse and densely interconnected world, as the complex neo-realist (CNR) perspective suggests, then its foreign policy should increasingly be determined by societal groups within Canada, and not just by the more powerful external actors and processes to which Canada must adjust. Thus societal determinants should become more **salient**.

As Canada acquires more freedom to make its own foreign policy at home, the policymaking process should be “opened up” (Griffiths 1968) or “democratized” (Nossal 1995; Cameron and Molot 1995). It should include not just the internationally-oriented foreign policy professionals or elites within Ottawa. It should also embrace, outside Ottawa, a broadening array of societal actors, with growing international interests, resources, demands, involvement, and influence. Thus the **scope** of relevant societal actors and the **sensitivity** of their impact should increase.

As the array of influential societal actors broadens, the domestic debate about foreign policy should become more **balanced** and less **biased**. It should become less dominated by particular powerful groups, such as the province of Ontario or Quebec, the Liberal Party of Canada, big business, or special interest groups such as the Canadian Jewish community. In this broader, more balanced process, any systematic biases toward central Canadians, business, Anglophones, males, or otherwise privileged Canadians should decline. Previously silenced groups such as women, minority communities, diasporas and aboriginals should find a more consequential voice.

From this vibrant pluralist process should flow a foreign policy that better reflects Canada’s overall **distinctive national values** deeply embedded in Canada’s political culture—the values that all or most Canadians, regardless of their particular attributes or affiliations, care about and share as a consequence of their common citizenship and identity. Partial, parochial, sectional, sub-national interests or the more transitory preferences of particular societal actors should have a less salient place. It will be easier, with rational Canadians, for the country’s ultimate national interests to prevail.

The **CNR** perspective predicts the prevalence of this salient, sensitive, broad, balanced, unbiased societal process, in which Canadian’s distinctive national values and Canada’s national interests dominate. In contrast, the **peripheral dependence** (PD) perspective predicts that societal sources of foreign policy will have low salience and sensitivity. The only domestic actors that matter will be provincial governments and a business community, both acting directly abroad in association with more powerful French or American allies. In such a biased, externally aligned and penetrated process, other voices are silenced, or denied the access they need to have an effect. **Liberal internationalists** (LI), in contrast, see societal sources of foreign policy as having moderate salience. But in keeping with their liberal-pluralist soul-mates at the domestic level, they look to Parliament, backed by parties and elections, as the important interest aggregating funnel through which societal demands are expressed.

The Thesis of Increasing Societal Salience

In 1968, the **new Trudeau** government felt that foreign policy could and should be made the way the CNR perspective predicts. Responding to Quebec’s assertions abroad and to English Canadian nationalist demands to “open up the policy process” (Griffiths 1968), it initiated the first comprehensive foreign policy review and gave groups outside government a role (Thordarson 1972; Stairs 1970–71). The resulting June 1970 white paper, *Foreign Policy for Canadians*, called for a domestically driven foreign policymaking process. It proclaimed that henceforth Canadian foreign policy was to be the “extension abroad of domestic policy,” rather than a pursuit of internationalist values or an ad hoc adjustment to the daily demands of the outside world (Department of External Affairs 1970).

During the ensuing decades, the strength, diversity, activity, and influence of domestic groups steadily increased, despite such difficult periods as the onset of the new cold war from 1980 to 1985 (Dewitt and Kirton 1983; Nossal 1997). During the post–Cold War, globalizing era, the trend intensified. It did so to the point where some questioned whether the federal government could manage the new demands from new domestic groups, such as the Bloc Québécois, the Reform and then the Alliance parties, and the separatist Parti Québécois–governed Quebec. The attacks of September 11, 2001, brought a wider range of more involved multicultural communities in Canada more fully into the foreign policymaking process at home.

Under the **Chrétien** government, the strength of Quebec’s demands for sovereignty became a serious concern in the lead-up to the narrow federalist victory in the October 1995 referendum (Doran 1996). But elsewhere, a new societal activism flourished. Parliament, political parties and elections, business, interest groups, policy communities, the media, and public opinion displayed increasing interest, involvement, and influence across a broader policy spectrum. As Canadians lost a little of their earlier faith in big government, as Ottawa’s fiscal pressures reduced the size of the federal government and as Chrétien, Axworthy and Graham sought to democratize the foreign policymaking process, societal actors became better positioned to compete with those in the state, and acquire a higher salience, in the making of foreign policy. These trends continued into the 21st century under the minority Martin and Harper governments, even with the return of fiscal surplus and a Canada still seriously at war in Afghanistan half a world away. It is thus understandable that by 2008 leading scholars of Canadian foreign policy were using theoretical frameworks drawn from the making of domestic policy itself (Tomlin et al. 2008).

The Four Stages of Influence

To chart the emergence of these CNR patterns in the societal process, it is important to invoke two analytical frameworks. The first, offered by Denis Stairs (1977–78), addresses the stages of the foreign policymaking process. Stairs specifies four: 1. agenda setting; 2. parameter setting; 3. policy setting; and 4. administration setting. Stairs suggests that societal actors can thrust their concerns onto the government foreign policy agenda – forcing governments **what** to think **about**. He further suggests society can place parameters or broad limits on the policy options under serious consideration – telling governments **how** to think about the problem, for example, by not conscripting Canadians for overseas military service. But society cannot dictate the policy itself by telling governments **what to** do, or its administration or implementation, by telling them precisely how to do it. Kim Richard Nossal (1997, 129–30) largely agrees, suggesting that society matters in agenda setting and especially parameter setting but not in policy making or administrative implementation. In contrast, CNR suggests that societal actors will increasingly set the policy itself and determine or even deliver its implementation as well.¹

The Four-Way Influence Relationship

CNR further predicts that this increased societal influence through all four stages will come at the expense—not of governmental determinants—but of the external ones. To chart this transfer, it is important to devise a second framework that charts a four way influence relationship. The first relationship is the familiar one-way process of **society pressuring the state** within Canada. The second reciprocally sees the state influencing society, by inviting in, funding or fostering the growth of the societal actors it favours, by crafting the media messages to influence public

¹ For example, the Finnish Canadian community successfully lobbied to prevent the Canadian government from closing its embassy in Finland, thus preventing the implementation of a policy decision already taken.

opinion and mobilize consent for the policies it autonomously prefers or by simply saying no (as over Biafra in 1969 and Arctic waters in 1920) (Kirton and Dimock 1983, Kirton 1993a). Third, domestic groups may bypass government altogether to **act directly abroad**, as with Greenpeace protesting French nuclear testing in the South Pacific, parliamentarians going off to Iraq during the first Gulf War, and the province of Quebec acting independently as a sovereign state on the world stage. Indeed, on January 9, 2009, the federal NDP finance critic Thomas Muclaer was the only Canadian invited to a summit as the global financial crisis in Paris, hosted by President Sarkozy and including German Chancellor Angela Merkel and former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Fourth, as students of PD emphasize, foreign groups and governments can **intrude directly** into Canadian society to dominate domestic actors that then transmit foreign influences onto the Canadian government through them, as U.S.-controlled multinational corporations (MNCs) with branches in Canada have been thought to do. In dealing with its domestic actors then, a government must respond to societal demands, but also to resist and shape them, control domestic actors' direct access to the outside world, and prevent foreign influences from flowing in to forge alliances with actors inside.

The strength of these relationships can be traced in the activity of all major societal actors: the provinces; Parliament, parties and elections; business, labour, and other interest groups; the research communities at the centre of policy networks or epistemic communities, the media, public opinion and the judiciary.² It can also be traced in regard to structural biases, or traditionally "silenced" groups such as women and the First Nations communities.

The Provincial Governments and Quebec

Potentially the most powerful societal actors are provincial and territorial governments. They have partial legal sovereignty in their policy spheres, the resources and legitimacy of government and considerable expertise in policy areas such as education (Atkey 1970–71; Mace, Bélanger and Bernier 1995; Bélanger 2002, Michaud 2006, Kukutchas 2007, Kukutchas and Keating 2008)). A societal process dominated by highly salient provincial governments, especially a Quebec bent on sovereignty and separation in alliance with France abroad, is a PD one. Its ultimate expression, Quebec's separation, would mean the end of Canada itself.³

The scare of the October 1995 Quebec referendum suggested to some that this PD process was rising and could prevail (Doran 1996). However, the actual role of the provinces in making Canadian foreign policy over the past several decades shows a **diminishing salience** for provincial governments, as CNR predicts.

First, despite the close vote in the October 1995 referendum in Quebec and the autumn 1998 re-election of the Parti Québécois (PQ) government, the Quebec-centred national unity threat receded. This was especially so after the election of Jean Charest's Liberal government in Quebec in 2003, its re-election with a minority in March 2007 and again with a majority in the late autumn of 2008. The subsequent eruption of the sponsorship scandal in 2005 temporarily increased support for separatism. But such support receded after the election of Stephen Harper's

² The judiciary can be considered a societal actor in that it is not part of the executive branch and is ultimately responsible for the constitutional and legal system, including individual rights, that all citizens share. Its impact was seen in the Singh case in 1985.

³ Some would add the assertions of the Alberta government, as in the case of the 1980 National Energy Program (NEP) and Canada's 2001 ratification of the Kyoto protocol, amidst the surging world oil prices in 2006. But the scale of the autonomous challenge from Alberta is much less full and frequent than that of Quebec.

minority Conservative federal government on January 23, 2006. More broadly, the attempt of Quebec to secure independence through direct international action and recognition, and the intrusion of Charles de Gaulle's France from 1965 to 1975, has been replaced since November 1976 by a domestic process of political party formation (the Parti Québécois and Bloc Québécois), and by elections and referendums, which the federalists have always won. Abroad it has dwindled to a demand for representation at the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) (Michaud, 2006)

Second, the 1990s **post-Cold War "decolonization"**, or fragmentation into "liberated" states, has not come to Canada. It has been largely limited to once communist-dominated countries such as the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Many of their successor states have paid a significant price for separation into ever smaller, more nationally pure states, with Kosovo, South Ossetria and Azkekia being the most recent cases. The dominant lesson from abroad has thus been "don't do it." The 1990s further eliminated French imperialists, communist marauders, or newly independent developing country radicals intervening in Canada in support of separatist forces there. International actors are now entirely on a united Canada's side. Even France under Jacques Chirac joined the U.S. and the rest of the G7 during the October 1995 referendum campaign. And Sarkozy's France now flipped fully to being firmly on a united Canada's side.

Third, deficit- and debt-ridden provincial governments have joined Ottawa's emphasis on **fiscal consolidation** and reduced their activities abroad.⁴ The 2008-9 recession should intensify this effect. Provincial premiers traveled with Chretien on Team Canada missions, including the supposedly separatist premier of Quebec. Indeed in the spring of 2000 Ottawa participated in the first Group of Eight (G8) ministers of education meeting, without the PQ government in Quebec raising a jurisdictional fuss. It did so again in 2006.

This pattern of decreasing provincial government salience must be assessed against a fundamental constitutional feature of Canada – that of **divided sovereignty**. Among the world's consequential countries, Canada stands virtually alone in the degree to which it legitimately, constitutionally and operationally divides sovereignty between two levels of government—federal and provincial—each with sovereign powers and claims in the international realm (Atkey 1970–71).⁵ Ottawa also shares power with the provinces in internationally relevant fields such as agriculture, immigration, and the environment (where an estimated 85 percent of the powers lie under provincial control).⁶

⁴ This is evidenced by Ontario eliminating all its offices abroad under the government led by Bob Rae's New Democratic Party (NDP) in the early 1990s as a cost-saving measure when its deficit soared.

⁵ In the *Labour Conventions Case* in the 1930s, as Canada was acquiring from Britain the control of its external relations, Lord Atkins considered the division of powers in the *BNA Act*. He concluded that "although the ship of state now sails on larger ventures and into foreign waters, she retains the watertight compartments which are an essential part of her original structure." Simply taking a provincial policy area and transferring it from the domestic to the international arena did not, then, transform it into a fully federal responsibility. The federal government demanded and largely retained the right of international representation, and treaty making. But to implement its international commitments at home it often needed provincial co-operation and consent. For that reason, in the early post-World War II period Canada was reluctant to sign UN conventions on human rights and labour, because these subjects were under provincial jurisdiction, and powerful provincial governments (notably in Quebec) might not go along.

⁶ Ottawa does retain the power of disallowance, and peace, order and good government, subject to the approval upon appeal by the supreme court.

In the 1960s, as the Cold War waned and Quebec's Quiet Revolution waxed, the Quebec government argued it needed to exercise its constitutionally granted powers for education and culture in the international sphere, both to ensure the survival of the small francophone community within North America (*survivance*) and to have it flourish abroad in the modern age (*épanouissement*). It claimed that exercising its constitutional right to act autonomously abroad could benefit Canada. For the provinces had unique expertise in functional fields such as education and would add to the combined Canadian representation and resources available.⁷ Quebec also claimed privileged access and influence with fellow francophone communities abroad.

In 1968 **Ottawa countered** that a fragmented image would dissipate Canada's modest power, allow foreigners to play Canadians off against one another and see them forge alliances with individual provinces that made them instruments of foreign influence. Canada must thus have a single formal voice abroad and the federal government must retain ultimate control (Office of the Prime Minister 1968; Martin 1968). Direct functional activity by the provinces could take place, under the authority of *accords cadres* or umbrella agreements, for such functional activities as trade and investment promotion and educational exchange. But provinces should not be allowed a political presence, such as a Quebec office in Washington. The provinces and territories would be accorded greater consultation at home, through new bodies such as the foreign ministry's federal-provincial relations office, and greater representation on Canadian delegations abroad. The latter compromise was forged in the Gabon case, through the formula for Quebec's representation in la Francophonie's Agence de coopération culturelle et technique (ACCT) (Schlegel 1992).

This *Trudeauvian compromise* went unchallenged during the second national unity debate of 1976–80, initiated by René Lévesque's shift in Quebec's position after the PQ victory in the November 1976 Quebec election. Lévesque (1976) believed that Canadian foreign policy was destroying the chances of survival for francophones in North America and accused Ottawa of "demographic genocide". But he did not seek to secure sovereignty by direct assertions of Quebec autonomy abroad. The strong support for a united Canada from the U.S. government stemmed fears abroad about Canada's continuation, created confidence within Canada, and helped the federalist forces prevail (Kirton and Bothwell 1986). Federalists won decisively in the 1980 Quebec referendum over whether the PQ should be given a mandate to negotiate "sovereignty-association."

During the **third Trudeau** government, from 1980 to 1984, only Alberta challenged Ottawa, over the National Energy Program (NEP) (Leyton Brown 1992). But then Trudeau and Chrétien unilaterally patriated the Canadian constitution from Britain, over the objections of the provincial government in Quebec. A ticking time bomb was set off.

When the **Mulroney** government came to power in 1984, it was determined to redress Quebec's grievances over unilateral patriation (Bernier 2001, Mulroney 2007). In foreign policy, Mulroney allowed Quebec greater representation abroad, under Ottawa's overall authority. He forged an agreement with Quebec premier Pierre Marc Johnson that created a biennial francophone summit in 1986, with the Quebec premier in attendance. Mulroney continued to give francophone priorities equal weight with those of the rest of Canada. He secured a bilateral free trade agreement with the U.S., which was strongly favoured in Quebec. Mulroney also developed a close personal relationship with French president François Mitterrand and leaders of la

⁷ For example, the Japanese-hosted 2000 G8 education ministerial gave Ottawa an awkward moment as it had no federal minister of education of its own to send. A subsequent such meeting in the Russian-hosted 2006 G8 year revived the challenge.

Francophonie to dampen any external support for Quebec's sovereigntist claims. While Mulroney ultimately failed to secure societal support for his Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional accords, he succeeded in containing and satisfying Quebec in the foreign policy realm.

The **Chrétien** years brought a further decline of Quebec's and other provincial government influence. The autumn 1995 Quebec referendum campaign ultimately showed the strong support for a united Canada that existed abroad. U.S. president Bill Clinton strongly and subtly intervened in the debate on Ottawa's side (Blanchard 1998). The French government and other francophone governments failed to lend moral support to the sovereigntist cause.⁸ In foreign policy, Quebec became a provincial government *comme les autres*, at a time when all provincial governments had a diminished role. This was even though globalization had thrust many more once domestic issues—and thus issues under provincial jurisdiction—into the foreign policy domain (Doern and Kirton 1996). Here the federal government's response was to allow for greater direct provincial participation in international institutions. The 1994 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and its Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) gave Quebec, Alberta, and any other acceding province a seat at the international institutional table.

The **Harper** government extended this approach with its promise to allow greater participation for the Quebec government in UNESCO. It succeeded in finding a formula, based on the Mulroney-Johnson precedent, that satisfied both sides (Michaud 2006, Cf. Simpson,). However, it also sought to have a single national securities regulation replace the 13 separate provincial and territorial ones. Its determination was reinforced by the 2008-9 global financial crisis and the resulting global governance move to address systemic, rather than single jurisdiction, market or sector risk.

Parliament, Parties, and Elections

The second broad trend in the societal process has been the broader and more balanced parliamentary, party, and electoral impact on foreign policy, especially as influence has moved outward from the legislative branch in Ottawa to Canadian society's political life at large. The bipartisan consensus, elite process, and centrist orientation that dominated the 1950s and sustained the LI approach broke down in subsequent decades.⁹ Parliament became more active, with the recurrence of minority governments after 1957 and their return from 2004-2010. Parliamentary-based, public foreign policy reviews arrived in and became routine from 1979-80 to 2004. The party system became more vibrant, as the Conservatives, with their distinctive foreign policy preferences, replaced the Liberals more often, and as the separatist Bloc and quasi isolationist Reform/Alliance parties arose. And elections mattered more in foreign policy, first in 1957 and then in the nuclear weapons controversy of 1963 and the free trade election of 1988.

Parliament

Parliament's role had been steadily increasing, with more committees becoming involved in foreign affairs and more interparliamentary groups that directly connect parliamentarians with

⁸ Although Quebec-Ottawa sparring occurred over arrangements for the Francophone held in New Brunswick and the Quebec City Summit of the Americas (SOA) in April 2000, there were few issues of foreign policy that caused discord between Quebec and Ottawa.

⁹ This historic multi-partisanship was seen in the response of all party leaders during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. This was in notable contrast to the Liberal opposition to the nuclear weapons issue in 1963 and the Mulroney government's decision to go to war in the Gulf in 1990-91.

counterparts abroad. The more autonomous role of Parliament arose under minority governments, during foreign policy reviews, and with the recurrent emphasis on “democratization.” **Minority** government came in 1957, 1962, 1963, 1965, 1972, and 1979, and returned in 2004, 2006 and 2008. It produced the defeat in the House of Commons and the decision to accept nuclear weapons in 1963, the nationalist tilt of Trudeau from 1972 to 1974 driven by the New Democratic Party (NDP), and the 1980 defeat of the Clark Conservatives over its policies on the Jerusalem embassy and energy conservation (Takach 1992). It helped keep the 2004 Martin and 2006 and 2008 Harper governments more in the foreign policy mainstream than they might have otherwise been, despite the new directions Harper forged on climate change and Afghanistan.

The **foreign policy review** process also gave greater salience to Parliament (Malone 2001). The design for a parliamentary-based review process was set by the 1979 Clark government and brought into being by Mulroney and Clark in 1984. Their Hockin-Simard Committee involved an unprecedentedly large number of Canadians. It influenced the government’s decision on the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and on continental free trade. It also set the precedent, followed by Chrétien, for a review based on a government green paper at the start, a parliamentary report in the middle, and a government response at the end. At the end of the Chrétien years, the review process broadened further, with the “dialogue” conducted by the former chair of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT) and then foreign minister Bill Graham. But Martin moved back to the 1968 Trudeau model with an elitist process to produce the 2005 International Policy Statement. Harper went back even further, deliberately conducting no foreign policy review at all.

More broadly, following the Trudeau effort to “open up” the policy process, the Chrétien government’s Red Book promised a **democratization** of Canadian foreign policy. It pledged that Canadian troops would not be sent abroad for peacekeeping or combat without a full parliamentary debate. It held such a debate before continuing with “peacekeeping” in Bosnia. But in October 2001, the Chrétien government dispatched Canadian forces to the Afghanistan theatre prior to a debate in a recalled parliament—despite having criticized the Mulroney government for doing this in the Gulf War in August of 1990.

In sharp contrast, Harper asked his minority Parliament in May 2006 to approve his decision to extend Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan to 2009. He promised to do so again when he decided in 2007 to extend the mission to 2011. While Parliament thus became more salient, it served primarily as a forum and catalyst for other actors to exert influence. Despite important reports from SCFAIT, Parliament’s traditional place as the pillar of an LI process had not returned.

Parties

Increasing **salience and scope** arose in Canada’s party system, where the long Liberal hegemony and bipartisan brokerage party consensus of the 1950s had broken down by 2001.¹⁰ The scope of views expressed was broadened by the frequency of victories for the Progressive Conservative Party, with its distinctive foreign policy traditions, and by the 1990s fragmentation of the party system (Nossal 2001).

With five different Progressive Conservative prime ministers and six Liberal ones since 1948, there are enough cases to identify the existence and content of distinctive party-based traditions in

¹⁰ In the 1950s bipartisanship was evident on decisions on the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), peacekeeping and the Korean war, and Cuba in 1962.

Canadian foreign policy.¹¹ Amidst these eleven cases six **Progressive Conservative traditions** stand out.¹² These are placing human rights over trade (including over apartheid in South Africa), Japan over China and a hard-line approach to the latter, (despite Diefenbaker's wheat sales), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over the USSR, Israel over the Arabs and Palestinians, strong defence spending, and the appointment of women to major international affairs portfolios and positions (Sjolander 2001). Here the setting of administration and policy as well as the parameters and agenda have changed.

After 1993, despite three successive Chrétien majority governments, the scope of foreign policy debate widened with the rise of the Bloc Québécois (BQ) and the Reform/Alliance parties, with their distinctive, more radical positions. At the same time, party policies on immigration showed the limits on this new diversity. And in the October 2001 decision to dispatch Canadian forces for combat in Afghanistan, all parties save the NDP at the margins offered their support. Under the Martin and Harper governments, the minor parties opposed Canada's combat involvement in the war.

Elections

General elections along with political parties have come to matter more. The first instance was in **1957**, where the Liberals' handling of the Suez crisis and pipeline dispute helped the Diefenbaker government get elected. Diefenbaker's apparent "indecisiveness" in the Cuban missile crisis helped drive him into a minority in **1962**. In **1963** the nuclear weapons controversy determined the outcome of the election. In **1968**, Trudeau's bold campaign promise to recognize communist China—a promise kept when he was elected—and above all to stand up to Quebec's separatist and international assertions helped cement his image as a decisive leader. In 1980, Joe Clark's handling of the Jerusalem embassy decision and especially his G7-generated energy tax increase helped speed the return of Pierre Trudeau (Takach 1992; Bayer 1992).

In **1988** came the second great foreign policy election. The continental free trade agreement dominated the campaign and brought the Mulroney government a second majority government. Subsequently, with fragmented opposition parties ensuing Liberal majorities, campaign promises mattered little, as shown by Chrétien's 1993 reservations about the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the campaign trail and his swift acceptance of it once elected.

With the return of a minority government, especially under the internationally inexperienced Harper government with a recently merged Conservative party, the carefully crafted compromised party platforms and campaign commitments mattered more. Arguably, the re-election of the Harper minority government on **October 14, 2008**, depended importantly on liberal leader Stéphane Dion's choice of a "green shift" to combat climate change as his core election plank.

Business, Labour and Interest Groups

The further trend in the societal process is the **broader more balanced** influence among business, labour, and interest groups. Some saw a "bias toward business" dominate Canada's continentalist post-World War II policies and culminate in the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) of 1989. If ever it existed, was clearly on the wane by the 1990s. The

¹¹ The five Conservative governments are Diefenbaker, Clark, Mulroney, Campbell, and Harper and the six Liberal ones are St. Laurent, Pearson, Trudeau, Turner, Chrétien, and Martin.

¹² Even though both of these are mainstream brokerage parties, they tend to have different party legacies in foreign policies and different demographic bases.

offsetting power of unionized labour has been reinforced by a host of newly empowered “counter-cultural groups,” as the development, environmental, and women’s movements and the aboriginal community joined the peace movement and churches of old.

Moreover, demographic transformation reduced the relative weight of once dominant linguistic and religious groups, notably the British, then the French, and the Jewish communities. New groups arose, such as the Ukrainian and other anti-communist communities, Canadians with Asian connections, and those brought by post-war globalization to Canada as immigrants and refugees. Behind the scenes, faith-based organizations may have had some influence as well, perhaps beyond the highly visible Canadian Council of Churches at the core.

The Bias-to-Business Argument

To identify these trends, it is necessary first to assess the important argument that there is a permanent, pervasive “bias to business” in Canadian foreign policy, flowing from a corporate elite that enjoys undue access and influence and makes policy that is less humanitarian and redistributive than it otherwise would be (Pratt 1983–84, 2007). There are several problems with this claim.

First, it is **hard to refute** with “process tracing” evidence, for it claims both that business groups actually exercise this influence, but also that governments will do what business wants even without any influence attempts being made. Second, it **assumes** rather than shows that Canada would normally undertake far more humanitarian and redistributive policies if business influence were not there. Third, on many issues, such as the wars in the Gulf, Kosovo, or Afghanistan, the business community had **no predefined** or clear preferences or interests. Fourth, business is often badly divided, for example, between the Ontario-based automotive and Alberta-based oil industry over environmental regulations (Rugman, Kirton, and Soloway 1999). Fifth, some businesses have adopted ethical concerns as a core part of their corporate culture with voluntary standards or codes of corporate responsibility to give them effect (Kirton and Trebilcock 2004). Sixth, to say that business favours the maintenance of the capitalist system, or a market-based economy, is a very general claim that **does not specify** what Canadian foreign policy should result. Almost any effect could come from this assumed cause.

Seventh, and most important, the claim of a permanent, pervasive bias to business cannot explain the **major moments of change** in Canadian foreign policy, such as the acceptance of nuclear weapons in 1963, the move to bilateral free trade with the U.S. in 1988 (Hart 1992) or the move toward sanctionist policies directed at South Africa under the Mulroney government (Redekop 1992). To say that the business community must have changed its mind at these moments shows an eighth flaw in the argument—it **seldom specifies in advance** what the business community actually wants. The failure of the business community to secure one of its major post-NAFTA objectives—deeper integration within North American union, perhaps even a currency union—shows how limited the power of the business community can be. So does Canada’s decision to ratify the Kyoto protocol, a policy decision opposed by the country’s leading energy companies, even if, in administration setting, business concerns contributed to delaying Canada’s ratification and made the prospect of securing the promised carbon dioxide reductions virtually impossible to achieve (Simpson et al. 2007).

The Bias Against Women

If there is a bias in Canadian foreign policy, it is one **where a majority** of Canadians have not had their proportionate share in the making of Canadian foreign policy, or have not had their distinctive preferences expressed in its output. Here the “bias against women” is the most

compelling one to explore (Keeble and Smith 1999; Whitworth 1995; Sjolander, Smith, and Stienstra 2003). In spite of brief respites during Conservative interludes, this bias largely endures to this day. Canada's approach to world order through the G8 is the most important case in point, despite a brief gender-sensitive interlude when Canada hosted the summit in 2002.

The Counter-Consensus Groups

Under the Chrétien Liberals, especially in their Axworthy phase, the “counter-consensus” groups among nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and in civil society were increasingly looked to for inputs into the making and implementation of Canadian foreign policy. Under Axworthy, “vanguard NGOs” were financed to challenge the advice of the professionals in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). They became instruments for the exercise of Canadian influence abroad, as in the landmines case. With transnational networks and the Internet, oppositional NGOs helped overturn Canada's efforts at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to negotiate the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) (Dymond 2002; Rugman 1999). The new coalition of the labour community and the environmental movement was influential in shaping the direction of Canadian trade policy. Pierre Pettigrew, Chrétien's minister of trade, moved to affirm the need for a **trade-environment** and trade-labour link in future liberalization initiatives (Kirton 2003a; Pettigrew 1999). Thus, while the 1989 continental free trade agreement contained no environmental or labour provisions or side agreements, the 1994 NAFTA, negotiated by the same Mulroney government, did (Kirton and Maclaren 2002; Hockin 2004). Canada opposed inserting such provisions in the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, but supported their inclusion in the subsequent Doha Round.

Interest Groups

A further increase in the salience, sensitivity and scope of societal actors flowed from the growing power of a new generation of interest groups (Norton 2001). Some of the most visible were **policy-based**, such as Maude Barlow's Council of Canadians or the development community combined in the Canadian Council for International Co-operation. Their members regularly lobbied behind the scenes and issued reports to protest the plurilateral summits and ministerial meetings that Canada hosted as well as to lobby behind the scenes. While polls suggest that Canadians have little sympathy for such protests, their influence has been increasingly felt (Kirton 2001–02). Evidence comes from the creation of a civil society forum at the April 2002 Quebec City Summit of the Americas (SOA), the public release of the text of the draft Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) in 2001, and foreign minister Bill Graham's (2002) conduct of civil society consultations at the Kananaskis G8 in June 2002.

Also of increasing power are the **ethnic lobbies** in Canadian foreign policy, whose members are defined by diasporic country of origin or ancestry, religion, or language spoken at home. Here much attention has been devoted to the role of the Canadian **Jewish** community in the making of Canadian foreign policy toward the Middle East (Taras and Goldenberg 1989). Yet its internal strains, the weight of the Arab-oriented oil industry and the growing demographic power of Canadians of Arab origin and the Muslim faith have provided an important offset.

This new balance points to the broader influence of groups, both old and new, of Canadians with demographic ties to the ever increasing number of places where a globally affiliated Canada is connected. Canadians of British, French and Irish origin have a predominant if largely invisible influence. Vastly less numerous, active and influential are the American “late loyalists”, giving PD patterns no demographic, societal boost. The more than one million Canadians of **Ukrainian** origin, importantly concentrated in the prairies, had an influence over Canadian policy on east-west relations in the eras of Brian Mulroney, Joe Clark, and Don Mazankowski. Roy Norton

(1998) shows that “cold war” Canadians from the three Baltic states, Ukraine, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and the visible minorities from the American, Haitian and Sikh communities had an impact on Mulroney’s foreign policy in most cases. But they did so not by themselves but because the government relied on Parliament, was sympathetic to outsiders, wanted to broaden its electoral base and was committed to human rights.

More recently, the increasing size of the Canadian **Asian** community, with close to three million Canadians of Asian origin, helped propel Chrétien’s emphasis on Team Canada, trade over human rights in the region, and build institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. It also supported Harper’s promise of a Pacific gateway and free trade negotiations with India. It has helped move Canada from having an Atlantic-centric foreign policy to an Asian Pacific and thus more global one.

One interest group with increasing involvement consists of Canada’s numerous, long resident aboriginal or **First Nations** communities (Abele and Rodon 2007, Wilson 2007, Lackenbauer and Cooper 2007). Although they have traditionally had international interests and involvements, their influence had long been small. In the 1970’s their opposition had helped stop the proposed MacKenzie Valley gas pipeline carry Canada’s Arctic natural gas to markets in the energy-short U.S., at considerable cost to American energy security objectives and global climate change control. But beyond the home continent, the attempt of apartheid South Africa to forge alliances with aboriginals to counter the Canadian government’s crusade for regime change within South Africa met with little success. However in the 1990’s their voice was increasingly felt on environmental issues, such as the Stockholm Convention on persistent organics pollutants (POPs) and the creation of the Arctic Council in 1996. They were subsequently involved, in the Harper government’s ultimately unsuccessful effort to have the UN craft a Canadian-compatible Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (DRIP).

Knowledge Producers, Policy Networks and Epistemic Communities

In a fourth trend, the relevant **knowledge producers** have become more sophisticated, more diverse, and more influential. Within Canadian **universities** international affairs and Canadian foreign policy expertise has flourished, come to depend less on the American imports of the 1960s, offered a diversity of epistemic traditions, and, thanks at first to Trudeau’s foreign policy review, become a central part of the foreign policy debate.

Beyond the academy, the debate has diversified beyond the old **think tanks**—the formally nonpartisan but intellectually traditional oriented LI Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA), now the Canadian International Council (CIC), the proudly LI United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC), and the allegedly “anti-nationalist” C.D. Howe Institute — they have been joined by many others with far less of a continental, anti-nationalist cast and brought a more diverse array of newer voices into the debate (Clarkson 1978). These new additions include the Council of Canadians and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives on the left, the Fraser Institute on the right, and the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) and Public Policy Forum in the middle.

Simultaneously, the government’s own, old para-statal in-house think tanks—the Economic Council of Canada, the Science Council of Canada, and the Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security — have been replaced by those focused on new priorities — notably the Canadian Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (CCHRDD), the National

Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE), and the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

The Chrétien government's 1996 initiative of creating the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and instituting annual National Forums, both with a formal role in the government policy formation process, provided other additions before their 2003 demise (Lee 1997). At the same time, the hope of policy openness in the initial foreign and defence policy reviews, and the efforts of newer coalitions such as Canada 25 to exploit this, came to little (Stein 1994–1995). In 2006 under Harper, with Canada's first prime minister coming in as a policy analyst from a think tank, knowledge producers had a potentially more attentive audience at the top.

The Media

The fifth trend is the larger, broader influence of the **media**, particularly with the development of television network news and the Internet. In Canada, the Canadian media, not American, dominate, with new channels now available from many countries abroad on cable or satellite. Canadian media present a very distinctive portrait of the world and Canada's place in it. As Canada's experience during the 1990–91 Gulf War and war in Afghanistan since 2001 clearly show, the Canadian government can still “mobilize consent” for its key foreign policy objectives (distinct from American or British ones), but only if it responds to the very well-defined distinctive world view, myths, and values that Canadians share (Kirton 1993a). In short, Canadians see, hear, and thus think from and for themselves.

The Primacy of TV News

As Archibald MacMechan (1920) noted more than 85 years ago, Canada has long been penetrated by American media. But even in the old print world of daily newspapers, Canadian-controlled dailies dominate the market. With the advent of the *National Post* in the 1980s, they offer a much more diverse and vibrant debate than before. The coming of the Internet has broadened Canadians virtually cost free access to print media from around the world. Far more importantly, television—especially television network news—has become the premium medium, with a unique power to set agendas, shape attitudes, and arouse its audience into political action. The more distant or foreign the issue, the more Canadians depend on the media and television for their information and opinion about what to think about (agenda setting), how to think about it (parameter setting), and what to think (policy setting) (Dewitt and Kirton 1989). Television network news seems still to be central for mass political activation, even as specialty channels and the Internet have come on strong (Ahlers 2006; Delwiche 2005). The 2004-5 Asian tsunami case confirms the point.

A Canadian Production and Portrait

Within Canada, the television networks—CBC, CTV, Global, SRC and TVA—are all Canadian owned. The news they offer is overwhelmingly produced by Canadians. Even at times of great international crisis, Canadians watch their own national news rather than that freely available from the U.S. networks or other increasingly accessible international ones. The advent of Newsworld, Newsnet, and their francophone equivalents has reinforced this Canadian hold. The Canadian media has ownership and regulatory requirements to emphasize Canadian content and the Canadian angle. With its limited production resources concentrated within Canada and especially in Ottawa, and with its network of foreign correspondents deployed in particularly Canadian parts of the world (often with unifying anglophone/francophone double-casting on the CBC/SRC), even English Canadian television news offers a distinctively Canadian view of the world. It is one very different than that of its American counterparts.

Even for distant, U.S.-dominated international events where Canada has historically had little involvement, such as the 1990–91 war in the Gulf, Canadian news offered a distinctive story. It was based on **the 1939–41 myth** of Canada going off to war with Britain and France, backed by the legitimacy of the League of Nations-turned-UN, to stop a dictator whose name began with the letter “H” from gassing to death innocent civilians because they were Jews (Kirton 1993a). It is likely that a similar myth sustained Canada’s involvement in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995. The evidence suggests it did so during the war in Afghanistan, across the two major linguistic communities into which the Canadian media, public, parliamentarians and policy-makers divide (Kirton 2007).

The Reciprocal Impact

The media by itself cannot arouse otherwise reluctant and ordinarily pacific Canadians to go war in distant regions when their government does not want to go. The state has considerable autonomy on such issues and the process is more complex than suggested by any unidirectional “brute force” model of “society rules the state.” But a minimum level of media-driven public support is necessary for the “mobilization of consent” that Canadian governments need to sustain costly, complex, and long investments in combat that can bring casualties abroad. Canadian governments thus take much care to manage the media so that it can communicate government--defined messages to aid in this mobilization of consent. This task is often easier in international than domestic affairs, for there are fewer independent, easily available sources, including those with first-hand knowledge to give citizens alternative information and points of view. Yet government media managers and communications strategists can sometimes suffer from this same disadvantage and thus make clear mistakes.

Coverage of Canada Abroad

The Canadian government’s media managers also seek to influence the coverage of Canada in foreign media, as part of the soft power projection game. This technique, includes meeting with key columnists and the editorial board of the *New York Times* and prime ministerial appearances on “Larry King Live”. It was used to good effect in the 1970 Arctic waters pollution prevention case. It was also used in Canada’s campaign to have the U.S. keep an open border with it in the wake of the September 11 attacks, by convincing Americans that Canada was not a “Club Med” for terrorists. While the routine coverage of Canada in the international media tends to be weak (Keenleyside and Gatti, 1992), these targeted interventions do have a useful effect. They are supplemented by more direct measures, such as RCI radio, broadcasts, and the production of world war two propaganda films, notably the legendary **49th parallel**.

Public Opinion and Distinctive National Values

A further societal trend is the increasing depth, coherence, distinctiveness, and salience that mass public opinion has. The very existence and effectiveness of such public opinion on international affairs is disputed. But the evidence suggests it is not an autonomous, if often latent, reservoir of support and demand, with important agenda-setting, parameter-setting, and policy-shaping effects. Canadian public opinion on foreign policy exists. It is intentionally coherent, in a mythologically rational way. It has become more influential, as Canadians have developed deeper and more structured attitudes about the world abroad and as the government has come to rely upon ever-improved and more frequent polling for guidance in an uncertain world. It increasingly contains a new CNR consensus. Since the 1990s Canadians have been adopting the view that Canada is emerging as a principal power in a more diffuse international system and should behave as one. Finally, Canadians, whatever their other divisions, are strongly attached to a world

view and set of foreign policy priorities that reflect the unifying distinct national values that their government is increasingly pursuing in the external realm.

The evidence suggests that Canadians have become rational realists, and complex neo-realists, with some distinctive national values at their core.

The first consensus conviction emerging during the 1990s is about Canada's **considerable influence**. From 1987 to 1990, as the cold war ended, only 4–5 percent of Canadians believed that Canada had a “great deal” of influence on the course of world events. But those saying it had “some influence” grew from 32 percent to 49 percent over these three years. By 1990, a CNR majority of 53 percent felt it had a “great deal” or “some” influence, rather than “very little” or “none.”

The second shared belief was in Canada's **growing leadership**. By 1993, 58 percent of Canadians felt Canadian leadership in world affairs over the past decade has grown a great deal (16 percent) or somewhat (42 percent). They shared the CNR myth and model of Canadian rise. Only 27 percent felt, in PD fashion, that it had declined “somewhat” or “a great deal.”

The third belief is in Canada's **global interests and associations**. Since 1979, Canadians, as fully engaged globalists, have believed that it is important to maintain good relations with a wide range of global regions and countries, and not just the U.S. or Atlantic world. Since 1979, they have always put the U.S. in first place. But close behind has come Japan, with western Europe, led by Britain, then Germany and France, a close third. Also relevant, but varying widely from year to year, have been Russia, China, Mexico, Latin America, and Asia.

Fourth, Canadians believe in maintaining **diverse international institutional affiliations**. In January 1995, their top-ranked institution was the UN, with which 77 percent were familiar and 85 percent wanted Canada to attach a high priority to. This LI icon was thus backed a bit by an ignorance gap. In a close second came the plurilateral, CNR **Commonwealth**, with a 67 percent familiarity and a 69 percent priority score. In a close third place came the **G7**, with 49 percent familiarity and 61 percent priority. This largely invisible international institution thus stood out as the global body to which Canadians were most prepared to give the benefit of the doubt. Also regarded as important, if little known, were APEC, the Organization of American States (OAS), and la Francophonie, which ranked second overall in the province of Quebec. While the LI icon lingers on in first, there is much greater diversity, with the old and new plurilateral summit institutions of the post cold war coming on strong. There is no case for international institutional niche diplomacy here.

Despite fears that Canada might be retreating into isolationism or niche diplomacy, the polls in 1998 and after showed a strong consensus for assertive globalism grounded in distinctive national values.¹³

The first conviction was about Canada's **growing influence**. Overwhelmingly (82 percent), Canadians felt Canada had more influence now in world affairs than it did 30 years ago. CNR's upward myth and model of the historical process was affirmed. Second, Canadians felt Canada should have **more influence**. A large majority (78 percent) judged that Canada had too little influence in the world. Third, they thought that the **government should get it**. A majority (52 percent) called for the federal government to devote more attention to improving Canada's place

¹³ This is evident in the results of a survey focused on foreign affairs, conducted from April 15 to 18, 1998, by the COMPAS organization and subsequent polls.

in the world, even if they were reluctant to sacrifice their cherished health care and education spending at home to this end. They did not think that an empowered civil society à la Axworthy's doctrine or free markets could substitute for a strong state.

Fifth, there was a **readiness to use force**. A strong majority (78 percent) in April 1998 would have sent the same or larger Canadian military contribution if Operation Desert Storm were repeated. Axworthy's soft power doctrine had not caught on. Canada's readiness to go to war in Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, or Iraq in 2003 in a minor way should have come as no surprise. Fifth, with rational consistency, Canadians believed, narrowly, that the post-Cold War world was a **dangerous** place.¹⁴

Canada's Distinctive National Values

What values do Canadians want to embed in international order through their desired global involvement and diverse array of preferred international institutions? The answer is a consistent, clear, and highly consensual one. The presence of distinctive national values is evident in the strong stable priorities that Canadians almost unanimously select as a focus for their government's involvement in world affairs. In addition to Canada's global **institutional** attachment, as noted above Canada's global embedded **ecologism** heads the list.

Since 1989, Canadians have been almost completely united in according an overall priority to **global environmental protection** as the number-one goal of Canadian foreign policy, even if their actual behaviour at home contradicts their professed values abroad. They have also, in second place, remained attached to **peace** as a goal for Canadian policy, even if few say they are interested in it. **Trade** came in third by the mid-1990s, but it was virtually tied with **human rights** in fourth. This suggests that Chrétien was out of touch with the public when he gave trade strong priority over human rights in his early diplomacy in Asia and elsewhere. Harper seems to be more in tune with his people in this regard. But he may be less in touch on global environmental issues. For when asked just after the December 2009 Copenhagen conference and failed terrorist attack on Detroit what the greatest global threat was, Canadians choice was climate change first, ahead of terrorism in second place.

The traditional LI and PD themes ranked poorly in the 1990s for the UN, peacekeeping, independence, and development were far down on the list. The political culture of Canadian foreign policy, at least as the polls show it, had changed substantially from that identified by Stairs in 1982.

In 1998, **global environmental protection** was a priority. The top reason Canadians wanted Canada to wield greater influence abroad was to protect the environment. This value was selected by a virtually unanimous 94 percent as the top priority. The values that followed, at 88 percent each, were disarming violent nations, getting other countries to respect international law, making the world more peaceful, and promoting Canadian exports (or economic internationalism in Munton-Keating terms). The Chrétien government's December 2002 ratification of the controversial Kyoto protocol was no surprise.

¹⁴ The other attitudes revealed by this poll are consistent with this attitudinal core. These include Canadians believe the U.S. will protect them, want to spend more on defence to strengthen independence from the U.S., continue to support NATO, want well-equipped troops to defend Canada's border, want Canadian troops peacekeeping stationed around the world, should speak up against human rights abuses with conviction even if it means a loss of trade, support the landmines initiative, believe in business leaders and NGOs such as Amnesty International more than federal government to advance their interests, and dislike the treatment of protestors at the APEC Summit in Vancouver in 1997.

Judiciary

The judiciary has had an increasing impact on foreign policy, especially since the 1982 Constitution Act fully patriated Canada's constitution from Britain.¹⁵ Its influence was first apparent in the 1985 Singh case, which forced the executive branch to expand the rights of refugees claimants who reached Canada's territorial limits, even on the high seas. It has since been influential in cases regarding holocaust prosecutions. But it still lacks the considerable influence of the judiciary in the United States.

Conclusion

Taken together, the evidence shows that since 1945, the societal determinants of Canadian foreign policy have **changed** considerably, largely in the way that the **CNR** perspective predicts. On the whole they have become more **salient, more sensitive, broader** and more **balanced** in scope. The dominant societal actors have shifted from the provinces (since 1960) and Parliament (since 1957) to the media and mass public opinion while more continuously connect the government to the Canadian people at large. This allows the publicly growing CNR convictions and distinctive national values to have greater effect.

At the same time, the **LI** perspective remains relevant. The 2004 return of minority government has made Parliament, parties, and elections more important and the UN retains its first-ranked place in Canadians' hearts. And the **PD** perspective is also still necessary, for even when the international assertions of Quebec and the other provinces are in remission, their constitutional competence, unbalanced political power and the threat of separation driven by the linguistic demographics have not gone away.

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¹⁵ Prior to the second world war the ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain in the Labour Conventions case rule, containing Lord Atkins dictum, had had a decisive impact on the freedom of the federal government to act in foreign policy, by affirming the province's sovereign rights.

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Appendix A: Party and Elections Results by Party

Election	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Social Credit	Bloc Québécois
1949	191	41		10	
1953	169	51		15	
1957	104	111		19	
1958	48	208			
1962	99	116	19	30	
1963	128	95	17	24	
1965	131	97	21	14	
1968	154	72	22	14	
1972	109	107	31	15	
1974	141	95	16	11	
1979	114	136	26	6	
1980	147	103	32		
1984	40	211	30		
1988 Nov	83	169	43		
1993	177	*52	9		54
1997	155	*60	21		44
2000	172	*66	13		38
2004	135	99	19		54
2006 Jan 23	103	124	29		51
2008 Oct 14	95	143			

Notes:

Seats=Popular Vote Share

Bold indicates party in power

*indicates Reform Party/Canadian Alliance Party

in 1993 the Progressive Conservatives only won 2 seats

in 1997 the Progressive Conservatives won 20 seats

in 2000 the Progressive Conservatives won 12 seats

Reference: History of Federal Ridings since 1867. *Parliament of Canada*.

Appendix B:
Judicial Decisions Affecting Canadian Foreign Policy Policies

1985 Singh Case

Appendix C:
Canadian Languages Spoken at Home

	1996	2001	2006
English	59.8%	59.3%	57.2%
French	23.5%	22.7%	21.8%
Non-Official	16.6%	17.6%	19.7%
Other			06.3%
Total			105.0
Chinese	02.6%	02.9%	03.2%
Italian			01.5%
German			01.4%
Punjabi			01.2%
Spanish			01.1%
Arabic			00.8%
Tagalog (Pilipino)			00.8%
Portuguese			00.7%
Polish			00.7%
Vietnamese			00.5%
Ukrainian			00.4%
Dutch			00.4%
Greek			00.4%
Cree			00.3%
Inuktitut (Eskimo)			00.1%

References: Statistics Canada

Notes: Numbers have been rounded to the nearest tenth.

Appendix D: Canadian Graduate Schools of International Affairs

1965 Carleton University: Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

1967 Norman Patterson

2000 University of Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies

Ph.D added 2008

2007 Simon Fraser University: School of International Studies

2007 University of Ottawa: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs

Note: Excludes those focused on a single geographic region, issue area or function

Appendix E: Canadian Think Tanks on International Affairs

- 1921 Canadian Institute for International Affairs (CIIA) to 2007
- 1944 Council of Canadians
- 1946 United Nations Association of Canada (UNAC)
- 1958 C.D. Howe Institute
- 1972 Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP)
- 1974 Fraser Institute
- 1976 Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies
- 1976 North-South Institute
- 1980 Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives
- 1984 Asia-Pacific Foundation
- 1987 Public Policy Forum
- 2002 Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
- 2007 Canadian International Council (CIC)

State-Dominated Think Tanks:

- 1963 Economic Council of Canada
- 1966 Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development
- 1966 Science Council of Canada,
- 1968 International Development Research Centre (IDRC)
- 1984 Canadian Institute of International Peace and Security
- 1988 Canadian Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (CCHRDD)
- 1989 National Roundtable on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE)
- 1990 International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

Notes: Excludes university-based centres

**Appendix F:
Quebecers' Support for a United Canada**

Date	No (to separation)	Yes (to separation)	Undecided

Appendix G: Public Opinion

Existence

First, Canadian mass public opinion on foreign policy does exist. Some doubt whether the mass public really has an opinion on subjects as specialized and remote as foreign policy, beyond the ways in which pollsters manufacture it by asking to polite Canadians to invent a response on the spot to get through their telephone call. But Canadians do have deep, durable, well-defined, internally coherent, and highly structured, if not necessarily well-informed, views on international affairs. As Don Munton and Tom Keating (2001, 546) conclude, “Canadians have an underlying structure of attitudes related to internationalism, not random or assorted views.” This structure has endured for decades.

Effectiveness

With such depth and durability, mass public opinion places a powerful constraint on what Canadian governments can do in foreign policy. It does so primarily through its “naming and framing” effects and by defining the class of cases a problem lies in. It can create an agenda-setting demand on governments for international action (Martin and Fortmann 2001; Munton and Keating 2001). It has a strong parameter-setting effect through “framing” reality. Canadians’ inherent internationalism, as measured by Munton and Keating, has four distinct dimensions—active internationalism, economic internationalism, liberal-conservative internationalism, and independent internationalism. Thus governments can choose to change course or simultaneously pursue apparently contradictory paths. Yet as only active internationalism and economic internationalism command widespread consensus, the range of choice is ultimately constrained.

This enduring consensus on active internationalism and economic nationalism seems to indicate a LI foundation for Canadian foreign policy in mass public opinion, as Denis Stairs’s (1982) conception of the political culture of Canadian foreign policy suggests. Yet Munton and Keating (2001) note that this internationalism is about the degree of international involvement, rather than the ends or means. It endorses active involvement but to a high degree. It may thus be that Canadians’ conception of the purposes of Canadian foreign policy and a desirable world order has changed over the decades, and done so in CNR ways.