Declaration on Non-proliferation and Disarmament
Deauville, May 26-27, 2011 (published May 27, 2011)
1. Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their means of delivery is one of our top priorities, because as we have already recognized, the proliferation of WMD represents a major threat to international peace and security. We are determined to strengthen the global non-proliferation architecture, by supporting all multilateral treaties and arrangements which help to prevent and combat proliferation, and by promoting their implementation and universalization. We call upon all States still not Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to accede without delay. We also remain determined to increase the effectiveness of our national systems to combat proliferation.
2. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
3. We welcome the adoption by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 of a balanced Final Document on the three pillars of the Treaty. We are determined to meet our commitments and call upon all States Parties to collectively implement the provisions of this document. In this regard, we support the meeting which will take place in Paris on 30 June 2011 of P5 States on the follow-up of the NPT Review Conference. The States concerned also reaffirm their commitment, to consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. While respecting article X of the NPT, we at the same time recognise that modalities and measures to address a withdrawal are needed. In that regard we stress that the UNSC must immediately address any State's notification of withdrawal from the NPT and that any State Party remains responsible under international law for violations of the NPT committed prior to its withdrawal. This important issue should remain on the agenda of the next NPT review cycle.
4. We express our readiness to make any contribution necessary to the implementation of the decisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference regarding the establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We call upon all States concerned to make all efforts necessary to the preparation of the Conference to be held in 2012. To that end we welcome the EU efforts in organising a seminar.
5. Having in mind the nuclear accident in Japan, for which we express our solidarity with the Japanese government and people we highlight the necessity to pay particular attention to nuclear safety. In this regard we look forward to the 7-8 June Paris meeting on nuclear safety and to the June 20-24th ministerial conference organised by the IAEA in order to draw lessons and improve the international nuclear safety measures and regime.
6. We reiterate our strong concern about the severe proliferation challenges and our commitment to working to resolve them through diplomatic means. The IAEA, and in particular its safeguards system, remains an essential tool for the effective implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The IAEA must have the necessary resources and be capable of fully exercising its verification mission, and, in accordance with its statutory mandate, to report cases of non-compliance to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
7. Iran's persistent failure to comply with its international obligations under numerous UNSC and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions remains a cause of utmost concern. We note that, following intensive diplomatic efforts by China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union High Representative as well as the adoption of measures in UNSCR 1929 (June 2010), Iran finally accepted to meet twice in Geneva (December 2010) and Istanbul (January 2011). We regret that Iran was not willing to discuss the practical and detailed ideas that were put forward, and still fails to respond to the concerns of the international community on the purpose of its nuclear program. We recall that, according to UNSCR 1929, Iran shall not undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including launches using ballistic missile technology. We urge Iran to enter without preconditions into a constructive dialogue on how to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme. We recall that we recognize Iran's right to peaceful nuclear energy under the NPT, but that this right also comes with obligations that all States parties to the NPT, including Iran, have to respect. Iran has yet to demonstrate through compliance with its international obligations under the relevant UNSC and the IAEA Board of governor's resolutions that its programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call upon Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA in this respect by implementing all transparency measures, as requested by the Agency. We urge Iran to change course and to engage into a constructive dialogue with the Six to discuss its nuclear programme, with the ultimate goal of establishing a comprehensive relationship, involving cooperation in all fields (economic, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, political and security) and benefiting Iran and the international community. Depending on Iran's actions, we will determine the need for additional measures in line with the dual-track approach.
8. We condemn the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions 1718 and 1874, by its development of nuclear and ballistic missile programmes, including its uranium enrichment programme. We urge the DPRK to fully abide by its international obligations and commitments including those under the September 2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks and to abandon all its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as stated in UNSC resolutions 1718 and 1874, inter alia by providing the IAEA unlimited access to all its nuclear facilities, sites and other locations. We demand the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. We also call upon the DPRK to take all necessary measures to prevent any proliferation of materials, technologies or know-how, related to WMD and their means of delivery and conventional arms. We urge the DPRK to take concrete actions which would create an environment conducive to the resumption of dialogue and to take irreversible steps toward denuclearization. We urge the DPRK to refrain from any acts or provocations, such as the November 2010 artillery shelling of Yeongpyang Island, which negatively impact the stability of the region.
9. We note with deep concern the lack of cooperation by Syria reflected in the most recent IAEA report. We urge Syria to fulfil its obligations and fully cooperate with the Agency and respond to the IAEA Director-General's requests for access and information in order to clarify all outstanding issues. We look forward to the IAEA Board of Governors addressing the seriousness of the issue.
10. We express our concern at the continued proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery which constitutes a threat to international peace and security as underlined in UNSCR 1540, 1887 and 1977. While considering cooperation in the field of ballistic missile technology, know how and systems, States must pay particular attention to proliferation risks in this regard. We are concerned about the ongoing missile programmes in the Middle East, North-east Asia and South Asia including Iran and DPRK. We recognise the need to step up our efforts to increase the effectiveness of multilateral arrangements, particularly the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In this regard, as mentioned in the last MTCR plenary press release (Buenos Aires, 15 April 2011), MTCR Partners discussed proliferation of WMD as well as their means of delivery that constitute a threat to international peace and security and reaffirmed the importance of addressing these specific challenges and the role the MTCR serves in this regard. We support the efforts made with regard to the universalization of the HCOC and express our willingness to make the Code more efficient. We are committed to making the international community further aware of this threat and to promoting transparency on ballistic missiles.
11. On 14-15 March 2010, the G8 Foreign Affairs ministers adopted a Statement on the Seventh Review Conference for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We welcome this declaration and look forward to a successful 7th BTWC Review Conference dedicated to the effective review of the operation of the Convention.
12. We reaffirm our unconditional support for the CWC and the functions of the OPCW. Destruction of chemical weapons remains a key objective of the Convention. We encourage all possessor States to take every necessary measure to accelerate their destruction processes in a transparent fashion, and within the framework of the existing verification regime. We reiterate the need for an enhanced industry verification regime. Selection of facilities should be directed towards those sites of the greatest relevance to the object and purpose of the Convention.
13. We are determined to promote a more concrete approach with regard to the fight against proliferation through the effective implementation of multilateral instruments and strong national measures. To fight proliferation financing, we support the process launched at the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) that will strengthen the financial vigilance of G8 countries in a coordinated manner. To support UN proliferation sanctions, we will bolster the existing criminal provisions in national legislation and encourage States to identify as a specific offence the proliferation of WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials. Such provisions will also target financing and financial services. To better counteract proliferation, we are committed to strengthening cooperation in this area among the G8 and with others, where appropriate, notably by increasing State endorsements of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and improving its effectiveness. We will continue to strengthen our national export control policies and we will exercise vigilance with regard to access to WMD and their means of delivery proliferation-related knowledge and know-how. Such actions will be taken to further implement Resolutions 1540 and 1887, as well as other UNSC resolutions.
14. We fully support the key role played by the United Nations Security Council in addressing proliferation issues. We welcome the adoption of Resolution 1977 reinforcing Resolution 1540 which aims to prevent non-State actors from acquiring WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials and renewing the mandate of the 1540 Committee. We invite all States to contribute to the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and we reiterate our support to the 1540 Committee in the discharge of its mandate.
15. We recall our commitment to seeking a safer world for all, and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT, in a way that promotes international stability, based on the principle of undiminished security for all, and underlining the vital importance of non-proliferation for achieving this goal.
16. We welcome the entry into force of the New START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America as a significant progress on the disarmament agenda. We also recall and welcome the disarmament efforts already made by France and the UK. Efforts by some nuclear weapons States in nuclear arms reductions, disarmament, confidence-building and transparency, including increased transparency measures of some nuclear-weapon States, represent major steps in line with the action plan adopted by the NPT Review Conference in May 2010. We urge all States to extend these efforts by bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty.
17. We will continue our efforts for the permanent and legally binding cessation of all nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion through the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. We call upon all States to join our efforts in this regard, to uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. We reiterate our support for the work achieved by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), in building up all elements of the verification regime, particularly its International Monitoring System (IMS) and on-site inspections.
18. We note our profound regret and growing frustration in the international community over the persistent failure of the Conference on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including verification provisions. We call on all States participating in the Conference on Disarmament to immediately start, building on the CD/1864 programme of work, substantive international negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. We express our support for the moratorium on the production of such materials announced by the G8 nuclear-weapons States, and we call on the other States concerned to follow suit.
19. We actively support the ongoing efforts within the UN regarding the elaboration of a global instrument on conventional arms.
20. We support the decisive role of the IAEA in strengthening the international non proliferation regime and express our willingness to promote as a universally accepted international verification standard the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with the Additional Protocol. We call on all States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol and apply its provisions as soon as possible.
21. Reaffirming the inalienable right of all States Parties to the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in compliance with their international obligations, we reiterate our willingness to cooperate with States which meet their non-proliferation obligations and wish to develop a civil nuclear programme, in order to help them fulfil the essential requirements of a development of nuclear energy. These requirements include safety, security, non-proliferation and respect for the environment. We are committed to continuing our efforts towards the universal acceptance of the IAEA Comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the Additional Protocol, as the IAEA verification standard. We call on all States which are developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to develop or strengthen national civil nuclear liability regimes in line with the relevant international civil nuclear liability instruments. Development and application of innovative technology in relevant frameworks has a growing role to play in supplying global demand for energy and also in building up robust and transparent atomic energy infrastructure resistant to nuclear accidents. We underscore the responsibility of governments for timely and sufficient measures on accident prevention and management to minimize the consequences of accidents, should they occur. Efficiency and substance of notifications in case of nuclear accidents should be further improved as well.
22. We acknowledge the useful contribution the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle provide in the field of nuclear energy and encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency's efforts to continue to address this issue. In this regard, we support the IAEA's decision to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium for the IAEA member states as well as its decision to establish a fuel bank and adopt a Model Agreement for Nuclear Fuel Assurance initiative, while respecting market rules.
23. We would like to stress the importance of nuclear security as part of the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We welcome the results of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010 and encourage States to implement the objectives set out in the Final Communiqué and the Work Plan, as well as the national commitments announced at the Washington Summit and those made ahead of the Seoul Summit in April 2012. We call on all States to implement the IAEA's most current recommendations on physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities (INFCIRC/225/Rev.5).
24. We welcome the work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to control the transfer of goods and technologies linked to the most sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing). We encourage the NSG to quickly reach consensus in order to implement a strengthened mechanism supervising these transfers. While awaiting the completion of this work, we agree to continue to apply on a national basis the set of relevant export criteria indicated in the declaration adopted at the L'Aquila Summit and reendorsed in Muskoka in 2010.
25. We welcome the achievements of the G8 Global Partnership, launched in Kananaskis in 2002, and remain committed to completing priority projects in Russia. Our assessment of the Partnership recognises the significant progress the 23 Partners have achieved on the full range of WMD non proliferation activities worldwide. The assessment also provides directions for the future. As such, we agree to extend the Partnership beyond 2012, based on the areas of focus enunciated at Muskoka (nuclear and radiological security, bio-security, scientist engagement, and facilitation of the implementation of UNSCR 1540). We will work with all Partners in discussing and coordinating projects in the above-mentioned areas, and we will expand membership of the Partnership. Partners will decide on funding of such projects on a national, joint, or multilateral basis.
Source: G8 and G20 French Presidency
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