We recognize, as we did at Hokkaido Toyako and at previous Summits, that the proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery continues to represent a global challenge and a major threat to international security. We are determined to seize current opportunities and the new momentum to strengthen our common non-proliferation and disarmament goals through effective multilateralism and determined national efforts. All States must meet in full their arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation commitments under relevant international treaties and multilateral arrangements. The universalization and reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime remains an urgent priority. We call upon all States still not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) to accede without delay.
We underscore that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and reiterate our full commitment to the objectives and obligations of its three pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament. We will work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty’s regime and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three pillars. We call upon all States Parties to the NPT to contribute to the review process with a constructive and balanced approach.
Safeguards are an essential tool for the effective implementation of the NPT and its non-proliferation objectives. We confirm our full support for the IAEA and are committed to continuing our efforts towards the universal acceptance of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol as the verification standard. We will also work to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We call upon all States that have not yet adopted an Additional Protocol to do so without delay while implementing its provisions pending ratification. We seek to ensure that the IAEA continues to have the technology, expertise, authority and resources needed to fulfil its vital, statutory responsibilities. We also agree that measures are needed to address non-compliance, to include real and immediate consequences for States that withdraw from the NPT while in violation of it, including appropriate action by the UN Security Council, and full use of IAEA inspection authorities that provide for access to all relevant locations, information and people.
We welcome the announcement made by the President of the United States of America that he has decided to seek ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and we will intensify our efforts towards the early entry into force and universalisation of the CTBT as one of the principal instruments of the international security architecture and a key measure of non-proliferation and disarmament. Meanwhile, we urge all States concerned to observe a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions.
We welcome the adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a program of work for its 2009 session. We strongly support the early commencement of international negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) including verification provisions, and call upon all States concerned to declare and uphold a moratorium on the production of such material. We welcome the fact that the nuclear-weapon States among the G8 members have already decreed such a moratorium. We will take action to resume substantive work in the CD as soon as possible.
We are all committed to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons, in accordance with the goals of the NPT. We welcome the nuclear disarmament measures implemented thus far by the nuclear-weapon States among G8 members.We welcome the Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States of America of 1 April 2009, their Joint Understanding signed on 6 July 2009, and their intention to conclude a legally binding agreement to replace the START Treaty before it expires in December 2009. We call upon all States to undertake further steps in nuclear disarmament and to greater transparency.
We reaffirm the inalienable right of all NPT Parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in conformity with all their Treaty obligations; compliance and effective verification will not hinder the use of nuclear energy, but rather facilitate its safe and secure development and deployment as energy source. We are committed to promoting nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security in cooperation with the IAEA and welcome new initiatives in emerging nuclear energy countries on nuclear education and training as well as institutional capacity building in these fields. We encourage the work of the IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including assurances of nuclear fuel supply, as effective means of addressing the expanded need for nuclear fuel services, while taking into account the global interest in minimizing the risk of proliferation.
In this regard, we appreciate the ongoing work at the Russian-led International Uranium Enrichment Centre at Angarsk and welcome progress made towards establishing a Nuclear Fuel Bank administered by the IAEA, Russia’s proposal to guarantee supply of low enriched uranium and the further development of Germany’s Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project. We also take note of other initiatives, including Japan’s proposal for an IAEA Standby Arrangement System for the Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply, the UK’s proposal for a political assurance of non-interference in the delivery of commercial nuclear contracts and the U.S. nuclear fuel reserve generated from material from its national security stocks.
To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment and technology, we welcome the progress that continues to be made by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of such enrichment and reprocessing items and technology. While noting that the NSG has not yet reached consensus on this issue, we agree that the NSG discussions have yielded useful and constructive proposals contained in the NSG’s “clean text” developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting. Pending completion of work in the NSG, we agree to implement this text on a national basis in the next year. We urge the NSG to accelerate its work and swiftly reach consensus this year to allow for global implementation of a strengthened mechanism on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing facilities, equipment, and technology.
We acknowledge the UN Security Council’s key role in addressing the challenges of proliferation and the consequences of non compliance. We call upon all States to fully implement UNSC Resolution 1540 on preventing non-State actors from obtaining WMDs, their means of delivery and related materials. We support the 1540 Committee’s fulfilment of its renewed mandate. We encourage all States to participate actively in the comprehensive review of the status of implementation of the Resolution and contribute to its success.
We welcome the ongoing progress under the CWC and BTWC and highlight the vital importance of the full and effective implementation of both Conventions.
We reiterate our unanimous commitment to working for a comprehensive, peaceful and diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and strongly support ongoing efforts to resolve it through negotiations. We urge Iran to use the present window of opportunity for engagement with the international community in a spirit of mutual respect and to respond positively to the offers advanced, in order to find a negotiated solution which will address Iran’s interest as well as the international community concerns. While recognizing once again that Iran has the right to a civilian nuclear program under the NPT, we stress that Iran has the responsibility, as reiterated by UNSC Resolutions, to restore confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, allowing for the establishment of a fruitful and wide-ranging cooperation with the G8 and other countries.
The proliferation risks posed by Iran’s nuclear program continue to be a matter of serious concern. We urge Iran to comply with the relevant UNSC Resolutions and to fully cooperate with the IAEA by providing the Agency such access and information that it requests to resolve the issues raised in the IAEA Director General’s Reports.
We condemn in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) on 25 May 2009 which constitutes a flagrant violation of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. Such a test undermines peace and stability in the region and beyond. In this regard, we welcome the UN Security Council Resolution 1874 of 12 June 2009 which represents the clear and strong will of the international community. We also condemn the April 2009 ballistic launch conducted by the DPRK which is in contravention of UNSCR 1718. We continue to urge the DPRK to abide by UNSCRs 1695, 1718 and 1874, not to conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology and to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, as well as ballistic missile programs, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We demand the DPRK to return to full compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. We call upon the DPRK to return immediately and without preconditions to the Six-Party Talks and reiterate our strong support for the early resumption of the Talks and the full implementation of the 19 September 2005 Joint Statement, including the resolution of all the outstanding issues of concern.
The threat of terrorist acquiring WMDs continues to be cause for deep concern. We are determined to continue working together to ensure that terrorists never have access to those weapons and related materials. We look forward to the development of the initiative announced by the President of the United States of America regarding a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world. We will further promote the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which plays an important role in developing its participants’ capacity to confront this global threat on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under relevant international legal frameworks.
We maintain our support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which plays an important part in preventing and countering proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials. We recognize the progress in combating the financing of proliferation activities, and the role of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
We will continue to uphold the importance of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), by promoting its universalization and full implementation. In this respect, we are encouraged by the positive developments announced at the 2009 HCoC annual meeting, and are confident that all subscribing States will soon fully implement their commitments. We call upon all States that have not subscribed to the Code to do so without delay.
The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction launched in 2002 at Kananaskis has become a successful large-scale initiative for the enhancement of international security. In parallel with the implementation of ongoing priority projects in Russia and Ukraine, to which we fully reconfirm our commitments, we are discussing the options for the Partnership’s further expansion by engaging potential new participants, including CIS countries, committed to the Kananaskis Principles and Guidelines.
The G8 is also ready to include new fields of cooperation in areas where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest. To prevent global WMD knowledge proliferation, particularly through collaboration with scientists, we welcome the Recommendations for a coordinated approach in this field.
Regarding nuclear safety, we acknowledge the progress made since the last Summit meeting in ongoing projects at the Chernobyl site and, while noting that additional financial resources will be needed for their completion, we reassert our commitment to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the site into a stable and environmentally safe condition.