



## REPORT ON THE G8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

1. Having passed the turning point towards 2012, we reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as set out in the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit documents. Since 2002, the Global Partnership has become a large-scale international initiative which has contributed to the enhancement of international security and stability. After the mid-term review produced under the German Presidency, the past year has witnessed the successful completion of a number of projects. Further progress should be made in turning initial pledges into projects and activities.

2. The destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists were identified as key priorities at Kananaskis. We are also making efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials and in other areas of cooperation in accordance with the Kananaskis Statement.

3. We are determined in our commitment to accomplish priority projects under this initiative in Russia as well as in Ukraine.

4. We also recognize that the GP must evolve further to address new, emerging risks worldwide if we are to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons and/or missiles.

### Chemical Weapons Destruction

5. International assistance in the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities was recognized at Kananaskis as a key requirement to help Russia to eliminate its stockpiles of chemical weapons, pursuant to its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Substantial progress has been made in the chemical weapons destruction area since 2002 through Russia's own funding as well as with foreign assistance.

6. Two chemical weapons destruction facilities have been built with international assistance. The facility at **Gorny**, built with the assistance by the EU, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, has destroyed all the chemical weapons stored there. The facility at **Kambarka**, built with assistance of the EU, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland, is destroying its chemical weapon stockpiles since becoming operational in December 2005.

7. The construction of the facility at **Shchuch'ye**, involving Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, the EU, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US is continuing. Finland will contribute to this project. Germany and Switzerland are providing assistance for the facility at **Pochep** and Italy will do so for the same facility. Switzerland is also providing assistance for the facility at **Leonidovka** and has already provided funds

for the facility at **Maradykovsky**. Canada has begun preparatory work to provide assistance for the facility at **Kizner**.

### **Dismantling Nuclear Submarines and Related Work**

8. Dismantling decommissioned nuclear submarines withdrawn from the Russian Navy is another priority area identified at Kananaskis Summit. This is a complex activity, including, inter alia, their transport to shipyards, removal of spent nuclear fuel, their dismantlement, and the safe, long term storage of their reactor compartments.

9. Substantial progress has been made in dismantling submarines both in the North West Russia and the Russian Far East since 2002. Russia has allocated substantial funding of its own with significant financial support from Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the UK and the US as well as the EU. However, more work remains to be done in the Russian Far East.

10. The ongoing projects related to the development of infrastructure to ensure safe and secure management of nuclear materials from the dismantlement process include:

- the German-financed land based long-term interim storage facility at **Sayda Bay** for reactor compartments of submarines, other naval ships and nuclear naval objects which will be extended with the construction of a radioactive waste management and storage facility in the second phase of this project;
- the construction of the facilities for the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management at **Andreeva Bay** funded by the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the EBRD;
- the launching of the rehabilitation of **Gremikha** former naval base funded by the EU, France and the EBRD, beginning with the withdrawal of spent nuclear fuel;
- the refitting of the nuclear waste incinerator in **Zvezdochka** shipyard funded by France, and the defueling from the nuclear cruiser 090 to be funded by Italy;
- a multi-use naval vessel for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear materials funded by Italy;
- a spent nuclear fuel storage facility at the Atomflot site in Murmansk funded by the UK;
- Canada has also funded environmental improvements at Zvezdochka.

11. The parties continue to use successfully a number of bilateral instruments as well as the Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme in the Russian Federation (MNEPR). The latter provided the basis for the implementation of the Northern Dimensional Environmental Programme's (NDEP) "Nuclear Window", managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) that includes a number of nuclear multilateral and bilateral projects, such as rehabilitation programmes at Andreeava Bay and Gremikha.

### **Disposition of Fissile Material**

12. In 2000, Russia and the US agreed to each convert 34 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium designated as no longer required for defence programmes into forms not useable for weapons. In 2007, Russia and the US bilaterally agreed on and signed a joint statement outlining a plan to dispose of 34 tonnes of surplus plutonium from Russia's weapons programme. Based on this joint statement, amendments to the US-Russia agreement of 2000 are to be made by the two parties.

### **Employment of Former Weapons Scientists**

13. Since 2002 more than 1400 research projects have been funded through the **International Science and Technology Center** (ISTC) in Russia and the **Science and Technology Center** in Ukraine (STCU) by Canada, the EU, Japan, the US and other countries. In particular, several donors are engaged in projects outside Russia concerning the response to biological threat. The parties seek to improve further the effectiveness of the two Centers.

### **Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials**

14. The G8 Gleneagles Statement and the Sea Island G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation highlighted the importance of addressing the security of nuclear materials, equipment and technology as well as radioactive sources.

15. A number of donors are implementing projects with Russia and Ukraine to upgrade the physical protection of and accounting for nuclear materials. These include Canada, the EU, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Republic of Korea, the UK and the US.

16. With a view to securing radiological sources, a number of donors, including Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, the US and the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) are supporting dismantling, storing and replacing some 700 highly radioactive **radioisotopic thermoelectric generators** (RTGs) which have been used to power Russian lighthouses. With Canadian assistance, a Russian "RTG Master Plan" has been completed and efforts are under way to increase co-ordination among participating countries.

### **Other Areas of Cooperation**

17. Global Partnership countries are also cooperating in other spheres in accordance with the Kananaskis Statement and reporting such cooperation annually.

18. The US is working with Russia and Ukraine on the dismantlement of **strategic weapons systems**, and enhancing the security of weapons transportation and storage. Several Global Partnership members are implementing bio-security projects in Ukraine. The UK, in collaboration with the US cooperates with Ukraine on security enhancements for long term storage of highly active spent radioactive sources.

19. The US and Russia are co-operating on the construction of **fossil fuel power plants** that, when completed, will allow the permanent closure of the three remaining Russian reactors that are producing weapons-grade plutonium. Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the UK have also contributed funds to support these projects.

20. Last year, in Heiligendamm, the G-8 reaffirmed its commitment to continue joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the damaged reactor unit site to a safe condition and to make available facilities at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant necessary for the safe decommissioning of the remaining reactors. In addition, a number of donors are engaged in projects with Ukraine to enhance export control and border security systems to help prevent the illicit trafficking in WMD across national borders.

### **Implementation challenges and solutions with regard to projects in Russia**

21. We will follow through our commitments made at the Kananaskis Summit and strive to overcome any remaining administrative challenges. Adequate information submission, site access and tax exemption in accordance with the existing legal requirements of donors and recipients are essential. While there remains room for improving project implementation, our experience has shown that it is possible to overcome the many bureaucratic obstacles to progress by sustaining good working-level relationships and a strong commitment to mutual cooperation and understanding, without compromising requirements for financial probity, safety standards or national security. Reliable long-term planning and predictable disbursement of funds are equally essential for successful completion of projects.

**Future benchmarks towards 2012 for projects in Russia**

22. In Russia, we will concentrate our efforts on the two programmes, which Russia considers of primary importance, in a more coordinated manner by establishing common future benchmarks towards 2012. This approach is expected to accelerate implementation of projects.

23. For the destruction of chemical weapons Russia has its own national plan for the construction of five chemical weapon destruction facilities with a view to complying with its legally-binding deadline under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

24. The national plan for the construction of those facilities to be completed is as follows:

- 2008 Shchuch'ye
- 2008 Maradikovsky
- 2008 Leonidovka
- 2009 Kizner
- 2009 Pochep

25. Cooperation and coordination under the GP will be focused on assisting Russia in the implementation of this national plan.

26. All decommissioned nuclear submarines from the Russian Navy are to be dismantled by the year 2010 both in the North West and Far East Russia. In addition, Russia has its national plan for storage of compartments, spent nuclear fuel, radioactive waste management and construction of related infrastructure.

27. This national plan is as follows:

- 2009           Completion of the facility for long-term storage of reactor compartments in the Northwest
- Reconstruction of a railway section in the Far East
- Removal of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear powered ships in the Northwest and the Far East
- Start of the construction of the infrastructure at Andreeva bay to allow for the removal of spent nuclear fuel by around 2014
- 2009           Regional center for the conditioning of solid radioactive waste in the North West (start of construction) Sayda Bay
- 2010           Construction of a ship for the spent nuclear fuel transportation in the North West
- 2012           Rehabilitation of building 5 at Andreeva Bay

Preparation works for removal of the spent nuclear fuel from the floating technical base “Lepse” in the Northwest

28. In addition to the projects enumerated in the Russian national plan, priority should be accorded to preparing for the safe and secure removal of spent nuclear fuel at Andreeva Bay, its eventual transportation to Mayak and the construction of the long-term storage facility at Razboynik Bay in the Russian Far East.

**Expansion of GP**

29. Risks of the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide. The Global Partnership will address such risks through implementing projects according to the GP common principles. In addressing threat reduction and non-proliferation requirements, the projects will be specifically aimed to implement and realize the GP common principles worldwide. To this end other recipient states and donor states accepting the GP principles and guidelines could be included on a case-by-case basis in an expanded GP for the implementation of projects in line with GP goals. At the same time, the GP will continue to focus on the ongoing GP projects.

30. At the same time, the GP will continue to provide assistance to ongoing GP projects in Russia noting that the areas of the chemical weapons destruction and the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines are priority areas for Russia. We are determined in our commitment to accomplish projects, including those which Russia considers of primary importance, under this initiative in Russia.

31. Based on the agreement that the Global Partnership will address such risks worldwide, the partners will work together constructively and practically to identify specific focuses of the expanded GP. The discussions on this issue will be conducted on a project based fashion and function-wise, inter alia, nuclear and radiological issues, chemical issues and biological issues. The GP welcomes the expertise of the OPCW on chemical issues and the IAEA on nuclear and radiological issues in the implementation of GP projects in their area of competence and seeks such expertise regarding biological issues within the BTWC. The effective implementation of IAEA safeguards agreement and the Additional Protocol, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are areas where partners may seek to engage through the GP. A “model agreement” proposed by the UK was noted as a reference which could be helpful in enabling new projects to be put in place with minimum delay.

32. The Global Partnership currently encompasses twenty-three partners including the EU. Efforts should, however, continue to be made to find new donors. Endeavors to communicate with potential new donors can be undertaken by interested partners.