Safe and Effective Management of Weapons Fissile Material Designated As No Longer Required for Defence Purposes

Summits > Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit

Background Document, Moscow, April 20, 1996

As a result of disarmament measures, there are growing stocks of weapons fissile material, separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU), designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is the national responsibility of each state possessing such material to ensure that it is kept safely guarded so that it may not become the object of criminal diversion which would be a serious threat to the international non-proliferation regime.

This fissile material should be safely, affordably, and effectively stored and handled under physical protection, accounting and control measures that meet the highest international standards and that ensure effective non-proliferation controls, until it can be transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and safely and permanently disposed of.

Significant effort will be required for the storage, handling, and eventual disposal of this fissile material, and each state possessing fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes is responsible for its management, taking into account the need to avoid contributing to the risks of nuclear proliferation; the need to protect the environment, workers and the public; the resource value of the material and the costs and benefits involved.

In the context of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, Participants wished to comment upon the importance of this issue and to address the risks associated with these growing stocks of excess weapons fissile material. At the same time, they identified possible strategies for the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. They reached a common understanding on the following:

reaffirmation of their commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to the Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the call for an early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to the relevant nuclear disarmament agreements;
recognition that the primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes rests with the nuclear weapons states themselves but that other states and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired;
support for efforts to rapidly ensure that separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, including that from dismantled weapons, are stored and handled under physical protection, accounting and control measures that meet the highest international standards and that ensure effective non-proliferation controls;
the placing of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes by the weapons states under IAEA safeguards (under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so, consistently with non-proliferation, economic, safety and environmental requirements, and that appropriate resources for safeguarding these stocks should be provided;
the importance of the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, of the cooperation programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, the United States and other states with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose, and of other efforts along these lines;
declaration that weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes will never again be used for nuclear explosive purposes and that effective management of this material will aim to reduce stocks of separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) through peaceful non-explosive use or safe and final disposal as soon as practicable; and
recognition of the importance of increasing transparency in the management of plutonium designated as not required for defence purposes.

On the specific question of possible options for dealing with fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, including--for plutonium--safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, or conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors, they reached a common understanding on:

the urgent need to identify appropriate strategies and to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies;
the willingness to undertake small-scale technology demonstrations; and
the convening of an international meeting of experts to examine available options and possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies. Such a meeting should take place by the end of 1996.

Criteria for selecting appropriate national strategies for managing fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, including safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, or conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors, were identified as:

reduction of the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
effective transformation of the material into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
speed with which stockpiles of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purpose are reduced;
safety, physical protection, environmental protection; and
other costs and benefits involved.

Source: Released at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, April 20, 1996.

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