The G8 started out in 1975 as a forum for “a searching and productive exchange of views on the world economic situation, on economic problems common to our countries, on their human, social and political implications, and on plans for resolving them” (Rambouillet Declaration 1975, para. 1). This dominant economic focus has been a continuing feature of the group’s development. At the same time, however, the “human, social and political implications” of the world economic situation have also gained prominence on the summit agendas. The G8 had in fact adapted to changing needs and circumstances, and one could argue that its dominant economic focus, although not totally replaced by new issues and challenges, has been supplemented and transformed.

This chapter argues that the concept of security has become integral to understanding the role of the G8 in international relations, and has been an important part of the development of the group itself. It begins with an outline of the changing conceptions of security from a political science perspective. This is followed by a closer look at the fundamental conceptual shift in recent years from state security to human security, both on a theoretical and political level. Against this background, the relevance of these new concepts for the G8 will be analyzed in relation both to the conceptual focus of its summit documents and some of its concrete political initiatives. The conclusion will argue that the G8’s role as an agent of securitization (in theoretical terms) and as a catalyst for the creation of new institutions (in practical terms), account for its special role in the global governance architecture.

Changing Conceptions of Security

The very meaning of the term security is to a large extent insecure. What constitutes security is obviously dependent upon contextual factors that change with different historical eras, social norms, and individual perspectives (see Caldwell and Williams

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1 All G8 documents in this chapter will be cited according to the online texts at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm>.
2 This aspect is also dealt with by a number of more recent studies on the G8, such as Dobson (2007), Kirton and Stefanova (2004) or Pentillä (2003).
Security is often tied to the perception of specific threats, and in that sense it is as much about concrete facts as about the assessment of those facts. An often cited definition from peace and conflict studies equates threat with a combination of capabilities and intent of an adversary power (Singer 1967). Though it implies that threats can be measured and weighed, this formula inevitably brings in the uncertainty as to who is the potential adversary power, how its capabilities can be detected and how its intentions can be interpreted. This uncertainty is especially pervasive in the realm of international relations where the focus traditionally lies with the security between states and nations. Walter Lippmann, political analyst and presidential advisor on American foreign policy, coined a short definition of security in 1943, not only valid for the Second World War but also for much of the ensuing Cold War:

A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a war. (Lippmann 1943: 51)

Such a definition clearly emphasizes military capabilities and ultimately points to the instrument of war as a means for survival and self-assertion in a hostile environment. In the absence of effective rules for the use of force and established procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the realist paradigm portrays the world as essentially anarchical with unavoidable power rivalries and security dilemmas where only nation states are deemed fit for defensive as well as offensive action (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 59–96). It is, however, interesting to see that Lippmann’s definition also makes a strong reference to the core values that lie at the heart of security concerns in international affairs. The international arena, therefore, is not only a place of power struggles but is also structured by norms and ideas, a concept that in the past years has been highlighted by the constructivist approach to international affairs (Jackson and Sorensen 2007, 161–177). Military means and material values are not the only things that constitute international interactions, but core values such as individual liberty or free market policies are also taken into consideration. Security is therefore not a mere means of survival; it aims to preserve certain values.

In this context it is interesting to consider that the 1975 Rambouillet communiqué echoes this notion of core values by referencing the shared beliefs of its members, specifically with respect to “an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement” (Rambouillet Declaration 1975, para. 2). This commitment to shared beliefs at Rambouillet was linked to another important decision by the group. They did not take the perspective of “a” nation (as in Lippmann’s definition), but the perspective of a collective gathering of “the” nations, joined by an initiative to pursue strategies for a common security. This notion of common or collective security was not new to the situation in the 1970s. It has been a standard argument in the history of international relations, with its most prominent manifestations being the League of Nations and the United Nations Organization (Claude 1964). What
was new in the 1970s was the intensified inter-connectedness that also marks a departure from Lippmann’s assessment.

This new state of international relations found its theoretical diagnosis in the classic *Power and Interdependence*, initially published by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in 1977. The study was published against the background of the oil crisis that had had consequences for the largely unprepared community of industrialized nations, and had only intensified a looming debate on American decline. Keohane and Nye argued for a reassessment of the very understanding of international politics. In their view, “complex interdependence” was the constitutive feature of international relations that expressed the cumulative effect of three fundamental changes in world politics (Keohane and Nye 2001). First, states were no longer perceived to be the sole and unquestioned actors of international politics—other actors such as private businesses or international organisations also appeared on an increasingly crowded international stage. Second, the power of pure military force could not be easily translated into bargaining power and the control over negotiation outcomes—military power was not always and not absolutely the prime power resource. Third, the somewhat artificial dividing line between so-called high and low politics could not be maintained any longer—various areas from technology to culture influenced the global interaction. This diagnosis had obvious consequences for the notion of security and the ways in which states tried to preserve it. In that sense, the study by Keohane and Nye can also be read as a theoretical blueprint for the emergence of the G7 in 1975. The need to better manage interdependence clearly resonates within the Rambouillet declaration.

Today the security debate has become even more complex. The landscape of international conflict has changed markedly from inter-state wars to intra-state wars, as the Uppsala conflict data demonstrates. Although the development in recent years has not been altogether negative as the *Human Security Report* (2005) shows, new forms of violence, war economies in civil conflicts, global inequalities as well as international organized crime and terrorism not only challenge traditional concepts of security but also traditional ways to tackle these threats (Human Security Centre 2005). The sovereign state, formerly the source of national and international order, also has the capacity to become a source of national and international disorder by exporting instability beyond its borders, when, for example, a government engages in the ethnic cleansing of its own population. While the state’s “offensive” potential for chaos and suffering may have increased, its “defensive” potential to effectively protect itself and its population against threats to its security has decreased. Interstate security becomes secondary in a situation where—every year—11 million children die from hunger and malnutrition and 3 million people lose their lives because of malaria, a disease that in principle can be treated and prevented. The absence of military threats around the Maldives is overshadowed by the fact that climate change and a potential increase in sea levels threaten the very existence of these beautiful islands.

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3 See the data at <www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php>.
4 For some illustrative data see <www.unmillenniumproject.org>.
In that context, the last 30 years have witnessed a broadening of the concept of security, including areas and issues that previously had not been deemed security-related (Caldwell and Williams 2006, 8–12). Table 9-1 identifies three turning points to illustrate this development, connecting concrete political events with concurring analyses.

The motivations for broadening the security agenda have had a cumulative effect. In the work of Buzan et al. (1998) there are at least five sectors of security: military, political, economic, environmental and societal.

The broader concept of security is also accompanied by a change in its point of reference: the nation state has lost its dominant position with respect to security. The theoretical diagnosis of “denationalization” (Zürn 1998) further intensifies the complex interdependence of Keohane and Nye.

Referring to a concept developed by Jürgen Habermas, Zangl and Zürn (2003) discuss the transformation from the national to the post-national constellation, addressing governance and legitimacy as well as problems and resources (see Table 9-2).

Whereas the former regime was organized by national problems, dealt with by national governments, and their national resources were used on the basis of national processes of legitimacy, the latter model is characterized by the transnationalization of problems, by the supranationalization of governance, and by changing modes of generating legitimacy in world politics. Only national resources remain relatively

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Changing Conceptions of Security and the G8

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tied to the national sphere. With respect to the security debate, this transformation of the state’s capacities and status results in yet another conceptual shift. The state is no longer the sole point of reference in defining, measuring and safeguarding security. Other political entities, and most notably the individual, move into the centre of debates. The most explicit manifestation of this shift is the concept of human security, which, besides broadening the concept of security, can be understood as extending its substance and scope (Caldwell and Williams 2006, 7–14).

From State Security to Human Security

The notion of human security emerged in the 1994 *Human Development Report* published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Following the trend outlined above to widen the scope of security, the Report distinguished seven dimensions of security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. The report, developed under the aegis of former Pakistani finance minister Mahub ul Haq, argued for a very broad understanding of what could constitute a threat to people. The Report opens with an explicit call for a re-orientation of international affairs:

> The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may often be within nations rather than between them—with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms. More generally, it will not be possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals—not peace, not environmental protection, not human rights or democratization, not fertility reduction, not social integration—except in the context of sustainable development that leads to human security. It is time for humanity to restore its perspective and redesign its agenda. (UNDP 1994, 1)

The link between security and economic development is particularly apparent here since the 1994 report preceded the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen. This nexus is, however, also relevant for the G8 agenda, as will be discussed below. The UNDP report concentrated its effort on the search for concrete indicators that could guide and measure the policies addressing the range of human security challenges, policies that would have an impact on individual level, and not necessarily on the level of the state.

At least two concrete variations of human security have evolved from this conceptual innovation, predominately spear-headed by two G8 members, Canada and Japan (Fröhlich 2007). It may be too simple to juxtapose these two variations, but it does serve to illustrate the shift in thinking about the concept of security. The Canadian concept is closely linked to the person and program of Lloyd Axworthy, the former minister of foreign affairs. Canada focused on a number of challenges in humanitarian law, from the protection of civilians in armed conflict to the successful
ban on landmines realized through the Ottawa Process (Hampson et al. 2001). Borrowing from Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms Speech,” the Canadian conception of security emphasizes “freedom from fear,” meaning the absence of violence and threats to the physical security of individuals. The challenges of humanitarian intervention epitomized by the NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (which, again significantly, was also dealt with by G8 nations faced with a deadlock in the UN Security Council) acted as a kind of catalyst for the Canadian approach.

The most prominent manifestation of this approach is the concept of responsibility to protect (R2P), the result of the Axworthy-led International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS 2001; Fröhlich 2006). The meticulously researched report aimed to deliver policy-relevant recommendations based on their argument that

sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. (ICISS 2001)

The R2P doctrine, however, does not only address military intervention, but also imposes responsibilities to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict, and to rebuild communities after conflict.

This doctrine can be understood as an explicit consequence of the transformation of the state and its capacity to provide security for its citizens. Against the background of state failure and state-induced catastrophe, a static concept of state sovereignty can no longer be upheld as a shield against intervention even in the case of genocide. Instead, a new understanding is gaining primacy, one that in 1999 UN secretary-general Kofi Annan called “individual sovereignty,” which qualifies the claim and exercise of sovereign rights in international affairs (Annan 1999). The R2P doctrine was included in the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document (UN Doc. A/60/L. 1 15.089.2005: para. 138–140) and, modified and declaratory as this inclusion may be, marks a significant change in the structure of international law and in the rationale of a world organization that had adopted national sovereignty as one of its cornerstones. National security, according to the Canadian approach, is a meaningful concept only insofar it serves to uphold human security within and beyond state borders.

The Japanese approach to human security is similar to the Canadian one, but with a different emphasis. It goes back to the work of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, and is articulated in an expert report on human security called Human Security Now (Commission on Human Security 2003). Led by former high commissioner for refugees Sadako Ogata and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, this report defined human security as the effort “to protect the vital core of all human lives that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.” The report continues, describing human security in broad terms:
It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people’s strengths and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity.

Although there is reference to freedom from fear, there is a strong emphasis on freedom from want based on economic and social conditions. Just as the Kosovo crisis can be considered the catalyst for the Canadian concept, the Asian financial crisis can be seen as the impetus behind the Japanese approach to human security.

There are a number of critical questions that can be raised against these concepts. The Canadian concept has been called a thinly veiled camouflage for military intervention without Security Council approval, and the Japanese concept was criticized for trying to turn every problem in social and individual life—all the “bad things that can happen”—into “security problems” (Krause 2005). Both approaches have, however, also led to positive action. The Canadian doctrine influenced the Ottawa Process, the establishment of the International Criminal Court and a number of Security Council resolutions explicitly dealing with the “protection of civilians in armed conflict.” Canada is an active part of the Human Security Network, an informal group of 14 states ranging from Austria to Thailand that pursues a common agenda, including enhancing the role of women in post-conflict peacebuilding and thinking about new ways to fight the spread of global pandemics like HIV/AIDS. Japan, although very close to that agenda, is not a member of the Human Security Network, but has initiated a number of efforts to further the aims of its own human security agenda. The most notable innovation in that context is the creation of a human security trust fund used to finance local projects that will enhance human security in various regions of the world.

The concept of human security as defined in these broad and arguably abstract ways leaves ample room for criticism of its conceptual soundness, its empirical applicability, and its potential for political realization. It is very difficult to measure human security and to find a comprehensive strategy to address the inter-connected threats and dimensions of such a concept. For the critics, conceptual vagueness is inextricably linked to a lack of concrete strategies, procedures, or institutions that could effectively provide human security. In this context, it is helpful to take a closer look at the changed concept of security within the G8, and at the potential of the G8 to engage with this complex concept of security. The next section will discuss how the G8 actively promoted and implemented a complex security agenda, expanding beyond its original economic mandate.

5 See the website of the network at <www.humansecuritynetwork.org>.
The Role of the G8

Originally conceived as a series of primarily economic summits and deliberations, the G8 always had an important, although indirect, relevance for global security: “The G8 and its predecessor, the G7, have a long and in many ways impressive history in the field of international security” (Pentillä 2003, 4). From the beginning, the G8 was also an actor in the political wrangling between the East and West, and the group made frequent comments on crisis situations and power rivalries. At the 1983 Williamsburg Summit, the leaders issued a separate political declaration focused on the question of security:

As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. Our arms will never be used except in response to aggression. (Statement at Williamsburg [Declaration on Security], 29 May 1983)

The call to protect the security of their countries with a reduced military capacity was a common feature of summit documents, particularly during the 1980s. This link between the G8 and domestic security policy does not, however, fully represent the larger role of the G8 within the global security debate.

This wider role can be traced by analyzing the references to the term “security” in relevant G8 documents. Although the term appears in both summit declarations and communiqués and the scope and length of these documents vary considerably over time, the overall trend is obvious: as far as summit communiqués are concerned, the word “security” appears five times in all the documents of the first G7/8 cycle (1975–1981). The second cycle (1982–1988) had 10 references, followed by 14 references for the third cycle (1989–1995). In this count, the added “eighth” summit on nuclear safety and security in Moscow—alone had 6 references to security. The fourth cycle (1996–2002) offers 32 references to security. Finally, the fifth cycle (2003–2010)

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6 Once again the source is the compilation of official documents at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/index.htm>. The author would like to thank Dorothea Töpfer for her assistance in researching the occurrence of security-related matters in G8 documents. While “insecurity” was counted as a reference to security, mentioning of the UN Security Council etc. was not included.

7 In this cycle, the nature of the communiqué texts changes. So far the analysis concentrated on the summit communiqué that is also referred to as the economic communiqué. Parallel to that there have been political declarations that also hold references to security but the fact that they are often subdivided into several single declarations that cannot be compared easily, is an argument for the focus on “the” summit communiqué. The Denver Summit combined the political and economic declaration and this led to a high count of 18 references to “security” in that document alone. Another change has to be noted for 2002: Here the count is problematic as there are a number of specific declarations but no comprehensive communiqué as in the years before. In lieu of that single document, the Chair’s Statement was included into the count. The
has a total of 173 counts and—notwithstanding the differences in the format and lengths of the texts—amply illustrates the increased awareness and importance of security matters in the G8 agenda.

This quantitative impression, superficial as it may be, is reinforced by the various issue-related declarations and statements. Some are entirely devoted to security issues, and others are replete with references to security. The 2007 Heiligendamm summit statement on Counter Terrorism begins with a section called “Security in the Era of Globalization.” The Heiligendamm Chair’s summary also contains a clear expression of a security concept that goes beyond a military focus: “We affirmed that military solutions alone cannot secure peace in the long term. Instead, the political, economic and social conditions needed for promoting human security and stability would have to be aimed for.”

The spectrum of security references, in the communiqués and the more specific issue-related summit statements, covers nearly all of the above-mentioned sectors and dimensions of a broadened concept of security. It is interesting to note that the very first mentioning of security in the 1980 Venice communiqué, fully in line with the economic focus, dealt with the security of the international banking system. Over time, several other dimensions were dealt with, including military security (for example, non-proliferation), political (for example, human rights), economic (for example, monetary stability), environmental (for example, climate change) and societal (for example, refugees) security. In addition, one can also find a number of security concerns specific to the G8 in various references to the security of travel, transport or supply as well as the introduction of biosecurity in the G8 Global Partnership Annual Report at the 2004 Sea Island Summit. Some of the issues that were mentioned in the innovative and holistic 1994 UNDP report were already prominent on the G8 agenda for some time: food security (Declaration of the Ottawa Summit, 1981, and then emphasized in the final communiqué at Genoa 2001); energy security (Declaration of the Versailles Summit in 1982 and in various documents at St. Petersburg in 2006) and the relevance of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS to the security of the global community (Communiqué of the 1997 Denver Summit and then prominently in Okinawa 2000, Genoa 2001 and Kananaskis 2002). The summit communiqués also underline the interconnectedness of the various dimensions of security. In the 1999 Cologne Summit Document, the group pledged to “ensure that our security, economic, environmental and development policies are properly coordinated and are conducive to the prevention of violent conflict.” This preventive aspect of the G8 security policy (see also Dudziak 2003; Malone 2004) constitutes the link between what could be described as a rather arbitrary laundry list of security concerns. The issue of security is not confined to the specialized statements formerly

three counts attributed to that seem to be compatible with the results of the other summits in that cycle (with Denver being the exception). Without overlooking the differences between the Chair’s Statement and the communiqué, this rule was also applied in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. The Heiligendamm Summit 2007 reintroduced the format of one comprehensive summit declaration.
termed “non-economic” or “political” declarations but is present in all of the G8 documents. In that regard, the G8 can be seen as an agent of securitization: The term “securitization” comes from the study by Buzan et al. (1998). It describes a process of attributing special attention and resources to a particular problem:

securitization on the international level (although often not on the domestic one) means to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues. (Buzan et al. 1998, 29).

This general definition can be applied to the G8. Its summits have done their part in securitizing several issues that had not been dealt with in an urgent and existential way before. In doing so, the G8 agenda also parallels the broadening and extending of the term “security” as outlined above. The Chair’s Statement from the 1996 Lyon Summit establishes the connection between global, regional, national and human security:

We also concurred that enduring security and stability is possible only when it is founded on the basic requirements of respect for human rights, establishment of democratic institutions and individual citizen’s security, and realization of sustainable development and economic prosperity.\(^8\)

Considering the broad definition of human security discussed above, it should come as no surprise that especially the 2000 Okinawa and 2008 Hokkaido Summits as well as the 2002 Kananaskis and 2010 Muskoka Summits, propagate an extended security concept (see Kirton 2000). The formative influences of the Japanese and Canadian approaches to security are evident within the G8 process. Okinawa introduced the Miyazaki principles, a framework for conflict prevention that calls for a comprehensive strategy to address a range of issues from small arms to child soldiers (G8 Miyazaki Initiatives for Conflict Prevention). At the Kananaskis Summit, the G8 Africa Action Plan was built upon the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its “pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development” (para. 3).

On the other hand, the Chair’s Summary of the 2003 Summit in Evian includes only a short paragraph stating that the group “took note of the report of the Commission on Human Security submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.” This small paragraph was included in the section on “development,” while the “security section” was focused on more traditional concepts of security like nuclear non-proliferation or the fight against terrorism. This may be a result of

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8 The same Lyon summary gives another illustration of the special concern that the language and concept of security has for the G8 in that it speaks of efforts to ‘secure security’ in the international system.
the competing definitions of human security. The Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 Africa Plan presented at Evian highlights the respective approaches:

Human security, in particular in war-affected areas is a common concern of the G8 partners. Japan intends to give greater priority to Africa in initiatives supported by the Trust Fund for Human Security … Canada’s five foreign policy program priorities for advancing human security—support for public safety, protection of civilians, conflict prevention, governance and accountability, and peace support operations also retain a significant focus on Africa. (para. 15)

Meanwhile, the European Union, including four of the G8 countries, developed a “Human Security Doctrine” of its own in the Barcelona Report (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 2004; Kaldor, Martin and Selchow 2007). There are considerable differences between these various manifestations of the concept of security; the contrast with some aspects of the 2002 national security strategy of the United States is a case in point (White House 2002; see also Fratianni et al. 2005). Nonetheless, the common ground on the issue of human security within the G8 has grown in recent years, and the G8 has been both a driving force and a reflection of a new understanding of security.

The Chair’s Statement from the 1996 Lyon Summit stresses that the pursuit of human security is directly linked to the institutional setting of the United Nations: “We continue to regard the United Nations as the cornerstone of an international system whose success or failure is increasingly significant for human security, including development within countries and partnership among countries.” The G8 contribution to human security, however, is not limited to the support of and coordinated efforts within the UN. G8 countries have at various times taken their own initiative in order to supplement, strengthen, and also fill gaps in the UN’s framework and actions. The 1994 Naples communiqué articulates an overarching motivation for these types of efforts: “How can we adapt existing institutions and build new institutions to ensure the future prosperity and security of our people?” There are four patterns that the G8 has followed with respect to supplementing and encouraging UN actions in the realm of security:

1. The creation of specific issue-related committees and initiatives. Examples include the Transport Initiative, the Renewable Energy Task Force or the

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9 The Barcelona Report strongly endorses both preventive engagement and effective multilateralism. It calls for a new legal framework for intervention but also for the establishment of a Human Security Response Force. Its approach is grounded on “[a] set of seven principles for operations in situations of severe insecurity that apply to both ends and means.” The principles that the report addresses are: “the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force”; Barcelona Study Group (2004), 5.
Nuclear Safety and Security Group. Each group devotes itself to one pressing concern of the member states in areas where their cooperation could make a difference.

2. The infusion of coordinated G8 efforts into other organizational settings. Apart from the established coordination procedures in the context of the UN General Assembly, the G8 action to resolve the Kosovo crisis by means of an unconventional move that resulted in Security Council resolution 1244 is a prime example of this pattern (Pentillä 2003: 44-51). The Cologne summit, judged to be a “‘big bang’ beginning of the G8’s concentrated, comprehensive, coherent work on conflict prevention,” clearly marks a more visible role in security affairs (Kirton and Stefanova 2004, 5).

3. The adaptation of the G8 agenda and its membership. The decision to include Russia in the G8 would also fit into the context of comprehensive understanding of security: ‘In one respect, the original G7 members regarded the inclusion of Russia partly as a security issue in an attempt to encourage a peaceful transition to free-market economics and democratic principles” (Dobson 2007, 46). From yet another perspective, the development of the G20 can also be related to this pattern, although it remains to be seen whether its work and that of the G8 will be complementary or competitive with a view to security issues other than financial and economic problems.

4. The creation and support of new political structures and global coalitions. This includes the Kimberley Process to combat the trade in blood diamonds, and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (see also Kirton et al. 2004: 80; Shaw 2005). The significance of these initiatives should not be underestimated: “The summit has also created and strengthened international regimes to deal with new international issues, revitalized and reformed existing international institutions, and provided a centre for global governance to deal with new challenges.” (Kirton 2005b, 354).

This fourth pattern of action integrates the new security agenda with new modes of governance. The Global Fund is a textbook example of the specific security role of the G8. It addresses a problem of hitherto “low” politics (health) with the urgency of a security matter. Following the global trend with respect to health, the G8 considered the issue to be a serious impediment to economic development and to international as well as human security.

Health had already been an important topic on the agenda for several years, and in 2001 at the Genoa summit, the G8 laid the groundwork for an innovative and unprecedented financing mechanism to combat the spread of these three pandemics. The G8 was also responding to a call for action by Kofi Annan, and made their partnership with the UN explicit:

At Okinawa last year, we pledged to make a quantum leap in the fight against infectious diseases and to break the vicious cycle between disease and poverty. To meet that commitment and to respond to the appeal of the UN General Assembly, we have launched...
with the UN Secretary-General a new Global Fund to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. We are determined to make the Fund operational before the end of the year. We have committed $1.3 billion. The Fund will be a public-private partnership and we call on other countries, the private sector, foundations, and academic institutions to join with their own contributions—financially, in kind and through shared expertise.

The G8 created a new institution, linked to existing structures such as the UN and its UNAIDS program, but independent from them. By 2010 the Fund had generated US$19.8 billion for 600 projects in 149 countries, providing medication for 3 million HIV-affected people and 77 million people suffering from tuberculosis and distributing 160 million bed nets. Its added value—although still not matching the enormous challenge of the deadly diseases—is beyond doubt. Looking at the role of the G8 in promoting human security there is another innovative feature that has to be underlined. The G8, a group of states, created an institution whose decision-making structure pays tribute to the “post-national constellation” in which the issue of health security is embedded, and which offers a contribution to a new form of “global security governance” (Kirton 2005a). In 2000 the Okinawa Summit document had committed the G8 members “to support innovative partnerships, including with the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the private sector and multilateral organisations. The creation of the Global Fund in 2001 is an example of this commitment being kept.

The Global Fund’s international board is made up of 20 voting members and six non-voting members. There are eight regionally allocated representatives of donors and seven representatives of recipient country-regions as designated by the World Health Organization, plus an additional representative from Africa. Along with these more traditional state actors, there are a further five representatives from civil society and the private sector: two NGO representatives, one from a developed country and one from a developing country, one representative of the private sector, one representative of a private foundation, and one representative of an NGO who is a person living with HIV/AIDS.

The inclusion of expert NGOs in the state-dominated international settings is no longer that remarkable, but it is noteworthy nonetheless. The direct involvement of private sector actors, however, is more unusual (see Bayne 2000, 213–16). Including one member from a charity foundation and the other from a business company is a clear indication that they play an important role in the fight against global diseases. The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, which has board experience at the Global Fund, has several dozens of billions of U.S. dollars at its disposal, far more than any country could devote to global health. Additionally, the fight against these diseases would be ineffective without the pharmaceutical companies that develop and deliver the medical treatment. Finally, the inclusion of a representative of those people

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10 For the most accurate and up-to-date information, see <www.theglobalfund.org>.
actually affected by HIV/AIDS is an important recognition of the kind of bottom-up approach that runs in contra-distinction to the state-centric governance structures.

The composition of the Global Fund’s board is an innovative answer to the challenge of governance in the post-national constellation. It is an effective organisational setting which acts “as global fundraiser” (Dobson 2007, 67) to muster the necessary resources, while recognizing the changing requirements of political legitimization. There are other examples of G8-inspired or implemented initiatives related to human security dealing with conflict prevention, peacekeeping capabilities, small arms, blood diamonds and the Kimberly Process (see Grant and Taylor 2004) and various development efforts in the context of the Millennium Development Goals (see also the 2005 Gleneagles Summit and its focus on debt, trade and development in Africa). There is no easy relationship between the G8 and human security and the group is not an expanded version of the Human Security Network. There seems, however, to be a firmly established link between the changing concept of security and the role of the G8, an institution with “a long tradition of dealing with non-traditional security threats” (Pentillä 2003, 31).

Conclusion

This chapter explored the role of the G8 as an agent of securitization (in theoretical terms) and as a catalyst for the creation of new institutions (in practical terms). The G8 has been a mirror and motor of human and global security, both in its words and deeds. Dobson argues that “ultimately, if one were to take a broad definition of security, as scholars such as Buzan urge us to do, then most of the summit’s agenda could be regarded as dealing with security issues” (Dobson 2007, 74). The very nature of the G8 summits and political documents does speak to a kind of securitization as defined by Buzan insofar as the “top leaders” identify those issues that “should be dealt with decisively” by them, prior to other issues. Although the legal authority to decide what does and does not constitute a threat to international peace and security is vested in the UN Security Council according to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the G8 has a remarkable potential for raising awareness and resources to deal with new security threats. On the other hand, extending the security concept is potentially problematic. Similar to some of the pitfalls within the theoretical framework, expanding the meaning of security could lead to an overloading of issues to deal with at the summit and a diverse but unspecific “Christmas tree agenda” (Fowler 2004, 39).

It must be stressed that the process of securitization and norm creation (Malone 2004) does not only consist of the rhetorical move (or speech act) of a securitizing actor (Buzan et al. 1998, 40) but also needs the approval and realization of a broader audience in order to be successful. Buzan et al. refer to Hannah Arendt’s communicative concept of power, and in the context of the G8 its securitization function is directly linked to the question of its legitimacy and the common purpose of those acting together (for some critical aspects, see Melber 2007). The problem
of different and competing security agendas should, therefore, not be treated lightly. The debate about expanding the G8 (Hajnal 2007; Fues 2007) should also take into account the conceptual cohesion among its members. From that perspective, the differences between the G8 and some of the foundations of China’s foreign and security policy have to be considered with great care (Pentillä 2003, 85ff.). At the same time, however, there are various indications that China is experiencing a shift in the idea of security, epitomized significantly not so much by the concept of human security but rather people’s safety (Chu 2002).

A common understanding of security is a key component of the G8’s internal cohesion and has a standard-setting, socializing effect on its members and non-members. But this common understanding remains fragile. The somewhat ambivalent definition of the 2005 High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change may provide a good foundation for the underlying core of the security concept of the G8. According to the panel, “any event or process that leads to large-scale death or lessening of life chances and undermines States as the basic unit of the international system is a threat to international security” (United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2005, 2). Reconciling the tensions implied in such a concept is a difficult task, and sacrificing such a demanding concept for the sake of superficial harmony or the inclusion of new members with different attitudes may be too high a price to pay.

The G8 has retained its strong economic perspective, and it also remains primarily an inter-governmental forum. Nonetheless, it has shown a capacity for generating new solutions to new problems, sometimes complementing, concurring or competing with other institutions such as the UN Security Council (see the discussion in Kühne and Prantl 2000). Sir Nicholas Bayne noted that “the best future approach for the summits is that of a catalyst, providing impulses to wider international institutions but not trying to work for them, either from inside or outside” (Bayne 1994, 20).

The G8 does not have an easy solution to the new challenges facing global and human security, and its flexible approach needs time to develop, gain traction and build upon experience. According to Bayne, that is exactly what the G8 is good at: “sustained, iterative treatment of difficult issues” (Bayne 2000, 213).

The G8 is often compared to the European concert of powers established after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 both in the academic literature and through the political work of Henry Kissinger (Dobson 2007, 2). This may well be a fruitful analogy (covering both the advantages and disadvantages associated with the historical precedent). One aspect seems to be similar and noteworthy: The European concert promoted international organizations such as the European Commission of the Danube, established in 1865 as one of the very first international bodies to have political and legal jurisdiction over people and parts of a river that (“transnationally”) runs through various states. The Global Fund might be considered a modern equivalent of that commission. Instead of regulating the ship traffic on a wide river, it navigates the resources to deal with a problem of the twenty-first century.
References

Changing Conceptions of Security and the G8


