

The Case for G8 Reform

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June 26, 2008

Lecture delivered at Chuo University, Tokyo, Japan, June 26, 2008. I gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Jenilee Guebert and other members of the G8 Research Group. Version of June 29, 2008.

Introduction

Calls for reform of the Group of Eight (G8) have now reached a new peak in the policy, political, public and scholarly worlds (Hajnal 2007b). But the resulting debate still features the familiar faults of the past 34 years. Reform proposals are advanced on the basis of political slogans or personal self-interest with little logic or evidence to back them up. Favourite criticisms flourish, such as the G8's alleged loss of effectiveness and legitimacy because it now lacks the commanding global power it once had and the broad geographic representativeness needed in today's changing world. Familiar reform proposals, such as the G8's need for a secretariat and council of ministers, are borrowed with little thought from very different institutions such as the European Union (EU) or deduced from liberal institutionalist assumptions that more legalized formality is a good thing. Reform proposals are offered at random, in shotgun fashion, without consideration of how they would fit with and alter the many other components of the complex, interconnected and quite coherent G8 system as a whole. Almost never are reform proposals accompanied by any logical or empirical analysis showing that the proposed changes — often already instituted in some form during the G8's past three and a half decades — would actually cause the enhanced performance that the advocate wants.

Moreover, current reform proposals concentrate heavily on only one of the three key dimensions of the reform debate — the “outreach” question of what countries and international organizations should be invited to be full permanent members or partial participants of the G8 summit club. Far less attention has been given to what might be termed “in-reach” — the institutional thickening of the summit system as a full-strength centre of global governance. And even less has been given to what can be labelled “down-reach” — the democratization of the G8 system by bringing civil society in all its rich diversity into G8 governance in a comprehensive, balanced and systematic way.

This study explores G8 reform by reviewing the G8's governance and analyzing on this foundation how changes in all three dimensions of outreach, in-reach and down-reach have enhanced performance in the past and could in the years ahead. It argues that since its 1975 start the G8 has increasingly met its ultimate goal of producing a global democratic revolution and providing domestic political management, deliberation, direction-setting, decision making, delivery and the development of a new generation of

global governance for itself and the world. During this time the G8 has broadened enormously in outreach, embracing Japan, Italy, Canada, an EU expanding to 27 states and a now rising Russia as full members, and a wide array of multilateral organizations and rising or regional powers as participants in its annual summit and institutions below. It has thickened its own structure or in-reach by developing a dozen ministerial and 80 official-level institutions across many policy fields, but not ministerial forums for health, defence, agriculture, industry, investment and now trade. It has deepened civil society participation through down-reach to collectively involve non-governmental organizations (NGOs), legislators, religious leaders, the media, youth and universities, but not judiciaries, business and labour.

A G8 devoted to the global promotion of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance now needs to broaden its outreach for this ultimate political purpose as well as for functional problem solving in a globalizing world. It needs to build ministerial-level institutions in the policy areas its summit prioritizes and where the United Nations (UN) system is institutionally weak. And it needs to bring all major parts of its democratic civil society in.

The G8's Rising Performance, 1975-2007

There is a strong *prima facie* case that the G8 needs no reform at all. For it has produced a robust performance as an increasingly representative, responsive, effective, and legitimate centre of global governance over its 34-year life. The G8 was formed for the core purpose of protecting within its members and promoting globally the values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. By this ultimate standard it has been strikingly successful in producing the global democratic revolution still unfolding throughout the world. The G8 started defensively, by bringing democrats in and keeping communists out of Spain in 1975, Italy in 1976 and France as the new Cold War of the 1980s began. In 1989 the G8 shaped the second Russian revolution — the largely peaceful destruction of the Soviet Union, bloc and system and the rise of democratic polities in their place. It later helped bring democracy to the Balkans and Indonesia, protect it in the Americas and support it in Africa as the new millennium dawned. These successes were brought by the G8 acting as a concert of all the world major power democracies, delivered by popularly elected leaders deeply committed to democracy, through a club they considered their own. Strengthening this fundamental foundation for proven performance is the standard by which any G8 reform proposals should be judged.

The G8 has addressed its basic political purpose and associated problem-solving functions by engaging in the six dimensions of global governance that most international institutions perform. The first is domestic political management, where G8 governors give their own and global citizens the confidence that open democratic societies can solve the many profound problems they face. The second is deliberation, where G8 governors meet face to face to foster transparency, understanding, trust and attention over the particular problems that require solutions from global governance in an increasingly globalizing world. The third is direction setting, by defining on a democratic foundation new principles of fact, causation and rectitude, and norms for proscribing and prescribing

what states and other actors should do as a result. The fourth is decision making, by collectively committing to specific, future-oriented actions that put these principles and norms into effect. The fifth is delivering these commitments by having the members individually comply afterward with what they have collectively promised to do. The sixth is developing global governance, by generating a new system of international institutions to meet the new needs of the global community in a rapidly globalizing age.

Across all these six dimensions of global governance, the G8 has produced a robust performance during its first 33 years (Kirton 2008c). As Appendix A shows it has held 96 days of leaders' discussions whose outcomes were recorded in 189 public documents. These contained almost 3,000 collective commitments, which were complied with by G8 members in the following year at a level of +44 on a scale ranging from -100 to +100. Over this time and its five seven-year hosting cycles, G8 performance has steadily grown. Although performance has varied from year to year, there has been a general ratchet-like rise, with two notable jumps. The first came as the Cold War ended in 1989 and the second as globalization took hold as the 21st century dawned. As all these achievements took place without the addition of any G8, EU- or UN-like legal charter, council of ministers or secretariat, the value of many of the standard liberal institutionalist proposals for G8 reform are cast into considerable doubt. At the same time, this robust and rising record allows for evidence-based assessments of the current proposals for outreach, in-reach and down-reach to improve performance further in the years ahead.

Outreach: Membership and Participation

The first component of outreach has long received most of the attention in the G8 reform debate, and almost all of it in recent years (Kirton 2008b). Outreach deals with how many more permanent seats at the summit table, or places in the waiting room (to be called in when their agenda item is up for discussion), there should be. The many proposals for adding more members and participants are driven by allegations that the G8 is so small and cohesive that it is unrepresentative, unresponsive, illegitimate and hence ineffective, especially with power now shifting to many other rising powers in the world. A milder version of the critique identifies a tradeoff. Under it, one choice is the K-group logic of smaller numbers for more cohesion and thus effectiveness, but less representativeness, responsiveness, and legitimacy as a necessary cost. The second choice is more members and participants for greater representativeness, responsiveness and legitimacy, but inevitably less cohesion and fast-moving, flexible effectiveness as well. Few of these arguments, however, stand up under scrutiny.

The criterion of representativeness, which tends to be defined geographically, has little relevance to the G8 concert today. The G8 is composed of major powers that by definition are those that affect, consider and have a sense of individual and collective responsibility for, all the world all the time, (Bull 1977). In today's world of intensifying globalization, defined by the decline and death of distance, geographic regional representation matters much less. On the other dimensions of representativeness — race, religion, language and level of development — the G8 has since its start possessed sufficient diversity with its open societies and mobile diasporas as well. It is only on the

gender dimensions where, with only three women leaders ever coming to the summit, that it is egregiously flawed.

The criterion of responsiveness deals with the fast-moving, flexibility of the institution in recognizing new problems and addressing them in a timely and well-tailored way. It also involves proactively and preventatively taking them up before they break out in a big and much more costly form. To the extent that greater outreach involves introducing more formality and procedural rigidity into a devotedly informal, anti-bureaucratic G8, expansion of the club could impose major responsiveness costs.

The criterion of legitimacy is highly relevant but often misunderstood. It is not about “being there” to be seen, to watch or to speak. Every individual reserves the right in his or her professional or private life to have meetings that not everyone in some larger group or the entire world has a natural or human or politically constructed right to attend. The UN Security Council is a case in point. Such meetings are not illegitimate as a result. Legitimacy, defined as right rule, has several dimensions. One is input legitimacy or whether the right number and set of views and actors are consulted, responded to or otherwise have their inputs fed in. A second is throughput legitimacy, or how well and how fairly the right process deals with all relevant views in a respectful, equal and balanced way. The third is output legitimacy, or whether the right decisions are made to solve the problem in the interests of the club and the broader community of which it is a part. The fourth is withinput legitimacy, or whether the right values propel the governance system throughout. Here the G8 as a club devoted to open democracy, individual liberty and social advance has a powerful, built-in legitimacy as a centre of global governance for a world where these values are increasingly cherished by many and now shared by most.

The criterion of effectiveness refers to the capacity of the club to solve the problems at hand, ideally in the most efficient and best way. The smallest number of relatively equal members with the combined capacity to solve the problem is optimum, especially if its cohesiveness is enhanced by shared values and the ability of its agents to act freely with the full authority of those they represent. Here expansion can be dangerous, if additions in combined capacity come at the cost of internal equality, low transaction costs, high cohesiveness, and high political capital and control back home.

All of the many proposals for changing G8 membership and expansion can be judged by these criteria. These proposals currently start with contracting the G8 by combining its five European members into one, or by removing a recalcitrant Russia from the club. They extend to adding as full members one more country (usually India or China), or two or three (usually these two with Brazil). The centre of the current debate in the political world is over the proposal of British prime ministers Tony Blair and now Gordon Brown to add as a full member all of the five recent regular Outreach Five (O5) participants of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. French president Nicolas Sarkozy has added Egypt to this list. Other suggest that the right number is 20, with the decade-old G20 finance ministers’ club upgrading to meet at the leaders’ level in a new L20 now.

A look at the evidence from the G8's long past suggests how this process of contraction or expansion is likely to unfold. As Appendix B shows, the G8 has already more than doubled its membership, as measured by the countries whose leaders come to the summit every year. Its first major expansion, from the "Berlin Dinner" four comprised of the US, Britain, France and Germany whose leaders had lunch at the British embassy in Helsinki in July 1975 to the six at the first regular summit at Rambouillet that November was a major advance. Adding Japan and Italy brought the world's second and fifth ranking powers in, turned a Euro-Atlantic club into a Mediterranean, Asia-Pacific and thus global one and expanded the G8's geographic, linguistic and religious diversity a great deal. Adding Canada, with the second largest territory in the world, in 1976 made the G8 more of a Pacific and Arctic club. The expanding multicultural EU, with its re-unified Germany and now 27 members and later Russia reinforced the power and diversity of the club, especially by bringing less economically developed non OECD countries in.

Amidst all this membership expansion the G8 has never removed a member, just as the rules of a concert but not collective security dictate. It has happily had the four European powers alongside the EU as members for 32 years. It has always expanded by adding one member at a time. It has done so increasingly slowly and in an incremental way.

Turning the G8 into a G13 by adding five full members all at once would thus be a truly unprecedented step. Nor is it clear why it is needed now. With the ever expanding EU included, the G8 now has 32 states as permanent members involved at first or second hand. The inclusion of a now rapidly rising Russia has enormous importance on the G8's diversity on many dimensions, including level of development, and is now increasing the G8's predominant capability and internal equality too. The ever enlarging EU 27 is doing the same.

Much the same can be said of participation. As Appendix C shows, since 1996 a total of 11 different multilateral organizations have been invited and have come to the G8 summit. The UN, representing virtually all the global community, has come to almost every one since 2001. To be sure, the UN-G8 connection could be strengthened. But the best way to do so is by having the UN invite the G8, represented by its annual chair, to its inner management clubs such as the Permanent Five (P5) of the UN Security Council (UNSC). For those who argue, in formulaic realist fashion, that multilateral organizations do not matter and that only countries count, Appendix D shows that 31 countries beyond the UN have participated in the summit since 2001. They are led by South Africa and the emerging O5 powers, but they include a wide range of democratic powers from all regions of the world.

This historic membership expansion and 21st-century proliferation of participation have been accompanied by the rising G8 performance identified above. But the causal connections between outreach and performance remain unclear. Performance may cause outreach, as a well-functioning G8 feels it can take the risk of including others and makes others want to come to such a well-performing club. It is a striking sign of the G8's legitimacy that many have long sought invitations to the G8 summit and that almost all of those who have been granted them have accepted when asked. The only one to refuse has

been Egypt's Mubarak, who has declined twice (in 2002 and 2008). If outreach indeed causes improved performance, it may do so with an issue-specific or lag effect. This would make the past moves of one-at-a-time incremental membership growth no justification for a great leap all at once into a G13 or G14.

Above all, the question of expanded membership and participation must be judged according to the G8's ultimate purpose of promoting open democracy in the world. None of the current five leading candidates in the O5 clearly meet all the *de facto* membership criteria. These are being a major power with global reach, relevance and responsibility, being committed to open democracy, and being a state where civilian non-nuclear power can substitute for the hard military power of old. A non-nuclear India and a continuously booming Brazil would have the best claim, but they would meet the test only some years from now. China's case depends importantly on the choices made by its new generation of younger leaders that will take office in 2012.

At present, a G8 summit with 32 members, 11 multilateral organizations and 31 country participants may have already approached or even reached a threshold or saturation point. It seems likely that if there were a G13, there would be less room and less flexibility for inviting others as partial participants. The big losers would probably be the multilateral organizations that represent everyone, the many poor but democratic African states and the many countries of the Americas (beyond the big two of Brazil and Mexico) that have almost entirely been left out.

Japan's formula for outreach at its 2008 summit suggests these constraints are real. Japan has chosen to have the G8 meet with eight invited Africans on the first day of the Hokkaido Summit, meet alone on day two, and spend day three by having breakfast with the O5 to discuss the Heiligendamm Process, then add the three Asian countries of Indonesia, Australia and South Korea to discuss climate change as the American-led Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEM-16), and finally have lunch where the 16 can discuss anything they want. The formula has expanded the predominance of democratic powers at the summit. But it has reduced to one day the time that leaders of the G8 have alone.

In-Reach: Leaders, Ministers and Officials Institutionalization

The second component of G8 reform is the G8's own institutionalization or "in-reach". This component has received little recent attention amidst all the fascination with the outreach debate. But it assumes even more importance as the G8 leaders' time together at their regular annual summit has dwindled to one day. Moreover the G8's institutionalization at the ministerial and officials levels has allowed a wide array of other relevant and responsible countries to participate as equals in the global governance of the G8 system as a whole.

The first element of in-reach is institutionalization at the leaders' level, where responsiveness, effectiveness, and legitimacy are all at stake. In 2002 the G8 for the first time defined its hosting order for the next full cycle, and thus extended its life for the

eight years to 2010. More recently it has announced the location of future summits two years in advance, with Canada declaring in June 2008 that its 2010 summit would be held in Huntsville, Ontario, at the Deerhurst Inn. And having the MEM-16 summit take place at and as part of the G8 summit in 2008 rather than at a different time and place shows the G8 is winning the competition among different summit combinations for attracting the leaders' scarce time. Yet there have been no bolder moves such as lengthening the duration of the annual summit, or calling a special subject-specific summit as was done for nuclear safety in 1996.

At the ministerial level, there is a strong case for greater G8 institutionalization even though there has already been a great deal (See Appendix E). This could help address the calls for membership expansion. The finance ministers' G20 created by the G8 in 1999 has proven its worth as an effective club of equals during its first decade of work. There are other fields where the case for expansion at the ministerial level is strong, as the Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainability since 2005 and Japan's ministerial-level outreach in 2008 has shown. The Toyako summit will build on this by launching a rebranded Toyako Dialogue devoted to bringing a low carbon society to life. At this ministerial level a functional problem solving logic should be stronger than a political democratization one in guiding outreach. For the G8 members with presidential systems usually send ministerial representatives who have no personal experience in ever having been democratically elected to anything at home.

A second need is in-reach to complete the process of making a now rising, richer Russia (that is aiding its G8 allies in Afghanistan) a full member of the G8 system as a whole. This can be done by admitting it to the G7 finance ministers forum and perhaps the G7-centric Global Health Security Initiative created in 2001. It would also help to repeat on an annual basis the ministerial meetings Russia held for its summit priorities of energy, health and innovation when it hosted the G8 summit in 2006.

Ministerial institutionalization could also increase the G8's performance across all six dimensions of governance in areas where the G8 summit agenda focuses, but where there are no G8 ministerial institutions or UN functional organizations to lend support. As Appendix E shows, the G8 has now developed a dozen ministerial institutions, with Japan in 2008 reinforcing the ones for energy, environment, development, and science and technology research. But here there has been no 21st-century leap. Indeed, the one for trade (where Europe was combined into one in the Quadrilateral) has fallen into disuse at the ministerial level, even as the prospects for successfully concluding the long overdue Doha Development Agenda have declined. G8 ministerial institutions for investment, innovation, health, food and agriculture, and defence have not emerged, despite the prominence on the summit agenda that these matters have assumed. As globalization has made many long local and national issues now a matter of global governance, more portfolio ministries in G8 governments could benefit from a G8 institution of their own.

At the official level, as Appendix F shows, the G8 has created 80 bodies over the past 33 years, with 37 of them born since 2003. They have been produced by all countries

hosting the summit during this current cycle. The allegedly unilateralist United States of President George Bush in 2004 was particularly energetic in this international institution-building regard. The official bodies, which come in diverse forms, are concentrated in policy areas that are the summit priority subjects at the time they are formed and field, such as energy, and terrorism where UN bodies are non-existent or weak. They have cumulatively come to cover a wide range of fields. They are usually short-lived, although there has been a post–Cold War tendency to make them continuing bodies, as with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of 1989, and the Roma and Lyon Groups on crime and terrorism. They have also expanded to embrace many other countries, with the first body – the London Nuclear Suppliers Club that coalesced in 1975 – now having 45 members in the club.

The G8 system could benefit from increased official-level institutionalization in several ways. The first is through a more systematic mechanism for leaders to keep track of what all these diverse and often opaque bodies do. The second is to give them longer mandates, in order to better help deliver the leaders’ ambitious commitments that take several years to fulfill. The third is to compensate for imbalances at the ministerial level, by building more bodies for foreign ministries. G8 foreign ministers and political directors meet far less frequently than finance ministers and finance deputies, even though the summit agenda has increasingly focused on foreign policy concerns. Under the German chair in 2007, directors of policy planning staffs in G8 foreign ministries met. But Japan in 2008 seemed less enthusiastic to follow this lead. And the Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting that flourished in 1999–2000 has died out, even if the conflicts that need preventing in the world have not. Both bodies should be revived.

Any reforms at the official level, however, should preserve the leaders flexibility to start and stop such bodies as they wish, and keep their direct relationship with the leaders themselves. There is thus no need for a G8 secretariat, beyond such short-lived, issue-specific, selective steps such as the Support Implementation Group and Heiligendamm Process platform that G8 governors have invented to assist with particular tasks.

Down-Reach: Civil Society Inclusion

The third component — down-reach for civil society inclusion — is where the G8 system has expanded the least and where the focus for future reform should be put (Hajnal 2007a, 2007b, 2008). For here legitimacy, responsiveness, effectiveness and even representativeness are most at stake in a globalizing world. For an institution devoted to open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, it is puzzling how slow the G8 has been to involve legislatures and judiciaries as the other two branches of government, religious leaders, NGOs and a broad range of other civil society actors.

As Appendix G shows, civil society started to connect with the G8 at the annual summit in 1984, when The Other Economic Summit (TOES) held a conference for critical NGO activists near the summit’s time and place. In 1998 civil society became much more organized, connected and influential, as an *ad hoc* coalition of religious, labour and NGO groups in Jubilee 2000 mounted a multi-year campaign, met with G8 host Tony Blair at

and during the G8's Birmingham Summit, and pushed the G8 to go further and faster on debt relief for the poorest. At Okinawa in 2000 such civil society groups were granted space at the summit site to hold briefings, and met with the host prime minister, Yoshiro Mori, during the summit itself.

Only in the 21st century, however, did the G8 begin to institutionalize its connection with civil society. In 2002, when Canada hosted, the Forum International de Montréal organized a meeting of global civil society leaders with G8 sherpas, starting an engagement that has continued and strengthened in subsequent years. In 2002, the speakers of the lower houses of G8 legislatures started to meet, and have continued to do so once a year. However, compared to the degree of legislative involvement in other similar plurilateral summit institutions (PSIs), starting with the Commonwealth that is almost a century old, the G8's legislative institutionalization is very late and still very light (Kirton 2008a).

The 2005 summit inspired the creation of the multi-stakeholder Commission for Africa (CFA) to support the work of host Tony Blair and some summit colleagues on his agenda priority. The civil society led Make Poverty History campaign mobilized many across Britain. Through its Live 8 rock concert on the eve of the summit, it connected with up to a billion citizens around the world. There was also a Junior 8 (J8), at which secondary school students from G8 countries met briefly with the G8 leaders at the summit itself.

The next major step in forging the G8-civil society connection came in 2006, when Russia hosted the G8 for the first time. The Russians created a formal year-long institution and process of Civil 8. It culminated in 700 global civil society leaders meeting host Vladimir Putin in a public session just before the summit's start. In 2006 G8 religious leaders gathered for the first time, creating a process that has grown ever since. The year 2006 also marked the first meeting of the Moscow Club, where representatives of G8 news agencies began their annual meeting with G8 governors just before the summit's start. There has also arisen the Academic 8, where leaders of universities from G8 countries meet and a process for their national academies of science to gather as well.

In the future, there is much to be done if the G8 is to develop the full set of civil society institutions that other PSIs such as the Commonwealth and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum have. These begin with the business community, to balance the NGOs that have long been collectively involved with the G8. They extend to organized labour, and even women and first nations. But the priority is to strengthen legislative involvement, to bring G8 judiciaries in and to create a multistakeholder mechanism for monitoring G8 governors' compliance with their commitments.

Conclusion

Since 1975 the G8 has performed increasingly well as a representative, responsive, effective and legitimate centre of global governance to foster open democracy, individual liberty and social advance throughout the world. At the same time it has increasingly expanded its outreach to new members and diverse participants, its in-reach to develop its

own leaders', ministers' and officials' institutions, and down-reach to engage civil society in its work. The reform strategy required for the future focuses on three needs. The first is to design outreach to further open and democratize critical polities such as China. The second is to develop in-reach to add ministerial institutions that fully include Russia and that focus on trade, investment, innovation, health, agriculture and defence. And the third is to bring legislatures, judiciaries, business, labour and multi-stakeholder compliance monitoring mechanisms into the G8 system of democratic global governance for all.

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Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2007

Year	Bayne grade	Domestic Political Management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Development of Global Governance
		% members	Ave # of refs	# of days	# of state-ments	# of words	# of references to core values	# of commit-ments	Compliance score	# of bodies created Minister/Official
1975	A-			3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1
1976	D			2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0
1977	B-			2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1
1978	A			2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0
1979	B+			2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	0/2
1980	C+			2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1
1981	C			2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0
1982	C			3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3
1983	B			3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0
1984	C-			3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0
1985	E			3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2
1986	B+			3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1
1987	D			3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2
1988	C-			3	3	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0
1989	B+			3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1
1990	D			3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3
1991	B-			3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0
1992	D			3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1
1993	C+			3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2
1994	C			3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0
1995	B+			3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2
1996	B	40%	1	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3
1997	C-	40%	1	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3
1998	B+	25%	1	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0
1999	B+	80%	1.7	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5
2000	B	40%	6.5	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4
2001	B	33%	1.5	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	½
2002	B+	17%	1	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8
2003	C	40%	2.5	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5
2004	C+	33%	1	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15
2005	A-	40%	1	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5
2006	D	39%	1.8	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4
2007	B-	75% ^o	1	3	8	25,857	651	329	33.0*	0/4
Ave. all	B-	42%	1	2.9	5.9	9,283	32.9	90.4	44.7	0.3/2.4
Av. cycle 1	B-	North America	North America	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.5	0.14/0.71
Av. Cycle 2	C-	North America	North America	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.4	0.29/1.14
Av. Cycle 3	C+	North America	North America	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.5	0.58/1.29
Av. Cycle 4	B	29.3%	2	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	40.7	0.58/3.57
Av. Cycle 5	B-	39.5%	1.5	3	15.3	26,849	177	262	58.0	0.00/7.4

Notes:

Bayne Grade: The 2005 grade of A- is a confirmed grade. Grades for 2006 and 2007 are unofficial. They are not for citation.

Domestic Political Management: % Mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year. Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year. Data for 2007 include United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and the United States.

Directional: Number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.

Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2007 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. Score for 2007 is the interim score for that year and is not included in the overall or cycle average.

Appendix B: G8 Membership in G8 Summit

1975 United States, Britain, France, Germany
1975 Japan, Italy
1976 Canada
1977 European Community 9
1981 European Community 10
1982 Belgium* (1987, 1993, 2001)
1986 European Community 12, Netherlands* (1991, 1997)
1995 European Union 15
2002 Spain*
2003 Greece*
2004 European Union 25, Ireland*
2006 Finland*
2007 European Union 27

Total Countries = 32 Members: 9 + 6 European Union outside presidencies + European Union 27

Appendix C: Participation of Multilateral Organizations in G8 Summits

United Nations	7	1996	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007	2008
World Bank	5	1996	2000	2001		2003	2005		2007	2008
IMF	4	1996				2003	2005		2007	
WTO	4	1996	2000	2001			2005			
IEA	3						2005	2006	2007	
African Union	3						2005	2006	2007	
WHO	3			2000				2006		
IAEA	1							2006		
UNESCO	1							2006		
OECD	1								2007	
CIS	1								2007	
Total	11	4	4	4	1	3	6	6	7	2

CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States

IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency

IEA = International Energy Agency

IMF = International Monetary Fund

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

UNESCO = United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

WHO = World Health Organization

WTO = World Trade Org

Appendix D: Participating Countries in G8 Summit

South Africa	8	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Nigeria	7	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
Algeria	7	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
Senegal	7	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
China	5			2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
India	5			2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Brazil	5			2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Mexico	5			2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Ghana	4				2004	2005		2007	2008
Egypt	2			2003				2007	
Ethiopia	2					2005			2008
Tanzania	2					2005			2008
Bangladesh	1	2001							
Mali	1	2001							
El Salvador	1	2001							
Morocco ^a	1			2003					
Saudi Arabia	1			2003					
Malaysia	1			2003					
Switzerland	1			2003					
Afghanistan	1				2004				
Bahrain	1				2004				
Iraq	1				2004				
Jordan	1				2004				
Turkey	1				2004				
Yemen	1				2004				
Uganda	1				2004				
Congo ^b	1						2006		
Kazakhstan ^c	1						2006		
Australia	1								2008
Indonesia	1								2008
South Korea	1								2008
Total ^d	31								

a. Representing the G77.

b. Representing the African Union.

c. Representing the Commonwealth of Independent States

d. Does not include outside presidencies of the European Union.

Appendix E: G8 Ministerial Institutions

1973 Finance, 1975, 1986-
1975 Foreign Affairs, 1984-
1979 Energy, 1998, 2002, 2005-
1981 Trade to 2000?
1992 Environment
1994 Employment & Labour
1995 Information to 1996
1995 Terrorism
1997 Justice & Home Affairs (Crime)
2000 Education, 2006
2002 Development, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008
2002 Research/Science and Technology 2008
Total = 12

Once: SME 1997, Health 2006

Excludes Finance G20 1999, Global Health Security Initiative 2002, Gleneagles Dialogue 2005

Appendix F: Official-Level Bodies

1975-1981	8
1982-1988	9
1989-1995	14
1996-2002	16
2003-2010	37
2003 France	8
2004 USA	16
2005 UK	5
2006 Russia	4
2007 Germany	4
Total	80

First Cycle (8)

1975 London Nuclear Suppliers Group
1977 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group
1979 High Level Group on Energy Conservation and Alternative Energy
1979 International Energy Technology Group
1979 High Level Group to Review Oil Import Reduction Progress
1980 International Team to Promote Collaboration on Specific Projects on Energy Technology
1980 High Level Group to Review Result on Energy
1981 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

Second Cycle (9)

1982 Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment
1982 Consultations and Coordination on East-West Relations
1982 Representatives to control exports of strategic goods
1982 Procedures for multilateral surveillance of economic performance
1985 Expert Group for Foreign Ministers
1985 Expert Group on Desertification and Dry Zone Grains
1985 Expert Group on Environmental Measurement
1986 Group of Experts on Terrorism
1987 International Ethics Committee on AIDS.

Third Cycle (14)

1989 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (with others, secretariat from OECD)
1989 International Ethics Committee on AIDS
1990 Chemical Action Task Force, 1990-1992 (with others)
1990 Task Force to Study the State of the Soviet Economy
(1990 Permanent Working Group on Assistance to Russia)
1990 Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group
1992 Nuclear Safety Working Group
1992 Group of Experts on the Prevention and Treatment of AIDS
1993 Support Implementation Group (SIG)
1993 G8 Non-Proliferation Experts Group
1995 Counterterrorism Experts Group
1995 G7/P8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Lyon Group)
1995 GIP National Co-ordinators
1995 Development Committee Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks

Fourth Cycle (16)

1996 Nuclear Safety Working Group
1996 Lyon Group
1997 Expert Group on Financial Crime
1997 Subgroup on High Tech Crime (of the Lyon Group)
1997 Officials Group on Forests
2000 Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting (CPOM)
2000 Renewable Energy Task Force
2000 Digital Opportunities Task Force (Dot-Force)
2000 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis
2001 G8 Task Force on Education
2001 Personal Representatives for Africa (APR)
2002 Energy Officials Follow-up Process
2002 G8 Global Partnership Review Mechanism
2002 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group
2002 G8 Experts on Transport Security
2002 Global Health Security Laboratory Network

Fifth Cycle (37-)

2003 High Level Working Group on Biometrics
2003 Counter-Terrorism Action Group
2003 Radioactive Sources Working Group
2003 Senior Officials for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development
2003 G8 Enlarged Dialogue Meeting
2003 Forum for the Partnership with Africa, November 10, 2003
2003 Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) Laboratory Network
2003 Technical Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
2004 Global Partnership Senior Officials Group (GPSOG), January 2004
2004 Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)
2004 Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise
2004 Microfinance Consultative Group
2004 Best Practises Microfinance Training Centre
2004 Democracy Assistance Dialogue
2004 Task Force on Investment
2004 G8 Expert-Level Meetings on Peace Support in Africa
2004 Friends of the Convention on Corruption
2004 G8 Accelerated Response Teams on Corruption
2004 International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)
2004 IPHE Implementation-Liaison Committee
2004 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)
2004 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership ((REEEP)
2004 Generation IV International Forum (GIF)
2004 Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)
2005 Dialogue on Sustainable Energy
2005 Working Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms
2005 Experts on IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting
2005 Global Bioenergy Partnership
2005 African Dialogue Follow-up Mechanism (Africa, paragraph 33)
2006 G8 expert group to develop criteria & procedures for evaluating educational outcomes/qualifications
2006 G8 expert group on strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to IPR enforcement
2006 G8 expert, UN and other international organization group on stabilisation/reconstruction
2006 G8 expert group on securing energy infrastructure
2007 Structured High Level Dialogue with major emerging economies (Heiligendamm process)
2007 Sustainable Buildings Network with G8 and major emerging economies
2007 Regional Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Fund
2007 International Working Group on Land Transport Security composed of G8 and non-G8 countries

Note: Excludes one-off meeting or conferences

Appendix G: Civil Society Involvement in G8 Summit

- 1984 The Other Economic Summit conference near summit site
- 1988 G8 Research Group: Conferences, Website (1996-), Compliance Report (1996-)
- 1998 Jubilee 2000 ad hoc coalition meets Tony Blair as host during summit
- 2002 Forum International de Montréal starts global civil society-G8 sherpa meetings
- 2002 Legislative Lower House Speakers annual meeting starts
- 2005 Commission for Africa with multi-stakeholder membership
- 2005 Make Poverty History Campaign, Live 8 Concert engage 1 billion citizens
- 2005 Junior 8 (J8) secondary school students meet leaders during summit
- 2005 Religious Leaders Summit starts
- 2006 Civil 8 formed to advise Russian presidency
- 2006 Media news agencies form Moscow Club to meet with G8 minister annually
- 2007 Academic 8 of university presidents

Includes collective action by G8 bodies aimed at the G8 itself at the time and place of, or as part of the lead up to, of the summit itself. Excludes activity within member countries or lead up lobbying of host and member governments by international bodies representing business, labour, agriculture, etc.