

# **G8: An Economic Forum of the Enlarged Western Alliance? The Record from Rambouillet 1975 through Heiligendamm 2007 to Canada 2010**

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## Introduction

Is the G8 — the Group of Eight major market democracies — an economic forum of the enlarged western alliance? The answer is **yes**, it is indeed. But it is also **much more** than that, in five specific ways.

First, it is an **economic** forum, but a political and security one as well.

Second, it is a **forum** where leaders and their delegations come together to deliberate, but also a body where they manage domestic politics, set new directions, make decisions, deliver them and develop global governance as a whole.

Third, it is an institution for an enlarged west, especially with an expanding European Union and Russia now as virtually full members, its participating “Plus Five” partners, its often invited African and Middle East leaders, and heads of multilateral organizations, most of whom share the democratic, market values of the “west.”

Fourth, it is a western-dominated institution geographically, but also a centre of global governance in its membership, participation, agenda and impact.

Fifth, it has become an alliance in the classic sense of a group of countries that will assuredly not go to war against one another, but that will come together to go to war against enemies outside.

To support these arguments, it is important to look in turn at four subjects.

1. **The G8's Origins and Evolution.** Why and how has the G7 and now G8 emerged, enlarged and evolved since its birth in 1975?
2. **The G8's Operation, 1975-2006.** How and how effectively has it governed for its first 32 years?
3. **The 2007 Summit's Success.** How and why did it work so well at its last summit, in Heiligendamm, Germany, on June 6-8, 2007?
4. **The Future Summits to 2010.** What lies ahead for the G8, with the challenges it will face at its next summits in the cycle in Japan in 2008, Italy in 2009 and Canada in 2010?

# 1. The G8's Origin and Evolution

## A. Introduction: The Debate about How, Where, Why and What

Thirty-three years after today's G8 was most visibly born at its first summit in Rambouillet, France, in November 1975, there continues to be a debate about what it is, how it works, and why and even where it sprung to life. To resolve this debate, it is important to recall the six shocks of the early 1970s that led to its birth.<sup>1</sup>

## B. The Six Shocks: Washington 1971 to Saigon 1975

These six shocks came in steady succession. Each catalyzed and compounded the subsequent one to produce an unstoppable cascade. Soon the democratic world with the Atlantic community at its core was in retreat and prospective defeat in both its North American and European homes.

These six shocks were individually and collectively ones where economics and politics were integrally linked. They were global in scope. They had war at their core, and threatened the value and even existence of the North Atlantic alliance itself. For their solution, they required not merely deliberation but also decisive action. After five years of failure, that deliberation and action were delivered to shape a new world.

### *i. Washington, DC, August 15, 1971, The White House: Money*

The first shock was about money. It came on August 15, 1971, from the White House in Washington DC. On that Sunday evening, President Richard Nixon went on television to tell the world that the U.S. had unilaterally decided to end the link that made the American dollar as good as gold. In doing so he destroyed the regime of fixed exchange rates embedded in the Bretton Wood agreements and institutions of 1944. He thus threw America's ranking allies in Europe, North America and Asia into the unstable, unknown world of floating exchange rates that could go wherever the mood of the market drove them on any given minute or day,

Nixon's move may have been about money, but it was motivated by war. In his speech, he said the war in Vietnam was over, the boys were coming home and they needed jobs that a devalued American dollar would bring. He bitterly and defiantly declared that "America will no longer fight with one hand tied behind its back."

### *ii. Brussels, Belgium, January 1973: Trade*

The second shock was about trade. It came from Brussels, Belgium, in January 1973 when Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Community (EC) to create the largest trade bloc in the world. The Americans had arguably fired the first salvo in this looming trans-Atlantic

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<sup>1</sup> Shocks, like classically conceived crises, are defined by high surprise and a high threat to national interest and values, but unlike crises do not demand a short time to respond.

trade war by unilaterally raising their tariffs against dutiable imports by 10% on August 15, 1971. But the enlarging EC brought a world of big regional blocs, separated by a new moat, rather than united by the Atlantic seaway of old. The Japanese tried to restore the multilateralism of the post–World War Two years by launching a new round of trade liberalization negotiations under the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1973. But no sooner had the round started then it stalled, as a result of the next shock from elsewhere in the world.

### ***iii. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, October 1973: Oil***

The third shock was about oil. It came from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in October 1973 when the Organization of (Arab) Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on Israel and its allies to punish them in the latest Arab-Israeli war that had erupted on Yom Kippur. War was the cause, oil the instrument and recession and inflation in the north the result. The destructive combination of economic stagnation and high inflation — “stagflation” — replaced the non-inflationary growth the west had enjoyed during the post–World War Two years. And the Atlantic alliance ruptured, as an embargoed Netherlands was abandoned, America left alone to fly badly needed military consumables to an Israel about to go under and France defected to seek due to oil deals with its assumed Arab friends.

### ***iv. New Delhi, India, May 18, 1974: Nuclear Weapons***

The fourth shock was about nuclear weapons. It came from New Delhi, India, on May 18, 1974, when the order was given to detonate the so-called peaceful nuclear explosion that gave an oil-short India the bomb. It blasted away a decade of nuclear nonproliferation, gave the first nuclear bomb to a state outside the Permanent Five (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and threatened to catalyze a wave of potential proliferation that would spread bombs throughout an unstable south.

### ***v. Saigon, South Vietnam, April 30, 1975, American Embassy Roof: War***

The fifth shock was about war directly. It came from the roof of the American embassy in Saigon, South Vietnam, in April 1975. From there the last American helicopters lifted off, leaving their South Vietnamese allies to their triumphant communist conquerors on the rise. America came home in defeat, having clearly lost its longest war.

### ***vi. Euro-communism (Madrid? Rome?): Subversion***

The sixth shock was about ideology. It came from Spain, Portugal, Greece and even Italy throughout 1975 and 1976. Communism was sweeping through southern Europe as well as Asia, as the dispirited, defeated democracies faced a “crisis of governability” at home. The triumph of the late 1940s when the new North Atlantic Community had stopped a dejected Europe from succumbing to communist subversion seemed in real danger of being overturned.

### **C. The Failure of Multilateralism, Atlanticism and Unilateralism**

What was to be done to stop this spiralling succession of shocks? Not surprisingly, the Atlantic democracies first relied on the three old formulae, each of which soon failed.

#### ***i. Multilateralism***

The first to fail was the multilateral system created in the great North American–European bargain by the major victor powers at the end of World War Two.

The first multilateral institution in this system to break down was the International Monetary Fund (IMF), on money in 1971. The second was the GATT, on trade in 1973. The third was the more recently established International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on nuclear energy, whose regime was blown away by the explosion of May 1974.

But the failure of multilateralism was much deeper. The UN-based multilateral system had not even tried to create an international organization to deal with energy to help solve the oil shock of 1973. Nor had the UNSC done anything to help the west cope with the shock of America's defeat in Vietnam. And a United Nations devoid of democratic principles in its Charter and dominated by non-democratic polities in its membership did nothing as Euro-communism swept through Europe's south.

#### ***ii. Atlanticism***

As in the late 1940s when multilateralism had first failed as the communist enemy emerged and the Cold War came, the democracies' second line of defence was Atlanticism. But the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) did little to help defend against the shocks from money and trade. The new International Energy Agency (IEA), hurriedly invented in April 1974, could not solve the oil shock, or the nuclear energy one that came in its wake. And the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was largely irrelevant as democracy was defeated in distant Vietnam and endangered in continental Europe itself.

#### ***iii. Unilateralism***

In such cases the last line of defence had long been unilateralism, largely from a hegemonic America that had decided by itself to go to war to stop the communists suddenly invading South Korea on June 25, 1950. But America had used unilateralism on August 15, 1971, and while it solved the immediate problem, it did not develop a durable solution for America, its allies and the world. While its mighty military could unilaterally re-supply a desperate Israel with critical "consumables," America no longer had enough oil of its own to supply its European and Asian allies, as it had during every earlier Arab-Israeli conflict when the Arabs had also always cut off

their oil. And the unilateralism America had used in Vietnam had failed for all to see when those helicopters lifted off that roof in Saigon for the last time.

This three-level failure forced America's European and North American allies to confront the cruel question they had faced before but had forgotten as America's rise to globalism assumed full force during the seemingly endless Cold War. While an America too powerful and globally engaged could be a problem, was a weak, isolationist America, coming home in defeat and retreat, really a good thing for its allies and the world? After some initial elation at the humbling of once mighty America and enthusiasm for their own expanding regionalism, the Europeans came to the conclusion it was not. The Americans did as well, for their own shock of Watergate, striking at America's constitutional core, showed them how much democracy had diminished at home and how they needed to look beyond for help. The challenge for both then became how to find the formula to build a new trans-Atlantic architecture that would work for both sides of the democratic homeland, and for the watching world as a whole.

#### **D. The Four Parents' Conceptions: d'Estaing, Schmidt, Wilson and Kissinger**

This task fell to the G8's four parents, whose distinctive conceptions of what their new body should be finally cross-fertilized to give it birth.

The first parent came from France. It initially went through the elation of its unilateralist, Gaullist "Jobertisme," then allowed a begging Britain to gain admission to France's EC, and finally did a direct oil deal with the Arab world. But then it realized it still needed help from across the Atlantic to cope with the still-unsolved problems of money, trade and military security, where its Foreign Legion and *force de frappe* might not be enough. Under its new president Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, it was then ready to do business with the Americans, as an equal and on as exclusive a basis as the Americans would allow.

The second parent came from Germany. Always an instinctive Atlanticist and increasingly the dominant power in the EC, its traumatic memories of World War Two led it to seek a better, broader way. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was worried, like all Germans, that floating currencies, as in the interwar period, could reawaken the inflation that had helped destroy the Weimar democracy and put Hitler in its place. And its *Wirtschaftswunder* powerhouse now needed export markets beyond those that an oil-strapped Europe, suddenly suffering from stagflation, could provide. Schmidt was ready to do a more broadly trans-Atlantic deal.

The third parent came from Britain. Far more than France, for centuries it had been an inherently imperial, trans-Atlantic and indeed North American power. It was by no means ready now to become a merely European one. And even with its newly discovered North Sea oil, it realized that its own instincts toward socialism and protectionism at home were not working. It too was eager once to serve again as a trans-Atlantic bridge, if only it could find someone to work with in a paralyzed, angry, isolated American administration on the other side.

The fourth parent finally did come, from America. It came as a politically shrinking and then prematurely physically departing President Nixon handed the White House over to an amiable Congressman from Michigan who served as the only unelected President America has ever had.

It came in the person of national security advisor and then secretary of state Henry Kissinger. He was by birth another European, who could thus never formally be elected president of the United States — the Arnold Schwarzenegger of his time. In reality, he was the de facto president for foreign policy.

Kissinger was a European not only in his personal origins in Germany but also in his own self-constructed intellectual paternity in Austria. His PhD was on the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe, examining the diplomatic genius of Metternich who had brought them to life and made them work for so long (Kissinger 1973). And as his own Atlanticist vision, to which he devoted a full “year of Europe,” failed to move a Jobertist France, he found a new model from Europe’s past to restore the modern democratic world. Thus was conceived intellectually and diplomatically the modern democratic global concert that the G8 was at its core, from its very start.

Kissinger outlined his conception plainly and publicly in a speech in Pittsburgh, just before the first summit began. He made it clear that it was to be a modern global concert, a permanent club of all the democratic, with an energy-rich Canada included in its ranks.

### **E. The Three Dates: Washington 1973, Helsinki 1975, London 1975**

By 1973 the four parents-to-be had been ready to start dating, at first through intermediaries, in different places around the world. They did so for two years, during which first dates turned into the relationships that in time gave birth to the G8.

#### ***i. Washington, DC, White House Library: March 25, 1973***

The first date was on March 25, 1973, in the Library of the White House in Washington DC, appropriately located in the same building where the first shock, over money, had come (Hajnal 2007, 11–12). The finance ministers of the U.S., France, Germany and Britain, and soon after Japan, gathered together in this “Library Group” to consider in concert how to restore, not the whole world, but merely its monetary regime, after the destruction of the old one at the hands of American unilateralism two years before. Its discussions were shrouded in secrecy so as to avoid moving markets and to diminish the dissatisfaction of those left out. The Library Group helped manage the uncertainties of the moment. But it would take much more to deliver a new international monetary regime.

#### ***ii. Helsinki, Finland, British Embassy Dining Room: July 31, 1975***

The second date, this time among the leaders themselves, took place in the dining room at the British Embassy in Helsinki, Finland, on July 31, 1975. It happened on the margins of a meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Over lunch, the leaders of the Berlin Dinner Four — the U.S., Britain, France and Germany — agreed they should meet again to discuss among themselves the economic dimensions of the political and security subjects the CSCE meeting had raised.

### *iii. London, England, 1975*

The third date came with equal intimacy, but larger numbers, in London in 1975 when the London Nuclear Suppliers Group first met. In accordance with the concert principle applied on an issue-specific basis, it included all the nuclear supply powers, among them Canada and the Soviet Union. The group considered how to stop any other country claiming a need for alternative energy sources from following India's path.

### **F. The Rambouillet Birth**

After dating for two years in these various venues, the countries at the core of all the clusters were ready for the real relationship that would give birth to the G7. Conceived first in Washington by Kissinger and then collectively by the leaders' personal representatives in New York, the G7 was born in Europe on the outskirts of Paris at the Château de Rambouillet under cold grey skies on November 15-17, 1975. At this former hunting lodge now used as a country retreat by the president of France, Giscard d'Estaing greeted his arriving colleagues in his sweater, while taking his dogs out for a walk. Their discussions unfolded with similar informality. But they had already conceded with reluctance that they would tell the world they were meeting, issue a written communiqué at the conclusion and even let a few dozen reporters come to question them about what they had done.

Their resulting statement — the G7/8's de facto "Charter of Rambouillet" — noted that they had discussed monetary, trade and other economic issues, including the energy and east-west economic relations that were inherently highly political, indeed security matters at the time. The document set forth several principles the leaders had collectively reached consensus on for the first time. It produced 14 clear concrete commitments, which were reliably delivered in the following year. What it did not note was that the leaders had agreed to meet again within the year, to make their initial two-day stand a permanent relationship centred on a face-to-face encounter for three days every year.

The most important product was their public statement of what the core mission of their new club would be. At the start of their communiqué, the six leaders present proclaimed: "We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere."

With "social advancement" in the mission statement, and Japan in the membership, the G7 was from the start an economic forum of an enlarged western alliance. But as a global democratic concert, it was also clearly and consciously much more than that.

## **G. The Great Expansion**

In their subsequent 32 summits, the club expanded enormously to create a new, full-blown institutional architecture for global governance as a whole. This expansion can be traced on 10 key dimensions.

First, the G8 has expanded its membership. Since the start the G8 has added others as full members, unlike the UN system with its Security Council frozen with the same five permanent veto powers it began with in 1945. Even before the first summit, an insistent last-minute Italy was included at the last minute of the first summit. The six leaders at Rambouillet in 1975 then added Canada in 1976, an ever expanding EU (sometimes with two seats) in 1977 and a democratizing Russia from 1992 through to 1998. The G8 has similarly attracted the attention of other countries and international organizations, led by the Netherlands, Belgium and Australia, which have sought to join.

Second, the G8 has expanded the participation of outside countries (Appendix A). After a failed effort by France as host in 1989, the G8 added as invited partial participants the four leading African democracies of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria from 2000 on, and about a dozen countries from 2003 to 2005. Since then the Plus Five powers of democratic India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa and communist China have always come.

Third, the G8 has expanded its inclusion of international organization (Appendix B). The G8 has increasingly included as invited participants the whole global community through the latter's universal multilateral organizations. Apart from the presence of the Non-Aligned Movement leaders on the margins of the summits in 1989 and 1993, this process began in 1996 when the executive heads of the UN, the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) came for a post-summit meeting with the G7. The UN returned in 2001. It has been at every summit since, apart from George Bush's Sea Island in 2004, when no heads of international organizations were invited. Reciprocally, the UN has been much slower to involve the G8 as an institution in its inner governance core.

Fourth, the G8 has expanded its institutions for ministers (Appendix C). Beneath the tip of the iceberg the G8 summit has proliferated downward to institutionalize its work in G8 meetings that now embrace a majority of ministers in its members' governments. Some of these bodies, notably the Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers formed in 1999, have included countries outside the G8 in their ranks.

Fifth, the G8 has expanded in its official-level institutionalization (Appendix D). It has given birth to at least 84 official-level bodies, some of which function to this day. Moreover, it is institutionalizing at an increasing rate, with only eight bodies created in the first cycle of summits (1975–81) and nine in the second (1982–88) but 14 in the third (1989–95), 16 in the fourth (1996–2002) and no fewer than 37 so far in the fifth (2003–2010).

Sixth, the G8 has expanded its involvement with the legislative, judicial and advisory branches of its member governments (Appendix E). Since 2002, the speakers of the lower house of its legislators have met annually, and its national advisory bodies on science have started to meet. However, even with these developments, the G8 remains largely a governance system driven by

the executive branch. In this respect it is far from begin a global expression of the UN galaxy, let along the EU.

Seventh, it has expanded its involvement with organized civil society (Appendix F). Over the years the G8 has increasingly involved civil society in the preparation of the summit and even at the summit itself. It started with a significant step forward at Okinawa in 2000 and has continued, with some interruptions, notably the virtual absence of civil society at Sea Island in 2004. In 2006 the Russians set a new standard, sending the host sherpa to consult civil society in the G8 partners and creating a well-resourced Civil Eight process that invited 700 global civil society representatives for an open dialogue with President Vladimir Putin on the summit's eve. However, in 2007, the Germans kept their sherpa at home and had hosted only a closed meeting with the chancellor and a few select special interest groups of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). More broadly, however, since 1998 young people have attended the summit through the Junior Eight (J8). And in 2006, the religious leaders of the G8 countries started meeting, and celebrities — especially at Gleneagles and since 2005 — have gotten involved directly in the G8 game through rock concerts and other means.

Eighth, the G8 has expanded in the number of protestors and police who are involved (Appendix G). Demonstrators now come to the summit in huge numbers to express their views directly to this emerging centre of democratic global governance. The 300,000 protestors at Genoa in 2001 have now been beaten by a big margin by the more than 1 billion who were involved in the Live Eight concerts in 2005. The police presence at the summit has seen a commensurate increase.

Ninth, the G8 has expanded in the presence of the media, who come to cover the summit in numbers up to 10,000 strong (Appendix H). It is they who tell the summit's story to the world, an especially important function as the G8 lacks a secretariat of its own to do the job itself.

Tenth, and most important, the leaders always come, unless they are dead. The summit is too important a meeting to miss. Since the start there have been 276 chances for a G8 leader to miss a G8 meeting, no matter how pressing his or her other responsibilities have been at home or abroad.<sup>2</sup> Not one ever has, save on one occasion when a leader (of Japan) died just before. In a world where these once rare plurilateral summit institutions are now plentiful, the G8 is the only one to which all the leaders always come.

## **2. The G8's Operation, 1975–2006**

### **A. Introduction: The Debate**

There is thus much *prima facie* evidence that this annual summit of the most powerful leaders of the world's most powerful countries matters, both for themselves and for the global community as a whole. But it is still necessary to look directly at the G8's operation in order to answer the fundamental question faced by all international institutions — how well has it performed?

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<sup>2</sup> 33 years x 8 leaders = 264 – 3 (Canada 1, EC 2) = 261 + 15 (Russia 1992–2007) = 276.

Thus far the answers to this question have produced a great debate among several schools of thought. The first set proclaims failure, or at least a limited and declining performance since the early days (Bergsten and Henning 1996). A second set sees success, but for the malevolent purposes of promoting G8 hegemony, neo-liberal values, inequality, poverty and ecological devastation throughout the world (Bailin 2005; Gill 1999). A third set sees success, in assisting the more legitimate, legalized multilateral organizations, in preventing disaster in the face of crisis or in producing desirable public goods on its own.

The evidence suggests that the third argument has the better case. Among the many disappointments and a few spectacular failures, the G8 summit has often been a body of substantial benefit and sometimes a striking success. The overview offered by Nicholas Bayne's annual grades, sherpa testimony and the G8 Research Group's annual performance assessments since 1996 all suggest that the G8 has gone through all three phases of performance, from high on its first seven-year hosting cycle to low in its second, to medium ever since. But a more careful look at its individual governance dimension shows generally steadily increasing performance from the start (Appendix I).

Most importantly, it has done much to meet its foundational purpose of promoting democracy and liberty globally, most decisively through its role in delivering the democratic second Russian revolution in 1989 and in liberating Kosovo from a major genocide in 1999. It has put new issues on the global agenda, set defining new directions for how to address them, made many meaningful commitments to realize them, kept those commitments to an increasingly high degree and developed new G8-centred institutions to render the G8's work more durable, detailed and effectively delivered. In the process, it has included more members and participants to reinforce its democratic power and reach. However, it has yet to reliably include in its own governance the judicial, legislative and civil society actors that all its members consider an essential part of democratic governance back home.

## **B. Delivering the Democratic Revolution**

In the broadest terms, the G8 has succeeded in its seminal, core, foundational purpose and *raison d'être* of promoting openness, democracy, individual liberty and social advance throughout the world.

In the mid 1970s, when the G7 was founded, democratic polities and principles were in defeat and retreat around the world, with the new cold war starting, America vanquished in its longest war in Vietnam and Euro-communism sweeping southern Europe and infecting Italy itself. The G7 summit's first success in defending open democracy was at Puerto Rico in 1976. Here it kept communists out of a fragile Italian government needing G7 financial support and moved to ensure that western banks individually secretly lending to the Soviet Union would not render G7 countries collectively vulnerable to Soviet designs and a threatened default.

By the late 1980s, the G7 went on the offence as a promoter of global democracy. It started in Venezuela and South Africa in 1987 and continued with Indonesia in 1997 and sub-Saharan Africa from 2001 on. The biggest breakthrough came in 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev sent his *de facto* surrender letter on behalf of the Soviet system — not to any single superpower rival or

multilateral organization but to the G7 leaders, meeting on the 200th anniversary of the invention of *les droits de l'homme*, at the Paris Summit of the Arch on July 14-17. Through the judicious, incremental conditional doling out of increased financial assistance and inclusion in the G7 and then G8, the G8 produced the second Russian revolution — the surprisingly peaceful destruction of the Soviet Union, Soviet Bloc, Soviet Empire and Soviet model, and its replacement by recognizably democratic alternatives in most of the once Soviet space. This includes a reunited Germany in whose east the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit was held, the year after the St. Petersburg Summit, the first summit held in a post-Soviet space. The benefits for the world of this defining event of the second half of the 20th century remain to this day, as virtually not one country has irreparably slid back out of the democratic sphere. Despite recent setbacks to democracy in Russia, as G8 host in 2006 Russia set a new record in having global civil society participate in the preparation of the first G8 summit it designed and produced.

In the field of individual liberty and human rights, beyond once apartheid-afflicted South Africa the G7 moved firmly with sanctions against communist China in 1989 for its military's mass murder of unarmed students in Tiananmen Square. In 1997 it pledged to keep a watchful eye on Hong Kong as it reverted to Chinese control that year, and nudged an Indonesia caught up in a financial crisis from a single party to a democratic state.

The G8's most decisive achievement was acting as an alliance to prevent a major genocide in Kosovo, by agreeing on military action in 1999. With Russia and China as veto-wielding P5 members, the UNSC refused to act, even as Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic-cleansing massacres mounted. In the lead-up to the 1999 Cologne Summit, the G8 agreed to initiate military action, first through an air war starting on March 24 and then through a ground invasion to finish the job. With the latter event looming, Russia then abandoned its traditional identity as a defender of the Slavs and Serbs and joined the G7 consensus, leading Milosevic to pull his troops out of Kosovo and the UNSC to retroactively adopt and legally legitimize G8 action by passing Resolution 1244. In doing so the G8 established through action the antithesis of the Westphalian principle, encoded in Article 2(7) of the UN charter, which prohibits interference from outside in the internal affairs of sovereign states. At its World Summit in New York in September 2005, the UN again adopted and legitimized the G8's new direction by affirming the principle of an international Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

To be sure, there is much left to do, for the G8 and others, in promoting open democracy and human rights globally. The next stage of the Kosovo settlement, the democratization of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) region, the continuing ethnic cleansing in Darfur and the defence of democracy in Russia are cases that stand out. But from 2004 to the present day the G8 has taken them up and stayed with them thus far.

### **C. Managing Domestic Politics**

On its first individual governance dimension — helping leaders manage their domestic politics — the G8 has often done well. It has given G8 leaders communiqué-encoded recognition of their country's contribution, provided media attention and approval, boosted them in the public opinion and re-election polls, and helped them justify their priorities in their national policy addresses and provided the external pressure enabling them to get badly needed policy change at

home. But it has also done the opposite, even driving them from office because they tried to comply with their G8 commitments unpopular back home.

#### **D. Setting the Global Agenda: Deliberation**

On its second dimension of deliberation, the G8 has also done well. Over its 33 years, it has done much to set the global agenda across a broadening array of issues, especially by taking up those that the UN-centred multilateral system did or could not (Appendix I). The G8 leaders have returned regularly and expansively to their seminal agenda, grounded in their core purpose of protecting within their own countries and promoting globally the values of openness, democracy, liberty and social advance. At the same time, they have expanded their agenda enormously in breadth and depth, taking up most international and domestic issues, in a judicious blend of iteration and innovation each year. The G8 has thus become a global centre of domestic and global governance as a whole.

At its first summit in 1975 the G8 dealt with energy conservation, at a time when the UN — as today — lacked any dedicated functional organization or even reference in the UN charter for the energy and the environment fields. In 1978 the G7 took up terrorism, in the specific form of skyjacking, as angry young men seized large commercial airliners to kill innocent civilians for the terrorists' political goals. Several other subjects largely ungoverned by the UN have been matters of recurrent concern, from foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1970s to hedge funds today.

To be sure, there are issues that the UN system has taken up much faster and more fully than the G8. Gender, including the role of women in development and conflict prevention, is the clearest case. Yet, since 2002, the G8 has moved quickly here. It has also done so on the challenges of multiculturalism and diversity that all G8 and many other societies face. The leaders discussed this latter topic at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2006.

#### **E. Defining the New Global Order: Direction Setting**

G8 initiative and innovation in deliberating on new issues has extended into the third governance dimension of setting directions for the global community through new principles and norms. Arguably the most important of these are principles, classically defined as statements of “fact, causation and rectitude,” for they publicly proclaim what the most powerful leaders of the world's most powerful countries commonly believe reality to be composed of, how the world works and what is legitimate “right rule” (Krasner 1982).

In 1977 the G7 declared that the inflation that came from economic stimulus was a cause of — not a cure for — unemployment, reversing the prevailing Keynesian political and economic consensus at that time. On the environment, as early as 1979 the G8 first addressed climate change, stating “we need to expand alternative sources of energy, especially those which help to prevent further pollution, particularly increases of carbon dioxide and sulphur oxides in the atmosphere” (G7 1979). In doing so the leaders agreed that stabilizing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at 1979 levels was their goal, and a reliance on alternative energy

sources their chosen means. Consistent with this call for stabilizing carbon concentrations at 1979 levels, the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of OECD countries decreased in the following five years. In 1990, the G8 broadened its arsenal by agreeing to control climate change by using “all sources and sinks.”

To be sure, these directions at times are slow to be set. Sometimes they seem misguided soon after they are set. One case came at the 1977 and 1978 summits, where the G7 called for a much greater reliance on carbon-creating coal as an alternative energy source to oil. But as a flexible forum where the many diverse political forces within its members are brought together in an equal dialogue, the G7 can listen, learn and self-correct quite quickly. The G8 soon said that coal must be used in an environmentally friendly way and then dropped it from its list of approved energy sources for good.

#### **F. Taking the Tough Decisions: Commitment**

The summit’s bold new directions have often been converted into the fourth governance dimension of decision making: creating collective commitments to act in specific, concrete, measurable ways in the time ahead and encoding them publicly in the summit’s communiqués. The first few summits generated a small number of such commitments, in the range of 7 to 14 each. But the total soon steadily rose, to a new high of 317 at the St. Petersburg Summit in 2006 and then 329 at the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit.

To be sure, these commitments vary widely in their level of ambition. And some commit to actions that outside experts and critics regard as the wrong thing to do. But the sheer numbers show that this small informal group of former adversaries-turned-like-minded democracies can come to consensus on many things. No single member can stop this consensus by invoking a unit veto like that at the UNSC. Moreover, the G8 commitments include and integrate all issues, goals and instruments that the global community has. And few doubt that the commitments at Gleneagles in 2005 to provide full debt relief for the deserving poorest countries and to double official development assistance (ODA) to democratically and developmentally deserving states by 2010 were not ambitious and desirable steps.

#### **G. Keeping Its Promises: Compliance**

The G8 further performs well the fifth governance dimension of compliance. For, on the whole, the G8 generates the commitments that count. Decisions made at the summit mountain top are actions delivered when the leaders descend and go back home. G8 summits are indeed worth the time and trouble, for they thus tend to constrain the ensuing behaviour of their member states, including those that are the most powerful and unilaterally inclined in the world.

A careful count of all members’ compliance within a year with all G7 commitments made at the summits from 1975 to 1989 shows that compliance was clearly positive, at +31%, on a scale that runs from –100% to +100%. Since 1989, as the Cold War departed and globalization arrived, the level of compliance rose. The most rapid rise came from the G8’s most powerful member, the

United States. It stood second lowest during the summits between 1975 and 1989 but soared to the top tier for the 21st-century ones.

On the critical issue of climate change. There was a great surge in compliance from 1992 to 1998, with complete compliance coming in 1994, 1995 and 1998. There was a second surge from 2003 to 2006. The 2004 Sea Island Summit hosted by U.S. president George W. Bush secured +89% and British prime minister Tony Blair's 2005 Gleneagles gathering generated +95%.

From 1989 to 2006, climate change compliance was led by the EU at +85%, followed by Japan at +79%, Germany at +74% and Britain at +68%. The U.S., at +44%, ranked second last, ahead of only Italy. However, during George Bush's time as president, U.S. climate compliance has been a lofty +75%.

To be sure, compliance can sometimes be driven down by extraneous political divisions. One case was the dispute over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, which pulled down compliance with the G8's 2002 commitments. And the G8 has no secretariat of its own to rely on to put its commitments into effect or even monitor how the members are doing in this regard. But its leaders can craft their commitments in ways that improve the chances of compliance (Kirton et al. 2007). And they can use their own powerful national governments and the international organizations they control to implement the promises they make.

## **H. Generating G8-Centred Global Governance**

A more enduring and detailed legacy of G8 governance comes from the sixth dimension of developing global governance. This is done largely through the new G8-centred institutions that the G8 summit fosters or creates. At the ministerial level, a majority of the portfolios in national governments now have a G8 gathering of their own (Appendix C). The process started with finance in 1973, trade in 1981, and foreign affairs in 1984. It leapt forward, under the impact of post-Cold War globalization, with the environment in 1992, labour in 1994, and terrorism and information technology in 1995.

At the official level, the G8 has generated 84 bodies since 1975 (Appendix D). The most frequent focus for them, especially from 1975 to 1980 and in 2004, has been energy, an area where to this day the UN has not created a dedicated, area-wide multilateral organization. Other major areas of G8 governance have been the environment and terrorism, where the UN system has again been absent in a comprehensive, coherent way.

More broadly from the start the G8 has dealt with other international organizations, leading and supporting them in different ways. It has also sought to reform and even eliminate them, most ambitiously at its summit at Halifax in 1995.

To be sure, some G8 ministerial bodies meet infrequently. Moreover, there remain notable areas ungoverned at the ministerial level. The most notable is defence, despite the G8's move into conflict prevention and war fighting since 1999. The G8 is thus not a military alliance like NATO in this institutional sense. Many of the official-level bodies have had a deliberately short shelf-life, such as the Renewable Energy Task Force from 2000 to 2001. However, as a flexible,

leaders-driven system, the G8 summit or its host can easily create such bodies, combine them or cast them off to govern on their own. It did so, respectively, for education in 2000, development in 2002 and health in 2006, for energy and environment ministers in 2005, and for finance and foreign affairs, which were separated from the leaders summit in 1998.

### **3. The G8's 2007 Heiligendamm Summit**

#### **A. Introduction**

The G8's performance on these six governance dimensions and overall reached new heights on the whole at the most recent summit. It took place from June 6 to 8, 2007, when G8 leaders and their now regular "Outreach Five" (O5) partners met in Heiligendamm, Germany, for the G8's 33rd annual summit.

There was much that made the gathering a potentially significant event. After a long absence, the G8 was due to return to its classical focus on economics, dealing with the old issues of global imbalances, private investment, and energy efficiency and the newer concerns of hedge funds, counterfeiting and piracy. It would further focus on its 21st-century preoccupation with Africa, trying to deliver its previous commitments on development assistance and health, and proceed to the tougher priorities of peace and security and investment flows. Above all it would confront the challenge of climate change, seeking to get the world's leading carbon-producing powers of the U.S. and among the O5 to commit to constrain their greenhouse gas emissions beyond the Kyoto protocol's pledges rapidly reaching their end. To help, the G8 had crafted a "Heiligendamm process" that would give the O5 powers a more reliable, institutionalized involvement in the G8 than ever before.

This agenda was to be delivered by the four old and five newer G8 leaders meeting for two days at a refurbished luxury resort hotel on the Baltic Sea. The veterans were Britain's Tony Blair, Russia's Vladimir Putin, America's George Bush and the EU's Jose Manuel Barroso. The newcomers included as sophomores Germany's Angela Merkel, Italy's Romano Prodi, and Canada's Stephen Harper and, as freshmen, Japan's Shinzo Abe and France's Nicolas Sarkozy. They made up the new generation now coming to power within the G8. Blair, there since 1997, would leave office within a month of Heiligendamm. Putin was constitutionally due to depart before the next summit in Japan in 2008 and Bush before the one in Italy in 2009. The newcomers were all institutionally destined to host the next summits in the current cycle, in Japan in 2008, Italy in 2009 and Canada in 2010.

At Heiligendamm, these G8 leaders would meet their increasingly G8 experienced O5 partners. Led by veteran Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, a G8 participant since 2001, they included Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, Hu Jintao of China, Manmohan Singh of India and rookie Felipe Calderón of Mexico (Appendix A). Rounding out the roster for the summit's second full day were the invited African leaders of Nigeria, Senegal, Algeria, Ghana and Egypt and the executive heads of several multilateral organizations – the UN, the IMF, the WTO, the African Union (AU), the OECD and the IEA (Appendix B). In all it was a large and disparate group.

As the leaders landed in Germany, predictions came from many quarters that this summit would fail. On its defining issue of climate change, host Angela Merkel herself said it was an open question whether a meaningful consensus could be forged.

But the G8's 2007 Heiligendamm Summit proved to be a striking success, due to its breakthroughs on climate and outreach and its advances on Africa and against Iran. It set several important new principles, made a record-breaking 329 commitments, mobilized US\$32.5 billion in new money — the second highest sum in G8 history — and instructed the OECD and other international organizations to deliver its decisions as never before (Appendix I). These achievements were in part pulled by G8 members' rising energy and ecological vulnerability, the inability of the UN institutions to cope, and the greater global predominance and democratic solidarity brought by the O5 powers, and the equalizing capabilities among G8 members and the O5 partners, led by an America in decline and a Russia, China and India on the rise. More importantly, despite its many leaders due to depart or with poor political control or popularity at home, it was pushed to high, historic performance by G8 veteran Tony Blair, in a bigger, bolder version of his G8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005.

## **B. The Preparatory Process**

### ***i. The Host's Agenda***

The success and substance of Heiligendamm were highly surprising, given where its German hosts had begun in planning their summit the previous year. As shown by the agenda they publicly released in November 2006 (Appendix J), they sought first to take their summit back to its assumed economic origins, by focusing on global imbalances, financial stability and hedge funds, private investment, counterfeiting, piracy and intellectual property rights. The previous year's priority of energy would be limited to energy efficiency. Climate change would be treated only in this light, leaving any bigger issues and breakthroughs to Japan's summit, with climate long chosen as its priority in 2008. On their second priority of African development, the Germans concentrated on the hard issues of peace and security, private investment and healthcare systems, as highlighted in the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan. Elsewhere they would try to deliver on their ambitious Gleneagles commitments to double aid and ensure universal access to AIDS treatment by 2010, rather than raise new funds. Thus lots on economics, little on climate and no new money for Africa were the central thrusts of the German plan.

Germany's planned agenda was sharply focused on the two themes of "growth" and "responsibility," grounded in the specific items identified within each. The agenda contained a good balance of iteration (with Africa and energy efficiency) and innovation (with the three African items and most of the global growth set). It also offered a good balance across the priorities of each G8 partner and several bold targets such as those on hedge funds and peace and security in Africa. The choice of only two planned themes left ample space to absorb the political-security subjects sure to arise from the Middle East, Africa, Asia or elsewhere.

There was a safe spot from the start for the African priority from Gleneagles and all from G8 summits since 2002. But both climate change and outreach were given scant space. Climate was but one component of one of the five items under the first of the two themes. The Plus Five

partners from Gleneagles, now newly named the Outreach Five and sometimes referred to as the "threshold" countries, would be invited to their third summit in a row. But there was no hint at the outset that the five would play any greater part in the G8. At the last session of the St. Petersburg Summit, Blair had proposed that the five be added to the G8 as full members. But his partners were convinced that the G8 should remain capable of taking action and thus decided to keep their club the way it was. They calculated that the bigger the group, the smaller the common denominator and thus the greater capacity for action that would come.

But the Germans would build on Blair's idea once they assumed the G8 chair at the start of 2007. For the German sherpa team, the challenge was how to keep the club cozy and capable of action while responding to the fact that structures in the world had changed. After the Iron Curtain came down and 50 years of world history had passed, the structural changes brought by the enormous economic growth of the threshold countries now enabled them to affect global policy. When it came to the crucial questions, solutions for the future were only obtainable once the G8 included the threshold countries and found common solutions together. Finding an acceptable and effective formula to do so was the outstanding task.

## *ii. The Sherpa Sequence*

The road to Heiligendamm featured an unusually intense preparatory process, at both the sherpa, ministerial and leader levels (Appendix K).

The first sherpa meeting, on January 19-20, was spent on working to achieve consensus on the orientation of the summit as a whole. This was usual for the first meeting held by a new G8 chair.

The second sherpa meeting, in late February, was also typical. It zeroed in on the issues, focused on texts and addressed the outreach strategy for inviting countries and involving civil society. The Germans were well advanced in developing the texts, although the foreign affairs sous-sherpas (FASS) still had a lot of work to do on them. A leaked draft of the world economy document showed that much remained to be resolved. The draft documents covered the themes of the economy, Africa and climate change. At the meeting different positions were set forth, but none was difficult, even on the new issue of hedge funds.

On climate change, the meeting did not advance a collective articulation. Some sought to move beyond the Gleneagles texts. There was a strong push from the British and from Blair himself to go further. But it was recognized that some countries were in a state of flux regarding their own policy stance. The EU, whose Council Germany would represent at the summit, was about to state a new policy. The U.S. had a redline position. The usual divides on nuclear energy continued. The non-Europeans knew that the one way to break EU unity was to suggest a stronger text on nuclear energy.

From North America, Canada saw the G8 climate discussions as intimately tied to its government's evolving stance on the subject. Along with the U.S., it felt that emerging economies needed to be engaged in making real commitments and the discussions would benefit from their involvement. Heiligendamm's discussion of climate would thus be helpful for Canada

for the recalibration of its policy. Canada recognized that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had a mandate for conducting the post-2012 negotiations and that is where they would be concluded or produce a result. But Canada also saw a need for more intimate forums for managing issues before they were sent to the UNFCCC. A G8-sponsored process could be useful. If the G8 and O5 agreed on critical parameters, a more broadly based body could follow up. This process would not be concluded at Heiligendamm but might under the Japanese G8 the following year.

Technology sharing was the other part of the deal for bringing the emerging economies into the climate control club. The G8 needed to frame the issue in terms of making technology available to emerging economies, in an economic framework or regime. The challenge for Mexico was to enact structural reforms that stimulated growth. Calderón was well positioned for this, particularly by restructuring Pemex to let in the private sector.

The German expectations on hedge funds were more modest than the media reported. Transparency was important. Adjusting to the German presidency's priorities, Blair made a statement to this effect.

On imbalances, the sherpas concluded that their leaders could have a serious discussion, but the summit was not the appropriate forum to deal with exchange rates, although the finance ministers would advise the leaders. The leaders could thus take up the subject, depending on how far their discussion went. The delicacies of the G8 within the finance ministers forum needed to be observed as well.

There was a rich conversation, introduced by Canadian sherpa Peter Harder, on the future of the G8 in the context of outreach in general. The sherpas asked, given the nature of the O5 — a term now used by everyone — how the G8 could engage them best. Up to then outreach had been at the invitation of the presidency, not the collective G8. On the other hand Blair had by now publicly stated that he wanted the G8 to expand. His views were thought in some measure to be driven by a desire to be on the right side of history, since he would soon depart. The sherpas felt that the G8 would see the adaptation of its structure, but there needed to be plans for continuity to preserve the sense of a G8 meeting with a G8 agenda and G8 documents, rather than a shared one.

Heiligendamm would be the third consecutive time the leaders would meet with the O5 at the summit. Some members of the O5 had even been at even earlier summits (i.e., South Africa, China). It was now hard not to invite them if the G8 was going to have any outreach at all.

Thus the process was evolving. But it remained for the G8 to adapt further to the shifts in geopolitical and geo-economic power that were are taking place. The sherpas agreed that the core of the G8 no longer focused just on economics and markets but also on shared values and sharing and broadening the benefits of globalization for all. Yet they recognized that the G8 as a collectivity no longer represented global strength as it once did. Consequently a number of issues no longer had a G8 solution. Issues with a global impetus could no longer be discussed fully without involving the O5, which play a stakeholder role. This led to a consideration of issues, such as climate change, that might be appropriate for a discussion at the L20 or G20.

Yet there was some reluctance to give up the shared history of the G8 and a desire to think through possible expansion carefully. It was seen as crucial that the Americans play in the mechanisms. The sherpas felt that as a new broader representation developed, it must not diminish the G8 or come at the expense of the candour, intimacy and shared values of this forum, which gives impetus to other institutions. It should not create a forum for ganging up on the “G1” (that is, America).

Another issue was further expansion — whether to invite others beyond the O5. Some felt such a group probably needed to extend beyond five in order to ensure, for example, Muslims representation, or Nigeria — the largest African country — or Saudi Arabia, because it would be difficult to obtain broad representation with only five participants.

Inclusion, however, cannot be done theoretically. It requires a real issue. After all, the sherpas recalled the origin of the G7 in the aftermath of the oil crises. One must be careful to find an issue that did not take away from other institutions that had it as their mandate. And there must be deliverables beyond simply “We came, we saw, we talked.”

The Heiligendamm agenda included a number of items appropriate for G8 Plus Five discussion, under the rubric of ensuring sharing and broadening the benefits of globalization. These were climate change, imbalances and intellectual property protection, which were not unrelated — new technologies were needed for coping with climate change and involved intellectual property protection. The question was o to pull these threads together into a robust agenda.

Another issue was whether to develop an agenda collectively beyond the G8. The timing was crucial. The world was entering a period when the leadership within and without the G8 could focus on this. It was ripe for serious reflection on what was core and what was not. The G8 as an institution had not yet been tested. There were differing perspectives, for example among Japan, Canada, Germany and Russia. But at this moment the G8 was on the cusp of change in the evolution of its architecture, offering a pragmatic opportunity that could bring out the creative element of G8 leadership.

Such change would not be possible in time for the Heiligendamm Summit, however, even though Merkel was quick to invite the O5. There remained the questions of including civil society and outreach countries further, the engagement of the sherpas and the broad sharing of documents. Nonetheless, the sherpas concluded that there would be a more elaborate engagement at Heiligendamm. There would be some discussions with the O5 and their sherpas, possibly even meetings with all the 13 sherpas together. There would not be a common agenda, but some common issues. This could result in experimenting in ways to engage with a new, broader representation.

#### *May 4, Berlin: Special Sherpa Meeting with Outreach Five on Climate*

The next major step came when Merkel asked her sherpa, Bernd Pfaffenbach, to organize a meeting of G8 sherpas with those of the O5. The Germans asked environmental and climate experts of each country to come, thus creating the climate agenda. At the end of the day, there

was a good result. But the way participants in the G8 knew one another and were aware of one another's positions, even though they may differ, was quite different than the dynamic with the O5. With new guests at the table, it was not always possible to see the articulation of positions. Discussion was more difficult. Participants are more cautious and progress is slower. The joint meeting showed the Germans the importance of intensifying this type of co-operation. They expected that on important global issues it would be possible to make headway once relationships were clearer. This implied that the industrial countries must not expect too much from the threshold countries in field of climate protection, as they were in a different position.

Given the desire to involve the threshold countries further in global governance, the Germans developed a proposal for the "Heiligendamm process," which, as of May 31, was still under debate. However, the German sherpa team was hopeful that by the end of the summit the proposal would be accepted. The threshold countries and G8 had come to agreement to have a structured topic-related dialogue. They would try to work on the basis of these topics and would submit the results in two years, under the Italian presidency in 2009. Possible issues would focus on topics of mutual interest related to the world economy, both for the threshold countries and the G8. One central topic was innovation and its protection. Knowledge-based societies needed innovation and needed to promote it for the sake of growth and jobs in G8 countries, but there was also a need to protect innovation, thus involving the issue of copyright. The protection of property rights must be a priority and common solutions sought.

Another potential issue was investment. On the one hand it was important that the G8 countries themselves make it clear that they favour open investment markets. It could no longer be taken for granted as it had been 10 years ago. The UN Convention on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which had a good reputation for collecting data, found that in the 1990s investment legislation contained only protectionist rules of up to 2% or 3%. But at the beginning of the 21st century 20% of legal provisions tended toward protectionism. The German chancellor and her sherpa were convinced of the danger of this protectionist path, regardless of one's position on globalization, and sought a declaration that supported the freedom of investment. Investment conditions were also considered important: the more open the markets are, the more important it is to agree on similar investment conditions with the most important trade partners. Thus this topic was important for dialogue with the O5.

There were two other possible items. One was energy efficiency and co-operation between the G8 and the O5. There was a debate over climate change. When asked practical questions about first steps, the Germans hoped the framework of the Heiligendamm process would produce reasonable results.

The other topic was development. The Germans were convinced that for Africa to embark on the path to much better development, good governance was required. It was thus important for the international community of donors to reach a consensus on governance. There were already different "*acquis*" available. But the Germans wanted to discuss them with the O5 countries.

The OECD secretariat proposed to serve as a platform and expected its offer would be accepted. Over the next two years, it would prepare the sherpa meetings on these four issues, but it would not serve as an implementing or controlling body.

The German goal was thus a structured dialogue between the threshold countries and the G8. For the global governance system, the leaders of these threshold countries must become aware that with growing economic weight comes more responsibility. But they were only able to take on such responsibility against the background of preparing for the G8. On issues such as climate protection, the O5 expected advance steps from the G8. This was taken for granted for the Europeans, but not all G8 partners shared the same policy. The Germans had to respond within the G8. Within the framework of the consensus process they also had to find a way to sum it all up in a document.

As of the end of May, the Germans were hopeful they could achieve this. With such dialogue and co-operation, a G13 could be possible in the end.

### *June 5, Berlin*

At a special sherpa meeting on June 5 in Berlin, the day before the leaders would meet at Heiligendamm, the G8 sherpas took up the issue of African development. They sought agreement on whether their leaders would make explicit new commitments based on the targets and timetables set in 2005 at Gleneagles. Several members opposed repeating the 2005 target of a new US\$50 billion by 2010, for fear they would miss it. Also in danger was a German proposal for a joint G8 effort to increase funds for the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.

At the end of the meeting, pledges by G8 members to increase official development assistance (ODA) seemed very unlikely. The sherpas also disagreed on making a new joint commitment to boost AIDS funding. They further failed to agree on the communiqué's wording on climate change, especially relating to a quantitative target temperature and greenhouse gas emissions. At the end of their meeting, the sherpas agreed to meet again the next day.

### *June 6, Heiligendamm*

This they did on the evening of June 6, the day the summit began. The G8 sherpas made some further progress, but left much for their leaders to decide face to face.

### ***iii. The Lead-Up Summitry***

Even as their sherpas slogged it, the leaders were active themselves in the months leading up to the summit in a dense web of overlapping bilateral summits among themselves (Appendix L). Of particular note was how all were connected, especially the new G8 leaders, but also the O5 ones. Although Merkel, with her coalition government and EU presidency, did not take the standard pre-summit tour of her partners' capitals, she still stood at the centre of the summit sociogram. So did Tony Blair.

Amid the dense web, two visits proved to be of particular importance. The first was Blair's trip to the White House in May, at the end of which he signalled that Bush could well adjust significantly on climate change. The second, at the Heiligendamm Summit itself, was Merkel's pre-summit lunch with Bush.

In addition, there were the many phone calls among the leaders. These included one from Merkel to Harper. By May 31, Canada had adjusted on climate change as well, agreeing that it would now accept the target and timetable of a 50% reduction by 2050 to be stated in the communiqué.

#### ***iv. The Compliance Momentum***

A further force propelling Heiligendamm toward high performance was the momentum from the substantial compliance that came with the priority commitments of St. Petersburg in 2006. As Appendix M indicates, the final compliance score was +47% — well within the normal respectable range of summits since 1996. Moreover, all members showed positive compliance, led unusually by the U.S., as well as Britain and Canada, each with +60%, closely followed by the EU with +58% and 2007 host Germany with +55. Even a long-lagging Russia, the host in 2006, had risen to an average +45%. Furthermore, high compliance had come on Heiligendamm's rapidly emerging priorities of climate change, at +78%, the related issue of renewable energy at +89% and even African security at +44%. With their credibility in keeping their commitments thus confirmed, they were well positioned to mobilize more money for Africa, the one area where civil society was watching and demanding the most.

### **C. The Summit's Results**

Heiligendamm proved to be a summit of historic success, primarily thanks to its breakthroughs on climate change, its new, inclusive Heiligendamm process with the O5, its good work on African development and its strengthening of solidarity with Russia on several security concerns. The 37-page document on "Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy," released late in the afternoon of June 7, recorded the results on the first two.

#### ***i. Climate Change***

On climate change, the document began by noting that global temperature was rising and that human activity was largely responsible — a significant strengthening of the encoded epistemic consensus on fact and causation from Gleneagles in 2005. It then declared, for the first time, that there would be a post-Kyoto framework, in which the U.S. and Outreach Five would participate as carbon-constraining powers, that this framework would be centred in the UN and that it would be defined by 2009. Gone was the old principle that the rich north, responsible for causing the problem, had to cut its carbon while the unconstrained poor south, now suffering from it, was free to get wealthy as it saw fit just as the north already had. Now all would act together, with the rich going furthest and fastest and still transferring resources to the south, while the south joined in as its responsibility and capacity allowed.

The G8 also agreed to “substantial” reductions in greenhouse gas emissions in the future and to consider seriously the EU, Canadian and Japanese approach of reducing them 50% by 2050 (from an undefined base). The point of convergence was thus clear, even though the G8 avoided setting a target that the developing countries could not accept. The G8 made these decisions on the first working day of the summit, before meeting with the O5 the next day. Further details would be defined through several processes feeding into a new UN agreement by 2009. The G8 participants and their outreach partners would start to take real action on a long list of proven measures right away. The G8 offered a long list of practical measures to control carbon, covering buildings, transportation, forests and biodiversity.

This big breakthrough on climate came thanks to Blair’s influence on an accommodating George Bush, bridge building by Canada’s Stephen Harper and Merkel’s skill in uniting G8 partners on an ambitious new approach. On climate, Bush’s America had finally been brought into the G8 club and, through the G8, into the UN one.

### ***ii. Outreach: The Heiligendamm Process***

The second historic step was the Heiligendamm process. It was a high-level, structured dialogue between the G8 and O5 on innovation, investment, development and carbon. This comprehensive summit follow-up process would start in the second half of 2007 and would aim at producing tangible results in two years. An interim report was due at the 2008 summit and a final one at the 2009 one. The OECD was asked to serve as a platform and the IEA to do so in the field of energy efficiency. The Germans had received all of their maximum vision, with climate and energy included and the OECD given a secretariat role.

Through this institutionalized outreach, the G8 club expanded to embrace the rapidly rising, largely democratic global threshold powers of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. The Heiligendamm process was an extension of the 2005 Gleneagles Dialogue on Clean Energy, Climate Change and Sustainable Development. The process had already proven itself when the meeting of the G8 and O5 sherpas in early May had delivered the down payment of an agreement that developing countries would control their carbon if America and its allies the NATO and the OECD would. The process showed the G8 could expand to include rising powers, unlike the UNSC, with its fixed membership of permanent members, and the Bretton Woods bodies still struggling with their issues of “voice and vote.”

### ***iii. Africa***

On Africa, after some internal debate, the G8 reiterated its ambitious agreement at Gleneagles to double aid by 2010 and ensure universal access to treatment for HIV/AIDS by then. To prove its credibility the G8 announced US\$60 billion to fight HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. About half of this money was in previously unpledged funds for the period beyond 2010, giving Heiligendamm US\$32.5 billion in new money mobilized in all. This was the second highest amount in G8 history thus far.

Furthermore the G8 also took up the tougher priority parts of the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan. It authorized action on healthcare systems, peace and security, and, importantly, women and girls. To add iterative continuity for yet another year, the Japanese agreed that Africa, along with climate change, would be high on the agenda of the summit they would host in July 2008.

#### ***iv. Security: Iran, Missile Defence, Sudan***

On the summit's broader peace and security agenda, G8 solidarity was strengthened on terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and several regional security concerns. On Iran, where WMD and terrorism came together, the G8 agreed on a response to Iran's latest defiance of the UN. On a missile defence plan against Iran, the U.S. and Russia took a welcome step toward working together should all else go wrong. Solidarity was also seen over Sudan.

These security subjects showed the power of the G8 summit to pull together rival superpowers falling out on the outside. As in the lead-up to earlier summits, the months before Heiligendamm were marked by Russians and Americans shouting Cold War slogans at each other across an iron curtain long gone. However, once Putin and Bush flew in for face-to-face dialogue with their colleagues, the harsh words were gone.

#### ***v. The Economic Disappointments***

To be sure, there were some subjects on which little was achieved. Several such disappointments came on the economic issues, especially in view of Germany's initial desire to bring the summit back to basics with a focus on its assumed economic core. Nonetheless, the recorded economic conclusions were long and detailed. The key "Growth and Responsibility" document of 37 pages contained 11,364 words, 145 commitments and 8 remit mandates. But on the big issues, they made little advance.

In their treatment of global imbalances, G8 leaders sent a message of confidence, noting that the imbalances were starting to correct and that G8 members had in place the medium-term strategies necessary to solve them over time. There was no recognition of threats from high and rising energy prices, or from the common interest rate increases, then starting, that could tip debt-laden consumers and frothy stock markets over the edge. There seemed to be a disconnect during the summit between G8 governors at Heiligendamm and their voters back home, as the latter filled up their cars with increasingly expensive gas prices and saw their stocks drop in value as the markets sharply sold off. Complacency more than confidence could well have been the message they took from the G8, even if stock markets soared to historic new highs in the month and a half after the summit's end.

A second economic disappointment came on hedge funds. A first deliberative step was taken, as the issue was firmly placed on the agenda, with the prospect of a return to it in the years ahead. But at Heiligendamm the leaders merely endorsed in less detail what their finance ministers had earlier agreed to, without adding anything of their own. While this seemed sensible at the time, given how little was still known on the subject, the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds and

concerns about the tax treatment of private equity in the weeks following the summit led some to wonder if done enough had been done.

A third economic disappointment came on private investment. While the Germans had initially envisaged the summit setting a new global regime governing freer investment flows among countries, Heiligendamm produced no such agreement or even strong endorsement of the underlying principle. But this was in large part because G8 members, led by Germany, were rapidly rethinking the value of free flows in a world where such investment was increasingly coming from state-owned enterprise, outside market disciplines.

A fourth economic disappointment came on intellectual property. Once again the summit delivered a deliberative success by putting intellectual property firmly on the Heiligendamm agenda, where it was destined to reappear in 2008. But there were few new principles to guide the G8's approach, let alone action to get a quick start.

### ***vii. The Security Disappointment: Kosovo***

In the field of security, amid several disappointments, the ticking time bomb of a Kosovo anxious for independence stood out. The summit leaders discussed this issue, which divided Russia from the rest, and made it no worse — and may have made it slightly better by showing that the G8 still sought consensus and by preventing any precipitous action taken by anyone in the weeks ahead. However, a last-minute, one-sided proposal by the new French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, unsurprisingly failed to overcome the impasse between the U.S. and Russia over Kosovo's status as a sovereign state. The G8 leaders were left to try to maintain the status quo for a while longer, while they looked again for a way forward at the UN and elsewhere.

## **D. The Summit's Performance**

Despite these disappointments, the Heiligendamm Summit's success is confirmed by a systematic examination of its performance both overall and on the six dimensions of domestic political management, deliberation, direction setting, decision making, delivery and the development of global governance.

### ***i. Overall Performance Assessment***

In overall terms, Heiligendamm performed at a strong B level for both its individual members and on 11 major issues, according to the currently available assessment by the G8 Research Group (Appendix N). It was particularly successful for the EU at A–, and host Germany, Britain and Canada at B+, but not for the U.S. at C+. Across its agenda it performed strongly on innovation and health at A– and on climate change, raw materials and African peace and security at B+. Together these scores suggest the important contribution made by Britain, along with Germany, on the defining issues of climate change and African development.

## ***ii. Domestic Political Management***

On the dimension of domestic political management, the summit did well for most leaders at home (Appendix O). Several members were spoken of approvingly by name in the chair's summary. In the post-summit national press briefings and afterward there were no signs of the dissension and unravelling that had erupted over the Soviet gas pipeline in 1982. And reports by the leaders to their parliaments and publics back home suggested their sense of personal achievement and summit unity was intact.

Media coverage of the summit shared this sense of success. When the summit ended, Germany's largest mass circulation daily, reliably in touch with the public mood, declared in its headline Angela Merkel to be the "woman of the world." In all G8 countries save perhaps Japan the summit story received substantial sustained front-page coverage in the elite general and financial daily newspapers, the national television network news and the editorials of the elite press (Appendix P). In general, the average tone of these newscasts, editorials and front-page stories started out neutral on June 1, soon dropped into negative where they stayed through the summit's opening day on June 6 and then rose strongly into the positive range through to the summit's end on June 8 and 9. A professionally skeptical media thus also judged Heiligendamm to have been a success.

The popularity of G8 leaders with their own publics also appears to have benefited from their summit performance. Even in the U.S., the president, deeply unpopular due to the war in Iraq that preoccupied his public, seems to have benefited from a slight summit bounce in the polls. His approval rating rose from 29–32% just before the summit to 34% during it, only to drop down to 26–32% soon after it ended and Iraq returned to the top of American minds.

## ***iii. Deliberation***

On the dimension of deliberation, the 2007 summit issued only eight documents. But their 25,857 words made them the third highest in G8 history and well above the 33-year average of 9,283. The O5 partners were associated with them as seldom before.

## ***iv. Direction Setting***

On the dimension of direction setting, the summit was highly successful in setting revolutionary new principles required to meet the central pressing problems of the time. As noted above, the standout success was the new climate change principle that ended the old north-south divide of the previous half century, with all its logical extensions that the rich north caused the problems, alone was responsible and alone must act to fix it up. In its place came an acceptance going forward of common causal responsibility, common cause for the solution (by controlling carbon) and thus a replacement of the old north-south divide by one world with all major powers together in the lead. These new G8-pioneered principles were antithetical to those entrenched in the UN and its UNFCCC and Kyoto protocol.

More broadly, the summit did much to have its members, including Russia, affirm the G8's core values of openness, democracy and individual liberty as the foundation and frame for their agenda, analysis and action across most policy domains. In the first and central document on "Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy," these core G8 values were noted 248 times (Appendix Q). They were led by the need for participation (with 71 references), less corruption (33) and transparency (34). The "Heiligendamm Statement on Nonproliferation" had 30 such notations, again led by participation with 33 and now the rule of law with 17.

#### *v. Decision Making*

On the dimension of decision making, the Heiligendamm Summit generated a historic high of 329 commitments from leaders, several of which were reiterated in the chair's summary. Across the eight documents issued by leaders, the world economy contained 144 commitments, Africa 123, nonproliferation 28, Sudan/Darfur 4, counter-terrorism 27, trade 2, the Global Partnership 2 and UN counter-terrorism 2 (Appendix R). On the face of it, this distribution suggests that the summit was indeed, as intended, an economic one.

But a closer look shows a more complex configuration. The component of climate and energy under the world economy contained 94 commitments overall. The conventionally conceived core economic subjects of growth and stability and of hedge funds had only one each, while innovation got eight and investment only 13. In the new world of the G8 since 1985, where economics and environment were integrally linked, climate and energy did indeed make Heiligendamm an economic summit. The Stern report produced by Tony Blair's Britain made the link more strongly in 2007, and Blair's agenda and achievements of 2005 made the 2007 summit a Gleneagles in Germany.

A further sign of the Heiligendamm Summit's success came in the role of the G8 as a great global fundraiser, using the de facto budgetary and fiscal power of the G8 as a global governor to mobilize new money as a "carrot-like" instrument to produce global public goods. The Heiligendamm Summit, not planned as a fundraiser, promised more than US\$60 billion, largely to promote health in Africa. Of this total about half was a useful reaffirmation of previous pledges, including that to double ODA by 2010 — a promise some G8 members increasingly doubted could be met. But US\$32.5 billion was genuinely new, rather than reaffirmed, money, pledged for the period from 2010 to 2013 (Appendix S).

It is worth noting that on its second-ranked priority and performance of Africa, the G8 put its money where its mouth was. The 123 commitments on Africa, including the 42 on health, were backed by US\$32.5 billion in new money. In contrast, the first-placed priority of climate and clean energy received virtually nothing in 2007, with indications only that the bill would be paid in the coming years. But even here Germany indicated it would use climate money for health, while Japan's signals were directed not only at helping developing countries mitigate greenhouse gas concentrations but adapting to its harmful effects as well.

## ***vi. Delivery***

On the dimension of delivery, there were signs at and after the summit that its large number of often ambitious and wide-ranging commitments would be complied with. The commitments were respectably replete with the catalysts that caused compliance in the past. There were few de facto national reservations or disagreements over the decisions expressed at the concluding news conferences or back home. Immediate adjustments came in national behaviour on several key issues, notably Sudan and Iran, both from the G8 and from the O5 now attached by the Heiligendamm process for the next two years.

A final sign was the summit's iterative concentration of its commitments on issue areas where high compliance has come in the past. In the lead were climate change and clean energy, and energy had led G8 compliance from 1975 to 1989. And since 1987, the 30 measured climate change commitments show compliance here has averaged a substantial +48%. At each summit since 1992 it has been over +50%, save for 2001 and 2006. Tony Blair's Gleneagles Summit generated a near-perfect performance of +95% for compliance with its commitments on climate change.

## ***vii. Development of Global Governance***

On the dimension of developing global governance, the German-hosted summit also produced a historic performance due to the Heiligendamm process with the threshold countries, the use of the OECD and the IEA as a secretariat, and the creation of four new official-level bodies to carry forward the G8's work.

The Heiligendamm process for the first time offered non-G8 members a substantive, structured dialogue on four broad topics central to the work of the G8 and the world in the years ahead. A final report on its outcomes would be presented to the G8 summit in 2009, meaning at a minimum the O5 would come to the next two, as well as work with the G8 year round. But the 2009 report would be on the outcomes of the process rather than the process itself. And the final report that had been requested of the G8's African personal representatives (APRs) did not lead to the end of that forum. At Heiligendamm, an embryonic, if still abortable, G13 for the future was clearly born.

## ***viii. Democracy Deepening***

On the ultimate dimension of deepening democracy globally the jury on Heiligendamm's performance is still out. But the prospects for a favourable verdict seem promising, on both the critical, interlinked Russian on O5 fronts.

The darkening doubts about Russia's democratic record and devotion were not dispelled by Heiligendamm. But the summit gave G8 leaders, such as Canada's Harper, the chance to express their concerns directly to President Putin and for the latter to reaffirm the democratic principles that pervaded the communiqués. It all inspired the Germans to lead a G8 effort to see if the members were complying with the energy principles, centred on openness, that they had agreed

to at St. Petersburg the year before. It also secured Russian foreign policy co-operation on issues such as Sudan, where human rights were seriously under attack in their most deadly form. Nor did G7 leaders feel that Russia's presence would dilute their own democratic mission, for none even tried to make the case that Russia should be downgraded or somehow be induced to leave (Kirton 2007).

Russia's continuing core democratic character and commitment were enhanced by contrast with a still communist China now becoming an institutionalized G8 partner through the O5. Apart from serving as a useful reminder of the stark differences between the once allied communist giants, it carried additional democratization benefits as well. The O5 brought four democracies as well as China, arguably enlarging and enriching the democratic character of the nascent G13. None of the four seem likely to follow any Russian de-democratization path. Conversely, among the G8 Russia was the member best positioned to educate the Chinese on why and how a once closed communist polity with major power status was better off moving, however incrementally, in the direction of greater openness, democracy and human rights. And with China now institutionally included in the G8, there were signs that China might be inspiring or allowing a potentially serious domestic debate on democracy, if in ways far more tentative than the glasnost Gorbachev had brought from the top when he started to transform the USSR of old.

### **E. The Sources of Success**

The success of the Heiligendamm Summit is adequately explained by the concert equality model, whose structural, ideational and institutional variables at the level of the international system have well explained G8 summit performance in the past. But 2007 also requires a closer look at individual factors beyond the political control that each G8 leader has at home. The G8 was only partly pulled into its achievements by high and rising world oil prices that hurt all G8 members save Russia and Canada on energy security, and the whole world on climate change should China, India and America be forced to rely more on dirty coal. The UN had failed to agree on a climate control framework beyond Kyoto, or to halt the dangerous and deadly behaviour of Iran, North Korea and Sudan. The surging currency values and economic growth of America's G8 partners, including Russia, induced adjustments from an America with a war going badly in Iraq and not yet won in Afghanistan.

The G8 was pushed more strongly into preventive, long-term action by several forces from inside the club. One was a new generation of G8 leaders in Germany, Canada, Japan and France whose domestic position was stronger, apart from Russia's Putin, than that of G8 veterans Blair, Putin and Bush, who would soon be gone. Merkel, as host of the summit and chair of the EU, made a difference as an individual. But in the end it was Blair, that great statesman of G8 diplomacy, who pushed the Heiligendamm Summit into its surprising striking success. At Gleneagles he had set the path that involved the O5 in this still constricted club, invited the leading African democracies, put climate and Africa as the defining themes, and worked assiduously behind the scenes to secure American adjustment on climate and agreement to deliver for Africa according to the Gleneagles plan. Heiligendamm was as much his summit as it was Merkel's, who will have to ensure by herself that its legacy lives on in the years ahead.

### *i. Vulnerability*

To be sure, there were strong pressures from the international system, starting with the structural factor of vulnerability that pushed the summit to perform well.

#### *Energy*

As the summit approached, world oil prices — the first proven driver of summit performance — rose from their January lows to levels above those at the highly successful Gleneagles Summit in 2005 (Appendix T). On Friday, June 1, 2007, the benchmark West Texas Intermediate (WTI) light sweet crude on the month forward contract closed at US\$65.15. On June 5, the day before the summit started, WTI hit US\$65.52 while Brent crude, emerging as the new global benchmark, rose to US\$70.23. On June 7, the summit's first full day, WTI closed at US\$66.93.

The rise was driven by OPEC's refusal to produce more (fearing the anticipated success of America's energy security moves to ethanol), political unrest in Nigeria and the new threat of a cyclone threatening supplies from the Persian Gulf, in a remembered reply to hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the Gulf of Mexico two years before. This increasing energy vulnerability provided a particular incentive for leadership from Britain. It had just become a net hydrocarbon importer and its public was still skeptical of a big shift to nuclear power to backfill the fast diminishing supplies of oil and gas from the North Sea. And few in Britain wanted to go back to carbon-laden, destructive coal.

#### *Terrorism*

The reality of G8 members' vulnerability was also reawakened by new terrorist attacks, if not the actual strikes — let alone the deaths of the July 7 assaults in London as Gleneagles opened in 2005 (Appendix U). In America's New York City, a still 9/11-shocked country uncovered a cell planning to attack the John F. Kennedy airport that included a member from Guyana. Islamic terrorism had infected America's own hemisphere and the G8 had been prescient in moving for the first time to protect critical energy infrastructure from terrorist threats.

#### *Health*

Similarly still present were scares recalling past shocks (Appendix V). While the proliferation of avian influenza had receded, a new scare arose from a drug-resistant form of tuberculosis, XDR-TB. It erupted first in Africa but then travelled from the U.S. to Europe to Canada and back to the U.S. — in one man. The case showed once again how vulnerable America, Europe and Canada were to the globalized spread of deadly infectious disease with their porous borders, easy air travel and health surveillance systems still inadequate to cope with such threats. Together with the continuing growth of HIV/AIDS and other deadly infectious diseases in Africa, this helped fuel the money mobilized for infectious diseases and the strong attention to health systems in Africa.

### *Environment*

Ecological shocks were also small but enough to reawaken bad memories from the recent past. On June 2, an earthquake hit southern China. A cyclone in the Persian Gulf drove up energy prices and constituted a new extreme weather event that again showed how an ecological vulnerability could quickly become an energy one. And the hurricane season started in the Gulf on June 1, with forecasts of several strong hurricanes to come, after their sabbatical the year before.

### *Finance*

Finance shocks were similarly muted, with just enough disruptive surprises to keep a sense of vulnerability alive. The week the summit started, stock and bond markets tumbled, catalyzed by interest rate increases in Europe and New Zealand and fears that a general rise in interest rates was about to be around the world. Meanwhile the Shanghai stock market took another tumble. Adding to the worries was the recent hedge fund failure at Amaranth Advisors due to bad natural gas bets and growing woes in the sub-prime market in the United States. But the markets quickly recovered, Amaranth's collapse had no systemic consequences and the sub-prime problem seemed contained. The financial shocks were not nearly strong enough to push the G8 into real action the imbalances or hedge funds.

### *Demography*

Similarly absent were any demographic shocks to spur a discussion on diversity like the one at St. Petersburg a year earlier. Bush's immigration bill was dying in Congress. Senegal's Abdoulaye Wade warned of desperate Africans invading Europe's porous coasts to shock the G8 into a success or even scrutiny on the subject.

### *Crime*

One vulnerability that mattered, even without a singular shock, was transnational crime in its many dimensions: drugs (Afghanistan), nuclear smuggling (plutonium), money laundering (terrorist financing) and corruption (looted assets from Africa and Russia in Britain). Here the G8 responded with attention and action in a range of relevant concerns.

## ***ii. Multilateral Organizational Performance***

A second systemic force pulling the summit toward success was an international institutional one, in the form of multiple failures of the multilateral organizations of the UN. On climate the UNFCCC, with its Conference of the Parties (COP) and the Kyoto protocol's Meeting of the Parties (MOP), was frozen in its traditional north-south gridlock and had failed to agree on a post-Kyoto framework as its December 2007 meeting in Bali approached. On nuclear weapons proliferation, the IAEA admitted it had decreasing capability to monitor Iran's nuclear program.

There was a further failure to respect UN resolutions on Iran and Sudan. And as in 1999 the UNSC P5 were deadlocked over Kosovo and required a G8 consensus on how to proceed. More broadly, the failure on UNSC reform at the UN World Summit in September 2005 left Japan and Germany, and a rapidly rising India, Brazil and South Africa, out in the cold. Outreach and inclusion, it was clear, would come only at the G8.

At the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF had failed to do much on imbalances or on giving rising powers appropriately greater voice and vote. And the World Bank was poorly positioned to deal with Africa, particularly on the issues of corruption and good governance, with its leading advocate, President Paul Wolfowitz, embroiled in bad governance of his own, which would lead him to resign.

### ***iii. Capability***

#### *Internal Equality*

Inside the G8, there was a strong surge toward internal equality (Appendix W). Since the last summit, against the U.S. dollar the euro had risen from US\$1.28 to US\$1.34, the British pound from US\$1.85 to US\$1.99 and the smaller Canadian dollar from US\$0.89 to US\$0.94.

In underlying growth, in first-ranked America the U.S. Department of Commerce reported on June 1 that the U.S. economy in the first quarter expanded only 0.6%, its slowest pace in more than four years. Meanwhile, all other G8 economies were much more strongly on the rise.

International equality and, with it, collective predominance of the global system were greatly enhanced if the O5 powers were included in a new G13. Even with the Chinese yuan largely capped, the currencies of the O5 powers were rising against the U.S. dollar. Indeed in the last week of May, the Indian rupee reached a nine-year high against the dollar. In underlying growth, the O5 were all rapidly outgrowing the U.S. and most G8 countries save for Russia. China would later report a growth rate of 11.9% for the second quarter of 2007, and on the eve of the summit India reported that its economy had grown 9.4% in the year ending March 31, the faster annual rise in gross domestic product (GDP) in 18 years and the continuation of a trend of growth above 8% for the past four years.

### ***iv. Common Principles***

The core common principles of the G8 also pulled the summit toward high performance. The discussions over the Heiligendamm process, as noted above, drove the sherpas to reflect on their deepest shared values and reaffirm their devotion to the democracy that lay there. Openness also connected directly with the planned priority agenda items of investment in both the growth and African domains, and in innovation and democracy and rights connected directly to good governance in Africa and an indirect one with a China coming in.

### *v. Political Control and Capital*

At the domestic level, the political control and capital of the G8 leaders had back home exerted a mixed impulse on summit performance, with the four veterans on the way out and the four newcomers just coming in (Appendix X).

Unlike the remarkable continuity and accumulating experience at G8 summits from 2001 to 2005, there was considerably less as the generational transition reached mid stage. Moreover, the veterans were constitutionally and politically due to leave soon — Blair in a few weeks, Putin within the year and Bush the year after that. And the newcomers were all in some ways insecure: Merkel with a coalition government and unpopular party, Prodi with a fragile complex coalition and razor-thin upper house majority, Harper with a minority government and polls that would keep him there, and Abe with plummeting popularity and an upper house election on June 29 fast approaching. Only Sarkozy seemed to have a big fresh mandate, but even he faced parliamentary elections soon after the summit that, as it turned out, took some of the strength off his surge. His momentary self-confidence as a summit novice led him to make a few false steps.

But if the aggregate and average promised modest results at best, the particular combination may have spurred success. In particular a deeply unpopular Bush, who had just lost control of both houses of Congress and was approaching the end of his presidency, was inclined to be modest and adjust, no more than on climate change. Above all, he was inclined to listen to his closest partner, Tony Blair, who would soon be gone from the summit but still had control of his legislature and could be assured that his party and designated number two would succeed him when he left. And here was continuity where it most counted, in the dean of the summit: a decade-long veteran, inventor of the new enlarged summit with the Russians he hosted in 1998 and the genius of Gleneagles on Africa, climate and outreach as host again in 2005.

### *vi. Constricted Participation*

Constricted participation is the critical international institutional variable that can let leaders be leaders by recognizing their common and balanced vulnerability and capabilities, realizing that other international institutions will not advance their shared values, and using or transcending their domestic political capital to create innovative, integrated solutions to large problems, as only leaders can. On the face of it, a two-day summit over three days stuffed with a ceremonial opening dinner and many participants from the O5, Africa and international organizations hardly seemed conducive to this task (Appendix Y). But there were several offsetting forces, both at and behind the scenes.

First, the leaders were all at the same single hotel in an isolated retreat, each just a short stroll away from any colleague he or she wanted to meet. They knew well the O5 leaders who had all come to the summit since 2005, and many of the African leaders and international organizations heads. The dense web of bilaterals before the summit and on-site at Heiligendamm as well as during the summit itself helped. But above all it was Blair, the veteran, who knew all the key players, had a privileged relationship with all of them and knew how to work them to produce once again the great successes of 1998 and 2005. While he was no longer host of the G8 or EU, he worked in close tandem with Merkel who was. Her skill at coalition government, her

understanding of Russia as a former East German and her respect as a physicist for the physical facts on climate change added critical ingredients to the success that came.<sup>3</sup> In the end, Heiligendamm was such a surprising success due to two individuals, Merkel as host and Blair as the great genius of the G8.

## **4. The Future Summits to 2010**

### **A. The Central Challenges**

Taken together, the success of Heiligendamm and 33 years of summitry shows that the G8 has generated increasingly effective and legitimate global governance. But there remain major challenges for the G8 to confront in the years ahead, as it moves to complete the current cycle and defined hosting order in Japan in 2008, Italy in 2009 and Canada in 2010.

These challenges relate to the summit's policy substance on the ongoing defining issues of climate change and African development, and the rapidly rising ones of imbalances, hedge funds, intellectual property and piracy, and investment. They also relate to the summit process, both in reaching out to include others, where Heiligendamm did so well, and reaching down to involve civil society, where it did not. The forthcoming summits could do increasingly well in both substance and process over the next three years.

### **B. Japan 2008: Climate, Africa, Intellectual Property, Russia, China, India, Asia**

The first future summit will be held, under Japan's hosting, at Lake Toya, Hokkaido, in northern Japan from July 7 to 9, 2008 (Appendix Z). Prime Minister Abe has officially declared this to be the "Hokkaido-Toyako Summit."<sup>4</sup> From a very early stage Japan had determined to focus on climate change. By the spring of 2007, African development had been added. Intellectual property and nuclear safety now round out the priority list as it stands in July 2007. This is a highly iterative agenda, reaching back to Heiligendamm and the summits before.

The key theme, signalled by Abe, will be the environment, with climate change at its core. Japan seeks ambitious results on this file. It wants to foster G8 discussions on a "new framework that will ensure participation by the United States and China, the world's largest greenhouse-gas emitters."<sup>5</sup> The summit will also receive the report, mandated at Gleneagles, on how to carry forward the sustainable energy dialogue and the interim report on the Heiligendamm process as specified in 2007.

The second priority, African development, was signalled in April 2007 when, following a meeting in Tokyo between Italy's Prodi and Abe, the latter stated that "as both our countries will

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<sup>3</sup> For example, on the eve of the summit, when the Americans were resisting putting a numerical figure on how warm the world could be allowed to be, Merkel made it clear she would sign no document that did not respect the scientific facts.

<sup>4</sup> Kyodo News (2007). "Japan to Host G8 Summit Next Year from July 7-9: Abe," May 19, <[home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=315544](http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=315544)> (May 2007).

<sup>5</sup> Agence France Presse (2007). "Japan Aims to Lead Post-Kyoto Climate Change Fight," March 20.

be chairing these summits, co-operation is essential. The issues to be taken up at the G8 summit meeting are long-term issues.”<sup>6</sup> Prodi stated that “it is necessary to build a joint policy towards Africa ... Africa is developing economically amid globalisation. We have up until now discussed major environmental and human disasters in Africa at our G8 meetings.”<sup>7</sup> Moreover, on November 18, 2006, a senior official from Germany had announced that it would not focus on debt relief and increased aid to Africa, stating that the 2005 report of the Commission for Africa (CFA) left the issue to be taken up again by the Japanese G8 presidency in 2008. Also in 2008 Japan will hold the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), a gathering of African leaders and their development partners that takes place every five years.

The third priority of intellectual property flows from Japan’s 2007 success in securing recognition of the need to streamline and harmonize the international patent system, and its failure to get its desired agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of counterfeit and pirated products. It will thus build on the 2007 leaders’ statement: “We recognize the need for continued study by national experts of the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to intellectual property right enforcement.”<sup>8</sup> It hopes to move to the treaty stage by the 2008 summit.

Japan’s fourth planned priority is nuclear safety. A May 2007 news report noted that “Japan plans to discuss compiling international safety guidelines for nuclear power plants with other members of the Group of Eight nations, with an eye to reaching agreement at next year’s G8 summit in Hokkaido, government sources said ... The guidelines are expected to include assistance from the G8 nations on techniques for safety inspections and maintenance, as well as stipulating training for local staff and unified regulations on management in order to prevent the transfer or leakage of technologies or nuclear-related materials.”<sup>9</sup> This item repeats the one area of nuclear power that an otherwise divided G8 could agree on in 2006 and 2007. It also responds directly to the deadly nuclear accidents that Japan has suffered from at home (Donnelly 2001).

To produce their summit the Japanese have predictably planned a dense series of lead-up ministerial meetings, with a draft of the schedule unveiled at Heiligendamm on June 6, 2007 (Appendix O). It contains ministerials on justice and the interior, labour and development, as well as energy and the environment and a meeting of the G20 devoted to global warming and clean energy.

The summit itself, at the Windsor Hotel Toya Resort and Spa, provides maximum time for the leaders to be alone together, cut off from the world. The site will showcase a range of Japan’s environmental technologies. The media centre will be in the Rusutsu Resort hotel in the village of Rusutsu, a 30-minute drive from the summit site. No plans for civil society consultation or involvement have been announced.

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<sup>6</sup> Agence France Presse (2007). “Italy, Japan Say G8 to Focus on Africa, Warming”, April 16.

<sup>7</sup> Agence France Presse (2007). “Italy, Japan Say G8 to Focus on Africa, Warming,” April 16.

<sup>8</sup> Eiji Hirose (2007). “G8 Eyes More Flexible Yuan,” *Daily Yomiuri*, June 9.

<sup>9</sup> Kyodo News (2007), “Japan Wants to Discuss Nuclear Plant Safety Guidelines at G8,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, May 20.

## **B. Italy: Heiligendamm Process Renewed? United Nations Reform**

The 2009 Italian-hosted summit will be held on the small Sardinian island of La Maddalena, accessible only by boat. This maintains the tradition of choosing sites in isolated luxury resorts so leaders can be alone together with as much constricted participation as the G8, plus O5 and, presumably, invited African leaders, will allow. With Italy working in tandem with Japan, and long focused on a Africa lying to its immediate south, it was understandable that Prodi signalled his African agenda in April 2007.<sup>10</sup> In addition, the Italian summit will deal with the challenging remit mandate from Heiligendamm of what to do with the Heiligendamm process when its comes to its current end with its final report in 2009.

## **C. Canada 2010: All the Big Deadlines Come Due**

Estimating what Canada's agenda and approach will be for the G8 summit it will host in 2010 is a more difficult task. That summit is still more than three years away. Canada will no doubt be guided substantially by the approach, achievements and unfinished business of its fellow non-UNSC P5 G8 partners that host the preceding three years. Moreover, by 2010 many of the well-known, predictable key leaders who have shaped the 21st-century summits will be gone — notably America's George Bush as of January 2009 and Russia's Vladimir Putin as of 2008, as well as Britain's Tony Blair. Canada's prime minister Stephen Harper, while physically young, could be gone as well, for he currently leads a minority government, has no strong prospects for a majority in the foreseeable future, heads a party that has not governed Canada for most of the post-World War Two years and almost certainly must call a general election before the 2010 summit comes.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, it is not even certain that it will be a G8 summit that Canada will host, for Italy in 2009 could define a post-Heiligendamm process that would make it a G13. All that is certain in 2007 is that Canada will host the summit in 2010, as the G8 decided it would at the last summit hosted by Canada, at Kananaskis in 2002.

Yet there are enough guides to start constructing a reasonable estimate. As the least powerful of the old G7 countries, and one committed to international institutionalism as a distinctive national value, Canada begins three years in advance of its summits to think strategically about how to shape the opportunity that hosting the G8 presents. Ottawa has now started to address the question, in the initial sense of acknowledging that it is time to have it addressed and have an interdepartmental group of senior officials start to discuss what could and should be done. Furthermore, there is considerable continuity in Canada's performance as host and as a summit participant, providing a foundation for judging what Canada's priority themes and preferred emphasis in the built-in agenda could be. Enough is known about defining target dates and high level events on the G8 and international calendar over the next three years to judge how Canada might use its 2010 G8 summit to shape global governance as a whole. And Merkel, Prodi, Sarkozy and even Abe could still be there, with three arriving with their own recent summit legacies to advance and Sarkozy with his first to set up the following year.

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<sup>10</sup> Agence France Presse (2007). "Italy, Japan Say G8 to Focus on Africa, Warming," April 16.

<sup>11</sup> Harper was elected on January 23, 2006, in a country where general elections are usually held every four years. While constitutionally he can extend his minority mandate to five years, until after the spring or summer of 2010, he is unlikely to do so, in part because he favours fixed terms.

Substantively Canada's 2010 agenda could be importantly shaped by the discussion among the leaders in Italy in 2009. But already it is identifying three or four strong candidates of its own. Given the Kananaskis sense of ownership one could well be Africa.

Indeed, the G8 could produce as decade-long continuity on Africa from 2002 to 2010. For a G8 notorious for its "done that, been there" attitude, touching lightly on an issue and then disappearing from it for a while, on Africa the G8 has demonstrated sustained and cumulative concern. Africa is now a regular feature on the G8 agenda in a way that has far exceeded what seemed possible heading into Kananaskis. While not the principal focus of every summit, the summits of 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2007 created a cycle with Africa as a key focus and commitments are reviewed at least every two years. Even in the "off years" there is still enormous attention paid to Africa. At 2004 Sea Island, at least half of the various deliverables touched on Africa and Africa, even though it was not on the host's agenda or invitation list at the start. The momentum has been such that there has been sustained focus, helped by design that the G8 returns regularly to the topic. G8 leaders know there is a review looming, as do their bureaucracies, even if it would not be at that year's summit. As a result the G8 has been able to achieve progress on the commitments in the G8 Africa Action Plan. The deliverables at Sea Island and since are consistent, so even without an explicit link, the bridge is visible.

With the Africa agenda several component issues seem possible as of 2007.

1. **Accountability, Transparency and Good Governance.** Canada's Federal Accountability Act will address concerns about democracy deficit in Canada, which will likely lead to a strong emphasis on accountability elsewhere. Furthermore, Canada is beginning to engage with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Key members of the governing party are interested in the role of parliamentarians in promoting accountability in the developing world, which suggests a more focused return to promoting good governance. Both the current and previous governments focused on accountability, transparency and good governance and will probably continue to do so. The New Partnership on Africa's Development (NEPAD) is useful vehicle for G8 engaging effectively on these issues.

2. **Conflict Resolution in Africa.** Canada's ambassador to the UN Alan Rock went to Abuja in the closing stage of the Darfur negotiations, and Sudan remains a very important issue to Canada under the Harper government. This could mean an initiative on the resolution of specific conflicts in Africa or on the NEPAD commitments on peace and security more directly.

3. **Women.** Much in the NEPAD plan has only been touched on. The Africa Action Plan is diffuse, as it had to be — the dialogue and partnership were too immature at in 2001 to be able to identify one key area for a strong impact. But this might be possible by 2010. One of NEPAD's principal, long-term objectives is to improve the situation of women in all sectors of the continent. It is possible that by 2010 the G8 will be able to give a big push on that front. In African terms that would be dramatic: most of the women do the work but without recognition. Recognition by the G8 would be electric.

**4. Private Sector in Development.** The role of the private sector in development is an issue than can produce traction, although there are problems on innovation. But the surface of the entrepreneurship report and the private sector's role in development has only just been scratched. With Canada's current government and its interest in the private sector there could be a match.

**5. Education.** In 2002 a concerted effort on knowledge and learning could not be packaged. By 2010, Canada could build on prior G8 work in a focused way, such as strengthening universities, digital opportunities and, again, innovation.

**6. Health.** Canada's expenditure on health has been important, with a promised 8% increase delivered. More could be pledged in 2010 for health systems and HIV/AIDS, polio and tuberculosis.

Apart from Africa, which also builds on Canada's longstanding north-south emphasis at summits, Canada's G8 tradition combines with the priorities of Merkel, Abe and Prodi to suggest the environment, energy and climate change and political-security issues such as conflict prevention.

Equally important, 2010 is the key deadline on the G8 and international calendar for many commitments and conferences that will be difficult to duck. Most significantly, by then the G8 must have doubled aid and delivered access to all who need affordable treatment for HIV/AIDS. That year is also the mid point of the 2008–12 Kyoto commitment conclusion period, the start of the third and final period for reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the time when the question of what to do about the overdue Doha trade negotiations must be faced. On Canada's own calendar of plurilateral summit institutions to host and big due dates, its 2010 G8 will culminate a sequence that runs as follows:

- 2008, October 17–19 Francophonie Summit, Quebec City
- 2009, February Canada's current commitment in Afghanistan ends
- 2010 Canada hosts the Security and Prosperity Partnership summit for the second time
- 2010, February 12–28 Winter Olympics at Whistler

Most broadly, there are several political issues that will still not be resolved. These could include genocide and ethnic cleansing and partition in Iraq; the war in Afghanistan, as well as development, democracy, drugs and corruption there; and Iran, which by then, based on a three-year estimate, will be ready to produce nuclear weapons. Canada will also likely insist on addressing the issue of Haiti.

This leaves the economic agenda, which — even more — cannot be dealt with without the greater participation of the O5. While the Heiligendamm process will have formally ended the year before, it could well be left to Canada's 2010 summit to give birth to a G13, or more. Some doubt that Japan has the capacity and desire to advance the process at its summit in 2008. Japan needs to be convinced about China. While Japan is comfortable with China being part of the O5, the Japanese want to drive the limo and have Hu on the bus. Democratic Japan remains reluctant to admit to "its" G8 a neighbouring rival communist China that keeps Japan out of its UNSC P5.

Nor are the Italians likely to drive the change. But Canada could do so in 2010. This would need a maturation of the view, and would require much understanding and a willingness to take risks.

In 2010, it would be appropriate and even necessary to review the results of the 2002 Kananaskis Summit. Kananaskis advanced outreach. At the 2000 Okinawa Summit the outreach effort was done in Tokyo so as not to “pollute” the intimacy of the G8. It was not until two summits later, at Kananaskis, that outreach happened at the summit itself. This was innovative. At Kananaskis the G8 leaders spent 23% of their time with the outreach partners; at Evian in 2003, 30%; and at Gleneagles in 2005 50%. There was thus substantial advance within one cycle of meetings.

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## **Appendix A: Participating Country Leaders at the G8 Summit**

### **Okinawa 2000 (4):**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

### **Genoa 2001 (4):**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

### **Kananaskis 2002 (4):**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

### **Evian 2003 (13):**

Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
H.M. King Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Chair of the Group of 77  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States  
Pascal Couchepin, President of the Swiss Confederation  
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China  
Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia  
Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of the Republic of India

### **Sea Island 2004 (12):**

Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria  
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, King of Bahrain  
Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, President of Iraq  
Abdallah II, King of Jordan  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey  
Ali Abdallah Salih, President of Yemen  
John Agyekum Kufuor, President of Ghana  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, President of South Africa  
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda

### **Gleneagles 2005 (11):**

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria  
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China  
Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
John Agyekum Kufour, President of the Republic of Ghana

Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India  
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States  
Olusegun Obasanjo GCB, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Benjamin William Mpkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania

**St. Petersburg 2006 (5):**

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil  
Hu Jintau, President of the People's Republic of China  
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India

**Heligendamm 2007 (10):**

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil  
Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, Mexico  
Hu Jintau, China  
Thabo Mbeki, South Africa  
Manmohan Singh, India  
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, Egypt  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria  
Umaru Yar'Adua, Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal  
John A. Kufuor, Ghana

## **Appendix B: International Organizations at the G8 Summit**

### **1989 Paris (4):**

Non-Aligned Movement: Presidents Abdou Diouf, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, Carlos Andres Perez and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi

### **1993 Tokyo (1):**

Non-Aligned Movement: President Soeharto of the Republic of Indonesia, Chairman

### **1996 Lyon (4):**

United Nations: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General  
International Monetary Fund: Michel Camdessus, Managing Director  
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President  
World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General

### **2001 Genoa (4):**

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General  
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President  
World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General  
World Health Organization: Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General

### **2002 Kananaskis (1):**

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General

### **2003 Evian (4):**

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General  
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President  
International Monetary Fund: Horst Köhler, Managing Director  
World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General

### **2005 Gleneagles (6):**

Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair  
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director  
International Monetary Fund: Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, Managing Director  
United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General  
World Bank: Paul Wolfowitz, President  
World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General

### **2006 St. Petersburg (7):**

Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair  
CIS: Nursultan Nazarbayev, Chairman-in-office  
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director  
International Atomic Energy Agency: Mohammed El Baradei, Director-General  
UNESCO: Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General  
World Health Organization: Dr. Anders Nordström, Acting Director-General  
United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General

### **2007 Heiligendamm (6):**

United Nations: Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General  
International Monetary Fund: Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, Managing Director  
World Bank Group:  
OECD: Angel Gurría, Secretary-General  
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director  
African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chairperson of the Commission

## Appendix C: G7/8 Ministerial Level Bodies, 1975-2008

1975	Foreign (at Summit, pre-Summit as of 1998)
1975	Finance (at Summit, pre-Summit as of 1998)
1981	Trade Quadrilateral, May 1993, June 1993, June 1993, May 1995, October 1995, April 1996, September 1996, April/May 1997, May 1999
1984	Foreign (Stand-Alone, Annual UNGA Dinner)
1986	Finance (G7 Stand Alone)
1992	Environment, Spring 1992, June 1992, March 1994, April/May 1995, May 1996, May 1997, April 1998, March 1999, April 2000, March 2001, October 2001, April 2002, April 2003, February 2005, March 2005, March 2005, November 2005, October 2006, March 2007, May 2008
1994	Employment, 1996, 1997, 1998
1995	Information, 1996
1995	Terrorism, 1996, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1998, 1999, 1999, 2001, 2001, 2002, 2003, October 2004
1997	Crime, 1999, 2000
1997	Justice and Interior, December 1997, February 2001, May 2002, May 2003, May 2004, October 2004, June 2005, November 2005, June 2006, May 2007, June 2008
1998	Energy: March 1998, May 2002, April 2003, March 2005, November 2005, March 2006, June 2008
1999	Labour: February 1999, November 2000, April 2002, December 2003, March 2005, October 2006, May 2007, May 2008
2000	Education: April 2000, June 2006
2001	Health: November 2001, March 2002, November 2003
2002	Development: September 2002, April 2003, March 2005, March 2007, April 2008

Note: By date of first meeting. Ministerial meetings held more than once, either as part of or apart from the annual Summit meeting, and usually attended by the ministers themselves. Some meetings have non-G8 members in attendance. Some meetings have ministers in addition to those in the core portfolio attend.

### G7/8 Ad Hoc Ministerial Meetings

1993	Russian Financial Assistance
1994	Ukraine Financial Assistance
1997	Small and Medium Enterprise
1998	Finance and Foreign Ministers
1998	Foreign Ministers on Nuclear Proliferation (Summer)
1999	Foreign Ministers on Conflict Prevention (December)
2000	Education Ministers (April 2000, Japan)
2002	Research Ministers (June 2002, Moscow)
2006	Health Ministers (April 2006, Moscow)
2006	Transport Ministers (January 2006, Tokyo)

Note: Ministerial meetings held only once, or in a particular configuration of combined ministers, apart from the annual Summit meeting. Some meetings have non-G8 members in attendance. If the Ministerial configuration meets more than once, it is coded as a regular institution rather than an ad hoc meeting.

## Appendix D: G7/8 Official Level Bodies

### First Cycle (8)

- 1975 London Nuclear Suppliers Group
- 1977 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group
- 1979 High Level Group on Energy Conservation and Alternative Energy
- 1979 International Energy Technology Group
- 1979 High Level Group to Review Oil Import Reduction Progress
- 1980 International Team to Promote Collaboration on Specific Projects on Energy Technology
- 1980 High Level Group to Review Result on Energy
- 1981 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

### Second Cycle (9)

- 1982 Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment
- 1982 Consultations and Coordination on East-West Relations
- 1982 Representatives to control exports of strategic goods
- 1982 Procedures for multilateral surveillance of economic performance
- 1985 Expert Group for Foreign Ministers
- 1985 Expert Group on Desertification and Dry Zone Grains
- 1985 Expert Group on Environmental Measurement
- 1986 Group of Experts on Terrorism
- 1987 International Ethics Committee on AIDS.

### Third Cycle (14)

- 1989 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (with others, secretariat from OECD)
- 1989 International Ethics Committee on AIDS
- 1990 Chemical Action Task Force, 1990-1992 (with others)
- 1990 Task Force to Study the State of the Soviet Economy
- (1990) Permanent Working Group on Assistance to Russia)
- 1990 Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group
- 1992 Nuclear Safety Working Group
- 1992 Group of Experts on the Prevention and Treatment of AIDS
- 1993 Support Implementation Group (SIG)
- 1993 G8 Non-Proliferation Experts Group
- 1995 Counter-Terrorism Experts Group
- 1995 G7/P8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Lyon Group)
- 1995 GIP National Co-ordinators
- 1995 Development Committee Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks

### Fourth Cycle (16)

- 1996 Nuclear Safety Working Group
- 1996 Lyon Group
- 1997 Expert Group on Financial Crime
- 1997 Subgroup on High Tech Crime (of the Lyon Group)
- 1997 Officials Group on Forests
- 2000 Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting (CPOM)
- 2000 Renewable Energy Task Force
- 2000 Digital Opportunities Task Force (Dot-Force)
- 2000 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis
- 2001 G8 Task Force on Education
- 2001 Personal Representatives for Africa (APR)
- 2002 Energy Officials Follow-up Process
- 2002 G8 Global Partnership Review Mechanism
- 2002 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group
- 2002 G8 Experts on Transport Security

2002 Global Health Security Laboratory Network

**Fifth Cycle (37)**

2003 High Level Working Group on Biometrics  
2003 Counter-Terrorism Action Group  
2003 Radioactive Sources Working Group  
2003 Senior Officials for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development  
2003 G8 Enlarged Dialogue Meeting  
2003 Forum for the Partnership with Africa, November 10, 2003  
2003 Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) Laboratory Network  
2003 Technical Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness  
2004 Global Partnership Senior Officials Group (GPSOG), January 2004  
2004 Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)  
2004 Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise  
2004 Microfinance Consultative Group  
2004 Best Practises Microfinance Training Centre  
2004 Democracy Assistance Dialogue  
2004 Task Force on Investment  
2004 G8 Expert-Level Meetings on Peace Support in Africa  
2004 Friends of the Convention on Corruption  
2004 G8 Accelerated Response Teams on Corruption  
2004 International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)  
2004 IPHE Implementation-Liaison Committee  
2004 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)  
2004 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership ((REEEP)  
2004 Generation IV International Forum (GIF)  
2004 Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)  
2005 Dialogue on Sustainable Energy  
2005 Working Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms  
2005 Experts on IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting  
2005 Global Bioenergy Partnership  
2005 African Dialogue Follow-up Mechanism (Africa, paragraph 33)  
2006 G8 expert group to develop criteria and procedures for evaluating educational outcomes and qualifications  
2006 G8 expert group on the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to IPR enforcement  
2006 G8 expert, UN and other international organization group on the feasibility of implementing stabilization and reconstruction measures  
2006 G8 expert group on securing energy infrastructure  
2007 Structured High Level Dialogue with major emerging economies (Heiligendamm process)  
2007 Sustainable Buildings Network with G8 and major emerging economies  
2007 Regional Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Fund  
2007 International Working Group on Land Transport Security composed of G8 and non-G8 countries

Note: Excludes one-off meeting or conferences

**Appendix E: Legislative, Judiciary and Advisory Involvement**  
To come

**Appendix F: Civil Society**  
To come

## **Appendix G: Protestors and Police (Number of Demonstrators and Security)**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Demonstrators</b>	<b>Security Personnel</b>
2007	100,000	17,100
2006	300-600	
2005	100,000	10,000
2004	500	20,000
2003	100,000	15,000
2002	2,000-3,000	6,800
2001	100,000-250,000	18,700
2000	70,000	20,000

## Appendix H: Media

<b>Year</b>	<b>Accredited</b>	<b>Attending</b>
2007	4,700	
2006	3,107	
2005	2,051	2,100
2004	3,100	1,492
2003	3,300	
2002	2,000-2,500	
2001	6,000	
2000	10,000	
1999		
1998	3,000	
1997		
1996		
1995	2,000-2,100	
1994		
1993	1,900	
1992		
1991	4,000	
1990	3,500-5,000	
1989		
1988	5,000	
1987	2,300	
1986		
1985		
1984	3,000	
1983	4,000	
1982	1,000	
1981	1,300	
1980		
1979		
1978	1,000	
1976		
1975	400	

## Appendix I: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2006

Year	Bayne Grade	Domestic political management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Development of global governance
		% mem	Ave # of refs	# of Days	# of State-ments	# of Words	# of references to core values	# of Commit-ments	Compliance Score	# of Bodies Created Min/Off
1975	A-			3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1
1976	D			2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0
1977	B-			2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1
1978	A			2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0
1979	B+			2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	0/2
1980	C+			2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1
1981	C			2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0
1982	C			3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3
1983	B			3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0
1984	C-			3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0
1985	E			3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2
1986	B+			3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1
1987	D			3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2
1988	C-			3	3	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0
1989	B+			3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1
1990	D			3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3
1991	B-			3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0
1992	D			3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1
1993	C+			3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2
1994	C			3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0
1995	B+			3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2
1996	B	40%	1	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3
1997	C-	40%	1	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3
1998	B+	25%	1	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0
1999	B+	80%	1.7	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5
2000	B	40%	6.5	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4
2001	B	33%	1.5	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	1/2
2002	B+	17%	1	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8
2003	C	40%	2.5	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5
2004	C+	33%	1	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15
2005	A-	40%	1	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5
2006		38.8%	1.8	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4
2007				3	8	25,857	651	329		0/4
Ave. all	B-	40%	1	2.9	5.9	9,283	32.9	90.4	44.7	0.3/2.4
Av. cycle 1	B-			2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.5	0.14/0.71
Av. Cycle 2	C-			3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.4	0.29/1.14
Av. Cycle 3	C+			3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.5	0.58/1.29
Av. Cycle 4	B	29.3%	2	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	40.7	0.58/3.57
Av. Cycle 5	B-	37.7%	1.5	3	15.3	26,849	177	262	58.0	0.00/7.4

Notes:

\*Bayne Grade: the 2005 grade of A- is a confirmed grade.

\*Domestic Political Management: % Mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year. Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year.

\*Directional: number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or Chair's Summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.

\*Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis.

Compliance scores from 1996 to 2005 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments.

## Appendix J: The Host's Agenda

### The 2007 G8 German Agenda (as of October 18, 2006) (Source: "Focuses of the German G8 presidency")

*Themes: Growth and Responsibility:* "living up to G8 responsibility to help create stable and reliable conditions for the global economy as well as at strengthening G8 commitment to assisting disadvantaged segments of the world population."

#### A. Shaping Globalization: Investment, Innovation, Sustainability

Economic policy agenda - issues of fundamental importance for stability in global trade and financial relations.

**1. Global Imbalances.** Renewed impetus in discussing strategies aimed at **reducing global imbalances** (current account deficit in the United States, insufficient growth in Europe and Japan, growing foreign exchange reserves in Asia).

**2. Financial Stability and Transparency.** Discussion of measures aimed at improving **systemic stability and transparency of financial markets**.

**3. Investment Freedom and Conditions.** G8 commitment to **freedom of investment** in industrial and emerging countries. Addressing of global **investment conditions**. Discussion of the social dimension of globalization.

**4. Innovation and Piracy.** Dialogue on the central importance of **innovation** in knowledge-based societies and the need to strengthen the **protection of innovations against product and trademark piracy**.

**5. Sustainable Resource Use.** Challenges posed by the need for **sustainable use of resources**. Key importance will be attributed to the subject of **energy efficiency**. Global efforts to prevent **climate change** and the Kyoto Process will play an important role.

#### B. Helping Africa Develop: Good Governance, Sustainable Investment, Peace Andsecurity

Urgent problems in Africa relating to economic development, poverty reduction, and the fight against HIV/AIDS. An expansion of G8 relations with Africa in the form of a **partnership for reform**. A new policy approach is needed for Europe's neighboring continent. It is not a "lost cause". A positive message expressing confidence in Africa's future. Economic growth and G8 responsibility are seen as key factors for development in Africa.

**1. Health Systems and AIDS.** Special importance attaches to the need to **strengthen African health care systems**, particularly in connection with the **fight against HIV/AIDS**.

**2. Private Investment.** The African countries need to develop structures that will encourage private investment, i.e. more democracy, less corruption, more self-responsibility, and more resource sovereignty.

**3. Peace and Security.**

#### C. Outreach Participation

**Africa.** Representatives of African countries that pursue these goals will be invited to take part in the summit. Plus Five. **Cooperation with emerging countries.** As at earlier G8 summits, there will be an outreach dialogue with emerging countries, without whose help it will not be possible to solve many of the problems being faced in the global economy. Germany will extend invitations to the five "outreach countries" (China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa) to attend the summit. A dialogue is to be initiated with the emerging countries to address specific issues. The unity of the G8 as a group based on shared values is to be preserved in this context.

## **Appendix K: Preparatory Process 2007: List of Ministerial, Sherpa and FASS Meetings**

### **Sherpa Meetings:**

January 19-20 Sherpa 1  
February (late) Sherpa 2  
May 4 Special sherpa meeting with O5 on climate, Berlin  
June 5 Special sherpa meeting  
June 6 (evening) Special sherpa meeting, Heiligendamm

### **Ministerial Meetings:**

January 26-27 G8 Finance deputies  
February 10-11 Finance  
March 15-16 Energy  
April 21 G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors  
April 28 Health (not the Global Health Security Initiative)  
June 1-2 Education  
June 9-10 Finance  
June 15-16 Justice and Home Affairs  
June 29 Foreign Affairs  
October 9-10 Labour and Employment  
(UNGA Foreign Ministers)

## Appendix L: Bilateral Summitry 2006-2007

### 2006:

050718 Singh visits Bush in Washington (India, outreach)  
050908 Blair visits Singh in Udaipur (India, outreach)  
051116 Bush visits Koizumi in Kyoto  
051118 Bush meets Putin in Busan, South Korea (margins of APEC meeting)  
051120 Bush visits Hu in Beijing (China, outreach)  
051121 Putin visits Koizumi in Japan  
051124 Merkel visits Blair in London  
051127 Blair visits Strasbourg for EU debate  
060113 Merkel visits Bush in Washington  
060228 Berlusconi visits Bush in Washington  
060303 Bush visits Singh in New Delhi (India, outreach)  
060309 Lula visits Blair in London (Brazil, outreach)  
060330-31 Harper meets Bush and Fox in Cancun (Mexico, outreach)  
060420 Hu visits Bush in Washington (China, outreach)  
060424 President of the EC visits Koizumi in Tokyo for Japan-EU summit  
060525-26 Blair visits Bush in Washington  
060513 Prodi visits Chirac in Paris  
060614 Prodi visits Merkel in Germany  
060620 Prodi visits Putin in Moscow  
060621 Bush visits Vienna for US-EU summit  
060623 Merkel visits Wen Jiabao (Prime Minister) in Beijing (China, outreach)  
060628 Koizumi visits Harper in Ottawa  
060629 Koizumi visits Bush in Washington  
060706 Harper visits Bush in Washington  
060713-14 Bush visits Merkel in Stralsund, Germany

### 2007:

to come

\* The 2006 outreach countries are Brazil, India, China, Mexico, South Africa and Kazakhstan (chair of CIS)

## Appendix M: 2006 St. Petersburg Final Compliance Scores by Issue

No.	Issue Area	CAD	FRA	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	USA	EU	Issue Average
1	Health (Global Fund)	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.56
2	Health (Tuberculosis)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.22
3	Health (Polio)	1	0	1	-1	0	1	1	1	0	0.44
4	Energy (Oil and Energy Reserve Data Collection)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
5	Energy Intensity	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.33
6	Surface Transport	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.44
7	Renewable Energy	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.89
8	Climate Change	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
9	Education (Academic Mobility)	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.44
10	Education (Qualification Systems)	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.33
11	Education (Gender Disparities)	1	1	0	-1	0	0	1	0	0	0.22
12	Africa (Security)	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0.44
13	Africa (Debt Relief)	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.89
14	Transnational Crime and Corruption	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
15	Intellectual Property Rights	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	N/A	0.13
16	Trade (Export Subsidies, Agriculture)	0	-1	1	-1	1	0	1	0	0	0.11
17	Counter-terrorism (Energy)	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.56
18	Stabilization and Reconstruction (UN)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
19	Global Partnership (Non-Proliferation)	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	0.56
20	Middle East (Lebanon)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
<b>Country Average:</b>		<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.40</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.60</b>	<b>0.58</b>	
<b>All Country Average:</b>											<b>0.47</b>
<b>All Issue Average:</b>											<b>0.47</b>
<b>2006 Final Compliance Average</b>											<b>0.47</b>
<b>2006 Interim Compliance Average:</b>		<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>-0.10</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>0.55</b>	<b>0.35</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>0.34</b>
<b>2005 Final Compliance:</b>		0.81	0.57	0.88	0.29	0.52	0.14	0.81	0.95	0.89	0.65
<b>2005 Interim Compliance:</b>		0.52	0.48	0.33	0.43	0.52	-0.14	0.71	0.67	0.75	0.47

Indicates increase since 2006 interim  
 Indicates decrease since 2006 interim

## Appendix N: 2007 Heiligendamm Summit Performance Assessment

### Country Assessments

Canada	A-
France	A-
Germany	A-
Italy	B+
Japan	A-
Russia	B
United Kingdom	A-
United States	B-
<u>European Union</u>	<u>B+</u>
Country average	B

### Issue Assessments


Climate change	B+
Balanced growth and global stability	B
Supporting innovation	A-
Freedom of investment	
Responsibility for raw materials	B+
Africa development	
Africa peace and security	B+
Global health	A-
Regional security	C+
Middle East	B-
Arms proliferation	B
<u>Terrorism</u>	<u>B</u>
Issue average	B

Source: G8 Research Group <[www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/index.html#2007](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/index.html#2007)>.





## Appendix P: Balance of Tone in G8 Media Coverage



## Appendix Q: 2007 Heiligendamm Summit Review of Democratic Principles

From “Growth and Responsibility in the World Economic,” released June 8, 2007.

<b>Market</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>World Economy</b>
Market	13	13
Transparency	24	24
Regulation	3	3
Competition	0	0
Legality	7	7
Contracts	1	1
Openness	15	15
Corruption	33	33
Standards	19	19
Governance	13	13
Rule of Law	5	5
Information	13	13
Reporting	4	4
Fairness	3	3
Ethics	0	0
Access	0	0
Democracy	5	5
Integration	2	2
Mobility	0	0
Discrimination	1	1
Property rights	16	16
Participation	71	71
Total	248	248

Compiled by Lindsay Doyle.

## Appendix R: 2007 Heiligendamm Summit Commitments

World economy	144
Growth and stability	1
Hedge funds	1
Investment	13
Innovation	8
Climate and energy	94
Corruption	18
Heiligendamm process	9
Africa	123
General	4
Good governance	25
Investment	32
Peace and security	20
Health	42
Nonproliferation	28
Sudan/Darfur	4
Counter-Terrorism	27
Trade	2
Global Partnership/Weapons of Mass Destruction	2
United Nations Counter-Terrorism	2

Compiled by Laura Sunderland and John Kirton.

## Appendix S: Money (Re) Mobilized, 2007

070530	30 b	Bush announces US\$30 b to combat AIDS for 2008-2013 (in addition to its \$15b since 2003 that expires in 2008)
070531	01 b	Merkel tell Bild German aid spending will rise by E750 in 2008. This is to influence summit, and is a 14% rise, the biggest of any department, and on top of E4.5 bil in 2007.
070531	03 b	Wieczorek-Zeul says similar 759 mil additions would happen in 2009-2001 for a total boost of E3 bil
070531	0.53 b	Barroso says EU will give a further E100 m in 2007 to GFATM and E300 m for 2008-2010.

Total to Date: US\$34.53 billion

To Come:

000000	?	Germany expects to increase aid by a further E350 m/yr from 2009 onwards from carbon credit auctions for AIDS in Africa
070606-8	?	Abe to announce new fund to help developing countries tackle climate change (energy savings, solar, forest conservation) and ask others to give for 2008
070606-8	?	Abe considering humanitarian aid to help developing countries with climate adaptation.

Euro = 1.343 US\$

Money (re) Mobilized is calculated the same way as, and is thus comparable to, the “Money Mobilized” used in 2006 and 2005. The “(Re)” refers to the fact that some of the additional 2007 funding will counted as part of and applied to the doubling of ODA by 2010 pledged in 2005.

Lead Researcher: Catherine Kunz

## Appendix T: Global Energy Vulnerability: World Energy Prices of Light Sweet Crude Oil

Date	US\$
74-00-00	9.07 (annual average)
81-00-00	35.24 (annual average)
90-10-12	41.15 (record)
91-01-16	32.00
99-12-31	12.00
00-06-30	35.00+
02-12-00	under 30.00
03-03-10	38.00
04-05-04	38.98
04-05-05	39.57
04-05-07	40.00+
04-05-13	41.10
04-05-15	41.38
04-05-17	41.55
04-05-25	41.72
04-05-31	40.50
04-06-01	42.33
04-07-02	39.86
04-08-02	43.83
04-09-01	43.89
04-10-01	50.16
04-11-01	50.10
05-04-01	57.26
05-07-01	59.11
05-08-01	61.51
05-09-01	69.50
05-10-03	65.36
05-11-01	59.85
05-12-01	58.46
06-01-03	63.11
06-02-01	66.61
06-03-24	56.63
06-05-26	63.49
06-06-16	62.66
06-03-03	55.98
06-04-07	61.27
06-05-05	66.94
06-06-02	64.67
06-07-07	67.74
06-08-04	69.79
06-09-01	64.49
06-10-06	54.92
06-11-03	53.32
06-12-01	56.13
07-01-05	54.63
07-02-02	52.11
07-03-02	57.83
07-04-06	64.93
07-05-04	63.40
<b>07-06-01</b>	<b>65.37</b>
07-07-06	69.91

**Source:** Energy Information Administration, “All Countries Spot Price FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Volume (Dollars per Barrel),” Accessed December 14, 2006, <http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wtotworldw.htm>

**Notes:** Daily closing price for near-month settlement price for light sweet crude oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange, closing price in U.S. dollars. 2005 data: The West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Brent numbers are published on the United States Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration’s website. Brent Crude is a type of oil sourced from the North Sea and forms a benchmark for the price of other crude oils from Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.

Data from March 2006 onwards reflects “All Countries Spot Price FOB Weighted by Estimated Export Volume (Dollars per Barrel),” not the cost on the New York Mercantile Exchange.  
The oil price before the annual summit is in bold.

## Appendix U: Global Terrorism Vulnerability

### Major Shocks from Terrorism to G8 Countries and Citizens Abroad

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of Attacks</b>	<b>Number of Injuries</b>	<b>Number of Deaths</b>
1983	1	175	370
1985	1		329
1988	1		28
1992	1		2
1993	2	1,073	24
1994	1		
1995	2	6,060	19
1996	1	200	19
1998	1	4,085	225
1999	1		300+
2000	1	39	17
2001	2	3,019	2,997
2002	5	229	488
2003	2	100+	62
2004	20	2,628+	721+
2005	22	836+	152+
2006 Q1	13	41	8

Note: Deadly attacks from terrorists of global (or local) reach on territory of G8 members (including the European Union) or on G8 nationals (i.e., citizens of G8/EU countries) anywhere in the world. Deadly = death or injury.

## Appendix V: Confirmed Cases (Cumulative) of H5N1 Avian Influenza<sup>a</sup>

	1996-2003	2003-2004	2004-Q1 <sup>b</sup>	2004-Q2 <sup>c</sup>	2005-Q1 <sup>b</sup>	2005-Q2 <sup>c</sup>	Jan 2006	Feb 2006	Mar 2006	Apr 2006	May 2006	Total human cases: deaths <sup>d</sup>
Other Asia												
Thailand		Y <sup>c</sup> :0:0	Y:12:8	Y <sup>t</sup> :17:12 <sup>g</sup>	Y:0:0	Y:22:14						22:14
Vietnam			Y:23:16	Y:27:20	Y:33:20	Y:66:22						66:22
Cambodia			Y:0:0	Y:0:0	Y:4:4				Y:1:1	Y:6:6		6:6
Lao PDR			Y:0:0	Y:0:0								0
Malaysia				Y:0:0								0
Mongolia						Y:0:0						0
Other Europe												
Kazakhstan						Y:0:0						0
Romania						Y:0:0						0
Croatia						Y:0:0						0
Turkey						Y:0:0	Y:21:4					21:4
Azerbaijan								Y:0:0	Y:7:5	Y:8:5		8:5
Bulgaria								Y:0:0				0
Slovenia								Y:0:0				0
G12												
Hong Kong	Y:18:6	0:20:7										20:7
China	Y:0:0		Y:0:0	Y:0:0	Y:0:0	Y:7:3	Y:10:7	Y:14:8	Y:16:11	Y:18:12		18:12
South Korea		Y:0:0										0
Indonesia			Y:0:0	Y:0:0		Y:16:11	Y:19:14	Y:27:20	Y:29:22	Y:32:24	Y:48:36	48:36
India								Y:0:0				0
G8								Y <sup>h</sup> :0:0	Y <sup>i</sup>			0
Japan			Y:0:0									0
Russia						Y:0:0						0
UK						Y <sup>j</sup> :0:0						0
Canada						Y <sup>k</sup> :0:0						0
Italy								Y:0:0				0
Germany								Y <sup>l</sup> :0:0	Y <sup>m</sup>			0
France								Y:0:0				0
EU												
Brussels				Y <sup>n</sup> :0:0								0
Greece								Y:0:0				0
Austria								Y:0:0				0
Sweden									Y:0:0			0
<b>Middle East</b>												
Iraq							N:1:1	Y:2:2				2:2
Iran								Y:0:0				0
Egypt								Y:0:0	Y:5:2	Y:12:4	Y:14:6	14:6
Afghanistan									Y:0:0			0
<b>Africa</b>												
Nigeria								Y:0:0	Y			0
Niger								Y:0:0				0
Djibouti											Y:1:0	0
<b>TOTAL</b>												225:114

Notes:

Mortality rate from H5N1 cases in humans is approximately 46%.

- a. Ratio used is birds infected : human cases : human deaths. Y = yes, a poultry outbreak has occurred; N = no.
- b. Q1 = January – June.
- c. Q2 = July – December.
- d. Total human cases : deaths represents all cases confirmed by laboratory tests and does not account for all “suspected” or “probable” human H5N1 infections.
- e. First cases of large mammal (non-human) infection in leopards and tigers fed on chickens.
- f. Outbreak and death in 147 tigers in Thai zoo.
- g. First case of human-to-human transmission.
- h. H5N1 confirmed in Germany in both poultry and three domestic cats (Baltic island of Ruegen).
- i. H5N1 confirmed in Germany in a second mammalian species, a stone marten, in the same area where the infected domestic cats were located (Ruegen).
- j. H5N1 confirmed in imported parrot, which was held in quarantine and died.
- k. Two outbreaks in birds in Canada (in Manitoba and British Columbia); H5N1 virus confirmed but not the same virulent strain as in Asia. <[www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/11/20/avian-flu051120.html](http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/11/20/avian-flu051120.html)>.
- l. H5N1 confirmed in Germany in both poultry and three domestic cats (Ruegen).
- m. H5N1 confirmed in Germany in a second mammalian species, a stone marten, in the same area where the infected domestic cats were located (Ruegen).
- n. Two eagles imported (illegally) into Brussels from Thailand infected with H5N1.


## Appendix W: Oil, Gold and Currency Price Watch 2006–2007

Date	Oil (CL)	Gold (Comex)	US/C	US/Euro	US/BP	Yen/US
060605	72.6	648.7	0.9081	1.2953	1.8786	111.71
060606	72.5	634.7	0.8967	1.2827	1.8607	113.30
060626	71.8	587.7	0.8898	1.2553	1.8187	116.41
060627	71.92	584.4	0.8918	1.2588	1.8235	116.26
060628	72.19	581.0	0.8893	1.2531	1.8158	116.42
060629	73.52	588.9	0.8961	1.2532	1.8107	116.18
060630	73.93	616.0	0.8969	1.2777	1.8488	114.51
060703		623.0	Bank Holiday			
070704		622.0	0.9041	1.2797	1.8462	114.55
060705	75.19	629.7	0.8995	1.2726	1.8340	115.67
060706	74.14	636.3	0.8995	1.2756	1.8374	115.18
060707	74.09	634.8	0.8981	1.2819	1.8513	113.98
060810	74	646.0	0.8879	1.2765	1.8887	115.59
061013	58.57	592.7	0.8797	1.2501	1.8549	119.80
061106	60.02	627.9	0.8855	1.2714	1.8966	118.40
061107	58.93	627.7	0.8868	1.2806	1.9098	117.44
061110		630.1	0.8844	1.2861	1.9122	117.49
061120	58.8	622.1	0.8716	1.2809	1.8963	118.17
061122	59.24	635.4	0.8762	1.2927	1.9144	116.63
061128	60.99	643.7	0.8841	1.3162	1.9478	116.15
061130	63.13	652.9	0.8760	1.3260	1.9690	115.56
061201	63.43	650.6	0.8737	1.3316	1.9795	115.35
061205	62.51	630.6	0.8759	1.3327	1.9745	114.99
070305	60.4		0.8467	1.3094	1.9234	116.02
070312	58.91		0.8553	1.3187	1.9293	117.52
070319	56.59	653.1	0.8509	1.3298	1.9461	117.52
070326	62.91	663.9	0.8601	1.3335	1.9692	117.85
070327	62.93	668.8	0.8633	1.3356	1.9663	117.81
070330	65.87	669.0	0.8674	1.3373	1.9687	117.57
070402	65.94	671.5	0.8650	1.3373	1.9785	117.71
070409	61.51	676.9	0.8679	1.3366	1.9608	119.29
070410	61.89	681.5	0.8711	1.3438	1.9718	119.06
070411	62.01	681.7	0.8734	1.3436	1.9786	119.37
070412	63.85	679.7	0.8800	1.3484	1.9768	119.01
070413	63.63	689.9	0.8787	1.3518	1.9828	119.26
070416	63.61	694.5	0.8842	1.3549	1.9905	119.85
070417	63.1	692.5	0.8854	1.3568	2.0060	118.96
070418	63.13	693.3	0.8859	1.3573	2.0041	118.27
070419	61.83	688.3	0.8861	1.3605	2.0027	118.38
070420	63.38	695.8	0.8907	1.3601	2.0045	118.83
070423	65.89	694.2	0.8907	1.3579	2.0015	118.49
070424	64.58	687.7	0.8906	1.3622	2.0027	118.52


070425	65.84	687.4	0.8973	1.3646	2.0040	118.64
070426	65.06	678.0	0.8927	1.3590	1.9903	119.51
070427	66.46	681.8	0.8966	1.3625	1.9982	119.60
070430	65.71	683.5	0.9036	1.3659	1.9999	119.44
060501	64.4	677.3	0.9018	1.3600	1.9994	119.79
070502	63.68	675.1	0.9020	1.3596	1.9909	120.05
070503	63.19	684.4	0.9033	1.3565	1.9878	120.34
070504	61.93	689.7	0.9034	1.3587	1.9931	120.17
070507			0.9071	1.3616	1.9944	119.97
070508	62.26	687.4	0.9051	1.3532	1.9900	119.89
070509	61.55	682.5	0.9038	1.3549	1.9964	119.81
070510			0.9031	1.3512	1.9831	120.38
070511			0.8981	1.3519	1.9823	120.20
070514	62.46	670.1	0.9034	1.3543	1.9801	120.35
070515	63.17	674.5	0.9110	1.3603	1.9861	120.23
070516	62.55	661.5	0.9067	1.3521	1.9775	120.73
070517	65.86	657.2	0.9110	1.3494	1.9747	121.31
070518	64.94	662.0	0.9188	1.3510	1.9755	121.11
070521	66.27	663.8	Bank Holiday			
070522	64.97	659.9	0.9212	1.3463	1.9768	121.47
070523	65.77	662.6	0.9244	1.3482	1.9880	121.52
070524	64.18	653.3	0.9224	1.3429	1.9851	121.47
070525	65.2	655.3	0.9263	1.3451	1.9843	121.73
070528	64.55	655.3	0.9258	1.3453	1.9831	121.66
070529	63.15	657.2	0.9329	1.3483	1.9812	121.79
070530	63.49	653.1	0.9299	1.3418	1.9745	121.49
070531	64.01	661.0	0.9347	1.3452	1.9796	121.76
070601	65.08	676.9	0.9430	1.3439	1.9806	122.11
070604	66.21	676.3	0.9452	1.3488	1.9922	121.74
070605	65.61	675.1	0.9429	1.3525	1.9939	121.49
<b>070606</b>	<b>65.96</b>	<b>674.6</b>	<b>0.9446</b>	<b>1.3490</b>	<b>1.9914</b>	<b>121.08</b>
<b>070607</b>	<b>66.93</b>	<b>665.2</b>	<b>0.9422</b>	<b>1.3456</b>	<b>1.9796</b>	<b>121.35</b>
<b>070608</b>	<b>64.76</b>	<b>650.3</b>	<b>0.9414</b>	<b>1.3359</b>	<b>1.9656</b>	<b>121.63</b>
070611	65.97	659.0	0.9422	1.3360	1.9684	121.79
070612	65.35	653.1	0.9403	1.3325	1.9749	121.78
070613	66.26	652.7	0.9375	1.3294	1.9728	122.37
070614	67.65	655.9	0.9360	1.3311	1.9697	122.97
070615	68	658.7	0.9364	1.3364	1.9763	123.56
070618	69.09	659.9	0.9327	1.3401	1.9822	123.68
070619	69.1	664.7	0.9399	1.3416	1.9883	123.41
070620	68.19	660.0	0.9393	1.3428	1.9936	123.60

Notes: Figures come from *The Globe and Mail*. All currencies are extracted from the Bank of Montreal's BMO Nesbitt Burns Capital Market's noon rates. Oil prices are reflective of Light, Sweet Crude and are extracted from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) in US dollars and are the 'most recent settle' prices, using the most active contract data. Gold prices are extracted from the Comex division of NYMEX in US dollars and are the 'most recent settle' prices, using the most active contract data. The dates of the Heiligendamm Summit are in bold


### Price Watch for Oil




### Price Watch for Gold




### Price Watch for the Canadian Dollar



### Price Watch for the Euro



### Price Watch for British Pound



## Appendix X: Political Capital and Control

Year (Average)	Leader	First Elected	Re-elections	Summit experience (hosting)	Legislative control	Party control	Approval rating	Next election
1975 (6)								
1976 (7)								
1978								
1979								
1980								
1981								
1982								
1983								
1984								
1985								
1986								
1987								
1988								
1989								
1990								
1991								
1992								
1993								
1994								
1995								
1996								
1997 (8)								
1998								
1999								
2000								
2001								
2002								
2003								
2004								
2005								
2006	U.S. (Bush)	2000	1 (2004)	5 (1)	2 of 2	Yes	29%	2008 lame duck; Midterm Nov 2006
	Japan (Koizumi)	2001		5 (0)				
	Germany (Merkel)		0	0 (0)				
	Britain (Blair)	1997	2 (2005)	9 (2)				
	France (Chirac)	1995		11 (2)				
	Italy (Prodi)	2006	0					
	Canada (Harper)	2006	0	0 (0)				
	Russia (Putin)	2000	1 (xx)	6 (0)				
	EU (Barroso)							

## Appendix Y: Constricted Participation: The Physical Summit

Dimension	2004	2005	2006	2007
Site	Resort	Resort	ProvCity	Resort
Length in days	3	3	3	3
Length in hours	42	48	45	44
G8 leaders present	10	09	09	09
Early departures	01	00	00	00
Late departures	Funeral	01 (Koizumi)	00	00
Outside country leaders invited	13	12	05	11
Outside country leaders attending	11	11	05	11
Outside heads of IOs invited	00	06	07	07
Outside heads of IOs attending	00	06	07	07
On site bilaterals	17	06	28	28
Sessions at eight	04	04	04	04
Hours alone at eight	10	06	11	14 (est)
Hours alone at eight for working sessions	09	06	11	10.5 (est)
Hours of social/ceremonial sessions	3	4	4	3.5
Sessions with outsiders	2	2	2	3
Hours with outsiders	5	6.25	4	4.75
Media accredited <sup>a</sup>	3100	3,051	3,107	4,700
Media attending <sup>b</sup>	1492	2,100	3,107	
Total costs		£90.9m	\$397m	£68m 73.7 mill GBP
Security costs	\$37 million	£618 million		€12.5 million (\$25 m)
Economic benefits	\$1 billion			
Security personnel	20 000	10,000 est. police		17, 100
Civil society activists on site <sup>c</sup>	500	100,000s est.	300-600	100,000 est.
Number of protests				11
Arrests <sup>d</sup>	15	358 <sup>30</sup>	200	138
Property damage	0			3
Personal injury	0	20		1, 008
Deaths	0	0	0	0

*Notes:* Numbers are the most reliable and mean estimates of news accounts or, where possible, direct evidence from G8 officials. All costs are in nominal U.S. dollars at prevailing exchange rates. a. Number of media representatives who successfully completed the accreditation process. b. Number of media representatives who picked up their credentials. c. Includes those at the Summit, the international media centre and nearby major cities, and those taking part in protests and demonstrations and educational forums such as The Other Economic Summit. d. Includes those for minor charges such as blocking a highway or providing a false name. e. Hours: 2004 = 42 hours (from 1800 on 8 June to 1200 on 10 June), 2005 = 48 (from 1700 on 6 July to 1700 on 8 July), 2006 = 45 hours (1800 from 15 July 2006 to 1400 on 17 July).

## Appendix O: Japan's G8 Agenda

G8 Summit, Lake Toya, Hokkaido, Japan: July 7-9, 2008

On June 12, 2007, *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific* reported that the government has officially decided that the 2008 Summit will be held July 7-9.<sup>31</sup>

On May 19, 2007, *Kyodo News* reported that the summit will be held from July 7-9, 2008.<sup>32</sup> Abe stated that the summit will officially be called the "Hokkaido-Toyako Summit" in Japanese.<sup>33</sup> According to *Kyodo News*, "Government sources said the official name came as a compromise between the prefectural government calling for the "Hokkaido Summit" and the town government favoring the "Toyako Summit." It is still unknown what Japan will officially call the summit in English."<sup>34</sup>

On April 24, 2007, *Jiji Press English News Service* reported that the Japanese government plans to host the summit in July, 2008.<sup>35</sup>

On April 16, 2007, *Agence France Presse* (among other sources) reported that the Japanese summit will focus on global warming and African development.<sup>36</sup> See also "Japan Selects Hokkaido for 2008 Summit" <[www.g8.utoronto.ca/whatsnew/2008location.html](http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/whatsnew/2008location.html)>.

### 1. Climate Change and Sustainable Energy

#### *Environment*

On June 8, 2007, Prime Minister Abe told reporters during his summit press conference in Heiligendamm that environment will be a major issue for the summit in 2008.

On May 19, 2007, *Kyodo News* reported that Abe, while visiting Tokayo, stated that "I was convinced that it is the right place to speak about the environment, which is one of the themes next year."<sup>37</sup>

#### *Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Dialogue*

On June 8, 2007, Prime Minister Abe told reporters during his summit press conference in Heiligendamm that climate change will be a major issue for the summit in 2008.

On June 8, 2007, *Agence France Presse* reported that Japan will continue the climate change debate when it hosts the summit in 2008.<sup>38</sup> According to Japanese Prime Minister Abe, "The achievement at the Heiligendamm summit will be a precious base for next year's summit... From this base, we want to make an effort to show big results."<sup>39</sup>

On March 20, 2007, *Agence France Presse* reported that Japanese "Prime Minister Abe will ask his cabinet ministers to develop a package of proposals to present to next year's Group of Eight summit of world leaders which Japan will host, they said. Japanese government ministers will "discuss proposals on a new framework that will ensure participation by the United States and China, the world's largest greenhouse-gas emitters," a foreign ministry official said."<sup>40</sup>

On February 18, 2007, *Jiji Press English News Service* reported that Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that he will lead discussions of environmental protection and climate change in Heiligendamm, where it will be a major topic.<sup>41</sup> *Jiji Press English News Service* also reported that "Environmental issues will remain at the fore at next year's G-8 summit in Japan, where attendees are seen to discuss how Japan and other advanced nations should achieve their targets for cutting greenhouse gas emissions set out in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. A post-Kyoto Protocol framework for tackling global warming will also likely be on the agenda at the 2008 summit among Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States, Abe said."<sup>42</sup>

In the G8 leaders' 2005 official document on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, the text read "We welcome Japan's offer to receive a report at the G8 Summit in 2008 [to take the sustainable energy dialogue forward]."<sup>43</sup>

### *Nuclear Security*

On May 20, 2007, *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific* reported that "Japan plans to discuss compiling international safety guidelines for nuclear power plants with other members of the Group of Eight nations, with an eye to reaching agreement at next year's G-8 summit in Hokkaido, government sources said... The guidelines are expected to include assistance from the G-8 nations on techniques for safety inspections and maintenance, as well as stipulating training for local staff and unified regulations on management in order to prevent the transfer or leakage of technologies or nuclear-related materials."<sup>44</sup>

## **2. Africa**

On April 16, 2007, *Agence France Presse* reported that following a meeting in Tokyo between Italian Prime Minister Prodi (who will host the summit in 2009) and Japanese Prime Minister Abe, Abe stated that "As both our countries will be chairing these summits, cooperation is essential. The issues to be taken up at the G8 summit meeting are long-term issues."<sup>45</sup> Prodi stated that "It is necessary to build a joint policy towards Africa... Africa is developing economically amid globalisation. We have up until now discussed major environmental and human disasters in Africa at our G8 meetings... Africa is developing economically amid globalisation. We have up until now discussed major environmental and human disasters in Africa at our G8 meetings [such as investment]."<sup>46</sup>

On November 18, 2006, a senior official from Germany announced that Germany will not focus on debt relief and increased aid to Africa, stating that the 2005 report of the Commission for Africa left the issue to be taken up again by the Japanese G8 presidency in 2008.<sup>47</sup>

According to a report by Julius Court, of the Overseas Development Institute: "In [2008], Japan will be Chair of the G8 and host the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development – a 5-yearly gathering of African leaders and their development partners. Africa will be in the spotlight again."<sup>48</sup>

## **3. Intellectual Property Rights**

On June 9, 2007, *Daily Yomiuri* reported that "On intellectual property protection, the declaration recognized, for the first time as a summit meeting document, the importance of streamlining and harmonizing the international patent system. A treaty to prevent the spread of counterfeit and pirated products, which Japan aims to establish, was not included in the declaration. But it said, "We recognize the need for continued study by national experts of the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to intellectual property right enforcement," suggesting the treaty may be included in a document at the next G-8 summit meeting to be held in Hokkaido."<sup>49</sup>

## **4. Ministerials**

On June 6, 2007, representatives from the Japanese government released the following information on ministerial meetings to journalists covering the Heiligendamm summit:

July 7-9, 2007	Summit, Toyako, Hokkaido
June 26-27, 2007	Foreign Ministers, Kyoto
June 13-14, 2007	Finance Ministers, Osaka
Early June, 2007	Energy Ministers, Aomori
June 11-13, 2007	Justice and Interior, Tokyo
May 25-27, 2007	Environment Ministers, Kobe
May 11-13, 2007	Labour Ministers, Niigata
Early April, 2007	Development Ministers, Tokyo
March 14-16, 2007	G20 Dialogue, Chiba
May 28-30	Tokyo International Conference on African Development, Yokohama <sup>50</sup>

On May 29, 2007 the *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan* released dates for ministerial meetings: G8 Foreign Ministers on June 26-27 in Kyoto, G8 Development Ministers in early April in Tokyo and the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development on May 28-30 in Yokohama.<sup>51</sup>

On May 19, 2007, *Mainichi News* reported that “Finance ministers will meet in the western city of Osaka, foreign ministers in the ancient capital of Kyoto and environment ministers in the nearby port town of Kobe. Justice and home affairs ministers are slated to meet in Tokyo, while labor ministers will convene in the northern coastal city of Niigata. The Tokyo suburb of Chiba will host a Group of Twenty conference on global warming and clean energy, and Yokohama will hold talks on African development.”<sup>52</sup>

On May 10, 2007, *Associated Press Newswires* reported that a G20 conference on global warming and clean energy will be held in Tokyo.<sup>53</sup>

On April 24, 2007, *Jiji Press English News Service* reported that the first ministerial meeting is set to be held in March 2008.<sup>54</sup> The Japanese government is also considering holding a meeting of justice and internal affairs ministers in Tokyo.<sup>55</sup>

On April 23, 2007, *Kyodo News* reported that the following cities have informally been selected to host ministerial meetings in 2008: Kyoto will host the foreign ministers meetings, Osaka will host the finance ministers meeting, Kobe will host the environment ministers and Niigata will host the labour ministers.<sup>56</sup>

## 5. The Physical Summit

### *Leaders*

On July 3, 2007, *ITAR-TASS World Service* reported that G8 delegations will drive environmentally friendly cars at the summit, including cars running on hydrogen fuel batteries, electric and hybrid cars.<sup>57</sup> Solar cells will produce a large part of the energy used at the summit, and energy-efficient televisions, air conditioners and light bulbs will be used.<sup>58</sup>

On June 12, 2007, *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific* reported the summit will be held at the Windsor Hotel Toya Resort and Spa.<sup>59</sup>

### *Media*

On June 18, 2007, *Kyodo News* reported that according to Kazuya Nashida, director of the Economic Policy Division of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Affairs Bureau, the media centre for the summit will be set up in Rusutsu Resort hotel in the village of Rusutsu.<sup>60</sup> It is located 30 minutes by car from the Windsor Hotel Toya Report and Spa, where the Hokkaido-Toyako summit will be held.<sup>61</sup>

On June 8, 2007, Prime Minister Abe told reporters during his summit press conference in Heiligendamm that the summit will be an environmentally-friendly one that will showcase Japan's efficient technologies. Abe stated that he would like members of the press to experience this.

### *Security Preparations*

On July 2, 2007, *Kyodo News* reported that the Japanese National Police Agency launched a panel to develop security plans for the summit, and the Hokkaido police created a 70-member special division in charge of the summit.<sup>62</sup>

On June 12, 2007, *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific* reported “Kensei Mizote, chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, vowed to take “all possible security measures” by assembling police forces nationwide amid “concerns over possible violence by anti-globalization activists and terror attacks by Islamic radicals.”<sup>63</sup>

### *Host Government Preparations*

On July 1, 2007, *Kyodo News* reported that the G8 preparatory committee has been established by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to liaise between central and local governments and others and is headed by Hiroshi Fukada, deputy director general of the ministry's International Cooperation Bureau.<sup>64</sup>

On June 12, 2007, *BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific* reported that a government spokesperson stated that the Japanese government will set up a G8 preparatory committee headed up by Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki and composed of Cabinet Secretariat officials and senior ministry and agency officials.<sup>65</sup> The committee will liaise with government organs, prepare the summit venue, press centre, facilities and security, and coordinate member delegations' accommodations.<sup>66</sup> Prime Minister Abe is quoted as instructing cabinet to make "thorough preparations for smoothly receiving" the leaders. The foreign ministry will set up its own preparatory committee, according to Foreign Minister Taro Aso, to be established in July to coordinate climate change policy.<sup>67</sup>

### **6. Remit Mandates**

In the G8 leaders' 2005 official document on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable Development, the text read "We welcome Japan's offer to receive a report at the G8 Summit in 2008 [to take the sustainable energy dialogue forward]."<sup>68</sup>

Notes: Compiled by Laura Sunderland.