

**Explaining G8 Effectiveness:
A Concert of Vulnerable Equals in a Globalizing World**

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Introduction

Over the past few years, there has arisen a wealth of new models directed at explaining the performance of the Group of Eight (G8) Summit-centered system of global governance. Traditionally, the debate over what causes G8 Summits to be successful had centered on the competing claims of the “American leadership” model first specified by Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne in 1987, and the “Concert Equality model first suggested by William Wallace in 1984 and analytically created by John Kirton in 1989 (Putnam and Bayne 1987, Wallace 1984, Kirton 1989, 1993, 1999, 2003). As the G8 Summit and system moved into the post cold war years of rapid globalization, and slowly moved from the G7, with the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Canada as members, to the G8, with the addition of Russia in 1998, several additional models arose. These were the “false new consensus” model of Fred Bergsten and Randall Henning in 1996, the “G8 nexus” model of Stephen Gill in 1998, and the “democratic institutionalist” model first offered by John Ikenberry in 1993 and specified and applied by Ella Kokotsis in 1999 (Bergsten and Henning 1996, Gill 1998, Ikenberry 1993, Kokotsis 1999, Kokotsis and Daniels 1999). Added since 2000 have been the “collective management” model first presented by Nicholas Bayne in 2000, the “Ginger Group” model of Andrew Baker, the “group hegemony” model of Alison Bailin, and the “meta-institution” model of Risto Pentilla (Bayne 2000, 2002, 2003, Baker 2001, Hodges 1999, Bailin 2001, Pentilla 2003).

This outburst of scholarly creativity suggests a growing scholarly consensus that the G8 is, or at least could be, emerging as an effective centre of global governance, and thus an international institution worthy of serious study, even in a world where the legalized “hard law” institutions assert a priority claim (Abbot et al. 2000). Yet amidst this ever more expansive academic activity, there has been little move toward consensus on any essential analytic or empirical points. Thus the competing models of G8 performance offer different and often poorly specified conceptions of what core functions and roles the G8 does or should perform, and often lack careful empirical assessments of its performance and success. Similarly, these models offer as an explanation of successful or failed performance a set of causes, from various levels of analysis, that are seldom specified with precision, followed by indicators, or arranged into a parsimonious cluster of causes tightly connected with the performance they seek to explain. As a result, few of the models are tested empirically and systematically against the performance of the G8 system over the thirty years since the institution began, as an annual Summit of the leaders of the major market democracies, at Rambouillet, France in November 1975. Indeed, there is even growing disagreement on the unit of analysis itself, as the early focus on the annual summit of the leaders has given way to growing attention to the expanding system of stand-alone G8 ministerial and official-level bodies that lie below, and the broader G8 “nexus” that includes the financial interests and social classes with which the current incumbents of government positions in the G8 are closely allied.

This paper seeks to inject into this creative conceptual proliferation the analytic discipline required for an empirically-grounded debate among the nine major models that now

claim to describe and explain G8 performance over the institution's full thirty year life. To do so it first offers an analytic framework of the G8's functions that builds on the concerns of the competing models, is consistent with the larger literature on international institutions, and that can be measured in a valid and reliable way over the past 30 years. It secondly identifies indicators and applies relevant measures of the G8's functions to provide a systematic descriptive account of G8 performance, over the 30 annual "cases" of Summit-level G8 governance from 1975 to 2003. It thirdly arranges each of the nine major models of G8 performance into its core causal claims, identifying which are capable of empirical measurement at present. It finally empirically assesses the actual explanatory power of the major measurable causal variables shared by the competing models, to begin the task of developing empirical answers to the competing conceptual claims. Here it adds to the existing array of core causal variables the concept of "vulnerability," arguing that it is of growing relevance in the post cold war, rapidly globalizing, post September 11th years (Keohane and Nye 1977).

This analysis finds that the nine competing models of G8 performance share a conception of the G8's fundamental functions and that they can be arranged into a framework based on the institution's domestic political, deliberative, directional, decisional, delivery and development of global governance roles. An application of indicators of these roles over the past 30 Summits suggests yearly and cyclical variations in G8 performance, but a secular trend toward increasingly high performance across most functions, into more far-reaching functions, and overall in the post cold war years. These variations can be partly accounted for by the changes in the relative capabilities of the group as a whole *vis-à-vis*

the outside world, and among G8 members, just as many of the earlier models, in authentic realist fashion, highlighted or recognized. Yet while the collective predominance of the G8 in the overall global system explains performance, the equality of capability among members within the group operates in both dimensions, with sound evidence suggesting that greater inequality among members produces success. Perhaps more importantly, the growing vulnerability of the most powerful G8 members, and of the G8 as a whole to the outside system, also strongly explains why the G8 is emerging as an effective centre of global governance in the contemporary world. The causal factors offered by liberal-institutionalist theories of legalization and those at the domestic level find little empirical support. It is thus system-level theories that best accounts for G8 Summit performance, and a more capable and more vulnerable G8, and America within it, that makes the G8 Summit perform well. Capability counts, but vulnerability matters just as much.

1. An Analytic Framework of G8 Functions and Performance

As with any international institution, and especially any informal, non-legalized institution relying on regular Summits of leaders rather than on an international bureaucracy of its own, the G8 Summit can be viewed as performing six major governance functions, of an increasingly global, future-oriented and far reaching form (See Appendix A). These six functions embrace the conceptions of the G8's proper core roles offered by the competing causal models of Summit performance, are consistent with

the central literature on international institutions, and provide a foundation for generating overall assessments of annual G8 Summit performance superior to those that currently exist. Each can also be assessed against a common, crosscutting temporal dimension, based on the prescience, speed and effectiveness of the Summit in immediate crisis response, preventing future problems, or addressing long term structural problems (such as aging populations) that lie far ahead.

The first function is the domestic political role of the Summit, often dismissively captured in the charge that the annual summit is nothing more than a “photo-op” (Antholis 2001). Indeed it is. A leader’s presence at the Summit shows his/her citizens that the country has the prestige to be included as an equal in an exclusive forum of the great powers, that the leader is voicing national concerns and attempting to secure support for the country and for the policies for which it and s/he stand, and that any “crisis of governability” is being addressed by leaders attempting to create confidence among domestic audiences back home. Simply “being there” means a lot.

The second function is the deliberative role. The Summit is the world’s ultimate “talk shop”, as the annual institutionalized summit provides a low transaction cost venue for direct dialogue among leaders, thus increasing communication, transparency, and lengthening the shadow of the future, as standard liberal-institutionalist theory suggests (Keohane 1989). Here the Summit creates “mutual enlightenment”, by fostering the transparency, trust, and longer shadows of the future that allow leaders directly, and thus more precisely, accurately and interactively, to identify compatible interests and avoid

accidental, unintended conflict (Putnam and Bayne 1987). Should they establish personal relationships at the Summit that inspire them to remain in close direct contact, this effect has more powerful future effects.

The leader's deliberation has an important agenda setting function, for participating and outside governments, as it creates action-forcing deadlines in the preparatory process, generates initiatives, and induces governments to create, confirm or revise their positions on the issues the Summit highlights. In particular, as constructivist theorists suggest, it forces governments to take up new issues and/or define interests and create positions or policies where none may have previously existed. In this sense institutions create interests – both their existence and their substance. Summit deliberations further have an attention-getting role, by giving public prominence and priority to otherwise neglected problems and issues. Here they may attract publicity for the otherwise dispossessed and marginalized constituencies and causes. They inspire networks to be mobilized at both the trans-governmental and societal level, as many engage in multi-level games. The leaders' deliberations can also engender learning and epistemic consensus, especially as they share and compare domestic policies and experiences, as a foundation for reaching consensus on what best practices are.

The third function is the G8 Summit's directional role. Here it affirms, adjusts or creates principles and norm, beginning with the classic statements of fact, causation and rectitude (Krasner 1982). Here the Summit can create new and legitimize old issue areas. It can identify priority values. It can affirm new causal relationships, such as that between

inflation and unemployment. It can also establish new priority linkages, such as that which affirms the value of the natural environment in trade liberalization, or that democratic governance and an absence of unproductive and military expenditures are required for development (Kirton 2002).

The fourth function is the Summits' decisional role. Here it functions as an authoritative collective decisionmaker, or indeed, "*directoire*", issuing collective statements of desired and intended clear, future-oriented action, with varying degrees of precision, obligation and delegation, and specification of targets and timetables, implementing instruments and intended welfare outcomes. These commitments can cover a wide breadth of policy domains, issue areas or geographic regions, and come with varying degrees of ambition and significance. The decisional function includes the particular case of "money mandated" to fulfill particular functions, casting the G8 in the role of providing the discretionary budget for global governance, on the expenditure if not revenue side.

The fifth function is the Summit's delivery role, in which it carries on to implement the commitments it has made. Here it may move to implementation by issuing "remit mandates" calling for it to take up, or others to report to it on, a specified subject in subsequent years. Its members can comply with their commitments during the year until a subsequent summit may affirm or alter the commitment, or in the time beyond. Its members may actually mobilize and disburse the monies the Summit has mandated. It may alter or reinforce members' expectations and behaviour in other ways. Outside governmental and societal actors may also have their expectations and behaviour

affirmed or altered, even without any further action on the Summit members' part. Here the Summit might be a significant source of persuasion, just as political leaders can be at home.

The sixth function is the development of global governance role. Here the Summit moves to render more permanent its capacity to implement its own commitments, and to prepare, produce and develop new ones in designated areas. It does so by issuing instructions to existing international institutions, including those which its members effectively control. Such instructions may contain far reaching reform proposals which represent a constitutional revision of the foundation on which these institutions were established or currently operate. It also does so by creating its own G7/8-centered institutions at the ministerial or official level, to function on a temporary or permanent basis, with varying relationships to the Summit itself. Here the G8 Summit may act as a global governor "gap filler", creating its own institutions in areas where none currently exist. Or it may act as a global governor of last resort, creating institutions in areas where other have long existed and acted but now have clearly failed.

These six functions, so ordered, together generate a scale along three dimensions. The first is geographic, as the first, domestic political function focuses on impacts within the G8 member countries, whereas the final, development of global governance function, concerns the global system as a whole. The second is temporal, as the first, domestic political function, focuses on short term impacts on leader, party and government regime popularity from actions taking place during the days of the Summit, whereas the final,

development of global governance function looks at very long term impacts flowing from a pattern of institutionalization taking place in the years after the Summit has ended. The third is the strength of the impacts, as the first, domestic political function, deals with support for current policies, politicians or parties, while the final, development of global governance function, deals with the institutional or even constitutional architecture of global governance as a whole – the higher level framework within which subsequent agendas can be raised and actions authorized and pursued. Given these component scales, one could assign ever heavier weights to each successive function in aggregating them to generate an overall, multi-functional score of Summit performance each year.

Such an approach provides a more systematic and perhaps empirically superior method for assessing overall annual G8 Summit performance than the three that have been employed thus far. The first, pioneered by Putnam and Bayne (1987) and followed by Bayne (2000, 2001, 2002, 2003), focuses on a Summit's overall achievements. It assigns an overall letter grade for each Summit, based on a judgment of the major component achievements, if any, that each has made. This method has the advantage of capturing the ability and flexibility of the Summit to perform in many different ways in many different issues areas, and the international system and needs of its members demands. However despite recent attempts to develop and apply a five-point analytic framework for assessing Summit achievements in the issue areas of trade and finance, using the fivefold component criteria of leadership, effectiveness, durability, acceptability, and consistency, there is no well developed conceptual foundation for these assessments, beyond perhaps the initial Putnam and Bayne view of the Summit's core function as the decisional one of producing large package deals (Bayne 2001, 2002).

The second existing method for generating overall assessments is to assemble the professional consensus, usually the “sherpa consensus” from the public written evaluations of each Summit’s performance, produced by many personal representatives of the leaders at the G8, after these sherpas have left office and ideally public life (Kirton 1989). As the professionals of the Summits system, the sherpas are thought to be in a position to provide judgments not unduly afflicted by partisan and national bias, with the use of as many sherpa evaluations as possible further producing a mainstream cross-nationally corrected consensus view. Yet this method may privilege the functions most closely related to the Summit as a forum for the leaders inside (that is the domestic political and deliberative Summit) over the larger and longer term global governance functions that lie beyond.

The third existing method is to assess the objectives obtained by each summit. This approach is used to generate the annual Performance Assessments that the G8 Research Group has produced since 1996. It is limited by the level of ambition each Summit sets for itself, and the judgments individual coders make.

2. Assessing G8 Performance, 1975-2003

Each of these functions, and many of their components, is capable of being empirically measured by indicators which capture in varying degrees the key features of each.

Although the development and application of such indicators is largely a task still in its infancy, Appendix B provides a relatively comprehensive list. In some cases, such as the length of the Summit, they provide only a very crude indicator of the variable being assessed. In others, such as compliance, a well developed method still suffers from differing methods, sampling strategies and significant missing data, due to the resource-intensive nature of the data acquisition and application task. Yet in some areas, such as commitments, classic valid and reliable measures are accompanied by a complete data set spanning 29 years. Together they are enough to enrich the ongoing task of developing and applying better indicators, and to begin the empirical application task.

Appendix C reports the results of the G8 Summit performance since 1975, according to various indicators of the last five of its six functions. Several patterns stand out. The most striking is a general sustained rise in Summit performance, across virtually all functions and indicators, as one moves toward the present. Although the start dates for the sustained, higher, recent performance vary by function and indicator, three common break points, each defining a Summit era, stand out. The first is the start of the new cold war and Summit's second cycle in 1982, when the Summit moved from a two day to a three day event as the norm. The second is the start of the post cold war era and third Summit cycle in 1989, when the number of communiqués, words and commitments jumped. They were followed by the compliance score (into the consistent positive range) and the number of ministerials created in 1992, and by the number of directions to international institutions in 1994. The third and largest break is the start of the globalization era and fourth Summit cycle, in 1995 and 1996, when the Bayne

achievement grades, number of communiqués issued, words, and commitments and remit mandates surged.

Together these patterns strongly suggest that the G8 Summit is emerging as an effective centre of global governance in, for, and because of the post cold war, rapidly globalizing world. They further suggest that the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States may be fuelling a new wave of effective G8 governance. The ill-fated Genoa Summit saw a sharp drop in performance on a few functions, notably the number of words and commitments in the communiqué. But on the whole the Summit proved resilient to the upsurge in civil society protest and violence, and the advent of a new host, in the person of Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, and a new president of the United States, in the person of George Bush. The 2002 Kananaskis Summit, the first taking place after September 11th, saw the Summit surge to new highs, with only compliance lagging as the spring 2003 intra-G8 strains over Iraq took hold. The 2003 Evian Summit, which in effect declared the intra-G8 Iraq war to be over, moved strongly to many new highs.

The data further suggest that there is a general consistency between the major date of temporal improvement in Summit performance, and the ever more far reaching and future constraining scale of functions the Summit performs. Thus the Summit first moved in 1982 to improve its deliberative performance by meeting for three days rather than two. It moved in 1989 to improve its deliberative and decisional performance, with major increases in the number of communiqués issued and words in them, and the number of commitments they contained. In 1994 delivery and development of global governance

improved with a jump in the compliance score and the number of G7/8 ministerial bodies born. 1994-5 brought further increases in delivery and the development of global governance, with an increase in remit mandates and instructions to international institutions, and a jump in the overall Bayne grade. 1996 reinforced the accomplishment with new jumps on several dimensions, as did 2002 and 2003.

Appendix D reports the inter-correlations among the main indicators of five of the six Summit performance functions (all but domestic political management). It suggests the Bayne grade, which is not intercorrelated with any of the five measured functions, is inadequate as a sole measure of overall Summit performance. Moreover the fact that the indicators of the five measured individual function are all connected, and at times highly intercorrelated, suggests that a weighted additive strategy is appropriate for assessing overall Summit performance. However the fact that no single function is correlated with all others, and the fact that none is correlated with the critical compliance function, suggests that an analysis aimed at explaining Summit performance should proceed on a disaggregated, function-specific basis at present.

3. Explaining G8 Performance through the Nine Major Causal Models

What explains this particular pattern of generally rising Summit performance, with its particular temporal punctuations and annual variability within? Appendix E summaries the key causal variables and the logic of all the models, that claim to account for Summit performance since 1975. Together they feature a great diversity of causal variables, at

several levels of analysis, from realist, liberal-institutionalist, political economy and constructivist theoretical traditions. They also vary widely on which performance functions are central, whether Summit performance has improved or declined over the years, and whether a particular variable contributes positively or negatively to the same performance effect.

Yet amidst this creative diversity, several commonalities stand out. The most common causal variable is the realist's relative capability, both as collective G8 predominance in the overall international system and as relative capability difference among the members within the G8. It is featured, with varying strength and specifications, in the classic American Leadership, Concert Equality, and False New Consensus models, and in the contemporary G8 Nexus, Group Hegemony, and Meta-Institution models

A second popular causal favorite at the international level comes from the processes among states and their parts. Here American Leadership offers transnational alliances, G8 Nexus the driver of marketization, globalization and liberalization, Collective Management the globalization constraint on independent major power action, and Ginger Group financial market globalization.

Also quite common are the liberal institutionalist's international institutional variables, both in regard to attributes of the G7/8 Summit and system itself, and the larger array of multilateral organizations in the world. International institutional variables lead the Democratic Institutionalist and Collective Management models They are importantly

included in the Concert Equality, Collective Management, Ginger Group, Group Hegemony and Meta-Institution models as well

The ideational and cognitive variables highlighted most recently by constructivist scholars also have a frequent place. American Leadership offers “reigning ideas and historical lessons as interpreted by leaders,” Concert Equality the “common principles of open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement,” False New Consensus the leader’s flawed collective cognition, Democratic Institutionalism the leaders’ commitment to international co-operation, the G8 and its issues, G8 Nexus the similar outlook and principles of the G8 elite, Ginger Group the G8 participants common worldview, and Group Hegemony a common attachment to economic liberalism.

Variables from the level of domestic politics are also prominent, being offered with an unusual degree of diversity about what is important here. For American Leadership it is electoral uncertainty, for Concert Equality domestic political capital and control, for Democratic Institutionalism strong G8 bureaucratic units and popular support for leaders and issues, and for G8 Nexus the dominance of financial-asset interests.

Five alleged causal variables remain as orphans, each unique to a specific model. The realist’s polarity variable of the cold war’s end and fixed national interest of “traditional differences” arise only in the False New Consensus model, where they are specified as a cause of declining Summit performance in the 1990’s. Bailin’s Group Hegemony includes the social-psychological variable of “group identity,” which may be associated with constricted participation as cause and effect but is not the cognate of it. Bayne’s

Collective Management offers the demand side variable of the complexity of new and unexpected global problems, where it may be associated with the onset of globalization and its “dark sides” but is not fully subsumed by it. And Kirton’s Concert Equality model offers the sharper demand side, action-forcing variable of equal vulnerability activated by shocks. Appropriate for status quo oriented cybernetic concert decision-makers, these are, in particular, second shocks (Kirton 1989).

4. Explaining G8 Performance through Empirical Application

Appendix E presents a list of indicators of the major causal variables offered by the nine major models of Summit performance, concentrating on those relating to relative capability where the debate among classic and contemporary models is most strongly lodged, in ways that are capable of empirical tests. Appendix F presents the results of an intercorrelation of these independent causal variables against the indicators of Summit performance functions discussed above. This intercorrelations reveal several suggestive results.

First, the realist’s relative capability counts a great deal in explaining a wide range of functions through which the G8 Summit performs. The G8’s collective predominance of capability in the world is strongly and positively correlated with all performance functions save for compliance and Bayne’s achievement grades, as the Concert Equality, G8 Nexus, Group Hegemony and Meta-Institution models centrally claim. Moreover the internal equality in capability among G8 members also matters mightily for Summit

performance across a similarly wide array of functions. Yet a real puzzle arises here. Higher Bayne achievement grades and longer Summits are associated with a decreased American share of capability among the G8 and a depreciating US dollar, as the Concert Equality model predicts. Yet increases in internal inequality within the G8 as a whole are strongly and positively correlated with higher Summit performance across virtually all function, and often to a very high degree. This suggests that it is the ratio between the Americans and the rest together, rather than among all as equals, that matters most.

Second, the systemic variable of vulnerability also matters a great deal. The variable that most maps the classic Keohane and Nye conception of vulnerability, and that was central to the Summit's birth and early accomplishments among the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 is the energy dependence of the G8 members on those outside (Ikenberry 1982). As the Concert Equality model uniquely predicts, it is substantially and positively correlated with Bayne achievement grades, and with several other component Summits functions as well. A second measure of vulnerability, terrorists attacks worldwide, performs even more strongly, but in an unexpected way. For the data show that an increase in terrorist attacks worldwide lead to decreased performance across virtually all functions within the G8. It may be that only terrorist attacks within the G8 or on G8 citizens are the shocks bred by vulnerability that force the G8 to act. It should also be noted that US bank failures is the only causal variable anywhere that is significantly related to G8 compliance, but it is related in a way that shows that fewer US bank failure led to higher compliance.

Elsewhere little else matters. An increase in the concentration of G8 trade within the group is associated with longer summits but nothing else. At lower levels of analysis only the association between ideological consensus and the words in the communiqué matters at all. In all, the evidence suggests that it is at the level of the international system that the causes of G8 Summit performance lie.

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Appendix A

A Framework of G8 Summit Performance Functions

1. The Domestic Political Summit

- A. Prestige
- B. Support for Domestic Policies, Parties, Politicians
- C. Confidence in Established Regime

2. The Deliberative Summit

- A. Mutual Enlightenment
- B. Personal Relationships
- C. Agenda-Setting
- D. Attention-Getting
- E. Epistemic Learning
- F. Interested and Identities Formation

3. The Directional Summit

- A. Issue Area Legitimation
- B. Priority Value Identification
- C. Causal Relationship Specification
- D. Priority Linkage Specification

4. The Decisional Summit

- A. Number of Commitments, by Precision, Obligation, Delegation
- B. Breadth of Commitments, by Policy Domain, Issue Area, and Geographic Reach
- C. Ambition-Significance of Commitments
- D. Money Mandated

5. The Delivery Summit

- A. Mandates Remitted to Subsequent Summit
- B. Member Compliance
- C. Member Money Mobilized and Disbursed
- D. Member Expectations and Behaviour Altered
- E. Outside Actors Behaviour Altered

6. The Development of Global Governance Summit

- A. G8 Ministerial Institutions Created, Adjusted Affirmed
- B. G8 Official Institutions Created, Adjusted, Affirmed
- C. Instructions to Outside Intergovernmental Institutions

7. Overall Assessments

- A. Achievements
- B. Professional Consensus
- C. Objectives Obtained

8. Other Dimensions

- A. Forward or Backward Looking
- B. Crisis Response/Prevention

Appendix B

G8 Summit Performance Indicators by Function

1. *The Domestic Political Summit*

- A. Media Coverage at Home
- B. Elite Editorial Consensus
- C. Public Opinion Poll Change
- D. Election Record During and After
- E. Civil Society Participation and Protest
- F. Societal Behaviour Changed

2. *The Deliberative Summit*

- A. Length of Leaders Participation
- B. Length of Summit in Days
- C. Length of Summit in Hours
- D. Length of Summit Working Sessions
- E. Location of Summit
- F. Level of Spontaneity

3. *The Directional Summit*

- A. Number of Words in Leaders' Collective Summit-Released Documentation
- B. Number of Separate Summit Released Collective Documents by Leaders
- C. Number of Priority Values Identified and Affirmed in Communiqué Chapeau
- D. Number of Linkages Identified and Affirmed in Communiqué Chapeau

4. *The Decisional Summit*

- A. Number of Commitments
- B. Breadth of Commitments (by domain, and issue area)
- C. Ambition-Significance of Commitments
- D. Money Mandated

5. *The Delivery Summit*

- A. Compliance
- B. Money Mobilized and Disbursed
- C. Member Behaviour Reinforced, Constrained and Altered
- D. Member's Conception of Interests and Identities Changed
- C. Outside Country Behaviour Altered

6. *The Development of Global Governance Summit*

- A. Reinit Mandates
- B. G8 Ministerial Institutions Created, Adjusted Affirmed
- C. G8 Official Institutions Created, Adjusted, Affirmed
- D. Instructions to Outside Intergovernmental Institutions

7. *Overall Assessments*

- A. Bayne Grades (1987, 2000, 2001-) and Grid (2001-)

- B. Sherpa Consensus (Kirton 1989)
- C. G8 Research Group Summit Performance Assessment, 1996-)

**Appendix C:
An Assessment of Summit Performance by Indicator, 1975-2003**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Bayne</i>	<i>Days</i>	<i>Communiqué</i>	<i>Commit's</i>	<i>Comp</i>	<i>Minists</i>	<i>Remit</i>	<i>Leader</i>		
	<i>Grade</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Words</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Born</i>	<i>Mand</i>	<i>Bodies</i>		
								<i>Cr Ttl</i>		
1975	CapL	A-	3	01	1,129	14	+57.1	0	01	01 01
1976	RRes	D	2	01	1,624	07	+08.9	0	01	00 01
1977	Cap	B-	2	06	2,669	29	+08.4	0	01	00 01
1978	Cap	A	2	02	2,999	35	+36.3	0	00	02 03
1979	Cap	B+	2	02	2,102	34	+82.3	0	01	03 05
1980	PCity	C+	2	05	3,996	55	+07.6	0	01	00 03
1981	CapL	C	2	03	3,165	40	+26.6	1	01	02 04
1982	CapL	C	3	02	1,796	23	+84.0	0	01	03 03
1983	RRes	B	3	02	2,156	38	-10.9	0	01	00 02
1984	Cap	C-	3	05	3,261	31	+48.8	1	03	01 04
1985	Cap	E	3	02	3,127	24	+01.0	0	01	02 05
1986	Cap	B+	3	04	3,582	39	+58.3	1	01	01 03
1987	PCity	D	3	06	5,064	53	+93.3	0	01	00 02
1988	PCity	C-	3	02	4,872	27	-47.8	0	01	01 03
1989	Cap	B+	3	11	7,125	61	+07.8	0	01	01 02
1990	PCity	D	3	03	7,601	78	-14.0	0	03	02 05
1991	Cap	B-	3	03	8,099	53	00.0	0	03	00 02
1992	PCity	D	3	04	7,528	41	+64.0	1	02	01 02
1993	Cap	C+	3	02	3,398	29	+75.0	0	05	00 02
1994	PCity	C	3	02	4,123	53	100.0	1	02	00 04
1995	PCity	B+	3	03	7,250	78	100.0	2	06	02 03
1996	PCity	B	3	05	15,289	128	+36.2	0	02	01 06
1997	PCity	C-	3	04	12,994	145	+12.8	1	10	01 06
1998	PCity	B+	3	04	06,092	073	+31.8	0	03	01 04
1999	PCity	B+	3	04	10,019	046	+38.2	1	03	01 02
2000	RRes	B	3	05	13,596	105	+81.4	0	05	02 05
2001	PCity	B+	3	07	06,214	058	+49.5	1	04	01 06
2002	RRes	B+	2	18	11,959	187	+35.0	1	06	03 08
2003	PCity	TBA	3		16,889	206	+65.8	0	4	02 09
2004	RRes		3							
Average. All	C+				06,197	026	+37	.38	2.6	1.1 3.5
Av. Cycle 1	B-				02,526	029	+32	.14	1.0	1.1 2.6
Av. Cycle 2	C-				03,408	034	+32	.29	1.0	1.3 3.1
Av. Cycle 3	C+				06,446	056	+48	.57	3.1	0.9 2.9
Av. Cycle 4	B				10,880	106	+41	.57	4.7	1.4 5.3
Av. Cycle 5	TBA				16,889	206	TBA	.00	4.0	2.0 9.0

Compiled by John Kirton, November 5, 2003. Notes: CapL = lodge on outskirts of capital city, Rres = remote resort, Cap = inside capital city, Pcity = provincial (not capital) city.

2003 Compliance score is extrapolated from interim score based on the 2002 ratio

Appendix D
Inter-Correlation of Summit Performance Indicators

	Grades	Length	Comus	Words	Comts	Compl	Remits	Minist	Institutions
Grades	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Length	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	429*	-
Communiqués	-	-	-	466*	664**	-	-	407*	445*
Words	-	-	466*	-	885**	-	618**	670**	657**
Commitments	-	-	664**	885**	-	-	642**	568**	813**
Compliance	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Remits	-	-	-	618**	642**	-	-	643**	486**
Ministerials	-	429*	407*	670**	568**	-	643**	-	480**
Institutions	-	-	445*	657**	813**	-	486**	480**	-

Significant Relationships Only Noted. All Noted Relationships are Positive

*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) **at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Appendix E: Causal Models of Summit Performance

1. American Leadership (Putnam and Bayne, 1984, 1987)

Decisional Performance, Occasionally High, due to:

- a. US Able and Willing to lead with support of a Strong Second;
- b. Reigning Ideas and Historical Lessons as interpreted by leaders;
- c. Electoral Certainty
- d. Transnational Actors Alliances

2. Concert Equality (Wallace 1984, Kirton 1989)

Comprehensive Performance, High, Low, then Very High, due to:

- a. Collectively Predominant and Internally Equal Capabilities
- b. Equal Vulnerability Activated by Shocks
- c. Common Principles of Open Democracy, Individual Liberty, Social Advancement
- d. Constricted Participation
- e. Domestic Political Capital and Control

3. False New Consensus (Bergsten and Henning 1996)

Decisional Performance, Declining During 1990's, due to:

- a. False New Consensus that Economic Globalization makes Governments Impotent;
- b. American Economic and Political Decline due to Cold War's End and Poor Policy;
- c. Traditional Differences Between the US and Germany

4. Democratic Institutionalism (Ikenberry 1993, Kokotsis 1998)

Delivery Performance, Increasing into 1990's, due to:

- a. Effective Multilateral Organizations Controlled by G7;
- b. G7 Institutionalization at Ministerial and Official Level;
- c. Strong G8 Bureaucratic Units in Domestic Governments;
- d. Leader's Commitments to International Co-operation, G7 Institutions, Individual Issue;
- e. Popular Support for Leaders and Issue

5. G8 Nexus (Gill 1998)

Directional and Decisional Performance, Increasingly Effective but Contested, due to:

- a. Marketization, Globalization and Liberalization, producing a
- b. Global Concentration of Wealth and Power
- c. Similar Political Outlook and Congruent Political/Economic Principles of Elite
- d. Dominance of Financial-Asset (bond-currency) Market Interests in leading states

6. Collective Management (Bayne 2000, 2001, 2002)

Comprehensive (Five Function) Performance, Increasingly Effective, due to:

- a. Complexity of New and Unexpected Global Problems;
- b. Inadequacy of Other Global Institutions;
- c. Globalization Constraint on Independent Major Power Action;
- d. G8 Iteration, Agenda Focus, Leaders-Only Format; Institutionalization;

7. Ginger Group (Baker 2000, Hodges 1999)

Deliberative Performance, Increasingly Effective, due to:

- a. Financial Market Globalization;
- b. Small Private Club of Governmental Agents;
- c. Common Worldview

8. Group Hegemony (Alison Bailin 2002, 2003)

Decisional Performance, Constantly High, due to:

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Concentration of Power | > Small Group Size | > Designate K-Group |
| 2. Group Identity | > Small Group Size | > Designate K-Group |
| 3. Economic Liberalism | > Mutual Interests | > Reach Mutual Agreements |
| 4. Preparatory Process | > Mutual Interests | > Reach Mutual Agreements |
| 5. System of Interaction | > Shadow of the Future | > Develop Trustworthy Relations |
| 6. Documentation | > Shadow of the Future | > Develop Trustworthy Relations |

9. Meta Institution (Pentilla, 2003)

Decisional Performance, Increasingly High, due to:

- 1. Concerted Power of G8 Members;
- 2. Failure of Established International Organizations

Appendix F
Indicators of Major Causal Variables

Relative Capability

Collective Predominance:

G7/8 GDP per World Total (current US\$)

G7/8 GDP per World Total (1995 base US\$)

Internal Equality:

GDP Inequality Within the G7/8 (current \$, sigma GDP)

GDP Inequality within the G7/8 (1995 base sigma)

US GDP Share of G7/8 Total GDP

Average US\$ Depreciation

Cumulative US\$ Depreciation

Relative Vulnerability

Collective Vulnerability:

Energy Dependence (NEI/DEC)

Terrorist Attacks by Number, Global Total

Deaths from Human-Induced Ecological Disasters

Annual Average Change in NYSE, NIKKEI, and LSE Indexes

Internal Equality of Vulnerability:

US Bank Failures by Number

Interdependence

G7-bound Trade as % of total (average for G7)

Common Principles (Shared Social Purpose)

Freedom House Democratization Index

Ideological Consensus

Political Control and Capital

Years Since Last Election

Appendix G
Intercorrelation of Independent and Dependant Variables

	Grad	Leng	Cmqu	Word	Comt	Comp	Remit	Mini	Inst
Relative Capability									
1. G7/8 GDP A -	614**	-	517**	-	-	413*	699*	-	
2. G7/8 GDP B -	-	-499**	-773**	-817**	-	-799**	-828**	-646**	
3. GDP Inequality A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4. GDP Inequality B	-	518*	-	803**	685**	-	709**	838**	535**
5. US GDP Share	-61*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6. US\$ Depreciat'n A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7. US\$ Depreciat'n B	-	509**	-	-	-	-	-	504**	-
Relative Vulnerability									
8. Energy Dep	427*	-	-	429*	381*	-	387*	421*	-
9. Terrorist Attacks	-	-	-463*	-578**	-682**	-	-511*	-652**	-501*
10. Ecological Deaths	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11. Stock Market	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12. US Bank Failures -	-	-	-	-	-428*	-	-	-	-
Interdependence									
13. G7-bound Trade	-	695**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Common Principles									
14. Democratization	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15. Consensus	-	-	-	394*	-	-	-	-	-
Political Control									
16. Last Election	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Grad	Leng	Cmqu	Word	Comt	Comp	Remit	Mini	Inst

Appendix F
Summary of Variables, Methods and Sources

Bayne Grade – Numerical equivalent of the letter-grade assessment of summit performance compiled by the G8RG and Sir Nicholas Bayne (source: www.g8.utoronto.ca)

Summit Length (days) – Length of the G7/8 summit in days (source: Fact Sheet at www.g8.utoronto.ca)

Number of Summit Communiqués – Number of official documents issued at the summit (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca)

Number of Words in Summit Documents – Length of the official documents produced at the summit measured in words (source: Internal G8RG compilation; available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).

Number of Commitments – Number of total commitments identified in the summit documents (for methodology see Kokotsis 1999; source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).

Compliance – Average standardized compliance with the commitments undertaken by summit members (for methodology see Kokotsis 1999; source: Internal G8RG compilation at www.g8.utoronto.ca).

Remit Mandates – Remit mandates are formal instructions contained in the documents the leaders collectively issue at the annual G7/8 Summit, specifying that they will deal with an item at their summit the following year or in subsequent years (source: Fact Sheet at www.g8.utoronto.ca).

Ministerial Bodies Created – Number of ministerial bodies created at the summit. Inter-summit ministerials and equivalents are meetings of G7/8 ministers or heads or equivalents from these actors (collective statements issued in the name of the G7/8, conference calls) between the end of one year's annual summit and the start of the summit the regularly scheduled annual following year (source: Fact Sheet at www.g8.utoronto.ca).

Leadership Bodies Created, Approved or Adjusted (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).

Average Depreciation of the US\$ and Cumulative Depreciation of the US\$ – Denotes the average depreciation of the US\$ against the basket of G8 currencies between the end of a summit and the start of the next one. The formula used is: $AVERAGE([E_{s/i}^{t+1} - E_{s/i}^t] / E_{s/i}^t)$, where i iterates through all seven other currencies, and t and $t+1$ are the days

on which the summit ends and the next one starts, respectively (source: The UBC Pacific Exchange Rate Service located at fx.sauder.ubc.ca).

US Bank Failures – Number of US Commercial and Savings Banks and Insurance Trusts Failures, as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (source: For methodology and data see the “Historical Banking Statistics” series at www.fdic.gov).

G7/8 GDP as percentage of total world GDP (in current US\$ and in 1995-base year US\$) – Denotes the ratio of the cumulative G7/8 GDP to the total world GDP as reported by the World Development Indicators Database of the World Bank. The two variables measure GDPs in current and real (1995 base-year) US dollars (source: for complete methodology and source: www.worldbank.org). **Methodological note:** Because base-year deflation uses a fixed consumption pattern (an assumption likely to introduce distortions for years significantly removed from the 1995 base-year), the “real US\$” deflated numbers should be interpreted with caution.

Inequality of G7/8 GDP composition (in current US\$ and in 1995-base year US\$) – This is the standard deviation of the set of the individual G7/8 members GDP shares in the G7/8 cumulative GDP in each year. The two variables measure GDPs in current and real (1995 base-year) US dollars (source: complete methodology and source: www.worldbank.org). **Methodological note:** Because base-year deflation uses a fixed consumption pattern (an assumption likely to introduce distortions for years significantly removed from the 1995 base-year), the “real US\$” deflated numbers should be interpreted with caution.

Terrorist Attacks – Total terrorist attacks worldwide (series covers 1981-2002 only) as reported by the U.S. Department of State in its *Patterns of Global Terrorism* report in 2003 (source: www.state.gov, Statistical Appendix).

Ideological Consensus of G7/8 Leaders – This number signifies the ideological likeness of the leaders of the G7/8 countries defined as the ratio of leaders of same or similar ideological/political persuasion to the total number of summit leaders. (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).

Average Years since Last Election – Average of the years since the last election of each of the leaders attending the summit. (source: Internal G8RG compilation available by request from g8info@library.utoronto.ca).

Freedom House Democratization Index – An index of global democratization developed by the Freedom House Foundation (methodology and source: www.freedomhouse.org).

Energy Dependence – Measures the dependence of the G7/8 on outside (non-G7/8 produced) energy imports. The data used for the compilation of this time-series covers tradable energy (oil, natural gas and coal) measured in Mtoe (millions of tons of oil equivalent). The following formula is used to arrive at the aggregate annual ratio: Total

G7/8 energy consumption [Mtoe] – Total G7/8 energy production [Mtoe] = Net G7/8 Energy Imports [NEI in Mtoe] \ Energy dependence = [(NEI) / (Total G7/8 energy consumption)] (sources: British Petroleum Database, www.bp.com; UNCTAD TRAINS Database, www.unctad.org; Euromonitor Database, www.euromonitor.com).

G7/8-Bound Trade as Percentage of Total Trade of G7/8 Members – The share of G7/8-bound trade in the total trade of G7/8 members (annual average for the G7/8; trade measured in customs-reported value) (sources: UN Common Database, unstats.un.org; Euromonitor Database, www.euromonitor.org).

Deaths and Injuries from Human-Induced Ecological Disasters Worldwide – Total number of deaths and injuries from human-precipitated ecological disasters; annual aggregate (source: UNEP GEO Data Portal, geodata.grid.unep.ch).

Average Change in Major Stock Indexes (NYSE, NIKKEI and London Stock Exchange) – Data is compiled for value of transactions, annual averages (source: Wren Research Database, www.wrenresearch.com.au).

US GDP as percentage of G7/8 Total GDP – Calculated in current US\$ (source: World Development Indicators Database, www.worldbank.org).