

Chapter 10

G8 Sanctioning Success

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Sanctions have been an integral instrument of Group of Eight (G8) governance since the very start. The G8 was first created in 1975 to defend against and defeat the oil embargo imposed by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' (OPEC) on democratic America, the Netherlands and Israel in October 1973. Inspired by the Indian nuclear explosion in May 1974, the G7 (as it was then) swiftly initiated its own sanctions, acting against nuclear proliferation through the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) formed at the time of the first summit in 1975. At the 1976 summit, most members agreed to withhold financial support desperately needed by democratic member Italy if it allowed the Communist Party members to join its governing coalition. All agreed to monitor and if necessary restrict their banks' lending to the Soviet Union so they would not be collectively overexposed. In 1978 members threatened sanctions to stop skyjacking. After the G8's successful response to the terrorist fuelled second oil shock in 1979 the G8 created the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In the 1980s, it mounted a failed attempt to stop a Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe in 1982, and action against Libya as a state supporter of terrorism in 1986 (Putnam and Bayne 1984, 1987). The post-Cold War, globalizing era brought G8 sanctions against apartheid South Africa in 1987, China over the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, financial crime in 1989, the former Yugoslavia, Indonesia in 1997 and terrorist finance since 2001. Today's G8 continues to ask how much and how to use sanctions against a now nuclear North Korea, a rapidly nuclearizing Iran, and authoritarian Sudan and Zimbabwe to counter and control the insecurity they create.

With the G8 imposing so many sanctions against so many actors for so long, there is a pressing need to address the basic question—do G8 sanctions work? So far this question has not been directly addressed or adequately answered. Among the ever-increasing number and quality of scholarly works on G8 performance, the instrument of sanctions or cases involving their use has not been selected for systematic analysis. Nor, beyond individual case studies involving Russia, has the inverse instrument—the use of carrots rather than sticks—in the form of financial reward or greater inclusion (rather than isolation) in the G8. Also largely absent have been analyses of the range of instruments in the middle, notably the dynamics

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of socialization, sharing, comparing, naming, shaming or single-out-and-shun, as pioneered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and increasingly adopted by the G8.

Thus far there have been only fragmentary judgements from scholars exploring G8 performance in general. These have offered no consensus or conclusive answers about whether the isolation of unpleasant governments (and other actors) is a winning strategy.

Among those who have looked in detail at G8 diplomacy, especially in the political-security sphere, there is a general conclusion that, in varying degrees, G8 sanctions work (Bayne 2005). Several diplomatic observers have also concluded that the G8 has appropriately and successfully used sanctions, particularly in the new security spheres of crime, nuclear safety, nuclear terrorism and terrorist finance (Pleuger 2000; Félix-Paganon 2000; Brenton 2000). Others have concluded that over time not only has the G8 been successful in utilizing sanctions, but also that its willingness and ability to do so have helped solidify its role and purpose as a global security governor (Penttilä 2003). The successful use of sanctions over the Soviet Union, skyjacking, hostages, drugs and Kosovo all stand out. Some have even argued that the G8 could replace the United Nations and its Security Council (UNSC) as the dominant institution of peace and security governance, in part because of its record of sanctions, including against nuclear non-proliferation in 1975, the Italian Communists in 1976, Soviet bank lending in 1976, missile technology in 1981, South African apartheid in 1987, and China's Tiananmen in 1989 (Kirton 2000). But these conclusions only scratch the surface and contradict much scholarly literature and public impressions about international relations that assume sanctions do not work. Needed is a deeper examination of G8 sanctions and how well, how and why they work.

This chapter presents the first systematic scholarly analysis of these central questions. It begins with the general premise that both G8 governance and the use of sanctions in international relations more broadly exhibit a wide range of effectiveness from high success to great failure. Both the institution of the G8 and the instruments of sanctions need to work for G8 sanctions to be effective. This study thus first constructs a general framework of sanctions in a G8 context, identifying the spectrum of purpose, ambition and consequent criteria of success and the key causes of probable success, using the proven concert equality model as the latter's guide (Kirton 1989). It next applies this framework to, and thus tests it against, the major cases of "hard" sanctions—those involving the threat of use of material deprivation—from 1975 to the present to see how often, how well and why G8 sanctions work. It then seeks to determine if G8 action is associated with sanctioning success, as a basis for subsequent detailed process tracing to find how much and how G8 action, amid of other causal factors, was responsible for the success or failure which came. It finally explores some possible and plausible causes of why G8 sanctions work.

This chapter shows that G8 sanctions work. Indeed, they work so well that the G8 has used them since its start, against an ever expanding array of countries and

actors, for ever more ambitious goals, and with growing success. Over its 35-year life, the G8 has moved overtly in its instruments from mild to more muscular sanctions measures, starting with statements of collective disapproval, through social and economic measures to the deployment of military force. In its targets it has scaled up its use of sanctions and targets, shifted from employing them against its own members to its greatest, and then global adversaries, and expanded to include non-state actors. In the ambition of its goals it has gone from defensively reacting to the objectionable foreign policy behaviour of adversaries in order to preserve the status quo to preventively and offensively intervening in the internal affairs of other states to induce them to adopt the values of democracy and human security that G8 members and their institution share at their core.

These shifts can be seen through three distinct, if overlapping, phases. During its first decade, from 1975 to 1985, G8 members used sanctions to preserve their top dog position, as nuclear weapons, missile capable states, to stop communist expansion in Italy, the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and Western Europe, and to stop terrorism through skyjacking, diplomatic hostage taking and state sponsorship. From 1986 to 1998, as the Cold War receded, the G8 focused its sanctions on bringing democratization and human security to states such as apartheid South Africa, Venezuela, the former Yugoslavia and Indonesia and combating the less appealing sides of globalization such as the war on drugs, financial crime and ozone destroying chemicals. In 1999 it moved to a third phase of conflict prevention, seeking to act against actors and individuals in other countries, above all Kosovo, to stop objectionable behaviour before it could flourish or even begin.

Together, the G8 has used sanctions at almost every summit, has used as many as 17 at a single summit, and has used them in over two dozen major cases in all. This intensity strongly suggests that G8 governors know, or at least think, that sanctions work in some politically valuable ways. A systematic examination of the correlation between the G8's initial objective in using sanctions and the ultimate outcome of these cases suggests that G8 governors are largely correct in their belief.

In explaining why G8 sanctions work, several causes stand out—the shared vulnerability, collective predominance and internal equality of the G8, its commonality of purpose, its control by leaders and its compressive, integrative flexibility in using a variety of economic and other instruments for political ends (Penttilä 2003, 7; Kirton 1989). Yet these core features of the concert equality model of G8 governance require three adjustments to explain G8 sanctioning success. First, the increasing G8 sanctioning success has not always been reactively driven by shocks showing growing and equalizing G8 vulnerabilities but proactively driven by its core mission and shared values of promoting democracy, individual liberty and social advance in the world. Second, constricted participation has given way to inclusive participation, starting as early as 1975 with the NSG, as the G8 has involved many others in the sanctioning coalition to better isolate the target. Third, iteration, the constant focus on a single sanctions case over several summits, helps breed eventual success (Bayne 1999). Thus the isolation of unpleasant

governments and actors is a winning strategy for the G8 but usually when the G8 through persuasion or coercion gets many others on its side.

An Analytical Framework for G8 Sanctions

To determine how much and why G8 sanctions work, it is necessary to first define sanctions and their effectiveness. From the vast literature on sanctions in international relations, the following choices can be made for the purposes at hand (Martin 1992a, 1992b; Huffbauer et al. 2009).

Sanctions can be defined as the collective threat of government actions that restrict existing or expected flows of government, business or societal behaviour between one group of countries and the targeted state or actor, in order to accomplish a specified goal. They involve a deprivation of existing or expected transfers of a material or reputational sort. "Soft" sanctions involve a reputational deprivation of status, prestige or approval, through naming, shaming, and shunning. They take the form of private, verbal statements of disapproval or exclusion from valued contacts and clubs, including international institutional isolation through exclusion or expulsion. "Hard" sanctions involve material deprivations of societal or economic flows, or the deployment and threat of employment of military force. Sanctions are thus verbal, diplomatic, social, economic or military instruments used for disapproval or denial to hinder an actor and by doing so encourage it to alter its behaviour.

This analysis focuses, at the lower level, on public, written collective statements and known private, verbal indications of disapproval by the G8 leaders at their annual summit.² At the upper end, attention focuses on cases when police or military force has been used to restrict the flow of prohibited goods or behaviour, as distinct from when the G8 moves to destroy things or people in the targeted group. In all cases sanctions must contain a clear indication of the actor and/or type of action being sanctioned and/or the alternative desired behaviour or goal. This analysis focuses on discrete major cases of G8 sanctions, excluding actions regarding the general conditionality of the international financial institutions (IFIs) (as distinct from specific critical or crisis cases of their use). It includes all cases where G8 sanctions were threatened or used. This procedure limits selection bias, by excluding only of cases where G8 sanctions could have been or should have been threatened or used but were not (King, et al. 1994).

In whatever form sanctions are invoked (threatened or imposed), there is a specific objective in mind. Thus the following six-point scale can help to determine the varying degrees of G8 sanctioning action, as a referent for success.

² Excluded are cases where one member's unilateral sanctions, such as those flowing from the Helms-Burton Act in the 1990s, are the subject of summit discussion.

1. *Reassurance.* The first purpose is to demonstrate to G8 citizens, the global community and the targeted actor that G8 governments regard the behaviour of a targeted state as offensive and signal that they are acting and may act against it in the future. Here G8 leaders declare, in effect, that “we don’t like it” and prefer something else. The G8’s reiteration of democratic values during its first decade, when specific targets were included, is a case in point.
2. *Containment.* The second purpose is to contain the damage by stopping the objectionable behaviour of the target from spreading to be adopted by other actors. Here G8 says “don’t do it too.” Attempting to stop others from exploding nuclear devices after India did in 1974 or 1998, or stopping Japan and Korea from getting nuclear weapons after North Korea exploded, are such cases.
3. *Deterrence.* The third purpose is to deter the targeted actor from engaging once again in the offensive actions. “Don’t do it again” is the message here. The case of the G8 reaction to the massacre by the communist Chinese government in Tiananmen Square is a successful case.
4. *Return.* The fourth purpose is to return the external behaviour or even the internal policy and constitution of the targeted actor to what it was before. Here the G8 says “reverse what you have done.” A failed case of return is the effort by the leaders at their 1982 summit to act against the prospective expansion of the Soviet gas pipeline to western Europe and the public destruction of the fragile consensus hours after it was announced.
5. *Prevention.* The fifth purpose is prevention. Here the G8 threatens or imposes sanctions on the target actor in advance of the latter’s intended actions and the clear and present danger they are thought by the G8 to represent. Here the G8 says “don’t do it in the first place” or “don’t do it even once.” One successful case of prevention is the compliance of the government of Italy in 1976 by not allowing Communist Party members to enter into a coalition government after the G8 made it known that financial support for an embattled Italy would be cut off if it did.
6. *Revolution.* The sixth and most far-reaching purpose is, even in the absence of new offensive behaviour from a target, to transform its external behaviour or even internal constitutional composition to have it move from what it long has been to conform to the wishes and practice of the G8 states. Here, the message is “transform what you are,” or even “become like us.” The successful cases of the democratic revolutions in South Africa, the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation and Indonesia stand out.

G8 Sanctions Use

To assess how often the G8 uses sanctions, against whom and for what goals, Appendix A shows the record of the G8's use of sanctions, from 1975 to 2009. It includes all cases where the G8 has considered, threatened or used restrictive measures for political purposes, starting from the first occasion on which it did so, and including those where the sanctions were those of the G8 or someone else.

The record shows that the G8 has used sanctions as an instrument from the very start, and used them a great deal ever since. At only two summits—1975 and 1985—did the G8 summit not deal directly with cases where sanctions were involved. At L'Aquila in 2009 it reached a high of 17 cases. Its multiyear average is about six a year, coming in three distinct phases, as described below.

The Top Dog, Cold War, Common Enemies Era, 1975-1986

The first generation of G8 sanctions came from 1975 to 1986. During these 12 years it averaged two sanctions cases a year. It peaked at five cases in 1980, just after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and the new cold war began. They arose rapidly and repeatedly, through three seminal cases worth examining in some detail.

The first case concerns Italian communists (Putnam and Bayne 1984, 1987). At the second summit, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in 1976, some of the G7 leaders privately made it known to the attending Italian leader from the Christian Democratic Party that if he allowed Communist Party members into his collapsing coalition, they would refuse to give Italy the financial support its fragile economy needed, and that a similarly beleaguered Britain had received from the IMF the year before. The threatening G7 leaders were motivated by fear of the Euro-communism then sweeping southern Europe, and perhaps by the memories of how the communists had come to power in Czechoslovakia in the late 1940s at the start of the Cold War. The Italian leader responded to his colleagues in their desired way. The Communists were kept out and the financial support came in. This first direct case of G7/8 sanctions was a clear short-term success. It was a relatively easy one, for it was aimed at preserving the status quo in a G7 member, by using the instrument that the target was highly vulnerable to and that the G7 predominantly controlled.

The second case is Soviet bank lending. Here the G8's consideration of sanctions was more public. At the conclusion of their second summit, in Puerto Rico, the G7 leaders declared: "We discussed East/West economic relations. We welcomed in this context the steady growth of East/West trade, and expressed the hope that economic relations between East and West would develop their full potential on a sound financial and reciprocal commercial basis. We agreed that this process warrants our careful examination, as well as efforts on our part to ensure that these economic ties enhance overall East/West relationships. We welcome the adoption, by the participating countries, of converging guidelines with regard to export credits. We hope that these guidelines will be adopted as soon as possible by as many countries

as possible.” On the whole they were, enough to prevent any Western economic vulnerability to the USSR.

The third case is skyjacking. On 17 July, 1978, at the conclusion of their fourth summit, held in Bonn, Germany, the G8 leaders released a separate Statement on Air Hijacking which stated: “The Heads of State and Government, concerned about terrorism and the taking of hostages, declare that their governments will intensify their joint efforts to combat international terrorism. To this end, in cases where a country refuses extradition or prosecution of those who have hijacked an aircraft and/or do not return such aircraft, the Heads of State and Government are jointly resolved that their governments shall take immediate action to cease all flights to that country. At the same time, their governments will initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. They urge other governments to join them in this commitment.” In Bayne’s view, this was “the first G7 agreement on a non-economic subject—a declaration on hijacking proposed without warning by Schmidt and concluded over a working lunch” (Baynes 2005, 21). At the Montebello Summit in 1981, in the face of a hijacked Pakistan International Airlines flight taken to Afghanistan, France adjusted its position so the G7 anti-skyjacking measures could be implemented in response. A medium-term success, and the first involving non-state actors came.

Despite this fast start, during this first generation the G8 was selective in its sanctioning. The G8 summit dealt first with Soviet bank lending and Italian communists in 1976, then with nuclear proliferation from 1977 to 1980 and again in 1984, and skyjacking from 1978 to 1981 and in 1984 and 1986-87. Starting in 1980 its sanctions agenda expanded, with the Iranian hostage-taking, USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, East-West economic relations, and the MTCR regularly added to the list.

These sanction actions tended to be catalysed by direct and at times deadly attacks on G8 citizens and territory. Sanctions arose from the Indian nuclear explosion of May 1974, repeated skyjackings, Iranian energy and terrorist shocks in 1979, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that year. They did, however, have a substantial preventive dimension, both in responding to the clear and present danger of Italian Communists in government (with the possible coup they could bring) and the more distant, cognitively constructed threat of collective vulnerability in the Soviet bank-lending case.

Sanction activity was initiated by many members, well beyond the most powerful United States. It arose at times from the spontaneous combustion of the leaders, most clearly over skyjacking in 1978 where Helmut Schmidt as the German host initiated the move and Canada seconded it. Leadership was also shown in the Italian communists and Soviet bank-lending cases. The clearest case initiated by the America alone, the 1982 Soviet gas pipeline, was the most divisive and least durable, although the Americans successfully led on the MTCR.

Several sanction instruments were used. They started with financial sanctions in 1976 over Italian communists and Soviet bank lending, moved to natural resources, goods and technology with nuclear proliferation in 1977, and then to transportation

sanctions with skyjacking in 1978. In no cases were these G8 sanctions accompanied by the consideration, threat or use of military force. However, from 1979 onward, the spectre of force was not very far away, given the failed American rescue mission for its hostages in Iran and the American-British air strikes on Libya.

These G8 sanctions were aimed at many targets, from the most powerful of the states outside the club to a weak member within, and to the new security threat from terrorists acting with or without state support. Indeed, in its first three years the G8 moved rapidly from sanctioning member Italy within to the Soviet Union without, and then skyjacking terrorists on the non-state side.

The G8's sanctioning behaviour was primarily defensive, aimed at keeping the Soviets from expanding in the Cold War competition, keeping the G8 as the top dog in the nuclear and missile fields, and dealing with the new common, non-state enemies of terrorists hijacking aircraft, seizing diplomats as hostages in Tehran, and using state support from Libya to kill state agents and civilians in London and elsewhere. The G8's seminal mission to globally promote open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, as a guiding goal, was apparent from the start, most clearly in the Italian Communist case.

There was a great deal of continuity and iteration in the G8's attention and action on sanctions (Bayne 1999). Indeed, many of the cases from this first generation remain with the world to this day, at times in expanded and more acute form. This list includes nuclear proliferation, skyjacking, Iran (with new "hostages" and with nuclear proliferation), Afghanistan (now due to the non-state al Qaeda and Taliban rather than the USSR), missile technology and even Soviet bank lending and its pipeline case, in the form of concerns about private direct investment in Russia and the security of energy from there. Only in the cases of Libya and the Soviet-related ones has the first-generation threat, like the Soviet Union itself, gone away, apparently for good due in part to G8 sanctioning success.

The Democratization, Globalization, Human Security Era, 1987-2001

The second phase of G8 sanctions, taking place from 1987 to 2001 saw the G8 turn to offense, after many years of defending against the communist threat. Now the G8 used sanctions effectively to promote democracy and human rights around the world. Over these 15 years, the G8's sanctioning attention and action averaged nine cases per year. It peaked at 16 in 1990, the year after the Berlin Wall and the cold war came tumbling down. It covered diverse issues ranging from the traditional condemnation of narcotics to newer threats like the Taliban in Afghanistan and terrorist finance.

During this era of rapid globalization, G8 countries reached out to condemn actions threatening global democracy and human security in Libya, China, South Africa, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Haiti, India-Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Myanmar. Several important cases are worth examining in detail.

On 15 July 1989, the G8's Declaration on China, following the military murders in Tiananmen Square: condemned the "violent repression in China in defiance of human rights" of those who had "done no more than claim their legitimate rights

to democracy and liberty.” The leaders stated that “this repression has led each of us to take appropriate measures to express our deep sense of condemnation to suspend bilateral ministerial and high-level contacts, and also to suspend arms-trade with China, where it exists. Furthermore, each of us has agreed that, in view of current economic uncertainties, the examination of new loans by the World Bank be postponed. We have also decided to extend the stays of those Chinese students who so desire.” These G8 sanctions were a short term success, in that China did not repeat the offensive act (Kirton 2001).

During this second phase, the G8 frequently used the term “sanction” in its publicly released communiqués in regards to Iraq, Libya and the former Yugoslavia. Iraq first appeared on the agenda in the context of sanctions in 1991, at the end of the first Gulf War. The G8 leaders announced in their political declaration that “we intend to maintain sanctions against Iraq until all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council have been implemented in full and the people of Iraq, as well as their neighbours, can live without fear of intimidation, repression or attack.” The leaders went on to assert the importance of democracy and human rights by noting “as for the Iraqi people, they deserve the opportunity to choose their leadership openly and democratically. We look forward to the forthcoming elections in Kuwait and to an improvement of the human rights situation there and in the region.” In 1994, the G8 “reiterate[d] our resolve to enforce full implementation of each and every relevant UN Security Council resolution concerning Iraq and Libya until they are complied with, and recall that such implementation would entail the reassessment of sanctions.” In 1995, the G8 repeated this call and added “we urge Iraq to reconsider its rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 986 which would permit the sale of oil and purchase of humanitarian goods.” In this case, G8 sanctions helped prevent a resumption of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program but otherwise failed, leading to the US-led invasion of 2003.

Similarly, in 1992, the G8 started endorsing UN sanctions against the former Yugoslavia. It stated that “Sanctions decided by the UN Security Council in resolution 757 as well as all other provisions of relevant UN resolutions must be fully implemented.” The following year the G8 strengthened its resolve, noting that “sanctions should be upheld until the conditions in the relevant Security Council Resolutions are met. Stronger measures are not excluded.” But it took the threat and use of force in 1999 until the case was successfully resolved, with ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and all the former Yugoslavia stopped.

The Terrorist-Nuclear Proliferation Era, 2002-2009

From 2002 to 2009, the third phase of G8 sanctioning attention and action focused primarily on terrorism, in a world that had become increasingly dangerous since the attacks on America on 11 September 2001. The leaders averaged nine sanction actions per year, with a fairly steady rise to a peak and all-time high of 17 in 2009. They focused on terrorism, by naming and shaming countries guilty of supporting or harbouring terrorists within their borders, and took up the important

issue of terrorist finance. The leaders employed both hard and soft sanctions and continued to explore new and innovative methods that could be used to tackle the target actions. In 2009, the G8 acknowledged the effectiveness and utility of these actions, including the “comprehensive sanction regime by UNSC Resolutions 1267/1999, 1373/2001, other relevant resolutions, and through implementation of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.”

Nuclear proliferation in both Korea and Iran were a significant focus of the G8’s agenda during this time. An increasingly dangerous North Korea was met by a growing number and intensity of G8 sanctions. At the 2009 summit the G8 stated, “We urge the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] to fully comply with its international obligations. In this context, we support the unanimous adoption of the Resolution 1874/2009 of the Security Council which reinforces international sanctions towards the DPRK and call upon the international community to implement fully and transparently the provisions of that Resolution.” In regards to Iran, the G8 applied a slightly less intense approach, urging them to “comply with the relevant UNSC Resolutions” and to cooperate with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] by sharing information and access as required. However, in 2009 it also condemned Iran’s Holocaust-denying leader, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, by name.

This period also saw the emergence of a major new and ongoing conflict in Sudan. As a result in 2004, 2005 and 2007, the G8 issued a separate statement to deal specifically with the case. The G8 also continued to name and shame the guilty parties in the Lebanon conflict and issued a spontaneous statement on the matter at its St Petersburg Summit in 2006. Undemocratic measures in Myanmar and Zimbabwe also led to new G8 sanctions, as did issues such as tax havens, which were spurred on by the financial crisis in 2008.

G8 Sanctions Compliance

Over time, the G8’s use of sanctions had increased in number, scope and intensity. But are the G8 members bound by the sanctioning moves they so often make? The mere fact that they use them so often offers *prima facie* evidence that they work, for it would be illogical for the G8 to keep considering, threatening or imposing sanctions if they knew from the record that they would not be kept and that the credibility of the G8 institution and its members would suffer as a result. But the Achilles heel of sanctions has long been the propensity for insiders to defect and for outsiders to free-ride or fill the gap. And the G8 has offered memorable cases—above all the Soviet gas pipeline case of 1982—where G8 sanctions agreed at the summit were abandoned by the members within hours of the summit’s end.

It would take a detailed process tracing of all members’ behaviour in all sanctions cases to know with confidence how much and why G8-associated sanctions commitments were kept. But a preliminary judgement about the first stage of their effectiveness can be made by reviewing the record of G8 compliance with the 46

measured commitments made in the cases where G8-associated sanctions arose (see appendices B and C). This review suggests several results.

First, G8 member compliance with commitments in sanctions-related cases from 1996 to 2009 shows substantial compliance, at a level of +51 percent on a scale ranging from -100 percent to +100 percent. On the more popular 0-100 percent scale, this is equivalent to +76 percent. Second, compliance varies widely by year, from an average of +100 percent in 2001 to -4 percent in 1997. Similarly compliance with individual commitments ranges widely, from +100 percent on nine occasions to -86 percent on Russian reform in 1997. Third, compliance is highest in North America, with Canada in the lead at +73 percent, followed by the US at +62 percent. Japan comes in last at +31 percent with Italy and Russia not too far behind, at 35 percent and 38 percent respectively. Thus, there may be some reason to believe that countries that have been the targets of G8 sanctions in the past seem less willing to comply with sanctions against others.

Fourth, across the sanctions-related policy areas, compliance varies widely (see appendices B and C) (Scherrer 2009). High compliance, on the whole, seems to come about when the issue area is dealt with more frequently, in areas where the G8 has been sanctioning the longest and most continuously, from almost the very start.

Yet there can be exceptions in important ways. As Appendix D shows, apart from the US, trade between all G8 members and Iran has generally risen, even as G8 sanctions against Iran have increased.

G8 Sanctions Success

Have such G8 sanctions worked, and not only in generally securing members' compliance but also in helping achieve the core political purposes for which they are used? An overview suggests that there have been far more cases of success than failure, although success often took a long time to come and causes other than G8 action were important in producing the desired results (see Appendix E).

Success can ultimately be measured by assessing whether or not the G8 secured its intended outcome in each case. From the initial cases of combating nuclear proliferation in 1975 and stopping the spread of communism in Italy in 1976 to the democratization of South Africa, Indonesia, Russia in the 1980s and 1990s and finally in combating terrorism and terrorist financing in the post-9/11 era, G8 sanctions have been successful across time, region and issue area (Bayne 2005; Félix-Paganon 2000). While there have been failures that require future monitoring and analysis, such as the Soviet gas pipeline and Indian nuclear test cases, and ongoing cases, such as Sudan and North Korean nuclear testing, on the whole G8 sanctions seem to have worked, worked reasonably well and given the G8 "what it wants" (Bayne 2005; Wadhva 1998).

Certainly other institutions, such as the OECD and UNSC, have played an important role in many of these successes. But without the G8's often initial push and follow-up action, many such sanctions may have never have been initiated,

such as stopping the spread of Italian communism, or seen through to the end, as in the case of Kosovo.

Causes of G8 Sanction Success

Why has the G8 been successful in its sanctioning? There appear to be six main, often overlapping, causes of G8 sanctioning success, starting with those highlighted by the concert equality model of G8 governance (Kirton 1989, 1993). The first is the G8 members' share shock-activated vulnerabilities, which give members a reason to act in concert against other actors who harm their collective interest. Energy concerns, Cold War threats, nuclear proliferation and 9/11 have all served to solidify such collective vulnerability. Second, the G8 share a collective predominance, which allows members to exert a clear, coordinated and central power over the actors that they are issuing their sanctions against. They often use for this purpose the world's major multilateral organization they control. The recent, rapid response of long-established tax havens to comply and share information demonstrates the power and influence the G8 and its companion G20 institution have.

Third, the G8 has an internal equality that allows each member to empathize and commiserate with each other and the challenges they face, to initiate action and to monitor the compliance of anyone who might be tempted to defect. Again, 9/11 is a clear example of this shared, "if it can happen to you, it can happen to me" feeling. Fourth, G8 members share a common purpose and set of democratic values. The members have used the G8 to promote democratic principles and even intervene in the internal affairs of others, when other institutions, such as the UN, have been unable or unwilling to.

Fifth, as a group of leaders, the G8 can make decisions and take actions that have the power and weight to be implemented immediately. Unlike other ministerial and bureaucratic institutions, the G8 has the actual power to implement and enforce sanctions. Sixth, the flexible nature of the G8 allows it to use sanctions when and as necessary, especially as it has acquired institutional depth (see Appendix F). The G8 has often included the use of sanctions at its summits as an additional or last-minute response to changing circumstances, such as in the case of North Korea, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. Seventh, the G8 has often iteratively stuck with sanctions, until they have succeeded in the medium or long term.

Conclusions

The G8's use of sanctions has been intense, important and successful, supported by the shared vulnerability among G8 members, their collective predominance, equality, shared purpose and the structure of the G8 itself. While the G8 has failed in some instances, and certain cases have taken longer than others to generate

the desired goal, G8 sanctions have, on the whole, produced the successful and desirable outcomes that the leaders have sought. Members have complied to a high degree with their sanction-related commitments. Since 1975, the G8 has increasingly used sanctions to respond to a broader range of issues.

The employment of sanctions by the G8 thus seems to be a winning strategy (Bayne 2005; Penttilä 2003; Kirton 2000; Brenton 2000; Félix-Paganon 2000). The G8's past performance and increasing use of sanctions, particularly recently, is therefore promising, especially as an alternative to using deadly military force. The G8's position as an effective governor of global peace and security is thus reinforced.

The success of the G8 with sanctions raises the question of whether it can be supported by the G20 summit, which sprang to life in November 2008 to contain the global financial and economic crisis that had erupted. Composed of 19 diverse, systematically significant countries from around the world, plus the European Union, the G20 would find it more difficult than the compact, club-like G8 with its common political values to come to any consensus on sanctions. But if it did, the breadth of its membership and predominant capabilities, constituting 85 percent of the global economy, would give its broad if shallow sanctions great force. The G20 summit's potential as a sanctioner is underscored by the speed and skill with which its precursor, the G20 finance forum created in 1999, imposed sanctions to stop terrorist finance in the immediate response to the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 (Kirton 2005). It is also suggested by the use of the third G20 summit, in Pittsburgh in September 2009, as an occasion for the leaders of the US, Britain, France and Germany to highlight Iran's illegal behaviour in its nuclear program and call for stronger sanctions in response. Because financial sanctions are often a politically easy and effective instrument, the G20 at both the leaders' and finance ministers' levels has the capacity and control to use this tool.

With the G8 and G20 summits taking place in tandem in Canada in June 2010, and with the G8 taking up Iran, North Korea and nuclear non-proliferation as a priority concern at its summit on 25-26 June, it would be easy for the G20 summit immediately afterward on 26-27 June to deal with financial sanctions in a consistent way. But that short summer had a crowded agenda and the leaders of China and Saudi Arabia could well be very reluctant to move.

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Appendix A: G8 Sanctions Use

The Top Dog, Cold War, Common Enemies Westphalian Era

1975	0	
1976	1	Soviet bank lending
1977	1	Nuclear proliferation
1978	2	Proliferation, skyjacking
1979	2	Proliferation, skyjacking
1980	5	Proliferation, skyjacking, Iran hostages, USSR Afghanistan, bribery
1981	4	Skyjacking, Iran hostages, USSR Afghanistan, MTCR
1982	4	Soviet bank lending, MTCR, Soviet Pipeline, Export Credits
1983	1	Soviet bank lending (General)
1984	3	Proliferation, skyjacking, Libyan terrorism
1985	0	
1986	2	Skyjacking, Libyan terrorism

The Democratization, Globalization, Human Security Intervention Era

1987	7	Skyjacking, Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, South Africa, Venezuela, drugs
1988	4	Afghanistan, skyjacking, drugs, South Africa
1989	7	Skyjacking, hostages, Libya, China Tiananmen, S. Africa, Ozone, FATF
1990	16	Skyjacking, Hostages, China, South Africa, ozone, FATF, export credits, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, assistance to the former Soviet Union, drugs, chemicals, terrorism, proliferation/NSG, MTCR, CB proliferation, Korea
1991	12	Skyjacking, hostages, South Africa, FATF, drugs, chemicals, proliferation/NSG, MTCR, CB proliferation, Iraq, Arab boycott, former Yugoslavia
1992	2	Non-proliferation, Yugoslavia
1993	8	Libya, South Africa, MTCR, Korea, Iraq, Arab boycott, former Yugoslavia, Iran
1994	14	Libya, FATF, drugs, terrorism, proliferation/NSG, MTCR, CB proliferation, Korea, Iraq, Arab boycott, former Yugoslavia, Iran, Haiti, crime
1995	12	Libya, terrorism, CB proliferation, Korea, Iraq, Arab boycott, conventional arms, former Yugoslavia, Iran, nuclear smuggling, India-Pakistan, Myanmar

1996	12	Drugs, terrorism, proliferation/NSG, CBproliferation, Korea, Arab boycott, conventional arms, former Yugoslavia, Iran, nuclear smuggling, corruption, toxics
1997	5	Chemicals, terrorism, Korea, conventional arms, Iran
1998	10	FATF, drugs, terrorism, proliferation/NSG, MTCR, Korea, Iraq, conventional arms, crime, India-Pakistan
1999	8	FATF, drugs, proliferation/NSG, MTCR, Korea, crime, India-Pakistan, terrorist finance
2000	8	Skyjacking, hostages, FATF, drugs, terrorism, crime, corruption, Afghanistan Taliban terrorism
2001	3	Terrorism, anarchy violence, Middle East violence

The Conflict Prevention Era

2002	3	India-Pakistan, terrorism, nuclear trafficking
2003	5	FATF, terrorism, proliferation/NSG, Korea, terrorist finance
2004	5	Terrorism, proliferation/NSG, Korea, Iran, Sudan
2005	5	Terrorism, Korea, Iran, MidEast, Zimbabwe
2006	9	FATF, terrorism, Korea, conventional arms, Iran, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan/Armenia, Lebanon/Israel, Mumbai terrorist attack
2007	16	Sudan, Iran, Middle East, Middle East Peace Process, Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea, WMD, IAEA, nuclear enrichment, Iranian nuclear program, North Korea nuclear tests, India, nuclear terrorism, HCOC, raw materials
2008	12	Raw materials, IPR, corruption, tax evasion, North Korea, Iran, FMCT, counter proliferation, terrorism, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Myanmar
2009	17	Tax evasion, corruption, Iranian elections, maritime piracy, North Korea, Israeli-Palestine, Myanmar, North Korea nuclear test, WMD, Iran nuclear program, nuclear terrorism, HCOC, terrorist financing, terrorism, biological and chemical weapons, transparency, denying holocaust

Total: 225 cases, average of 6

Notes: By number of sanctions cases recorded in the summit documentation. CB = chemical and biological weapons; FATF = Financial Action Task Force; FMCT = Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; HCOC = Hague Code of Conduct; IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency; MTCR = missile technology control regime; NSG = Nuclear Suppliers Group; WMD = weapons of mass destruction.

Appendix B: Compliance with G8 sanction-related commitments by issue area and year

Issue	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	Ave.
Terrorism	0.83	-	-	1.00	0.40	1.00	1.00	1.00	-	1.00	0.56	0.22	-0.22	68%
Human rights	0.83	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	83%
Conventional arms control	0.33	-	-	0.88	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	49%
Landmines	0.71	0.75	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73%
Conflict in Europe/Yugoslavia/Bosnia	1.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100%
Transnational crime/drugs	0.50	0.00	-	0.88	-	0.25	0.25	-	0.11	1.00	0.00	-	-	39%
Terrorist financing	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.50	0.44	-	-	-	-	-3%
Russian reform	-	-0.86	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-86%
Human trafficking	-	-	0.25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25%
Financial Action Task Force	-	-	-	0.00	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.78	-	39%
Conflict prevention/illicit trade in diamonds	-	-	-	-	0.53	-	0.38	-	-	-	-	0.11	-	34%
Weapons of Mass Destruction/non-proliferation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.00	0.78	1.00	0.56	0.26	0.33	66%
Sudan/Darfur	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.89	0.89	-	0.78	-	85%
Corruption	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.78	0.67	73%
Average	70%	-4%	25%	50%	67%	100%	47%	50%	56%	97%	37%	49%	26%	51%
Overall average														

Note: To be included as a sanction-related commitment, the commitment must refer to the issue area that is (or has been at previous summits) targeted for sanctions. The commitment does not have to contain the text of the sanction within it. Due to mathematical errors, some numbers are not the same as those contained in the G8 Research Group reports available at: <www.g8.utoronto.ca/compliance...>

Appendix C: G8 sanction-related compliance by country


Year	Issue	Ave	US	UK	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Canada	Russia	EU
1996	Average (6)	70%	33%	83%	67%	100%	20%	100%	100%	na	na
1996	Terrorism	0.83	1	0	1	1	1	na	1	na	na
1996	Human rights	0.83	1	1	1	1	0	na	1	na	na
1996	Conventional arms	0.33	-1	1	0	1	0	na	1	na	na
1996	Landmines	0.71	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	na	na
1996	Europe/Yugoslavia/Bosnia	1.00	1	1	1	1	na	1	1	na	na
1996	Crime/drugs	0.50	0	1	0	1	0	na	1	na	na
1997	Average (3)	-4%	00%	00%	00%	-33%	33%	-33%	33%	00%	na
1997	Landmines	0.75	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	na
1997	Crime/drugs	0.00	1	0	0	-1	0	-1	1	0	na
1997	Russian reform	-0.86	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	-1	na	na
1998	Average (1)	25%	na	na	00%	00%	100%	na	na	na	na
1998	Human trafficking	0.25	na	na	0	0	1	na	na	na	na
1999	Average (2)	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%	50%
1999	Terrorism	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
1999	Financial Action Task Force	0.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2000	Average (4)	67%	75%	100%	75%	100%	50%	67%	75%	33%	na
2000	Terrorism	0.40	1	1	0	na	0	na	0	na	na
2000	Conventional arms	0.88	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	na
2000	Crime/drugs	0.88	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	na
2000	Conflict prevention	0.53	1	1	1	1	0	0	1	0	na
2001	Average (1)	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	na
2001	Terrorism	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	na
2002	Average (4)	47%	75%	50%	75%	50%	00%	00%	75%	50%	na
2002	Terrorism	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	na
2002	Crime/drugs	0.25	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	na
2002	Conventional arms	0.25	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	na
2002	Conflict prevention	0.38	1	1	1	1	-1	-1	1	0	na
2003	Average (3)	50%	67%	67%	100%	67%	67%	67%	100%	67%	na
2003	Terrorism	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	na
2003	Terrorist financing	-0.50	-1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	na
2003	WMD/non-proliferation	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	na
2004	Average (4)	56%	75%	50%	75%	50%	50%	50%	50%	00%	75%

Appendix C (continued)

Year	Issue	Ave	US	UK	France	Germany	Japan	Italy	Canada	Russia	EU
2004	Crime/drugs	0.11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	Terrorist financing	0.44	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
2004	WMD/nonproliferation	0.78	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1
2004	Sudan/Darfur	0.89	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
2005	Average (4)	97%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	75%	100%
2005	Terrorism	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2005	Crime/drugs	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2005	WMD/nonproliferation	1.00	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2005	Sudan/Darfur	0.89	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
2006	Average (3)	37%	33%	67%	33%	33%	33%	00%	67%	33%	33%
2006	Terrorism (energy)	0.56	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
2006	Crime/drugs	0.00	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006	WMD/nonproliferation	0.56	0	1	0	1	1	0	1	1	0
2007	Average (8)	39%	75%	38%	50%	38%	13%	13%	50%	38%	38%
2007	Raw Materials	0.11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2007	Corruption	0.33	1	1	1	0	-1	0	0	0	0
2007	WMD/FMCT	0.11	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	-1	0
2007	WMD/HCOG	0.56	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
2007	Sudan/Darfur	0.78	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
2007	Terrorism	0.22	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2007	FMCT	0.78	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	1
2007	WMD/GP	0.22	1	0	0	1	-1	0	0	1	0
2008	Average (3)	26%	100%	33%	-33%	00%	-67%	33%	67%	33%	67%
2008	Corruption	0.67	1	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
2008	WMD/non-proliferation	0.33	1	1	-1	1	-1	0	1	1	0
2008	Terrorism	-0.22	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	0	-1	1
Ave.		51%	62%	58%	57%	51%	31%	35%	73%	38%	58%

Note: To be included as a sanction-related commitment, the commitment must refer to the issue area that is (or has been at previous summits) targeted for sanctions. The commitment does not have to contain the text of the sanction within it. Due to mathematical errors, some numbers are not the same as those in the G8 Research Group compliance reports available at <www.g8toronto.ca/compliance>. FMCT = Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; GP = Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; HCOG = The Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. WMD = Weapons of mass destruction.

Appendix D: Trade between G8 Members and Iran, 1977-2008



Source: Based on United Nations data compiled by Sara Shearkhani.

Appendix E: Outcomes of major G8 sanctions cases

Year	Case	Time Frame	Outcome
1975	Nuclear proliferation	Medium to 1998	Success
1976	Italian Communists	Short	Success
1976	Soviet bank lending	Short	Success
1978	Skyjacking	Medium	Success
1979	Iranian hostages	Short	Success
1980	Soviet's Afghanistan	Medium	Success
1981	Missile technology	Medium	Success
1982	Lebanon	Medium	Success
1982	Soviet gas pipeline	Short	Failure
1984	Libyan terrorism	Long	Success
1987	Drugs	Ongoing	Failure so far
1987	South Africa apartheid	Medium	Success
1989	China Tienanmen	Short	Success
1989	Ozone	Short	Success
1989	Financial crime	Ongoing	Success so far
1991	Iraq	Short	Failure
1992	Former Yugoslavia	Medium	Success
1997	Indonesia democracy	Short	Success
1998	Indian nuclear test	Short	Failure
1999	East Timor	Short	Success
2001	Terrorist finance	Ongoing	Success so far
2004	Sudan	Ongoing	Success so far
2006	Nuclear terrorism	Ongoing	Success so far
2006	Iran	Ongoing	Failure so far
2006	North Korea	Ongoing	Failure so far
2006	Lebanon	Ongoing	Failure so far
2007	Myanmar	Ongoing	Failure so far
2007	Zimbabwe	Short	Success
2008	Tax havens	Short	Success

Notes: Includes only cases where sanctions were clearly specified in the G7/G8 leaders' documents. Year refers to first mention. Case refers to the issue for which sanctions were applied. Time frame refers to the length of time the G7/G8 dealt with the case (Short term [1-2 years]; Medium term [3-10 years]; Long term [10+ years]).

Appendix F: G7/8 official level bodies*First Cycle (8)*

- 1975 London Nuclear Suppliers Group
- 1977 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group
- 1979 High-Level Group on Energy Conservation and Alternative Energy
- 1979 International Energy Technology Group
- 1979 High-Level Group to Review Oil Import Reduction Progress
- 1980 International Team to Promote Collaboration on Specific Projects on Energy Technology
- 1980 High-Level Group to Review Result on Energy
- 1981 Missile Technology Control Regime

Second Cycle (9)

- 1982 Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment
- 1982 Consultations and Coordination on East-West Relations
- 1982 Representatives to control exports of strategic goods
- 1982 Procedures for multilateral surveillance of economic performance
- 1985 Expert Group for Foreign Ministers
- 1985 Expert Group on Desertification and Dry Zone Grains
- 1985 Expert Group on Environmental Measurement
- 1986 Group of Experts on Terrorism
- 1987 International Ethics Committee on AIDS

Third Cycle (14)

- 1989 Financial Action Task Force (with others, secretariat from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
- 1989 International Ethics Committee on AIDS
- 1990 Chemical Action Task Force, 1990-1992 (with others)
- 1990 Task Force to Study the State of the Soviet Economy
- (1990 Permanent Working Group on Assistance to Russia)
- 1990 Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group
- 1992 Nuclear Safety Working Group
- 1992 Group of Experts on the Prevention and Treatment of AIDS
- 1993 Support Implementation Group
- 1993 G8 Non-Proliferation Experts Group
- 1995 Counterterrorism Experts Group
- 1995 G7/P8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Lyon Group)
- 1995 GIP National Coordinators
- 1995 Development Committee Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks

Fourth Cycle (16)

- 1996 Nuclear Safety Working Group
- 1996 Lyon Group
- 1997 Expert Group on Financial Crime
- 1997 Subgroup on High Tech Crime (of the Lyon Group)
- 1997 Officials Group on Forests
- 2000 Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting
- 2000 Renewable Energy Task Force
- 2000 Digital Opportunities Task Force (Dot-Force)
- 2000 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis
- 2001 G8 Task Force on Education
- 2001 Personal Representatives for Africa
- 2002 Energy Officials Follow-up Process
- 2002 G8 Global Partnership Review Mechanism
- 2002 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group
- 2002 G8 Experts on Transport Security
- 2002 Global Health Security Laboratory Network

Fifth Cycle (up to 2008) (41)

- 2003 High-Level Working Group on Biometrics
- 2003 Counter-Terrorism Action Group
- 2003 Radioactive Sources Working Group
- 2003 Senior Officials for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development
- 2003 G8 Enlarged Dialogue Meeting
- 2003 Forum for the Partnership with Africa
- 2003 Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) Laboratory Network
- 2003 Technical Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
- 2004 Global Partnership Senior Officials Group (GPSOG), January 2004
- 2004 Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)
- 2004 Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise
- 2004 Microfinance Consultative Group
- 2004 Best Practices Microfinance Training Centre
- 2004 Democracy Assistance Dialogue
- 2004 Task Force on Investment
- 2004 G8 Expert-Level Meetings on Peace Support in Africa
- 2004 Friends of the Convention on Corruption
- 2004 G8 Accelerated Response Teams on Corruption
- 2004 International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)
- 2004 IPHE Implementation-Liaison Committee
- 2004 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)
- 2004 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP)
- 2004 Generation IV International Forum (GIF)

- 2004 Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)
- 2005 Dialogue on Sustainable Energy
- 2005 Working Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms
- 2005 Experts on IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting
- 2005 Global Bioenergy Partnership
- 2005 African Dialogue Follow-up Mechanism (Africa, paragraph 33)
- 2006 G8 expert group to develop criteria and procedures for evaluating educational outcomes and qualifications
- 2006 G8 expert group on the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to IPR enforcement
- 2006 G8 expert, UN and other international organization group on the feasibility of implementing stabilization and reconstruction measures
- 2006 G8 expert group on securing energy infrastructure
- 2007 Structured High Level Dialogue with major emerging economies (Heiligendamm process)
- 2007 Sustainable Buildings Network with G8 and major emerging economies
- 2007 Regional Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Investment Fund
- 2007 International Working Group on Land Transport Security composed of G8 and non-G8 countries
- 2008 G8 Experts Group to monitor implementation on food security
- 2008 Climate Investment Funds (CIF; CTF; SCF)
- 2008 Energy forum
- 2008 Global Remittances Working Group

Note: Excludes one-off meeting or conferences.