

A Committed Contributor: Japan in G8 and G20 Governance

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Introduction

There is currently profound pessimism about Japan’s performance and prospects, both outside the country and within. The long litany of woes begins with the global financial and economic crisis that has sent Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth into a severe recessionary plunge, its export surplus into deficit, its unemployment up and its government into major fiscal stimulus programs that compound its already formidable burden of accumulated debt. The crisis has already compounded an array of chronic problems, from the plight of contract workers, through the rise in income inequality to the burdens a rapidly aging and retiring population will impose on family structures, the social safety net, and the deficits and debt burden.

It is, however, of considerable intellectual benefit, if cold comfort for those suffering from the current gloom, to recall that many of these maladies are not new, in kind and even in some cases in degree. Japan’s lost decade of the 1990s has given it a recent policy relevance and even resilience that can temper the psychological devastation of the current downturn. Its experience can offer lessons for others about how to deal with bad banks and use innovative monetary policy, especially as Japan has largely escaped the epidemic of failing financial institutions currently sweeping much of the North Atlantic world. Beyond the traditional linkages of trade, Japan has largely escaped the newer contagion mechanisms unleashed first in the Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997-99 and now more virulently in the American-turned-global financial crisis since 2008. And Japan’s long-known problems of income inequality, job insecurity and aging have not yet led to any civil strikes of the sort now frequent in Europe and right next door in China.

This broader perspective on Japan’s performance highlights a central fact that could otherwise be obscured by the current gloom. Even as Japan has been afflicted by today’s domestic difficulties and international obstacles, it has remained a reliable, resilient, first-ranked, global governor in the world at large. This performance is evident not only in regional bodies of transnational reach and relevance, such as the Association for South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the East Asian Summit (EAS), and in the old multilateral Bretton Woods–United Nations bodies. In addition, it is most striking in those informal, plurilateral, summit institutions that have arisen to conduct contemporary global governance — above all the Group of Eight (G8) major market democracies and its recent offspring, the Group of Twenty (G20) systemically significant, established and emerging states. The record clearly shows that Japan continues to be a committed and consequential contributor to global governance, and convincingly suggests that this will continue to be its role in the world.

The only puzzle is why, amidst all the challenges Japan confronts at home and abroad. The most convincing answers lie at the international level of analysis, rather than the societal or state levels, and in the shock-activated vulnerabilities and the institutionalized structure of the international system, rather than in the raw relative capability ratios that neo-realists reach to use. An insecure Japan has a very high demand for effective global governance, to confront its conventional state-to-state vulnerabilities from still threatening neighbours and distant wars and its newer non-state vulnerabilities from nuclear accidents (1986), terrorism (1995), infectious disease (2003), extreme environmental events of earthquakes and typhoons, climate change with its rising sea levels and, potentially, finance.¹ Yet starting with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) controlled by the veto-wielding Permanent Five members, the 1994-45 Bretton Woods–UN system headquartered in the United States still denies Japan its rationally and democratically rightful place in global governance, while the G8-G20 alternative has granted that position to Japan from the very start.

Japan's G8 Governance, 1975-2008

Japan's leadership in G8 governance is the easiest to identify, especially as it recently served as host of the G8 summit in Toyako, Hokkaido, on July 7-9, 2008. Yet its first-ranked record as a committed G8 contributor dates back to the very start of the summit at Rambouillet, France, in 1975. During these 35 years of now G8-plus summitry, Japan is the only member to have consistently hosted successful summits, having done so on all of the five occasions when it has been put to the test.

As Appendix A shows in part, in the overall achievements of the annual summits, as assessed by Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne (1987), Japan stands out as the only G8 member to mount consistently successful summits (Bayne 2000, 195; Bayne 2005, 18, 214). As Appendix A shows, Japan as a host scores B+ in 1979, B+ in 1986, C+ in 1993 and B in 2000, for an overall hosting average of B–, the highest in the club. Japan has never hosted a summit that has scored below C+. Importantly, Japan's high-performing summits have come from their achievements first in the political-security fields of energy and terrorism, next in the G7's economic institutional development, and then in trade.

Evaluations by elite daily newspaper editorialists, sherpas and G7/8 experts tend to confirm this view (Kirton 1998, 301). Moreover, former Japanese sherpa Hisashi Owada (1994), evaluating the most successful and significant summits from 1975 to 1993 from a Japanese perspective, places both Tokyo 1979 and Tokyo 1993 on his list of the top five.

The “objectives obtained” performance has been able to obtain its summit objectives very well at each annual summit since 1996. Japan's average record of B+ places it, along with many other others, in the top tier of summit performers overall. Japan's poor grades in 1998 and 1999 are offset by its strong grades in 1996, 1997 and 2000. At Evian 2003, Japan was awarded the top grade of A–, along with the U.S., Russia and Italy. At Sea Island 2004, Japan received B+, just below the U.S. and UK at A– each, tied with France and the European Union, and ahead of Germany and Russia with B, Canada with B– and Italy with C–. Because so many members are simultaneously able to get what they most want from the G8 summit, it seems that a process of mutual balance adjustment is what enables Japan, along with its many partners, to do so well.

¹ Japan leads the G8 and the Group of Five countries (see below) in having its political capital (Tokyo), economic capital (Osaka) and all of its major cities on a coast and thus subject to sea-level rise.

On the individual dimensions of G8 performance, as Appendix A again shows, Japan also stands out, often in first place. It leads by far in the use of its summit record for purposes of domestic political management, as measured by references to the G8 in the national policy addresses of G8 members every year or so. In deliberation it has tended to host summits with average performance, with a notably higher performance against the cycle average in 2000 and a notably lower one in 2008. In decisional commitments it has similarly hosted average summits, with notably higher performances in 1979 and 2008. In the development of G8 governance, Japan as host has strongly succeeded in institutionalizing the G8 system, especially at the ministerial level for energy in 1979, finance in 1986 and agriculture in 2008 — subjects with a sound fit with the new vulnerabilities Japan confronts. While a clear and consistent democratically devoted minimalist in regard to summit membership, it has been a 21st-century leader in outreach to other countries and international institutions, first in 2000 and above all at Toyako. Then it hosted the first summit of the Major Economies Meeting of 16 countries (MEM-16), which added Japan's democratic Asian neighbours of South Korea, Indonesia and Australia to the now familiar roster of Group of Five (G5) guests Mexico, Brazil, China, India and South Africa.²

Taken together, the overall profile is of a Japan that has led in effectively developing the G8 as an effective decision-making centre of global governance, in ways that matter to its domestic politics back home.

Japan as a Committed Complier with G8 Commitments, 1975-2008

Japan also has a respectable if not robust record in delivering G8 governance, by reliably complying with the summit commitments the G8 has made. Both in the study of G7 members' compliance with all their economic and energy commitments from 1975 to 1989 and in the more recent studies on compliance with the G8's priority economic, transnational and security commitments, Japan has come in just under the country average of compliance, making it almost as committed a complier as the club's members as a whole. During the post-Cold War period, as Appendix B shows, Japanese compliance averaged +46, compared to a G8 average of +51. Japan thus ranks sixth among the nine members, after the EU at +67, Canada at +64, Britain at +61, the U.S. at +60, Germany at +55 and France at +50, but ahead of Italy at +30 and Russia at +25.

Where Japan leads is in hosting summits with high compliance performance, thanks to the 1993 Tokyo Summit's +57 and the 2000's +75 (almost certainly the highest complying summit among the 35 held to date). This suggests, to realists, that Japan is highly successful in designing and delivering summits as host where the other members comply with the commitments crafted at Japan's initiative and in accordance with its image and agenda, while complying less well with the commitments from the many other summits its partners host to forward their priorities.

The composite conclusion is that G8 governance works for Japan in effectively getting its powerful partners, including the U.S., to do what Japan wants, both for itself and for providing global public goods. Japan also works for the G8 as a reasonably committed complier. But on balance, Japan gets more compliance than it gives at the G8. This seems like a sharp contrast to its balance sheet at the UN, where it gives a lot in financial contributions, but receives relatively

² The leaders of Mexico, Brazil, China, India and South Africa have been invited to participate in part of the G8 summit since the British-hosted 2005 Gleneagles Summit. They have been referred to as the Outreach Five (O5) and Plus Five, but in 2008 on the eve of the Toyako Hokkaido Summit, they issued a statement referring to themselves as the Group of Five (G5). These five countries are the G8's partners in the Heiligendamm Process. For convenience, the term G5 is used in this paper.

little in control, appointments to the most senior positions or having headquarters located in its home.

This comfortable realist conclusion requires some supplement from findings about how G8 leaders can craft their commitments to increase compliance in the fields of finance and development, climate change and health. The composite conclusion from a continuing research program is that compliance is explained not by changing relative capability or even vulnerability among countries but by the presence in the commitment of specific compliance catalysts that the leaders can control. Here Japan has a very distinctive profile of cocktail catalysts that work to raise its compliance with G8 health commitments (as assessed from the 46 measured health commitments of the 225 that G8 has ever made). It is the G8's only committed comprehensive multilateralist, for only its compliance and that of Britain rise where the core international institution for health — the World Health Organization — is invoked, and only Japan's alone rises when other international institutions relevant to health are noted. Japan's compliance rises (along with that of Britain, Germany and Italy) when the health commitment is given priority placement in the communiqué. And Japan is the only country where compliance does not fall when the commitment references a past promise the G8 has made. Japan in the G8 seems to be uniquely committed to complying with G8 commitments, from the G8's past and through and with the multilateral institutions in the world.

Japan's Contribution as 2008 G8 Host

A closer look at the design, delivery, and results of the 2008 summit shows where Japan's G8 diplomacy has been most adept. At Toyako the G8 leaders made substantial advances in several very difficult, tightly interconnected fields. On climate change, the defining challenge for the summit, they affirmed an alternative to the failed UN approach in which a little group of rich countries promised to do a little bit for a little while and largely failed to do it. In its place all G8 leaders agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least half by 2050. The G8 affirmed an innovative, bottom-up sectoral strategy to which both the developed and developing worlds would contribute. They offered major new financing and technology to developing countries and liberalized trade in environmentally enhancing products. All major emitters pledged that all would act to control their carbon and identified ways in which they would do so in the short and medium term. As a result, the United States, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, at long last and just in time, accepted politically binding commitments to reduce carbon under a now genuinely global and prospectively effective climate control regime.

On development, especially in Africa, G8 leaders moved forward on health, water, education and development assistance by reaffirming past commitments, adding mechanisms to monitor their compliance and supporting the healthcare workforce and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They produced innovative medium-term approaches to food security by exploring a G8 strategic grains reserve and asking their agriculture ministers to meet for the first time. They further promised to enhance infrastructure, reduce corruption and build peace support capabilities in Africa and around the world.

On their pressing political-security agenda, the G8 leaders moved with determination to restore democracy in Zimbabwe through actions set forth in a separate statement. They supported democracy in Afghanistan and their war against terrorism there. They supported sanctions and incentives to stop nuclear proliferation in Iran and offered incentives to do so in North Korea. They further stood up for democracy, the rule of law and human security in Myanmar, Sudan and the Middle East.

On strengthening the G8's own architecture for global governance, its leaders created a mechanism to monitor more credibly, and thus help deliver more effectively, their compliance with their many ambitious summit commitments, especially those on health, that come due in 2010. They received an interim report on the Heiligendamm Process and enthusiastically took the next incremental step toward including those outreach partners who show they are ready to accept the demanding responsibilities of being part of the G8 club. They said a second MEM-16 summit would be held as part of their G8 summit next year, in which the G5 members would participate for a longer time.

Only on the economy, amidst a housing crisis, credit contraction, slowing growth, rising inflation, and soaring energy and food prices, did Japan's G8 summit fail. G8 leaders ignored the poor growth in their economies and chose inflation alone as the key concern. They called for imbalances to be reduced but did nothing to stop the dollar's drop. Their treatment of trade and energy was equally mundane. They did set new directions for managing sovereign wealth funds and offered political, if not practical, support for shared and secured innovation and intellectual property rights.

A push toward high performance at Toyako flowed from several forces. The first was the shock from oil prices reaching historic highs, from cyclones and floods that showed the costs of uncontrolled climate change, and from bank bankruptcies hurting G8 citizens already suffering from soaring food and gas prices, falling home and stock prices, contracting credit and confidence, and slowing wages and jobs. A second force was the internally equalizing and globally predominant capability among G8 members, thanks to an economically slowing U.S. with its dropping dollar, a rising Japan and Russia, and an expanding EU and strengthening euro. A third force was the common commitment of the G8 countries and all their 16 invited participating countries — with the exception of China — to the G8's core values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, as applied to energy security, African development, Zimbabwe, Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Middle East, North Korea and Iran.

However, several substantial obstacles stood in the way of a strong summit success, containing a big breakthrough codified in ambitious quantitative targets and timetables on climate change. There were no severe shocks to security, energy supply, national financial systems or health to show the G8 leaders their countries' immediate vulnerability to global threats from outside and propel them into the high performance of past summits, such as Japan's first in 1979. Moreover, the UN system had already made promising efforts to respond to clean technology investment, the global food crisis and nuclear proliferation in Iran, if not to human security in Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Sudan. The UN also offered an alluring Kyoto protocol precedent as an alternative process and a December 2009 Copenhagen deadline to tempt some G8 and G5 powers to delay acting on climate change at Toyako in the self-interested hope of getting themselves a better deal later on. Many of the most powerful G8 members, including host Japan, sent to the summit leaders who did not firmly control their parties or legislatures, who were deeply unpopular with their voters and who would not be in office long enough personally to deliver the promises they made. There was a particularly strong temptation to delay doing any big deal on climate change, health, development and trade until 2009, when a new American president and Congress would arrive to fulfill the hope that they would accommodate the G8 and G5 partners' most audacious demands. Finally, with eight invited African leaders participating in the summit's first day, and the world's eight other major emitters and emerging economies on the third, there was only one day in the middle for the G8 leaders to be alone to mobilize their collective political will and responsibility to lead the world, on issues as complex as the financial, food and energy crisis, and much else.

In the end, they used their short time to good effect. Their invited partners joined all G8 colleagues in the critical task of controlling climate change, just enough to make the summit a success. America's George Bush and China's Hu Jintao showed that they were statesmen, by making the adjustments needed to produce the badly needed big global deal on climate change. With America, its Congress and Bush himself already moving in this direction, Hu's ecologically vulnerable country assumed a global responsibility commensurate with its global rise. Japan's high-risk summit strategy thus paid off. Against all the odds, Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda as G8 host proved to be a G8 global governor of the first rank.

Japan's Contribution to G20 Summitry, 2008-2009

The combination of the September 15, 2008, advent of a post-World War Two global financial crisis unprecedented in scope, speed and scale, and the failure of G8 financial and economic governance in Japan earlier that year in July, inspired the G20 finance ministers and central bankers forum to leap into summit-level governance, first in Washington DC on November 14-15, 2008, then in London on April 1-2, 2009, and very probably in the U.S. at the end of September 2009. The promise of three expanded summits within a year confirm that the centre of global financial, economic and trade governance has passed at the summit level to the G20 from a G8 that abandoned those challenges some years ago.³ If Japan is indeed a committed contributor to contemporary global governance, it is important to identify its performance at the G20 summits over the past half year.

At first glance the G20 summit might appear to be the club of and for a rapidly rising China's global governance in the 21st century, just as the G8 had been for a rising Japan in the last quarter of the 20th century. Moreover, the catalytic cause of G20 summitry — the 2008-09 American-turned-global financial and economic crisis — would seem to reinforce that impression, given that the crisis had devastated the Japanese economy far more than it had the Chinese one. Yet a closer examination reveals that despite these handicaps in the global challenge and in the global governance architecture in response, Japan has proven to be a G20 leader far more than China has.

In the G8 Japan, along with Canada, and China and the other G5 partners outside, is positioned as a provider rather than a consumer of global financial security. In sharp contrast to the 1990s, when the 1998 Birmingham Summit harshly ordered Japan to clean up its bad banks, Japan has avoided the collapse or compromise of any of its financial institutions. It has thus served as a leader and a lesson giver to its partners in how best to clean up their own bad banks. As an island of stability in the field of financial regulation, and as still the second most powerful member of the G8 club, it has helped lead the club in effectively resisting the demands of the continental Europeans for heavy government regulation, with supranational characteristics comparable to those of their own EU. China, with its still relatively closed financial system and ongoing legacy of bad debts, has had less to contribute to this debate and outcome. It saved its influence on the financial regulation agenda for ensuring that Hong Kong and Macao were not singled out as tax havens whose regulatory advantages must end.

³ Indeed, the 1975-89 compliance data suggest that the G7 had abandoned financial and economic governance from the start where compliance was concerned. Its members' compliance with the commitments on trade at +73 and energy at +66 was high, those on real growth in gross national product (GNP) at +40, on multi-country inflation, aid, fiscal adjustment, demand composition, interest rates and inflation rates, all in the +20 range were low, while that on foreign exchange rates, at -70, was almost the opposite of what the G7 had sought.

In the field of fiscal stimulus, Japan has been a G20 leader in the size, speed and frequency of the packages it has unleashed. While driven by its domestic difficulties, these packages have had the effect of generating domestic demand, rather than promoting exports, to the benefit of its G20 partners, with its fellow Asians integrated into its supply chains benefiting first and most. It has shown all G20 leaders that it can do this despite its domestically unpopular leader, politically uncontrolled legislature and massive government deficits and debt. At the London G20 Summit second-ranked Japan was an outspoken supporter of American president Barack Obama's preference for a priority on the G20 endorsing, as it did, whatever more fiscal stimulus was needed to get the crisis solved. In accordance with this consensus, Japan soon after the summit acted yet again, with a third round of fiscal stimulus, delivered just as the forecasts released by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded that G20 and global growth was worse than it had thought only a few short months before. Japan is thus ahead of the stimulus curve, while its G8 partners, including first-ranked America, third-ranked Germany (also facing elections in the fall) and London Summit host Britain, stall in complying with the "whatever it takes" fiscal stimulus pledge. Japan's fiscal stimulus also stands out in its quality, for its package contains less spending for infrastructure such as the "roads to nowhere" that did little to enhance its economic, energy and environmental security in the past. In contrast, China's fiscal stimulus, while seemingly large, remains opaque.

In monetary policy, Japan is also a G20 leader. It led the world a decade ago in massive interest rate reductions and prolonged near-zero interest rates. It is thus the mentor in how they work in major economies when real estate and stock market bubbles burst and deflationary death spirals loom.

In the field of trade and investment protectionism, both G20 summits have firmly taken an aggressive anti-protectionist pledge. Japan has not visibly violated it, according to data from the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and civil society sources, even as its exports have collapsed. China has, however, violated that pledge, both on trade and on investment. Its use of anti-monopoly regulations to prevent the takeover of a relatively small domestic fruit-juice producer does not bode well for the prospects of preventing investment protectionism in the world, nor for the Heiligendamm Process of structured dialogue, where investment is one of the subject areas and whose future will be defined at the Italian-hosted G8 summit on July 8-10, 2009.

In the field of the resources and reform of international financial institutions, Japan's G20 leadership has been unmatched. At the time of the Washington Summit, it pledged to make a contribution to the international financial institutions, and offered an impressively large \$100 billion loan. Only at the end of the London Summit did China contribute, in much more modest proportions and in a more opaque way. While China's contribution importantly showed it was willing to accept its global responsibilities before securing its right to enhanced voice and vote at the IMF and the World Bank, in G20 diplomacy and in Bretton Woods governance, China followed while Japan led.

Japan is also committed to developing the G20 as an institution, just as it has long been for the G8. Japan offered to host the second and third G20 summits. While its offers were not accepted, this decision was due to the difficulties of scheduling a time and place for so many world leaders to meet at such short notice. In this latter respect, this situation was different than the refusal to accept Japan's offer to host the G7's second, third and fourth summits from 1976 to 1978.

In G20 as well as G8 governance, Japan thus remains a committed contributor and indeed a leader, even in the face of domestic difficulties, a rising Chinese neighbour and renewed leadership under Barack Obama in America itself.

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Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2008

Year	Bayne Grade	Domestic Political Mgmt						Ave # Refs	% Mem	Deliberative			Directional # Refs to Core Values	Decisional # Cmts	Delivery Compliance	Dev Glob Gov # Bodies Min/Off	Attendees	
		By Country								# Days	# State-ments	# of Words					# Mem	# Par C/IO
		U	J	G	B	C	R											
1975	A-	1	0	-	0	-	-	0.33	33	3	1	1,129	5	14	-	0/1	4/6	0/0
1976	D	1	5	0	0	0	0	1.00	33	2	1	1,624	0	7	-	0/0	7	0/0
1977	B-	3	3	-	0	0	-	1.50	50	2	6	2,669	0	29	-	0/1	8	0/0
1978	A	1	8	-	0	4	-	3.25	75	2	2	2,999	0	35	-	0/0	8	0/0
1979	B+	1	9	-	0	-	-	3.33	67	2	2	2,102	0	34	-	1/2	8	0/0
1980	C+	0	2	0	0	0	-	0.40	20	2	5	3,996	3	55	-	0/1	8	0/0
1981	C	6	9	-	0	0	-	3.75	50	2	3	3,165	0	40	-	1/0	8	0/0
1982	C	1	5	1	0	-	-	1.75	75	3	2	1,796	0	23	-	0/3	9	0/0
1983	B	3	11	1	0	0	-	3.00	60	3	2	2,156	7	38	100 (1)	0/0	8	0/0
1984	C-	0	2	-	0	0	-	0.50	25	3	5	3,261	0	31	-	1/0	8	0/0
1985	E	0	3	-	0	-	-	1.00	33	3	2	3,127	1	24	50 (1)	0/2	8	0/0
1986	B+	1	16	-	0	1	4	4.40	80	3	4	3,582	1	39	-	1/1	9	0/0
1987	D	0	24	0	0	-	-	6.00	25	3	7	5,064	0	53	29 (1)	0/2	9	0/0
1988	C-	0	2	-	0	0	-	0.50	25	3	3	4,872	0	27	-	0/0	8	0/0
1989	B+	0	3	-	0	1	-	1.00	50	3	11	7,125	1	61	0 (2)	0/1	8	0/0
1990	D	0	1	-	1	-	-	0.67	33	3	3	7,601	10	78	43 (1)	0/3	8	0/0
1991	B-	0	14	0	0	0	-	2.80	20	3	3	8,099	8	53	38 (2)	0/0	9	1/0
1992	D	0	4	-	0	-	-	1.33	33	3	4	7,528	5	41	71 (3)	1/1	8	0/0
1993	C+	0	3	-	0	-	-	1.00	33	3	2	3,398	2	29	57 (2)	0/2	8	1/0
1994	C	0	4	0	0	-	5	1.80	40	3	2	4,123	5	53	71 (2)	1/0	8	1/0
1995	B+	0	0	-	0	-	1	0.25	25	3	3	7,250	0	78	29 (1)	2/2	8	1/0
1996	B	0	0	-	0	1	1	0.40	40	3	5	15,289	6	128	48 (24)	0/3	8	1/4
1997	C-	0	0	-	1	0	1	0.40	40	3	4	12,994	6	145	21 (10)	1/3	9	1/0
1998	B+	0	0	1	1	-	3	1.00	60	3	4	6,092	5	73	44 (11)	0/0	9	0/0
1999	B+	1	2	-	0	1	4	1.60	80	3	4	10,019	4	46	45 (11)	1/5	9	0/0
2000	B	0	38	-	0	-	0	9.50	25	3	5	13,596	6	105	75 (29)	0/4	9	4/3
2001	B	0	4	-	0	2	0	1.20	40	3	7	6,214	3	58	46 (19)	1/2	9	0
2002	B+	0	0	0	1	0	0	0.17	17	2	18	11,959	10	187	34 (28)	1/8	10	0
2003	C	0	1	-	1	-	3	1.25	75	3	14	16,889	17	206	61 (18)	0/5	10	12/5
2004	C+	0	0	0	3	1	0	0.67	33	3	16	38,517	11	245	55 (30)	0/15	10	12/0
2005	A-	1	0	-	1	-	0	0.50	50	3	16	22,286	29	212	63 (26)	0/5	9	11/6
2006	N/A	1	0	-	0	0	-	0.25	25	3	15	30,695	256	317	41 (27)	0/4	10	5/10
2007	N/A	0	3	-	1	1	-	1.25	75	3	8	25,857	651	329	53 (24)	0/4	9	9/9
2008	N/A	0	4	-	0	0	-	1.33	33	3	6	16,842	TBC	296	13 (20)*	1/4	9	15/6
Total		21	180	3	10	12	22			95	195	313,915	1052	3,118		13/92	289	74/43
Ave. all	B-	0.62	5.29	0.30	0.29	0.35	1.47	1.74	43	2.8	5.7	9,233	31.9	91.7	51 (273)	0.38/2.71	8.5	2.17/1.26
Av 1 cycle	B-	1.86	5.14	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.94	47	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	-	0.14/0.71	7.43	0/0
Av 2 cycle	C-	0.71	9.00	0.67	0.00	0.25	4.00	2.45	46	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	60 (3)	0.29/1.14	8.43	0/0
Av 3 cycle	C+	0.00	4.14	0.00	0.14	0.50	3.00	1.26	33	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47 (13)	0.58/1.29	8.14	0.57/0
Av 4 cycle	B	0.14	6.29	0.50	0.43	0.80	1.29	2.04	43	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	48 (132)	0.58/3.57	9.00	0.86/1.00
Av 5 cycle	B-	3.29	26.9	1.50	2.29	2.80	6.25	0.88	49	3	12.5	25,181	177	255.67	54 (125)	0.17/6.16	9.50	10.67/6.0

Notes: N/A or (-) indicates that the data is not available.

Domestic Political Management (National Policy Addresses): % Mem is the percentage of measured G8 countries that referred to the G7/8 at least once that year in their national policy address(es). Ave # refs = average number of references for the measured countries. Directional: number of references in the communiqué’s chapeau or chair’s summary to the G8’s core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.

Compliance scores only include G8 Research Group’s analysis, including special retroactive reports, which were compiled by the group. Number in parenthesis indicates the number of commitments measured for the year in question.

2008 score is interim score for that year. It is not included in the overall or cycle average.

Bodies Min/Off is the number of new G7/8-countries institutions created at the ministerial (min) and official (off) level at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place. The first number represents ministerials created. The second number represents official level bodies created.

Attendees refers to the number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start, and the number of invited participants of countries and/or of international organizations at the G8 leaders’ session. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met.

C=Countries; IO=International Organizations. The first number represents non-G8 countries who participated. The second number represents international organizations that participated.

Appendix B: G8 Compliance by Country, 1975–2008

Year	G7/8+EU	U.S.	Japan	Germany	UK	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	EU
1975	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1976	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1977	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1978	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1979	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1980	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1981	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1982	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1983	100 (1)	100 (1)	–	–	–	–	100 (1)	100 (1)	–	–
1984	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1985	50 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	00 (1)	–	100 (1)
1986	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1987	29 (1)	00 (1)	00 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	–	–
1988	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
1989	00 (2)	–100 (2)	100 (2)	00 (2)	100 (2)	–50 (2)	–50 (2)	00 (2)	–	–
1990	43 (1)	–100 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)	100 (1)	–	–
1991	38 (2)	–100 (2)	00 (1)	100 (2)	50 (2)	50 (2)	50 (2)	100 (2)	–	–
1992	71 (3)	33 (3)	100 (3)	100 (3)	67 (3)	67 (3)	33 (3)	100 (3)	–	–
1993	57 (2)	100 (2)	100 (2)	00 (2)	50 (2)	00 (2)	50 (2)	100 (2)	–	–
1994	71 (2)	100 (2)	50 (2)	100 (2)	100 (2)	50 (2)	00 (2)	100 (2)	–	–
1995	29 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	–100 (1)	100 (1)	00 (1)	00 (1)	100 (1)	–	–
1996	48 (24)	50 (24)	67 (24)	67 (24)	54 (24)	35 (23)	50 (10)	54 (24)	–	–
1997	21 (10)	40 (10)	33 (9)	67 (9)	60 (10)	10 (10)	–56 (9)	–10 (10)	–17 (6)	100 (1)
1998	44 (11)	75 (8)	22 (9)	13 (8)	86 (7)	50 (8)	17 (6)	83 (7)	00 (6)	100 (2)
1999	45 (11)	45 (11)	73 (11)	36 (11)	45 (11)	45 (11)	27 (11)	64 (11)	00 (6)	00 (4)
2000	75 (29)	76 (29)	79 (29)	82 (28)	86 (28)	82 (28)	74 (27)	76 (29)	45 (21)	88 (8)
2001	46 (19)	32 (19)	37 (19)	53 (19)	58 (19)	58 (19)	47 (19)	73 (19)	–0.2 (19)	100 (1)
2002	34 (28)	46 (28)	11 (27)	18 (27)	37 (27)	40 (27)	04 (24)	59 (28)	29 (24)	67 (3)
2003	61 (18)	61 (18)	56 (18)	56 (18)	61 (18)	77 (18)	44 (18)	89 (18)	44 (16)	80 (10)
2004	55 (30)	87 (30)	37 (30)	60 (30)	60 (30)	43 (30)	50 (30)	60 (30)	21 (28)	60 (30)
2005	63 (26)	73 (26)	58 (26)	80 (25)	88 (25)	60 (25)	24 (25)	73 (26)	28 (25)	91 (24)
2006	41 (27)	51 (27)	37 (27)	41 (27)	32 (27)	37 (27)	04 (27)	47 (27)	26 (27)	60 (25)
2007	51 (24)	91 (24)	33 (24)	59 (24)	71 (24)	54 (24)	20 (24)	66 (24)	33 (24)	50 (24)
2008*	13 (20)	40 (20)	–10 (20)	40 (20)	45 (20)	–05 (20)	–30 (20)	15 (20)	05 (20)	20 (20)
Average	51 (273)	60 (270)	46 (267)	55 (265)	61(265)	50 (265)	30(246)	64 (269)	25 (202)	67(133)

Notes: Number of cases of compliance = 273, done April 23, 2009

(–) indicates that the data is not available; TBC=to be calculated.

Compliance scores only include G8 Research Group’s analysis, including special retroactive reports, which were compiled by the group.

Number in parenthesis indicates the number of commitments measured for the year in question.

2008 score is interim score for that year. It is not included in the overall or cycle average.