

# Assessing G8 and G20 Performance, 1975–2009

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## Abstract

The paper provides an overview and update of methods to measure the performance of G8 summits as an indication of their output legitimacy. Strengths and weaknesses of methods are critically evaluated. Existing methodologies allow a comparison of G8 summits and reveal an evolution over the years. This evolution can be related to explaining variables such as the G8 members’ absolute and relative capabilities as well as their interests, values and “intervulnerability.” The paper also explores ways to compare the G8 as a diplomatic method with other diplomatic arrangements such as the United Nations, as well as reflect on how G8 performance can be assessed against externally given benchmarks for global governance performance. Then the paper offers an empirical analysis of the G8’s effectiveness from 1975 to 2009. A crucial question is how deepening globalization and multipolarity have affected G8 performance in recent years. The paper concludes with a reflection on the current relevance of the G8 at the time when the G20 is gaining prominence, the debate on G8 expansion continues and the UN General Assembly actively attempts to counterbalance the power of G8 and G20.

## Introduction

On November 14-15, 2008, the leaders of the world’s 20 systemically significant countries held their first summit in Washington DC, in response the great made-in-America financial crisis that had erupted in full force two months before. Within six months they met again, on April 1-2, 2009, in London. A mere six months later, they met for a third time, on September 24-25, 2009, in Pittsburgh. There they proclaimed that their summit would become a permanent institution, to serve as the primary centre of global economic governance for the world for the indefinite future long after the crisis that created their summit had passed.

The eruption of institutionalized Group of Twenty (G20) summitry gave rise to much assumption, argument and advocacy that the G20’s time had come and that the older Group of Eight (G8) of major market democracies formed in 1975 would — and should — quickly fade away. The claim was based overwhelmingly, following neo-realist logic, on the simple argument that relative capability in the world had passed from the G8 countries to China, India, Brazil and a few others countries in the G20, and that to be effective a central global governance forum must reflect in its membership the configuration of relative capability in the world. A second claim, based on foundational Westphalian logic, was that to be legitimate, even in a fast-paced globalizing age, such a global governance centre had to contain, as full members, fixed territorially grounded countries from all the major geographic regions of the world.

Amidst the celebration and classic logic there seemed little need to subject the new G20 summit, and its decade-old finance minister–central banker progenitor, to the same systematic scholarly scrutiny that the G8 had attracted from scholars in the field of “G8 studies,” as it had become established over several years. During these years many had regularly attacked the G8 for its presumed lack of power, legitimacy and geographic representativeness and its resulting

ineffectiveness. But such claims could be and were carefully assessed through the theoretically grounded frameworks, concepts, indicators and methods that flowed from, connected with and contributed to the study of international relations and international institutions as a whole.

This paper reviews the results of this repertoire of G8 research and assesses its applicability to the new G20 summit-centred system, operating amidst the other plurilateral summit institutions and multilateral organizations beyond. It argues that G8 scholars have now developed several systematic frameworks, concepts, indicators and methods to assess G8 summit performance, an array that has proven its value and that, with minimal adaptation, applies to the G20 and to other plurilateral summit institutions and multilateral organizations that meet at the summit level. The application of this analytical array points to the continuing value of the G8 and to the gaps in G20 governance regarding the compliance of its members with their many commitments and its development as a global governance system that reaches down to civil society and reaches out to the G8.

## **Assessing G8 Performance**

The first systematic, scholarly framework for assessing G8 governance came from Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne (1987, 260) in second first edition of *Hanging Together: Co-operation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summit*. It offered a four-part scale of summit success: mutual enlightenment (“sharing information about national policy directions”), mutual reinforcement (“helping one another to pursue desirable policies in the face of domestic resistance”), mutual adjustment (“seeking to accommodate or ameliorate policy divergences”) and mutual concession (“agreeing on a joint package of national policies designed to raise the collective welfare”). Putnam and Bayne thus placed a premium on offensive, comprehensive package deals, encoded in interlinked decisional commitments that collectively enhanced the G8 or global public good.

This foundation was subsequently developed by Nicholas Bayne (2000, 2005, 12–13) into a distinct collective management model with six criteria for assessing summit performance. These were leadership, effectiveness, solidarity, durability, acceptability and consistency.

The third comprehensive framework, appearing immediately after the initial Putnam and Bayne offering, has been developed by John Kirton (1989) since 1989 (see Appendix A). It is based on the six performance components of domestic political management, deliberation through conversation, direction setting through consensus, decision making through commitments, delivery through compliance and the development of global governance through constructing G8-centred institutions and shaping those outside.

Kirton has also developed several supplementary ways to assess G8 performance. One is objectives obtained — the ability of the summit to meet or exceed its priority objectives as assessed by a single analyst or a team of analysts against specified pre-summit objectives or by the self-evaluation of G8 governors after the event. A second is the consensus of sherpas or scholars, as published in scholarly sources after the summits and combined into an internally consistent, rank-ordered composite that identifies which summits were better than others by what degree. A third is “mission accomplished” — the ability of the G8 summit to advance its foundational mission of protecting within it its members and promoting globally open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. A fourth is the ultimate referent of the number of human lives saved rather than lost as a result of what the summit did. A fifth is a process-based set of criteria focused on the ability of the summit to predict, prevent or react to crises in a timely, well-tailored way.

## Explaining G8 Performance

These frameworks for assessing G8 performance have been accompanied by the development of diverse and at times detailed causal models for explaining why the G8 governs as it does (Fратиanni, Rugman, Kirton and Savona 2005). There are at least ten distinct major models that claim, with varying degrees of specification, to offer a complete, internally consistent explanation of G8 governance on at least some of the dimensions identified above (see Appendix B).

The first such model was offered by Putnam and Bayne (1987) to explain why in their view the G8 summit performed well in the 1970s but less so during subsequent years. They argued that the summit's decisional performance was high when the United States was able and willing to lead with support from a strong second G8 member, the reigning ideas and historical lessons as interpreted by leaders sustained such a unified thrust, electoral certainty at home allowed leaders to adjust and concede to their G7 partners abroad, and transnational actors and alliances forwarded solutions that were superior and better supported than those from any combination of single, self-contained states.

Several features of this "American leadership" model stand out. It was a multilevel model, combining causes at the international, state and individual levels. It relied on Hans Morgenthau's (1948) "quality of diplomacy" and on ideational factors in the form of lessons from the past. It fully absorbed subsequent scholarship on trans-governmental (if not transnational) relations and an America "after Hegemony" in the post-Vietnam age (Keohane 1984). Strikingly absent, however, beyond the static "ability to lead of America alone as a necessary condition was any dynamic variation in the systemic distribution of material capabilities, either in the Morgenthauian factors of national power or the structural realist form developed by Kenneth Waltz (1979). Variation here was replaced by the assumption that America's material capabilities remained so predominant that only it could assume leadership in its foreign policy, but had been sufficiently diminished that, unable to lead on its own, it needed the strong support of a strong second state. Moreover, while ideas mattered, they were more the selections from the static repertoire of the past, rather than any autonomous socially constructed lessons of the present for the future that constructivist scholarship had already begun to infuse into the international relations field (Adler 1997, 2002).

This American leadership model was very quickly challenged by a "concert equality" competitor, first offered in 1989 by John Kirton, building on the initial insight of William Wallace (1984). It is the only model, along with Nicholas Bayne's more loosely specified collective management model, that has been progressively developed, through repeated empirical application, since that time (see Appendix C). The concert equality model consists of six components: shock-activated equalizing vulnerability; multilateral organizational failure; collectively predominant and internally equal capabilities; common core principles; constricted, controlled, continuous club participation; and domestic political control, capital, continuity, conviction and civil society connection.

This model is grounded fully at the systemic level, in its components of relative vulnerability, relative capability and international institutions both multilateral and plurilateral. It also draws to a lesser extent on unit (member) compatibility on core principles and domestic control. Its components are unified by the concept of concert and the central claim that the G8 is a modern, democratic concept. Unlike the American leadership model, but as with the collective management one, the concert equality model begins on the demand side, with Napoleonic-like successive shocks (Ikenberry 1988), old state-to-state vulnerabilities (Keohane and Nye 1977) and new non-state vulnerabilities (Kirton 2007). It then moves to the systemic supply side with

multilateral organizational performance (cf. Ikenberry 2001) and the configuration of relative capability. Here it claims, in direct contrast to the American leadership model but in accordance with the concert concept, that diffuse, equal, predominant major-power capabilities breed summit-level global governance success. Arising from the domestic level, in an extension of democratic peace theory and John Ikenberry's (2001) accessibility logic, is a common distinctive devotion to open democracy and individual liberty, and also political control by the leaders, or their responsiveness of their polities as a whole. Uniting the individual, national and international levels is the particular way the national leaders configure and operate their annual international institutional encounter to create the club-like dynamics that leads the G8 to govern well. It is within this last realm that the still largely unapplied dynamics highlighted by constructivist theory come into play (Baker 2000).

## **The G8 and United Nations Diplomacy**

In explaining G8 governance, this concert equality model competes with those that claim to explain how the United Nations system works. The central difference is that between the G8 as a model concert and the UN as a modern collective security institution (Jervis 1985; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991, 1995). A second defining difference is the contrast between a multilateral, hard law organization (replete with a charter and secretariat) born in 1944–45 but dating back to 1919 and ideationally to 1648, and a plurilateral (or “mini-lateral”), soft law institution born in 1975 and altered in its core membership and much else, but not its core constitutionalized, anti-Westphalian mission since then.

Ideationally, at the core of the UN systems stands the Westphalian article 2(7)–encoded constitutional principle forbidding international interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In contrast, the constitutional G8 principle is to interfere in the internal affairs of its members and outside countries to protect and promote open democracy, individual liberty and social advance throughout the world. Both global governance systems have largely operated in accordance with their constitutional mission since their respective starts, with the contrast arising most dramatically from their respective behaviour over the war to liberate Kosovo from a coming genocide in 1999 (Kirton 2000).

Institutionally, the UN stands as a partial, segmented loosely interconnected galaxy with little overall co-ordination or control. To the extent that it has a centre, it is the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), with a small membership that has not changed since 1945 and a unit veto decision-making procedure as its regulative rule. In the P5 each of the powers can and do formally veto or informally and implicitly threaten to veto anything they do every week not like. In the G8, with its consensus decision-making procedure, each member cannot veto but can only threaten to leave (as France's François Mitterrand did in 1985), thus surrendering its instrument of influence and identify as a member of this prestigious great-power democratic concert in the modern age.

At the unit attribute level, all P5 members have acquired nuclear weapons and the other capabilities, behavioural propensities, interests and identities of “warfare” states. In the G8, even with the post-1998 addition of Russia as a full member, there is a balancing non-nuclear coalition provided by second-ranked Japan and third-ranked Germany, along with Italy, Canada and the European Union, with capabilities, interests and identities as “civilian” powers. As a result, as a global security governor the G8 has found it easier to go beyond classic military national security concepts and actions to adopt human security and other forms than that offered by the UNSC P5.

Despite the proliferation of UN summitry since its post-1945 start in 1990, UN diplomacy is typically delivered by diplomats permanently stationed at the UN, backed by foreign ministries and foreign ministers at home. G8 governance is overwhelmingly directed and delivered by leaders, especially as the foreign ministers have no longer participated in the summit since 1998. Leaders are responsible, horizontally and vertically, for everything all at once and have the authority to change things as they wish. Foreign ministers do not. They are not even in sole control of the security field.

## **Measuring G8 Effectiveness, 1975–2009**

The major frameworks for assessing G8 performance have been applied successfully to provide a cumulative data base of G8 performance consisting of 36 annual summit cases over the G8's 36 years of life (see Appendix D). In the Kirton framework, most of the six dimensions of G8 performance have several components, and some components come with multiple measures. Many are easily applicable, through standard content-analytic methods, employed with modest resource requirements. The great exception is the critical dimension of compliance, for the G8, as with other international institutions, is primarily worth studying, influencing and employing primarily if its commitments and consensus are complied with by its member states.

Despite a rich diversity in the detailed results, several clear trends stand out. The first is the G8's emergence as a comprehensive global governor, embracing ever more subjects on its agenda across a comprehensive, if not complete, global, regional and domestic range. The second is that G8 performance has been generally rising on all six dimensions over the past 36 years, thus disconfirming the claims of those who assert that the G8's effectiveness is declining and that it should be superseded or replaced by other global governance forums. The third is that on the critical dimension of compliance, performance has also been rising, and doing so across most issue areas taken up by the G8.

There have been few attempts to take the causal models that claim to explain G8 performance and develop the measures and methods that would enable them to be applied. In regard to some models this is possible, as Robert Hornung's (1988) early effort to test the American leadership model confirms. His application refuted the central hypothesis that greater American leadership led to or accompanied greater summit success.

In contrast, successive efforts to test the concert equality model suggest that it is at least an adequate explanation of G8 performance on all dimensions of G8 governance save one. That exception is compliance, an anomaly for which several reasons can be advanced. However, several recent efforts to solve the compliance puzzle have suggested that the G8 leaders themselves control their own compliance fate, in that the commitment can craft their commitments with embedded catalysts that increase or decrease the chances they will be complied with during the following year (Kirton 2006; Kirton, Larionova and Savona 2010). Indeed, each country seems to have a distinctive cocktail of such catalysts to which its compliance with G8 commitments responds (Kirton and Guebert 2010).

Such findings call into question the systemic foundations of the concert equality model, at least as far as compliance is concerned. They suggest individual leaders make a difference when they come to create or approve the encoding of their collective commitments in a written and enduring communiqué. This finding is consistent with the G8's creational determination that leaders should govern the globe by themselves and with their 36-year refusal to acquire a secretariat, organization or any hard law attributes of any kind. But it may also point to the value of again

revising the concert equality model and seeing if such autonomous leader's action explains G8 performance beyond the compliance domain.

## **From G8 to G20**

Beyond the progressive research program within the field of G8 studies, the application of its frameworks and methods to other global governance institutions of several sorts is needed. The most obvious and easy candidates for such expansion are other summit-level institutions, of either a plurilateral or even a broadly multilateral kind. The limited work done here suggests that such G8-pioneered scholarship works well in these domains.

The greatest candidate calling out for such an extension is the G20. It was created by the G8 summit in 1999 as a forum of finance ministers and central banker governors and then rose at the summit level in November 2008. In the rapidly accumulating literature on the G20 summit system, there has been little attempt to adapt and apply the above frameworks, or alternative ones, to assess the course and causes of the performance of this new plurilateral summit institution. Much of the relevant literature first focused on why and how such a G20 summit should be created (English, Thakur and Cooper 2005). The second generation concentrated on why the new G20 summit should eclipse the old G8 one. A third generation, just beginning, moved to explore the evolving and desirable role of each and the relationship between the two. But actual analysis of the G20 summit's performance, even after its first three installments and with its fourth and fifth taking shape, has remained largely the preserve of ad hoc commentary, rather than systematic, conceptually guided, empirically careful scholarly assessment of how the G20 summit has performed and why.

This is somewhat surprising, given the existence for over a decade of the G20 institution at the ministerial level as an empirical base on which to build. Since its start in 1999 the extensive literature on this finance ministers' forum has largely consisted of passing references in broader accounts of global economic governance, or dedicated analysis produced by the G20 governors themselves (Kirton and Koch 2008; G20 2008). Indeed there have been only a few dedicated analyses by scholars, using the concepts and methods of their discipline to assess how the finance G20 has performed and why.

One such analysis, directly drawing on the concepts and methods used to assess the G8 summit, focused on the performance of the G20 finance forum from 1999 to 2004 (Kirton 2005a, b). It argued that the G7 finance ministers forum and the G8 summit were created as high-capacity institutions not only to deliberate, take decisions and develop global governance in response to the cascading financial and other crises of the 1970s and since, but also to diffuse globally the core principles of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. The changes brought by globalization, notably a succession of financial crises since 1994 and terrorist shocks since September 2001, catalyzed the creation and development since 1999 of a broader, more collectively capable G20 to help provide global governance in finance and related fields in the new age. The G20's expanded number and range of systemically important countries along with international organizations as members increased the capacity, representativeness and resulting legitimacy of this new centre of collective leadership. But with countries such as China and Saudi Arabia as members, and a principled core of "stability, growth and equity" rather than democracy, to what extent could it globally diffuse the principles of open democracy and individual liberty that its G8 members shared mission? An expanded version of the concert equality model developed to describe and explain G8 effectiveness in global governance suggested that the G20 had done much to adopt and further diffuse democratic norms, and that

the stronger vulnerability bred by globalization shared by all G20 members substantially explains this trend.

This study showed the applicability of the G8-developed framework for the analysis of the G20 at the finance ministers' level. Following work on the principles of embedded liberalism and "embedded ecologism" (Kirton 2002), it developed the concepts, methods and measures for direction setting, focused on the democratic principles at the core of the G8, as distinct from the financial stability that was the constitutional core of the G20. It demonstrated that these democratic principles were diffusing throughout the G20 despite its very different mission, and thus suggested that the G8 members and the democratic non-G8 members of the G20 were the most influential members of the broader club. It further argued that the concert equality model explaining G8 summit performance also explained G20 finance governance, with the finance shocks of 1999 and the terrorist shocks of 2001 providing the initial causal thrust.

More recently, Kirton has applied the performance framework developed to assess G8 governance to the G20 finance ministers meeting and the three G8 summits thus far (see Appendices E, F, G). The results suggest the full and fruitful applicability of the G8-developed framework to assess the performance of the G20 at both the leader and ministerial levels (Kirton 2010; Alexandroff and Kirton 2010). The concert equality model also appears adequate as an explanation of G20 governance, with the shock of the 2007–09 made-in-America financial crisis serving as the creational catalyst for G20 governance at the summit level to spring to life (see Appendix H).

From this most recent work, three major issues arise. The first concerns compliance. Here the G8 framework and method, applied to the G8 summit, raises two operational challenges. The first challenge is in assessing compliance not during the full year leading up to the next annual summit, as with the G8, but on a six-month or shorter basis before the subsequent G20 summit is held. While this change requires some interpretive adjustment to take account of annual compliance implementing events (such as the U.S. State of the Union address or national budgeting cycle), the interim (six-month) compliance assessments conducted by the G8 Research Group since 2002 assist with the adaptation and the comparison of the G20-G8 results. The second challenge is the resource-intensive requirement to measure the compliance of many more, more diverse, G20 members, some of which do not have G8-like levels of transparency to report publicly on what compliant-relevant actions their governments take.

Nonetheless, the G8 Research Group's compliance framework has been successfully applied by its partners at the State University Higher School of Economics in Moscow to the G20 summits, first on a pilot basis to the anti-protectionist pledge of the first summit in Washington in November 2008, then to five commitments across a broader range of commitments made at the second summit in London in April 2009, and currently with those from the third summit at Pittsburgh in September 2009. The results of the London analysis, reported in Appendix I, show that the G20's compliance performance is much lower than that of the G8 and, within the G20, the compliance of the G8 members is much higher than those that are members only of the G20. The same is true for the G20's democratic members compared to the two non-democratic ones. This evidence should give pause to those who argue that the G20 should and will replace the G8 as the centre of global economic governance on either effectiveness or democratic legitimacy grounds.

The second issue concerns the relationship between the two summit-level global governance institutions (Kirton 2009). Within this complex question, in the domain of the development of G8/G20/global governance, the early evidence suggests that the G8, at its 2009 L'Aquila Summit,

is acting in explicit reference to the work of the G20 summit, offering both leadership guidance and followership support. The G20, in contrast, at its first three summits, has largely ignored what the G8 has done. Explicit connection and co-operation are thus a one-way street.

The third issue deals with the overall configuration of global governance, through the network of the many plurilateral summit institutions that the global community has now produced (see Appendix J). It is clear that the countries that are members of most of those institutions, and thus connect them as hubs of the meta network, are the members of the G8 and not the non-G8 members of the G20. The G8's status as the great global governance connector is reinforced by its at least residual ability to comprehensively cover and combine all issues of global governance, compared to the G20, which is confined to economic issues alone, with only a limited foray into climate change. These results suggest that whatever the allegations about relative effectiveness, representativeness and legitimacy, it is far too early to say goodbye to the G8.

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## **Appendix A: The G8's Governance Functions**

### **A. Overall Performance**

- Achievements (Bayne grade, Kirton grade)
- Objectives obtained (G8 Research Group performance assessments, government self-evaluation)
  - Professional consensus (sherpas, scholars)
  - Mission accomplished
  - Lives saved
- Process (forward or backward looking, crisis response and prevention, timely, tailored)

### **B. Governance Functions**

#### ***The Domestic Political Summit***

- Prestige (presence, domestic demonstration, communiqué compliments)
- Media attention and approval (news coverage and editorials)
- Popularity: support for domestic policies, parties, politicians (public opinion)
- Election (re-election, ongoing election campaign or for incoming host)
- National satisfaction (legislative reports, national policy addresses)
- Regime confidence and national unity

#### ***The Deliberative Summit***

- Mutual enlightenment (length of summit, number of sessions, attended)
- Personal relationships (on-site bilaterals, spontaneous encounters, informality)
- Agenda setting (number of words in communiqués, number of subjects)
- Attention getting (number of communiqués, chapeau or chair's summary)
- Epistemic learning (participants' reports)
- Interest and identity formation (subsequent participant self-descriptions)

#### ***The Directional Summit (Fact, Causation, Rectitude)***

- Issue and issue area legitimation (new issues and issue areas added)
- Facts affirmed (new facts affirmed)
- Priority value identification (democratic principles priority placement and pervasive)
- Causal relationship specification (changes in casual claims from last summit)
- Priority linkage specification (synergies identified)

#### ***The Decisional Summit***

- Number of commitments, by precision, obligation, delegation
- Breadth of commitments, by policy domain, issue area and geographic reach
- Ambition-significance of commitments
- Instruments employed: rewards (money mandated), inclusion, sanctions

#### ***The Delivery Summit***

- Compliance catalysts (confirmed catalysts included: priority, timetable, core international organization)
- Member compliance (interim and final compliance scores)
- Member expectations and behaviour altered
- Outside actors behaviour altered

#### ***The Development of Global Governance Summit***

- Outreach: summit membership/participation
- In-reach: G8 ministerial institutions created, adjusted affirmed
- In-reach: G8 official institutions created, adjusted, affirmed
- Outreach: instructions to outside intergovernmental institutions
- Down-reach: civil society involvement

## **Appendix B: Causal Models of G8 Summit Performance**

### **American Leadership (Putnam and Bayne 1984, 1987)**

Decisional performance, occasionally high, due to:

- U.S. able and willing to lead with support of a strong second
- reigning ideas and historical lessons as interpreted by leaders
- electoral certainty
- alliance of transnational actors

### **Concert Equality (Wallace 1984; Kirton 1989)**

Comprehensive performance, high, low, then very high, due to:

- shock-activated equalizing vulnerability
- multilateral organizational failure
- collectively predominant and internally equal capabilities
- common principles of open democracy, individual liberty, social advancement
- constricted participation: constricted, controlled, club like, continuous
- domestic political control, capital, continuity, conviction

### **False New Consensus (Bergsten and Henning 1996)**

Decisional performance, declining during the 1990s, due to:

- a false new consensus that economic globalization makes governments impotent
- American economic and political decline due to the end of the Cold War and poor policy
- traditional differences between the U.S. and Germany

### **Democratic Institutionalism (Ikenberry 1993; Kokotsis 1999)**

Delivery performance, increasing into the 1990s, due to:

- effective multilateral organizations controlled by the G7
- G7 institutionalization at ministerial and official levels
- strong G8 bureaucratic units in domestic governments
- leaders' commitments to international co-operation, G7 institutions, individual issues
- popular support for leaders and issue

### **G8 Nexus (Gill 1999)**

Directional and decisional performance, increasingly effective but contested, due to:

- marketization, globalization and liberalization producing:
  - global concentration of wealth and power
  - similar political outlook and congruent political/economic principles of the elite
  - dominance of financial-asset (bond currency) market interests in leading states

### **Collective Management (Bayne 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005)**

Comprehensive (five-function) performance, increasingly effective, due to:

- complexity of new and unexpected global problems
- inadequacy of other global institutions
- constraint of globalization on independent major power action
- G8 iteration, agenda focus, leaders-only format; institutionalization

**Ginger Group (Baker 2000)**

Deliberative performance, increasingly effective, due to:

- financial market globalization
- small private club of governmental agents
- common worldview

**Group Hegemony (Bailin 2001, 2005)**

Decisional performance, constantly high, due to:

- concentration of power and small group size create K-group
- group identity and small group size create K-group
- economic liberalism and mutual interests enable mutual agreements
- preparatory process and mutual interests enable mutual agreements
- system of interaction and the shadow of the future create trustworthy relations
- documentation and the shadow of the future create trustworthy relations

**Meta Institution (Penttilä 2003)**

Decisional performance, increasingly high, due to:

- concerted power of G8 members
- failure of established international organizations

**New Perspectives (Fратиanni, Kirton, Rugman and Savona 2005)**

Increasingly transformational comprehensive G8-centred and networked governance due to:

- new demands from new problems of human security, globalization, vulnerability
- new players demanding broader participation: countries, international organizations, civil society
- demands for a new institutional supply of G8-centred governance
- demands for a new ideational supply of G8-centred governance
- need for coherence from a new summit process
- international institutional over inter-state competition in a post-Westphalian world

## **Appendix C: The Concert Equality Model**

Comprehensive performance, high, low, then very high, due to:

### **Shock-Activated Equalizing Vulnerability**

- Shock: severity (deaths, subsequent, scope [types], spread [connections], space)
- Vulnerability: unilateral policy changes attempted and failed, deterred
- Interdependence sensitivity

### **Multilateral Organizational Failure**

- Core multilateral organization: 1944–45+, dedicated mission, years, resources (budget, staff)
- Competitors: number of multilateral organizations claiming a role
- G8 control of multilateral organization
- Plurilateral institutional governors

### **Collectively Predominant and Internally Equal Capabilities**

- Predominant overall capability: global share of gross domestic product at current exchange rates
- Equal and equalizing overall capability among G8 members: Gini co-efficient
- Predominant specialized capability (issue-structure model)
- Equal and equalizing
- Specialized capability

### **Common Core Principles of Open Democracy, Individual Liberty, Social Advancement**

- Average democratic openness of members (Polity 5, Freedom House)
- Average number of elections held, leaders changed, party in power changed

### **Constricted Club Participation: Constricted, Controlled, Club Like, Continuous**

- Constricted: number of members and participants at summit sessions
- Constricted: members or participants as share of major powers in system
- Controlled: change in members and participants from past year
- Club-like: site (isolated for spontaneous encounters and reduced formality)

### **Domestic Political Control, Capital, Continuity, Conviction and Civil Society Connection**

- Control: leaders' control of executive (central bank) and legislature
- Continuity: leaders' experience at home and at summit
- Capital: personal or party approval rating before and at summit
- Capital: public support for summit priority issues
- Conviction: personal conviction of leaders about summit priorities

## Appendix D: G8 Performance, 1975–2009

Year	Grades		Domestic Political Management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Development of Global Governance		Attendees
	Bayne	Kirton	Members	References (average)	Days	Statements	Words	References to Core Values	Commitments	Compliance	# Bodies	Ministerial/ Official	Countries/ International Organizations
1975	A–		33%	0.33	3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1	4/6	0/0
1976	D		33%	1.00	2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0	7	0/0
1977	B–		50%	1.50	2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1	8	0/0
1978	A		75%	3.25	2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0	8	0/0
1979	B+		67%	3.33	2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	½	8	0/0
1980	C+		20%	0.40	2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1	8	0/0
1981	C		50%	3.75	2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0	8	0/0
1982	C		75%	1.75	3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3	9	0/0
1983	B		60%	3.00	3	2	2,156	7	38	–10.9	0/0	8	0/0
1984	C–		25%	0.50	3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0	8	0/0
1985	E		33%	1.00	3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2	8	0/0
1986	B+		80%	4.40	3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1	9	0/0
1987	D		25%	6.00	3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2	9	0/0
1988	C–		25%	0.50	3	3	4,872	0	27	–47.8	0/0	8	0/0
1989	B+		50%	1.00	3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1	8	0/0
1990	D		33%	0.67	3	3	7,601	10	78	–14.0	0/3	8	0/0
1991	B–		20%	2.80	3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0	9	1/0
1992	D		33%	1.33	3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1	8	0/0
1993	C+		33%	1.00	3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2	8	1/0
1994	C		40%	1.80	3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0	8	1/0
1995	B+		25%	0.25	3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2	8	1/0
1996	B		40%	0.40	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3	8	¼
1997	C–		40%	0.40	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3	9	1/0
1998	B+		60%	1.00	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0	9	0/0
1999	B+		80%	1.60	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5	9	0/0
2000	B		25%	9.50	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4	9	4/3
2001	B		40%	1.20	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	1/2	9	0
2002	B+		17%	0.17	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8	10	0
2003	C		75%	1.25	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5	10	12/5
2004	C+		33%	0.67	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15	10	12/0
2005	A–		50%	0.50	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5	9	11/6
2006			25%	0.25	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4	10	5/9
2007			75%	1.25	3	8	25,857	651	329	51.0	0/4	9	9/9
2008		B+	33%	1.33	3	6	16,842	TBC	296	48.0	1/4	9	15/6
2009		B	NA	NA	3	10	31,167	62	254	NA	TBD	NA	28/10
Total					98	206	345,082	1,105	3,369		13/92	289	74/43
Average	B–	B/B+	43%	1.74	2.8	5				41.35	0.38/2.71	8.5	2.17/1.26
1975–81	B–		47%	1.94	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.46	0.14/0.71	7.43	0/0
1982–88	C–		46%	2.45	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.39	0.29/1.14	8.43	0/0
1989–96	C+		33%	1.26	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.54	0.58/1.29	8.14	0.57/0
1997–2002	B		43%	2.04	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	42.17	0.58/3.57	9.00	0.86/1.00
2003–09	B–	B/B+	49%	0.88	3	12.5	25,181	177	255.67	56.56	0.17/6.16	9.50	10.67/6.0

**Notes:**

NA = not available; TBC = to be calculated.

Grades up to and including 2005 are determined by Nicholas Bayne; from 2006 on are determined by John Kirton, using different frameworks and methods.

Domestic Political Management: Members is the percentage of G8 countries measured that referred to the G7/8 at least once that year in their national policy addresses; References refers to the countries measured.

Deliberative: Days is the duration of the summit. Statements refers to the number of documents issued at the summit. # Words refers to the number of words in those documents.

Directional: Number of references to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty contained in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary.

Decisional: Number of total commitments for the year in question, as counted by the G8 Research Group.

Delivery: Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis; compliance scores as of 1996 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments.



Development of Global Governance: Bodies is the number of new G7/8-countries institutions created at the ministerial and official levels at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place. Attendees refers to the number of leaders of G8 members, including those representing the European Community from the start, and the number of invited participants from countries or from international organizations. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met.

## Appendix E: G20 Performance, 1999–2009

### G20 Finance Ministers

Year	Deliberation			Decisional	Delivery	Development of G20 Governance				Development of Global Governance														
	Words	Doc	Days			G20 I	G20 B	Dep Mtgs	Workshops	Other Institutions Noted at Meetings														
										BWI	IMF	WB	WTO	FSF	FATF	UN	BCBS	OECD	IFI	IEF	IOSCO	FSB	Other	
1999	402	1	2	4	TBC	2	1	1	NA	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2000	2,455	1	2	8	TBC	0	0	2	NA	0	12	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
2001	1,631	2	2	24	TBC	0	1	2	1	0	4	3	2	3	8	6	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2002	958	1	2	2	TBC	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	
2003	1,185	1	2	6	TBC	1	2	2	1	0	6	3	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	
2004	1,392	1	2	10	TBC	2	0	2	3	0	4	4	0	0	5	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	
2005	1,683	2	2	8	TBC	0	0	2	3	15	8	4	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
2006	2,048	1	2	10	TBC	1	0	2	3	1	13	10	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
2007	2,236	1	2	20	TBC	1	0	2	3	3	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
2008 <sup>a</sup>	259	1	2	4	TBC	0	0	-	-	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2008	1,744	1	2	27	TBC	5	0	2	3	3	8	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	
2009 <sup>a</sup>	1,669	3	1	18	TBC	0	0	2	0	0	5	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	
Total	17,662	16	23	92	TBC	12	5	19	18	24	74	39	8	9	17	10	1	4	11	1	1	0	16	

### G20 Leaders

Year	Deliberation			Decisional	Delivery (catalysts)	Development of G20 Governance			Development of Global Governance														
	Words	Doc	Days			G20 OI	G20 B	Working Groups	Other Institutions Noted at Meetings														
									BWI	IMF	WB	WTO	FSF	FATF	UN	BCBS	OECD	IFI	IEF	IOSCO	FSB	Other	
2008 Nov	3635	2	2	95	139 (39, 1Y [+]; 14, CIO [+]; 13, OIO [-])	1	2	4	TBC													0	TBC
2009 April	6228	3	2	88	65 (6, 1Y [+]; 19, CIO [+]; 10, OIO [-])	0	1	1	0	35	8	2	5	3	2	8	2	12	0	3	20	TBC	
2009 Sept	TBC																						
Total	9863	5	7	183	204	1	3	5															

Source: International Organizations Research Institute of the State University Higher School of Economics in cooperation with the National Training Foundation of the Russian Federation.

Notes:

Includes only meetings at which communiqués were issued. Domestic political management has not yet been assessed and is therefore omitted here.

<sup>a</sup>Emergency or special meeting held outside regular annual schedule.

TBC = to be calculated. Catalysts: 1Y = one-year time table; CIO = delegation to core international organization; OIO = delegation to other international organization.

Deliberation: Words is the number of words in documents issued at the annual meeting. Doc is the number of documents issued at the annual meeting. Days is the duration of the meeting.

Decisional: Number of total commitments made for the year in question, including commitments as they relate to the G20 as a whole and excluding country-specific commitments.

Delivery refers to the total number of compliance catalysts embedded in commitments for the year in question. Catalysts highlighted in parentheses affect compliance either positively (+) or negatively (-).

Development of G20 Governance refers to the documents issued for the year in question, excluding titles and subtitles. One unit of analysis is one sentence. G20I is the number of references to G20 as an institution; G20B is the number of references to G20 official-level bodies, including seminars; Dep Mtgs refers to the number of deputies meetings.

Development of Global Governance refers to the number of times an international institution is mentioned in the documents for the year in question, excluding titles and subtitles. One unit of analysis is one sentence. If more than one institution is mentioned within a sentence, each institution is accounted for; if one institution is mentioned more than once in a sentence, it is only counted once.

BCBS = Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors; BWI = Bretton Woods institutions; FATF = Financial Action Task Force; FSB = Financial Stability Board; FSF = Financial Stability Forum; IEF = International Energy Forum; IFI = international financial institutions; IMF = International Monetary; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN = United Nations; WB = World Bank; WTO = World Trade Organization.

**Appendix F:  
Communiqué Compliments: G20 Summit, April 1–2, 2009**

Country	# of compliments
Spain	1
European Union	1
Mexico	4
Poland	2
Colombia	2
Japan	2
China	2

Compiled by Zaria Shaw, G20 Research Group.

## Appendix G: G20 Leaders Communiqué Conclusions, 2008–09

### Financial Crises

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	1865	50.9	25	35.2	1	100	1
London 2009	2135	34.1	30	32.6	3	100	3
Pittsburgh 2009	3118	33.4	33	30.2	1	100	1
Average	2372	39.4	29.3	32.6	1.6	100	1.6

### Development

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	651	17.8	9	12.6	1	100	0
London 2009	1726	27.6	28	30.4	3	100	1
Pittsburgh 2009	2292	24.5	20	18.3	1	100	0
Average	1556	23.3	19	20.4	1.6	100	0.33

### Climate Change

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	64	1.7	2	2.8	1	100	0
London 2009	64	1	2	2.1	1	100	0
Pittsburgh 2009	911	9.7	10	11.7	3	100	0
Average	247.3	4.1	4.6	5.5	1.3	100	0

### Energy

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	29	0.79	1	1.4	1	100	0
London 2009	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Pittsburgh 2009	1259	13.4	12	11	1	100	0
Average	419	4.7	4.3	4.1	1.6	66.6	0

#### Notes:

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G20 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

# of Words is the number of issue-specific subjects for the year indicated, excluding titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

% of Total Words refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year indicated.

# of Paragraphs is the number of paragraphs containing issue-specific references for the year indicated. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

% of Total Paragraphs refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year indicated.

# of Documents<sup>7</sup> is the number of documents that contain issue-specific subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

% of Total Documents refers to the total number of documents for the year indicated.

# of Dedicated Documents is the number of documents for the year that refer to the specified issue in the title.

## Appendix H: G20 Compliance, London Summit 2009

Member	Overall
<b>France</b>	<b>+100</b>
<b>Germany</b>	<b>+100</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>+100</b>
Australia	+80
<b>Canada</b>	<b>+80</b>
<b>European Union</b>	<b>+80</b>
<b>Russia</b>	<b>+40</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>+40</b>
Brazil	+20
<b>Japan</b>	<b>+20</b>
Saudi Arabia	+20
Turkey	+20
<b>Italy</b>	<b>00</b>
Mexico	00
South Africa	00
South Korea	00
China	-40
India	-40
Indonesia	-40
Argentina	-60
All Average	+23
G8 Average (9)	+62
Non-G8 Average (11)	-03

Note: G8 members are in bold.

## Appendix I: G20 Leaders' Experience

Country	Leader	Most Recent Election	Next Election	# G8 summits attended	# G20 summits attended	# G20 finance attended
Argentina	Cristina Fernández de Kirchner	28 Oct 2007	2011	0	3	0
Australia	Kevin Rudd	24 Nov 2007	By 16 Apr 2011	2	3	0
Brazil	Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	29 Oct 2006	3 Oct 2010	6	3	0
Canada	Stephen Harper	14 Oct 2008	By 15 Oct 2012	4	3	0
China	Hu Jintao	15 Mar 2008	2013	5	3	0
France	Nicolas Sarkozy	22 Apr/6 May 2007	2012	3	3	1
Germany	Angela Merkel	27 Sep 2009	Autumn 2013	4	3	0
India	Manmohan Singh	16 April-13 May 2009	By 31 May 2014	5	3	0
Indonesia	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono	8 July 2009	2014	1 <sup>a</sup>	3	0
Italy	Silvio Berlusconi	13-14 Apr 2008	Variable	11	3	0
Japan	Yukio Hatoyama	30 Aug 2009	By August 2013	0	3	0
Korea	Lee Myung-bak	19 Dec 2007	2012	1 <sup>a</sup>	3	0
Mexico	Felipe de Jesús Calderón Hinjosa	2 Jul 2006	2012	3	3	0
Russia	Dmitry Medvedev	2 Mar 2008	2012	2	3	0
Saudi Arabia	Adbullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud	NA	NA	0	3	0
South Africa	Petrus Kgalema Motlanthe	22 Apr 2009	2014	1	3	0
Turkey	Tayyip Erdoğan	22 Jul 2007	Variable	0	3	0
UK	Gordon Brown	5 May 2005	By 3 June 2010	2	3	9
United States	Barack Obama	4 Nov 2008	November 2012	1	2	0
EU	José Manuel Barroso	4-7 June 2009	2014	5	3	0
Average				2.8	2.95	0.5

Note:

a. Participated in the Major Economies Meeting held immediately following the G8 summit.

## Appendix J: The Plurilateral Summit Institutions Network

G20	G8+5	MEM-16	CHOGM	FRA	ASEM	OSCE	APEC	SOA	SCO	NATO
United States	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+
Japan	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Germany	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
France	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+
Italy	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+
Russia	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-
EU	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
China	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
India	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+ Observer	-
Brazil	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Mexico	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
South Africa	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Korea	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Australia	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+
Spain	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+

Notes:

APEC = Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation; ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting; CHOGM = Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting; FRA = Francophonie; G8+5 = G8 plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa; MEM-16 = Major Economies Meeting/Forum; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; SCO = Shanghai Co-operation Organization; SOA = Summit of the Americas.