

NOTES

1. I would like to acknowledge the support and assistance offered during the preparation of this study by my colleagues at the Centre for International Studies, whose good spirits and collegiality made this project a rewarding and enjoyable experience. Special thanks to Claudia Diaz for her many hours of research assistance, her continuing emotional support, and her enduring good humour.
2. See Frederic Spotts and Theodor Wieser, Italy: A Difficult Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), chapter 13, pp. 263-82.
3. Spotts and Wieser, 292.
4. Norman Kogan has noted how a national Italian foreign policy based on a widespread political consensus emerged only in 1975, emphasizing Italy's place as a western, Atlanticist power. That consensus settled a longstanding debate in Italian foreign policy over whether Italy should pursue a European or a Mediterranean orientation in its approach to the outside world, a debate grounded in the North-South regional division within the Italian political economy. Kogan fails to note the third pillar of Italy's contemporary foreign policy, however, its membership in the Seven Power Summit, which complemented its western orientation in the mid-1970s and which has been strengthened further in the more recent re-emphasis of Italy's position as a Mediterranean power in Italian foreign policy. See Kogan's "Italy, the European Community, and the Alliances", International Journal 32 (Spring 1977): 272-87.
5. Cesare Merlini, "A Fall after the Rise? The Political Options for Europe", in his Economic Summits and Western Decision-Making (London: Croom Helm and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984): 193-212, especially 202-3.
6. For a related discussion limited to Italy's approaches to the EEC and NATO, see Kogan, *op. cit.*
7. Unless otherwise specified, the chronological account presented here is a compilation of those found in Robert Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven-Power Summits (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Guido Garavoglia, "From Rambouillet to Williamsburg: A Historical Assessment" in Merlini, Economic Summits and Western Decision-Making, *op. cit.*, 1-42; and David Watt, Next Steps for Summitry (New York: Priority Press, 1984). It also reflects the findings of a comprehensive survey of international media coverage of the various summits, specific items from which are cited when significant pieces of evidence are attributable exclusively to them. I also acknowledge with gratitude the important contribution made to my account of the history of the summit of my colleagues in the Summit Research Group of the Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto.
8. See Putnam and Bayne, 42; and Ezio Cappadocia, "Italy: The Politics of Subtlety -- Plus Ça Change...?", Behind the Headlines 37 (1979).

9. On the Italian search for assurances of continued economic support, see Philip Shabecoff, "Economic Talks: Dialogue is Stressed", New York Times, 26 June 1976.

10. See H. Smith, "Summit Parley Ends", New York Times, 9 May 1977; Ian Rodger, "Seven Nations Agree to Fund to Stabilize Raw Material Prices", Globe and Mail, 9 May 1977; Paul Lewis, "Leaders Voice a Growing Concern over Unemployment among Young", and "Summit Parley: Limited Accord", New York Times, 8, 10 May 1977; C.L. Sulzberger, "Carter's First Summit", New York Times, 8 May 1977; "Target: Recovery without Panic", London Observer, 8 May 1977; and Flora Lewis, "Carter Meets with 5 of 6 Leaders in a Prelude to Economic Parley", New York Times, 7 May 1977.

11. The power of these constraints were real, especially concerning terrorism in Italy. Prior to the summit, for example, a Turin court was unable to enlist enough jurors to try 57 alleged members of the famous "Red Brigade" (F. Lewis, op.cit.). And it was in the very next year that the kidnapping and ultimate killing of Aldo Moro, the worst high-level terrorist incident on record, would rock Italy and the world.

12. See R. Herlt, "What the Big Seven Achieved in Bonn", Die Zeit, 21 July 1978; R. Hickel, "What the Bonn Talks Achieved: Two Experts Fight it Out", German Tribune, 6 August 1978; Franz Thoma, untitled, German Tribune, 30 July 1978; Joseph Harsh, "Summit Sum-up: going it together", Christian Science Monitor, 21 July 1978; Roderick Oran, "It will be 'Chicken' and Bluff this Week-end as Big Seven Jockey at the Bonn Summit", and "Long Odds on Jackpot from Bonn Summit", Christian Science Monitor, 15, 22 July 1978; F. Lewis, "Carter is Pleased", New York Times, 18 July 1978; William Keegan, "Seven Men in Search of a Summit" and "Bonn Talks may Bury Hatchets", London Observer, 9, 16 July 1978; and David Blake, "A Hazy View from the Summit", London Times, 14 July 1978.

13. The expression, and the general discussion surrounding this issue, are borrowed from Putnam and Bayne, 110-118.

14. The effects of the Guadeloupe summit are summarized effectively in Putnam and Bayne, 102-8.

15. The Economist Intelligence Unit, World Outlook 1980 (London: The Economist, 1980): 29-30.

16. *ibid.*; "When Leaders Go Home", Christian Science Monitor, 25 June 1980.

17. Joseph C. Harsh, "The New Foreign Policy System", Christian Science Monitor, 1 July 1980; Andrew Szende, "Summit Ends Allies Sniping", Toronto Star, 24 June 1980; Paul Lewis, "The Seven: Energy, Trade and Fear of a Global Slump", New York Times, 22 June 1980.

18. See "Leaders All Take Something Home but Reagan had the Starring Role", Toronto Star, 22 July 1981; J. Rusk, "North-South Economic Woes Left Open in Draft Communique" and "Tough Talk on US Rates Fizzles Out", Globe and Mail, 20, 21 July 1981; "The Ottawa Opportunity", London Times, 17 July 1981; and "Most Leaders Political Veterans but Rookie Summiteers", Globe and Mail, 17 July 1981.

19. EIU, World Outlook 1984, 34-5.
20. See Putnam and Bayne, 188-90.
21. See the communique and Putnam and Bayne, 203.
22. Geoffrey Smith, "Commentary", London Times, 6 May 1985; "Summit Fails to Agree on Trade Liberalization", Manchester Guardian, 12 May 1985; Paul Lewis, "Paris Said to Link Free Trade Talks to Dollar Parley", "Discord Apparent Even Before Bonn Talks Begin", and "Leaders Seeking Accord on Trade", New York Times, 28 March, 2 and 4 May 1985; Leonard Silk, "French-US Fight", New York Times, 4 May 1985; "The Outcome in Bonn: US Avoids Political Clash", New York Times, 5 May 1985; Sarah Hogg and David Smith, "Summit Clears Way for June Deal on Monetary Reform", London Times, 4 May 1985; Hedrick Smith, "Allied Statement Backs US Position in Talks on Arms", New York Times, 4 May 1985.
23. EIU, World Outlook 1986, 28-9.
24. Putnam and Bayne, 208.
25. See Yoichi Funabashi, Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988): 137-42.
26. The indicators proposed for use by all parties to chart economic patterns in order to forecast inflationary or deflationary trends were: GNP, inflation, interest rates, unemployment, fiscal deficits, trade and current balances, money growth, foreign reserves and exchange rates.
27. Funabashi, 1988: 140-41
28. On the G-5 dispute, see John Tagliabue, "Italians Boycott Group of 7", New York Times, 23 February 1987. On the extent and nature of *Il Sorpasso*, see "The Flawed Renaissance", The Economist, 27 February 1988.
29. See Putnam and Bayne, 252-3; R. Burns, "Reagan Wins Allies for Farm Subsidy Cuts", Globe and Mail, 9 June 1987.
30. See Jan Louder, "Summit Profile: the Leaders", Sunday Sun 8 May 1988.