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Analysis

T20 2021 Recommendations Realized at the G20 Rome Summit

Brittaney Warren, G20 Research Group
January 31, 2022
[pdf]

Executive Summary

This report on the 2021 Think 20 (T20) recommendations realized identifies the impact of the policy recommendations made by the T20 and its global network of think tanks to the Group of 20 (G20) leaders for their Rome Summit on October 30–31, 2021. This report first matches the 220 recommendations contained in the T20's 2021 Communiqué on October 4–5 across 14 issue areas to the 225 collective, precise, future-oriented and politically binding commitments made by the G20 leaders at Rome.

Of the T20's 220 recommendations, 76 (35%) either partially or fully matched, and thus were realized in, the 225 leaders' Rome commitments. This 35% match is a large increase from the low 11% match with the G20's Riyadh Summit in 2020. It is a decline from the 46% match at Osaka in 2019 and a rise from the 24% match at Buenos Aires in 2018 and 25% match at Hamburg in 2017. In 2021, the most full matches as a portion of the recommendations were on agriculture for 60%, the digital economy for 48%, employment and social cohesion for 44%, anticorruption and health for 42% each, and the energy transition and climate sustainability for 40%. The fewest matches were on multilateralism and civil society engagement for 25%, the global economy and international finance also for 25%, sustainable finance for 18%, and education for 15%.

Ultimately, even if these T20 recommendations are realized as commitments in the G20 communiqué, they are of little value if those commitments are not realized when the leaders return home. To predict the impact of the matched commitments on compliance, this analysis compared the T20 recommendations with the historical level of G20 compliance for each matched subject in 2021. Here, on the subjects addressed by the 2021 T20 recommendations, the G20's strongest compliance since 2008 came on infrastructure at 91%, the global economy and international finance at a combined 79%, employment and social cohesion at 76%, migration at 74%, agriculture at 73% and health at 71%. Below the G20 overall compliance average of 71% came compliance with the digital economy commitments at 68%, trade and investment, and development at 67% each, the energy transition, environment and climate sustainability at a combined 66%, anticorruption at 61%, and multilateralism and civil society at 58%.

Several subjects with the highest recommendation-commitment match in 2021 did not correspond with the G20's compliance on these subjects. At Riyadh in 2020, the 20 assessed commitments averaged 85% compliance, as did the two commitments that fully or partially matched two 2020 T20 recommendations. Yet the other 18 Riyadh commitments assessed, with no T20 match, averaged 83% compliance. A previous T20 recommendation seems to coincide with a G20 compliance increase of 2%.

Thus in crafting its recommendations in 2022, the T20 could consider how the G20 can better comply with the recommendations that become commitments at the summit the year following that summit.

This 2021 T20 Recommendations Realized Report makes several contributions. First, and most immediate, it provides evidence to encourage think tanks already involved in the T20 process and those not yet involved to increase or initiate their involvement, on the grounds that such investment appears to have some influence on an important centre of global governance. Second, this report helps build an analytical and empirical foundation for the T20 to adjust its process and products to enhance its influence on the G20 and the effectiveness of the G20 summit itself. Third, this study supports the hope expressed by some scholars that the G20 provides a valuable forum for a diverse array of transnational actors, including those involved in the T20, to exercise influence. Fourth, it contributes to a growing data set to identify how the G20 governors themselves can improve their compliance with their summit commitments.

Introduction

This 2021 T20 Recommendations Realized Report identifies the impact of the policy recommendations made by the T20 and its global network of think tanks to the Group of 20 (G20) leaders for their Rome Summit on October 30–31, 2021. It matches the 220 priority T20 recommendations from its 14 task forces to the 225 collective, precise, future-oriented, politically binding commitments made by G20 leaders at Rome, using a method pioneered by the University of Toronto's Global Governance Program and first applied to summits on non-communicable diseases convened in 2007, 2011 and 2014 (Kirton, Kulik and Bracht 2016). The current simplified version scores each of the 220 recommendations on a three-point scale to track the degree of the match. A score of −1 indicates no match, a score of 0 indicates a partial match and a score of +1 indicates a full match with one or more Rome commitments (see Appendix A).

This report finds that 76, or 35%, of the 220 T20 recommendations were either partially or fully matched with, and thus realized in, the Rome commitments (see Appendix B). Of these 76 recommendations, 18 recommendations were fully realized and 58 were partially realized.

In 2021, the most T20 recommendations were on the subject of the global economy and international finance, totalling 36 recommendations. This was followed by trade and investment with 33 recommendations, the digital economy with 23, and employment and social cohesion with 18. All subjects were realized to some degree in the G20 Rome communiqué.

The most full matches between T20 recommendations and Rome commitments came in agriculture with 60%, followed by the digital economy with 48%, employment and social cohesion with 44%, anticorruption and health with 42% each, and the energy transition and climate sustainability with 40%. The G20's historical compliance average across these six fully matched subjects is 69%. This is slightly below the G20's overall compliance average of 71% since 2008 and across all subjects.

The G20's historical compliance with these fully matched subjects differs from the level and order of matches by subject at Rome. The G20's historical average compliance on agriculture is 73%, digital economy 68%, employment 76%, anticorruption 61%, health 71%, and energy, the environment and climate change combined 66% (see Appendix C).

The T20 recommendations likely to make the most real difference are those on agriculture, with a 60% full commitment match, and 73% historical compliance, for a combined estimated impact score of 44% (0.60 × 0.73). T20 recommendations on the digital economy have an estimated impact score of 33% (0.48 × 0.68). Those on labour and employment have an estimated impact score of 33% (0.44 × 0.76). Those on health have an estimated impact score of 30% (0.42 × 0.71). Those on energy, the environment and climate change have an estimated impact score of 26% (0.40 ×0.66). Across the Rome Summit's three pillars of "People, Planet and Prosperity," the T20 was thus likely to be more influential on the "Planet" (agriculture, and energy, environment and climate change) than on "People" (labour and employment and health) or on "Prosperity" (where only the single component of the digital economy did well).

For the full list of the T20's 2021 recommendations and matched commitments, see Appendix D.

Recommendations Realized

Of the 220 T20 recommendations, 76 (35%) were either partially or fully realized or matched in the 225 G20 commitments made at the Rome Summit and had a degree of match of 21% (see Appendix B).

The highest proportion of recommendations realized partially and fully in the Rome commitments came on agriculture with 60% of the recommendations, the digital economy with 48%, and employment and social cohesion with 44%. The subjects with the highest degree of match were agriculture with 45%, the energy transition and climate sustainability with 30%, and the digital economy with 26%.

The subjects with lowest proportion of recommendations realized were education with 15%, sustainable finance with 18%, multilateralism and civil society with 25%, and the global economy and international finance also with 25%. Recommendations with the lowest degree of match were the same three subjects: education with a 7% degree of match, sustainable finance with 9%, multilateralism and civil society with 10%, and the global economy and international finance with 18%.

The following summary of the T20 recommendations realized are presented in order of appearance in the T20 communiqué.

Health

On health, the T20 made 14 recommendations to the G20 leaders. Six, or 42%, either partially or fully matched. The degree of match was 25%.

One recommendation matched fully. It was to develop technology and transfer with long-term distribution and manufacturing. Five recommendations matched partially. These were, broadly, on adoption of a One Health approach; vaccine equity; regional capacity building for long-term health plans; support for regional leadership for healthcare coordination; and safe international travel in the age of pandemics.

Education

On education, the T20 made were 13 recommendations. Two, or 15%, matched partially. The degree of match was 7%.

Both recommendations were to encourage support for educational resources for the most disadvantaged and bridge the gender digital divide.

Trade and Investment

On trade and investment, the T20 made 33 recommendations. Eleven, or 33%, matched. The degree of match is 20%.

Two recommendations were a full match: on reforming the World Trade Organization (WTO) and conducting trade negotiations in a transparent and inclusive manner. Nine were a partial match. Three related to specific reforms in the WTO, plus recommendations to foster trust in e-commerce; develop global cyber security standards; differentiate types of data; support digital-friendly investment climates for digital foreign direct investment; promote guiding principles for the trade-sustainable development link; and launch the MSMEs Link-20 Initiative for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises.

Development

On development, the T20 made 12 recommendations. Three, or 25%, matched partially. The degree of match was 25%.

The three recommendations were to push for collective G20 action to support the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development at the United Nations General Assembly; to update the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda, focusing on partnerships for development; and to update the framework on base erosion and profit shifting established by the G20 and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to support small- and medium-sized enterprises' capacity to disclose financial information relating to environment, social and governance.

Digital Economy

On the digital economy, the T20 made 23 recommendations. Eleven, or 48%, matched. The degree of match was 26%.

One recommendation matched fully. It was to recognize and address the gender digital divide. Ten matched partially. These were to invest in subsidizing the cost of data and devices for marginalized communities and users; endorse innovative financing mechanisms for digital inclusion projects; promote awareness campaigns against gender stereotypes; foster measures for gender-neutral parental leave; support technology adoption by women to support their labour force participation; strengthen financing and capital access for women-led businesses; address home-based care work; support science, technology and innovation in low- and middle-income countries; enable financing for technology for low- and middle-income countries; and increase protection for youth from online threats.

Anticorruption

On anticorruption, the T20 made 12 recommendations. Five, or 42%, matched. The degree of match was 25%.

One recommendation, to share information, matched fully. Four matched partially. These were to support vaccine rollouts, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF); enhance transparency of capital flows; increase punishment for non-transparent actors; and help low-income countries curb illicit financial flows.

Employment and Social Cohesion

On employment and social cohesion, the T20 made 18 recommendations. Eight, or 44%, matched. The degree of match was 25%.

One recommendation matched fully. It was to ensure lower-educated workers have quality jobs. Seven matched partially. These were to support safety nets in developing countries in light of the pandemic; coordinate regulations for remote working; ensure remote workers are treated according to the regulations of the country where the employer is located; leverage trade policy for decent work for women; encourage financial literacy in schools in developing countries, especially for women and youth; raise revenue through corporate and wealth tax; and integrate refugees into the labour market.

Energy Transition and Climate Sustainability

On the energy transition and climate sustainability, which included the environment, the T20 made 15 recommendations. Six, or 40%, matched. The degree of match was 30%.

Three recommendations matched fully. These were to preserve marine biodiversity and natural protected areas, recognize nature-based solutions to fight climate change and biodiversity loss, and recognize nature-based solutions and budgetary instruments to fight and adapt to climate change. Three recommendations matched partially. These were to deploy budgetary instruments, such as carbon pricing, tax incentives and subsidies, including coal financing; commit to carbon neutrality by 2050; and implement capacity building for workers' transition and youth education for climate change and sustainable development.

Agriculture

On agriculture, the T20 made 10 recommendations. Six, or 60%, matched. The degree of match was 45%.

Three recommendations matched fully. These were to support sustainable farming; enhance social protection for food security, including informal workers and children; and operationalize the One Health approach for sustainable food systems. Three matched partially. These were to invest in multisectoral nutrition programs, in preparation for future pandemics; empower small farmers and integrate them into regional value chains; and promote the digital transformation of agriculture.

Migration

On migration, the T20 made nine recommendations. Three, or 33%, matched. The degree of match was 22%.

One recommendation matched fully. It was to financially support COVAX. Two matched partially. These were to ensure migrants were included in the vaccination effort and to include migrants and refugees into national vaccination plans.

Multilateralism and Civil Society Engagement

On multilateralism and civil society engagement, the T20 made five recommendations. One, or 25%, matched. The degree of match was 10%.

The recommendation matched partially. It was to tackle the spread of disinformation.

Global Economy and International Finance

On the global economy and international finance, the T20 made 36 recommendations. Nine, or 25%, matched. The degree of match was 18%.

Four recommendations matched fully. One was on the global financial safety net; two were on the allocation of special drawing rights (SDRs) to lower-income countries; and one was on stimulatory fiscal policies.

Five matched partially. These were on providing short-term liquidity for emerging markets and developing economies; aligning SDRs with national plans and needs; launching a liquidity and sustainability facility; avoiding an abrupt deleveraging process through banking supervisory and regulatory policies; and reducing the cost of remittances.

Infrastructure

On infrastructure, the T20 made nine recommendations. Three, or 33%, matched. The degree of match was 22%.

One recommendation, on digital infrastructure in emerging countries, matched fully.

Two matched partially. These were to mobilize capital and markets for sustainable infrastructure and designing a G20 Pact on sustainable urbanization in support of the 2030 Agenda.

Sustainable Finance

On sustainable finance, the T20 made 11 recommendations. Two, or 18%, matched. The degree of match was 9%.

Both recommendations matched partially. These were on climate risk analysis at the IMF and to provide fiscal support for climate efforts via the IMF.

Results

Ultimately, T20 recommendations have little value if G20 leaders enshrine them as commitments in their communiqués that do not lead to real results through effective implementation when the leaders return home after the summit. Thus, this section reviews how well the G20 has complied with its past commitments that match the subjects the 2021 T20 made recommendations on.

G20 Overall Compliance, 2008–2020

Overall, on the T20 2021 subjects, the G20's strongest compliance since 2008 is with infrastructure commitments, at 91% (see Appendix C). This is followed closely by the global economy and international finance at 79%, employment at 76%, migration at 74%, agriculture at 73% and health at 71%.

The subjects with compliance below the overall G20 71% average are the digital economy at 68%; trade and investment at 67%; and development also at 67%; energy, climate change and the environment at 66%; anticorruption at 61%; and multilateralism, or international cooperation, at 58%. There are no compliance scores for education or sustainable finance as core G20 subjects.

Compliance with Commitments from the 2020 Riyadh Summit

An examination of compliance with the priority commitments made at the 2020 Riyadh Summit shows a negligible 2% difference in compliance between assessed commitments that both fully and partially matched the T20's 2020 recommendations (see Appendix E). The compliance difference between the fully matched and non-matched commitments was 3%. The 6% compliance difference between the partially matched and non-matched commitments was the largest, though still small.

The 2020 T20 made 131 recommendations to the 2020 G20 Riyadh Summit. A mere 14 (11%) matched the 107 commitments made by the leaders at Riyadh. Just one recommendation matched fully and 13 matched partially.

The G20 Research Group and the Centre for International Institutions Research (2021) assessed 20 Riyadh priority commitments for compliance. They had an average of 86%. Of these, only two commitments fully matched one or more of the 2020 T20 recommendations. These were on development and climate change. The development one averaged 83% and the climate change one averaged 78%, for a combined average of 80%.

Eleven commitments partially matched. These had a higher average of 89%. They spanned the subjects of macroeconomic policy, international taxation, trade, the digital economy, labour and employment, gender, health and the environment.

The combined weighted average of all matched commitments, partial and full, is 85%.

Seven commitments did not match. They averaged 83% compliance. They were on corruption and energy, two subjects uniquely with no match, along with international taxation, trade, health, gender and climate change.

The ratio of matched 2020 T20 recommendations realized in G20 Riyadh assessed commitments (partial and full combined) to recommendations to unmatched assessed commitments is 13:7. Yet there is only a 2% difference in compliance between each of the matched and unmatched groups. This suggests that the T20's recommendations have a little influence on commitment making but no compliance-enhancing effect. Therefore, the G20's high compliance with the assessed priority commitments from Riyadh was not necessarily achieved through commitments that carried the full weight of civil society, and particularly a T20 recommendation.

Conclusion

There is little evidence to suggest that the T20 influences the G20 summit's work. The 2021 T20's 220 recommendations were fully or partially realized in the G20's 225 commitments at a level of 35%. This is a decline from 46% for the 2019 Osaka Summit, and a rise from the 24% for the 2018 Buenos Aires Summit and 25% for the 2017 Hamburg Summit. The 35% match of the 76 T20 2021 recommendations that were fully or partially matched is much higher than the 11% from the 2020 Riyadh Summit, lower than the 46% match in 2019 and much higher again than the 24% match in 2018 and 25% in 2017.

Further Research

These inconclusive numbers call for further research on the depth and degree of civil society's influence on the G20, and if or how G20 engagement groups can increase their effectiveness, starting with – but not limited to – the T20, with its very broad array of subject expertise and high volume of recommendations that may not be easily or readily digestible by busy G20 leaders.

Further research can build on the G20 Research Group's compliance database, which shows very low 58% compliance with the two commitments that refer to civil society. In addition to adding more compliance studies on civil society, further research can expand the dataset to include compliance studies that monitor commitments that refer to the G20's mission of inclusivity and globalization that works for all, a core priority for many civil society groups. One could also compare the number of references to civil society in the G20 communiqués, including the T20 and other engagement groups, against the G20 leaders' compliance that year, and specifically with those commitments and subjects with civil society references.

Further research should also include a literature review on non-state actor engagement in the G20 (see for example Chodor 2020; Steiner 2020; Luckhurst 2019; Slaughter 2019). Given what can be expected to be small amount of literature on the specialized subject of the G20–engagement group relationship and civil society effectiveness in influencing G20 summit outcomes and compliance, it could be useful to extend such a review to broader civil society influence and effectiveness in order to help identify creative solutions for increasing the G20's uptake of engagement group recommendations. For example, it has been suggested that the T20 can play a vital role in evaluation of G20 policies (Hilbrich and Schwab 2018). This post-summit monitoring could have a compliance-enhancing effect, while improving the T20's ability to influence G20 leaders. The T20's wide range of experts creates challenges and opportunities. On the latter, it has high credibility in identifying governance gaps and policy solutions and constraints (Lombardi and Amand 2015).

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References

Chodor, Tom (2020). "The G20's Engagement with Civil Society: Participation without Contestation? Globalizations.17(6): 903–916. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2019.1702804.

G20 Research Group and Center for International Institutions Research (2021). "2020 G20 Riyadh Summit Final Compliance Report." G20 Research Group, November 10.http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/compliance/2020riyadh-final.

Hilbrich, Sören and Jakob Schwab (2018). "Towards a More Accountable G20? Accountability Mechanisms of the G20 and the New Challenges Posed to Them by the 2030 Agenda," International Organisations Research Journal 13(4): 7–28.https://doi.org/10.17323/1996-7845-2018-04-01.

Kirton, John, Julia Kulik and Caroline Bracht (2016). "Report on Objective Six: Impact of the Port of Spain Summit on Regional and Global Institutions." (Global Health Diplomacy Program: University of Toronto).

Lombardi, Domenico and Samantha St. Amand (2015). "Prioritizing International Monetary and Financial Cooperation for the G20 Views from the T20," Centre for International Governance Innovation.https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/pb_no.63_web.pdf.

Luckhurst, Jonathan (2019). "Governance Networks Shaping the G20 through Inclusivity Practices," South African Journal of International Affairs.26(4): 521-547.https://doi.org/10.1080/10220461.2019.1699159.

Slaughter, Steven (2019). "Interpreting Civil Society Engagement with the G20: the Qualified Inclusion of the 2014 Civil 20 Process," Globalizations.16(1): 36–49.https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2018.1518862.

Steiner, Sherrie (2020). "Transnational Interfaith Diplomacy: The Interfaith G8/G20 Shadow Summits," in John Fahy and Jan-Jonathan Bock, eds., The Interfaith Movement: Mobilising Religious Diversity in the 21st Century (Abingdon: Routledge).

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Appendix A: Methodology ↩

Recommendations Realized Reports identify the impact of policy recommendations made to G20 leaders by formal and informal engagement groups in the lead-up to their annual leaders' summits. These reports match the recommendations made by a given entity, such as the Think 20 (T20), with the collective, precise, future-oriented, politically binding commitments made by the summit leaders in their official documents. The assessment uses a method pioneered by the University of Toronto's Global Governance Program, first applied to summits on non-communicable diseases convened in 2007, 2011 and 2014 (Kirton, Kulik and Bracht 2016). This methodology has since been applied to recommendations contained in the G7/G20 background publications produced by the G7 Research Group and G20 Research Group, the Young Entrepreneurs' Alliance and now by the Think 20.

In the more simplified version employed here, each recommendation made is given a score on a three-point scale. A score of −1 indicates no match with a commitment, a score of 0 indicates a partial match, and a score of +1 indicates a full match. The following explanation of the assessment of the degree of match can also be applied to scoring commitments, rather than recommendations, on the same three-point scale (i.e., does the leaders' commitment fully, partially or not match a recommendation?).

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Appendix B: T20 Recommendations Matched with 2021 G20 Commitments ↩

Notes:

Subject are as listed in the T20 2021 communiqué.

Total made = total T20 recommendations made.

Total realized = total recommendations realized in the G20's commitments. % in brackets is the number of recommendations realized divided by the number of recommendations made on that subject.

Full match = the number of recommendations that scored a +1 for a full match with one or more G20 commitments.

Partial match = the number of recommendations that scored a 0 for a partial match with one or more G20 commitments.

No match = the number of commitments that scored a −1 for a non-match with any G20 commitment.

Degree of match = if all components of the recommendation were realized in one or more commitments, the recommendation received a score of +1 for a full match. If at least one but not all components of the commitment matched with one or more commitments, the recommendation received a score of 0 for a partial match. If no components of the recommendation matched any commitment, the recommendation received a score of −1 for no match. The total is added and divided by the total number of recommendations made on that same subject.

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Appendix C: G20 Compliance, 2008–2020 ↩

Notes:

Blank cells = data not available.

Degree of match = the 2021 Rome commitment is given a score of −1, 0 or +1, if it did not partially or fully match a T20 2020 recommendation and averaged, with −1 being 0% and +1 being 100%.

[a] Global economy and international finance combine the scores for the G20 core subjects of macroeconomy policy (82%) and financial regulation (76%).

[b] Energy transition and climate sustainability combine the scores for the G20 core subjects of energy (70%), climate change (68%) and the environment (60%).

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Appendix D: Full List of T20 Recommendations and Matched G20 Commitments ↩

Health

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

1. Develop national Health policies through a balanced model that incorporates hospital-centred and decentralised, community-based approaches, guaranteeing routine diagnosis and treatment protocols of chronic and other diseases during a pandemic; [−1]
2. Integrate One health in all relevant national and international prevention and preparedness plans and institutionalise it through a specific governance structure that comprehensively and promptly enhances the benefits of One Health approaches; [0]

26. We commit to pursue a One Health approach at global, regional, national and local levels. (health)

81. We will integrate the implementation of a One Health approach in relevant policies and decision-making processes. (health)

3. Boost equitable access to and production of diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines to confront COVID-19 on a global footing, especially through enhanced regional planning and production capacity in LMICs and in particular in Africa to ensure more resilient supply chains; [0]

8. we will advance our efforts to ensure timely, equitable and universal access to safe, affordable, quality and effective vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, with particular regard to the needs of low- and middle-income countries. (health)

9. To help advance toward the global goals of vaccinating at least 40 percent of the population in all countries by the end of 2021 and 70 percent by mid-2022, as recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO)'s global vaccination strategy, we will take steps to help boost the supply of vaccines and essential medical products and inputs in developing countries and remove relevant supply and financing constraints. (health)

12. [We will reinforce global strategies to support research and development as well as to ensure their production and swift and equitable distribution worldwide, by]…expanding and diversifying global vaccine manufacturing capacity at local and regional level (health)

17. In particular, we will support increasing vaccine distribution, administration and local manufacturing capacity in LMICs, including through technology transfer hubs in various regions, such as the newly established mRNA Hubs in South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, and through joint production and processing arrangements. (health)

Integrate equitable access to vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics with longer term health goals through:  

4. Technology development and transfer with long term distribution and manufacturing; [+1]

12. [We will reinforce global strategies to support research and development as well as to ensure their production and swift and equitable distribution worldwide, by]…expanding and diversifying global vaccine manufacturing capacity at local and regional level (health)

17. In particular, we will support increasing vaccine distribution, administration and local manufacturing capacity in LMICs, including through technology transfer hubs in various regions, such as the newly established mRNA Hubs in South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, and through joint production and processing arrangements. (health)

5. Enhanced capacity to use the existing policy instruments and TRIPS flexibilities, in particular licensing, intellectual property arrangements, price controls, use of public, non-profit, or public-private arrangements in regional research and development; [−1]
6. Regional capacity to assist the integration of long-term health and industrial plans; [0]

26. We commit to pursue a One Health approach at global, regional, national and local levels. (health)

7. Establish a new independent and scientist-led reporting of pathogens and other emerging health threats, called Emerging Health Threat Data Platform, that strongly incentivises scientists to share information; [−1]
8. Encourage reporting of all health emergency data to WHO in a standardised, disaggregated manner, including by age and sex, as high-quality health data are essential for both effective and equitable responses; [−1]
9. Establish a Global Health Equity Observatory that includes data on health inequity within and between countries as well as on the underlying drivers of inequity, supplemented by complementary systems of global accountability; [−1]
10. Evaluate the gendered impact of policies through the production of gender data and addressing gender inequities in health systems and policy design by, inter alia, giving the right value to the care work; [−1]
11. Build and support regional leadership for the design and rolling out of coordinated actions in the health sector that are based on regional needs; [0]

12. [We will reinforce global strategies to support research and development as well as to ensure their production and swift and equitable distribution worldwide, by]…expanding and diversifying global vaccine manufacturing capacity at local and regional level (health)

26. We commit to pursue a One Health approach at global, regional, national and local levels. (health)

12. Maintain schools open with the proper mitigation measures, as halting education exacerbates socio-economic and gender inequalities within and between countries and has a long-term impact on mental health and well-being; [−1]
13. Promote wider health education commitments for schools and public information campaigns aimed at improving the level of health literacy of the population; [−1]
14. Create a globally consistent regulatory framework for international travel that establishes common standards including interoperability and mutual recognition of digital applications, testing requirements, recognition of vaccination status including exemptions and comparable criteria for when responsive measures may be required, as international mobility is key to economic and social recovery; [0]

159. We will endeavor to restart international travel in a safe and orderly manner, consistent with the work of relevant international organizations such as the WHO, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime Organization and the OECD. (trade)

Education

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

15. Encourage G20 countries and private donors to institute and support mechanisms and policies in education financing, provision, and regulation that proactively boost education resources overall and target supplementary resources to the most disadvantaged at all levels. [0]

136. [We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in]…educational services (gender)

153. We commit to ensure access to quality education for all, with particular attention to women and girls and vulnerable students. (education)

154. We will increase our efforts to make education systems inclusive, adaptable and resilient (education)

16. Pro-equity measures should build on an integrated crisis-sensitive inclusive approach to educational policy and planning. [−1]

154. We will increase our efforts to make education systems inclusive, adaptable and resilient (education)

17. Policies should be established at the institutional level by addressing system-level governance issues and at the individual level, by supporting those experiencing new exclusions and vulnerabilities caused by the pandemic and those in existing compound crises and with intersecting inequities redressing individual experiences of disruption for marginalised groups; [−1]
18. Acknowledge the key importance of highly integrated and multi-sectoral approaches to early childhood education, care and development services to support social cohesion, build sustainable welfare systems, and achieve the objectives of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals framework. [−1]
19. Encourage the G20 to support member states to build integrated and multi-sectoral data, monitoring and evaluation systems in early childhood development, education and care; [−1]
20. Commit to overcoming the hard and soft barriers to internet access, addressing the gender and cultural biases that limit the potential benefits of digital learning; [0]

151. [we will]…strive to adapt our regulatory frameworks to new forms of work, ensuring that these are fair and inclusive, leaving no one behind, while paying special attention to addressing the digital gender divide and intergenerational inequalities. (labour and employment)

153. We commit to ensure access to quality education for all, with particular attention to women and girls and vulnerable students. (education)

21. Make educational materials available in documents, sizes, and formats easily and cheaply accessible through low-speed Internet or offline and integrated with existing devices [−1]
22. At the same time, governments and telecommunication companies should subsidise data costs and devices to reduce their cost, making them more accessible. [−1]
23. The use of digital and blended learning should be anchored to a sound pedagogical approach and supported by an improvement of the basic digital skills of all children; [−1]
24. Define a coherent legal system to ensure that every migrant can fulfil their right to education which is essential. [−1]
25. To facilitate access to education, it is required to promote specific programmes and support for migrants who do not speak the official language and collaborative programmes, NGOs, and local authorities to improve education for migrant students. [−1]
26. Targeted interventions to fight xenophobia and racism should also be fostered; [−1]
27. Expand innovative circular migration projects that combine vocational training in home countries and work-related migration opportunities for selected trainees. [−1]

Trade and Investment

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

28. Revitalise multilateral trade cooperation in the WTO through inclusive plurilaterals. [+1]

165. We commit to a successful and productive WTO 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) as an important opportunity to advance that reform and revitalize the organization. (trade)

We, especially, propose to:

29. Focus on developing countries' needs and capacities using the TFA model to address implementation challenges; [−1]
30. Conduct negotiations in an inclusive and transparent manner to avoid negative effects and establish trust; [+1]

164. Recalling the Riyadh Initiative on the future of the WTO, we remain committed to working actively and constructively with all WTO Members to undertake the necessary reform of the WTO, improving all its functions, and we highlight the need to implement this commitment in practice through an inclusive and transparent approach including tackling the development issues. (trade)

31. Clarify the legal options for incorporation into the WTO; [0]

164. Recalling the Riyadh Initiative on the future of the WTO, we remain committed to working actively and constructively with all WTO Members to undertake the necessary reform of the WTO, improving all its functions, and we highlight the need to implement this commitment in practice through an inclusive and transparent approach including tackling the development issues. (trade)

165. We commit to a successful and productive WTO 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) as an important opportunity to advance that reform and revitalize the organization. (trade)

32. Increase coordination between different plurilateral tracks; v) Conduct impact assessments and evaluations; [−1]
33. Use online or hybrid negotiations to ease capacity constraints; [−1]
34. Confront "deglobalization" in the multilateral trading system by supporting the WTO role. [−1]
35. Update the Dispute Settlement System. [0]

164. Recalling the Riyadh Initiative on the future of the WTO, we remain committed to working actively and constructively with all WTO Members to undertake the necessary reform of the WTO, improving all its functions, and we highlight the need to implement this commitment in practice through an inclusive and transparent approach including tackling the development issues. (trade)

165. We commit to a successful and productive WTO 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) as an important opportunity to advance that reform and revitalize the organization. (trade)

36. Foster issue-specific dialogue based on experiences of relevant RTAs and soft law developments in the OECD. These should include disciplines on SOEs, rules on digital trade and improved notifications, particularly for subsidies, services regulation, investment facilitation and climate change; [−1]
37. Promote a flexible and needs-oriented solution to the contested issue of developing country-member status and special and differential treatment (SDT) among WTO members. This could be done by addressing issues on a case-by-case basis, considering the particular SDT architecture under consideration for the negotiation at hand; [−1]
38. Uphold the WTO Moratorium on Customs Duties on E-Transmissions [−1]
39. provide technical assistance to developing countries on the efficient non-discriminatory implementation of VAT and GST [−1]
40. roll back de facto discriminatory digital services taxes; [−1]
41. Build on recent outcomes on cross-border data flows in RTAs and digital economy agreements (DEAs) to Hasten progress in the WTO JSI on E-Commerce. [−1]
42. To foster trust in e-commerce, G20 Members must cooperate to achieve widespread interoperability of data protection regimes. [0]

19. [We will work together to]…strengthen the organization's ability regarding approval of vaccines, including optimizing procedures and processes, with the aim of broadening the list of vaccines authorized for emergency use (EUL), while continuing to protect public health and ensuring privacy and data protection. (health)

185. We will continue to work on addressing challenges such as those related to privacy, data protection, security and intellectual property rights, in accordance with the relevant applicable legal frameworks. (digital economy)

43. G20 Members should provide technical assistance for developing countries to upgrade and align their data protection regulations; [−1]
44. Engage in exchanges on e-commerce-related services market access and consider an extension to other services of existing GATS undertakings on financial services disciplining restrictions on transfers and data processing by electronic means; [−1]
45. Cooperate in developing consensus-based international cybersecurity standards to reduce regulatory friction. [0]

181. [With this in mind, we will work to]…combat cyber crime. (crime and corruption)

G20 Members should:

46. refrain from unilateral extraterritorial application of all digital standards [−1]
47. collaborate in the international standards bodies to develop globally competitive, open market-driven frameworks; [−1]
48. Differentiate across types of data to encourage multilateral cooperation on regulation. [0]

193. Recognizing the importance of an efficient use of digital tools within public administrations, we will continue to promote agile regulatory frameworks (digital economy)

49. Governments should remove data localization requirements while retaining regulatory flexibility on data protection legislation [−1]
50. apply tariff exemptions for low-value packages and use of digital technologies to enhance trade facilitation; [−1]
51. Benchmark the different dimensions of digital access to promote digital trade accessibility, especially for SMEs, also through greater integration of trade policy with technology and investment policies, focusing on conflict prevention and management, and should be informed by experiences from other processes such as trade facilitation; [−1]
52. Support the creation of 'digital friendly' investment climates through policies, regulations and measures that attract Digital FDI, or FDI in the digital economy. [0]

193. Recognizing the importance of an efficient use of digital tools within public administrations, we will continue to promote agile regulatory frameworks (digital economy)

173. We endorse the G20 Menu of Policy Options - Digital Transformation and Productivity Recovery (digital economy)

174. Drawing on the Menu we will continue discussing policies to sustain productivity growth (digital economy)

53. Promote a set of guiding principles for trade facilitation policies aimed, inter alia, at supporting sustainable development; [0]

77. [we...will take concrete measures to…combat crimes that affect the environment such as]…illegal wildlife trade (crime and corruption)

78. [we...will take concrete measures to…combat crimes that affect the environment such as]…illegal movement and disposal of waste and hazardous substances. (crime and corruption)

167. We support reaching a meaningful WTO agreement on harmful fisheries subsidies by the MC12, in line with the SDG 14.6. (trade)

205. [We endorse the G20 Rome Guidelines for the Future of Tourism, and commit to take action to fulfill its objectives, in particular with regard to]…sustainability (trade)

54. Develop a common understanding of the impact of FDI flows and screening on growth prospects. Therefore, we propose that the G20 should commission international organisations to conduct a comprehensive stocktaking exercise and compile regularly updated comparative analyses of the extent and impact of the different screening mechanisms. [−1]
55. The G20 should set up an Investment Screening Expert Group to provide regularly updated reports with basic policy recommendations for the leaders' level; [−1]
56. Become a key global forum for exchange and collaboration on this critical challenge, setting up effective processes to ensure multilateral coordination for sustainable GVCs; [−1]
57. Commit to a standardised process of subsidy evaluation, using several indicators such as the OECD's framework for analysing agriculture subsidies, the Australian Productivity Commission's mandate and the Kiel Institute for the World Economy's methodology of a subsidy robot; [−1]
58. Promote the reform of the notion of subsidy under the WTO's Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) to encompass a broader range of financial contributions, currently not covered by the Agreement; [0]

164. Recalling the Riyadh Initiative on the future of the WTO, we remain committed to working actively and constructively with all WTO Members to undertake the necessary reform of the WTO, improving all its functions, and we highlight the need to implement this commitment in practice through an inclusive and transparent approach including tackling the development issues. (trade)

165. We commit to a successful and productive WTO 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) as an important opportunity to advance that reform and revitalize the organization. (trade)

59. Encourage G20 member-states to launch the MSMEs Link-20 Initiative as a platform to connect service providers and institutions that can support linkage development and provide technical assistance. [0]

176. Mindful of the need to support a better inclusion of MSMEs in the digital economy, we commit to reinforce our actions and international cooperation towards the digital transformation of production, processes, services and business models (digital economy)

60. This should be complemented by a fund to finance employment-generating, productivity-boosting, and innovative MSMEs in developing countries. [−1]

Development

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

61. Push for increased G20 collective action supporting the Agenda 2030 at the UN General Assembly in September; [0]

38. We reaffirm our commitment to a global response to accelerate progress on the implementation of the SDGs (development)

62. Update the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for sustainable development drawing on the idea of "partnerships for development"; [0]

45. We will strengthen our actions to implement the G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda (development)

63. Establish strong coordination with the future Indonesian and Indian G20 Presidencies, working in a "3Is" perspective and identifying effective monitoring systems to track performances and ensure more coordinated ownership between the Global North and the Global South in tackling common challenges; [−1]
64. Support debt relief in both LICs and LMICs to ensure increased ownership for recipient countries, particularly in Africa. [−1]
65. Encourage each member state to report how COVID-19 recovery programmes align with the SDGs within their economies through adequate tracking tools. [−1]
66. Budgetary cycles should be re-designed to increase transparency and ease cross-sectoral integration across various sustainability dimensions; [−1]
67. Promote the global coordination of creative economy indexes to fully address current imbalances between platform operators and the new entrants who lack adequate capacities, profile or market power; [−1]
68. Endorse the construction at the UN level of a "Multidimensional Livelihoods Index" to design a coordinated livelihood and resilience-based programming approach across agencies and organisations, implemented by humanitarian and development players; [−1]
69. Support Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises' capacity to disclose their financial and non-financial information relating to ESGs by updating the OECD/G20 inclusive framework on base erosion and profit sharing (BEPS); [0]

128. We call on the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS to swiftly develop the model rules and multilateral instruments as agreed in the Detailed Implementation Plan, with a view to ensure that the new rules will come into effect at global level in 2023. (international taxation)

70. Strengthen and systematise G20 relationship with African multilateral institutions. [−1]
71. Help ensure that a complex and diverse continent is better represented in global decision-making bodies; [−1]
72. Steer the creation of a Working Group on International Development Cooperation and Foreign Aid (WGIDCFA), wherein Think Tank representatives, agencies (UNOSSC, OECD/DAC, etc.) and scholars could debate on differences and commonalities in statistical definitions related to cooperation and aid, norms and criteria, experiences in monitoring and evaluation. [−1]

Digital Economy

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

73. Invest in electricity and connectivity, focusing on marginalised communities and users by developing G20 coordinated multilateral collaborative funding and subsidising data costs and devices; [0]

100. [We will support intermediary cities in]…enabling more equitable access to digital innovations. (digital economy)

151. [we will]…strive to adapt our regulatory frameworks to new forms of work, ensuring that these are fair and inclusive, leaving no one behind, while paying special attention to addressing the digital gender divide and intergenerational inequalities. (labour and employment)

176. Mindful of the need to support a better inclusion of MSMEs in the digital economy, we commit to reinforce our actions and international cooperation towards the digital transformation of production, processes, services and business models (digital economy)

196. Recognizing that sustainable investment in quality digital infrastructure can greatly contribute to reducing the digital divide, we will promote universal, and affordable access to connectivity for all by 2025. (digital economy)

74. Endorse innovative financing mechanisms for digital inclusion projects such as specialised Digital Inclusion Social Impact Bonds; [0]

196. Recognizing that sustainable investment in quality digital infrastructure can greatly contribute to reducing the digital divide, we will promote universal, and affordable access to connectivity for all by 2025. (digital economy)

75. Recognise and address the existing gender divide in the digital economy. [+1]

151. [we will]…strive to adapt our regulatory frameworks to new forms of work, ensuring that these are fair and inclusive, leaving no one behind, while paying special attention to addressing the digital gender divide and intergenerational inequalities. (labour and employment)

Some of the policy instruments suggested for tackling this issue are:

76. Time-bound targets and grant schemes for women in STEM [−1]

131. We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in STEM sectors (gender)

77. awareness campaigns against gender stereotypes [0]

137. [We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in]…the overcoming of gender stereotypes (gender)

187. Recognizing the responsibility of digital service providers, we will work in 2022 towards enhancing confidence in the digital environment by improving internet safety and countering online abuse, hate speech, online violence and terrorism while protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. (digital economy)

78. measures fostering gender-neutral parental leave-taking for care; [0]

138. [We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in]…the uneven distribution of unpaid care and domestic work. (gender)

79. Initiatives that accelerate technology diffusion among and adoption by women and prepare them to successfully participate in the digital labour force; [0]

151. [we will]…strive to adapt our regulatory frameworks to new forms of work, ensuring that these are fair and inclusive, leaving no one behind, while paying special attention to addressing the digital gender divide and intergenerational inequalities. (labour and employment)

80. Tools to strengthen the financing for women-led businesses and grow capital market access to equity and crowdfunding financing for women-led companies; [0]

132. [We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in]…the promotion of women's entrepreneurship and leadership (gender)

151. [we will]…strive to adapt our regulatory frameworks to new forms of work, ensuring that these are fair and inclusive, leaving no one behind, while paying special attention to addressing the digital gender divide and intergenerational inequalities. (labour and employment)

81. Design policies to address women's "time poverty" and make sure that home-based platform work is visible and free from the biases that characterise the offline world; [0]

138. [We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in]…the uneven distribution of unpaid care and domestic work. (gender)

82. Support Science, Technology and Innovation missions for SDGs in LMICs based on country-level priorities [0]

17. In particular, we will support increasing vaccine distribution, administration and local manufacturing capacity in LMICs, including through technology transfer hubs in various regions, such as the newly established mRNA Hubs in South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, and through joint production and processing arrangements. (health)

47. We welcome the progress made and reiterate our continued support to African Countries, in particular through the G20 Initiative on Supporting the Industrialization in Africa and LDCs, the G20 Africa Partnership, the Compact with Africa and other relevant initiatives. (development)

175. [Drawing on the Menu we will continue to]…help ensure that the benefits are evenly shared within and across countries and sectors. (digital economy)

83. boosting multilateral and regional efforts to enable financing for technology facilitation that can promote global public goods for LMICs; [0]

17. In particular, we will support increasing vaccine distribution, administration and local manufacturing capacity in LMICs, including through technology transfer hubs in various regions, such as the newly established mRNA Hubs in South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, and through joint production and processing arrangements. (health)

47. We welcome the progress made and reiterate our continued support to African Countries, in particular through the G20 Initiative on Supporting the Industrialization in Africa and LDCs, the G20 Africa Partnership, the Compact with Africa and other relevant initiatives. (development)

84. Fundamentally reconceptualise existing regulatory tests to take into account the realities of platform work, based on its specific criteria, such as the role played by the platform "app", the manner of control exercised through the app, and the power to set terms and conditions for service provision; [−1]
85. Adopt a coordinated framework based on commonly accepted principles for the designation of digital gatekeepers or providers of core platforms. [−1]
86. Create a comprehensive international governance architecture for big data, artificial intelligence and digital platforms; the G20 should establish a Digital Stability Board: a multi-stakeholder forum to coordinate and shape global standards and policies across the digital economy, monitoring their implementation; [−1]

179. With this in mind, we will work to strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation to secure our ICT (digital economy)

184. [Well aware of the benefits stemming from the responsible use and development of trustworthy human-centered Artificial Intelligence (AI), we will advance the implementation of the G20 AI Principles, while considering the]…importance of international cooperation to promote research, development and application of AI. (digital economy)

185. We will continue to work on addressing challenges such as those related to privacy, data protection, security and intellectual property rights, in accordance with the relevant applicable legal frameworks. (digital economy)

87. Agree on a Foundational Framework to identify the relevant AI-related pillars, goals and metrics, and then employ a common Operational Framework for effective execution and development of trustworthy AI/digital ecosystems. [−1]

184. [Well aware of the benefits stemming from the responsible use and development of trustworthy human-centered Artificial Intelligence (AI), we will advance the implementation of the G20 AI Principles, while considering the]…importance of international cooperation to promote research, development and application of AI. (digital economy)

88. Set up an independent and multi-disciplinary AI ethics committee, including representatives of all 20 country-level AI ethics committees; [−1]

199. [We will enhance our efforts to]…harness the potential of innovation and digital tools whilst upholding shared ethical principles and values. (digital economy)

89. Open up and multilateralism and regional certification schemes governing cross-border flows of personal data in APEC and EU countries to outside countries, with the prospect of moving towards interoperability in the future; [−1]
90. Implement policies that can make use of the benefits of cryptocurrencies, and distributed ledger technology (DLT) with its faster and more efficient transaction execution process [−1]
91. Improve the cyber resilience of the financial sector based on a model of operational collaboration. [−1]

181. [With this in mind, we will work to]…combat cyber crime. (crime and corruption)

92. In particular, the G20 should task the Financial Stability Board to serve as a hub for sharing information and promoting transparency about expectations around appropriate responses for norms violations; [−1]

163. [We welcome the progress reported against milestones set for 2021 by the G20 Roadmap to enhance cross-border payments, and] we endorse the ambitious but achievable quantitative global targets for addressing the challenges of cost, speed, transparency and access by 2027 set out in the FSB report. (financial regulation)

93. Increase personal protection against online threats, with the creation of specific schools' curricula to help young people identify these threats and provide them with the tools to evaluate misinformation and potential deceit; [0]

187. Recognizing the responsibility of digital service providers, we will work in 2022 towards enhancing confidence in the digital environment by improving internet safety and countering online abuse, hate speech, online violence and terrorism while protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. (digital economy)

94. Re-design the "notice and consent" model to create better ways to have meaningful "agency" over their data. [−1]
95. Establish a governance structure along with the GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) to regulate data traffickers and ad networks to ensure individualised data are not manipulated. [−1]

Anti-corruption

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

96. Explore potential areas of cooperation based on an update of the IMF framework of capital flow management measures to support countries that are lagging behind in vaccine rollouts and which are still struggling with economic fallout are and facing volatilities also resulting from capital outflows; [0]

8. we will advance our efforts to ensure timely, equitable and universal access to safe, affordable, quality and effective vaccines, therapeutics and diagnostics, with particular regard to the needs of low- and middle-income countries. (health)

12. [We will reinforce global strategies to support research and development as well as to ensure their production and swift and equitable distribution worldwide, by]…expanding and diversifying global vaccine manufacturing capacity at local and regional level (health)

17. In particular, we will support increasing vaccine distribution, administration and local manufacturing capacity in LMICs, including through technology transfer hubs in various regions, such as the newly established mRNA Hubs in South Africa, Brazil and Argentina, and through joint production and processing arrangements. (health)

166. We will work with all WTO members in the lead-up to the MC12 and beyond to enhance the capacity of the multilateral trading system to increase our pandemic and disaster preparedness and resilience through a multifaceted response, with a view to deliver an outcome on trade and health by MC12, including to work towards enhancing timely, equitable and global access to vaccines. (trade)

97. Formulate a globally accepted definition of State-Owned Multinational Enterprises (SOMNEs). [−1]
98. the T20 also recommends that the G20 to should make the Legal Entity Identifier, overseen by the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation, mandatory for all cross-border transactions undertaken by SOMNEs; [−1]
99. Make the Registers of Beneficial Ownership (RBO) of G20 countries publicly available to enhance transparency in global capital flows. [0]

223. We confirm our support for strengthening the FATF recommendations to improve beneficial ownership transparency (crime and corruption)

100. information should be shared between national actors. [+1]

215. We will also provide competent authorities with adequate, accurate and up-to-date information by adopting legally appropriate measures to improve international and domestic beneficial ownership transparency of legal persons and arrangements and real estate, especially trans-national flows, in line with the Financial Action Task Force recommendations. (crime and corruption)

220. [we will]…share information on our actions towards criminalizing foreign bribery and enforcing foreign bribery legislation in line with article 16 of UNCAC, with a view to the possible adherence of all G20 countries to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. (crime and corruption)

101. An international standard – built upon a risk based approach – should be adopted to define Ultimately Beneficial Owners (UBOs) listed in the RBO. [−1]
102. The G20 should increase punishment for non-transparent actors through naming & shaming and other forms of punishment; [0]

217. We will ensure that G20 Countries adapt their regulation and legislation to comply with the relevant obligation to criminalize bribery, including bribery of foreign public officials (crime and corruption)

103. Consider the implications of G20 transparency measures on non-G20 economies. [−1]
104. Help low-income countries curb illicit financial flows by supporting developing countries in the design and implementation of measures being put in place; [0]

48. We remain committed to addressing illicit financial flows. (crime and corruption)

105. Recognise different forms of corruption with a strong gender dimension (such as sextortion, human trafficking, and petty corruption) and define them. [−1]
106. The G20 should constitute a specific focus of any anti-corruption endeavour. This means that state institutions need to ensure that justice systems have the appropriate tools to register, investigate and prosecute these cases, and undergo adequate training to deal with cases of sextortion. [−1]
107. Moreover, anti-corruption strategies should specifically target petty corruption linked to the delivery of basic common goods, such as health and education, which disproportionately affects women due to their role as primary caregivers. −1

Employment and Social Cohesion

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

108. Support the introduction of safety nets in developing countries where poverty has increased the most during the pandemic. [0]

2. Underlining the crucial role of multilateralism in finding shared, effective solutions, we have agreed to further strengthen our common response to the pandemic, and pave the way for a global recovery, with particular regard to the needs of the most vulnerable. (health)

3. We remain determined to use all available tools for as long as required to address the adverse consequences of the pandemic, in particular on those most impacted, such as women, youth, and informal and low-skilled workers, and on inequalities. (macroeconomic growth)

149. To reduce inequalities, eradicate poverty, support worker transitions and reintegration in labour markets and promote inclusive and sustainable growth, we will strengthen our social protection systems, as outlined in the G20 Policy Principles to Ensure Access to Adequate Social Protection for All in a Changing World of Work. (social policy)

109. Make sure that lower-educated workers have appropriate access to skills and technologies in order to generate "quality" jobs. [+1]

3. We remain determined to use all available tools for as long as required to address the adverse consequences of the pandemic, in particular on those most impacted, such as women, youth, and informal and low-skilled workers, and on inequalities. (macroeconomic growth)

149. To reduce inequalities, eradicate poverty, support worker transitions and reintegration in labour markets and promote inclusive and sustainable growth, we will strengthen our social protection systems, as outlined in the G20 Policy Principles to Ensure Access to Adequate Social Protection for All in a Changing World of Work. (social policy)

155. [we]…will enhance the coordination between education, employment and social policies to improve the transition from education to quality employment, also through lifelong learning. (education)

156. [We recognize the critical role of education for sustainable development, including environmental stewardship, in empowering younger generations with the necessary skills and mindset to address global challenges.] We commit to enhance cooperation and to foster stronger, effective measures to this end. (education)

Reduce socio-economic and inter-generational inequalities by:

110. increasing government funding in several education areas (i.e. remedial education, vocational education, digital technology for poorer pupils, re-training schemes for job-seekers, pedagogical strategies and teacher training for the recovery remedial education) [−1]
111. by designing policies that exploit complementarities between these areas. [−1]
112. Foster online training to enable people to overcome barriers arising from distance to an educational provider and potentially enables greater flexibility. [−1]
113. Promote cross-country coordination in the regulation of remote working. [0]

150. We will work to ensure decent working conditions for remote and platform workers (labour and employment)

114. As in the case of posted workers, international agreements should be reached establishing, for instance, that the remote worker should be treated according to the regulations of the country where their employer is located; [0]

150. We will work to ensure decent working conditions for remote and platform workers (labour and employment)

115. Address housing inequality, a problem that the spread of remote working has worsened. [−1]
116. We recommend improving data collection on the interactions between remote working and housing inequality. [−1]
117. Leverage trade policy as a means to generate decent work for women and reduce gender inequality. [0]

132. [We will work on key factors such as equal access to education and opportunities, including in]…the promotion of women's entrepreneurship and leadership (gender)

148. [In cooperation with social partners, we will adopt human-centered policy approaches to]…decent work for all, including within global supply chains. (trade)

118. Encourage the introduction of financial literacy programmes in school curricula, using digital tools, particularly in developing countries, to facilitate access to the labour market for women and youth; [0]

190. We endorse the G20 Menu of Policy Options for digital financial literacy and financial consumer and MSME protection "Enhancing digital financial inclusion beyond the COVID-19 crisis", with the aim to provide a guide for policymakers in their efforts to lay the ground for new financial inclusion strategies in the post-pandemic world. (development)

119. Raise revenue through corporation taxation and wealth taxation, which is more effective and efficient with international cooperation and coordination. [0]

128. We call on the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on BEPS to swiftly develop the model rules and multilateral instruments as agreed in the Detailed Implementation Plan, with a view to ensure that the new rules will come into effect at global level in 2023. (international taxation)

120. Consider the establishment of a Global Citizen Income (GCI) through a two-step approach: a partial GCI to tackle poverty and unemployment generated by COVID-19; a full-scale GCI to build global citizenship. [−1]
121. Devise policy solutions to improve integration of refugees in labour markets; [0]

97. [We will support intermediary cities in]…fostering empowerment and decent work for women, youth, migrants and refugees; (labour and employment)

122. Promote labour market integration for refugees by geographically placing them where they are more likely to succeed; [−1]

97. [We will support intermediary cities in]…fostering empowerment and decent work for women, youth, migrants and refugees; (labour and employment)

123. Enhance the effective use of technology, including matching algorithms, to match labour market supply and demand; [−1]
124. Develop active labour market programmes for refugees, including language training, work first schemes and, entrepreneurship programmes, and expanding labour laws to protect refugees' rights; [−1]

97. [We will support intermediary cities in]…fostering empowerment and decent work for women, youth, migrants and refugees; (labour and employment)

125. Re-design the asylum process with a focus on integration to promote better reception, faster decisions and unrestricted labour market access. [−1]

Energy Transition and Climate Sustainability

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20

126. Prioritise low-carbon, green growth policies in the post-pandemic recovery packages and commit that any funding adheres to the "do no significant harm" principle; [−1]
127. Deploy budgetary instruments, such as carbon pricing, tax incentives and subsidies, to encourage decarbonisation while implementing a rapid phasing-out of direct and indirect fossil-fuel subsidies and any public financial support for fossil fuels, particularly new coal power plants and mining facilities [0]

117. We will increase our efforts to implement the commitment made in 2009 in Pittsburgh to phase out and rationalize, over the medium term, inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption and commit to achieve this objective, while providing targeted support for the poorest and the most vulnerable. (energy)

121. we will put an end to the provision of international public finance for new unabated coal power generation abroad by the end of 2021. (energy)

128. Set a common international taxonomy of sustainability and standards for consistent and comparable reporting frameworks to underpin reliable disclosure of green investments, including green bonds and sustainable assets. [−1]
129. Establishing a Low-Carbon Finance Facility to catalyse funds for the recovery, as well as a Green Rating Agency to support the adoption of internationally recognised sustainability disclosure and reporting standards, and the development of a global green bond market; [−1]
130. Take a leadership role in global governance and foster cooperation to align the legal and policy regimes on climate and international trade, including carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs); [−1]
131. Commit to becoming carbon neutral by 2050. [0]

105. In this endeavour, informed by the IPCC assessments, we will accelerate our actions across mitigation, adaptation and finance, acknowledging the key relevance of achieving global net zero greenhouse gas emissions or carbon neutrality by or around mid-century and the need to strengthen global efforts required to reach the goals of the Paris Agreement. (climate change)

132. G20 countries should furthermore define their long-term strategy, including science-based, sector-specific targets for 2030 and 2040. [−1]

107. [Accordingly, recognizing that G20 members can significantly contribute to the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions, we commit, in line with the latest scientific developments and with national circumstances, to]…formulate Long-Term Strategies that set out clear and predictable pathways consistent with the achievement of a balance between anthropogenic emissions and removal by sinks by or around mid-century, taking into account different approaches, including the Circular Carbon Economy, socio-economic, economic, technological, and market developments, and promoting the most efficient solutions. (climate change)

133. Create a G20 Forum on energy poverty for establishing an institutional dialogue in which public finance and public authorities identify and disseminate the best regulatory and business model practices on energy poverty; [−1]
134. Endorse the concept of "energy communities" and recognise their role in actively involving citizens and other stakeholders in the renewable energy transition; [−1]
135. Establish a Commission to accelerate the implementation of capacity building for workers affected adversely by the transformation, as well as quality youth education for climate change and sustainable development; [0]

123. [As we are recovering from the crisis, we are committed to]…guaranteeing just and orderly transitions of our energy systems that ensures affordability, including for the most vulnerable households and businesses. (energy)

156. [We recognize the critical role of education for sustainable development, including environmental stewardship, in empowering younger generations with the necessary skills and mindset to address global challenges.] We commit to enhance cooperation and to foster stronger, effective measures to this end. (education)

136. Preserve marine biodiversity and natural protected areas [+1]

83. We commit to intensify our actions to conserve, protect, restore and sustainably use marine biodiversity (environment)

85. In the context of the Antarctic Treaty System, we fully support, and encourage further progress to implement the long-standing commitment of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), recognizing Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) can serve as a powerful tool for protecting sensitive ecosystems representative of the Convention Area, in particular in East Antarctica, the Weddell Sea and in the Antarctic Peninsula. (environment)

137. recognise nature-based solutions to fight climate change and biodiversity loss; [+1]

80. We will scale up and encourage the implementation of Nature-based Solutions or Ecosystem-based Approaches as valuable tools providing economic, social, climate and environmental benefits including in and around cities, in an inclusive manner and through the participation of local communities and Indigenous Peoples. (environment)

138. Strengthen the REDD+ climate instrument for forests and extend it to Blue Carbon from coastal and marine ecosystems; [−1]
139. Recognise nature-based solutions in addition to budgetary instruments to fight – and adapt to – climate change; [+1]

50. We also call on the IMF to establish a new Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) – in line with its mandate – to provide affordable long-term financing to help low-income countries, including in the African continent, small island developing states, and vulnerable middle-income countries to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability, including those stemming from pandemics and climate change. (development)

80. We will scale up and encourage the implementation of Nature-based Solutions or Ecosystem-based Approaches as valuable tools providing economic, social, climate and environmental benefits including in and around cities, in an inclusive manner and through the participation of local communities and Indigenous Peoples. (environment)

114. We recall and reaffirm the commitment made by developed countries, to the goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 and annually through 2025 to address the needs of developing countries, in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation and stress the importance of meeting that goal fully as soon as possible. (climate change)

117. We will increase our efforts to implement the commitment made in 2009 in Pittsburgh to phase out and rationalize, over the medium term, inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption and commit to achieve this objective, while providing targeted support for the poorest and the most vulnerable. (energy)

140. Tackle the interaction between migration and the environment. [−1]

Agriculture

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20

141. Catalyse investments towards multi-sectoral nutrition programmes to ensure recovery and increase resilience in case of future pandemics; [0]

60. We are committed to achieving food security and adequate nutrition for all, leaving no one behind. (food and agriculture)

61. To this end, we endorse the Matera Declaration and its Call to Action. (food and agriculture)

142. Establish a permanent joint Thematic Group on the AFOLU sector (Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use) that brings together Agriculture, Finance, Development, Environment, and Health Ministers to ensure policy coherence across their respective policy areas in relation to food security and food systems; [−1]
143. Empower small farmers through policies that fully integrate them into regional value chains so that developing countries with a comparative advantage in agriculture are not compromised by the domination of global value chains by a handful of Trans-national Corporations; [0]

61. To this end, we endorse the Matera Declaration and its Call to Action. (food and agriculture)

144. Reach consensus on how to repurpose agricultural subsidies of advanced economies to avoid unfair competition for smaller producers in Low and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) [−1]
145. truly support the transition towards sustainable farming practices and restoration activities; [+1]

61. To this end, we endorse the Matera Declaration and its Call to Action. (food and agriculture)

146. Enhance effective social protection programmes to tackle the emergency, reducing vulnerabilities and achieving food security to support the most in need, such as informal workers and children; [+1]

61. To this end, we endorse the Matera Declaration and its Call to Action. (food and agriculture)

147. Identify strategies to operationalise the One Health approach on sustainable food systems, promoting policies to properly manage those intersections, minimising risks, and avoiding unintended consequences; [+1]

61. To this end, we endorse the Matera Declaration and its Call to Action. (food and agriculture)

148. Promote the digital transformation of agriculture using the new technological enablers (e.g. digital data-centric and information-centric technologies) that provide fine-grained data-rich analysis of the various stages of agricultural production across the end-to-end food value chain; [0]

61. To this end, we endorse the Matera Declaration and its Call to Action. (food and agriculture)

149. Encourage a shift towards more sustainable diets for our health and that of the planet. These should be based on a reduced share of animal-based proteins in the global protein consumption mix and richer in fruits, vegetables, nuts, legumes and whole grains; [−1]
150. Finally, the G20 countries should address all those regulatory bottlenecks (e.g. land usage, energy subsidies, tax incentives) to support the development of urban farming practices and minimise their carbon footprint. [−1]

Migration

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20

151. Grant access to health care, income support, and suitable working and living conditions to asylum-seekers and migrants [−1]
152. Provide income support for migrants predictably and regularly as an effective tool to increase access to essential social services, such as education and health. [−1]
153. Developing early childhood education and care (ECEC) services as an effective measure to address the health, nutrition and education needs of migrants' children. [−1]
154. Support catalysing both regional solutions and concrete national actions to reduce women migrants' vulnerabilities. [−1]
155. Ensure an inclusive, free-of-charge and proactive COVID-19 vaccination offer to migrants and refugees (M&R), irrespective of their legal status and extending this approach beyond the current pandemic; [0]

157. We commit to take steps to support the full inclusion of migrants, including migrant workers, and refugees in our pandemic response and recovery efforts, in the spirit of international cooperation and in line with national policies, legislation and circumstances, ensuring full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their migration status. (migration and refugees)

156. Financially support COVAX [+1]

15. We reiterate our support to all pillars of the ACT-Accelerator, including COVAX (health)

157. endorse the WHO SAGE prioritisation roadmap, identifying migrants and refugees among priority groups for COVID-19 immunisation; [−1]
158. Encourage the inclusion of migrant – and refugee – specific strategic goals, targets and indicators into national vaccination plans; [0]

157. We commit to take steps to support the full inclusion of migrants, including migrant workers, and refugees in our pandemic response and recovery efforts, in the spirit of international cooperation and in line with national policies, legislation and circumstances, ensuring full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms regardless of their migration status. (migration and refugees)

159. Support the role of return migrants' networks and making them a building block of the post-pandemic development strategy in the countries of origin, in light of the increasing return migration and the challenges posed by the disruption of supply chains due to the pandemic. [−1]

Multilateralism and Civil Society Engagement

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

160. Leverage the opportunities offered by a bottom-up, flexible and open approach to multilateralism, calling on G20 leaders to set up an open and inclusive platform to share information and evidence on the costs of non-coordination. [−1]
161. In particular, efforts should be devoted to exploring avenues for developing a comprehensive index on the costs of non-coordination. [−1]
162. Issue an annual report on "Global Risk", which would become a flagship product of the G20 with T20 support. [−1]
163. Explore how best it can engage with the major internet and technology companies, ensuring that all its members' interests, not just those at the technological cutting edge, are represented. [−1]
164. Tackle the spread of disinformation through the creation of a G20 communication office responsible for developing a comprehensive communication strategy, including a dedicated website, the launch of a T20 Taskforce and a permanent roundtable on disinformation; [0]

13. We will reinforce global strategies to support research and development as well as to ensure their production and swift and equitable distribution worldwide,]…while promoting vaccine acceptance, confidence and fighting disinformation. (health)

Global Economy and International Finance

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

165. Provide short-term liquidity to Emerging Markets & Developing Economies that face balance of payment stresses due to global shock; [0]

50. We also call on the IMF to establish a new Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) – in line with its mandate – to provide affordable long-term financing to help low-income countries, including in the African continent, small island developing states, and vulnerable middle-income countries to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability, including those stemming from pandemics and climate change. (development)

166. Reset the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN) to foster global financial stability and sustainable growth. [+1]

54. [We reiterate our commitment to strengthening long-term financial resilience and supporting inclusive growth, including through]…maintaining a strong and effective Global Financial Safety Net with a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at its centre. (IFI reform)

167. The dual IMF accounting (regular and Special Drawing Rights (SDR) accounts should be eliminated. [−1]
168. The possibility of increasing the share of developing countries in the allocation should be discussed. [+1]

49. We are working on actionable options for members with strong external positions to significantly magnify its impact through the voluntary channelling of part of the allocated SDRs to help vulnerable countries, according to national laws and regulations. (development)

169. The GFSN should also be aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Climate Agreement; [−1]

54. [We reiterate our commitment to strengthening long-term financial resilience and supporting inclusive growth, including through]…maintaining a strong and effective Global Financial Safety Net with a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at its centre. (IFI reform)

170. Urge Regional Financial Arrangements (RFAs) to further optimise their lending toolkits and funding policies to complement those of the IMF. [−1]
171. RFAs should join hands with the IMF to form an integrated global economic surveillance framework to ensure global financial stability; [−1]
172. Call for the development of Global Legal Standards. [−1]
173. Urge the IMF to develop a multilateral swap mechanism that scales up the swap networks that are already in operation across the global financial system; [−1]
174. Urge the IMF to reform its access limits and surcharge policy because they affect middle-income countries and should be suspended/eliminated to support their recovery; [−1]
175. Urge the IMF to double two emergency credit facilities in 2021: the Rapid Credit Facility and the Rapid Financing Instrument; [−1]
176. Support a robust and accelerated International Development Association (IDA) replenishment; [−1]
177. ensure a robust replenishment of the African Development Fund (ADF) in the following year; [−1]
178. allow the ADF and IDA to pursue alternative sources of funding beyond donor contributions; [−1]
179. Introduce a new facility called Countercyclical Sovereign Financing Mechanism to provide cheaper access to the international debt market and automatically reduce debt burden and servicing cost; [−1]
180. Create a World Recovery Fund to allow emerging countries to swap existing debt for new debt and/or to issue new debt under improved market conditions, with an underlying project as collateral; [−1]
181. Play a more proactive role in mandating a complete disclosure of outstanding debt in beneficiary countries as a condition of benefitting from any form of debt treatment; [−1]
182. Discuss options to include country groups other than the DSSI-eligible countries. [−1]
183. Develop proposals to allocate new SDRs to low-income countries with a volume exceeding their quotas; [+1]

49. We are working on actionable options for members with strong external positions to significantly magnify its impact through the voluntary channelling of part of the allocated SDRs to help vulnerable countries, according to national laws and regulations. (development)

184. Urge the IMF to align SDRs with national plans and needs, leverage the private sector's investments and ensure easier access to capital markets. [0]

49. We are working on actionable options for members with strong external positions to significantly magnify its impact through the voluntary channelling of part of the allocated SDRs to help vulnerable countries, according to national laws and regulations. (development)

50. We also call on the IMF to establish a new Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) – in line with its mandate – to provide affordable long-term financing to help low-income countries, including in the African continent, small island developing states, and vulnerable middle-income countries to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability, including those stemming from pandemics and climate change. (development)

185. Launch a Liquidity and Sustainability Facility (LSF) as a particular purpose lending vehicle to support LICs and LMICs sovereigns in advancing sustainable development initiatives and, more immediately, facilitate access to liquidity; [0]

50. We also call on the IMF to establish a new Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) – in line with its mandate – to provide affordable long-term financing to help low-income countries, including in the African continent, small island developing states, and vulnerable middle-income countries to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability, including those stemming from pandemics and climate change. (development)

186. Bring private creditors to the table of debt transparency initiatives; [−1]
187. Create a central credit facility (CCF) to implement a debt standstill that would free significant resources, involve the private sector and allow for an orderly restructuring in the event of a wave of sovereign debt crises; [−1]
188. Introduce a "legal air cover" to temporarily protect countries against lawsuits, in the form of either a UN Security Council Immunity Shield, or an executive order by the US President and similar legislative action by the UK parliament (most international debt is issued under either New York law or English law), or the doctrine of Necessity under Article 25 of the International Law Commission's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; [−1]
189. Request an international body such as the Bank of International Settlements or the Financial Stability Board to establish an independent office to review central banks' global financial governance activities and the impacts of all decisions intended to operate extraterritorially; [−1]
190. Urge central banks in G20 countries to set regular schedules for communications to avoid a sharp turn of market expectation caused by divergent policy moves; [−1]
191. Keep monetary policy expansionary for an extended period. [−1]
192. Banking supervisory and regulatory policies should contribute to avoiding an abrupt deleveraging process. [0]

160. While the global financial system has been largely resilient, gaps in the regulatory framework remain which we are committed to addressing, including by completing the remaining elements of the G20 regulatory reforms agreed after the 2008 financial crisis. (financial regulation)

193. Fiscal policies should remain stimulatory until GDP has reached its pre-pandemic growth path. [+1]

4. We will continue to sustain the recovery, avoiding any premature withdrawal of support measures, while preserving financial stability and long-term fiscal sustainability and safeguarding against downside risks and negative spill-overs. (financial regulation)

194. The balanced budget rule should apply to current government spending and taxation, but bond issues should finance capital spending; [−1]
195. Avoid adopting a one-size-fits-all phasing out policy: firms' productivity must be considered. [−1]
196. Those firms that were already unproductive before COVID-19 should be phased out first; [−1]
197. Launch a scaled-back pilot project that provides limited pandemic-risk coverage to test the risk-securitisation concept. [−1]
198. Stress the importance of diasporas for development and humanitarian action, highlighting the importance of migrant integration in host countries and facilitating circular migration to transfer skills and experiences. [−1]
199. The G20 should also underline the importance of initiatives that engage and connect diasporas and their organisations to policymakers, the business community and other private actors; [−1]
200. Deepen its collaboration with the G7, relevant international organisations and other stakeholders to further reduce the cost of sending remittances, better regulate the remittances markets, and ensure more competition among service providers. [0]

191. We support the GPFI in bringing forward the monitoring of National Remittances Plans, also gathering more granular data (development)

192. [we] strongly encourage the continued facilitation of the flow of remittances and the reduction of average remittance transfer costs. (development)

Infrastructure

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

201. Explore convergence between multilateral initiatives such as the new G7 Building Back a Better World (B3W) initiative or the existing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to build a new sustainable economy. [−1]
202. Establish a permanent dialogue mechanism among the infrastructure expertise within the context of G20, particularly the Infrastructure Working Group (IWG), the Development Working Group (DWG) and the D20, and other engagement groups; [−1]
203. Mobilise Capital and Markets for Sustainable Infrastructure. [0]

170. In line with the G20 Roadmap for Infrastructure as an Asset Class, and building on the G20 Infrastructure Investors Dialogue, we will continue, in a flexible manner, to develop further the collaboration between the public and private investors to mobilise private capital. (infrastructure)

171. We will continue to advance the work related to the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment. (infrastructure)

204. Standardise data and disclosure and harmonise ESG and QII indicators to mobilise institutional investors further to support infrastructure investments, particularly in emerging countries; [−1]
205. Include sub-national governments, especially cities, in global efforts to mobilise private investments in low-carbon and climate-resilient infrastructure; [−1]

93. We endorse the G20 Platform on SDG Localization and Intermediary Cities, with the support of the OECD and UN-Habitat. (environment)

94. We will support intermediary cities in adopting integrated and inclusive urban planning; (environment)

206. Enhance the sharing and reuse of data and pioneering technologies that can improve infrastructure value-chain integration and strengthen infrastructure productivity, efficiency and affordability, from design to construction and operation, maintenance and resilience. [−1]
207. Develop new digital infrastructure, particularly in emerging countries, creating significant spill-over effects to achieve an affordable well-being economy. [+1]

196. Recognizing that sustainable investment in quality digital infrastructure can greatly contribute to reducing the digital divide, we will promote universal, and affordable access to connectivity for all by 2025. (digital economy)

208. Design a G20 Pact on sustainable urbanisation to support the United Nations Secretary-General's initiative on the future of cities through macro-economic policies that recouple human and economic development and regenerate the 2030 Agenda; [0]

93. We endorse the G20 Platform on SDG Localization and Intermediary Cities, with the support of the OECD and UN-Habitat. (environment)

209. Invest in the resilience of infrastructure systems in emerging and developing countries to bring huge economic and social benefits. [−1]

Sustainable Finance

The T20 Italy recommends that the G20:

210. Urge the IMF to integrate climate risk analysis in its surveillance activity; [0]

50. We also call on the IMF to establish a new Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) – in line with its mandate – to provide affordable long-term financing to help low-income countries, including in the African continent, small island developing states, and vulnerable middle-income countries to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability, including those stemming from pandemics and climate change. (development)

211. Urge the IMF to open a new financing window through which balance of payments and even fiscal support for climate efforts and just transitions can also be channeled; [0]

50. We also call on the IMF to establish a new Resilience and Sustainability Trust (RST) – in line with its mandate – to provide affordable long-term financing to help low-income countries, including in the African continent, small island developing states, and vulnerable middle-income countries to reduce risks to prospective balance of payments stability, including those stemming from pandemics and climate change. (development)

212. Support governments in developing budgetary instruments to account for climate risk and mainstream and integrate climate frameworks, policies, and laws into national and sectoral budgets; [−1]
213. Define the scope and goals of ESG investing for the next ten years along with the relevant ESG policies at all levels. [−1]
214. The G20 should ensure that developed and emerging markets are part of the strategy designing process and that closing the ESG gap becomes a strong focus; [−1]
215. Standardise metrics, narratives, and benchmarks in the assessment of ESG policies. [−1]
216. Promote the financing of projects to increase energy efficiency. [−1]
217. The investment gap in this sector should be filled by incentivising fiscal instruments such as subsidies and tax exemptions that should be implemented globally with the same tax rate; [−1]
218. Set up an International Hydrogen Economy Initiative (IHEI) – with its Secretariat based in Rome - to spread best practices in policy instrument design related to green hydrogen. [−1]
219. Help at the international level to adopt an unambiguous definition of "green bond" to have a well-functioning green bond market; [−1]
220. Support establishing a unified green rating agency to avoid having different standards for each country. [−1]

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Appendix E: G20 2020 Riyadh Summit Assessed Commitments and Compliance by Match ↩

Fully Matched

N=2
Compliance: 80%

2020-15: We are committed to implementing the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) including its extension through June 2021, allowing DSSI-eligible countries to suspend official bilateral debt service payments. (development) [83%] [+1]

2020-101: We endorse the Circular Carbon Economy (CCE) Platform, with its 4Rs framework (Reduce, Reuse, Recycle and Remove), recognizing the key importance and ambition of reducing emissions, taking into account system efficiency and national circumstances. (climate change) [78%] [+1]

Partially Matched

N=11
Compliance: 89%

2020-36: We will strengthen long-term financial resilience and support growth, including through promoting sustainable capital flows and developing domestic capital markets. (macroeconomic policy) [95%] [0]

2020-70: We will continue our efforts to reduce inequalities, reaffirming our previous commitments to promote inclusive growth. (macroeconomic policy) [95%] [0]

2020-51: We will continue our cooperation for a globally fair, sustainable, and modern international tax system. (international taxation) [95%] [0]

2020-27: We strive to realize the goal of a free, fair, inclusive, non-discriminatory, transparent, predictable, and stable trade and investment environment (trade) [83%] [0]

2020-49: We support fostering an open, fair, and non-discriminatory environment, and protecting and empowering consumers, while addressing the challenges related to privacy, data protection, intellectual property rights, and security. (digital economy) [90%] [0]

2020-75: We will continue to support workers through training and reskilling policies. (labour and employment) [83%] [0]

2020-88: We will take steps to remove the barriers to women's economic participation and entrepreneurship. (gender) [94%] [0]

2020-5: We remain determined to support all developing and least developed countries as they face the intertwined health, economic, and social effects of COVID-19, recognizing the specific challenges in Africa and small island developing states. (health) [93%] [0]

2020-18: We commit to advancing global pandemic preparedness, prevention, detection, and response. (health) [90%] [0]

2020-21: [We reaffirm our commitment to] the continued sharing of timely, transparent, and standardized data and information [IHR] (health) [90%] [0]

2020-95: We reaffirm our commitment to reduce additional pollution by marine plastic litter, as articulated by the Osaka Blue Ocean Vision (environment) [73%] [0]

Not Matched

N=7
Compliance: 83%

2020-52: we remain committed to further progress on both pillars and urge the G20/OECD Inclusive Framework on BEPS to address the remaining issues with a view to reaching a global and consensus-based solution by mid-2021. (international taxation) [100%] [−1]

2020-28: [We strive to]…keep our markets open. (trade) [56%] [−1]

2020-47: We reiterate our strong commitment to tackle all sources, techniques and channels of these threats. (crime and corruption) [80%] [−1]

2020-6: We will spare no effort to ensure their [vaccines] affordable and equitable access for all people, consistent with members' commitments to incentivize innovation. In this regard, we fully support all collaborative efforts, especially the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) initiative and its COVAX facility, and the voluntary licensing of intellectual property. (health) [85%] [−1]

2020-81: As many women have been disproportionately affected by the crisis, we will work to ensure that the pandemic does not widen gender inequalities and undermine the progress made in recent decades. (gender) [93%] [−1]

2020-100: We reaffirm our joint commitment on medium term rationalization and phasing-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, while providing targeted support for the poorest. (energy) [70%] [−1]

2020-104: Signatories to the Paris Agreement who confirmed at Osaka their determination to implement it, once again, reaffirm their commitment to its full implementation, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances. (climate change) [98%] [−1]

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