

# **From Collision to Co-operation: Prospects for the Hamburg G20 Summit**

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## **Introduction**

In exactly two weeks' time, on July 7-8 2017, the leaders of the world's systemically significant countries will gather in Hamburg for their 12th Group of Twenty (G20) Summit. What should it, and what will it, do for the world and for you?

It is an unusually important event. It is the first G20 summit hosted by Germany, the fourth ranked economic power in the world. Its chair, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, is the most experienced G20 leader, has been in office continuously since 2005 and is the only G20 leader to have attended every G20 summit since their start in 2008. It is the first G20 summit chaired and hosted by a former environment minister, a professional scientist and a woman, at a time when climate change, science and technology and gender issues have centre stage. It comes a few months before Merkel faces a general election. It features her global leadership on key issues, above all climate change control and openness in trade and migration. Here she stands opposed to a newly elected, internationally inexperienced, domestically distracted US President attached to an antithetical approach. Never before has a G20 summit faced such stark divisions among its leading members on its eve. If the current collision course cannot be changed into a co-operative path, Hamburg could be the first failed summit the G20 has had, as all others have been at least a substantial success (see Appendix A).

US President Donald Trump will arrive in Hamburg having just withdrawn from the historic 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change (see Appendix B). He will face other newcomers with a stronger, fresher electoral mandate, notably France's Emmanuel Macron and South Korea's Moon Jae-In, along with Italy's Paolo Gentiloni who just hosted the successful G7 Summit in Taormina on May 25-26, 2017. Hamburg will be the second G20 summit for Britain's electorally weakened Theresa May, Argentina's Mauricio Macri, Brazil's Michel Temer and Saudi Arabia's Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and the third for Canada's popular Justin Trudeau, and the European Union's Donald Tusk. The veterans will be India's Narendra Modi, Indonesia's Joko Widodo, and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan at their fourth, Japan's Shinzo Abe and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto at their fifth, Russia's Vladimir Putin at his sixth, and South Africa's Jacob Zuma at his tenth.

Germany as host will seek to mobilize the work of the G20's six ministerial forums, seven engagements groups (from business, labour, think tanks, science, youth, civil society and women), invited guest leaders (from Spain, the Netherlands, Norway, Singapore and the chair of APEC) and the heads of major multilateral organizations. To

counter popular anti-globalization sentiment, it will seek to communicate convincingly how the G20 works for the benefit of all.

At Hamburg G20 leaders will confront a broad range of pressing global challenges, arranged by the German host under three agenda pillars. The first pillar, Building Resilience, contains the world economy, trade and investment, employment, financial markets and international financial architecture and international tax co-operation. The second pillar, Improving Sustainability, consists of climate and energy, the 2030 Agenda on sustainable development, digitalization, global health and empowering women. The third pillar, Assuming Responsibility, is composed of tackling the causes of displacement, partnership with Africa, fighting terrorism, anti-corruption and agriculture and food security.

## **The Debate**

In the lead up to Hamburg, the debate about how much and why it would succeed was dominated by those who predicted failure in several forms.

## **The Thesis**

Yet despite these doubts, Hamburg is likely to be a summit of solid success. It will advance agreement on terrorism, anti-corruption and macroeconomic growth, employment, tax, women's economic empowerment and perhaps health and Africa. Given the large differences between President Trump and most other leaders, little will be done on trade and investment, financial regulation, digitalization, migration, food, sustainability, and above all on the central, compelling threat of climate change.

This two-speed performance will be driven by the unifying shocks of the recent terrorist attacks in Manchester, London and Michigan, American memories dating back to September 11, 2001, at home, and the evident failure of the multilateral organizations of the United Nations system to control or prevent such security threats. The rising relative capabilities of China, India, Germany and France and their leaders' high domestic political control and popularity will propel co-operation against terrorism and the corruption that cripples economic growth. Yet the resistance of a domestically distracted Donald Trump, backed by Saudi Arabia and Russia, will prevent progress on climate change and the many related sustainable development goals. Still, Hamburg will bring a diminution and delay, not a durable decline or disappearance of the G20's growing effectiveness. For Europe, China, India, and Canada, supported by their sympathetic partners, will unite to lead the G20, along with the U.S. where possible, and without it where necessary, until the U.S. learns how much its needs G20 co-operation to meet American needs.

## **The Preparatory Process**

### **The German Plan, December 1, 2016**

The plan for the Hamburg Summit was publicly announced by its German host on its G20 website on December 1, 2016, the day Germany formally assumed the G20 chair for the year. Under the central theme of “Shaping an Interconnected World”, it presented 15 items under agenda pillars. The first pillar, Building Resilience, contained the traditional economic and finance subjects of the world economy, trade and investment, employment, financial markets and international financial architecture and international tax co-operation. The second pillar, Improving Sustainability, consisted of the newer items of climate and energy, the 2030 Agenda on sustainable development, digitalization, global health and empowering women. The third pillar, Assuming Responsibility, was composed of the urgent issues of tackling the causes of displacement, partnership with Africa, fighting terrorism, anti-corruption and agriculture and food security.

### **The Lead-up Ministerials**

The path to Hamburg was paved by six G20 ministerial meetings (see Appendix C). These were for: Agriculture on January 22 in Berlin; Foreign Affairs on February 16-17 in Bonn; Finance on March 18 in Baden Baden; on Digitalization on April 7 in Dusseldorf; Labour on May 19 in Bad Neuenhaur and Health on May 20 in Berlin. All issued a communiqué, save for the foreign ministers who had never planned to produce one (Kirton 2017). There was no energy or trade ministers’ meeting, unlike the two previous years and no trade ministers one.

The agriculture ministers in January made 29 commitments, compared to the 47 in 2016 and 16 in 2015. The finance ministers in March made 28 commitments, led by 7 (or 25%) on financial regulations, 5 (18%) on taxation, and 3 (11%) on IFI reform. Beyond these core subjects, it made two commitments on Africa, one each on terrorism, energy, crime-corruption and development but notably none on trade, climate change or migration. The digitalization ministers in April made 89 commitments. The health ministers in May made 44. There was a notable surge since April’s start.

### **The Compliance Momentum**

Momentum also came from members’ compliance with the 16 priority commitments they made at the Hangzhou Summit the previous year. Six months later, their compliance averaged 72%, just above the G20 summit’s multi-year final compliance average of 71% (see Appendix C). Compliance normally could be expected to rise during the second half of the implementation period. Yet in 2017 there were signs that Trump and his fellow Republican-dominated Congress were reversing the earlier implementing steps of their Democratic party predecessors. Concerns arose that other members would follow this U.S. lead.

The interim compliance level of 72% was lower than the 2015 Antalya Summit's final compliance of 77%. Yet it was on par with the 2014 Brisbane average of 71% and the 2013 St. Petersburg average of 72%.

Compliance with the priority Hangzhou commitments was led by Canada and Australia at 89% each and host China at 82%. In the middle came the EU at 79%, the U.S., Russia and UK at 76% each. Argentina, now a member of the G20's governing troika had 71%, as did Mexico. At the bottom came Korea, Indonesia and Japan with 68% each, India at 66%, Saudi Arabia with 63% and Turkey with 61%. G7 host, Italy, came last at 58%.

By issue, compliance was led by knowledge and technology transfer at 100%. Implementation of the G20 Guiding Principles for Global Investment Policymaking at 98%, building tax capacity in developing countries, supporting implementation of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and working towards innovation-driven growth at 95%, 93% and 90%, respectively, terrorist financing and lowering the costs of trade at 85% and macroeconomic policy at 83%.

In the middle came advancing cooperation on base erosion and profit shifting at 75%, addressing forced migration at 73% and addressing climate change at 68%. Advancing implementation of the G20 Anti-Corruption Action Plan, finalizing the agreed financial sector reform agenda and continuing the G20's commitments to standstill and rollback protectionist measures until the end of 2018 each had 65%.

Near the bottom was promoting e-commerce development with 63%, implementing intended national actions under the UN's Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and improving energy efficiency at 60% each, and further developing employment plans for youth and female employment at 45%.

Dead last, at only 10% was the commitment to "phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption over the medium term, recognizing the need to support the poor."

## **The Sherpa Process**

### **The Summit's Eve**

One month before the summit, the G20 sherpas were heading into extremely difficult negotiations. The two leading protagonists were on a collision course on the major issues of climate change, trade, migration, Russia and financial regulation. On one side stood a very ambitious German host, driven by a very engaged, hands-on, passionate leader, who saw her Sherpa on a regular basis and gave him more access than anyone else in the German government. Merkel saw herself and her G20 as the leading voice to counter the prevalent anti-globalization and anti-protectionist rhetoric. Her forthcoming general election in the fall, her encounter with Trump at the G7 summit in Taormina, and her subsequent comments in the beer tent in Munich, put her in no mood to compromise with a US president who had just withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and who was distracted

by Congressional hearings into his relationship with Russia and his firing of his FBI director. The U.S. president and his policies would be front and centre at Hamburg and a wild card there. For the first time at a G20 summit, several major issues would be left for the leaders themselves at the summit table to resolve — climate change, migration, trade and perhaps even the SDGs.

The dynamics and divisions at the recent G7 summit were likely to reappear at Hamburg in intensified form. To be sure, the G7 summit had turned out better than many had expected. But the U.S. had quickly retreated from some of the consensus reached there, especially on trade. Ministers at the OECD's Ministers of Trade Meeting (MTM) during the first week of June found it very difficult to hammer out an agreed statement on trade. There was thus likely to be statement from all MTM members and a separate chair's statement from Denmark, focused on the divisive issues of climate change and trade. The US, retreating from Taormina's firm language against protectionism, was due to issue its own national position.

One month before the summit, G20 sherpas had not seen a draft summit communiqué. Germany felt that if it presented one too early the preparatory process would bog down. It was likely to appear in a week or so. In the meantime, sherpas worked with "building blocks" of short one pagers or less that articulated high-level messages or priorities, rather than detailed texts or proposals. Even in these general building blocks difficulty arose on trade and climate change.

### **The Summit Agenda and Schedule**

The Summit itself was due to focus on globalization as the overarching theme. Germany had advanced an agenda under the title of "shaping an interconnected world." It was based on the three pillars of resilience, sustainability and responsibility. In each summit session and on each topic leaders would be asked: how do we manage globalization, respond to those questioning the benefits of globalization, reach marginalized groups and make sure globalization benefits all. This emphasis would appear in all the summit discussions.

The schedule was likely to feature a leaders-only retreat at the start or early in the program, to allow for a very frank discussion of this broad theme of globalization. This discussion would set the tone for the rest of the summit (see Appendix D).

The global economy would be addressed in the next session. As usual, it would cover trade, investment, taxation, financial inclusion and financial architecture. Leaders would produce a Hamburg Action Plan on the Global Economy, which would detail how the instruments of fiscal, monetary and structural policy should be used. There would also be an update on progress in meeting the 2% additional growth target set by the Brisbane Action Plan at the Australian hosted summit in November 2014.

Trade again raised the question of whether the word "protection" would appear in the communiqué. It had finally done so in the G7 Taormina communiqué. But soon after, it

became clear that the U.S. did not feel bound by that commitment (Schmucker 2017). The US refused to have the word “protection” appear in the OECD statement.

Steel overcapacity would be discussed, as it had been at Hangzhou. A global task force at the OECD was examining the issue. It had been slow to engage the Chinese who had not been helpful in providing data to establish an evidence base. The aluminum industry was lobbying hard to have its issue mentioned as an overcapacity problem too.

Climate and energy would be the subject of a separate discussion. Germany had prepared a very detailed G20 Action Plan on Climate and Energy for Growth. At the previous Sherpa meeting, the U.S. had said that even if it remained part of the Paris Agreement, it would have a problem with the Action Plan because it was too detailed. It contained things it could not see the US agreeing to. After the US had announced at the start of June that it was pulling out of Paris, the entire Plan Action could die.

There would also be a Green Economy Action Plan. Argentina sought one focused on oceans. Germany pushed a broader economy approach that would include the oceans.

On climate change specifically there was a 19 to one divide, will all arrayed against a resistant US. Amidst the many scenarios, at Hamburg there might be a separate chair’s statement on climate change and on trade, which would not bind the US. There were several components to tackling climate change. Explicit references to the implementation of the Paris Agreement were out of reach and no consensus text was in sight. Yet there was common ground on growing the economy through investments in clean technology.

Terrorism would be discussed at a separate session. It could be a working lunch. The recent terrorist attacks in Manchester, London and Michigan would spur a strong consensus here, as had appeared at Taormina. Leaders would probably also discuss broader foreign policy issues, as they had at all G20 summits before.

Migration was likely to arise in the discussion. It was another sensitive sticking point. Canada’s welcoming approach was antithetical to that of the US. It was unclear what the tone and balance of the communiqué would be.

Health would have a separate discussion. Germany had pushed hard on the health agenda, more than any presidency before. Health had not traditionally been on the G20 agenda in this planned way from the start. The building block on health had strong references to the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) and trying to build it up. It also affirmed the role of the international community in responding to health emergencies and pandemics such as Ebola.

Anti-microbial resistance (AMR) would likely be the main issue. It would be addressed primarily from a market perspective and how to manage finding new pharmaceuticals by filling a market vacuum. TB as a cause of AMR was seen as the top challenge at the sherpa table. Yet some members were reluctant to identify a specific need, even though it

was the leading cause of AMR. Some countries did not want to make AMR itself a major issue.

Development would receive a very robust discussion, focused on a few components. One was the Hangzhou 2030 Agenda Action Plan, endorsed by G20 leaders there. There would be a Hamburg update on the G20's collective implementation of the SDGs. Sherpas were actively discussing having leaders make a firm commitment on when G20 countries would go to the UN High Level Meeting (HLM) to report on their progress on implementing the SDGs. The date was originally seen as 2018, when Canada's G7 summit would be held. Yet now countries were reluctant to do it so early. Still, the 2030 Agenda would be at the heart of the Hamburg communiqué, particularly on development.

Africa would be discussed, following the attention to it at the last few summits. The focus at Hamburg would be on the Compact with Africa between individual G20 companies and African countries to promote private sector investment with development impacts. There were questions about what impacts those investments would have. Yet at the Sherpa table, there was strong support from the previous Chinese and Turkish presidencies for the Compact. A conference with African leaders, opened by Merkel, took place in Germany the second week in June. The Germans were mobilizing compact pledges, even if there was not much on the table yet. The Africa compact would probably survive to be at Hamburg deliverable.

Women and entrepreneurship was an area of emerging consensus. From the start it had been agreed that women, girls and gender equality would be a crosscutting theme. The US and other countries had stepped forward. There were several components on the Hamburg agenda.

The first was e-skills for girls, to break down the digital divide in skills for the digital economy. The G20 could launch a digital platform for skills development.

The second was a World Bank Women's Entrepreneurship Facility, pushed by the U.S. It could be the flagship achievement of the summit. It would be a fund centred at the World Bank to support women-led or women-owned small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the developing world through loans, technical assistance, equity, and other instruments. Focused very much on developing countries, the Fund could contain about a billion dollars. Its proponents wished to have G20 and other countries pledge about \$200 million through a public sector window. Saudi Arabia and the UAE had announced a \$100 million contribution. The U.S. and Germany would contribute too.

A Women's Business Council (WBC) was proposed by Canada. It would be composed of prominent high-profile women business leaders. It would resemble the Canada-U.S. Business Council, but in expanded form. It would examine the challenges globally to women's entrepreneurship and leadership in the international economy. Its members would brainstorm, network, share best practices, reach out to stakeholders, and produce recommendations for Argentina's G20 presidency. It would be G20-wide, so both

developed and developing countries would participate. It would nicely complement the World Bank facility. Accenture would help finance it.

Yet Germany and others feared such a Council would duplicate the World Bank Facility. The latter would have a governing council of member states which had contributed at least \$10 million and possibly a council of high powered women leaders such as Christine Lagarde to provide guidance. The U.S., Europeans and Argentineans asked if the two bodies could be combined. Canada replied that the leadership group was for the Facility. It would be focused on the strategic direction for that fund, notably the \$200 million from the public sector that would leverage much more money in contrast, the Women's Business Council would be much larger in its global reach and have a bigger impact by working with G20 leaders.

The third component of the women's agenda was the Brisbane Summit commitment to closer the gender gap in the workplace by 25% by 2025. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) had indicated that G20 members were short of the goal and were not moving fast enough to reach it.

On refugees and labour market integration, there was strong language in the building block.

Digitalization and employment would be dealt with in the last summit session. It would build on the Chinese presidency's emphasis on the economy and digitalization. It would stress the importance of digitalization to the global economy and growth. It would focus on inclusion and inclusiveness in the digital economy, skills training across age and gender categories, and treat them as reinforcing and complementing.

Skills training and education, with a strong emphasis on youth, was pushed by Canada. Merkel was receptive to these ideas.

On taxation the G20 would enhance tax certainty. Germany might also wish to have stolen assets addressed.

Inequality was now at the heart of G20 governance, starting with its inclusive growth agenda. The communiqué under the Germans and Argentineans would contain much text about inequality.

Civil Society had been easier to push under the German presidency than the Chinese one. Germany had been able and willing to reach out to civil society groups.

## **Conclusion: Scenarios for Success**

Two weeks before the Hamburg Summit, three scenarios for its success stand out.

**Collision.** The first scenario is collision, with the first failed G20 summit as the result. Here Germany's Merkel and the America's Trump both dig in on their deeply held and diametrically opposed positions on trade, climate change, and migration, due to their

personal convictions and domestic political preoccupation and public support. They emphasize these above all other issues and concerns. They produce a domestic political success for them and for Merkel's hardline soulmates, but a failure for everyone else, for the G20 summit and probably for the world.

**Compromise.** The second scenario is compromise, as both sides blink and swerve from their collision course, on to the many cooperative off ramps that await. Here the divisive issues of trade and climate change are deemed unsolvable, and downplayed or dropped at Hamburg. This allows advances on the consensus items of terrorism, economic growth, women, tax, digitalization and health. The result is a summit of solid success. It will be deemed a failure by the media and publics and thus its domestic political management, but it will succeed in deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making and the development of global governance, if not delivery when Trump and his fellow leaders return home.

**Co-operation.** The third scenario is cooperation to secure a stronger success. Here all the leaders led by Trump and Merkel come together at Hamburg, as the G7 ones did at Taormina, to produce useful solutions across the agenda, including on the big divisive issues of climate change, trade, and migration. Inspired by the recent upsurge in terrorist attacks, they could start, as at Taormina, by putting Trump's priority of terrorism first, adding the advances needed by the UK, France, Germany, Canada and others and identifying how economic growth, equality, inclusion, health and immigration can counter terrorism (See Appendix E). They would highlight how gender equality is key to making globalization work for all, how open trade can and must be made to work for the workers and women entrepreneurs, and how clean infrastructure supports such trade and development. They would put aside their preoccupation with the Paris Agreement, an agreement that was designed to fail, and do real things to really control climate change enough on time.

In conclusion, four questions remain. They are:

1. Which of these scenarios, or others will prevail?  
Welches dieser oder anderer Szenarien wird eintreten?
2. Do you want the Hamburg Summit to succeed?  
Wollen Sie, dass der Hamburger Gipfel gelingt?
3. What do you want it to do for you?  
Was erwarten Sie sich vom Gipfel persönlich?
4. How would you make it succeed?  
Wie würden Sie dafür sorgen, dass der Gipfel gelingt?

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### Appendix A: G20 Summit Performance, 2008–2016

Summit	Grade	Domestic political management			Deliberation			Direction setting				Decision making	Delivery		Development of global governance					
		Attendance	# compliments	% members complimented	# days	# documents	# words	Stability	Inclusion	Democracy	Liberty		# commitments	Compliance	# Assessed	Internal		External		Engagement groups
												# references				Spread	# references	Spread	# references	Spread
2008 Washington	A-	100%	0	0%	2	2	3,567	16	2	10	2	95	+0.50	8	0	4	39	11	0	0
2009 London	A	100%	1	5%	2	3	6,155	29	6	9	0	129	+0.17	6	12	4	120	27	0	0
2009 Pittsburgh	A-	100%	0	0%	2	2	9,257	11	21	28	1	128	+0.31	16	47	4	115	26	0	0
2010 Toronto	A-	90%	8	15%	2	5	11,078	47	32	11	1	61	+0.39	14	71	4	164	27	0	0
2010 Seoul	B	95%	5	15%	2	5	15,776	66	36	18	4	153	+0.34	41	99	4	237	31	0	0
2011 Cannes	B	95%	11	35%	2	3	14,107	42	8	22	0	282	+0.49	21	59	4	247	27	4	2
2012 Los Cabos	A-	95%	6	15%	2	2	12,682	43	23	31	3	180	+0.54	19	65	4	138	20	7	2
2013 St. Petersburg	A	90%	15	55%	2	11	28,766	73	108	15	3	281	+0.37	23	190	4	237	27	9	5
2014 Brisbane	B	90%	10	40%	2	5	9,111	10	12	1	0	205	+0.46	24	39	4	42	12	0	0
2015 Antalya	B	90%	0	0%	2	6	5,983	13	22	0	2	198	+0.43	19	42	4	54	11	8	6
2016 Hangzhou	B+	95%	7	25%	2	4	16,004	11	29	34	5	213	N/A	N/A	179	4	223	19	14	6
Total	N/A	N/A	63	N/A	22	48	132,486	361	279	179	21	1,926	N/A	191	803	44	1,616	238	42	21
Average	N/A	95%	5.73	19%	2	4.36	12,044	32.82	25.36	16.27	1.91	175.09	+0.40	19.10	73.00	4.00	146.91	21.64	3.82	1.91

Notes:

N/A = not applicable. Only documents issued at a summit in the leaders' name are included.

Grade is based on a scoring scheme created by John Kirton, as follows: A+ Extremely Strong, A Very Strong, A-Strong, B+ Significant, B Substantial, B- Solid, C Small, D Very Small, F Failure (including made things worse). available at <http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/analysis/scoring.html>.

Domestic political management: participation by G20 members and at least one representative from the European Union and excludes invited countries; compliments are references to full members in summit documents.

Deliberation: duration of the summit and the documents collectively released in the leaders' name at the summit.

Direction setting: number of statements of fact, causation and rectitude relating directly to open democracy and individual liberty.

Decision making: number of commitments as identified by the G20 Research Group.

Delivery: scores are measured on a scale from -1 (no compliance) to +1 (full compliance, or fulfilment of goal set out in commitment). Figures are cumulative scores based on compliance reports.

Development of global governance: internal are references to G20 institutions in summit documents; external are references to institutions outside the G20; engagement groups are references to engagement groups. Spread indicates the number of different institutions mentioned.

## Appendix B: G20 Leaders at the Hamburg Summit

Leader	Number of Summits (not including Hamburg)
<b>Emmanuel Macron (France)</b>	<b>0</b>
Theresa May (United Kingdom)	1
Angela Merkel (Germany)	11
Justin Trudeau (Canada)	2
<b>Donald Trump (United States)</b>	<b>0</b>
Narendra Modi (India)	3
Jacob Zuma (South Africa)	9
<b>Paolo Gentiloni (Italy)</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>Moon Jae-In (Korea)</b>	<b>0</b>
Xi Jinping (China)	4
Mauricio Macri (Argentina)	1
Joko Widodo (Indonesia)	3
Shinzo Abe (Japan)	4
Enrique Pena Nieto (Mexico)	4
Vladimir Putin (Russia)	5
Recep Tayyip Erdogan	3
Donald Tusk	2
Jean-Claude Juncker	3
Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (Saudi Arabia)	1
Michel Temer (Brazil)	1
Malcolm Turnbull (Australia)	2

### Appendix C-1: G20 Ministerial Performance

Subject	Date	Place	Conclusions	Commitments
Agriculture	January 22	Berlin		29
Foreign affairs	February 16-17	Bonn	-	-
Finance	March 18	Baden Baden		28
Digitalization	April 7	Düsseldorf		89
Labour	May 19	Bad Neuenhauer		
Health	May 20	Berlin		44

### Appendix C-2: G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, March 18, 2017, Baden Baden

Issue area	Number of commitments	Percentage of total commitments
Financial regulation	7 (1/7 on digital economy)	25%
Taxation	5 (1/5 on digital economy)	17.9%
Macroeconomics	5	17.9%
International cooperation	4 (2/4 on Africa)	14.3%
IFI reform	3	10.7%
Terrorism	1	3.8%
Energy	1	3.8%
Crime and corruption	1	3.8%
Development	1	3.8%
Total	28	100%

## **Appendix D: Projected Deliverables at Hamburg the Month Before**

### **Session 1 (Leaders Only)**

**Globalization:** Mainstreamed message on managing globalization to benefit all.

### **Session 2**

**Global Economy:** Hamburg Action Plan on the Global Economy, BAP Progress Report

**Trade:** Will “protection” be renounced?

**Steel:** Will overcapacity be reduced, aluminum added?

**Tax:** enhance tax certainty. Stolen assets was also on the German radar screen.

### **Session 3**

**Climate and energy:** Clean technology investment. G20 Action Plan on Climate and Energy for Growth? Green Economy Action Plan? Chair’s Statement on Paris Agreement?

### **Session 4 (Working Lunch)**

**Terrorism:** Responses to Manchester, London, Michigan attacks.

**Foreign policy:** Middle East? North Africa? Ukraine? Russia sanctions?

**Migration:** tone and balance of the communiqué?

### **Session 5:**

**Health:** fill AMR market gap, TB?, enhance WHO role, emergency response

**Development:** key, update G20’s SDG implementation, When to UN High Level Meeting?

**Africa:** African Compact pledges,

**Gender:** crosscutting theme. e-skills for girls & digital platform for skills development, World Bank Women’s Entrepreneurship Facility as flagship, Women’s Business Council? Update workplace gender gap 25 x 25

**Refugees:** **emphasize** labour market integration

### **Session 6 (Final)**

**Digitalization & Employment:** key to global economic growth, inclusion key

**Skills training and education** across ages and genders.

**Inequality: central and integral**

**Civil Society: included**

## Appendix E: Terrorist Shocks and Vulnerabilities

Date	Event	G8/20 Member Affected	Impact
<b>2013</b>			
January 2013	Algeria	Japan	16 dead (UK 6 Japan 10)
April 15, 2013	Boston marathon bombing	United States	3 dead
May 23, 2013	London soldier attack	United Kingdom	1 dead
May 26, 2013	Dagestan suicide bombing	Russia	1 dead
June 2013	Luquan, Turpan, Xingjiang	China	35 dead
<i>June 17-18, 2013 G8 Lough Erne Summit, United Kingdom</i>			
<i>September 5-6, 2013 G20 St. Petersburg Summit, Russia</i>			
October, 2013	Tiananmen Square, Beijing	China	5 dead
Dec 29, 2013	Volvograd RR stn bomb	Russia	18 dead, 44 injured
Dec 30, 2013	Volvograd trolley bus	Russia	16 dead, 44 injured
<b>2014</b>			
March 29, 2014	Kunming train station	China	29 dead
April 14, 2014	School girls kidnapped	Nigeria	200+ kidnapped
Apr 30, 2014	Rail station, Urumqi, Xianjing	China	3 dead, 79 injured
April 30, 2014	Xianjing, lake	China	3 officials dead
April 30, 2014	India	India	
May 22, 2014	Xinjiang, Urumqi market	China	31 dead, 94 injured
<i>June 4-5, 2014, G7 Brussels Summit, Belgium</i>			
Late Sep 2014	Xinjiang, Luntai County	China	2-40/dozens dead
Oct 5, 2014	Chechnya, Grozny	Russia	5 police dead
October 20, 2014	Soldiers run over in Quebec	Canada	1 dead
October 22, 2014	Soldier outside Parliament, Ottawa	Canada	1 dead
<b>2015</b>			
January 7, 2015	Charlie Hebdo in Paris (5 attacks)	France	18 dead
February 14-15, 2015	3 attacks, Copenhagen	European Union	2 dead
March 18, 2015	Tourists at Bardo Museum, Tunisia	European Union	20 dead
May 3, 2015	Cartoon display in Texas	United States	2 dead
June 26, 2015	Tourists at beach in Tunisia	European Union	38 dead
October 2, 2015	Police officer shot, New South Wales	Australia	2 dead
October 31, 2015	Egypt Air crash	Russia	224 dead
November 13, 2015	Stadium, Bataclan, Paris	France	130 dead
<i>November 15-16, 2015, G20 Antalya Summit, Turkey</i>			
December 2, 2015	San Bernardino, California	United States	14 dead, 22 injured
<b>2016</b>			
March 22, 2016	Suicide bombings, Brussels	European Union	32 dead
<i>May 25-26, 2016, G7 Ise-Shima Summit, Japan</i>			
June 12, 2016	Orlando nightclub	United States	49 dead, 53 injured
July 2016	Truck crash	France	84 dead
December 2016	Truck crash, Berlin	Germany	12 dead
<b>2017</b>			
March 22, 2017	Car crash at Parliament	United Kingdom	6 dead
April 3, 2017	Subway bomb in St. Petersburg	Russia	14 dead
April 7, 2017	Truck crash in mall in Sweden	European Union	4 dead
May 22, 2017	Suicide bomb Manchester concert	United Kingdom	22 dead, 60 injured
<i>May 25-26, 2017, G7 Taormina Summit, Italy</i>			

As of May 25, 2017, compiled by John Kirton.