The G7 Research Group
at the Munk School of Global Affairs at Trinity College in the University of Toronto
presents the

2016 Ise-Shima G7 Interim Compliance Report
29 May 2016 to 19 February 2017

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“We have meanwhile set up a process and there are also independent institutions monitoring which objectives of our G7 meetings we actually achieve. When it comes to these goals we have a compliance rate of about 80%, according to the University of Toronto. Germany, with its 87%, comes off pretty well. That means that next year too, under the Japanese G7 presidency, we are going to check where we stand in comparison to what we have discussed with each other now. So a lot of what we have resolved to do here together is something that we are going to have to work very hard at over the next few months. But I think that it has become apparent that we, as the G7, want to assume responsibility far beyond the prosperity in our own countries. That’s why today’s outreach meetings, that is the meetings with our guests, were also of great importance.”

Chancellor Angela Merkel, Schloss Elmau, 8 June 2015
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“We remain committed to the universalization of the treaties and conventions relevant to, amongst others, preventing and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.”

**G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration on Non-proliferation and Disarmament**

**Assessment**

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Lack of Compliance</th>
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**Background**

The potential that weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have to cause unprecedented levels of destruction and human suffering serves as a reminder of the dangers of conflict escalation and instability for the international security environment. As the global community continues to grapple with threats emanating from active theatres of conflict — notably in Syria and Ukraine — as well as persistent attempts by North Korea to develop its nuclear weapons program, the risk of further instability remains high. As such, the G7 has committed to promoting international cooperation to “combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

This pledge represents a continuation of the G7’s policy of combating proliferation. For example, in 2002 the G7 initiated a ten year Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction initiative aimed at preventing terrorists and other proliferators from acquiring and developing weapons of mass destruction.

Having raised USD20 billion, the initiative was later extended in 2011.

As the host country for the 2016 Ise-Shima Summit, Japan ensured that the issue of WMDs would remain a priority on the G7’s agenda, and placed special emphasis on the dangers of nuclear proliferation. In the Leaders’ Declaration, G7 members reasserted their “commitment to seeking a safer world for all and to creating the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in a way that promotes international stability.”

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Prior to this, the G7 Foreign Ministers met on 10 and 11 April 2016 in Hiroshima.\textsuperscript{732} During this time, they visited the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, and the Cenotaph for Atomic Bomb Victims.\textsuperscript{733} They also approved the Hiroshima Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, in which G7 members re-stated their “strong commitment” to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).\textsuperscript{734} This is in accordance with Article IV of the NPT, which recognizes “the inalienable right of all the Parties to … develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,” and with Article VI, which calls for the pursuit of “effective measures relating to … complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”\textsuperscript{735}

The G7 also placed an emphasis on the importance of the non-proliferation of chemical, biological, and toxic weapons at the Ise-Shima Summit through its support for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).\textsuperscript{736} In line with these treaties, the G7 aims to eliminate and prevent “the development, production and stockpiling of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.”\textsuperscript{737}

\textbf{Commitment Features}

This commitment states that G7 members “remain committed to the universalization of treaties and conventions” that are focused on “preventing and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”\textsuperscript{738} The term “remain[ing] committed” means that this commitment has been made in the past. However, new efforts in this area must be made for G7 members to achieve compliance.

The primary goal of the commitment is to achieve the “universalization” of the named treaties, which can be defined as taking steps to ensure that all states have signed and ratified the agreements, so that the treaties apply to all. The commitment concentrates on the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC, but is not limited to these agreements.

The NPT entered into force in 1970, and “represents the only binding commitment in a multilateral treaty to the goal of disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States.”\textsuperscript{739} Currently, only Israel, India, and Pakistan are not signatories, while North Korea withdrew in 2003.\textsuperscript{740} The main principles of the NPT include a commitment by states without nuclear weapons “not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons” and a pledge by nuclear-weapon states not to give them to others or help others acquire them.\textsuperscript{741} The International Atomic Energy Agency has been tasked with the job of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{734} G7 Foreign Ministers’ Hiroshima Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, G7/G8 Information Centre (Toronto) 11 April 2016. Access Date: 28 September 2016. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/foreign/formin160411-declaration.html.
\item \textsuperscript{737} The Biological Weapons Convention, United Nations (New York City). Date of Access: 1 October 2016. https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/bio/.
\item \textsuperscript{738} G7 Ise-Shima Leaders’ Declaration, G7 Information Centre (Toronto). Date of Access: 1 October 2016. http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2016shima/ise-shima-declaration-en.html
\end{itemize}
ensuring that states are adhering to this treaty.\textsuperscript{742} Finally, NPT signatories have agreed to work towards disarmament.\textsuperscript{743} Recently, however, efforts to strengthen the NPT regime have stalled. Although NPT parties met at Preparatory Committee meetings to “consider principles, objectives, and ways to promote Treaty implementation and universality”\textsuperscript{744} amongst other things,\textsuperscript{744} NPT states were unable to reach a consensus at the 2015 Review Conference. However, parties are bound by the conclusions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The concluding document “calls upon States to promote universal adherence to the Treaty and not to undertake any actions that can negatively affect prospects for the universality of the Treaty.”\textsuperscript{745} Thus, examples of efforts to universalize this treaty could include, but are not limited to, unilateral or joint statements pressuring non-party states to join (or re-join) the NPT regime, in addition to not taking actions that are incompatible with the NPT.

On 29 April 1997, the CWC entered into force.\textsuperscript{746} This treaty forbids states from making, accumulating, trading, or using chemical weapons, and requires that parties “chemically disarm by destroying any stockpiles of chemical weapons they may hold”\textsuperscript{747} The agreement also created the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which helps to oversee the implementation of the CWC and promote universality.\textsuperscript{748} Currently, only North Korea, Egypt, and South Sudan have not signed the treaty, while Israel has not yet ratified it.\textsuperscript{749} In 2003, the First Review Conference on the CWC noted that it “was convinced that universality and full compliance by all States Parties with all the provisions of the Convention are necessary to the achievement of the global ban on chemical weapons,”\textsuperscript{750} and adopted an action plan to promote universality.\textsuperscript{751} Thus, any efforts by G7 states to promote the CWC will count towards compliance with this aspect of the commitment. This could include, but is not limited to, statements supporting the CWC, cooperation with the OPCW to hold workshops and information sessions on the CWC with non-party states, and other outreach activities.

The BTWC entered into force on 26 March 1975.\textsuperscript{752} As of today, it has 172 state parties and nine signatory states.\textsuperscript{753} This treaty “prohibits the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological and toxin weapons.”\textsuperscript{754} The BTWC is one of the major pillars “in

the international community’s efforts to address the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Since its inception, the BTWC has undergone several amendment processes, whereby parties to the treaty have convened every five years at BTWC Review Conferences to add additional understandings to the document. In 2011, G7 Foreign Ministers underlined the importance of creating “tangible progress with respect to increasing mutual confidence in compliance [with] the BTWC as one of the most important global arms control treaties.” An eighth review conference took place between 7 and 25 November 2016. Efforts to promote the universalization of this convention could include statements of support to non-party states to sign and ratify the convention as soon as possible, or contributions of support to help developing countries maintain their commitments under the convention through the assistance and cooperation database or through the “sponsorship programme in order to support and increase the participation of developing States parties in the meetings of the intersessional programme.”

Finally, this commitment does not limit G7 members to pursuing only the three aforementioned treaties. The G7 pledged to promote “the universalization of the treaties and conventions relevant to … preventing and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” In the G7’s joint statement to the Disarmament Commission on the Foreign Ministers’ Declaration, they expressed support for the universalization of several additional agreements. These include, but are not limited to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

Thus, G7 members must make efforts to universalize the NPT, the CWC, and the BTWC in order to achieve full compliance with this commitment.

**Scoring Guidelines**

<table>
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<th>Score</th>
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<tr>
<td>-1</td>
<td>The G7 member has not undertaken any new efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), or related treaties or conventions OR has taken steps to promote the universalization of only one of these treaties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>The G7 member has made new efforts to promote the universalization of TWO relevant treaties or conventions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+1</td>
<td>The G7 member has made new efforts to promote the universalization of the NPT, CWC, BTWC, AND at least one additional relevant treaty or convention.</td>
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*Lead Analyst: Mathieu Sitaya*

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Canada: 0
Canada has partially complied with its commitment to undertake new efforts to promote the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BTWC).

Per the Fifth Regional Review Meeting on Radioactive Source Security released in July 2016, Canada remains dedicated to funding CAD73.4 million annually to the Global Partnership Program (GPP).762 The GPP aims to promote projects that reduce threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) related to nuclear security, biological security, and the destruction of chemical weapons.

On 21 October 2016, Canada entered into force the amendments to the implementations of the United Nations’ resolutions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.763

Canada had previously been a major contributor to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons missions in Libya.764 Canada provided further funding in the amount of CAD750,000 to a multinational effort aimed at removing Libyan chemical weapon stockpiles from the country and destroying them in Germany.765

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has also been active in several projects on the domestic level. Notably, the CNSC published a document called Environmental Principles, Assessments and Protection Measures, which promotes environmental principles with the use of safe nuclear energy on 19 December 2016.766 Moreover, in September 2016, Executive Vice-President Ramzi Jammal was the leader of an Integrated Regulatory Review Service mission in China which assessed China’s nuclear regulations concerning nuclear and radiation security.767

On the Syrian chemical crisis, Foreign Minister Stéphane Dion made a statement calling for the accountability of those who have committed obvious violations of international treaties related to the use of chemical weapons.768 Dion’s statement to the United Nations came after the release of the United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism report, which was funded by several countries, including Canada.

Therefore, Canada has been awarded a score of 0 for its efforts to counter the proliferation of WMDs since the summit. It has not been awarded a fully compliant designation because it is yet to attempt...
to universalize the BTWC and other relevant treaties, and it is yet to make new efforts in the NPT and the CWC.

*Analyst: Maher Sinno*

**France: 0**

France has partially complied with its commitment to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It has made some efforts to universalize the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

On 21 November 2016, France’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Development, Jean-Marc Ayrault, met with Director-General of the Organization of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ahmet Üzümçü, during which time he reaffirmed France’s commitment to working with the organization towards the elimination of chemical weapons worldwide, and reflected on France’s contributions to the international effort against chemical weapons use in Syria and Libya and the promotion of the CWC.\(^{69}\)

During the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference in Geneva, November 2016, France’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed the issue of enhancing national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).\(^{70}\)

However, no further action has been taken to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since the 2016 Ise-Shima summit.

France has partially complied with its commitment to the universalization of the NPT, CWC, BTWC and another relevant treaty. It has, therefore, been awarded a score of 0.

*Analyst: Jodi Euteneier*

**Germany: 0**

Despite Germany’s long-standing commitment towards non-proliferation efforts aimed at nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, it has only partially complied with its commitment to enact new measures aimed at universalizing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

On 27 October 2017, during a First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly meeting, Germany voted against resolution L.41; a proposal aimed at developing “a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their elimination.”\(^{71}\) The Permanent Representative of Germany to the Conference on Disarmament, Michael Biontino, validated Germany’s position by stating that “negotiations on a nuclear ban treaty without the involvement of nuclear weapon states will be ineffective, [and that in order for] nuclear weapons to disappear nuclear weapon states will have to engage in the process.”\(^{72}\) He also suggested that “an immediate ‘ban’ of nuclear weapons without verification mechanisms or restrictions on the production of fissile material bears the risk of

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weakening the NPT — contrary to the intention of its proponents.\textsuperscript{773} His proposed alternative was to restrict the production of fissile material, referencing a tabled resolution on fissile material cut-off that would aim to facilitate new efforts to renegotiate a treaty on fissile materials.\textsuperscript{774}

Indeed, the day before, on 26 October 2016, Germany presented resolution L.65/Rev.1 in cooperation with Canada and the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{775} One of the reasons for tabling this resolution was in order to follow the agreement that states made at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT to “immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”\textsuperscript{776} This resolution was adopted on 28 October 2017, and created “a high-level preparatory group” to work on outlining the treaty.\textsuperscript{777}

It has also, since 2013, contributed EUR5 million to Syria to destroy Syrian chemical weapons.\textsuperscript{778}

On 8 September 2016, Ahmet Üzümçü, Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons announced that a multi-country effort aimed at removing Libyan chemical weapon precursors — for the purpose of destruction — out of Libya to Germany had successfully been completed.\textsuperscript{779} Üzümçü thanked “Germany for its leadership and contributions, which are indispensable for the successful conclusion of this operation.”\textsuperscript{780} Germany formally proposed that “the chemical weapons … be destroyed at a highly-capable specialised destruction facility operated by GEKA in Munster.”\textsuperscript{781}


\textsuperscript{775} Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, United Nations General Assembly (New York) 26 October 2016. Date of Access: 18 February 2017.

\textsuperscript{776} Treaty Banning the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices, United Nations General Assembly (New York) 26 October 2016. Date of Access: 18 February 2017.


With regards to biological weapons, Germany has consistently been a frontrunner in compliance. Though all signatories to the BTWC have agreed to publish their confidence-building measure returns, Germany is one of a few states to permit their returns to be published to the BTWC’s Implementation Support Unit website, and has campaigned with several Scandinavian states to ensure that returns are published and comprehensible in all UN languages.

After the eighth Review Conference held in Nov 2016, the ISU mandate was renewed for another five years while all states committed to at least one annual meeting. The next conference is to have a German vice-chair, where Germany will report its priorities as improving national implementation of the Convention, strengthening confidence-building measures, and improving the operationalization of the UN Secretary General’s Mechanism through concrete measures such as expert training sessions and workshops.

Germany has also taken steps to support the universalization of other related treaties during the compliance period.

On 21 September 2016, Germany met with other “Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty” at a ministerial meeting to call for the agreement’s entry into force. Minister for Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier attended the gathering, where a joint statement was released. This document noted that “We urge all States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular the remaining eight States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty. We appeal to all States to make the utmost efforts to achieve its prompt entry into force.” The statement continued, “We dedicate ourselves individually and jointly to continuing to raise awareness among the general public and to advocate at the highest political levels.

On 2 September 2015, Germany opened up an exhibition on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the German Federal Foreign Office. The purpose of this exhibit was to spread awareness about the treaty amongst the public, and encourage other states to agree to it. In his opening statement, Minister of European Affairs Michael Roth urged others to adopt the treaty, saying that “The contract must enter into force as soon as possible in order to develop its full normative power.

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Eight countries have still not ratified the treaty — including the US, Israel, China, Iran and North Korea.\textsuperscript{790}

Thus, Germany has been awarded a score of 0 for its efforts to universalize at least two of the relevant treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

\textit{Analyst: Kristen Shi}

\textbf{Italy: 0}

Italy has partially complied with its commitment to take new steps aimed at universalizing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

Italy has taken steps to promote the universalization of the NPT during the compliance period. The Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, Vinicio Mati, participated in the 71st United Nations General Assembly’s Thematic Discussion on Nuclear Weapons on 17 October 2016.\textsuperscript{791} In a statement at the First Committee Meeting, Mati declared that “We emphasize the importance of its [the NPT’s] universalization and call upon States that have not yet done so to join the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States without delay and without conditions.”\textsuperscript{795}

Italy has also openly expressed concern at North Korea’s continued absence in the NPT and its militant nuclear testing procedures during the compliance period,\textsuperscript{793} and has also expressed its support in renegotiating trade deals with Iran in light of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.\textsuperscript{794}

On 27 October 2017, during a First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly meeting, Italy voted against resolution L.41; a proposal aimed at developing “a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their elimination.”\textsuperscript{795} In a joint statement to the chair of the First General Assembly, Italy highlighted its belief that “without the support of nuclear weapon states and a large number of other countries with specific security interests, [resolution L.41] would be premature.”\textsuperscript{796} Moreover, Italy asserted “a prohibition treaty would only engage those states that are


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already bound by the NPT and would likely mirror existing obligations, without any mechanism to ensure any new treaty obligations were being fulfilled.  

Italy has robust reviewing procedures for its nuclear energy programs, which are overseen by the Advanced Institute for Environmental Protection and Research and one of its subcommittees, the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS). As of December 2016, it concluded a review of its four soon-to-be-decommissioned nuclear reactors, along with numerous other nuclear resource management and waste facilities. The IRRS is composed of representatives from other NPT signatories and representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency; of their review they praised “state-of-the-art standards in decommissioning and waste management,” but highlighted areas for growth in legal frameworks, and a proposed regulatory body called the Inspectorate for Radiation Safety and Radiation Protection in the near future.  

Italy is also one of five European nations participating in a nuclear-sharing program in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and purportedly has US nuclear resources in domestic territory.  

Throughout 2016, Italy has “actively participated in planning and carrying out the removal of the remaining precursors of chemical weapons still present in Libya in order to destroy them.” In addition to collecting samples of the chemical substances, Italy has also provided ships from its Navy and Coast Guard in order “to escort … Danish vessels [transporting] chemical agents out of the country to Germany, where they will be disposed of.”  

Moreover, Italy has contributed to the universalization of other relevant treaties.  

Italy expressed its support for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty during the eighth ministerial meeting, which was help on 21 September 2016. Italy indicated its approval of the Joint Ministerial Statement that was released at this conference. Moreover, in an additional statement

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that was sent to the meeting, Italy declared that “we call for a prompt signature and ratification of the Treaty by those States that have not done so, in particular by the remaining eight Annex-2 States.”

In November 2016, Permanent Representative of Italy to the Conference on Disarmament, Ambassador Vinicio Mati, spoke during the general debate at the Eighth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Mati emphasized Italy’s support for the universalization, full implementation and strengthening of the Convention.

In January 2017, Vinicio Mati spoke at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, at which point he stressed Italy’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), particularly in relation to Italy’s G7 Presidency in 2017.

Thus, Italy has been given a score of 0 for its effort at universalizing at least two of the relevant treaties aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

*Analyst: Kristen Shi*

**Japan: 0**

Japan has partially complied with its commitment to undertake new efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

On 11 November 2016, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Japan agreed to sell India civil nuclear power equipment and technology. This is Japan’s first such deal with a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The nuclear pact has raised concerns about a risk of Japan’s technology being diverted to India’s nuclear weapons program. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe insisted that the agreement “is in line with Japan’s position to promote non-proliferation to create a world without nuclear weapons.”

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the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,” Abe said, adding that it gets India to effectively participate in the non-proliferation treaty framework.810

On 18 October 2016, Japan’s Toshio Sano stressed the importance of universalizing the CWC at the 21st Session on Disarmament and International Security. Highlighting the deep concerns associated with the danger of non-state actors’ and terrorist groups’ obtaining and using chemical and biological weapons, Sano emphasized that “we must definitely prevent chemical weapons and toxic chemicals from falling into the wrong hands.”811 Sano stated that Japan was ready to work with the Security Council and offer its cooperation and assistance for those state parties in need.812 Reporting on Japan’s efforts to fulfill its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations, Sano stated that consistent progress was being made in destroying abandoned chemical weapons in China.813

On 21 September 2016, Fumio Kishida, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, promoted the universalization of the CTBT at the eighth ministerial meeting in New York. Kishida stated that “universal condemnation by the international community demonstrates that prohibition of nuclear testing is a de facto international norm. In order to make this prohibition a legal obligation, early entry into force of the CTBT is imperative.”814 In his closing remarks, Kishida called upon the remaining non-ratifying states to sign and ratify the CTBT.815 The CTBT has been recognized as an instrument that “constrains the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and thereby provides an effective disarmament and non-proliferation measure.”816

On 13 June 2016, Seiji Kihara, State Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, expressed support for the universalization of the CTBT at the CTBT 20th anniversary meeting in Vienna. In his remarks, Kihara stated that the CTBT has contributed to helping consolidate universal norms against nuclear testing and that the development of the verification system under the Treaty has shown remarkable progress.817 Kihara announced that Japan “will double the number of trainees they invite to the Global Seismological Observation Training course, which provides knowledge and techniques for detecting nuclear tests and an opportunity for outreach to non-signatory states.”818 Kihara stressed the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT. “We are all fully aware that this is not an
easy task, but we should keep in mind that the CTBT is a most practical and effective measure for a world free of nuclear weapons.  

Thus, Japan has been awarded a score of 0 for its efforts to promote the universalization of two treaties or conventions relevant to preventing and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly the CWC and the CTBT.

**United Kingdom: −1**

The United Kingdom has not complied with its commitment to undertake new efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). However, the UK has continued to pursue its long-term Counter-Proliferation Strategy, which is of some relevance to nuclear and biological security objectives.

The Counter-Proliferation Strategy has several programs under its umbrella including the Global Threat Reduction Programme and the International Biological Security Programme. The UK also has a broader Security Programme in place, part of which relates to its Counter-Proliferation Strategy. Furthermore, the UK has no biological or chemical weapons but has a small maritime nuclear arsenal that was recently reduced.

During 2014 and 2015, the UK spent GBP14.1 million on matters related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear security. The Global Threat Reduction Programme focuses on nuclear and radiological security objectives. Notable projects have included combating the illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials along the border regions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, initiating a nuclear security culture programme and security workshops, as well as implementing secure and safer nuclear technologies in Ukraine and neighbouring countries.

The International Biological Security Programme focuses on projects that promote biosafety and biosecurity systems, establish biorisk management training, combat infectious diseases, and improve education related to the misuse of biological science. Notable projects have included strengthening biological security and safety in former Soviet Union countries, developing educational resources on biosecurity and dual-use issues, training six Iraqi chemists in detecting chemical weapons, funding of the annual conference on Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation, funding the plant pathogen security

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The security program focuses on creating conditions for successful diplomatic engagement with states on security issues and large-scale non-material interventions with regards to non-proliferation. The objectives of this programme include: ensuring priority countries strengthen their capacity to secure chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials and expertise from acquisition by non-state actors; ensuring priority countries strengthen their export control regimes; strengthening international regimes, treaties, and initiatives that underpin global non-proliferation, security, and disarmament objectives; supporting the NPT; progressing towards the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East; and reducing the threat posed by conventional weapons to UK, regional and global stability.\footnote{Counter Proliferation Programme, United Kingdom Government (London) December 2014. Date of Access: 18 December 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/548692/Counter_Proliferation_Programme_Strategy_2015-16.pdf}

To conclude, the United Kingdom has been awarded a score of –1 for failing to undertake any new non-proliferation initiatives since the conclusion of the previous G7 summit. However, it continues to pursue its long-term Counter-Proliferation Strategy.

\textit{Analyst: Jaspreet Khela}

\textbf{United States: 0} 

The United States has partially complied with its commitment to undertake new efforts to universalize the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

On 24 August 2016, Ned Price, Special Assistant to the President, Spokesperson, and Senior Director of the National Security Council at the White House, issued a statement in support of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Responding to a UN-OPCW report on the investigation into the allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria, Price stated that the United States will work with its international partners to hold accountable those involved in the use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2014 and 2015 “through appropriate diplomatic mechanisms, including through the United Nations Security Council and the OPCW.”831 “The findings by the UN and the OPCW present yet another opportunity for all nations to speak with one voice to address these heinous crimes and to make it clear that the use of chemical weapons is intolerable,”832 said Price.

On 8 June 2016, President Obama announced his support for India’s intent to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), a 48-state body that governs trade in nuclear-related exports and that requires its members to be a party to the NPT. If India’s application to the NSG is accepted, it will be the first member of the NSG that is not a party to the NPT.833 It has been reported that the Obama administration has not exerted any pressure on India to join the NPT regime in exchange for the benefits of NSG membership.834 In fact, “President Obama is lobbying for India to win membership through a special exception.”835

On 2 June 2016, the US Department of State welcomed a step by India to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC) and called on all countries who have not done so to subscribe to the HCOC as well.836 The State Department defines the HCOC as “a voluntary mechanism that has built a broad international predisposition against ballistic missile proliferation and promotes transparency and confidence building.”837

Thus, the United States has been awarded a score of 0 for its efforts to promote the universalization of two treaties or conventions relevant to preventing and combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, namely the CWC and the BTWC.

**European Union: +1**

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). It has worked to support the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological and

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Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). It has also supported these instruments through statements denouncing non-compliant countries.

The EU has worked to encourage the universalization of the NPT. On 3 November 2016, the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium held a conference in Brussels for Europe’s non-proliferation community. The meeting focused on deterrence and disarmament, analysis of the Iran nuclear deal, and the role of disruptive technologies in non-proliferation. These talks also discussed the threat of non-state actors, regional concerns in Asia, missile defense, and the disarmament of chemical and biological weapons. This conference was the largest iteration to date, attended by approximately 300 participants from over 60 countries and international organizations, including Kim Won-soo, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs.

On 24 October 2016, the EU co-sponsored a seminar on the nuclear weapons crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea in Seoul. Approximately 60 governments and think-tanks from Europe, North-East Asia, and the United States participated. Participants assessed the capacity of the DPRK nuclear and ballistic programs, reiterated their grave concern about the threat the programs constituted, and discussed how the international community should best respond. Key topics included the effectiveness of a diplomatic response, including sanctions, as well as counter-proliferation options and solutions. Participants agreed that the seminar had been useful, and expressed the hope that dialogue on the issue would continue, particularly in the EU and the Republic of Korea’s bilateral relations.

The EU has also made a number of statements encouraging compliance with the NPT and support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On 13 September 2016, the EU condemned “in the strongest terms the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 9 September 2016.” The EU demanded that the DPRK completely, verifiably and irreversibly abandon its nuclear weapons and programs, stating that it “fully supports the international community’s demand for the DPRK to return to compliance with the NPT and IAEA safeguards at an early date.”

The EU again condemned the DPRK’s nuclear test at the IAEA’s 19-23 September 2016 meeting, asserting that “the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapons State in accordance with the NPT,” and recalling the associated responsibility of all UN Member States to “do their utmost to

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contribute to curbing proliferation flows from and to the DPRK and their financing.  At the same meeting, the EU also reaffirmed its support for a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and urged Iran and, in November, Syria, to comply with their Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements helping to ensure compliance with the NPT. Finally, the EU restated that they view the NPT as “the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime,” and reaffirmed “the essential responsibility and the central role of the IAEA in strengthening the international nuclear security architecture.”

The EU has worked to encourage universalization of and compliance with the CWC. On 8 November 2016, it funded the Stakeholders Forum in Africa, a pilot event initiated to provide legislative support to CWC states. More than 45 participants from 11 African member states attended the event in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, discussing relevant challenges of the CWC’s legislative adoption and associated approaches for mitigation. Additionally, on 6 October 2016, the European Union Parliament denounced the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Sudanese government, following an Amnesty International report that over 200 people had been killed in Darfur Jele Marra since January 2016. The EU Parliament also “recalls that Sudan is a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and calls for an international investigation into these allegations led by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).”

On 11 November 2016, the EU Delegation to the UN worked with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs to organize a panel discussion on EU support for the BTWC. It presented the results of four EU-sponsored regional workshops, which occurred in Astana, Kazakhstan, in June 2016, and in

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India, Ethiopia and Brazil in August and September.\textsuperscript{851} It also informed new and interested state parties of forthcoming EU assistance activities from which they could potentially benefit.\textsuperscript{852}

The EU also participated in the eighth Review Conference of the BTWC, which took place from 7 to 25 November 2016. During the Conference, representatives reiterated their support for the BTWC as “the cornerstone of efforts to prevent biological agents and toxins from ever being developed of used as weapons,”\textsuperscript{853} confirming that all 28 EU members remain party to the Convention.\textsuperscript{854} The EU also called for “universal adherence to the Convention,”\textsuperscript{855} recommending the adoption of an action plan aimed at universalization, to be coordinated by the Implementation Support Unit and supported via efforts to strengthen the UN Secretary General’s mechanism for investigating allegations of biological and chemical weapons use.\textsuperscript{856}

Additionally, the EU has expressed support for several other non-proliferation treaties. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been supported by EU statements. When denouncing the DPRK’s September nuclear test, the EU urged them to ratify and comply with the CTBT,\textsuperscript{857} arguing that the DPRK’s “irresponsible behavior” demonstrated the importance of achieving universalization of the CTBT, calling all other non-member states to ratify the treaty.\textsuperscript{858}

Additionally, the EU has supported a UN General Assembly Resolution to begin the negotiation of a new treaty to prohibit the existence of nuclear weapons. On 27 October 2016, the European Union Parliament passed a joint motion welcoming a 2017 conference to begin negotiations, inviting EU members to support its convening and to participate constructively in its proceedings.\textsuperscript{859}

The European Union has fully complied with its commitment to the universalization of the NPT, CWC, BCTW and another relevant treaty. Therefore, it has been awarded a compliance score of +1.

*Analyst: Karen Holstead*