

Energizing Global Sustainable Development: Promising Prospects for the Gleneagles G8

Professor John Kirton

Director, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto

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Introduction

On July 6-8, 2005, the leaders of the world’s major democracies gather in Gleneagles, Scotland, for their 31st annual Group of Eight (G8) Summit, along with some carefully chosen guests from developing countries. This gathering promises to be a summit of significant, and in some respects historic, accomplishment, in both long anticipated and unexpected ways. As its British hosts had long and skillfully planned for, the Gleneagles Summit will make history on its first priority of democratic development in Africa, where the G8 with these same leaders have been working persistently for five years in a row. Even before the summit started, it set a new all-time high in money mobilized by having G8 finance ministers agree on, subject to approval by their leaders, a well-crafted, sustainable US\$55 billion package of debt relief for the poorest, by encouraging continental European and other G8 countries to make lead-up pledges of additional official development assistance (ODA) and by prompting new commitments for famine relief. At Gleneagles itself, further progress will come on the planned pillars of development assistance and development-friendly trade liberalization, on the more fundamental foundations of conflict resolution and prevention, good governance and private sector development, on famine relief and a new front-loaded mini International Finance Facility (IFF) to develop needed vaccines, even if the great British goal of a full-blown IFF to double ODA to more than US\$100 billion per year will not be achieved.

The great Gleneagles surprise success will come on its British host’s second priority pillar of climate change. Unlike Africa, where the G8’s half-decade-long push is ending, its twenty-first century push to deliver a regime for climate change and integrally linked sustainable energy security is just starting. Thus Gleneagles will be expected to deliver not new monies or painful cutbacks to meet precise targets and timetables but the core principles of the “beyond Kyoto” sustainable energy regime. These principles start with the willingness of emerging developing countries as well as developed G8 countries to take carbon-constraining, security- and prosperity-enhancing action, with the development, transfer and use of clean technologies as the lead instrument of this new North-South bargain. At Gleneagles a Kyoto-reluctant George Bush and his Kyoto-committed G8 partners should be able to do the deal with the invited leaders of the rising, first-rank climate change and energy powers of Mexico, Brazil, India and China to launch together the new regime.

Fuelling the high and historic achievements of Gleneagles, and adding the unexpected sustainable energy accomplishment to the long-expected African one, are the unfolding outside forces and inside processes highlighted by the concert equality model of G8 governance (see Appendix A) (Kirton 2005a). From the outside, the small shocks are reminding the G8 leaders of their past nightmares and their continuing, compounding common vulnerabilities to one another and the global community. These shocks are coming from volatile and generally rising energy prices, driven by growing demand from the new systemically significant powers, and from

political unrest in a terrorist-infected, only nascently democratic Middle East, Africa and larger world. On the critical conventional energy supply capabilities of oil, gas and nuclear energy, the 1944-45 generation of multilateral organizations centred on the United Nations and the subsequent Atlanticist institutions led by the International Energy Agency (IEA) are weak and failing, while in the case of African development a revitalized World Bank and reforming UN — looking forward to its Millennium Development Review Summit in New York in September 2005 — can be relied upon to do much of the work. The globally predominant and internally equal capabilities that drive G8 success are being reinforced by the growing power of Russia and Canada as global energy superpowers, by the acute energy-related vulnerabilities of the otherwise economically pre-eminent U.S., Japan, Germany and soon Britain, by the presence of China, India, Brazil and Mexico at the Gleneagles table on its first full day, and by the broader vulnerabilities of an America afflicted by twin deficits at home and body counts abroad, even if the growth of its gross domestic product (GDP) and rising currency leads the G7 of old.

Pushing toward historic success from inside the summit process is the way Britain, adjusting to America, other summit partners and solid analysis of its Commission for Africa, is increasingly placing its preferred African strategy of debt, aid and trade on freedom and good governance, normative foundations that match well the G8's seminal core values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. At the summit table itself, it will be possible for G8 leaders to realize that a sustainable energy solution lies within their own already democratic G8 family and open innovative societies, rather than with an all-too-slowly democratizing Middle East outside. Also assisting is the strong domestic political capital and control of host Tony Blair just re-elected with an historic third majority government, a recently electorally refreshed George Bush whose party controls both chambers of Congress, and a still secure Vladimir Putin and Junichiro Koizumi, even if the other members are electorally vulnerable, and none as popular as they once were. Yet this shared unpopularity can inspire a "hanging together" form of collective G8 action (Putnam and Bayne 1987), especially from America, where rising gas prices at the pump have become Americans' number-one domestic concerns, and where the steadily growing number of body bags from Iraq and Afghanistan has ended the earlier confidence in the president's crusade against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And Blair's ability to mobilize for Gleneagles the visible and vociferous consent of hundreds of thousands of his voters and those of his G8 partners, in a much magnified twenty-first century replay of the technique he successfully pioneered when he hosted his first summit at Birmingham in 1998, will provide an additional push.

The ultimate push from deep inside the G8 process comes from the innovative institutional strategy of a physically energized Tony Blair, who is, rarely in summit history, hosting the G8 at Gleneagles for a second time. To be sure, some summit partners understandably worry that a Britain slow to adjust to its partners' priorities has left little time at a relatively short summit for leaders to be alone to be leaders and do big package deals, especially as they must meet in the midst of their own meetings with an unusually large number of outside guests. But these compromises of constricted participation are importantly offset by the unusually early statement of British priorities, the production and publication of highly ambitious but largely achievable objectives, the dogged determination to stick to them as the summit approaches, the large number of regular and creatively blended lead-up G8 ministerials, the innovative multistakeholder Commission for Africa, the energetic burst of bilateral pre-G8 summitry, the creative mobilization of business leaders on the eve of the summit, and the momentum offered by the above-average compliance with the priority commitments these eight country leaders made at George Bush's Sea Island Summit last year. At Gleneagles, Blair can count on the fact that virtually all of these G8 leaders have, uniquely in G8 history, been meeting at the annual summit, to do Africa and other things, for five years in a row (Bayne 2005). They thus know how to adjust to one another in balanced fashion so they can succeed together for the sake of each one and the world as a whole. This summer-camp club significantly includes Russia, which Blair welcomed as a full member of his newly designed G8 in 1998, and which Blair can look to as the G8's incoming host in 2006 to build on the new directions on sustainable energy directions launched at

Gleneagles and extend them to the still-to-be-democratized, energy-rich regions to Russia's south.

To support these arguments, this paper examines in turn the plans for and preparation of the 2005 summit on the road to Gleneagles, the positions of the G8 partners on the summit's eve, the six forces highlighted by the concert equality model that are pushing them toward historic success from without and within, and what Gleneagles can be expected to accomplish as a result.

The Road to Gleneagles

The road to Gleneagles was an unusually long and busy, but by no means a winding one. It started unusually early, proceeded with unusual intensity and innovation, and maintained its firm, focused, inflexible singular sense of purpose to almost the very end.

British Plans and Preparations

Over the 30-year history of the G7/8 summit, Britain has tended to be a relatively successful host, and no more so than at Birmingham, when Tony Blair hosted his first summit in 1998 (see Appendix B). There he introduced several successful innovations to the summit format and process. He has been coming to the G8 as a leader for an unusually long eight years in a row before Gleneagles. It is thus understandable that he would have a highly strategic, self-confident, ambitious and innovative plan for his second summit and for the process that would get him there successfully.

Blair moved unusually early to produce internally and declare to his G8 government partners the core agenda items around which his Gleneagles Summit would revolve. At the final sherpa meeting of the French presidency in autumn 2003, while everyone was waiting to hear what the Americans were planning for 2004, the British announced that for Gleneagles almost two years later, they would focus on Africa, climate change and a third theme — presumably a political-security issue — that would be defined in the spring of 2005 as the international agenda unfolded at that time.

To some, at the time this appeared to be making a virtue of necessity, by constructing an Anglo-American two-year tandem that would help a George Bush team that intended to do nothing on Africa or climate change during the U.S. year as host in 2004. But even as Sea Island unfolded as a summit that did much for Africa and a little for the science and technology of sustainable development and thus for climate change, the British stuck with their two priorities. At the start of the British year as host, at Davos and in the world's elite publications, Tony Blair himself set forth specific, highly ambitious but largely achievable objectives on both the African development and climate change fronts. Each was a quite different kind of package, well tailored to the issue area at hand. On Africa, it was finally delivering the big breakthrough package on debt, aid and trade, based on the principles the G8 and Africans had been together developing and delivering down payments on since 2001. On climate change, it was to start a process, rather than to end one, by securing agreement on the science and the need for action by the G8 and Kyoto-unbound systemically significant climate powers of the future, as the principles on which a twenty-first century regime beyond Kyoto would be built.

To lock himself in further and to build broader support for a highly ambitious, comprehensive, interlinked Africa package, Blair created a 17-member multistakeholder, Commission for Africa, composed of currently serving finance ministers and other influential figures from key G8 countries and African states. Its weighty 427-page report, released on March 11, 2005, made a convincing case for ambitious action across many fronts, in a sequence that respected reasonably well the seven-point strategy that the Africans had themselves asked for, and that the G8 had supported at the Canadian-hosted Kananaskis summit in 2002. It provided important stabilizing ballast to the epistemic broadsides unleashed from other quarters. The most notable was Jeffrey Sachs's Millennium Development Project and its one-note tune in its public relations

presentational campaign of give massive amounts of new ODA money now and worry about corruption later, if at all.

A further tactic for the same purpose, pioneered by Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien at Kananaskis, to invite carefully selected leaders of non-G8 countries and international organizations and treat them not as guests in add-on sessions but as full partners for joint sessions embedded in the midst of the summit itself. For and from Africa, Blair invited the original four from Kananaskis and Genoa — Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria. He extended this core to the Sea Island six, by asking John Kufour of Ghana back but substituting Benjamin Mkapa, the leader of Tanzania, for Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, who had come in 2004. In addition, Blair created a new African eight, by inviting Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, who first indicated he was coming, and then not coming, but in a fashion that still left the British hopeful as June moved to its end. Blair also invited the leader of Ethiopia, a prominent regional leader, but one whose repressive measures at home began led the British and others to hope that he would stay home. To round out the African roster, the executive heads of the secretariats of the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) were invited as well. These African leaders and international civil servants were scheduled to meet with the G8 leaders on July 8, when Africa would be featured as the great dramatic climax on the summit's final day.

Blair broke some new ground by doing the same thing on the previous day, when climate change was the featured priority theme. Here he invited India, which accepted very early, Brazil, which also did so, and China, which said yes only during the third week in June. Apparently subsequently, and presumably under American pressure or its power of attraction, Blair also invited Vicente Fox of Mexico, thereby adding George Bush's fellow rancher and Rio Grande neighbour, and a systemically significant emerging power that was a net exporter of oil and a major foreign supplier of an ever-thirstier United States. Together with South Africa, these "plus five" powers would meet with their G8 partners in a one-hour-and-a-half session to discuss climate change, immediately after the G8 would spend one hour discussing it among themselves, on June 7, the summit's first full day.

As the spring unfolded, the British moved intensively and innovatively to mobilize civil society from the nongovernmental, research and faith-based communities and mass publics, primarily for their African cause. At their March 23 sherpa meeting in London, the host sherpa Sir Michael Jay and all his fellow sherpas held a meeting that lasted more than an hour with the leaders of the major nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) interested in the agenda of the Gleneagles G8. When Jay made a pre-summit tour of the partner capitals, he included a session beyond the capitals so he could consult with civil society there. Immediately following the American session in New York, on April 8 the Canadian session was hosted by the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies, where Jay and Canadian sherpa Peter Harder consulted both live and by videoconference with Canadian stakeholders in Toronto, Montreal, Calgary and Halifax. The British also provided financial support to the annual pre-summit academic conference held on June 29-30 and globally webcast from the University of Glasgow, and offered encouragement for a civil society consultative network organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

In a much magnified twenty-first-century repeat of a technique that had worked well with Jubilee 2000 at the 1998 Birmingham Summit, Tony Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, also offered encouragement for citizens sympathetic to the new Make Poverty History coalition and campaign to come to Edinburgh on the eve of Gleneagles to make themselves visible and their voices heard. In doing so he helped unleashed a dynamic that by June saw Bob Geldof appeal for a million people to come to Edinburgh, as well as mount star-studded "Live 8" rock concerts around the G8 countries, in a replay of his Live Aid invention for starving Ethiopia in 1985. More broadly and innovatively, Blair inspired meetings with major business leaders mounted by the Commission for Africa right on the eve of Gleneagles Summit, and not far away from it. Many caught the civil society G8 spirit, such as those who produced a TV film, *The Girl in the Café* about the forthcoming summit, first aired on British and American television

on June 25, or the playwrights who contributed to the “G8 Plays” that were performed at the end of June at the National Theatre in London.

To be sure, there were some serious bumps and time-consuming delays on this in part of the previously travelled, well-paved straight road to Gleneagles. But they were mostly self-inflicted and thus part of Blair’s strategic plan for a process that was always very firmly and closely under his control. The first bump came at the start of the British presidency when Blair, about to call a general election, changed his sherpa from a close political associate needed on his leadership campaign to a permanent civil servant and head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Sir Michael Jay. The change delayed the start of the sherpa meeting sequence from January to February. Further delays came in the month-long campaign lead-up to the general election called for May 5, as Tony Blair had no time to design or deliver his summit, and his sherpa team had very limited room to do so as well. The cumulative effect was to make the formal sherpa process preparations for Gleneagles unusually late, leading some partners to worry even into mid April that no draft analytical papers had been put into the sherpa net. Moreover, as the British stubbornly stuck with their core agenda and ambitions through the third sherpa meeting at Gleneagles during the second week of June, frustrations mounted among more than one summit partner that the British were all in “send” rather than “receive” mode, and now willing to make the accommodations necessary to produce a broad, big bargain success.

Other less controllable bumps arose as well. Revelations about Anglo-American planning for the invasion of an Iraq where no WMD had been discovered harmed Blair’s political standing and his ability to focus on democratizing and developing the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) as much as George Bush had done at Sea Island the year before. Another was a crisis from the European Union in late June. While Blair had carefully scheduled his Gleneagles Summit immediately after he assumed the six-month presidency of the European Council, the changeover happened just after its new constitution had been rejected by voters in France and the Netherlands and a budget deal to curb its costly development destroying agricultural subsidies had failed.

Inside the summit process other challenges arose. Apart from Jay and Harder in particular, there were few experienced strong sherpas, and it took the newcomers some time to settle into their new jobs when they met. In addition, a quiet struggle continued about the proper G8 institutional mechanism to continue the African work in the years ahead when Russia was expected to drop it from prime time. A remit mandate from the 2003 Evian Summit had asked, unusually, for a report from the African personal representatives (APRs) — a process that had been created at the 2001 Genoa Summit with Canadian sherpa Bob Fowler put in the chair from the start. Some had wondered whether and worried that Blair’s new Commission for Africa created a rival body, in a replay of the 1999-created Anglo-Canadian competition between the International Monetary and Finance Committee hosted by British finance minister Gordon Brown and the Group of Twenty (G20) chaired at the start by Canada’s then finance minister and now prime minister Paul Martin. The British had a respectable rejoinder, noting that the Commission for Africa was to be a temporary body designed to mobilize those with high-level influence on the current Gleneagles leaders, in a way that the less well-connected APRs were thought could not.

Sherpa Meetings

Bumped around in such fashion, the sherpa process began to deliver big results only as June moved to an end. Its first meeting in London on February 16-17 was uneventful. Its second meeting on London on March 23rd featured its session with civil society. Here the Russian sherpa, Igor Shuvalov, signalled that as hosts the Russians intended to fulfill all the traditional tasks up to the highest standard, including consultation with civil society. The third sherpa meeting, at Gleneagles on June 15-16, went smoothly from a logistical standpoint. But at the end of the meeting a few important issues remained outstanding, requiring the sherpas to meet again one the eve of the summit in London on July 1-2.

Africa

The first of the outstanding issues requiring the July sherpa meeting was Africa. On African development, the British still stuck to their plan to immediately raise an additional US\$50 billion a year in ODA by getting countries to commit to giving 0.7% of their GDP by 2015, and they cashed in these promises for monies to be spent immediately by floating bonds through the mortgage-like, off-balance-sheet debt IFF scheme that Brown had proposed long ago. At the other pole, American officials were adamant that no additional money for Africa would flow from them. In the face of these major divisions about whether or how to raise an extra \$50 billion a year in ODA, the British were slow to respond to suggestions from their partners about how to move ahead.

Yet as June approached its end, there was an evolving consensus in favour of a communiqué formula that would add up all the money already pledged to show that the G8 had in fact produced the \$50 billion-a-year additional target that the British had long sought. At the same time, no new money need come from America. The G8 at Gleneagles would pledge in principle to raise additional money beyond that already promised, but would not commit to doing anything new or specific to achieve that goal. The full-blown scheme of the IFF — spend and borrow now, hide the debt on the balance sheet and pay it back later — would not be adopted. But there would be a mini-IFF — an international finance facility for vaccinations — that would produce an additional \$4 billion in the near future for this credible cause. The search started to find the right words in the communiqué to capture this approach.

Climate Change

The second major issue requiring the July 1-2 sherpa meeting was climate change. An earlier draft of the relevant section of the Gleneagles statement, leaked in March, had given hope that the U.S. had accepted Blair's core objectives. The passages that included "the world is warming" and text that humankind was partly responsible seemed to suggest acceptance of the science. Passages indicating that G8 countries would pledge money for specific projects showed a sense of urgency and a willingness to undertake immediate action as a result. Yet a subsequent draft, also leaked, suggested that a U.S. now driven by a president finally focusing on the summit had relented on all of these points. Many of the key previous passages were square-bracketed or eliminated, including those that suggested the Americans accepted the same scientific facts that most others did. The little that remained implied that the Americans were willing to do something, but of a scientific and research sort in a search to learn more.

Immediately after the mid-June sherpa meeting, the phone calls started to fly back and forth, as officials rushed to save all from the failure of having to take to their leaders such a heavily bracketed text to be negotiated at the summit table. As June ended the positions were coming together on climate change and the square brackets starting to come off, although there were still serious discussions on the file. But as the Americans were still reluctant to accept the basic scientific fact of human-caused global warming, it was clear that there was much more of major proportions for the leaders themselves at Gleneagles to do. Optimism and pessimism about whether they would do so arose in an equal uneasy balance. But those who had been involved in climate change negotiations for many years judged that Gleneagles, with its limited leaders' agenda time for dealing with this subject on their own, would accomplish less on climate change than it could have done.

The Summit Process

The third major issue requiring the July 1-2 sherpa meeting was the summit process itself. A early draft summit schedule had looked at having G8 leaders meet alone all day on July 7, discussing political security issues at a working lunch that day, and meeting both their African and climate

change guests on the final day. The sherpas had complained to their British host that under the proposed schedule, the G8 leaders had inadequate time alone together to deal with each key file. The British adjusted to meet this concern by promising a new schedule, which was delivered on June 25 (see below).

A second process-related concern was that the British draft summit documents on both the physical and policy side were delivered to their partners at a very late date, leaving no time for careful consideration in the field and in national capitals back home. Sometimes partners were given the documents only one or two days before the next meeting. The documents for the July 1-2 sherpa meeting were received only on June 25.

A third, related problem was that the British kept pushing their own agenda and proposals with compromising single-mindedness and were not open to inputs from their partners. While some wondered if part of the reason was Michael Jay's position as a new sherpa inexperienced in working a consensual sherpa process, it was clear that he was under strict instructions from to give nothing from Tony Blair. Indeed, on the evening of July 1, Downing Street indicated that pre-summit agreement on key items was unlikely, as the British sought to push it to the wire at Gleneagles to "squeeze out" as much as they possibly could (Baldwin and Charter 2005).

Ministerial Meetings

To help create momentum, accommodate partners' preferences on lesser items and free up valuable time at Gleneagles for the great last push on Africa and climate change, Blair mounted a vigorous program of lead-up G8 ministerial meetings. It featured most of the previous portfolio ministers' forums, and was noteworthy for blending hitherto separated portfolio ministers, as in the joint meeting for G8 ministers of development and energy. This sequence reached its climax with the three immediate pre-summit ministerials for finance, justice and home, and foreign affairs, held in June.

Finance, June 10-11, London

The biggest breakthrough came at the June 10-11 G8 finance ministers meeting in London, which produced the US\$55 billion program for debt relief for the 40 or so heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC's), with 18 benefiting immediately, a further nine to benefit soon and the remainder to benefit if they responded to the incentive to meet the conditions, and with the resources of the World Bank, African Development Bank and IMF resources left largely intact and to be replenished by new additional grants from G8 countries so that newly needed loans could be made to the poor.

Justice, June 16-17, Sheffield

On June 16-17, the G8 ministers of justice and home affairs met in Sheffield, along with Ron Noble, Secretary General of Interpol, who had been invited to make a presentation on transnational organized crime. In their sessions they covered a wide agenda embracing organized crime, immigration, narcotics, cybercrime, counterterrorism, corruption and the work of the G8 Lyon-Roma Group. The British hosts sought a free-flowing discussion, unimpeded by any pressure to descend into a drafting exercise for a document to be released to the public. They ran the show, bringing all topics into the domestic sphere as hosts are wont to do. Home Secretary Charles Clark confidently stated that all the G8 countries would most certainly adopt the biometric identification cards, yet such a policy would in reality be difficult to implement in North America. He soon found out identification cards were a subject of political controversy and possible Labour Party backbencher revolt in Britain as well. Yet, on the whole, there was

widespread agreement, even if the agreed conclusion contained square-bracketed text to be negotiated away in the weeks that followed.

Foreign Affairs, June 23rd, London

The final lead-up ministerial took place on June 23rd in London. Here G8 foreign ministers gathered to discuss an agenda focused on the three priorities of Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iran, as well a broad range of other issues around the world (Kirton 2005b). They first discussed Afghanistan and then the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), on which James Wolfensohn, special envoy of the Quartet, made a forceful presentation. Then they subsequently discussed the other items including Sudan and Haiti. All spoke in English, save for the French and Japanese.

In all, it was a productive gathering, showing the best in G8 diplomacy as all countries contributed in an equal, balanced, mutually accommodating and adjusting way. There were no assigned leads on most subjects, and anyone could and did speak out in a free-flowing exchange. This allowed the Japanese and Italians to lead on some issues. The British led on an international arms treaty, the Americans on BMENA and Iran, and the Canadians on Haiti and Sudan. The Russians spoke on all items save distant Haiti, but proved willing both to offer a consistent position and adjust to their partners concerns. Seeking to separate nuclear and human rights issues, and to treat Iran and North Korea the same way, they wished to avoid linking messages about nuclear restraint with other concerns or threats. Thus the Russians opposed any reference in the concluding chair's statement to the forthcoming elections in Iran, but relented when the Americans and British insisted such mentions go in. Similarly, the Russians suggested that there be no reference to the North Korean abductions of Japanese nationals. But they relented when the Japanese foreign minister Nobutaka Machimura adamantly noted that if there was no reference to abductions in the next he would not be welcome back in Tokyo.

As a result, the statement and subsequent news conference by the participating ministers issued sharp, forceful unified messages on immediate concerns. The statement recorded disagreement only on the fairness of the elections in Iran that would take place immediately after the meeting's end. For the leaders at Gleneagles, the foreign ministers prepared a text on Afghanistan and the Broader Middle East and on the central issue of how to raise the major new military and development resources required to build Afghanistan as a stable democracy free of terrorists and a narco-economy over the next ten years. It was likely that the leaders' text on MEPP at Gleneagles would be adjusted to include what Wolfensohn said.

Blair's Pre-Summit Diplomacy Tour

As the sherpa sequence and ministerial meetings moved into their endgame intensity, Tony Blair took a tour of his G8 partners to give a last push for his African and climate change goals. He began in nearby and neighbourly Italy, then went to more distant and difficult Washington, and continued with Russia. France and Germany also received actual visits, while Japan and Canada were consulted by videoconference, on the grounds that they were too far away from Britain for Blair to come in person.

The visits in Europe helped Blair secure pledges of more development assistance, as part of the plan to build momentum that would ultimately sweep the U.S., Canada and Japan into a new burst of big beneficence. The Washington visit produced the breakthrough of a major, well-constructed bilateral Anglo-American deal on debt relief for the poorest that was accepted by the full G8 at the finance ministers meeting on June 10. The encounter with Putin paved the way for Russia as host in 2006 to follow up on the work launched at Gleneagles on international energy security, climate change and the democratic development of the hydrocarbon rich countries to Russia's south.

Yet as July approached, Blair was forced to turn his focus to the crisis in the EU and bilateral relations between the British and French and Germans. This left the real high-level deal making

to the face-to-face discussions among G8 leaders bilaterally or all together at Gleneagles itself. And as both EU and G8 president after July 1, Blair could bring a single synergistic solution to both the EU's budget dilemma and the G8's trade dilemma by forging a deal at Gleneagles to curb or cut agricultural subsidies in the G8, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the developed world.

The Players and Their Positions

One week before the Gleneagles Summit opens, there is still enough divergence among the G8 countries to force the leaders themselves at Gleneagles to act collectively as real leaders if the historic accomplishments almost at hand are to be brought home by summit's end.

The United States

The first challenge is the often challenging United States. To secure success, Blair must bring on board the G8's leading sustainable development skeptic, George Bush. Bush will arrive self-confidently sporting the G8's strongest currency and growth rate, the biggest recent electoral victory and the glow of hosting a productive G8 summit last year at Sea Island, Georgia. He will want the G8 to remain focused on his Sea Island crusade of bringing freedom to the Broader Middle East and North Africa, mobilizing resources for the long haul in Afghanistan and Iraq, forwarding the MEPP and stopping the development of nuclear weapons' capability and support for Islamic terrorism in Iran.

Yet Bush owes Blair, as well as Italy's Berlusconi and Japan's Koizumi, as he put boots on the ground in Iraq and is keeping them there while others are pulling out. As Bush flies into Scotland, he will watch with some admiration at how Blair has switched his own reluctant voters' attention from Iraq to Africa and the atmosphere as the dominant international and potentially even domestic issues. Bush could well conclude he could keep his own voters and legislature, now on the verge of staging a Vietnam-like rebellion over the troops in Iraq and resulting body count, by similarly getting on board the great global crusade of saving Africa and the atmosphere as well.

Bush also knows that all four of his buddies on the ground in the G8 are committed to the quest for sustainable development. So is much of Bush's Christian evangelical base, which wants to stop genocide in Darfur as well as the rapacious exploitation of an earth that they feel belongs to God. Bush himself knows that poverty in Africa can breed terrorism against America, and that he needs a co-ordinated program of international energy conservation to control America's rising energy insecurity, gas prices, inflationary pressures and current account deficit. While some of his ideologues may dream of turning Saudi Arabia into a secure petro-democracy, as a realist Texas oilman Bush knows that supply-side solutions lie more in the barrels-in-hand in Canada, Russia, Mexico and Nigeria, whose leaders will all conveniently assemble at the Gleneagles G8.

Japan

For Japan's Koizumi, the focus is on securing support for Japan's bid for permanent membership on the UN Security Council, a goal that both Bush and Blair and all G8 partners but Canada have pledged to support. His preoccupations include containing the nuclear sabre rattling and abduction of Japanese nationals from his unpredictable Stalinist neighbour of North Korea, and managing a precarious partnership with regional rival and Gleneagles guest China. On Africa, Japan is committed, but worries about its G8-leading fiscal deficit, cumulating debt, and its rapidly aging population. On climate change, as a Kyoto pioneer, the most oil-import dependent of the G8 and a country with more than 90% of its oil imports coming from an unstable Middle

East, Japan has every incentive to bring its G8 partners together to solve the sustainable energy challenge they all face.

Germany

As another state on the front line of the looming energy mini-crisis and of the climate change crusade, Germany will also focus on the sustainable energy file. It has long called for greater transparency from hedge funds and other players in the energy market that it believes may be responsible for the fear-driven volatility and rise of oil prices that are doing such harm to Germany's inflation rate, industrial input costs, aggregate demand and GDP growth rate. On Africa, a rapidly aging, deficit-ridden Germany in breach of its original Maastricht obligations when the EU is in such disarray is reluctant to commit real money right now for additional ODA. As with Japan, it will find it easy to concentrate its energy on delivering for a big breakthrough at Gleneagles on the sustainable energy rather than on the African development file.

France

France is in a somewhat similar position as its continental European neighbour and fellow EU pioneer Germany. As a G7 leader in francophone Africa, it has a strong incentive to find a way to produce a big deal on African development, even potentially at some cost to the agricultural subsidies of its wealthy often weekend farmers at home. France has long sought to institute a well-crafted form of international transaction tax, and its leadership on an international aviation passenger or fuel tax at Gleneagles is likely to move France and some of its partners toward a deal for development in which airline passengers provide the guaranteed real resources needed right away.

Italy

Italy's Berlusconi is seeking sympathy and support within the EU for his desire to keep running fiscal deficits beyond the Maastricht-mandated ceiling of 3% of GDP. He was thus more than willing to offer firm if vague support for incoming EU president Tony Blair when he came calling in Rome as the first stop on his pre-summit partner tour. Elsewhere Italy is eager to share the burden on Iraq and the MEPP and BMENA, to help pave the way for its declared intention to pull its troops out of Iraq in the year to come.

Canada

As a member of both the Commonwealth, with 18 members in Africa, and la Francophonie, Canada had a singularly strong incentive to reduce poverty in its African family, a linguistically continental-sized Canada in the world (Kirton 2005a). A Kyoto signatory with citizens who, with almost one voice, have always chosen global environmental protection as their first foreign policy priority for the past 15 years, Canada had a strong incentive to shape a carbon-controlling post-Kyoto climate change regime. With proven oil reserves the size of Saudi Arabia, it also had the power and incentive to induce its American next-door neighbour to come on board a secure sustainable energy regime. And as a country with a strong anti-nuclear weapons and anti-military tradition, it looked with favour on an international arms trade treaty and on reducing nuclear weapons-related capabilities in North Korea, Iran, Russia through the Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, and everywhere.

More specifically, as the inventor and first host of the APR mechanism, Canada sought to give it a strong role in the follow-up to Gleneagles, as the G8 moved into a phase where the

forthcoming hosts were unlikely to give Africa the same prominence as in the summit's past five years. With a leader who had, over the past decade, made Canada the only G7 member with a fiscal surplus and declining ratio of debt to GDP, Canada was strongly opposed to any automatic, big, debt-inducing pledge to give 0.7% of GDP in ODA in ten years' time, or to spend and borrow now and pay back later in the IFF. A leader who had himself suffered from polio, as had his father, Paul Martin was eager to lead on global health. He is also a member of Parliament from Montreal, the world's second largest Haitian city, where consistent support for national unity was particularly welcome in Quebec — where support for separatism was on the rise; thus Canada was eager to keep the G8 engaged in troubled Haiti for the long haul. It also wanted the G8 to help the broader process of UN reform stay on track, and not be held hostage to the single issue of who would get any new permanent Security Council seats.

Russia

Russia's Vladimir Putin will come to Gleneagles to protect Russia's distinctive positions on Iran and North Korea. But above all he will want to make this G8 summit work in a way that prepares for the first summit he and Russian will host next year. With that summit likely to be devoted to energy, and with Russia still an energy and environmental superpower, he will want to have Gleneagles produce a strong sustainable energy regime. He will also want it to take strong action against terrorism, and on BMENA, especially in regard to Afghanistan and other places to Russia's south from where the Chechen-aiding terrorists come.

Propellers of Performance

Despite these different national priorities and positions, there are powerful outside forces pushing the G8 partners to come together as the Gleneagles Summit draws nigh.

Growing Global Demands and G8 Vulnerability

The first force propelling the G8 leaders to success at Gleneagles is an outside push of proven power from a small shock that reminds G8 leaders of their past nightmares and their continuing, compounding common vulnerabilities to one another and the world beyond.

Energy

It was the classic, G7-creating energy shock that returned on the summit's eve to force leaders to recall the dangers unleashed in 1973 and 1979. In the American-hosted lead-up to the previous year's Sea Island Summit, between January 1, 2004, and June 3, 2005, the month forward closing oil prices on the New York mercantile exchange had risen 21% (compared to copper 23%, lumber 20% and aluminium 10%). For Gleneagles, from January 1 to June 24, 2005, they rose 60%. On April 4, they reached a historic high of \$58.28 nominal dollars a barrel. In the one week from Friday, June 17, to Friday, June 24, just after the sherpa meeting the previous week and just before the newly scheduled one of July 1-2, oil prices reached new nominal highs on four of the six trading days, ending at a new record closing of \$59.84 a barrel at the close on June 24. During that week they repeatedly went above \$60 a barrel in intraday trading. Also importantly, the futures prices for many months forward showed that the market expected prices to rise further in the coming months and to stay at elevated levels in the years ahead.

This cadence took an immediate toll on prospects the G8's ability to govern the G8 and global economy. Stock markets in the U.S., Europe and Japan started to plummet, as the steady rise of oil prices damaged prospects for corporate profits, GDP growth and stable prices in the quarters

and years ahead, and triggered memories of the stock market crash of October 1987. On the supply side, the price surge stemmed from new terrorist mini shocks in Nigeria, where Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic fundamentalists threatened G8 diplomatic posts, from similar fusions in Iraq, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia earlier, from unusually extreme weather — perhaps because of climate change — that closed offshore rigs in the Gulf of Mexico, from strikes and social unrest in Norway, Nigeria and elsewhere, the spread of open markets and a stable rule of law in Africa, the Middle East, Russia and elsewhere, from insecure oil tanker routes and liquefied natural gas terminals to bring supplies in form abroad, and from a lack of refining capacity within the G8. Completing the tightly connected complex of reawakened energy/financial/terrorist/social shocks on the supply side was the nuclear component, through the reminder that the U.S. had not constructed a single new nuclear power plant (the immediate alternative to energy supply) since the Three Mile Island explosion in 1979. The new element came on the demand side, where this first embryonic energy crisis of the twenty-first century was driven by the take-off in growth in the often newly democratizing, newly dynamic powers and Gleneagles guests of Mexico, Brazil, India and China.

In light of such a shock, it was hardly surprising that on Friday, June 24, the G8 leaders decided to put energy as their top priority on the agenda of their Gleneagles Summit taking place in two weeks' time (Hoyos 2005). The initially foreseen but long unidentified third major priority theme for the Gleneagles had suddenly appeared and been defined. To be sure, leaders at Gleneagles would first concentrate of the clear and present energy price, supply and demand. But the solution lay, as they would quickly realize, in the direct connection to clean energy, conservation, climate change, intra-G8 co-operation with conveniently located, hydrocarbon laden Russia and Canada, and Russia's energy priority and southern outreach strategy as G8 host next year.

Terrorism and War

Other small shocks reinforced the sense of urgency. A bomb presumably set off by Chechen terrorists on a train in Russia on Russia's national day of June 12 injured several, but killed no one, and reminded Russia of the ongoing threat from terrorists at home with Islamic affiliates outside in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Broader Middle East. A Chechen blast that killed 10 Russian servicemen at the end of June had a similar effect. The steady flow of body bags of American military service people killed by increasingly imported terrorists-cum-insurgents in these latter theatres reached politically problematic levels for a Vietnam-sensitized U.S. public and Congress, and gave George Bush a particular incentive to co-operate with his G8 partners to find an adequate way out of what was quickly becoming his Broader Middle East quagmire.

Other

Elsewhere, the still recent memory of the Asian tsunami of December 26, 2004, while not physically connected to climate change, reminded some of the deadly costs of unpredictable extreme weather and natural forces, a close at-hand referent for the suffering and solutions on Africa, and a spur to a Gleneagles-generated earth observation system that could measure, warn and thus help defend against both naturally caused tsunamis and earthquakes, on the one hand, and human-fuelled gradual and abrupt climate change on the other as well.

On issues where clear, tightly connected mini shocks were absent, the impetus for G8 attention and action at Gleneagles were reduced. The small scares of the deadly SARS virus that infected the G8 in 2003, as reinforced by the spread of deadly avian flu in Asia in spring 2004 provided some pressure for action against infectious disease and elsewhere. But the chronic rather than crisis-erupting deaths of innocent civilians in large number in Darfur and Congo produced little push for the G8 to perform here. Even on an especially menacing nuclear-arming Iran and North Korea, it was the distant memories of the Indian nuclear explosion at the time of Blair's 1998

Birmingham Summit and the subsequent Pakistani explosion that would have to serve as a cognitively constructed physical shock, rather than rationally recognized one.

International Organizational Failure

Even if they were not acute, in their chronic form these global demands received a poor response from the array of established multilateral organizations that constituted the global communities first line of defence.

In the broadest terms, the United Nations was in the throes of a major reform effort that would culminate in the Millennium Development Review Summit in New York in September. But the prospects of the Secretary General's proposals for reform of the UN Charter and Security Council were minimal, and thus entrenched the Westphalian logic and vicious victor-power oligarchy produced in 1945. One third of the way to the 2015 date by which the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were to be reached, the global community was far behind schedule, and looked to the Gleneagles G8 provide the necessary money and political push. It did also over Darfur, where the UNSC was slow to move to prevent the genocide unfolding there.

Nor were the functional organizations performing much better. In the political sphere, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to show its impotence in the face of the Iranian and North Korean threats. The World Health Organization (WHO) was freely admitting its inability to meet the year-end targets for the 3x5 initiative it had set.

In the economic field, similar failures stood out. The International Energy Agency (IEA) remained unable to control oil supply or prices, or even provide the reliable information that would prevent hedge funds from moving the market in disruptive ways. The IMF seemed unable to do much to deal with global imbalances, the undervalued Chinese yuan or Argentina's historic and defiant default. The World Bank was still waiting to see what new direction it would set out in under its new American managing director, Paul Wolfowitz. The WTO had already missed its December 2004 deadline for completing the Doha Development Agenda negotiations and was looking to the Gleneagles G8 to give it the high-level boost needed to get a framework deal done for its ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in December 2005.

Predominant, Equalizing G8 Capability

The third outside force pushing Gleneagles, both toward divergence breeding failure as well as toward unifying success, was the decline in the global predominance and internal equality of overall capabilities in the G8, along with the opposite in the critical specialized capabilities at play.

In overall capabilities, the global predominance of the G8 was eroding, as the rising emerging powers led by China and India, competed with the G8 growth burst generated by the recent eastern expansion of the EU. The G8 seemed destined to emerge as the loser, once the soon expected revaluation of the yuan arrived to lift its currency and measured GDP power up. Within the G7, the United States held the lead, both in the rise of its currency and in the growth of its GDP. While there were some signs of a long-awaited revival in Japan, once reliable Britain, Canada and Russia were all falling backward as Europe remained in its familiar stagnant place. With these trend in relative capability, Bush is likely to arrive at Gleneagles with the sense of strength and self-confidence that generates stubbornness rather than a rush to compromise.

Yet at the top of the mind of George Bush, a former oilman from Texas, will be the trends in a particular critical relative capability, the price and supply of oil. Here America as a surplus producer rather than consumer, is falling fast from its already poor positions in 1973 and 1979, even if Japan and Europe suffer more, despite their nuclear reactors. At the same time, the new great global suppliers lie within the G8 in the presence of Canada and now Russia, rather than in an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with little surplus capacity and price control in the new demand-driven crisis now taking hold. The G8's global predominance

and internal equality are similarly pronounced in the other specialized capabilities critical for the Gleneagles agenda, notably environmental technologies, debt relief, development assistance and trade.

Common Principles

Another promising match is that between the G8's core common institutional values of values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance and the particular agenda and approach that Gleneagles is putting at centre stage. Its African agenda is building directly on the 2002 fusion of New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the G8 Africa Action Plan, both of which put good governance at the core. The June 11 debt relief package showed how seriously the G8 took the condition and value of good governance. Both Blair and Bush in particular have stressed how central good governance and combating corruption is to the aid and trade actions they intend to take. Conversely, Sudan's Darfur, Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe and the Congo vividly display the deadly force of development-destroying bad governance in Africa's north and south.

Similarly, open democracy and good governance are considered central to the energy security and end to terrorism that all G8 countries seek from the Broader Middle East and North Africa, Nigeria and Angola, and Venezuela and Indonesia beyond. Fostering transparency in hedge fund behaviour to control the fear, volatility and rise in oil prices also invokes a G8 democracy norm. And locking in the rule of law in Russia and strengthening it in China are thought to foster energy security, clean technology transfer and sustainable development there.

Political Control

A fifth propeller of performance produces a much more mixed prospect for a summit where strong performance has been helped by the strong political control and capital its leaders have back home. With his recent secured historic third majority mandate, host Tony Blair is in a strong position, especially as his potentially rebellious backbenchers empowered by his reduced majority press him to do more to help the poor abroad in Africa as at home. In a similarly strong position is America's George Bush, with a recently refreshed majority mandate yielding an assured three-year future and no fear of re-election compromises, and control by his party of both houses of Congress. Russia's Vladimir Putin sports much the same political control, and Japan's Junichiro Koizumi and France's Jacques Chirac almost as much. Less secure are Italy's Silvio Berlusconi and Canada's Paul Martin, who could face a general election at any time. The only leader with little control is Germany's Gerhard Schroeder, who has engineered an early election that will probably take place on September 18.

In contrast to this substantial political control is the lack of political capital that all leaders bring, relative to their own performance in the recent past. Blair suffers from the small plurality he secured in the last election, Bush from the plummeting approval ratings for him and his Iraq war, Putin from doubts about the economy and his war on terrorism, Schroeder from economic stagnation and persistently high unemployment, Chirac from his voters' recent rejection of the new EU constitution, Martin from an ongoing corruption scandal, and Berlusconi and Koizumi from similar dissatisfactions as well. Yet while such unpopularity at home will reduce the freedom of each to accommodate his G8 partners, in particular important cases they could help get Gleneagles get its big deals done. Blair, Bush, Berlusconi and Koizumi will all want to take their voters' minds off Iraq and its deadly dangers by delivering a successes on the African, climate change and other related fronts. Bush knows that the soaring high gas prices his voters pay at the pumps is now Americans' number-one domestic concern and he may want to secure a summit solution as large as the one Jimmy Carter helped deliver, in a similar situation, at Tokyo in 1979. And social democrat Schroeder, with his Green Party coalition allies, will want to show

their core voters about to go to the polls that he can deliver at Gleneagles the development and sustainability values they so cherish at home.

Constricted Participation

A sixth propeller of high performance comes from inside the G8, in the person of the particular group of eight leaders who will assemble there. Never before in G7/8 history have the same group of eight individuals come to the summit for five years in a row (with Canada's Paul Martin long involved since 1994 as Canada's finance minister in the club). While such continuity can breed complacency, the recent electoral mandates of Blair, Bush and Martin should produce a new burst of creative political energy, especially as none of these G8 leaders, unlike Reagan at Toronto in 1988, is looking to retire soon. They have thus learned how to work with one another even more successfully than did their long-serving predecessors in the 1980s under similar circumstances.

A second strong asset is the fact that Tony Blair is hosting, for only the fifth time in G8 history, a summit for the second time, and for only the fourth time having been in power continuously during the intervening years. The record of Canada's Jean Chrétien in 2002 after 1995, France's François Mitterrand in 1989 after 1981, Germany's Helmut Kohl in 1992 after 1985, if not Italy's Silvio Berlusconi just returned for 2001 after having been defeated just after 1994, suggests that such a second chance breeds a better performance than the leader's first time out. Moreover, no leader has introduced such far-reaching innovations at his first summit as host as has Tony Blair, and built on this so strongly at his second summit.

Because Blair scheduled his summit just after he has assumed the presidency of the EU Council he will have more authority and one less voice to cope with at the summit table. The latter is a real advantage, as the time-wasting divisiveness bred by the talkative Belgian Prime Minister at Genoa 2001 showed. Russia will be there because Blair transformed the G7 into a permanent G8 when he first hosted in 1998, and dispatched the ministers to do their work more productively in the preparatory lead-up to the summit, rather than at it.

To be sure, Blair has invited to Gleneagles 16 non-G8 leaders, to participate with the G8 within the middle of the rather short summit. Yet this number is less than the number invited by Chirac to the modestly performing Evian in 2003 and only slightly more than Bush brought to the high-performing Sea Island in 2004. Four of Blair's African guests have been to every summit since 2001, and one of them, Mbeki of South Africa, will participate in the discussions on both Africa and climate change. Most of the rest are veterans of G8 summits in the recent past and they and their G8 partners should thus know how to make maximum use of their time together there. This move from constricted to comprehensive participation should be less costly than it would seem at first glance, especially as Blair has carefully chosen his particulars to put his priority agenda, high ambitions and far-reaching, forward-looking strategy into effect.

It is in a similar context that the unprecedented mobilization of civil society before and at the Gleneagles Summit must be assessed. The performance pattern of twenty-first century G8 summits, compared to their predecessors, suggests that success has risen as more outside invited guests have participated at the summit table, and as more civil society voters have demonstrated on the outside in a non-violent way. For Gleneagles, Blair has mobilized a much-magnified twenty-first century version of a technique he pioneered in 1998. Then 70,000 demonstrators organized by Jubilee 2000 surrounded the summit site to link arms, demand that their elected G8 leaders break the chains of debt, and induce them to go further and faster in this direction than they otherwise would have done. At an early stage Blair and Brown encouraged their citizens to come to Edinburgh on July 2 to demonstrate that they wanted to make poverty history too. Joining the movement was Live 8, which on the same day mobilized ten rock concerts, an estimated 1 million spectators, and 2 to 3 billion viewers by television, radio and internet around the world. This unprecedented mobilization of peaceful democratic demonstrators on the global level has a summit-supporting effect even before July 2 and will have more in the days ahead. While some were concerned about the continental European-style anarchists who would come to Edinburgh later, those inside the G8 system were confident that the professional security forces

assembled and available could easily cope with the up to 300,000 demonstrators expected to arrive in Edinburgh and Gleneagles at any one time.

The Gleneagles Finale

How is a summit so strategically prepared by its British host, resisted by its divided G8 partners and pushed by such powerful outside pressures from the oil markets and the civil society—crowded streets, likely to all come together at Gleneagles to produce a successful result? One week before the leaders get down to do their most serious work at Gleneagles, the prospects are in place for a leaders-driven and invented, cross-issue grand bargain that will produce a historic success on both the African development and climate change control fronts.

The Gleneagles Grand Bargain

With the debt relief and development assistance pillars of the British trilogy largely delivered before Gleneagles opens, the leaders will be free to concentrate on the remaining third trade pillar, and promise to cut agricultural subsidies so as to free up more money for ODA, help Africans export their way to prosperity, and bring the overdue Doha agenda to a successful conclusion shortly after the WTO's ministerial meeting in December in Hong Kong. After five years of sustained, central, ever-more ambitious effort, the G8's African development priority will be largely done, with strong success.

On climate change control and sustainable energy security, the G8 will also make a successful start on its new multiyear program to define the post-Kyoto sustainable energy regime. With George Bush's Rio Grande neighbour Mexico, along with the key rising carbon-producing powers of China, India, Brazil and South Africa at the table as equal partners of the G8 for the first time, it will be possible to do the great North-South bargain needed to define and start the new beyond-Kyoto regime. Its new, fundamental principle will be that both the already rich and the rising rich will now contribute to carbon control, through co-ordinated measures that magnify the efforts of each. The principle will be put into practice by practical measures to invest in clean energy production, transfer and use, and to diffuse the fruits of the new technologies and investment throughout the world of the rich, and transfer it throughout the world of the poor. Making the connection required for this great cross-issue bargain will be the fact that rising energy prices not only harm an oil-thirsty and import-dependent America and most other G8 partners, but, as understood by Henry Kissinger in 1973, harm the poor countries much more. Indeed, just as the G8 delivered US\$1 billion a year to Africa in debt relief, the rise of energy prices to close to US\$60 a barrel will cost it an additional \$10 billion a year (Morrison and Giles 2005). And measures to impose a dedicated tax for development on passenger air travel will work simultaneously for Africa and climate change control. Global warming dries out Africa and China and breeds desertification, crop failures and famine, and it produces other effects that harm the poor more than the rich, and that give the systemically significant rapidly developing countries a real incentive to co-operate in a new climate change control regime. But more broadly, the sterile debate on science will be sidestepped by G8 leaders, none of whom has the background or interest in chemistry that Margaret Thatcher at the summit table once did.

The Gleneagles Guests

Participating as invited partners during the working sessions of the Gleneagles Summit will be an unusually large number of non-G8 leaders, likely a total of 17 in all (see Appendix C). For the discussions on climate change and the world economy on the first full working day, there will be Manmohan Singh of India, Hu Jianto of China, Luis Ignacio Lula de Silva of Brazil, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Vicente Fox of America's oil-rich, next-door neighbour Mexico.

For and from Africa on the second full working day will be Mbeki in South Africa's second appearance, plus Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Aboulaye Wade of Senegal and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria — regulars since 2001 — and the Sea Island addition of John Kufour of Ghana and newcomer Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania. Also expected is Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia with its famine and regional institutional headquarters, although the British, disapproving of Ethiopia's recent domestic repression, hoped its leader would choose not to come. In contrast, the British hoped that the often invited by only sometimes appearing Hosni Mubarak of Egypt would change his mind once again and decide at the last minute to come.

Also attending will be the international civil servants leading the four major, still economically relevant multilateral organizations: Kofi Annan of the UN, Paul Wolfowitz the World Bank, Supachai Panitchpakdi of the WTO, Rodrigo Rato of the IMF, Claude Mandil of the IAEA and Alpha Oumar Konari of Commission of the African Union.

The Summit Schedule and Agenda

The Formal Schedule

The Gleneagles Summit will begin with arrivals ceremonies during the day of Wednesday, July 6. According to the schedule distributed to the sherpa teams on June 25 (but still subject to discussion and revision), the summit will formally open that evening with cocktails and dinner for the G8 leaders, their spouses and the Queen, and no other guests, for a total of about 20 people in all. While the dinner is largely ceremonial, as at Sea Island, it will give a chance for the leaders in informal conversations with each other to advance issues on their own.

Thursday, July 7, will be the first full working day of the summit. From 10h00 to 11h30, in the first working session, the leaders will discuss the global economy, including the component issues of trade and oil, and then climate change. From 12h15 to 13h15, they will meet with the invited leaders from the "Plus Five" emerging economies. That session will be devoted to the global economy and climate change and opened by a presentation from the five visitors, who will have met by themselves beforehand to prepare their collective approach. From 13h30 to 15h00, the same group will continue their discussions over lunch. Following a press opportunity at 15h40, the G8 leaders will proceed from 17h00 to 18h00 to hold their second working session, devoted to regional issues including the Middle East, followed by BMENA. From 20h15 to 22h00, they plan a working dinner, focused on political security subjects and dealing in turn with regional issues, counter-proliferation, nuclear issues and foreign policy.

On Friday July 8, from 10h00 to 11h15 the third working session will tackle Africa. It will be followed from 11h30 to 15h00 by a meeting with African leaders, led off by a presentation from the latter and continuing with a discussion over lunch. The summit will end at 15h15, with a final news conference.

This schedule has still raised concerns that it leaves too little time for G8 leaders to be alone to discuss critical issues, and devotes too much time to uncontrollable discussions with too many, too diverse guests. But the late start each morning responds well to the biorhythms of North America leaders, who will be asked to get to work at 5h00 in home capitals' time zones. And it leaves some time for Blair to meet spontaneously with a famously early-rising Bush in the hotel gym for a private conversation as the two had at Kananaskis in 2002.

Returning Remit Mandates

As part of this formal schedule and agenda, the leaders will deal with specific mandates given by and to them from summits past. These include both hard remit mandates that ask for a report on a subject for the next or a subsequent summit, and soft remit mandates that include an injunction to complete action "by the 2005 summit" (which imply that G8 leaders will be watching and will if necessary take up the item again, even if no actual report "to" the summit is demanded).

Sea Island gave Gleneagles hard remit mandates on corruption and transparency, on a G8 Africa Action Plan progress assessment and on global HIV vaccine initiatives. It added five soft remit mandates on terrorism, and one each on the Nonproliferation Action Plan, Sustainability of the Poorest and Debt Relief, Africa Peace Support Action Plan, Global HIV Vaccine Initiatives, and Polio. Perhaps the most challenging remit mandate came from Evian 2003, where the leaders specifically stated in their Chair's Summary: "We will review progress on our [Africa] Action Plan no later than 2005 on the basis of a report."

Gleneagles Visibility

It is likely that Gleneagles will attract unprecedented visibility and attention from domestic publics in both Britain as the host country, and throughout the G8 and the world. Already the 10 Live 8 concerts and March in Edinburgh on June 2 produced a direct face-to-face audience of an estimated 1 million in attendance, and an electronic audience of 2-3 billion around the world. With this media momentum and the planned demonstrations during the summit within earshot of the leaders in Gleneagles, the audience is likely to build during the summit, which should dominate the front pages and the newscasts in Britain and the G8 as a whole. Already it has delivered Tony Blair's priority in domestic political managements, by changing the minds of his voters from Iraq where they dislike his policies, to Africa and climate change where they support the crusades he leads.

The Gleneagles Documents

The British have had a long aversion to long summit documents, and Tony Blair is determined to concentrate leaders attention on discussing and coming to consensus on basic principles, rather than negotiating like lawyers the fine print of detailed extensive communiqués. Yet despite this approach and the difficulty of drafting in the sherpa process, Gleneagles will likely produce between eight and ten separate documents. One will come on Africa. A second will come on climate change, where the British desire for comprehensiveness and detail competes with an American desire, supported by the Russians, for a short general statement followed if necessary by a more detailed action plan. A third document will come in response to the Asian tsunami, and a fourth on the world economy. The fifth will constitute the overall political security statement, which will probably deal with Afghanistan, rather than in an attention-attracting separate statement of its own.

The remaining documents are less clearly defined. The discussion on energy and oil will take place as part of the session on the world economy. Its results may be similarly incorporated in a single communiqué, rather than in an additional separate statement of its own. As it is very likely that the Gleneagles Summit will approve action on infectious disease and vaccines, if not necessarily in an initially conceived mini-IFF, there could well be a separate statement on health to record and highlight the results.

While this total of 8-10 documents will be fewer than the 16 of Sea island and the 14 of Evian in the two years before, the total will be large enough and innovative enough to make Gleneagles a strong deliberative and directional success. And given the American penchant for measurable results, and their G8 partners for clear locked-in promises, Gleneagles will probably produce a large number of specific, future oriented collective decisional commitments as well.

The Gleneagles Follow-Up

The likelihood that Gleneagles will be a summit of historic significance depends in substantial part on the resources and processes it puts in place. And here the prospects are very good indeed. Its accomplishments on setting specific targets and timetables, specifying agents responsible for

implementing its commitments, generating remit mandates for reports to subsequent summits and directing other international institutions may be modest. But on the big measures of new money mobilized and G8 institutions created and directed, it is headed toward major success.

Money Mobilized

G8 ummits have now become great global fundraisers, mobilizing more money to finance badly needed global public goods. Here Gleneagles has already set a new summit record, far surpassing the previous high of US\$50 billion in new financial resources raised at Kananaskis in 2002. At the centre of Gleneagles history-making performance is the \$55 billion deal for debt relief for the poorest done by G8 finance ministers at their June 10-11 meeting and to be confirmed by the leaders at Gleneagles itself.

To that should be added a substantial part of the major new commitments of increased development assistance made in the immediate lead-up to Gleneagles by all the world's major donors including the G8, despite the large fiscal deficits and accumulated debts they face at home. The first to move here were Tony Blair's fellow Europeans, just before he assumed the presidency of their common EU club. In late April came the Japanese, already the world's second largest ODA donor, who offered to double their aid to Africa over the next three years. Finally, on June 30 came the U.S., already the world's largest ODA donor with a president already in the process he claimed of tripling America's ODA from its level when he first took office. Bush pledged to double the already expanded figure before he left. It is noteworthy that these leaders felt pulled by the force of the Gleneagles G8 attractive power to announce these major new commitments in the months and weeks immediately before it opened, rather than wait to make their pledges to and for the UN just before it met for its Millennium Development Review Summit in September in New York.

At Gleneagles itself, it is highly likely that more money will flow. Most concretely, Gordon Brown moves to dedicate part of his air travel tax to development purposes and European pressure for a similar levy should fund an IFF that will add another US\$4 billion to the pot.

G8 Institutions Created and Directed

It is also possible that Gleneagles will create new G8 institutions and direct existing ones to put their decisions into effect. For the post-summit "back half" of their presidency, the British have up their sleeve the idea of possibly calling a meeting of G8 health ministers, the first ever forum for such ministers (as distinct from the Global Health Security Initiative of G7 ministers plus Mexico but without Russia, which has met annually since 2001).

Gleneagles is also likely to produce something for follow-up on Africa, if not clearly yet on climate change. On Africa, one possibility is a new G8-plus institution of one wise person from the G8 North and one from the outreach South to review and report on implementation of the G8's African plans. The alternative is to continue with the APRs, who have functioned well since their creation in 2001.

On climate change, the British are pushing hard for a follow-up mechanism, which the Americans are resisting with equal force. One possible solution would be a gathering of the G8 together with the Plus Five at the ministerial level and maybe with multistakeholder participation, along the lines of the Forum for the Future invented by the Americans at Sea island to put their BMENA legacy into effect.

The 2006 St. Petersburg Follow-on

The final promising prospect for high performance at Gleneagles is the plans the Russians have and have publicly signalled for the summit they will host in 2006, probably in St. Petersburg at

around the same time as the British in the first half of July. Almost certain to be their centrepiece is energy, in the form of international energy security, with the environment starting with climate change another strong stand-alone candidate on their priority list. Under either or both headings it is thus highly likely that the climate change principles and actions pioneered at Gleneagles will have fast, full, expansive and innovative follow-up under Russian leadership next year.

The Russians are also set on keeping alive and innovatively expanding the G8's core principles of spreading open democracy, economic and social development, and perhaps clean energy technology to their former Soviet republics, four poorest Commonwealth of Independent States and next-door neighbours to the south — Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. They are likely to be invited as outreach guests to St. Petersburg as well as being subjects for discussion there. Their situation may be discussed not as a sixth stand-alone thematic subject but infused into the other relevant parts of an agenda that may include not only energy and the environment but also health, education and migration. One possibility is to mobilize G8 money for them, along the lines of what the G7 did in the wake of Chernobyl, or to expand the 2002 Global Partnership to include these states as beneficiaries. However, U.S. officials have made it clear that there will be no commitments for additional money for the partners next year, just as they have been adamant there would be no new money for Africa in 2005.

This Russian focus on its poor southern partners is likely to extend all the way to Afghanistan, and thus keep alive Bush's BMENA breakthrough from 2004. It is, however, likely to do little directly for sub-Saharan Africa, thus placing more pressure on Gleneagles to get the G8's five-year job largely done and finding the right below-the-leaders follow-up mechanism to put in place.

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Appendix A: The Concert Equality Model of G8 Summit Performance

I. Dimensions of Performance

1. Domestic Politics
2. Deliberation
3. Direction-Setting
4. Decision making (commitments, money mobilized)
5. Delivery (compliance)
6. Development of Global Governance (within and outside G8)

II. Causes of Performance

A. Past Propulsion and Preparations

1. Past Performance of Summit and Host
2. Last Year's Performance of Summit and Host
3. G8 Members Co-operation in Past Year
4. Host Plan for Summit (how much and what)
5. Preparatory Process Convergence from Sherpas and Ministerials
6. Members' Priorities and Preferences (Can closure and big bargains be made)

B. Present Pressures to Come Together

1. Shock-Activated Vulnerability (Do we need something done?)
2. UN/U.S. System Failure (Can the UN or U.S. do it?)
3. Predominant Equal Capability (Can we do it together as the G8?)
4. Common democratic Principles (Should we do it in the G8?)
5. Political Capital and Control (Will our voters let us do it?)
6. Constricted Participation (Will the summit format let us do it?)

Appendix B: G8 Summit Political Policy Performance by Function, 1975–2005

Year	Site	Bayne Grade	# of Days	# of State-ments	# of Words	# of Commit -ments	Comp- liance Score	# of Minis- terials Created	# of Remit Man- dates	# of Leaders Bodies Cr Ttl
1975	Ldg	A–	3	1	1,129	14	+57.1	0	1	1 1
1976	Res	D	2	1	1,624	7	+08.9	0	1	0 1
1977	Ca	B–	2	6	2,669	29	+08.4	0	1	0 1
1978	Cap	A	2	2	2,999	35	+36.3	0	0	2 3
1979	Cap	B+	2	2	2,102	34	+82.3	0	1	3 5
1980	Prv	C+	2	5	3,996	55	+07.6	0	1	0 3
1981	Ldg	C	2	3	3,165	40	+26.6	1	1	2 4
1982	Ldg	C	3	2	1,796	23	+84.0	0	1	3 3
1983	Res	B	3	2	2,156	38	–10.9	0	1	0 2
1984	Ca	C–	3	5	3,261	31	+48.8	1	3	1 4
1985	Cap	E	3	2	3,127	24	+01.0	0	1	2 5
1986	Cap	B+	3	4	3,582	39	+58.3	1	1	1 3
1987	Prv	D	3	6	5,064	53	+93.3	0	1	0 2
1988	Prv	C–	3	2	4,872	27	–47.8	0	1	1 3
1989	Cap	B+	3	11	7,125	61	+07.8	0	1	1 2
1990	Prv	D	3	3	7,601	78	–14.0	0	3	2 5
1991	Ca	B–	3	3	8,099	53	00.0	0	3	0 2
1992	Prv	D	3	4	7,528	41	+64.0	1	2	1 2
1993	Cap	C+	3	2	3,398	29	+75.0	0	5	0 2
1994	Prv	C	3	2	4,123	53	100.0	1	2	0 4
1995	Prv	B+	3	3	7,250	78	100.0	2	6	2 3
1996	Prv	B	3	5	15,289	128	+36.2	0	2	1 6
1997	Prv	C–	3	4	12,994	145	+12.8	1	10	1 6
1998	Prv	B+	3	4	6,092	73	+31.8	0	3	1 4
1999	Prv	B+	3	4	10,019	46	+38.2	1	3	1 2
2000	Res	B	3	5	13,596	105	+81.4	0	5	2 5
2001	Prv	B	3	7	6,214	58	+49.5	1	4	1 6
2002	Res	B+	2	18	11,959	187	+33.0	1	6	3 8
2003	Prv	C	3	14	16,889	206	+51.0	0	4	2 9
2004	Res		3	16		245+	+55.0			
2005	Res		3							
Av. All		C+			6,197	26	+.37	.38	2.6	1.1 3.5
Av. Cycle 1		B–			2,526	29	+.32	.14	1.0	1.1 2.6
Av. Cycle 2		C–			3,408	34	+.32	.29	1.0	1.3 3.1
Av. Cycle 3		C+			6,446	56	+.48	.57	3.1	0.9 2.9
Av. Cycle 4		B			10,880	106	+.41	.57	4.7	1.4 5.3
Av. Cycle 5		C to date			16,889	206	TBA	.00	4.0	2.0 9.0

Notes:

- Location: Ldg = Lodge on outskirts of capital city; Res = remote resort; Cap = inside capital city; Prv = provincial (not capital) city.
- Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2002 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. The compliance score for 2002 is an extrapolation from the interim compliance score based on the 2002 interim-to-final compliance ratio.
- British-hosted summits are in bold.

Appendix C: The Physical Summit

Dimension	2004	2005
Site	Resort	Resort
Length in days	3	3
Length in hours	42	48
G8 leaders present	10	9
Early departures	(Martin) 1	0
Late departures	Reagan's funeral	1 (Koizumi)
Outside country leaders invited	13	12
Outside country leaders attending	11	
Outside heads of international organisations invited	0	6
Outside heads of international organizations attending	0	6
On-site bilaterals		
Sessions at eight	4	
Hours alone at eight	10	
Hours alone at eight for working sessions		
Hours unscheduled for spontaneous encounters		
Hours of social/ceremonial sessions	3	
Sessions with outsiders	2	2/4
Hours with outsiders	5	6.25
Delegations size (total for all countries)	1000+ est.	
Media accredited ^a	3100	3000+ est.
Media attending ^b	1492	
Total costs		
Security costs	\$37 million	
Economic benefits	\$1 billion	
Security personnel	20,000	10,000 police est.
Civil society activists on site ^c	500	100,000s est.
Arrests ^d	15	
Property damage	0	
Personal injury	0	
Deaths	0	

Summit Schedule Efficiency Ratios

Summit Hours/Number of Outsiders Ratio	3.5
Number of Documents Issued/Hours of Summit	
Number of Words Issued/Hours of Summit	

Notes:

Numbers are the most reliable and mean estimates of news accounts or, where possible, direct evidence from G8 officials. All costs are in nominal U.S. dollars at prevailing exchange rates

- Number of media representatives who successfully completed the accreditation process and had credentials available to them.
- Number of media representatives who picked up their credentials when they arrived to cover the Summit.
- Includes those at the Summit, the International Media Centre sites and nearby major cities, and those taking part in protests and demonstrations and educational forums such as The Other Economic Summit.
- Includes those for minor charges such as blocking a highway or providing a false name.
- Hours: 2004 = 42 hours (040608 @ 18h00 to 040610 @ 12h00), 2005 = 050706@17h00 to 050708@17h00)