

2003 Evian Final Compliance Report Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commitment

2003-186: “We reaffirm our support for the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.”

Background

The focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the 2003 Evian Summit was driven by the threat of nuclear proliferation in the three countries labeled by US President Bush as the ‘Axis of Evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union address: Iraq, Iran and North Korea.⁴⁵¹ At the time of the summit, many G8 member-states still supported the idea that the US had invaded Iraq prematurely and had failed to afford the IAEA adequate time to conclude its search for Iraq’s alleged WMD program. Furthermore, the US was also facing criticism for denying the IAEA re-entry into Iraq to resume its search after the fall of the former regime in May 2003.⁴⁵² In light of these tensions, the strong commitment delivered at the Evian Summit for the work of the IAEA can be interpreted partly as a reconciliatory gesture by all member-states in an effort to mend trans-Atlantic ties frayed in the US-led war on Iraq. However, the majority of the G8’s robust commitment towards the IAEA can be attributed to the alarming risk of nuclear proliferation in both North Korea and Iran that emerged in the first-half of 2003. In October 2002, North Korea announced that it had resumed operation of an illicit nuclear weapons program mothballed in 1994. In January 2002, the country officially withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁴⁵³ Grave concerns over the recent unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons to unstable states were only reinforced amongst accusations by the United States in the summer of 2003 that Iran was seeking to develop a WMD program.⁴⁵⁴ In both these instances, the United States and the international community have opted to chart a course of diplomacy and inspections as opposed to the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation. As a result, the G8 has directed renewed attention and support towards IAEA and its operations which has been translated into several documents released at the Evian Summit pertaining to WMD. These documents include *Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction — A G8 Declaration*,⁴⁵⁵ as well as a reference to the matter in the *Chairman’s Summary* from which the above commitment is extracted.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵¹ “Timeline: Iran,” BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 [news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm].

⁴⁵² “Putting the World Back Together Again,” The Economist (London/Washington D.C.) 7 June 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 [www.economist.com].

⁴⁵³ “Timeline: North Korea,” BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 28 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 [news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1132268.stm].

⁴⁵⁴ “Timeline: Iran,” BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 [news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm].

⁴⁵⁵ Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – A G8 Declaration, 2003 Sommet d’Evian Official Website (Evian/Paris) 3 June 2003. Date of Access: 3 January 2003 [www.g8.fr/evian/English].

⁴⁵⁶ Chairman’s Summary, 2003 Sommet d’Evian Official Website (Evian/Paris) 3 June 2003. Date of Access: 3 January 2003 [www.g8.fr/evian/English].

Assessment

Score	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
Russia			+1
United Kingdom			+1
United States			+1
European Union			+1
Overall (not including EU score)			+1.00

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown

1. Canada: +1

Canada has maintained a high level of compliance throughout 2003 and the beginning of 2004 towards the weapons of mass destruction commitments proposed at the G8 Evian Summit. It has been able to do so through monitoring and dismantling projects in Russia, and an overall firm commitment to the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction and other treaties pertaining to the latter, which are all administered or monitored by the IAEA. Canada has maintained this level of support for the IAEA due to its large exporter status of uranium, coupled with its status as a middle power country without a nuclear arsenal.

In August 2003, Rob McDougall, Director of Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament Division, of the Department of Foreign Affairs, restated Canada's commitment of CDN\$1 billion over the next ten years towards disarmament and non-proliferation issues in Russia in an effort to aid the IAEA in the region, and added that the commitment, "confirms this area as one of Canada's highest NACD priorities..."⁴⁵⁷ As of May 7, 2004, Canada has contributed CDN\$4 million to IAEA projects to strengthen nuclear and radiological security in the former Soviet Union, and CDN\$65 million to plutonium disposition.⁴⁵⁸ In addition, on 19 November 2003, Canada and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Moscow, part of the project designed by the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in June 2002 by G8 leaders in support of the IAEA's efforts, geared towards supporting Russia in destroying its nuclear and chemical weapons stockpiles. Canada is

⁴⁵⁷ Opening Remarks by Rob McDougall, Director Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament Division: Government Consultations with Civil Society on Issues Related to International Security, Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa), August 26, 2003. Date of Access: December 30, 2003 [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/mcdougall6-en.asp].

⁴⁵⁸ Global Partnership Funding Commitments, Monterey Institute of International Studies: Center for Non-Proliferation Studies (California), May 7, 2004. Date of Access: May 15, 2004. [cns.miis.edu/research/globpart/funding.htm]

to provide CDN \$33 million, which the UK will use to finance the project.⁴⁵⁹ In 2004, Canada took a further step in aiding Russia and the IAEA by enhancing its devotion to the dismantlement of Russia's weapons of mass destruction stockpile through the Sustainable Development Strategy 2004-2006 implemented by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

Through the Strategy, Canada will conclude a bilateral legal agreement with the Russian Federation in 2004 for the destruction of nuclear weapons that satisfies the Global Partnership's Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects. In addition, it will contribute funds to such projects as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's program to safely and securely manage spent nuclear fuel from submarines in northern Russia (2003-2004), Russia's plutonium disposition program, and the International Atomic Energy Agency initiative to strengthen nuclear and radiological security throughout the former Soviet Union (2004). The aim of the strategy involves the total the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines and fissile materials, and the re-direction of scientists toward opportunities for sustainable employment in peaceful scientific pursuits.⁴⁶⁰

More universally, Canada has attempted to take a leadership role in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by providing active support towards such non-proliferation treaties as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which are administered and monitored by the IAEA. For instance, on March 18, 2004 the Canada-EU Summit in Ottawa produced an effective promotion of the transatlantic partnership particularly through a firm implementation of the recent EU Security Strategy and their continued support of the G-8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as agreed to at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002. Through this strategy, Canada and the EU will cooperate on efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, particularly through strengthening the implementation of and compliance with disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements set out by the IAEA and the international community, and the further development of verification instruments to aid the IAEA.⁴⁶¹

On April 16, 2004, James Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy remarked to the Proliferation Security Initiative Operational Experts Working Group Meeting in Ottawa that, "The IAEA is another indispensable mechanism in our collective non-proliferation toolbox. We continue to successfully promote effective IAEA action to address states' non-

⁴⁵⁹ UK and Canada Cooperate to Assist Russia in Destroying Chemical Weapons, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa) November 19, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. [www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership/uk_canada-en.asp].

⁴⁶⁰ Sustainable Development Strategy 2004-2006, Goal 3: Promote international security and respect for human rights, good governance and the rule of law as prerequisites for sustainable development, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa), February 12, 2004. Date of Access: May 13, 2004 [www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/sustain/sd-dd/adg-06-sec08-en.asp].

⁴⁶¹ Canada-EU Summit, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa) March 18, 2004. Date of Access: May 13, 2004 [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadaeuropa/eu/partnership_agenda-en.asp].

compliance with their safeguard obligations. In this regard, universalization of the Additional Protocol would be an important step in the right direction.”⁴⁶²

Finally, on April 22, 2004 Mr. Gilbert Laurin, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, at the United Nations Security Council opened debate on draft Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, stating that, “Canada strongly supports a resolution that will help us confront the proliferation challenge, that respects the rights and obligations of States under current international treaties and that encourages the international community to use its energy and creativity to improve and build on the complex structure of non-proliferation, arms controls and disarmament regimes and mechanisms that have been established over the past 50 years.”⁴⁶³

2. France: +1

France has exhibited a high level of compliance with regards to the weapons of mass destruction commitments laid out at the 2003 Evian G8 Summit, principally through the IAEA’s efforts in Iran in 2003, and its own efforts to promote awareness of the commitments to the UN in 2004. France has repeatedly taken a strong stance in support of the IAEA’s efforts due to its status as a nuclear power, not only militarily but also through its civilian nuclear energy programs, and it being a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Since February 2003, the IAEA has been occupied in verifying the Iranian nuclear program and its history. France has been a strong supporter of this task and has mobilized its efforts with those of its European partners to gain Iran’s ascension to the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In October 2003, M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kharrazi, in Tehran in order to guarantee that Iran’s obligations to the IAEA follow through, and was quoted as saying that, “it is an important visit because proliferation issues are at the heart of our [France’s] concerns...”⁴⁶⁴

In November 2003, France, along with Germany and Britain, also drafted a resolution, that was favoured strongly by the Board of Governors of the IAEA, where by Iran would commit itself to IAEA inspections and halt its uranium enrichment programs rather than be in violation of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and succumb to UN sanctions.⁴⁶⁵ However, Tehran’s decision to reactivate its uranium enrichment activities in January 2004 after signing the IAEA’s Additional Protocol for Nuclear Safeguards on 18 December 2003, forced M. de Villepin to visit

⁴⁶² Remarks to the Proliferation Security Initiative Operational Experts Working Group Meeting by James Wright, Assistant Deputy Minister, Global and Security Policy, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa) April 16, 2004. Date of Access: May 13, 2004. [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/psi3-en.asp].

⁴⁶³ Statement by Mr. Gilbert Laurin, Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, to the United Nations Security Council open debate on the draft resolution on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Ottawa) April 22, 2004. Date of Access: May 13, 2004 [www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/unsc-en.asp].

⁴⁶⁴ Visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran: Interview given by M. Dominique De Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) October 21, 2003. Date of Access: December 30, 2003 [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20031022.gb.html#Chapitre2].

⁴⁶⁵ Most IAEA board members favor EU trio-backed resolution, International Atomic Energy Agency, (Vienna) November 20, 2003. Date of Access: January 10, 2004 [www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-031120-irna02.htm].

Iranian Secretary of the Supreme Council of National Security, Dr. Hassan Rohani to discuss the nuclear energy crisis once again. In his discussions with Dr. Rohani, Villepin strongly emphasized European desire for Iran to suspend its reactivation of uranium enrichment activities that occurred earlier in January, and to ratify the IAEA Additional Protocol it had signed in November 2003. Villepin went on to state that, “this meeting has confirmed our continued effort to reengage in strong bilateral agreements and place greater focus on today’s greater regional and international questions.”⁴⁶⁶

Finally, to further stress France’s support for non-proliferation and the IAEA’s activities, France has put forth numerous statements and actions in the UN General Assembly on various occasions. In September 2003, at the opening of the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, President Chirac emphasized the need for unity towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He proposed a permanent team of inspectors under the control of the Security Council as a plan of action: “we must unite to assure the universality of agreements and the effectiveness of non-proliferation methods”.⁴⁶⁷ On April 29, 2004, France went on to celebrate a victory in the UN Security Council in regards to non-proliferation, with the UN adoption of Resolution 1540 which it had co-authored. In the resolution, the Security Council again demonstrated its resolve to tackle the proliferation of WMDs and to provide for the establishment of a committee, which will be tasked, with following up the implementation of the resolution. This committee will bring together all the Council members and receive reports from states. A French Foreign Affairs spokesman went on to state that, “France considers it essential to ensure compliance with the non-proliferation regime as a key element in collective security... This is a step towards effective multilateralism and adds to other international initiatives, the G8 World Partnership on the same issue and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).”⁴⁶⁸

3. Germany: +1

Germany has registered an acceptable level of compliance with its Evian commitments regarding weapons of mass destruction in relation to the efforts exhibited by other G8 nations. The majority of Germany’s support for the IAEA has come in the form of diplomatic support for resolving the nuclear issue with Iran and endorsing Libya efforts to dismantle its WMD program. In its actions at the UN and other diplomatic arenas, Germany has also endeavored to preserve the jurisdiction of the IAEA in light of recent non-proliferation emerging outside the Agency’s framework. Lastly, as has been the case for several decades, Germany remains the IAEA’s third

⁴⁶⁶ Point de Presse du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, M. Dominique de Villepin, a la suite de son entretien avec le Secretaire du Conseil Supreme de Securite Nationale Iranien, M. Hassan Rohani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) January 15, 2004. Date of Access: May 12, 2004 [www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr].

⁴⁶⁷ Point de Presse du Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres, M. Dominique de Villepin, a la suite de son entretien avec le Secretaire du Conseil Supreme de Securite Nationale Iranien, M. Hassan Rohani, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) January 15, 2004. Date of Access: May 12, 2004 [www.doc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/BASIS/epic/www/doc/DDW?W=CLE=926498819].

⁴⁶⁸ Non-Proliferation/Adoption of Resolution 1540 by the Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) April 29, 2004. Date of Access: May 14, 2004. [www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=41895].

largest financial contributor (after the United States and Japan, respectively), with Berlin accounting for 10% of the IAEA's operating budget.⁴⁶⁹

The majority of Germany's support for IAEA activities have been centered about returning Iran to the international nuclear inspection regime, administered by the IAEA, since the US announced suspicions over Tehran's alleged WMD program in 2003. On October 21, 2003, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer traveled with his counterparts from France and the United Kingdom to Tehran, where they discussed the nuclear crisis with top Iranian officials. Joschka and his colleagues conveyed to Iran on behalf of the European Union that it must adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit to IAEA inspections in order to maintain normal relations with the EU.⁴⁷⁰ All parties agreed the talk were productive, resulting in "an agreed statement from the government in Iran and three foreign ministers who were present about the co-operation by Iran with the IAEA."⁴⁷¹

On November 25, 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors released a Germany-France-UK backed resolution urging Iran to cooperate with IAEA inspectors and to sign on to the Additional Protocol. The German government was closely involved in blocking a competing US -backed resolution which would have automatically transferred the issue to the UN Security Council following non-compliance on the part of Iran — a move that would have greatly diminished the ability of the IAEA to regulate the crisis itself.⁴⁷² Germany and its EU partners also encouraged Iran's cooperation at the time by promising, along with the US, continued technological assistance and development pending Tehran adoption of IAEA inspections.⁴⁷³ However, following serious omissions in the report delivered by Iran in early 2004 outlining its nuclear activities, Germany, France and the UK agreed to back a subsequent US-sponsored IAEA resolution mixing praise with sharp criticism of the country — this after the EU states agreed to block resolution as they did before in exchange for greater nuclear compliance.⁴⁷⁴ After a brief pause in IAEA inspections, Germany and the UK once again reprimanded Iran over its operation of a uranium conversion plant near the city of Istafan. Although Tehran says the plant is not a breach of its commitment to end uranium enrichment, the two European states cautioned that the "plant's creation sent the wrong signal to the international community."⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁶⁹ International Nuclear Policy: IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), Auswärtigen Amt (Federal Foreign Office) (Berlin) June 2002. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/vn/nuklearpolitik/iaeo_html].

⁴⁷⁰ Bundeskanzler dankt Joschka Fischer fuer erfolgreiche Vermittlung in Iran, Office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Berlin) 22 October 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004 [www.bundeskanzler.de/-7698.545309/Bundeskanzler-dankt-Joschka-Fischer-fuer-erfolgr...htm].

⁴⁷¹ Iran visit represented the 'Best of European Cooperation' – Straw – Edited Transcript of An Interview Given by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw for BBC Radio 4, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (London) October 23, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004. [www.fc.gov.uk].

⁴⁷² "US Welcomes Iran Report," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 26 November 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3241662].

⁴⁷³ "Tehran Pledges to Work With the IAEA," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 29 November 2003. Date of Access 2 January 2003 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3248854.stm]

⁴⁷⁴ "Iran slams US nuclear bullying". BBC World News UK Edition (London) 10 March 2004. DATE OF ACCESS 10 May 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3497518.stm].

⁴⁷⁵ "Iran uranium plant sparks new row." BBC World News UK Edition (London) 1 April 2004. Date of Access: 1 May 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3589737.stm].

Germany has also been increasingly supportive of Libya's decision on December 19, 2003 to unilaterally dismantle its WMD program and submit to IAEA inspections. Berlin joined other IAEA Board of Governors members in praising Tripoli's actions in a March resolution and calling for further cooperation with the country on WMD disarmament.⁴⁷⁶ In addition, during Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi's visit to Brussels on April 27, 2004, German Foreign Minister Fischer stated that despite remaining "obstacles," Germany welcomed Libya's decision to submit to IAEA inspections.⁴⁷⁷ Germany has further employed its position as UN Security Council President in April 2004 to reward Libya for its active compliance. On April 22, 2004, Germany released a Statement by the President of the Security Council praising the WMD dismantlement efforts, stating that UN "welcomes the roles played in that regard by IAEA and OPCW in facilitating the fulfillment of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab commitment, demonstrating the importance and usefulness of existing international treaty regimes."⁴⁷⁸

Germany has also employed its position as a temporary member of the UN Security Council during this compliance year and as Council president during April 2004, to ensure the mandate and jurisdiction of the IAEA is not trounced by other non-proliferation regimes. On April 22, 2004, Dr. Gunter Pleuger, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, delivered a speech to the Security Council concerning US-sponsored draft *Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* which would illegalize the sale, transfer or use of a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon by a non-state (read: terrorist) organization. Concerned that the resolution does not involve the direct cooperation of the IAEA, Pleuger stressed the need for the resolution to highlight that, nonetheless, "the multilateral treaty regime provides the normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts" –singling out the IAEA's NPT for particular mention. Germany also implicitly echoed the concerns of other states that the Special Committee of the Security Council set up to monitor compliance with the resolution may interfere or overlap with the mandate of the IAEA. To remedy this, Pleuger's comments stressed the need for the resolution to be implemented "without interfering with the mandates of relevant institutions and other bodies established under international treaties or arrangements." Lastly, Pleuger comments as the President of the Security Council concerning Resolution 1540 stated the "the Committee should work in cooperation with competent other bodies such as the IAEA...[as t]his would enhance its efficiency and credibility."⁴⁷⁹ Germany, along with a

⁴⁷⁶ "Iran slams US nuclear bullying". BBC World News UK Edition (London) 10 March 2004. DATE OF ACCESS 10 May 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3497518.stm].

⁴⁷⁷ "Gadhafi urges end to all WMDs." CNN World News (Atlanta) 27 April 2004. DATE OF ACCESS 9 May 2004 [www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/europe/04/27/gadhafi.brussels/index.html].

⁴⁷⁸ Statement by the President of the Security Council: Decision of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to abandon its weapons of mass destruction programs. United Nations Security Council (New York) 22 April 2004. Date of Access: 4 May 2004 [ods-dds-ny.un.org].

⁴⁷⁹ Statement by Ambassador Dr. Gunter Pleuger, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations "Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" New York, Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (New York/Berlin), 22 April 2004. Date of Access: 4 May 2004 [www.germany-un.org/archive/speeches/2004/sp_04_22_04.html].

unanimous Security Council, voted in favour of *Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* on April 28, 2004.⁴⁸⁰

4. Italy: +1

Italy has registered an acceptable level of compliance with Evian's WMD commitments, focusing primarily upon the IAEA's efforts towards non-proliferation regarding North Korea, Iran and Libya. Italy has traditionally maintained a low-profile on nuclear proliferation issues owing to the fact it is without a military atomic program and abandoned its civilian atomic energy program in 1987.⁴⁸¹ Nevertheless, Rome did successfully employ its presidency of the European Union from July 1 to December 20, 2003 to forward this G8 priority on a continental and international scale, and to imbed it within EU policy, earning it a passing compliance grade.

One of the areas where Italy used its presidency in EU to make a stand was in the North Korean nuclear crisis. On December 10-12, 2003, Guido Martini, Director-General, Department of Asia and Oceania of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led a nine-member EU delegation to North Korea — one of the few Western diplomats to enter the country in several years. The EU envoy was principally meant as a confidence-building measure and comes shortly after the US, Japan and South Korea agreed with the North to a broadly-worded statement of principles of nuclear disarmament. Nevertheless, Martini made it clear to Pyongyang that EU currently holds all economic and diplomatic ties with North Korea to be conditional upon the country's compliance with international nuclear norms.⁴⁸² The EU announced, however, that humanitarian aid would continue, with Martini summing up all other discussions with the generic statement that "the trip was very good for all of us."⁴⁸³

Another area in which Italy, in its capacity as EU President, reiterated its support for IAEA is with the agency's efforts to compel Iran comply with international nuclear treaty norms following US suspicions that Tehran was harboring a clandestine nuclear program in 2003.⁴⁸⁴ On September 29, 2003, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini chaired a meeting of the EU's fifteen foreign ministers at which Iran was a key issue of discussion. Frattini, on behalf on the EU, expressed concern over Iran's alleged nuclear weapons programs and stated that "closer economic relations [with the EU] will only be possible following progress" on the issue.⁴⁸⁵ On October 21, 2003, Italian Foreign Minister Franco Frattini praised Tehran's promise to sign the Additional Protocol to IAEA Safeguard Agreements. According to Frattini, Iranian President

⁴⁸⁰ Explanation of Vote of Ambassador Dr. Gunter Pleuger, Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations, Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations (New York/Berlin) 28 April 2004. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [www.germany-un.org/archive/press/2004/pr_04_28_04.html].

⁴⁸¹ Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Italy, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Vienna) 2003. Date of Access: 2 May 2004 [www-pub.iaea.org].

⁴⁸² "EU Delegation Ends North Korea Sessions," International Herald-Tribune (New York/Washington D.C.) 12 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 April 2004 [www.iht.com/articles/121281.html].

⁴⁸³ "Six-nation nuclear talks on N. Korea planned", USA Today (McLean, Virginia) 12 December 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004 [nuclearno.com/text.asp?7377].

⁴⁸⁴ "Timeline: Iran," BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 [news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm].

⁴⁸⁵ EU: Foreign Ministers Discuss World Crises, Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (Brussels/Rome) 29 September 2003. Date of Access: 8 December 2003 [www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Notizie/affariGeneraliRelazioniEsterne/Notizia_09291935323.htm].

Mohammed Khatami has listened to the strong message delivered by the EU's foreign minister's weeks earlier. The Foreign Minister also stated that Iran's policy reversal "will contribute to universal action against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, helping achieve vital results."⁴⁸⁶

In November 2003, the Italian Presidency of the European Union took a clear position rejecting a proposal of an IAEA resolution that an eventual non-compliance from the part of Iran would be automatically referred to the Security Council, bypassing IAEA. Europe preferred to accept Iran's progress in joining the non-proliferation process while maintaining a strict inspection regime, rather than threats of sanctions.⁴⁸⁷ As an alternative, on November 17, 2003, after a meeting between Frattini, EU Foreign Policy and Security Policy Chief Javier Solana and the Head of Iranian Security Council, Mr. Rohani, the EU decided to include non-proliferation clause in all agreements any country would like to sign with the European Union.⁴⁸⁸

Among G8 members, Italy has the closest ties with Libya, which it ruled from 1911-1941. Italy expressed deep satisfaction with Libya's decision to adopt the IAEA Additional Protocol on December 19, 2003. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi claimed that Italy was involved in the agreement and was praised by USA.⁴⁸⁹ In October 2003 a significant shipment of centrifuges parts was seized in Italy.⁴⁹⁰ Minister Frattini said that this development was "the crowning of Italy's constructive dialogue-based approach"⁴⁹¹ with both Libya and country's that are suspected of WMD proliferation. Berlusconi was the first Western government leader to visit Libya since Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi announced the end development of weapons of mass destruction,⁴⁹² and together with the UK has lobbied for the lifting of UN and US sanctions against the country in reward for its compliance with the IAEA.⁴⁹³

5. Japan: +1

Japan has registered a high level of compliance with respects to Evian's weapons of mass destruction commitments, focusing primarily upon the IAEA's efforts towards nonproliferation regarding North Korea and Iran, and expanding membership in the IAEA's Additional Protocols

⁴⁸⁶ Nuclear Program: Frattini, Iran Meets EU Requests, Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (Brussels/Rome) 21 October 2003. Date of Access: 28 November 2004 [www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Notizie/Notizia_10211902421.htm].

⁴⁸⁷ Q&A: Iran nuclear dispute, Cable News Network (CNN) (Atlanta) 26 November 2003. Date of Access: 10 January 2004. [edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/11/26/iran.qa/index.html].

⁴⁸⁸ "Powell, Frattini, Solana, Patten after EU Ministers Lunch", US Department of State, International Information Programs, 18 November 2003, DATE OF ACCESS: 10 January 2004 [usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/usandun/03111801.htm].

⁴⁸⁹ "World leaders send clear signals to Libya after arms decision", AFP (Paris), 20 December 2003, Date of Access: 10 January 2004. [uk.news.yahoo.com/031220/323/ehjxb.html].

⁴⁹⁰ Peter Slevin, "Libya Made Plutonium, Nuclear Watchdog Says", Washington Post, 21 February 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58972-2004Feb20.html].

⁴⁹¹ Information Paper, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 December 2003, Date of Access: 10 January 2004. [www.esteri.it/attualita/2003/eng/notes/n031222a.htm].

⁴⁹² "Berlusconi Becomes Gaddafi's Go Between," The Scotsman (Edinburgh) 10 February 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004 [news.scotsman.com/latest.cfm?id=2516252].

⁴⁹³ "Britain's secret bid to end Gaddafi arms embargo" The Scotsman (Edinburgh), 11 March 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004 [thescotsman.scotsman.com/index.cfm?id=280732004].

to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Japan has always exhibited a heightened interest in the IAEA's activities due to its standing as the sole great power without nuclear arsenal, its extensive civilian atomic energy program, and it being the only country to have experienced a nuclear attack.

North Korea's expulsion of IAEA inspectors in late 2002 and its withdrawal from the IAEA's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003 has been the primary focus of Japan's WMD compliance efforts. Japan is an active party to the six-nation multilateral talks to negotiate an end North Korea's nuclear weapons program, and attended the group's unsuccessful first meeting on August 27-29, 2003⁴⁹⁴ and its second on February 28, 2004,⁴⁹⁵ both in Beijing. At the August talks, Japan clearly stated that "the nuclear problem...must be solved before the normalization of the relations between Japan and North Korea," which included the latter returning to the NPT regime.⁴⁹⁶ Following North Korea's threat to withdraw from the multilateral talks, the language at the February round meeting was more sedated and compromising; Tokyo endorsed the Chairman's Summary which stated "[t]he Parties expressed their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue."⁴⁹⁷ Japan has also raised the issue of North Korea's nuclear ambitions at several regional and international forums, each time gaining support for the demand that Pyongyang return to the NPT regime and re-admit IAEA inspectors to its nuclear facilities. Such statements were issued at the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) Regional Forum on June 18, 2003, in Phnom Penh,⁴⁹⁸ the ASEAN+3 Summit Meeting on October 7-8, 2003 in Bali, and the APEC Ministerial and Leaders' Meeting on October 17-21, 2003 in Bangkok.⁴⁹⁹ In late May 2004, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang for talks with North Korea leader Kim Jong-Il. The two leaders discussed nuclear issues among other matters, with Koizumi stating that he "conveyed to Chairman Kim the essential need for a complete dismantlement of nuclear weapons and the need for international inspections." For his part, Chairman Kim restated his commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the peaceful resolution of the nuclear crisis through the Six-Party Talks. Chairman Kim also reconfirmed that North Korea will maintain a moratorium on missile test launches.⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁴ "N. Korea Nuke Talk Begin," CBS News.com (New York) 27 August 2003. Date of Access: 29 April 2004 [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/world/main570570.shtml].

⁴⁹⁵ Chairman's Statement for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks, (Beijing), 28 February 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/state0402.html].

⁴⁹⁶ Six-Party Talks on North Korean Issues (Overview and Evaluation), The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) September 2003. Date of Access: 20 December 2003 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asiapaci/n_korea/6party0308.html].

⁴⁹⁷ Chairman's Statement for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks, (Beijing), 28 February 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/state0402.html].

⁴⁹⁸ Chairman's Statement: Tenth ASEAN Regional Forum: Phnom Penh. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 18 June 2003. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/conference/arf/state0306.html].

⁴⁹⁹ Japan-North Korea Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) February 2004. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/relation.html].

⁵⁰⁰ Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi After the Japan-North Korea Meeting, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 22 May 2004. Date of Access: 25 May 2004 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/pmv0405/press.html].

The other main arena of Japan WMD-compliance efforts involves the Islamic Republic of Iran and related suspicions that it has launched a covert nuclear weapons program. On August 26, 2003, Japan hosted the Japan-Iran Expert Meeting on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At this bilateral meeting Japan “requested again that the Iranian side cooperate fully with the IAEA, and promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol.”⁵⁰¹ In September 2003, Iranian Foreign Minister Sr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi attended a state visit to Tokyo, during which he presented a letter from Iranian President Khatami stating that Iran had “decided to expand its cooperation with the IAEA and begin talks on the IAEA Additional Protocol with the IAEA.”⁵⁰² On September 16, 2003, Japan co-sponsored a strongly-worded resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors condemning Iran for its covert nuclear weapons program. The resolution demanded that “Iran fully disclose uranium enrichment and other programs that can be directly linked to the development of nuclear weapons and sign an additional protocol to enable the IAEA to conduct inspections without prior notification.”⁵⁰³ In addition, Japan endorsed the IAEA’s November 22, 2003, report outlining Iran nuclear questionable activities. Along with the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and Australia, Japan also held out for stronger language in the IAEA Board of Governors’ statement demanding Iran cooperate more fully with the IAEA and sign the NPT Additional Protocol.⁵⁰⁴

The Government of Japan warmly welcomed Iran’s signing of the NPT Additional Protocol on December 18, 2003, and offered to share “with Iranian experts... Japan’s experience of the conclusion and implementation of the Additional Protocol.”⁵⁰⁵ Special Envoy of the Prime Minister, Masahiko Koumura, visited Iran and held talks with President Mohammad Khatami, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rouhani and Deputy Foreign Minister for Asian and Pacific Affairs Mohsen Aminzadeh, on 9-14 May 2004. During the course of discussions, Tehran expressed its desire to adhere to the action plan agreed to between itself and IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei. Iran also stated it was near completion of its report to be made to the IAEA, and claimed that when delivered to the IAEA Board of Governors in June, it would clear Iran of all accusation of harboring a nuclear weapons program. Koumura welcomed the statement and promised a concrete response would be decided after the Board’s meeting in the next weeks.⁵⁰⁶ Mr. Koumura was returning a visit paid to Tokyo

⁵⁰¹ Japan-Iran Expert Meeting on the IAEA Additional Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) August 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/iaea0308.html].

⁵⁰² Visit to Japan by Dr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Overview and Evaluation), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 September 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/fmv0308.html.

⁵⁰³ Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors’ Adoption of the Resolution concerning the Nuclear Issues of Iran, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 16 September 2003. Date of Access: 20 November 2003 [www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2003/9/0916-2.html].

⁵⁰⁴ “US Wants Tough Resolution on Iran: Move Follows IAEA Report of Clandestine Nuclear Program,” CNN.com (Atlanta) 22 November 2003. Date of Access: 22 December 2003 [www.cnn.com/2003/US/11/22/us.iran.nuclear.].

⁵⁰⁵ Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi on Iran’s signing of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 19 December 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 [www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2003/12/1219.html #1].

⁵⁰⁶ Visit by Special Envoy of the Prime Minister Masahiko Koumura to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (May 9 to 14) (Summary) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 14 May 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/sev0405.html].

by Mr. Rouhani on March 15-17, 2004, where nuclear issues were also discussed with less tangible results.⁵⁰⁷

Lastly, Japan have provided funding assistance in support of the IAEA's "Safeguards and Nuclear Security Seminars" which feature a wide-range of policy topics related to nuclear non-proliferation and promote the concluding of Additional Protocol negotiations between the IAEA and member-state to the NPT. Japan provided funding for such seminars in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in June, 2003, in Ouagadougou, Burkino Faso in February, 2004, and in Windhoek, Namibia in March, 2004.⁵⁰⁸

6. Russia: +1

Russia has obtained a high level of compliance with its Evian's commitments on weapons of mass destruction, focusing primarily upon the IAEA's efforts towards non-proliferation regarding North Korea and Iran. Russia has a unique position as a country with the second biggest nuclear arsenal in the world, an extensive civilian atomic energy program and the closest ties with Iran and North Korea of all other members of G8.

Russia showed strong support to IAEA during the meeting of First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. On November 5, 2003, Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumiantsev said that Russia will fight to achieve universal acceptance of principles, adopted in Evian and Kananaskis by the leaders of G8, aiming at preventing access for terrorists and their supporters to weapons of mass destruction⁵⁰⁹. On December 2, 2003, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov met in Vienna with the Director General of IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. They confirmed that approaches of Russia and the Agency coincide with regards to the solution of the questions linked to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea (DPRK)⁵¹⁰. Together with the USA, Russia initiated and introduced Resolution 1540 to the UN Security Council, adopted on April 28, 2004 that calls for additional steps to prohibit any non-state actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in particular for terrorist purposes⁵¹¹.

⁵⁰⁷ Visit to Japan of Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rouhani of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Summary), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 18 March 2004. Date of Access: 29 April 2004 [www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/snscv0403.html].

⁵⁰⁸ Japan's Efforts in the Universalization of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) May 2004. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [www.mofa.go.jp/policy/energy/iaea/protocol.html].

⁵⁰⁹ Intervention by Alexander Rumiantsev, Minister of the Atomic Energy, Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Press Centre (Moscow), Nov 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. [www.minatom.ru/presscenter/document/news/PRINT_news412.htm].

⁵¹⁰ Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov's Interview with State Television Corporation of the State of Qatar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation (Moscow), December 22, 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. [www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/E1E7F121FF467202C3256E07005856CE?OpenDocument].

⁵¹¹ Interview by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation V.I. Trubnikov to Interfax Agency on Fight Against Terrorism. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 23 April 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004.

With respects to the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction adopted at the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, Russia has commenced a series of projects aimed at securing its commitments to the agreement, which include a close partnership with the IAEA. Such projects include the removal of highly enriched nuclear fuel from research reactors in Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro and stock-taking inspections in CIS countries⁵¹². Russia is successfully dismantling nuclear submarines and has already removed spent nuclear fuel and partially utilized around half of 193 decommissioned submarines, all with IAEA supervision and verification.⁵¹³

Russia has traditionally maintained strong ties with Iran both diplomatically and trade-wise. Nevertheless, the sale of materials and equipment for a civilian nuclear power plant in Buser, Iran in 2003 was placed under considerable strain following Iran failure to submit to IAEA inspections pertaining to its alleged nuclear weapons program. Under constant pressure from Washington, Moscow made a strong effort to convince Iran to sign the Additional Protocol and open its facilities for IAEA inspections. After meeting with US President Bush in Camp-David in September 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a “clear but respectful signal to Iran about the necessity to continue and expand its cooperation with IAEA.”⁵¹⁴ On November 10, 2003, Hasan Rohani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, met with Putin in Moscow and declared that Iran would comply with the requirements of the IAEA⁵¹⁵. On March 10, 2004, Putin had a phone conversation with Iranian President Khatami about Iran’s cooperation with IAEA⁵¹⁶ and the same topic was discussed by Russian and Iranian Foreign Ministers in their meeting on April 6, 2004.⁵¹⁷ Iranian Foreign Minister will visit Moscow on May 16-17 and Russia will stress the importance of maintaining the voluntary commitment to freeze uranium enrichment works as well as of speeding up ratification of the Additional Protocol⁵¹⁸.

The other area in which Russia demonstrated its readiness to assist in the IAEA’s goals, was with North Korea’s nuclear crisis. Russia took part in the first round of six-nation talks held in Beijing at the end of August, 2003 together with the representatives of the US, the DPRK, the Republic

⁵¹² Statement by A.I. Antonov, Head of Russian delegation at the 3rd session of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference on the Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 28 April 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004 [www.ln.mid.ru].

⁵¹³ Decommissioning nuclear submarines: Press Conference in CNIATOMINFORM. Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation (Moscow) 24 December 2003. Date of Access: 30 April 2004 [old.minatom.ru/presscenter/document/news/PRINT_news473.htm].

⁵¹⁴ President Bush Meets with Russian President Putin at Camp David. Remarks by the President and Russian President Putin in Press Availability Camp David. Office of the White House Press Secretary (Washington D.C.) 27 September 2003. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030927-2.html]

⁵¹⁵ “Iranian Atom and Kremlin Prestige” Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow) 12 November 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. [www.redstar.ru/2003/11/12_11/3_02.html].

⁵¹⁶ Daily News Bulletin, Press Service of President of Russian Federation (Moscow), 11 March 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.ln.mid.ru]

⁵¹⁷ “Transcript of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov’s Speech and answers to questions on the results of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of Kaspian Sea states in Moscow,” Daily News Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation (Moscow), 6 April, 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004.

⁵¹⁸ Russia welcomes continuing cooperation of Tehran with IAEA concerning Iranian nuclear program, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 14 May, 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=1741&idChannel=66]

of Korea, Japan and China, designed to return Pyongyang to the IAEA inspections regime.⁵¹⁹ On November 13, 2003, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Alexander Losyukov, received the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Russia, Pak Ui Chun. In the course of the talk that took place, questions of preparation for a possible second round of six-way talks on the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula were touched upon. Both sides emphasized their readiness to conduct a constructive search for a just and mutually acceptable solution to this problem which would lead to the establishment of a nuclear-free zone on the Korean peninsula under IAEA monitoring— along with security guarantees for all the region's states, including the DPRK, and the establishment of favorable conditions for their economic and social development.⁵²⁰ Another meeting between Losyukov and Pak Ui took place on December 2, 2003.⁵²¹ Although the second round of talks on February 28, 2004 did not bring concrete results, the Parties “expressed their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula, and to resolving the nuclear issue peacefully through dialogue in a spirit of mutual respect and consultations on an equal basis, so as to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the region at large.”⁵²² Russia continues contacts with its North Korean partners and is the only country besides China that maintains top level bilateral contacts with North Korea.

Moscow also has received with satisfaction the statement by the Libyan leadership that Tripoli is giving up its plans to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction and is ready for the widest cooperation in this area with the international community. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs reminded that: “The Russian side had invariably called for this in the framework of its contacts with the Libyan partners for the last few years. We welcome Libya's declared readiness to sign the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime”⁵²³. With help of USA and IAEA, highly enriched nuclear fuel from Libyan research reactor was transported to Russia.⁵²⁴

7. United Kingdom: +1

The United Kingdom has registered a high level of compliance with regards to its Evian WMD commitments. London's efforts have been focused upon collaborating with the IAEA on bringing both Libya and Iran into the international nuclear inspections regime. In addition, the

⁵¹⁹ “N. Korea Nuke Talk Begin,” CBS News.com (New York) 27 August 2003. Date of Access: 29 April 2004 [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/world/main570570.shtml].

⁵²⁰ Press Release, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 13 November 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. [www.in.mid.ru].

⁵²¹ Daily News Bulletin, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 02 December 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. [www.in.mid.ru]

⁵²² Chairman's Statement for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks, (Beijing), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 28 February 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/state0402.html].

⁵²³ “Statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Regarding Libya's Decision to Give Up Its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs,” Daily News Bulletin, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 22 December 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. [www.in.mid.ru/].

⁵²⁴ Statement by A.I. Antonov, Head of Russian delegation at the 3rd session of the Preparatory Committee of the Conference on the Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 28 April 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004 [www.in.mid.ru/].

UK has also maintained its generous funding of the IAEA whose affairs impact the country directly, seeing as it maintains a civilian and military nuclear program.

The United Kingdom has always been significant contributor to the IAEA's operating budget. In 2003, the UK's assessed rate for required financial contribution to the Agency was £8 million, amounting to 5.5% of the IAEA's core budget and including tasks such as nuclear safety, nuclear security and verification activities. The UK is also involved with the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Fund to help share valuable safe-guard technologically with developing nations, voluntarily contributing £2.5 million per annum to the program. The United Kingdom also maintains a Member State Support Program (MSSP), amounting to an annual budget of about £1 million, to assist the IAEA in ensuring the continued and improved effectiveness of its safeguards system. In addition to these expenditures, extra-budgetary funding of about £90,000 per annum is provided to support IAEA travel and subsistence for projects associated with UKSP tasks. Recently, the UK has become concerned over IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei's remarks that without increased funding, the Agency would cease to be able to guarantee credible safeguards on nations' nuclear activities. In responding to this concern, the UK has lobbied strongly for an agreement amongst IAEA members for a significant budget increase for the Safeguards Department. In July 2003, London was successful in bringing about this reform which saw an agreement to increase safeguards budget allotment go to the September General Conference for final approval.⁵²⁵

The United Kingdom has also been intimately involved in bringing Libya back into the international nuclear inspections regime, administered by the IAEA, after it being branded as a pariah state for years. Libya approached the UK in March 2003 following the end of negotiations between the two countries over the Lockerbie bombing settlement, to see if a mutual arrangement could be reached to end Libya's clandestine WMD program.⁵²⁶ Together with the US, UK experts and diplomats worked for nine months to quietly lay the groundwork for Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's announcement on December 19, 2003 that Libya would abandon its WMD program and submit to IAEA inspections.⁵²⁷ Libya's cooperation was warmly received by Downing Street, with Prime Minister Tony Blair stating that "we have offered our support to Libya in presenting its programs to these international bodies and are prepared to offer assistance with dismantlement."⁵²⁸ Foreign Secretary Jack Straw went even further, announcing in January 2004 that Libya intended to rid itself of weapons of mass destruction as a direct result of efforts and negotiations with the United States and United Kingdom.⁵²⁹ Blair traveled to Libya on March 25, 2003 to reward Qadhafi diplomatically for returning to the IAEA's non-

⁵²⁵ The United Kingdom and the United Nations. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London) September 2003. Date of Access: 29 April 2004 [www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/Cm5898,0.pdf] 38-39.

⁵²⁶ FCO Department Report 2004: Chapter 2: UK and Global Security. Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London) 2004. Date of Access: 2 May 2004 [www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/DeptReport2004_Chapter2.pdf] 48.

⁵²⁷ "Libya Denounces WMD Program," CBS News (New York) 21 December 2003. Date of Access: 29 April 2004 [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/21/world/main589698.shtml].

⁵²⁸ PM Welcomes Libyan WMD Announcement, Office of the Prime Minister (London) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 31 December 2003 [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5075.asp].

⁵²⁹ Straw makes statement of Libya weapons decision. Office of the Prime Minister (London). 5 January 2004. DATE OF ACCESS 5 May 2004 [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5100.asp].

proliferation regime and to highlight the IAEA's recent statement at the time that Libya was indeed on the road to disarmament.⁵³⁰

The UK has also played a similarly influential role in prompting Iran to ascend to the IAEA's Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In light of US accusations that Iran was harboring an illicit nuclear weapons program, UK PM Blair called upon "Iran to sign and implement an IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions."⁵³¹ On October 21, 2003, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Jack Straw traveled with his counterparts from France and Germany to Iran for top-level discussions about the nuclear crisis. Straw and his colleagues conveyed to Tehran on behalf of the European Union that it must adopt the IAEA's Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit to IAEA inspections in order to maintain normal relations with the EU.⁵³² All parties agreed the talks were productive, with Straw stating they resulted in "an agreed statement from the government in Iran and three foreign ministers who were present about the co-operation by Iran with the IAEA."⁵³³ On November 25, 2003, the IAEA Board of Governors released a UK-Germany-France backed resolution urging Iran to cooperate with IAEA inspectors and to sign on to the Additional Protocol. London was closely involved in blocking a competing US-backed resolution which would have automatically transferred the issue to the UN Security Council following non-compliance on the part of Iran — a move that would have greatly diminished the ability of the IAEA to regulate the crisis itself.⁵³⁴ The United Kingdom and its EU partners also encouraged Iran's cooperation at the time by promising, along with the US, continued technological assistance and development pending Tehran adoption of IAEA inspections.⁵³⁵ However, following serious omissions in the report delivered by Iran in early 2004 outlining its nuclear activities, UK, France and Germany supported a subsequent US-sponsored IAEA resolution mixing praise with sharp criticism of the country — this after the EU states agreed to block resolution as they did before in exchange for greater nuclear compliance.⁵³⁶ After a brief pause in IAEA inspections, the UK and Germany once again reprimanded Iran over its operation of a uranium conversion plant near the city of Istafan. Although Tehran says the plant is not a breach of its commitment to end uranium

⁵³⁰ "Blair's visit seen as a reward for disarming." Guardian Unlimited (London) 25 March 2004. Date of Access: 3 May 2004 [www.guardian.co.uk/libya/story/0,14139,1177257,00.html].

Press Briefing: 3.45pm Wednesday 24 March 2004: Prime Minister's Visit to Libya, 10 Downing Street – Office of the Prime Minister (London) 24 March 2004. Date of Access: 2 May 2004 [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5575.asp].

⁵³¹ PM briefs MPs on G8 Summit, 10 Downing Street – Office of the Prime Minister (London) June 2003. Date of Access: 15 November 2003 [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page3817.asp].

⁵³² Bundeskanzler dankt Joschka Fischer fuer erfolgreiche Vermittlung in Iran, Office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Berlin) 22 October 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004 [www.bundeskanzler.de/-7698.545309/Bundeskanzler-dankt-Joschka-Fischer-fuer-erfolgr...htm].

⁵³³ Iran visit represented the 'Best of European Cooperation' – Straw – Edited Transcript of An Interview Given by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw for BBC Radio 4, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (London) October 23, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004. [www.fco.gov.uk].

⁵³⁴ "US Welcomes Iran Report," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 26 November 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3241662].

⁵³⁵ "Tehran Pledges to Work With the IAEA," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 29 November 2003. Date of Access 2 January 2003 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3248854.stm].

⁵³⁶ "Iran slams US nuclear bullying." BBC World News UK Edition (London) 10 March 2004. DATE OF ACCESS 10 May 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3497518.stm].

enrichment, the UK Foreign Office cautioned that the “plant’s creation sent the wrong signal to the international community.”⁵³⁷

Lastly, the United Kingdom has contributed generously to the *G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction*, in specific with regards to the funding of decommissioning projects in the Russian Federation under IAEA monitoring. On June 26, 2003, Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary Jack Straw announced the UK would contribute £10m to the Northern Dimension Environmental Program (administered by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) to fund several major projects to deal with spent nuclear fuel and other nuclear waste. The UK also announced another £20m in funding for Arctic Military Environmental Co-operation (AMEC) program to dismantle decommissioned nuclear submarines and safely store tones of spent nuclear fuel.⁵³⁸

8. United States: +1

The United States has registered a high-level of compliance with its WMD commitments from the Evian Summit, however, this assessment is not without noted caveats. The US has, on many fronts, exhibited ample evidence of its co-operation and support for the IAEA, primarily in terms of financial contributions, ratifying the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in prompting Libya, North Korea and Iran to return to the international nuclear inspections regime. However, the United States has on other occasions attempted to circumvent the IAEA’s activities both in Iraq and in creating a potential rival institution to the IAEA in the UN Security Council, threatening the Agency’s jurisdiction and mandate.

The United States remains today, as it has been since the Agency was founded, the IAEA largest single financial contributor. At the IAEA’s 47th General Conference in Vienna on 15 September 2003, US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham outlined the US’ keen diplomatic, but also financial, support for the work of the IAEA. In accordance with the US’ top priority of deterring nuclear proliferation, Abraham detailed US President Bush’s recommendation to the IAEA Board of Governors to increase in the Agency’s budget in order to carry-out its mandate to monitor and enforce nuclear safety norms. In addition, the Bush Administration has requested an additional USD\$10m from the US Congress for the Department of Energy to support international nuclear safeguard measures, which primarily refer to those administered by the IAEA. Furthermore, another USD\$6m has been requested by the White House for the Department of Energy’s budget to fund the training and equipping of custom agents and border officials. Such an initiative is intended to contribute to the IAEA’s campaign to end the illicit trade and proliferation of nuclear materials that could be assembled into a WMD or other security threat.⁵³⁹

⁵³⁷ “Iran uranium plant sparks new row.” BBC World News UK Edition (London) 1 April 2004. Date of Access: 1 May 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3589737.stm].

⁵³⁸ £30m to tackle Russia’s nuclear legacy, 10 Downing Street – Office of the Prime Minister (London) 26 June 2003. Date of Access: 28 November 2003 [www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page4034.asp].

⁵³⁹ Statement of U.S. Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham: “Nuclear Nonproliferation: New Challenges and New Solutions,” 47th General IAEA Conference (Vienna) September 15, 2003. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [www.crcpd.org/International_Issues-Topics/United_States.pdf].

The US Congress has already responded to these promises by the Bush Administration regarding the IAEA and its activities, in a very positive manner. House Resolution 2800 (S1426), *Foreign Operations Appropriations (FY2004) Bill*, was introduced on 21 July 2003 and seeks to provide the International Atomic Energy Agency with USD\$53-million in funding for the fiscal year ending on September 30, 2004.⁵⁴⁰ The US Senate Appropriations Committee stated in its report that the “Committee believes it is critical, especially in light of recent developments in Iran, that the IAEA receive adequate funding from the United States and other donors.”⁵⁴¹ In line with these statements, the Committee’s budget approval for the IAEA is USD\$3-million more than the White House requested. At the time of the writing of this report, HR2800 was awaiting final vote in both houses of Congress before becoming law.⁵⁴²

Next to its financial contributions, the most impressive piece of evidence of the United States’ compliance with its Evian WMD commitments is Washington’s ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) between the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).⁵⁴³ Following a request by President Bush on February 11, 2004 to do so, the US Senate approved the Additional Protocol overwhelmingly on March 31, 2004, following a unanimous vote in favour by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee earlier that month.⁵⁴⁴ Despite the fact the US signed the Additional Protocol in 1998, the State Department described the belated ratification as evidence of Washington’s belief that it “is essential for states to adopt the Additional Protocol in order to give the IAEA strengthened verification tools to deal with clandestine nuclear weapons programs.”⁵⁴⁵

The United States has, of course, been intimately involved in bringing North Korea and Libya back into the international nuclear inspection regime administered by the IAEA. The United States took part in six-nation discussions with North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia and China on August 27, 2003⁵⁴⁶ and February 28, 2004⁵⁴⁷ in Beijing to discuss the nuclear stand-off on the Korean peninsula. Washington has continually publicly pressed North Korea, more than any other country, to return to the IAEA’s NPT regime and allow the return of the Agency’s inspectors to the country to monitor its military and civilian nuclear programs. The US, in equal

⁵⁴⁰ Senate Rpt.108-106 - Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004: Department of States: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. Committee Reports for the 108th Congress (Washington D.C.) February 2004. Date of Access: 1 May 2004 [www.congress.gov].

⁵⁴¹ Senate Rpt.108-106 - Foreign Operations, Export Financing, And Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004: Department of States: Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs. Committee Reports for the 108th Congress (Washington D.C.) February 2004. Date of Access: 1 May 2004 [www.congress.gov].

⁵⁴² Status of FY2004 Appropriations Bills, Library of Congress (Washington D.C.) 5 February 2004. Date of Access: 2 May 2004 [thomas.loc.gov/home/approp/app04.html].

⁵⁴³ Ratification of the U.S. Protocol Between the United States and the IAEA, US Department of State (Washington D.C.) 1 April 2004. Date of Access: 13 May 2004 [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/31042.htm].

⁵⁴⁴ Foreign Relations Committee Approves U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol, US Department of State (Washington D.C.) 4 March 2004. Date of Access: 10 May 2004 [usembassy.state.gov/mumbai/wwwhwashnews1440.html].

⁵⁴⁵ Ratification of the U.S. Protocol Between the United States and the IAEA, US Department of State (Washington D.C.) 1 April 2004. Date of Access: 13 May 2004 [www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/31042.htm].

⁵⁴⁶ “N. Korea Nuke Talk Begin,” CBS News.com (New York) 27 August 2003. Date of Access: 29 April 2004 [www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/world/main570570.shtml].

⁵⁴⁷ Chairman's Statement for the Second Round of Six-Party Talks, (Beijing), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) 28 February 2004. Date of Access: 15 May 2004. [www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/state0402.html].

concert with the UK, is also credited with sudden announcement by Colonel Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi on December 19, 2003 that Libya would be abandoning its clandestine WMD program and would submit to international weapons inspectors under the auspices of the IAEA.⁵⁴⁸ The US described the about-face in Qadhafi's policies as being a product of the new US Security Strategy that was applied with disappointing results in the US invasion of Iraq.⁵⁴⁹ Lastly, the US has exerted aggressive diplomatic pressure on Iran to ratify the IAEA's Additional Protocol to the NPT and to submit fully and openly to weapons inspections. Initially Washington had been uncertain about the role the IAEA was to play in the crisis. In November 2003, the US tried unsuccessfully to force a resolution through the IAEA Board of Governors that would have automatically transferred jurisdiction over the nuclear matter to the UN Security Council — where the US holds a veto — in the event of Iranian non-compliance.⁵⁵⁰ Recently, however, the US has warmed to the IAEA role, openly praising a Board of Governors resolution in March 2004 that censured Iran for failing to disclose all of its nuclear activity to the UN.⁵⁵¹ On March 17, 2004, President Bush and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice met with IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei, where he pushed the US to engage in direct bilateral discussion with Iran over the nuclear issue.⁵⁵²

Lastly, the United States has employed the UN Security Council as an effective vehicle to support IAEA activities through the passage of Security Council *Resolution 1540 on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction* on April 28, 2004. The resolution effectively prohibits any non-state actor from manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, developing, transporting, transferring or using a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon, and prohibits any state from aiding and abetting in these activities. Although the US-resolution calls for the establishment of Special Committee of the Security Council to monitor compliance with the resolution as opposed to investing this responsibility in the IAEA, it does contain assurances that nothing in the text shall be interpreted “so as to conflict with or alter... the responsibilities of the International Atomic Energy Agency.” Indeed, the US-resolution “*Calls upon* states... To renew and fulfil their commitment to multilateral cooperation, in particular within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.”⁵⁵³

The United States, however, has been highly adverse, if not outright hostile, to the IAEA in other arenas, however, most notably in Iraq and other initiatives targeting nuclear proliferation across borders. Since the IAEA inspectors were forced to leave the country in March 2003 due to the pending US invasion of the country, the IAEA has not been able to return to Iraq. The now

⁵⁴⁸ “Statement on Libya by the Press Secretary,” Office of the Press Secretary at the White House (Washington). 26 February 2004. Date of Access: 12 May, 2004 [www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040226-1.html].

⁵⁴⁹ U.S. Security Strategy Induced Libya to Give up WMD Program. US Department of State (Washington D.C.) 2004. Date of Access: 10 May 2003 [usembassy.state.gov/posts/in3/wwwwashnews1118.html].

⁵⁵⁰ “US Welcomes Iran Report,” BBC World News UK Edition (London) 26 November 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004 [news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3241662].

⁵⁵¹ “IAEA text hits Iran nuke secrecy”. CNN International News (Atlanta) 9 March 2004. Date of Access 11 May 2004 [www.cnn.com/2004/US/03/09/us.iran.nukes/index.html].

⁵⁵² Joby Warwick, “U.S., Iran Are Urged to Talk Over Nuclear Plans,” Washington Post (Washington D.C.) 18 March 2004, A28. Date of Access: 13 May 2004 [www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2936-2004Mar17.html].

⁵⁵³ UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), US Department of State (Washington D.C.) 28 April 2004. Date of Access: 12 May 2004 [www.state.gov/t/np/rls/other/31990.htm].

defunct search for WMD, which the US used a pretext for the resort to war, is instead being conducted by the US-administered Iraq Survey Group with minimal coordination or contact with the IAEA. In the *Consolidated Progress Report to Security Council on IAEA Verification Activities in Iraq Pursuant to Resolution 687 and other Related Resolutions*, IAEA Director-General ElBaradei came close to describing this exclusion by the US as being a breach of UN Security Council resolutions calling for the IAEA to have unfettered access to Iraq. He also noted concern that several sites containing fissile and/or contaminated nuclear materials have been looted or at the least, their contents have been moved without IAEA approval.⁵⁵⁴ This mirrors other reports by the IAEA that Iraq's nuclear power plant sites were poorly guarded, prone to looting, and posed a serious threat of nuclear proliferation.⁵⁵⁵ To date, there has been no serious invitation by the US for the IAEA to return to Iraq.⁵⁵⁶

9. European Union: +1

The European Union (EU) has taken positive steps towards the resolutions agreed upon for weapons of mass destruction at the G8 Evian Summit. On June 16, 2003, the European Council at Thessaloniki agreed to implement an Action Plan to counter the proliferation of WMDs. Specifically, the aim of the plan was to take a united common position towards the, “reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of nonproliferation on WMD and their means of delivery...”⁵⁵⁷ The EU extended its support of the IAEA with the Action Plan through a commitment to implement and ratify any future Additional Protocols created by the IAEA, and to support “an adequate increase in the IAEA safeguards budget to ensure the credibility of the IAEA’s verification systems on an urgent and exceptional basis...”⁵⁵⁸ In a joint statement by European Council President Costas Simitis, European Commission President Romano Prodi and U.S. President George W. Bush, in Washington in June 2003, it was agreed that both parties would, “support an adequate increase in the IAEA safeguards budget to ensure the credibility of the IAEA’s verification system,” and that, “proliferation is a threat not only to our security, but also to the wider international system”.⁵⁵⁹ The EU in fact went on to fulfill this promise with the implementation of IAEA Additional Protocols in April 2004. On April 30, 2004, in Vienna, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei welcomed the entry into force today of the Additional Protocols for 15 States of the European Union — France, the United Kingdom and the 13 non-nuclear weapon States of the EU — and the European Atomic Energy Community

⁵⁵⁴ Mohammed ElBaradei, *Consolidated Progress Report to Security Council on IAEA Verification Activities in Iraq Pursuant to Resolution 687 and other Related Resolutions*, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) 1 April 2004. Date of Access: 30 April 2004 [www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIraq/unscreport_110404.shtml].

⁵⁵⁵ “IAEA: Iraq nuke plants apparently unguarded”. CNN International News (Atlanta) 16 April 2004. Date of Access: 11 May 2004 [www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/16/iraq.nuclear.ap/index.html]

⁵⁵⁶ IAEA, *UN Inspections in Iraq Worked*, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) 2 February 2004. Date of Access: 12 May 2004 [www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2004/inspectionsiraq20040202.html].

⁵⁵⁷ 2541st Council Meeting of External Relations Provisional Version 14500/03 Presse 321 – Weapons of Mass Destruction Council Conclusion, Council of the European Union, (Brussels) November 17, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004 [ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1, 21].

⁵⁵⁸ Weapons of Mass Destruction: Basic principles, Council conclusions and Action Plan, Council of the European Union, (Brussels) June 16, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004 [ue.eu.int].

⁵⁵⁹ EU-US SUMMIT - Washington, 25 June 2003 - Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the European Union (Brussels) June 25, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004 [ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1].

(EURATOM).⁵⁶⁰ The Protocols, which provide the Agency with better tools to verify compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments, entered into force when the European Commission informed the Agency that EURATOM's own requirements for entry into force had been met. Dr. El Baradei viewed the simultaneous entry into force of Additional Protocols for the 15 EU States as, "a very positive development and a milestone in our efforts to strengthen the verification regime."⁵⁶¹

The European Union has also played a decisive role in bilateral talks with Iran over its nuclear program. On August 31, 2003, Tehran invited EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana to discuss a bilateral cooperation to, "prevent the politicization of Iran's nuclear programs".⁵⁶² In a meeting with the Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh, Solana remarked that, "Tehran's cooperation with IAEA will remove ambiguities and hasten to assuage the prevailing political atmosphere".⁵⁶³ In October 2003, foreign ministers from France, Britain and Germany, representing the EU, were invited to Tehran to provide Iran with their viewpoints on the Additional Protocols of Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) designed by the IAEA. There, the ministers were able to emphasize the importance of the protocols and aid the IAEA in its efforts in Iran. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw was quoted as saying that they had managed to achieve "an agreed statement from the government in Iran and three foreign ministers who were present about the co-operation by Iran with the IAEA".⁵⁶⁴

The EU's commitment to non-proliferation in Iran continued in 2004 with a visit to Iran by Dr. Solana on January 12-13, 2004, at the European Council's request in order to discuss the modalities for taking forward the EU's dialogue with Iran in all areas. Ministers welcomed steps taken by Iran and particularly the signature and implementation of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement and underlined the need for Iran fully to comply with the IAEA Board of Governors' November resolution. The European Council stated in its February Conclusions that the EU "will continue its discussions [of Iran] in the light of IAEA Director-General El-Baradei's upcoming report and of the meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors."⁵⁶⁵

The EU has also demonstrated an interest in stemming the tensions on the Korean Peninsula by urging North Korea in June 2003, "to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle that program and to come into full compliance with international non-proliferation obligations," and

⁵⁶⁰ IAEA to implement Safeguards Additional Protocols in the EU, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) April 30, 2004. Date of Access: May 12, 2004 [www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/2004/prn200403.html]

⁵⁶¹ Ibid.

⁵⁶² "Iran invites EU to cooperation on nuclear programs: Aqazadeh," Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran) August 31, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004 [www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-030831-irna02.htm].

⁵⁶³ In Focus: IAEA and Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), 16 October 2003. Date of Access 5 January 2004 [www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/iaeaIran].

⁵⁶⁴ Iran visit represented the 'Best of European Cooperation' – Straw – Edited Transcript of An Interview Given by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw for BBC Radio 4, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (London) October 23, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004. [www.fco.gov.uk].

⁵⁶⁵ The EU's relations with Iran: News from the General Affairs & External Relations Council, Council of the European Union (Brussels), January 26 & February 23, 2004. Date of Access: May 13, 2004. [europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/intro/gac.htm#]

supporting the six-nation talks to which the EU is not a party.⁵⁶⁶ Dr. Solana remarked in a statement at the time that, “the European Union remains willing to contribute to an overall resolution of the situation.”⁵⁶⁷ A statement by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy, Roberto Antonione, on behalf of the EU at the 47th Annual IAEA Conference in Vienna in September 2003, commended “the Agency [IAEA] for its efforts since last September, and supports efforts by the Director General to seek dialogue with the DPRK in order to find a solution.”⁵⁶⁸ Mr. Antonione also urged North Korea to unconditionally allow the, “full implementation of all the required safeguards measures at all times including the return of IAEA inspectors.”

⁵⁶⁶ EU-US SUMMIT - Washington, 25 June 200 EU-US SUMMIT - Washington, 25 June 2003 - Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the European Union (Brussels) June 25, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004 [ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1].

⁵⁶⁷ HR Javier Solana welcomes North Korea's agreement to participate in multilateral talks, Council of the European Union, (Brussels) August 4, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. [ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1].

⁵⁶⁸ Statement by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy Roberto Antonione on behalf of the EU at the 47th Annual IAEA Conference in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), September 15-19, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004 [www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC47/Statements/eu.pdf].