The New Format

Birmingham was an innovative and experimental summit. It was the first G8 summit, with the Russians as full members; this completes a process of assimilation, which began in earnest at Naples 1994 and in fact goes back to Paris 1989, when Gorbachev first wrote to the G7 seeking entry. It was the first where leaders met alone, without their ministers, fulfilling the aspiration of Giscard and Schmidt, the summit founders, which had never been achieved before. The summit had a limited agenda of items publicly identified in advance, with most other subjects delegated to other G7 or G8 ministerial groups.

This does not mean G8 activity is reduced or simplified; quite the opposite. Birmingham was preceded by more intense preparations than ever, in the sherpa network, in specialist groups and in other ministerial meetings. Employment was prepared by a meeting of employment and finance ministers in London in February; crime by interior ministers in Washington in December 1997. Environment ministers met in Leed's Castle, England, in April, and energy ministers in Moscow, in March. A major innovation was the series of meetings of foreign and finance ministers in London on 8-9 May, a week before the summit, to prepare some items for Birmingham and dispose of others which did not need the leaders' attention.

These ministers met in four combinations: G7 finance ministers; G8 finance ministers (only briefly); G8 foreign ministers; and G8 foreign and finance ministers jointly. They issued documents totalling 41 pages in length. The G7 finance ministers did the groundwork for the summit on the world economy; the new financial architecture (with a detailed report on supervision); and financial crime; plus work of their own on tax competition. The G8 finance ministers issued national employment plans. The G8 joint foreign and finance ministers disposed of development (leaving debt for the poorest for the summit) and electronic commerce. The G8 foreign ministers dealt with environment, issuing a separate paper on forests, but reserving climate change for the leaders. They also disposed of UN issues, nuclear safety and non-proliferation, land-mines, human rights, terrorism and 17 regional issues, only two of which (Kosovo and Middle East) were picked up again by the leaders. A full assessment of the G7/G8 achievements in 1998 should take account of all this work. But the present note concentrates on Birmingham itself.

The British preparations were purposeful, well-organised and effective, both as regards the preliminary meetings and the summit itself. (This was in contrast to the confusion in the run-up to Denver 1997.)

They prevented extra items from cluttering up the summit agenda, though two political crises, which had blown up in the last week – Indonesia and Indian nuclear tests – were naturally added. The leaders could thus have an extended discussion of a few items. They appreciated this freedom and got through their agenda fast, leaving time for bilaterals and other contacts. It is clear that the Germans will adopt the same format in 1999.

This format does focus attention on the leaders themselves and their personal contribution to the outcome. This naturally varied, as the rest of this note will show. There was substantial discussion of crime and debt, which led to some real advances. But other items were treated more summarily; employability, for example, was taken over lunch, without officials present. On this item, as with the G7 work on the new financial architecture, the main contribution of the leaders was to add their authority and their impetus to the work being done at lower levels. This is likely to be a feature of heads-only summits and may increase the scepticism about the summits of those in the media who expect the leaders to change the world over a weekend.