

The G8 from Genoa to Kananaskis and Beyond: Performance, Prospects, and Potential”

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Introduction

Assessing the likely success of any G7/8 Summit two weeks before it takes place is a challenging task. For during their past 27 years in operation, Summits have displayed a very wide range of performance. They achieved an impressively high grade of “A” at Bonn in 1978, but a disappointingly low “E” when Germany next hosted at Bonn again in 1985. (Bayne 2000:195). The number of specific communiqué-encoded commitments ranges from a low of 7 at San Juan, Puerto Rico in 1976 to a high of 169 at Okinawa in 2000 (Kirton, Kokotsis and Juricevic 2002). Compliance with these commitments varies from only 30% during the first 15 years of Summitry, to around 80% for Okinawa’s in 2000 (Von Furstenberg and Daniels 1992). Most importantly, the G7/8 Summit is unique among international institutions. It is a forum designed for, and delivered by, individual leaders, to balance their responsibilities as global major power statesmen with their domestic concerns as popularly-elected democratic politicians back home. It is thus ultimately up to the eight particular individuals coming to Kananaskis to determine what will happen during their two days alone together in the Rocky Mountains in Alberta, Canada for the G7 and G8 Summit on June 26-27, 2002.

This year the uncertainty about the outcome is intensified by several factors. The Summiteers have chosen, in high-risk fashion, to focus on a single central theme, promising not to be diverted by their first day’s agenda on growth and terrorism, nor by any crises that may arise on the eve of the event. As their singular culminating centerpiece they have selected “poverty reduction in Africa” – one of the most formidable challenges the international community has faced over the past half-century and arguably the most ambitious one remaining after the successful end of the European-centered cold war. To give life to a New Plan for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), G8 leaders are including within their Summit five African colleagues. This will require a unique, three-layered process in which consensus must be forged first within the G8, second within Africa, and third between the G8 and Africa itself. As Kananaskis, at 30

hours, will be the shortest Summit in recent G7/G8 history, all participants will have little time, amidst their jet lag, and geopolitical and domestic political distractions, to reach such consensus in the right way at the same pre-set time. And these thirty hours are likely to be the last chance in a long time for the G8 to deal with this development agenda and thus the last chance for Africa itself. For after three years of increasingly ambitious action on Africa, G8 attention will probably turn to other pressing subjects when G8 co-founder France launches the fifth seven-year cycle of Summitry next year.

Despite these uncertainties, Kananaskis should be a strikingly successful Summit, indeed, a Summit of singular historic significance. For it promises to bring to Africa - the one continent thus far largely left out of the benefits brought by globalization - both enduring development and the democratic governance the G8 was created to generate on a global scale. In doing for Africa over the next decade, what the G7/8 has successfully done for the former Soviet Union during the past decade, this Summit will be mobilizing the G8's core mission and the common democratic convictions that all the assembled G8, and most of the African, leaders share. They will come to Kananaskis knowing that only the G8 can deliver the required outside leadership and resources to democratize and thus develop Africa, and that the G8 knows it now needs to do so as never before. G8 leaders will bring the domestic political capital required to exercise such far-reaching, forward-looking global leadership, even though their citizens are preoccupied with other things. The outstanding challenge is to ensure that the Summit itself allows leaders to act as leaders, so that the sixteen very diverse individuals crafting a future of democratic development for Africa can come to the right consensus on the one day at the Summit allocated to this task. Yet here host Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, as a skilled veteran of Summit diplomacy, has designed and should deliver a Summit that will produce the intended historic success.

To identify the foundation for this optimistic forecast, it is important to look in more detail at how Kananaskis will be a Summit where leaders build on the momentum of their 2001 Genoa Summit, focus on their common democratic convictions, recognize their common vulnerabilities and equal capabilities, mobilize their personal determination and domestic political capital, and come together with their African colleagues under the chair of their Canadian host to produce truly historic and lasting results.

A Summit with Commitment and Compliance Credibility

One factor propelling the leaders toward success at Kananaskis is the credibility they bring in having substantially kept the important promises they made at their Genoa Summit last year. Despite the distractions of the mass civil society protest and the resulting death in Genoa, the leaders made 58 specific, future-oriented measurable commitments in their G8 and G8 Communiques. Of the 58 Genoa commitments, 10 came in the G7 Statement, 43 in the G8 Communique, two in the "G8 Statement on regional Issues" two in the "Genoa Plan for Africa" and one in the "Statement by the G8 (Death in Genoa)". While this number was less than the norm for Summits of the fourth seven year cycle that began at Lyon, France in 1996 (and the 1995 Halifax that Canada last

hosted) , it exceeded the totals produced by Summits in most previous years. The Genoa commitments covered 15 different issue areas, a range slightly greater than Okinawa 2002 and broader than Summits in previous years.

Moreover, what Genoa lacked in volume it made up for in concentration. For a concern with such concrete commitments strongly suggests that Genoa was a development-oriented Summit. Indeed, a full 34 of the 58 commitments (or 59% of the total) were contained within the “Strategic Approach to Poverty Reduction.” The further nine commitments devoted to global environmental issues came Genoa and overwhelming Rio-conceived sustainable development focus. In sharp contrast to the year 2000 Genoa Summit, Genoa offered very few commitments on terrorism, crime, drugs and regional security concerns.

These largely development promises made were also substantially promises kept. During the eleven months since Genoa, the nine priority commitments among these 58 were complied with by the G8’s eight country members on average 50% of the time. This score compares favourably with the average 45% compliance score produced by the previously five Summits (including the historically high Okinawa in 2000), with the 43% of the USA and Canada on sustainable development commitments from 1988 to 1995, and with the 32% from all countries on all economic and energy commitments from the Summit’s 1975 creation to the start of its third cycle in 1989 (Kokotsis and Daniels 1999, Kokotsis 1999)..

Compliance with the Genoa commitments was particularly high in the issue areas that will be the center of the agenda at Kananaskis. Inspired by September 11th, members logged a perfect score in complying with the commitment on terrorism that came shortly after Genoa in the leaders special September 19th statement on terrorism. This was followed by trade at 88%, infectious disease and bridging the digital divide at 75% each, universal primary education at 58%, the environment at 17% and strengthening the international financial system at –100%. The specific commitment to develop “ a concrete Action Plan to be approved at the G8 Summit next year under the leadership of Canada” received a score of 0 as a “work in progress,” largely because full compliance can come only once the Kananaskis Summit takes place.

Canada will also come to Kananaskis with a reputation as a responsible, high complying Summit host. For Canada at 82% comes first among G8 members in its compliance with Genoa’s nine priority commitments. It is followed by its Commonwealth and francophone partners of Britain and France at 69% apiece, Germany at 59%, Italy at 57%, Japan at 44%, the US at 35% and Russia at only 11%. This suggests a substantially stronger compliance record for the G7 countries (without Russia) that will be critical in making Kananaskis’ African agenda a success. Yet given the lagging compliance scores of the G7’s two most powerful members, the United States and Japan, it highlights the added challenge Kananaskis faces in devising mechanisms to ensure that its ambitious agreements are reliably put into effect in the following year.

A Summit with Clear Democratic Convictions

Beyond this promising legacy, there are four background conditions, highlighted by the concert equality model of G8 effectiveness, that are central to making a Summit a success (Kirton 1999). All are strongly in evidence in the lead-up to Kananaskis this year.

The first condition is having the agenda and participants build directly on the democratic purposes at the institution's very core (Kirton 1999). In the concluding communiqué at the end of their first Summit in 1975, in what might be considered the G7/8's constitutional "Charter of Rambouillet," the founding G7 leaders left no doubt that their new institution was created primarily to protect and promote "open democracy", "individual liberty" and "social advancement" on a global scale. Starting by overcoming the so-called "stagflation" and "crisis of governability" that afflicted G7 countries at that time, the G7/8 steadily moved outward to accomplish its core mission in the global community as a whole. The largely peaceful and democratic "second Russian revolution", the end of constitutional racism in apartheid South Africa and the G7's vigorous defence of freedom in Tiananmen Square and Hong Kong can be counted among its major achievements in this quest.

Over these years, the Summit's expanding, ever-changing formal agenda has often drifted from issues directly connected to this democratic core. Yet Kananaskis will mark a return to the foundations. For its centerpiece subject of "poverty reduction in Africa" is one that puts democratization at its heart.. Kananaskis' central purpose is to accept and support a new paradigm and action plan for Africa's development. Under it African countries themselves, in their own voluntary "peer review" process, will assess one another according to their performance on the central drivers of development, with the principles of good governance and the rule of law put in first place.

With the proper principles and process in place, major new money will be mobilized to fuel Africa's democratic development. The estimated 64 billion U.S. dollars in new money required each year for this purpose will come from five sources. The first, once Africans have regained faith in their own governments, is the estimated 40% of African domestic savings now sent in flight capital out of Africa to the already rich north. The second, once foreigners see that Africans themselves have faith in their own continent's future, is foreign direct investment (FDI), potentially on a scale that other emerging economies and even developed countries have already enjoyed. The third is access to northern markets for textiles, agriculture and other products, so Africans too can experience the export-led growth so critical to so many Asian and G8 countries' economic success. The fourth is further debt relief for the poorest, an area where the G7 first started at Toronto in 1988 and since strengthened its efforts with the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative in recent years. And the fifth is official development assistance (ODA), where G8 performance, outside of Japan and the field of global health, has lagged badly in recent years.

The second Kananaskis Summit agenda theme – combating terrorism – also has a clear democratic connection. For the September 11th terrorists, in targeting not just the World

Trade Centre but also the Pentagon and probably the White House, were mounting a direct attack not just on capitalism but on democratic governance itself. All the Kananaskis G8 leaders personally feel the threat. For it is they, rather than Bill Gates and his CEO colleagues, that were targeted by the Al-Qaeda network at last year's Genoa G8 Summit, as they and their predecessors have been at every Summit since 1996. As Kananaskis will be the first time since September 11th that these G8 democratic leaders have gathered, they will want to answer the terrorists' assault with a single loud and clear voice.

There is, moreover, a direct connection between the African development and combating terrorism agendas. For past terrorist attacks on American embassies in Africa, and American attacks on terrorist facilities in Sudan, have underscored the current need to deprive terrorists flushed out of Afghanistan and the Middle East of the safe havens and new training camps in Africa that poverty and resentment can breed. As Summits' succeed best when they have a synergistic, interlinked political-economic agenda that can produce a large package deal (Putnam and Bayne 1987), it is also promising that the third Kananaskis theme of sustaining global growth is also vital to fuelling the development and counter-terrorism missions over the longer term.

Finally, virtually all the leaders will come to Kananaskis with strong democratic credentials. President Putin is the first Russian leader to have come to power in a transfer of leadership by democratic, constitutional means. The Prime Minister of Spain, coming to represent the European Council, flies in from a country with over two decades of democratic practice. Romano Prodi, now representing the European Commission, has been a democratically-elected leader of a major power in the past. And most of the five invited African leaders can claim to be democratically elected as well.

These common democratic convictions have already been challenged on the road to Kananaskis, and have already passed the test. Two of the African leaders of the NEPAD Steering Committee, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and President Osanjo Obasango of Nigeria, have stood with their democratic principles rather than their African neighbour to declare that Robert Mugabe's brutally rigged election in Zimbabwe falls beneath the minimum standard of good governance that the Africa of the future demands. From the G8, new ODA money has been committed – first an overall aid increase and an additional 500 million Canadian dollars earmarked for Africa alone from host Canada in its December 10, 2001 budget, then ten billion U.S. dollars from the United States on March 15, 2002, a similar sum from the European Union, an additional promise of an 8% annual increase from Canada again, and, at the June 15th G7 Finance Ministers meeting in Halifax, a US\$22 billion three-year replenishment of the World Bank's IDA with about 20% to flow in grant form. More debt relief is flowing, with Ghana being the latest addition to a HIPIC list where 23 countries have reached the "decision point" that relieves about 75% of debt, with donors such as Italy bilaterally writing off their debt to African countries such as Mozambique, and with the Halifax G7 Finance Ministers asking their leaders to top up the IFI's HIPC Fund. And a start is being made on market access, with Canada signaling it will open its long closed textile markets to African goods.

There are still forces that might disrupt this democratically-driven agenda. One is the outbreak on the eve of Kananaskis of an already burgeoning international crisis, such as those in the Middle East, Kashmir, the Gulf, the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Straits or an Argentina where the hard won still fragile democratic practices could come under severe strain. A second disruption could come from a United States, Russia, Italy or France where new terrorist attacks could compel their leaders to concentrate on this agenda item at the expense of Africa itself. A third could be a response to terrorist attacks by democratic governments, outside and within the G8, that, in the heat of the moment, unduly compromises the individual liberties their polities hold dear. A fourth could be a U.S.-incited intra-G7 spiral of protectionism, in which the first casualties would be the WTO's "Doha Development Agenda", African countries needing market access for agricultural products, and American and G8 investors who might come into Africa if they knew that the products from their new plants could freely find markets back home. And a fifth could be the demands of perfectionists arguing that major action on the African agenda be slowed or stopped until all violence is ended in Zimbabwe, Congo and Madagascar or until every African citizen has had a chance to approve the new plan. In such as case those claiming that "Africa doesn't deserve one day" at Kananaskis could thus be joined by those asserting that "Africa should wait another year."

Dampening the dangers of such disruptions, however, is the fact that host Jean Chretien has already discovered and successfully dealt with similar disturbances, at the 1995 Halifax Summit he hosted and in Lyon, France the following year. In his pre-Summit tour of his colleagues on the road to Kananaskis, Chretien has wisely had them agree in advance stay with, rather than stray from, the democratic African course.

A Summit with Common Vulnerabilities and Equal Capabilities

A second key background condition for a Summit's success is its leaders' ability to accurately sense that they collectively can and must act against acute global challenges, and that each can and should play an equal part in producing an effective collective response. This recognition of their externally predominant and internally equal capabilities and vulnerabilities is becoming clearer as Kananaskis draws near.

The Kananaskis agenda is largely one where G8 members beyond America have the capabilities, interest and thus incentive to lead and succeed as Summiteers. Impoverished Africa is of most concern to bilingual Canada, formerly colonial Britain, France, Italy and Germany and civilian global power Japan. And it is these G8 members beyond America that have the capabilities to make a real difference there. In the ODA that is the first instrument to be deployed to make NEPAD a reality, it is Japan and France, along with America, that lead the world in absolute terms. And in debt relief, market access and FDI, the G8 has the global predominance and internal equality that it lacks in other, largely military, fields.

Similarly, in the fight against terrorism, the immediate but misleading image is that of the American military in the lead in Afghanistan, with other G8 members fighting alongside it in secondary but not essential roles. But this portrait masks the political dynamic really at work. For from the World Trade Centre bombing of 1993 to its September 11th 2001 repeat and Pentagon extension, it is “America the vulnerable” rather than “America the victorious” that predominates, especially with the Al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership still on the loose. Indeed, among G8 copuntries, it is only America’s neighbour, Canada, that has not yet experienced a terrorist attack on its own soil since the Summit began. Yet this remains small solace to a country that, along with all G8 members, had its own citizens killed in the World Trade Centre attack. And all know they need the full co-operation of countries beyond the G8 if terrorist networks and their financing are to be detected and destroyed. Thus common equal vulnerability to outside enemies has come to offset, and can even overwhelm, internal inequalities in capabilities and competition for individual advantage, as the driving force inducing Summit co-operation in today’s globalizing age.

In the field of sustaining global growth, as in the broader, background realm of overall capabilities, this sense of common vulnerability and equal capability is also coming to prevail. Almost a decade of acute, contagious international financial crises, starting with Mexico, then ripping through Asia, the Americas, European Russia and ultimately America (with the collapse of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund), have taught the United States and its G8 colleagues that they are all vulnerable, and must all provide the resources, when these systemic threats arise. The current crises in Turkey, Argentina, Uruguay, and potentially Brazil and Venezuela, keep this lesson alive, and help shift investor attention from the once attractive Americas and Asian regions to new frontiers such as Africa. The recent G7 consensus on the need for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM) - a “standstill” mechanism with mandatory private sector participation in the face of Argentina-like meltdowns - confirms that all members have now come to feel the national vulnerability to systemic crisis that only the smallest member, Canada, first felt. Almost a decade of financial crises has also ended the early 1990’s fear that the “big ten” emerging economies were destined to soon overtake the G7 in globally predominant economic capabilities. Now the new fear is that even a superficially strongly growing China will trigger yet another crisis that a vulnerable G7, as crisis manager of last resort, will have to band together to contain.

Within the G8, capabilities as well as vulnerabilities are becoming more equal. The recent rise in U.S. GDP growth is already being overwhelmed by a U.S. dollar declining in value to a greater degree. At the bottom of the G7 batting order, Canada is slated to be the “gold medal” G7 growth leader this year and next. Moreover the G8’s Russia promises to be a strong producer rather than consumer of economic security in the decade ahead. If number two power Japan can sustain its recent strong move from recession to recovery, and from a sagging to a strengthening yen, Japan’s overall weight will ensure that G7 capabilities will equalize in the way that was normal before the difficult 1990’s arrived.

A Summit with Political Capital

A third central condition for a Summit's success is its direct control, from initial design to ultimate delivery, by popularly-elected democratic leaders who have the personal determination and domestic political capital to make the meeting produce real results. Here Kananaskis promisingly features a group of politically secure, domestically popular, personally energetic leaders, who all approved the basis architecture for Kananaskis' African focus at Genoa last year. Led by the vast Summit experience of this year's host Jean Chretien, and next year's host Jacques Chirac, these leaders should have the political commitment and capital to transcend the quite different concerns of their publics and thus make Kananaskis, on its centrepiece themes, a major success.

All G8 leaders save Germany's Schroeder are at the secure early or mid stages of their electoral mandates, with recently re-elected Jacques Chirac the most electorally empowered of all. All are in reasonable control of their legislatures, by their own past national standards. In the most potentially problematic Presidential systems, the majority secured by Chirac's coalition in the recent French legislative elections and Putin's purge of the crumbling Communist Party from his legislative coalition represent major and historic advances. While Bush is looking ahead to mid-term elections for his evenly divided Congressional elections in November, his legislative influence is superior to that of his predecessor Clinton during most of the latter's eight years.

Moreover, most G8 leaders are relatively popular, especially according to the low standards set by the Summit a decade ago. To be sure, Japanese Prime Minister's Koizumi has recently plunged from historic highs and Canada's Jean Chretien has faltered since his popular Finance Minister Paul Martin was removed from the cabinet at the start of June. But in neither case has any real rival emerged to surpass them as a near term political threat. The only G8 exception is comes from a continental Europe moving to the right, for Germany's Chancellor Schroeder is running behind his dominant political rival as his September national elections approach.

G8 leaders should thus have the required reservoir of domestic political capital to deliver the Kananaskis agenda, even though their voters are not particularly concerned about the Summit's core issues themselves. In none of the G8 countries is "poverty reduction in Africa" a national priority. Indeed, even in host Canada it ranks close to the bottom of foreign policy concerns. In Canada "global environmental protection" remains an overwhelming number one, as it has for over a decade. In the United States it is not even the Summit's secondary themes of "terrorism" nor "economic growth" that trumps, but rather education – a value that G8 leaders can connect to the African agenda should they so chose.. At the same time, all these G8 leaders personally agreed at Genoa last July to focus on NEPAD. They thus know the issues and will want to finish at Kananaskis what they started last year. Reinforcing their determination is a committed Jean Chretien who can remind them of their initial agreement. And they know they have to face at Kananaskis the same African leaders they made their promise to at Genoa last year.

The topic of terrorism could at first glance appear to destroy this common determination. For on the one hand seems to stand a passionate American president and supportive public and a Russian ally aroused for reasons of its own. On the other hand seem to sit, in varying degrees of disagreement, everyone else. Yet the polls show a deep reservoir of commonality across all G8 countries, with all G8 citizens supporting a forceful response to the September 11th attacks, while most outside the Group do not.

A Summit with Complex Participation

Finally, a Summit succeeds when it benefits from constricted participation. In such circumstances all leaders have, within the available time, ample opportunity to offer their real views with openness and nuance, to listen to and truly understand their colleagues, to reconsider previous positions, perspectives and preferences, and to construct ambitious comprehensive interlinked package deals. They thus have a maximum chance to come to consensus, and a minimum chance that anyone will feel left out, try to veto the result or walk out.

Here the Kananaskis G8 leaders face their most formidable challenge. For they have invited to the Summit a diffuse and diverse group of individuals. These comprise the G8 and European Commission leaders plus the Spanish Prime Minister, coming to the Summit for the first time, at the end of his six month Presidency, to represent the European Council. They also include five leaders from most ends, and the francophone and Anglophone parts, of Africa, and United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan. Moreover, this group of 16 leaders of 12 countries, one democratic regional organization and one non-democratically dominated multilateral organization have been added, not to a pre-Summit or post Summit meeting, but, for the first time in Summit history, as full partners to the Summit itself. There the sixteen leaders will be required to assemble a consensus within and between the G8 and the African group. Moreover with less than eight hours to do it, on the final day of a two day Summit, they will have no second chance if they do not get it right the first time.

Yet there are several factors that offset the risks flowing from the Kananaskis version of the “law of large and lumpy numbers”. Past Summits have proven they can work well with outside visitors, especially visitors from developing countries, and especially when Summits repeat rather than extend the formula for participation employed the previous year. These features will largely be present at Kananaskis. Its one new challenge, of moving from a pre-Summit meeting to full partnership in the Summit itself, is one the G8 has – with Russia – confronted and conquered before. Also offering a risk-reducing continuity is the fact that the African leaders, UN Secretary General and G8 leaders coming to Kananaskis will be virtually all the same individuals, from the same countries, to discuss the same subject as last year. As an agenda item, development in general and Africa in particular offers an even longer continuity and momentum-building cadence, having been dealt with ever more intensely and successfully at each Summit from Lyon in 1996 through to Genoa last year.

A further offsetting factor is the advantages in delivery – at and after the meeting – that the on-site presence of African leaders will bring. The centerpiece achievement of a new paradigm and action plan for African development will only work in the long run if G8 leaders understand at first hand African thinking and challenges, if Africans are treated as full partners, if African leaders feel ownership, and if their citizens back home are made aware of, and available to help implement, the paradigm and plan. This is not a precondition for, but a product of, Kananaskis' success. Kananaskis will thereby help with securing the required genuine civil society engagement, and give it deep and durable democratic African roots. The added complexities of coming to a co-operative consensus among an unusually diffuse and diverse set of participants are thus compensated for by the quality of the design and the prospects for durable downstream delivery through compliance, on the part of both G8 members, and now of Africa's democratic leaders and their citizens themselves.

This logic suggests some further challenges, which set benchmarks against which Kananaskis might ultimately be judged. Both flow from the fact that the Paris 1989 Summit was the start of two processes of G7 democratic outreach. The first came with the arrival of Gorbachev's letter saying the Soviet Union and the east wanted into the west. The second flowed from the 15 developing country leaders dining with their G7 colleagues on the eve of the Summit and signaling that the south wanted a new deal with the north so it could become part of the developed world. The G7 has accomplished only the first of these development and democratic revolutions during the past decade. The outstanding question is how it will deliver the second during the next ten years. Here the first step is to render permanent the new presence and partnership of African leaders with the G8, at Kananaskis and in the preparatory process behind. The second is to consider how African leaders, like those of Russia, might one day become full permanent partners in an expanded G8 forum, perhaps in the form of a leaders-level G20 in which democratic leaders from other democratic regions are included as well. Finally, with governments having moved so swiftly and substantially, on ODA, debt relief and market access, it remains for market players and civil society actors, first from within Africa and then from outside, to support the emerging democratic Africa with their own funds, and for the G8 to involve them more directly in its work.

A Summit with a Skillful Host

To reap the rewards of these four favourable conditions, the Canadian host at Kananaskis must mobilize the talents of the assembled leaders to put the new African development paradigm, plan and process in place. Here the G8 and outside world is fortunate to have as the Canadian host Prime Minister Jean Chretien - the man most likely to close the deal. Chretien has made the G7/8 the central element of his government's overall foreign policy, as expressed in its formal Statement on February 7, 1995. He has attended G7 Summits since Bonn 1978, where he went as finance minister for then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. He has been there as a leader himself continuously since Naples in 1994. As host of the 1995 Halifax Summit he has proven his ability to work with themes agreed at the Italian Summit the previous year, to stick with this agenda despite the distractions

that arise in subsequent months, and to flexibly absorb on site the sudden domestic political needs of arriving leaders – notably Jacques Chirac the U.S. President, and the Japanese Prime Minister – to have the Summit visibly respond to trade tensions within the G7 and security crises in the world outside.

As a veteran participant in Canada's Summit diplomacy, Chretien and his team have taken their inspiration from the first Summit Canada hosted, in Montebello, Quebec in 1981. There, with most of the media kept sixty miles away in a medium sized city, the leaders gathered informally in "the largest log cabin in the world", in an effort to induce a reluctant, rookie Republican American President to engage in global negotiations leading to a new north-South deal. They succeed – on the Summit site – in securing President Reagan's agreement. But the ultimate prize was snatched from them when the second stage – a multilateral conference on global negotiations in Cancun – fell prey to the usual political divisions brought to the fore by the UN forum in which it was held. This time the Canadians are following most of the Montebello model, but now trying to close the final, second stage of the deal on site in a single step. They are thus bringing the leaders of the "South" into the G8 Summit of the "North", and having the G8 institution itself work its special magic on the most formidable north-south challenge of the day.

To accomplish these two steps in a single Summit, Chretien has appointed as his personal representative, or "sherpa", Robert Fowler, a veteran of Montebello and the Canadian foreign service. Fowler bring personal experience and a passionate commitment on Africa and a record of recent success as Canada's ambassador to the United Nations. Uniquely among G8 members, Fowler serves as Chretien's personal representative for both the G8 and for Africa, and thus is uniquely positioned to bring the three separate processes of consensus formation, always prone to fragmentation, together on his leader's behalf. Fowler has set a new G8 record for consultation with civil society organizations on the road to Kananaskis. His Prime Minister has set one for the intensity and extent of pre-Summit consultations within the G8, within Africa and around the world. The challenge is now for Chretien and his colleagues, operating in the gloomy shadow of Genoa last year, to confront the current "crisis of governability" within G8 democracies and find a way to engage civil society in G8 and global governance, to enable globalization to work better for the benefit of all.

Partly as a result of these unprecedented pre-Summit consultations, the risk factors driving the leaders toward division rather than consensus at Kananaskis have been considerably reduced. Those that remain are of a sort Chretien has successfully coped with before. Here the key country is France, the only fellow francophone member of the G8 and in some ways Canada's most important foreign partner of all. Chretien will have to convince France's Chirac that the new resources NEPAD will unleash should go to Africa's new democracies, whatever language they speak, rather than to the countries that France had once colonized. Both leaders will have to cope with the complex issue of whether debt relief should remain directed only at the poorest countries, largely in Africa, or extended, on economic and other grounds, to include more middle income debtors, including those replete with French-language skills and oil. Yet Chretien, as Dean of the Summit, is on the whole highly fortunate to have France's Chirac as a strong second. For

both leaders and their countries bring vast Summit experience, a deep concern with development and Africa, and the critical link from one Summit and one hosting cycle to the next. If a way can be found to have the torch passed successfully, in French, the legacy of Kananaskis is likely to endure well beyond the limited time that Canada has as host.

That legacy could well be as large as the one Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau presciently pointed to at the conclusion of the first Summit Canada attended back in 1976. Here he stated, clearly and correctly: "...the success of these conferences are ... not to be judged by the solution of individual economic problems or by the setting up of new institutions or by the agreement on any particular resolution. The success will be judged by whether we can influence the behaviour of people in our democracies and perhaps even as important the behaviour of people on the outside who are watching us, in a way in which they will have confidence that our type of economic and political freedom permits us to solve problems." It is thus ultimately the judgments and actions of citizens within the G8 countries, in Africa outside, and throughout a global community coping with the multifaceted forces of globalization, that will make the Kananaskis Summit an historic success.

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