

# **A Summit of Substantial Success: Prospects for the 2008 G8**

John Kirton  
Director, G8 Research Group, University of Toronto  
July 7, 2008

The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Jenilee Guebert, and the contributions of the other members of the G8 Research Group. Draft of July 7, 2008.

## **Introduction**

On July 7-9, 2008, the Group of Eight (G8) holds its 34th annual summit at Lake Toyako in Hokkaido in northern Japan. In the chair will be Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, attending and hosting the summit for first time. Also coming to their first summit as leaders will be British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Russian President Dimitry Medvedev. It will be the second summit for French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the third for German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and the fourth for European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso. It will be Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's sixth, and the eight and last for U. S. President George Bush.

At Toyako these G8 leaders will make substantial advances in several very difficult, tightly interconnected fields. On the environment, where climate change stands as the defining challenge for the summit as a whole, they will chart an alternative to the failed United Nations' (UN) approach under which a little group of rich countries promised to do a little bit for a little while and largely failed to do it. In its place all G8 leaders will approve a revolutionary, bottom-up sectoral strategy to which both the developed and developing world can contribute. They will offer major new financing and technology to developing countries, liberalize trade in environmentally enhancing products, have all major emitters accept the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least half by 2050, pledge that all will act to control their carbon, and point to ways in which they will do so in the short and medium term. As a result, the United States, China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa will, at long last and just in time, move toward accepting binding commitments to reduce carbon under a now genuinely global and prospectively effective climate change control regime.

On the economy, amidst a housing crisis, credit contraction, slowing growth, rising inflation and soaring energy and food prices, G8 leaders will, for the first time in a decade, seriously address core economic and financial concerns. They will set new directions for improving financial supervision and regulation, for managing sovereign wealth funds, and for reducing subsidies, price and investment controls, and secrecy in energy markets. They will also offer political, if not practical support for shared and secured innovation and open investment and trade. However, their action exchange rate and macroeconomic policy will again disappoint.

On development, especially in Africa, G8 leaders will move forward on health, water, education, and development assistance. They will produce innovative medium-term approaches to food security. They will further enhance infrastructure, reduce corruption and build peace support capabilities in Africa and around the world.

On their pressing political-security agenda G8 leaders will pledge more for defence, development and democracy in Afghanistan to win their war against terrorism there. They will support sanctions and incentives to stop nuclear proliferation in Iran and offer incentives to do so in North Korea. They will stand up for democracy, the rule of law and human security in Zimbabwe, Myanmar, Sudan, and the Middle East.

On strengthening the G8's own architecture for global governance, its leaders will create mechanism to monitor more credibly, and thus help deliver more effectively, their compliance with their many ambitious summit commitments, especially those on health, that come do in 2010. They will convert their ministerial-level Gleneagles Dialogue on energy and environment into a Toyako Dialogue to develop a low carbon society, receive an interim report on the Heiligendam Process and thus take the next incremental step toward including those outreach partners who show they are ready to accept the demanding responsibilities of being part of the G8 club.

These advances are driven by a Japan that is deeply committed to the G8 and is the only member always to have hosted successful summits. These include Japan's first in 1979 with its historic achievements on climate change and energy and Japan's most recent in 2000 with its innovations on development and almost complete delivery of the many promises made. For 2008 further momentum comes, in the lead-up to Toyako, from a preparatory process featuring strong continuity with the priorities of recent summits, substantial compliance with the commitments made last year, intense bilateral summitry among the G8 members and their outreach five (O5) partners, an unprecedented sequence of G8 ministerial and broader meetings, and a full set of negotiating sessions by the personal representatives of the leaders.

A push toward high performance flows from several forces. The first is the shock from oil prices reaching historic highs, from cyclones and floods that show the costs of uncontrolled climate change, and from bank bankruptcies hurting G8 citizens already suffering from soaring food and gas prices, falling home and stock prices, and slowing wages and jobs. A second force is the internally equalizing and globally predominant capability among G8 members, thanks to an economically slowing U.S. with its dropping dollar, a rising Japan and Russia and an expanding European Union (EU). A third force is the common commitment of the G8 countries and almost all their 16 invited participating country leaders to the G8's core values of open democracy, individual liberty and social advance, as applied energy security, African development, Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Myanmar, the Middle East, North Korea, and Iran.

However several substantial obstacles stand in the way of a strong summit success, brought by big breakthroughs codified in quantitative targets and timetables on climate change. There are no severe security, energy supply, national financial or health shocks to

show G8 leaders their countries' immediate vulnerability to global threats outside and propel them into the high performance of past summits such as Japan's first in 1979. Moreover the UN system has already made efforts to respond to financing clean technology investment, the global food crisis, and nuclear proliferation in Iran if not Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Sudan. The UN also offers an alluring Kyoto Protocol precedent an alternative process and a 2009 deadline to tempt some G8 and O5 powers to delay acting on climate change at the Toyako summit in the self-interested hope of getting themselves a better deal elsewhere. Moreover, many of the most powerful G8 members, including host Japan, are sending to the summit leaders who do not firmly control their parties or legislatures, who are deeply unpopular with their voters, and who will not be in office long enough personally to deliver the promises they make. There is a particularly strong temptation to delay doing any big deal on climate change, health, development and trade until 2009, when a new American president and Congress will arrive to fulfill the hope that they will accept and deliver the G8 partners most audacious demands. Finally, with eight invited African leaders participating in the summit's first day, and the world's eight other major emitters and emerging economies on the third, there is only one day in the middle for the G8 leaders to be alone to mobilize their collective political will and responsibility to lead the world.

They will only do so if their invited partners join all G8 colleagues in this task. This will require America's George Bush and China's Hu Jintao above all to show that they are true statesmen, by making the adjustments needed to produce the badly needed big global deal on climate change. With America, its Congress and Bush himself already moving in this direction, and Brazil and Indonesia following suit, the world will be watching Hu Jintao, to see if his ecologically vulnerable country will assume a global responsibility commensurate with its global rise.

## **The Preparatory Process**

The preparatory process for the summit shows several promising signs for eventual success, with the leaders themselves about to meet.

### ***Japan's Approach to G8 Summitry***

The first promising push comes from the summits long past. Host Japan is the G8's most committed member (Dobson 2007, 2004, Kirton 2004a). It brings to its 2008 summit a proud and proven record of performance, as Appendix A shows. Japan is an experienced host, having mounted four previous summits, in 1979, 1986, 1993 and 2000. It has always hosted successful summits, according to Nicholas Bayne's (2005) grades. It stands out as the only G8 member to have done do. The scores produced by John Kirton for the six dimensions of summit performance support this view. In particular, Japan's first summit in 1979 produced the historic consensus, fully implemented for the following five years, on the need to stabilize concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at 1979 levels right away (Kirton and Guebert 2008). No other international institution or meeting before or after has ever done as much to control climate change.

Japan's performance at the last summit it hosted, at Okinawa in 2000, offers further promise (Kirton and von Furstenberg 2001, Kirton and Takase 2002). At this first summit of the 20th century G8 leaders looked back on the failures of global governance in the previous century defined by depression and war. They reflected on the performance of their own G8 born in 1975 and discussed how it should be strengthened to meet the needs of the international community in the globalized world ahead. Okinawa stood out for its broad and innovative agenda, its many achievements, its production of the G8's highest ever compliance with its commitments in the G8's 33 years and its innocation outreach to other countries and civil society. Japan delivered this strong success despite suffering from its "lost decade" of development during the 1990s, from changing its host prime minister suddenly (from an internationally-oriented Keizo Obuchi to a domestically-oriented Yoshiro Mori) during the lead-up year, from having a lame-duck U.S. president, Bill Clinton, at the end of his eight years in office, and from welcoming a brand new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, to the summit for the first time.

### ***The Recent Momentum***

A second promising push is the rising summit performance over the seven years since Okinawa. Across most dimensions of performance, notably the number of commitments produced, the G8's record has risen to robust levels during this time. It has shown remarkable resilience, recovering rapidly from the dips in 2003 (due to the Iraq war) and in 2006 (when Russia hosted for the first time).

Also promising is the more proximate push coming from compliance by G8 members with their 23 priority commitments from last year's summit. As they reached the halfway mark between the 2007 and 2008 summit and as Japan settled into the chair, G8 members' compliance had reached only +33 (on a scale where +100 is high or full compliance, 0 is partial compliance or a work in progress, and -100 is no or minimal compliance) (Erdman and Vanderlinden 2008). This was the lowest score since Kananaskis in 2002 (+27), well below Evian in 2003 (+43) and Sea Island in 2004 (+39), but about the same as St. Petersburg in 2006 (+35). However on the eve of the 2008 summit, overall compliance had risen to +52. This was the above the summit's post-1996 average of +49% and the fifth highest score in the past decade, having been surpassed by the +78 for Okinawa in 2000, the +65 for Gleneagles in 2005, the +54 for Sea Island in 2004 and the +53 for Genoa in 2001. Heiligendamm secured complete compliance in the two areas critical for Toyako – climate change and outreach (measured by the Heiligendamm Process of a structured, official-level dialogue among the G8 and O5).

### ***The Global Agenda and Japanese Host's Plans for 2008***

The third promising push towards high performance comes from the close fit between current global challenges and those that had G8 confronted and conquered in its early years. This gave Toyako's G8 governments some familiarity with these issues and an institutional memory about how to solve them, and endowed its leaders with an incentive

to live up to the high standards of leadership in global governance their predecessors and often domestic political rivals had set.<sup>1</sup>

At the Toyako summit G8 leaders face challenges all too reminiscent of those that inspired the G8's birth in 1975. In energy, world prices for oil, again driven in part by conflict in the Middle East, have surpassed in real terms the previous peaks from the oil crises of 1973 and 1979, placing a new premium on energy conservation, efficiency, alternatives, renewables and climate change control. In the political-security sphere, nuclear proliferation, now in Iran, Syria, North Korea and elsewhere, again commands centre stage, as it did in the wake of India's nuclear explosion in 1974. In the broader Middle East, war is again taking lives on Israel's borders, and now within Iraq and especially in Afghanistan, as terrorists still kill at will. Here as elsewhere democracy itself is endangered in fragile states, while other closed countries such as Myanmar, Zimbabwe and Iran await its return or arrival for the first time. It is a compelling call for action from a G8 whose foundational mission is to protect and promote open democracy, individual liberty and social advance worldwide. In finance a made-in-America, globally contagious financial crisis is driving major American banks, if not New York City, toward bankruptcy, afflicting credit and currency markets, affecting global growth and inflation, and assaulting an international financial system still centred on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 1944 and now struggling to cope with today's globalized world. In development newly interconnected global financial, energy, food and ecological crises compound the challenge of bringing the benefits of globalization to Africa, the one region of the world that has largely been left out.

At the Toyako Summit the G8 will confront these challenges head on, based on a plan the Japanese had prepared well over a year before they assumed the chair. It included the four multi-year commitments to be met in 2008 and the five remit mandates from 2007 that Japan had allowed into earlier G8 communiqués (see Appendix C). In keeping with Japan's highly strategic approach to G8 summitry, reaching several years back before it hosts (Dobson 2005), Japan from a very early stage had decided to focus on climate change. By the spring of 2007, African development had been added as a key theme. Intellectual property and nuclear safety rounded out the priority list by October 2007 (Guebert 2007).

The key theme, initially signaled by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in March 2007 and continued by his successor, Yasuo Fukuda after the latter replaced him in September 2007, was the environment, with climate change at its core. Here Japan sought ambitious results, in the form of G8 discussions on a "new framework that will ensure participation by the United States and China, the world's largest greenhouse-gas emitters."<sup>2</sup> The summit would also receive the report, mandated at Gleneagles in 2005, on how to carry

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<sup>1</sup> If 1979 is the dominant referent, this means that Japan's Fukuda will wish to surpass China and America's Bush Democrat Jimmy Carter, Germany's Merkel Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt, Britain's Brown Conservative Margaret Thatcher (also at her first summit), France's Sarkozy fellow conservative Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, and Canada's Harper Progressive Conservative Joe Clark, above all on climate change and energy.

<sup>2</sup> Agence France Presse (2007). "Japan Aims to Lead Post-Kyoto Climate Change Fight," March 20.

forward the sustainable energy dialogue and the interim report on the Heiligendamm Process, as specified in 2007 (see Appendix C).

The second priority, African development, was first publicly signaled even earlier, on November 18, 2006. Then a senior official from Germany announced that its 2007 summit would not focus on debt relief and increased aid to Africa because the 2005 report of the Commission for Africa (CFA) left the issue to be taken up again by the Japanese G8 presidency in 2008. Following an April 2007 meeting in Tokyo between Italy's then prime minister Romano Prodi and Abe, the latter stated: "as both our countries will be chairing these summits, co-operation is essential. The issues to be taken up at the G8 summit meeting are long-term issues." Prodi added: "it is necessary to build a joint policy towards Africa ... Africa is developing economically amid globalization. We have up until now discussed major environmental and human disasters in Africa at our G8 meetings."<sup>3</sup> Also in 2008 Japan planned to hold the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD-IV), a gathering of African leaders and their development partners starting in 1993 that had taken place every five years.

The third initial priority of intellectual property flowed from Japan's 2007 summit success in securing recognition of the need to streamline and harmonize the international patent system, and its failure to get its desired agreement on a treaty to prevent the spread of counterfeit and pirated products. Japan sought to build on the 2007 leaders' statement that "We recognize the need for continued study by national experts of the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to intellectual property rights enforcement."<sup>4</sup> Japan hoped to move to the treaty stage at its summit in 2008.

Japan's fourth initial priority of nuclear safety appeared in May 2007. A news report noted that "Japan plans to discuss compiling international safety guidelines for nuclear power plants with other members of the G8 nations, with an eye to reaching agreement at next year's G8 summit in Hokkaido, government sources said ... The guidelines are expected to include assistance from the G8 nations on techniques for safety inspections and maintenance, as well as stipulating training for local staff and unified regulations on management in order to prevent the transfer or leakage of technologies or nuclear-related materials."<sup>5</sup> This item would repeat the one area of nuclear power that an otherwise divided G8 could agree on in 2006 and 2007. It also responded directly to the deadly nuclear accidents that Japan had suffered from at home (Donnelly 2001). The most recent shock came from a deadly earthquake that had struck Japan in July 2007, damaged a nuclear power plant and produced radiation leaks.

Well before Japan assumed the chair at the start of 2008, these contenders crystallized into three summit priorities: the world economy, climate change and environment, and development and Africa. Japan subsequently added nuclear non-proliferation as the centrepiece subject in the political-security sphere.

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<sup>3</sup> Agence France Presse (2007). "Italy, Japan Say G8 to Focus on Africa, Warming," April 16.

<sup>4</sup> Eiji Hirose (2007). "G8 Eyes More Flexible Yuan," *Daily Yomiuri*, June 9.

<sup>5</sup> Kyodo News (2007), "Japan Wants to Discuss Nuclear Plant Safety Guidelines at G8," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, May 20.

These choices reflected a judicious combination of iteration and innovation. The world economy returns G8 leaders' attention to the topic that had dominated the early years of the summit, long before Russia joined in 1998. But economic and financial issues had been delegated to G7 and G20 finance ministers during the past decade, including at the 2007 summit when the current global financial crisis was starting to erupt (Kirton 2007). Climate change and African development continue to be the G8 leaders' focus, as they were at Gleneagles in 2005, Heiligendamm in 2007 and, in the form of energy and health, at St. Petersburg in 2006. Nuclear non-proliferation, a classic political-security subject, made it into the summit host's planned top tier in 2008 for the first time. In addition, Japan highlighted North Korea (including nuclear proliferation and abductions) and other Asian issues, which the G8 summit had dealt with before.

Japan was very cautious on G8 expansion. It has an ongoing dispute with Russia over the occupied Northern Territories, and was disappointed with Russia as a G8 member. Japan was reluctant to give a non-democratic neighbouring China a greater place in Japan's G8, while China continued to keep Japan out of a permanent place in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

When Fukuda replaced Abe as prime minister in September 2007, little changed, much like the Obuchi to Mori transition for Okinawa. Japan's agenda was publicly announced by Fukuda (2008) at the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 28, 2008. As summarized in Appendix D, it was a wide-ranging, internally interlinked and ambitious agenda that added surging oil prices, terrorism, keeping existing G8 commitments and multi-stakeholder participation to the earlier list. It was also an unusually specific agenda, accompanied by details about the proposals, goals and initiatives Japan would propose and unilaterally take. It clearly steered Toyoko toward using the G8 once again as a great global fundraiser, by identifying several new funding packages, led by a British-initiated, U.S. and Japanese-backed \$10 billion Climate Investment Fund (CIF), that it would launch and ask its G8 and outreach partners (including Australia) to help fund. This agenda proved to be prescient as new global crises came. It served as a stable platform for preparing the summit in the months ahead (see Appendix E). It included boosting agricultural productivity, which became a Toyoko priority and a favoured medium-term response when the global food crisis arose in April.

### ***The Sherpa Preparatory Process***

The fourth, less promising push was the set of sherpa meetings the Japanese planned to prepare the summit (see Appendix F). The first took place very early, in Tokyo on January 10. Others took place in February and April. The sequence included a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Sous Sherpas (FASS) on May 8-9, a special FASS meeting in Paris in early June and an overlapping gathering of the sherpas and the FASS at the summit site on June 23-25.

The sherpas were led by Japanese G8 sherpa veteran Masaharu Kohno. But several other countries sent newcomers. Canada's newly appointed (if G8 experienced) Len Edwards

went to his first sherpa meeting in April. In mid-May Russia's Dmitri Medvedev announced that Arkady Dvorkovich would replace Putin's Igor Shuvalov, now deputy prime minister in the latter's cabinet, as G8 sherpa. The new Berlusconi government took time to put its sherpa in place.

As of mid-May, some European G8 members felt Japan's preparatory process was about two months behind the pace of recent years. They thought that each sherpa meeting had gone over the same issues, including those of outreach and expansion, where the G8 was badly divided. Some were surprised that the Japanese had not followed the German example and called a special sherpa meeting at an earlier stage.

### ***The G8 Ministerial Meetings***

A fifth promising push was the unusually dense series of lead-up ministerial meetings the Japanese planned, as they had in the past (see Appendix F). A draft of the Japanese schedule, unveiled at Heiligendamm on June 6, 2007, contained ministerial meetings on justice and the interior, labour and development, as well as energy and the environment and a meeting of the Gleneagles Dialogue among 20 countries devoted to global warming and clean energy.

This unusually dense web unfolded in the spring of 2008 through G8 meetings of ministers: for finance on February 9 in Tokyo, April 11 in Washington DC and June 13-14 in Osaka; for development on April 5-6 in Tokyo; for labour on May 11-13 in Niigata; for environment on May 24-26 in Kobe; for justice and home affairs on June 11-13 in Tokyo; for energy on June 7-8 in Amori; for science and technology on June 15 in Okinawa; and for foreign affairs on June 26-27 in Kyoto, just before the summit's start. There was also a meeting of G20 environment and energy ministers of the Gleneagles Dialogue on March 14-16 in Chiba, and, innovatively, the fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV) on May 28-30 in Yokohama. Notably absent, given the evolving agenda, was a meeting for G8 ministers of health, as in 2006, of agriculture and of defence.

At the senior official level, the Heiligendamm Process, a structured dialogue of the G8 and O5 members on investment, innovation, development and energy got off to an initially slow but subsequently encouraging start (Kirton 2008). It was due to produce to G8 leaders and the public at the summit its scheduled interim report, in a document of reasonable length.

### ***The Lead-Up Summitry***

The sixth promising sign was the configuration of lead up bilateral visits among G8 leaders (see Appendix G). Despite his domestic constraints Fukuda took a full scale pre-summit tour of his partners, meeting virtually all his G8 colleagues in the half year before the summit was held. He led off with America's Bush, followed with the visiting EU Commission president and French prime minister, then Russia's leaders and China's Hu



Jintao. He followed with a tour of European capitals in late spring. Left out were Canada's Harper, which owed Japan a bilateral visit that would be given as part of Harper's summit trip just before the summit on July 6 and again just after, on July 10. The sociogram of bilateral lead-up summitry showed that G8 leaders would largely be familiar with one another when they all met together for the first time at Toyako, at the peak of a summit system designed above all to let real leaders lead.

## **The Propellers of Performance**

As they approached the final stages of their journey up to the Toyako mountaintop with the slope getting ever steeper, but all still holding hands so that none would fall to their death, G8 leaders were pulled toward success by some of the powerful forces from the outside world that had reliably produced high G8 summit performance in the past (Kirton 2004a).<sup>6</sup>

### ***Shock-Activated Equalizing Vulnerability***

The first force, pushing for substantial summit success, was the increasing, interconnected, equalizing vulnerability of G8 members to physical assaults from abroad, a vulnerability becoming ever more activated and apparent by severe shocks. These shocks sprung up in energy prices, ecology, food and finance. They spread simultaneously in a complex, closely interconnected cluster among the four.<sup>7</sup>

In the first and most potent field of security, there were few of the classic old and new shocks of defeat in war, nuclear explosions, terrorist attacks and civil strife to show G8 leaders their countries vulnerabilities and inspire them to co-operate. While all produced attrition events, none generated a single, galvanizing outbreak shock or the sort that the July 7 London subway bombings had in 2005. In Iraq, America and Britain's divisive war was going relatively well, with a surge in U.S. troops that threatened to become permanent — at least until the U.S. presidential and Congressional elections were held five short months hence. In Afghanistan, where all G8 members were at war together against terrorism in its epicentre, the poppies, police and porous border with Pakistan remained serious problems, especially with the approach of summer when Taliban offensives traditionally took place. Here small shocks came from the surprising Taliban jailbreak in Kandahar and the rising allied death toll, led by the 50 American troops killed in the first five months of 2008 — about double the year before. The British and Canadians saw their own body counts rise too. In the Middle East, Hezbollah, considered by many G8 members to be a terrorist organization, threatened to overthrow the western-

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<sup>6</sup> I am indebted to Japanese Sherpa Masahru Kohno for providing on July 3, 2008 this highly evocative and appropriate metaphor, replacing Putnam and Bayne's 'Hanging Together' from all-American Benjamin Franklin and applied with then summit was in a dark defensive mode, rather than proactively soaring to sunny peaks.

<sup>7</sup> The impact of these vulnerabilities and shocks, both individually and interconnected, as they drive summit performance can be traced in part by identifying explicit references to them in the summit communiqués.

backed government in Lebanon, if in ways far less dramatic than the conflict in that country at the time of the G8 summit in 2006.

There were also no shocks from nuclear proliferation similar to the galvanizing explosions in 1974 and 1998. Indeed, North Korea's explosion of the cooling tower at its nuclear weapons site on June 26th suggested that non-proliferation might finally be proceeding there. On September 6, 2007, Israel had destroyed a suspected Syrian nuclear weapons site in a decisive strike. And while Iran remained unyielding, it took no major steps toward becoming a nuclear state, even as the UN prepared to impose further sanctions to make it stop. Indeed, on the eve of the summit, it said it would talk to the Europeans about the offer they had made. Further afield India sought with America's help to return to the nuclear control club and Mohaman Singh seemed to have the domestic political strength to accept the U.S.-Indian nuclear deal.

Terrorist attacks were largely absent from all G8 countries and almost no G8 citizens died from it abroad. Only in June did terrorist again strike Russia's Chechnya, killing six. The terrorists had retreated to more distant places such as Algeria, and returned to the local level of civil strife. It was a far cry from the Al Qaeda-directed terrorism of global reach that had first attacked America and killed its citizens at the World Trade Centre in New York City in 1993. Civil strike more broadly was also subdued within the G8. But rising oil prices sparked labour unrest, strikes and stoppages in Europe and Japan.

The second, highly potent field of energy did feature a real shock, which Britain's Gordon Brown labeled the third energy crisis following those in 1973 and 1979. Steadily soaring energy prices doubled since the last summit to reached historic closing highs of US\$145.20 a barrel for month forward West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude on the NYMEX on June 27, just before the summit's start.<sup>8</sup> As in 1979 this spike led to pocketbook pain at the pump and peaceful political protests in some G8 countries, and most of the O5. It also directly fuelled a food, inflation and stagflation crisis or concern in O5, African and other developing countries, and prospectively within the G8 too. But despite disruptions caused by violent civil strife in Nigeria, price controls in China, and lack of money for imported fuel in the Marshall Islands, there was no state controlled supply shock targeted against the G8, as there had been in 1973 or 1979. Indeed, at a special consumer-produced summit in June, Saudi Arabia – the enemy of 1973 and 1979 - increased its oil production and promised it would further meet whatever global demand arose. The failure of this promise to move markets suggested that for the first time, the world faced a permanent demand-driven shock, and one that only climate friendly measures for conservation, efficiency, alternatives and renewables could meet.

In the third field of ecology, a sequence of shocks arose in the form of deadly water waves. They arrived first in Asia, two months before the summit's start. Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar on May 2-3, leaving more than 133,000 dead or missing, and endangering up to 2.5 million people due to a regime that refused to let aid in to protect its own citizens lives. The cyclone served as a second shock, especially for those in Asia, of the deadly Asian tsunami of December 2004. Severe flooding in China, which took

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<sup>8</sup> The historic intraday high, also on that day, was \$U.S. 145.85.

more lives, followed soon after Myanmar's cyclone. In America deadly floods moved from the Midwest down the Mississippi toward New Orleans, where Hurricane Katrina had recently arrived from the warming waters of the Gulf of Mexico to submerge the city. Deadly earthquakes in China and then in Japan helped show several summit participants, including Indonesia, the frequency, speed and severity of extreme weather and geophysical events and the impact of sea-level rise that would be caused by climate change. It made it more difficult to dismiss them as natural disasters that could not be controlled, rather than deal with them as human-created ones that could be mitigated or at least adapted to.

The fourth field of finance also produced a third shock, in the form of an internationally contagious financial crisis starting in New York City as in 1975.<sup>9</sup> In contrast to the most recent Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997-99, the sub-prime credit crisis that started in the summer of 2007 started in the most powerful G8 member, America, spread to other G8 countries and then to the rest of the world. This crisis was punctuated by the shock of bank failures (as distinct from the hedge fund collapse of LTCM in America in September 1998) — in America (Bear Stearns), Britain (Northern Rock) and Germany. It came in America with a classic run on the bank, but this time from fellow bankers who refused to lend, asked for the return of their money and forced central bankers to take unprecedented steps to bail them out and serves as an ongoing lender of last resort.. However as the summit approached, this financial crisis had only caused or threatened the bankruptcy of only banks, rather than of major cities as in 1975 or entire countries as in 1997-1999. But it did produce a bear market in stocks in all G8 countries but Canada and all O5 ones but Brazil.<sup>10</sup>

In the fifth field of food there was also a shock. It initially hit hardest in developing Africa, Asia and the Americas, as it had so often before. But it now for the first time erupted simultaneously around the world. It led to rampant inflation and political unrest in the G8's O5 partner of China. It threatened to bring the dreaded stagflation of the 1970s back to the G7 itself, as sharply slowing growth everywhere came with increasing inflation in the U.S., Europe and Britain. But within the G8 it remained primarily a price rather than a supply shock. It was not one awakening 1970's like memories of wartime food shortages in Germany and Japan.

While most of these shocks remained somewhat small and unfolded outside the G8, their tight interconnections were well designed to evoke a governance response from a G8 designed to have its leaders deal with all of the world's problems all at once in a

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<sup>9</sup> In 1975 the threatened imminent bankruptcy of New York City led it to ask the U.S. government for a bailout. These requests were refused until President Gerald Ford went to the first summit in Rambouillet, France, in November, where his fellow leaders told him that New York's bankruptcy would spark a global dollar crisis. Ford then adjusted America to the preferences of the G8 partners and gave New York the requested U.S. government financial support. This new vulnerability followed the American-initiated, state-created, -controlled and -targeted old vulnerability and shock in finance of August 15, 1971. The most direct comparison is with the collapse of Britain's Baring's Bank in the spring of 1995, a precursor of the death of America's Bear Stearns and Britain's Northern Rock in the spring of 2008.

<sup>10</sup> The classic G8 stock market crash is that of October 1987, coming in the early lead up to the Toronto Summit in June 1988.

comprehensive, coherent way. The food crisis was fostered by ecological vulnerabilities such as drought in Australia, and the switch from food to clean corn-fed biofuels that soaring energy prices spurred. The ecological shock in Myanmar wiped out an area that produced 65% of the rice in a country that was long the rice bowl of the world but now became an importer and thus a consumer of food security for the first time. It also threatened to bring a health crisis. Two weeks after the strike, the needed relief had not arrived to assist Myanmar's poor and overwhelmed public healthcare system cope with the typhoid, dysentery, diarrhea, cholera and measles epidemics were breaking out.

The Myanmar cyclone also catalyzed a causal sequence that activated some of the other reliable causes of high G8 performance in the past (Kirton 2004a). It showed the failure of the established multilateral organizations to deal with this ecological shock-activated new vulnerability. For the major relief agencies — the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) — remained wedded to their old article 2(7) principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, rather than giving precedence to the newer principles of human security or the responsibility to protect that had been proclaimed by all the leaders of UN member states at their recent world summit in September 2005. The UN agencies were thus unable to get their badly needed personnel and relief supplies into the country over the opposition of its suspicious, recalcitrant, repressive military regime.

The crisis also triggered the equalizing specialized capability of the G8, O5 and other participants invited to the Toyako Summit. The most powerful U.S., France and Britain contemplated unilateral actions, by air dropping relief supplies into Myanmar without the host state's permission. But with Myanmar's military likely to use force in response, they chose not to use their already strained military capabilities in this way. Meanwhile, supplies from Myanmar's often poor Asian neighbours such as tsunami-recovering Indonesia, Thailand, China and Japan arrived more rapidly. Indeed, G8 host Japan, the world's second strongest power, was a highly geologically and geographically vulnerable country regularly attacked by typhoons and earthquakes. It was thus in the lead in cyclone monitoring, warning and relief capabilities. These nearby Asian capabilities were allowed into an earthquake overwhelmed China, while those of more distant G8 powers were kept out.

The cyclone further evoked the common democratic purpose of G8 members. The refusal of Myanmar's military junta to allow international relief personnel into the country, coming in the wake of its recent crackdown on its Buddhist monks, defied the values of openness, democracy and human rights that stood at the core of the G8's mission and its citizen's convictions. The assault was compounded by the junta's diversion of relief supplies and dismissal of relief survivors' demands, in order to support a constitutional referendum that it refused to postpone, a referendum designed to cement and legitimize the military's rule. In Myanmar crackdown on Buddhist monks, relief refusal and aid diversion produced three successive shocks in one year to assault the core common principles the G8 held dear.

The cyclone also mobilized global public attention and action for Asia, poverty and disease reduction and, potentially, demands to control climate change and the extreme weather events it bred. Across the globe publics were aroused, supported their government's relief efforts and gave directly themselves to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), all on a scale comparable to the Asian tsunami (when corrected for the number of countries hit, victims, and citizens from G8 and outside countries who had visited and vacationed there).

The Myanmar cyclone further rendered more appropriate the expanded participation at the summit, still done in a constricted, continuous, controlled way. The summit was held in Asia in nearby Japan, with the Asian O5 members of China and India attending for the fifth time in six years and the fourth time in a row. Japan's additional invited participants — South Korea, Australia and Indonesia — were all from Asia and had a habit of working together at the summit level in forums such as Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and Association of South East Asian Nations Plus Three (ASEAN+3). The participation of tsunami-recovering Indonesia in particular would help Cyclone Nargis get greater attention and action when the summit came.

This second Asian tsunami shock within a three-year interval connected directly with the summit's priority agenda of climate, poverty reduction, health and water, and food. It and the Chinese earthquake pushed the G8 to add natural disaster relief to its agenda in an enhanced way, as part of the G8's climate change discussion and as an item in its own right. This was an issue not in the initial Japanese and G8 plan for 2008 but one that the summit had recently dealt with at Gleneagles in 2005 and St. Petersburg in 2006. Together with the food agenda it showed the fast flexibility of the G8 in responding to shocks, especially those the new vulnerability bred.

### ***Multilateral Organizational Failure***

The second force, both pulling forth and inhibiting substantial summit success, was the performance of the established multilateral organizations most relevant to the rising vulnerabilities, recent shocks and the priority agenda of the summit itself. The UN system failed to prevent or respond effectively to the shocks that arose in energy, ecology and finance. It did initially appear more responsive than it had in the past in nuclear proliferation, food relief, and democratization in Zimbabwe, but quickly came to disappoint yet again. And in the critical field of climate change, the UN's alternative of a north-south ministerial level negotiation at Copenhagen at the end of 2009 threatened to erode G8 action in 2008, even if UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon pleaded for G8 help just before the summit's start.

In the energy field, the multilateral system offered only a very partial International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), World Bank (dealing with energy poverty) and Atlantic-centric, plurilateral International Energy Agency (IEA). Much like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), these bodies functioned more as a G7 secretariat or platform (with Russia still excluded) than a global governance forum on their own. Nor did the multilateral system contain any established body to deal with the

fast emerging renewable, alternative and efficient energy fields. No new or extended institutions or action of any consequence came even as oil prices double to historic highs within a year.

In the closely related climate field, the fragmented, fragile architecture from the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (UNCSD), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) showed few signs of growing coherence or capability. The UNFCCC continued to focus on emissions sources, with little coordination with a CBD that had expertise in sinks. The UNFCCC's Conference of the Parties (COP) in December 2007 at Bali added nothing essential to the Heiligendamm framework on long- or medium-term targets to help define a fast-approaching "beyond Kyoto" regime. Its belated recognition of the role of avoided deforestation did not propel it to a broader inclusion of the sinks that the G7 had agreed were equally important at the summit George H. Bush had hosted in Houston, Texas, in 1990.<sup>11</sup> Nor did its two follow on meetings in 2008 advance the likelihood of agreement in Poland at the end of 2008 or Copenhagen at the end of 2009. They and the energetic, G8-centric new plurilateral institutions — the American-pioneered Major Emitters Meeting (MEM) of 16 countries, the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP 7) of now seven countries (with the recent additional of Canada), the ministerial Gleneagles Dialogue and the Heiligendamm Process energy efficiency group — needed the G8 summit if their work was to culminate in the intended way.

The multilateral system was similarly missing in action in coping with the global growth and financial crisis, where its oldest and most powerful body, the IMF, had long claimed centre stage. Thanks to a deal brokered in the finance G20 in November 2007, the IMF had made its first stage of reforms on "voice and vote." But despite the controversy over Paul Wolfowitz, the IMF and World Bank appointments of their new executive heads still preserved the ancient backroom brokered deal duopoly for the Europeans and Americans, freezing out the rest of the world. While the IMF was assigned a little of the analytic work required to cope with the new financial crisis, on key issues such as creating a regime to regulate sovereign wealth funds, the U.S. preferred an ad hoc coalition of the willing composed of itself and a few small friends such as Kuwait and Singapore. Most critical aspects of the new financial crisis lay beyond the IMF's mandate, its diminished resources or its professional competence. Its new managing director's pleas for a Keynesian stimulus package to spur global growth and its gloomy forecasts for American and global growth were widely ignored and the latter soon proved incorrect.

Elsewhere across the agenda there were no signs the multilateral system could cope without the G8's help. This included the World Bank on African development, the FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the WFP on the food crisis, the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the badly overdue Doha Development

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<sup>11</sup> As measured by deforestation, the greatest contributions to greenhouse gases were the U.S., Brazil and Indonesia, rather than the standard emitters of China, the U.S. and Japan. There was thus a strong logic in having the O5 and additional Asian three at the summit to deal with climate change.

Agenda, the IAEA on nuclear proliferation in North Korea, Iran and Syria and the UNSC on Myanmar, Sudan, Afghanistan and securing its porous borders with Pakistan.

### ***Predominant Equalizing Capabilities***

The new vulnerabilities and shocks that overwhelmed the established multilateral organizations also increased the collective predominance and internal equality of the capabilities of the G8 and now O5 powers. Rising oil prices empowered the otherwise weakest G8 members of Russia and Canada, while hurting the overall most powerful of America and Japan. Among the O5 they helped smaller Brazil and Mexico while harming China and India. The finance crisis struck hardest in America, Britain and Germany, while Canada and especially Russia largely escaped. The credit crunch in particular called into question America's historic advantage, as the global reserve currency provider, of having the most liquid capital markets in the world. It put a premium on countries with large hard currency reserves in sovereign wealth funds and elsewhere, notably China, India, Russia and Japan. The food crisis similarly helped Canada and potentially Russia, if not directly harming a long agriculturally protectionist America, Europe and Japan.

The strong equalization of capability was faithfully reflected in and driven by the currency values governing the international worth of the G8 and O5 countries (Appendix J). During the year leading up to the summit the U.S. dollar plummeted, the Japanese yen and British pound remained stable, while the Euro, the Canadian dollar, and the Russian rouble soared. Even the still heavily controlled Chinese yuan appreciated, breaking historic barriers in the spring.

The equalization of overall capability was also apparent, if less comprehensively, in the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates among G8 and O5 members. U.S. GDP growth plummeted to an initially reported 0.6% in the first quarter of 2008. Japan, which had been growing at 2% for several years, was due to fall back to 1.5% for 2008. Britain and Europe similarly softened but were still stronger than the United States. Only tightly connected Canada plummeted below America, falling into slight negative growth for the first quarter of 2008. Outside the G7, there was still strong growth in Russia, China, India and a now robustly growing Brazil.

The G8's global collective predominance thus increasingly depended on its most recent member Russia if not an O5 that was being increasingly integrated into the G8 club (See Appendix J). And within both the G8 and the O5 capabilities were equalizing. A relatively retracting America increasingly recognized it needed the help its G8 and O5 associates could provide. Their capability configurations pushed them away from repeating the polarized rich North-poor South confrontation of old.

### ***Common Democratic Purposes***

These powerful pulls from outside were, however, offset by the weakness in those pushes from inside the summit system that had proven effective in propelling performance in the past. The first was the fragile fit between the summit's priority agenda and the values of open democracy and individual liberty that constituted the G8's foundational *raison d'être*, constitutional charter and ultimate shared social purpose (see Appendix K).

The G8's planned priorities did not directly connect well with these values. Transparency was only a small part of the world economy, financial stability and energy security agenda. Development focused on health, water and education more than on corruption and good governance. And climate change had little direct connection to open democracy in most respects. It was a sharp contrast to the 2004 summit with the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA) initiative at its core.

Fukuda in his Davos speech had set forth several principles to explain how Japan would approach its summit priorities. But the speech was largely devoid of direct references to democracy beyond a few civil society and multi-stakeholder participation ones. Openness appeared only in reference to reforming the Japanese economy. Transparency arose only in a technical reference to measuring the 'bottom up' approach to climate control. On development and Africa, infrastructure was highlighted but institutions, good governance, and anti-corruption were notably absent, in sharp contrast the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan's emphasis on them.

Such democratic guides did begin to appear as the G8 agenda took shape by May. But much would depend on what built-in and breaking political security issues the G8 leaders chose to focus on. On Kosovo, Tibet and Zimbabwe, the G8 was somewhat divided among itself and especially with its O5 partners. A discussion here was not destined to put a devotion to democracy in as a powerful performance-inducing force. But the G8 was more united on Myanmar and, above all, Afghanistan. Last year at Heiligendamm the G8 leaders' discussion had led to a rousing dialogue on demonstration of G8 solidarity on the need to fight to defend open democracy, individual liberty and social advance there. That demonstration of democratic cohesion could appear again at Toyako, for the G8 leaders themselves, and perhaps all the world to see.

A prospective outbreak of a common democratic purpose was heightened by the configuration of players at the summit. Russia would be sending a new president, who was thought by some to be more inherently devoted to open democracy and the rule of law than Putin had been. His presence would at least offer an opportunity to set aside the recent chill surrounding Putin for a while. Moreover, the three additional Asian participants that Japan added were all from democratic polities, meaning that there would be more and more diverse leaders to try to socialize a politically lonely Hu Jintao of China onto a more open democratic path.



### ***Political Control, Capital and Continuity***

The fifth force of leaders' political control, capital and continuity at home also largely acted against summit success. The leaders had an unusually low ability to escape and re-shape the constraints of their domestic polities so that they could flexibly come to fast, far-reaching consensus and collective action abroad (see Appendix L).

In host Japan, 71-year-old Fukuda had only recently assumed office, had no popular mandate of his own, and had been facing rumors that he would depart soon after the summit, or conceivably even face an election before. His Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) did not control the upper house of the Diet. Its candidate overwhelmingly lost a by-election in a previously safe seat in April. Fukuda's approval rating, which had stood at 60% when he assumed office in September 2007, had plunged to 25% by April 2008. It only began to use a bit when Fukuda embarked on his pre-summit G8 summit tour. But the summit designed by his predecessor Shinzo Abe still approached amidst severe political constraints at home.

Elsewhere things were seldom brighter for Fukuda's G8 colleagues. In the U.S. a lame duck president George Bush, who no longer controlled Congress, saw his popularity plunge from its historic high of 90% in the wake of 9/11 to the lowest ever recorded in the 70-year history of polling in the U.S.<sup>12</sup> New historic lows were also reached when Americans were asked if their country was going in the right direction. Bush's Republican party lost a previously safe congressional seat in Mississippi in a special election in the spring.

In Germany, Angela Merkel's approval rating also sagged, as members of her sister party and the Social Democrats in her grand coalition became restive well before the next general election in autumn 2009. The result was a Germany that was reluctant to make an early pledge to a new climate technology fund, to deliver its promised double ODA to Africa or to pledge more to combat infectious disease there. It also refused to remove its veto of any G8-wide endorsement of using nuclear to control climate change. With Germany still using coal but saying no to nuclear energy, it was more difficult for the G8 to persuade the U.S., China and India to do the opposite in the interest of climate change control.

In Britain, Gordon Brown's approval rating plummeted from his majority highs when he took over to new lows by April, in part because he had backed away from going to the polls to get a popular electoral mandate of his own. In early May his Labour party suffered a devastating loss in local elections, as he faced a general election in 2010. Just before the summit he suffered two by-election loses, with the one immediately before the summit reducing his party to fifth place.

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<sup>12</sup> This is an average of ten polls with survey dates beginning April 6, 2008 and ending April 30, 2008. It includes the following polling companies: Gallup, AP/Ipsos, ABC/Washington Post, Newsweek, USA Today/Gallup, Pew, NBC/Wall Street Journal, CBS/New York Times, Fox/Opinion Dynamics and CNN/Opinion Research. President Bush's approval rating for the same period, using the same dates and polling companies is 29%.

In France a similar popularity plunge deflated Nicolas Sarkozy. In Canada, Stephen Harper's minority government remained tied with the opposition in the polls, even as a sagging economy threatened to drag the government down. Only in Italy did Silvio Berlusconi come with a very fresh mandate and honeymoon popularity. So did Dmitry Medvedev, assuming the glow bequeathed by his predecessor and mentor, Vladimir Putin, who was still very much at his side.

The continuity of leaders at the summit and the familiarity with colleagues and the experience it bred were also unpromising. Fukuda, as chair, was attending and hosting the summit for the first time. Brown and Medvedev were also brand new. It was the second summit for Sarkozy, the third for Harper and the fourth for José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission. Bush was at his eighth and last.

The particular combination of ideology and experience these leaders brought also suggested low performance. The most experienced leader, Bush, with his conservative ideology, came from the most powerful member, but had low political capital and control. Most other weighty members were relatively new, ideologically mixed and domestically weak. Only in the weaker members did high political control, with mixed experience, come.

A more promising projection came from an alternative conception of the impact of political control, capital and continuity. Offered by Nicholas Bayne (2008), it argues that summit success comes when leaders are new, anxious to make their mark and determined to deliver abroad to compensate for their poor popularity at home. Toyako was thus blessed with a new generation of many fresh leaders, with Germany's Merkel, and Canada's Harper at only their third, France's Sarkozy at his second, and Britain's Brown, Italy's Berlusconi, Japan's Fukuda and Russia's Medvedev at their first (even though Berlusconi hosted two and attended many before). The low polls that many had would, by this logic, drive them to high ambition and achievement abroad, perhaps led even by a veteran Bush in his legacy year.

In Bush's case, it bears noting that the two previous summits with a two-term lame-duck U.S. president had a solid performance. Ronald Reagan's last summit at Toronto in 1988 performed poorly overall in the Bayne scores and in a quantitative count of results across the six dimensions of summit governance. But it made substantial advances on climate change and African development (especially debt relief for the poorest and South African apartheid). Bill Clinton's last summit at Okinawa in 2000, the last one Japan hosted, was very successful; it produced, inter alia, the highest compliance record of all time and made notable advances on African development. For 2008, Fukuda, despite his domestic weakness, was willing and able in the spring of 2008 to use his extraordinary powers against his reluctant upper house to have Japan's Self-Defence Forces (SDF) continue to support an America, Britain, Canada and France fighting to defend democracy and defeat terrorism in Afghanistan.

Also promising well for summit success was the strong public support across virtually all G8 and some O5 members for the summit's priority issues, especially the defining one of

climate change. In a long skeptical U.S., in 2007 37% of Americans identified environmental problems as a leading global threat, an increase of 61% from 2002 (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2007). Consistent with this shift, in mid April Bush declared the U.S. would commit to binding emissions targets by having its greenhouse gas emissions (GGEs) peak and decline by 2025. He also signed the first increase in auto efficiency standards since the 1980s and supported alternative fuels. In the year before the summit the environment had become the top issue that concerned Canadians, and remained in a strong third as the economy and gas prices overtook it on the summit eve. In the same 2007 survey 45% to 66% of west Europeans chose environmental issues as a top threat, as did 70% of Chinese and large numbers in India, Brazil and other developing countries.

Among the new leaders attending the summit, Australia's Kevin Rudd had just won his first election, in a landslide after campaigning to ratify the Kyoto protocol. South Korea's new president Lee Myung-bak had become prominent by greening Seoul as mayor from 2002 to 2006. On the eve of the summit he announced, as an energy and climate security measure, that government employees would drive an alternative days and that their air conditioning would be turned down.

Within the G8 family, there was, however, public wariness about member countries, especially where Russia and the U.S. were concerned. In regard to a Russia, a GlobeScan poll taken from October 31, 2007, to January 25, 2008, found G7 citizens judging Putin as a net negative influence on democracy and human rights in Russia (56%-26%), on peace and security in the world (47%-38%), on quality of life in Russia (44%-39%), and on Russia's reliability as an energy partner (41%-37%). But they did feel he had a net positive impact on Russia's overall relations with other countries (40%-45%) and on citizens Russia's overall role in the world (44%-30%). The most negative of the 31 countries' surveyed were the Germans (56%) and the Italians (53%), while the most positive were the Egyptians and (78%) and Chinese (69%). Views of the U.S. were no more flattering.

However, there was strong support for the G8 as an institution, notably in its most powerful member. Bush and virtually all of Congress, backed by a broad bipartisan coalition, prepared to commit \$50 billion in new funds from 2008-13 to combat infectious disease, including through the Global Fund that the G8 had created at Bush's first G8 summit in 2001. Those looking further into the long shadow of the future beyond November 2008 and Bush's legacy could take hope from the publicly declared G8 proposals of the presidential candidates seeking to succeed him. All had clear G8 institutional reform policies in their campaign platforms. Republican senator John McCain wished to remove the Russians from the G8. Democratic senator Hillary Clinton (2007) promised to use the G8 as a model to create an E8 summit, with an adjusted membership, dedicated to climate change (Clinton 2007). Democratic senator Barack Obama offered a new forum of the world's largest greenhouse gas emitters, composed of the existing G8 and O5, "to focus exclusively on global energy and environmental issues."<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> "White House Set to Go Slightly Green," *New Zealand Herald*, April 10, 2008.

### ***Constricted, Controlled, Continuous Participation***

The sixth factor of constricted, controlled, continuous participation constituted a drag on summit success. It was comprehensive, rather than constricted, reasonably controlled with considerable global balance, but brought several new countries whose leaders would not participate throughout (see Appendix M). It was a high risk strategy that combined all the right players for producing much on climate change and African development, but gave the outsiders a defacto veto over high G8 achievements, and both sides little time to do the deals needed to pull it off.

For the fourth straight year the G8 heads would meet the O5 leaders of China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South Africa. Also attending were the leaders of Australia, South Korea and Indonesia from democratic Asia, leaders from seven African democracies, and the heads of the multilateral organizations most relevant to the summit's agenda this year. It was one of the largest and most diverse gatherings of leaders in G8 history, rivaled only by the Evian summit in 2003.

The summit itself, at the selective, remote Windsor Hotel Toya Resort and Spa, allows maximum time for the leaders to be alone together, cut off from the world. Indeed, for the first time in many years, all G8 leaders would sleep, edit and work under a single roof, maximizing the time for personal contact and spontaneous encounters to arise. With the invited leaders housed half an hour away by helicopter or two hours by car along a sometimes windy, foggy, windy route, the G8 leaders should have maximum opportunity for spontaneous encounters and conversations among themselves. But they could also have to deal with the psychological dynamic from their outreach guests who could feel like second-class participants who are largely left out.

The summit site would showcase a range of Japan's environmental technologies. The media centre was in the Rusutsu Resort hotel in the village of Rusutsu, a 30-minute drive from the summit site. No plans for civil society consultation or involvement were in the public plan. Both the media and civil society were likely to feel excluded, and underreport the summit's results.

This large number came from a new combination that included leaders of countries that have never attended a G8 summit before. They would meet in changing combinations, depending on the issue under discussion, over the summits three days, with only the G8 leaders there throughout (See Appendix on Summit schedule). The African would come the first day, the G8 meet alone on the second, and the O5 and additional MEM-8 come for the third and final day.

The O5, Africans and Asians had no tradition of coming to a consensus at the end of a G8 summit, either among themselves or with the G8. But this was the fifth time for the O5 to come to the G8, and among Africans had too. Moreover, there was evidence that the O5 were complying well with the key commitments made at the G8 last year.

## **The Prospects for Performance**

Taken together, these six forces are likely to produce a summit of significant success, both overall and across most of its priority themes and tasks.

### ***Overall Priorities***

By mid May, there was much continuity between the predominant global challenges, Japan's longstanding agenda, and Abe and then Fukuda's publicly stated goals on the one hand, and the summit agenda and prospects for action as they evolved. The unanticipated breaking challenges not on the earlier agenda — the food crisis and the natural disasters in Myanmar and China — had already been easily absorbed. The initial concern with terrorism had faded from G8's attention and agenda at an equal rate.

### ***Climate Change and Environment***

The first priority theme of climate change and environment stood as the make-or-break issue by which the summit as a whole would be judged. Here the first task was to have all G8 members and their O5 partners accept the ominous scientific findings of the most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and subsequent reports, to recognize that climate change imperils both the global environment and world economy, and to agree that major measures on the part of all major emitters are urgently required right now. They then needed to define the essential framework of a beyond-Kyoto climate control regime — one that is effective, inclusive and based on binding targets accepted by all countries that count. To do so they had to conclude their hard bargaining on long-term and medium-term targets, timetables and baselines, and the contribution that Japan's bottom-up sectoral approach would make.

While the G8's European and Pacific powers had long been divided here, both sides showed flexibility. Moreover, the O5 powers, led by China, were also moving to help the summit arrive at a meaningful deal. Part of the solution lay in agreeing on technology development and transfer, forestry, sinks and biodiversity, funding for technology and adaptation, and linkages to the summit's work on development, Africa, food and health. Also relevant was the role of various negotiation fora, notably the UN process, the Gleneagles Dialogue due to end this year and the MEM-16, whose first summit was likely to constitute the concluding climate change session of the G8 summit this year.

### ***Development and Africa***

The third priority of development and Africa also builds on the G8's recent momentum and adds a new emphasis now. The framework for the summit's discussions will be the 2002 G8 Africa Action Plan at the summit. G8 leaders plan to hold an accountability session to review how well they have fulfilled their commitments made in 2002 and after, starting with their most high profile promise to double aid to Africa by 2010. They will review and support the progress Africa is making toward good governance at the national

and regional level. Another major focus will be how well the G8 and world is doing at the halfway point on meeting the MDGs. At Toyako pride of place goes to education and especially health, starting with HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, polio and the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and expanding to embrace health systems and the health workforce. Also prominent will be the response to the food crisis especially in its medium-term dimensions, and the tight links of development with climate change, biodiversity and trade.

### ***World Economy***

The G8's third priority theme of the world economy began with the dynamics of globalization, as they are currently and dramatically being felt in the areas of finance, energy, investment and food. Here the focus was on stimulating the world economy in response to the current slowdown, asking if more fiscal stimulus is appropriate, or if the recent reductions in interest rates and internationally co-ordinated injections of central bank liquidity had already generated too much present and future inflation in too many parts of the globe. A second concern was coping with the 21st-century style contagious credit crisis that started with the subprime mortgage problem in the U.S. but had caused a much wider array of credit markets to freeze around the world. Here G8 attention centred on the causes and transmission channels of the crisis, the role of mortgage lenders, commercial and investment banks, hedge and private equity funds, rating agencies and insurers, and what regulatory and supervisory measures should be taken, nationally or internationally, by whom and when.

Also prominent on the G8's economic agenda were trade, where the badly overdue Doha Development Agenda of multilateral trade liberalization was in big need of a boost. Equally important was investment protectionism, including the need for internationally harmonized rules for the ever wealthier and more internationally active sovereign wealth funds. Attention extended to innovation and intellectual property rights, to corruption, corporate social responsibility and natural resource management and to energy security. Here world oil prices spiking to new highs in May threaten to imperil global growth and the political fortunes of most G8 and O5 leaders back home.

### ***Political Security***

Beyond this already ambitious agenda is the summit's de facto priority of nuclear non-proliferation. This is a subject of particular importance for Japan as the only G8 member which has experienced first hand the horrors of a nuclear attack and which lives so close to a new, unpredictable nuclear power — a totalitarian North Korea that invaded South Korea in 1950, shot a missile over Japan more recently, and is evidently exporting nuclear material to other non-democracies such as Syria now. Also of concern is a nuclear committed and non-transparent Iran that supports insurgents and terrorists and a precarious nuclear-armed Pakistan that could still fall further into Al Qaeda and Taliban hands. A central challenge for G8 leaders is preventing these groups from moving easily from their sanctuaries in Pakistan to terrorize and kill innocent civilians and the soldiers

of many G8 members now fighting for freedom in Afghanistan. Also important are strengthening the successful G8's 2002 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in Russia and confronting the conflicts in Sudan, Haiti, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, Tibet and Myanmar.

### ***Outreach, Expansion and Reform***

Perhaps the greatest challenge for Toyako is the architecture of the G8 summit and system itself. Already a centre of global governance that many national governments, intergovernmental organizations and civil society want to part of, the G8 has responded at Toyako by inviting an unusually large number of participants to the summit, in ever changing combinations, through the summit's three days. But G8 members differ about how far, how fast and how the G8 should further integrate its now established O5 partners, or even make them full members of a new G13 as France's Sarkozy and Britain's Brown have publicly proposed or along with Egypt in a G14 that Sarkozy has now suggested. G8 leaders must also decide whether to extend the Gleneagles dialogue beyond 2008 and steer the Heiligendamm Process which will issue an interim report to the summit in 2008 and a final report in 2009. And for 2010, the G8 has during the past decade has made 23 ambitious commitments to be reached in eight areas, including reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The greatest drama and defining test of Toyako in 2008 will thus be whether it can move a reluctant America and the major ecological powers of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa towards accepting binding targets to control their climate changing activity in the years ahead.

### ***The Paris FASS Meeting***

Just before the last sherpa meeting took place on June 23, it was clear that progress was being made in the preparatory process but that it would take the leaders themselves to resolve the large impasses that remained on the central issues.

A FASS meeting in Paris, held on the margins of the OECD ministerial, had been added to the initial preparatory schedule because there was much to discuss. At the meeting were a mixture of veteran and rookie FASSs, with a strong Japanese chair who was engaged, steered the discussion towards conclusions and offered a fair summary. The meeting went well, with participants agreeing on what the issues were but not the details. With a very co-operative approach they challenged each other on details in a desire to get them right. They discussed the draft communiqués line by line late into night. There was a certain amount of understanding where certain countries had more difficult issues. These were handled respectfully. It was much the same at the political directors sessions.

### ***The Summit Documents***

After the special sherpa meeting in Paris on The G8 teams continued to negotiate and draft the documents to be issued in their leaders names. The Japanese continued to insist

very seriously on a tight, short, concise, focused summit document, without a rambling discussion of all the issues their ministers and officials had worked on. It would highlight climate change, development and economic growth internationally, with Africa being a major component. There would now also be a separate stand-alone document on terrorism, and probably another on food security as well. It was not clear how and when the main document would be released during the summit. One possibility was to release each section on a specific subject (such as environment, climate development, investment, the world economy, nonproliferation and peacekeeping) as conversation packages throughout the summit, to form one package at the end.

The separate counterterrorism document responded to the very strong desire of the Americans to give this issue prominence in the same way as at every other summit since 2001. The separate food document reflected the decision of the Japanese to respond to current situation, to make sure G8 showed leadership on that issue. There would also be a chair's summary that would comment on some of the regional issues

### ***Climate Change***

Climate change was still front and centre, and a continuing source of debate. It was the issue where there was the least consensus, above all on medium and long-term goals. The U.S. very much saw it as a priority in regard to long term and medium term process. But it saw the MEM process as more important. The U.S. wanted to have the G8 endorse an MEM process that would offer long term and medium term targets from all MEM members. The U.S. also sought a strong G8 statement on clean technology.

Members tried to reach consensus that was useful and directive without crossing anyone's red lines. Europe and Japan were very respectful of not prejudging the MEM before its forthcoming meeting in Korea that would be followed by the G8 sherpa meeting on June 23. While the issue was contentious, there was much mutual respect in the room and attempts from one side or the other to suggest where the targets belonged. There was a good conversation on how we might move forward.

### ***Biodiversity***

Biodiversity would be a component of the environment and climate change part of the text. The negotiations on that had not yet begun so there was no draft text.

### ***Development and Africa***

On development and Africa in general there would be a continuing focus by the G8 on the issue and the economic situation in Africa. There would be comments on corruption related to economic development. But there would be little new.



### ***Food Security***

On food security there would a strong and comprehensive statement looking at the short term, what could be done to improve productivity in agriculture, and food security and prices over medium- and long-term. The prospective stand-alone statement on food security was not discussed in any individual detail. But there was great concern about the international crisis.

There was a relative consensus on food security, as reflected in the statements the leaders had individually released. This consensus covered the short-term needs that needed to be addressed now and, as food prices were expected to be high for next decade, longer-term solutions for the G8 and the rest of the world. There could be a plan of action, especially if accountability could be assured. The G8 was thinking hard about how it should make commitments and how it would hold its members accountable for delivering them. The answer was not yet well formed.

### ***Biofuels***

Biofuels was a more contentious issue. The U.S. pushed for language on biofuel sustainability wanted it in the energy security portion of the statement, rather than the food security one. Not everyone agreed. But the conversations went well, with solutions on the language being sought.

### ***Health***

Health was a key part of the development and Africa theme. The U.S. in particular put a great deal of energy and negotiating power into making sure statement on health was very strong. Here they focused on outcomes and results on HIV, AIDS, malaria, and polio, including the commitment on polio at Gleneagles. As no one was performing well, the U.S. challenged its partners to review these commitments, identify what they were doing to meet them and show that action would take place. The U.S. and G8 were also interested in supporting an initiative to increase the number of health workers in Africa, to reach a level of 2.13 workers per 1000 people. Another thrust was neglected tropical diseases, where President Bush was passionate and hoping to get the rest of the G8 to contribute the one billion dollars that the WHO said would reduce would by 80 to 90 percent the seven major neglected tropical diseases.

### ***Millennium Development Goals***

The MDGs also aroused disagreement. The U.S. saw development as broader than the MDGs and while others generally agreed they sought to focus on the MDGs. There was much disagreement on where the G8 was meeting the MDGs and what to do to meet them in the years ahead. Here most sought to be more accountable, but faced technical challenges in measuring performance relating to exchange rates, bilateral and multilateral mechanisms, and the unique disease specific approach used in he U.S. It was thus hard to

compare how all were measuring a specific commitment such as that on HIV/AIDS. The challenge was to find the right balance to properly measure how a specific commitment was being met.

## **World Economy**

### ***Open Investment and Sovereign Wealth Funds***

On the world economy, open investment was a very high priority for the US. It sought political leader-like messages to endorse the open investment that had been good for all the G8 economies. This was generally agreed.

On the more specific issue of sovereign wealth funds there were different ideas. One was to use bilateral investment treaties to regulate them. All agreed it was important given the current climate for leaders to endorse and support steady open investment.

### ***Corruption and Intellectual Property***

Corruption too was important for the U.S., as it had been since 9/11. Despite the Japanese desire to keep the communiqué short and tight, it would probably include highlights of the accomplishments of the past few years. The U.S. sought major G8 commitments on R&D, commercialization and fiscal incentives here. It pushed for and was very likely to get a strong G8 statement, similar to last year's about the importance of intellectual property but with strong follow-up commitments this time.

## ***Energy***

On energy security, the Japanese had broken it up to treat it in different parts of text. This was a contrast to the single treatment at Heiligendamm last year. Energy security was dealt with in world economy section and contained strong language here. But there were no reference to oil prices. Some countries wanted this in, but others did not.

### ***Nuclear Energy***

On nuclear energy several countries including the U.S. sought a stronger endorsement than last year. While the Germans continued to resist, there were some grounds for hope in the eyes of the U.S. but not of the Japanese host.

### ***Open Markets***

Open markets was a priority for Britain and the U.S. But there remained a tendency to leave the reaction to the WTO, whose 40 most relevant ministers would not meet until well after the G8 summit this year. It was not yet determined what they G8 would say on Doha, as it depended on developments in the WTO.

### ***Finance and Macroeconomics***

Issues of finance and exchange rates would be largely left to finance ministers. The U.S. was wary of G8 intrusion into issues it considered its own domestic ones. But attention to the macroeconomic situation and the balance between growth and inflation would be hard to avoid.

### ***Political Security***

In the political-security domain, the G8 had decided to deal in its leaders' document with the global security issues of nonproliferation, counterterrorism, peace-building and peacekeeping crime. These would provide a frame for many of the regional issues to be discussed, a list that included Iran, North Korea, Zimbabwe, the Middle East peace process (MEPP), the political situation in Lebanon and perhaps Sudan, the Caucuses and Kosovo. There would be a specific reference to peace-building and peacekeeping and innocuous comments on crime, followed by text on the regional issues flagged at the summit. There were issues about which countries to discuss and how to report G8 conclusions. But like last year on Kosovo ways were found to say something constructive and meaningful.

### ***Terrorism***

Counterterrorism and nonproliferation were very important to the U.S. They would be presented as recurring summit themes. Terrorism was particularly important, both for its substance but mostly for ensuring that the leaders stayed strong and clearly focused on the threat. There was no disagreement among G8 partners here. The U.S. would lead the summit discussion on terrorism and nonproliferation as well.

### ***Proliferation and the Global Partnership***

Proliferation also commanded consensus, including issues of enrichment and reprocessing. On the Global partnership, the G8 had made good progress in Russia and the CIS. There were issues about nuclear terrorism and expansion. There was a strong desire from some G8 members to expand. There was likely to be agreement in terms of past pledges and looking for opportunities to expand.

### ***Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding***

At Sea Island the G8 had made specific pledge on training and contributions. The U.S. believed it was fulfilling its commitments and sought to get G8 partners to help in the cause.

### ***Corruption***

On corruption G8 leaders would review past efforts the G8 had committed to over the past six years. These included extractive industries, the UN convention now ratification and the kleptocracy initiative from a few years ago.

### ***Iran***

Iran is covered in the nonproliferation statement, equal among concerns. Not the first paragraph. Nonproliferation as a theme is a concern, Iran a particular concern. We're pressing to be clear and consistent in what G8 says re Iran in that it's not pursuing nuclear weapons capability, and in terms of dialogue and diplomacy and respecting sanctions and living up to what the UN and IAEA is doing.

### ***Afghanistan***

On Afghanistan, a particular Canadian priority, G8 foreign ministers were due to issue a stand-alone statement at their Kyoto meeting as a follow-on to recent Paris Afghanistan Compact pledging conference. The G8 statement would and highlight continued support for Afghanistan national development strategy. At Toyako, G8 leaders would take note of that. In a single page statement on Afghanistan they would recognize there was still much work to do in regard to coordination on the ground, focus on border areas and connecting well with Islamabad and Pakistan and support Karzai in that co-ordination. There was no plan to comment on Iraq.

### ***Myanmar***

Myanmar would receive comment in the leaders' document in two ways. One was support of the UN-ASEAN process to get access to Myanmar and a clear assessment of what was needed in terms of disaster relief. The second was a call, maybe not explicitly on human rights, but for more transparency on the regime.

### ***Zimbabwe***

Zimbabwe would receive attention due to the failure of Robert Mugabe to hold a free and fair election there on June 28.

### ***Kosovo***

Kosovo remained a question mark. Some suggested the G8 had done what it could, that Kosovo was moving in the right direction did not need further comment from the G8. Others argued it was not done yet and that the international community and the G8 in particular would need to focus on it. It was a difficult issue for there was a clear divide in the G8 and one outlier on what the G8 should say.

The U.S. was prepared to be flexible. The Kosovars would soon endorse their constitution. There would be continued intra-EU discussions on security forces. The U.S. had a strong interest in the state of Kosovo and its independence being secure and recognized. The G8 could call for support on recognition of its independence, for a smooth transition of EU forces and for constructive engagement between Kosovars and Serbs. With Kosovo's independence successfully the true tension in the G8 was gone, even if differences of opinion remained. This was an issue on which the EU was expected to lead and carry the load.

### ***Caucuses and Georgia***

There could be a similar situation with the Caucuses, particularly Georgia, where the G8 might comment. There was a strong effort among the G8 members to collaborate and comment positively on a process for the Caucuses and Georgia and a resolution to the tensions there, to bring the Georgians and their opponents into a better dialogue.

### ***China***

On China, there would probably not be a comment. But the G8 could comment on the earthquake, its strong support for efforts of recovery and reconstruction. China's response to their earthquake was a perfect contrast to Myanmar's. The Chinese mounted a rapid response, open to assistance from the international community. They had been rather transparent in handling the disaster.

### ***Tibet***

Tibet was more likely to be taken up at the foreign ministers than the leaders meeting. It very important for the U.S. and G8 to discuss and promote positively the outreach the Chinese had made to the Dalai Lama. There were positives to comment on, with the intent to signal support for some of the progress and possibly with an undertone of concern on other issues where there had been less progress. But there was no agreement within the G8 as to whether and how to discuss Tibet.

### ***Summit Process***

#### ***Accountability***

Accountability was a key priority for the U.S. and President Bush personally. The U.S. pressed hard for the Toyako documents to include a stocktaking in terms of what had been done in past summits and to make sure there were mechanisms to measure progress now. The US strongly sought to have the G8 show where they had met their commitments, largely on health, but also on peacekeeping, anticorruption, intellectual

property and across the board. Such a stock taking would show the world what the G8 had done to add to the credibility of the G8.

### ***Outreach***

#### ***Major Economies Meeting***

The MEM would continue on as separate entity on its own after Toyako. The U.S. did not see the MEM as part of the G8. Nor did their counterparts.

#### ***Gleneagles/Toyako Dialogue***

#### ***Heiligendamm Process***

At Toyako, the Heiligendamm Process would provide its scheduled interim report to the leaders, in the form of a public document so some length. The O5 leaders would meet with the G8 for breakfast on the final day of the summit exclusively to discuss the Heiligendamm Process. But the O5 as a separate group would have no larger role in the summit.

### ***Expansion***

There would be no moves at Toyako to institutionalize outreach, for the O5 or anyone else, let alone expanding the G8. Beyond the Japanese, the U.S. was opposed to expansion. So were the Italians, who would receive the HPs final report at their summit in 2009 and the Canadians who would host in 2010. The U.S. did not we support G8 expansion, was not open to a discussion of it, and would oppose the French in doing so when they hosted in 2011. As a leader in Europe France would face demands from its European neighbours such as the Netherlands were it to try to expand. And it was uncertain how many more summits Gordon Brown, the other expansionist, would attend. As with UNSC reform there was natural consensus among the G8 about who else to include. And after Toyako, a G8 that continued to deal with climate would have to cope with the precedent of Indonesia, South Korea, and Australia having come. Raising the issue of expansion would inspire a reflection of likemindedness, raising an inconvenient question that would make Russia resist having such a debate.

On the morning of the summit itself opened, many of the existing differences had been narrowed, so that the G8 leaders and their partners could concentrate their formidable capabilities on only the largest things. The very largest of these was climate change, reinforced by the rising challenges of energy and food. On these issues as elsewhere, Toyako was well on track to be a summit of substantial success.

Toyako's biggest achievement will come on its centrepiece subject of climate change. Here the G8 and their major outreach partners will together agree on the central

architecture of a climate control regime to replace the fundamentally flawed and failed Kyoto approach of old. The Toyako leaders will agree that they all must and will control their carbon. They will endorse the sectoral bottom-up approach that will enable everyone to contribute to carbon control right away, and improve their performance as knowledge, technology and competitive pressures expand. They will also accept the relevance of carbon sinks, starting with avoided deforestation, that will allow the great biodiversity and forestry powers of Brazil, Indonesia, the United States, Canada and Russia to make an enhanced contribution that finally counts. Together these new principles of “all in,” “bottom up” and “sinks count” will form the foundation of a “beyond Kyoto” regime that promises to cope effectively with the urgent, even existential problem the global community now confronts.

To encourage this agreement and its effectiveness, the Toyako leaders will take further steps. They will endorse and fund Climate Investment Funds so that several billion dollars now and at least \$10 billion in the near future will be available to finance the flow of clean technology that China, India and so many other carbon-afflicted countries need. They will further call for freer trade in carbon-reducing products and services, so that these and the technology embedded in them can flow faster, wider and less expensively to benefit all. They will also finally agree that they need nuclear power, with its virtually emission-free performance, as part of the solution, within the G8 and around the world. And they will help those already afflicted by the natural disasters now coming with more frequency and severity due to climate change.

To provide a common reference point for their long-term efforts, the Toyako leaders will signal more clearly than before that they all understand they collectively need to cut their carbon emissions by at least 50% by 2050. They may even signal convergence on common reference points for medium-term targets and timetables in specific sectors, to build on the considerable commonality that now exists. It will be left to the UN process to fill in the details that will help some to contribute to the new architecture for global climate governance that the 2008 G8 at Toyako will create.

## **Dimensions of G8 Performance**

These prospective achievements are likely to be confirmed by the strong performance of the Toyako Summit across all of the six performance dimensions by which any international institutions summit can be assessed.

### ***Domestic Political Management***

On the first dimension of domestic political management, the Toyako Summit in its long lead-up has already helped Fukuda from being eased out as prime minister or being forced to go to the polls before his summit starts. The summit also offers him an opportunity to show his party colleagues, fellow legislators and voters that he is a world leader who can deliver results and thus deserves to stay on as PM not least depart with

dignity at an appropriate time. Indeed, as Fukuda's pre summit tour of Europe ended, and the summit approach, his approval ratings finally started to rise.

In the U.S., the G8 summit, far more than his many other trips abroad, gave Bush a chance to boost his polling numbers in his last year and burnish his legacy as a global leader. If he continued his tradition of announcing shifts in American climate change policy on the summit's eve, it could also help his and the summit reputation on this critical issue for publics in America and elsewhere in the world. Already in America, the G8 has also received attention from all three major candidates for the presidency, with the G8 priority issue of energy and the environment being the focus for those on the Democratic side.

In Russia, the summit also offered the new president Medvedev an opportunity to show he is a world leader, just as Putin did in 2000. Yet now Medvedev has the much larger task of establishing his reputation alongside that of a revered Putin with a powerful presence, in contrast to an ailing Yeltsin, who quickly faded away.

Britain's Brown was also using the summit to restore his popularity at home. It was he who led the public demands that the G8 add the food and fuel crises to the summit agenda a priority concerns.

### ***Deliberation***

The second dimension of summit performance is deliberation. Here the one day alone at eight and the small size and number of the documents pointed to lower performance here, especially as the agenda for that day and the strategy for releasing the G8's documents had not been defined by mid-June. But if the four documents from the G8 had added one with the Africans and one from the MEM, as was likely, the public dimension of deliberation would rise. However the invitees, especially the new Outreach 8, who would join the G8 to discuss climate on the final day, had no G8-like tradition of coming to consensus so that a meaningful communiqué could be released. s

### ***Direction Setting***

More promising was the dimension of direction setting, as measured by the number and breadth, if not the innovation, of the principles and norms the Toyako Summit is likely to set. A leading indicator here was the substantial list of principles by which the Japanese would address the agenda, as contained in Fukuda's Davos speech. That speech also identified several interconnections or "crosswalks" among the themes and issues, suggesting the probability of a coherent and consistent package of summit-produced principles and norms. As Toyako approached reports on the MEM preparatory meeting in Korea indicated that the leaders would approve some of the bold new principles needed to put a new beyond Kyoto climate control regime in place.



### ***Decisional Commitment***

The same conclusions carry over into the prospects for collective decision making, in the form of a large number of commitments, including ambitious ones. The specificity of the proposals in the Davos speech points in this direction too. This judgment is reinforced by the range and amount of money mobilized, both in the Davos speech and in subsequently announcements. These include the \$10 billion CIF, which could be counted as official development assistance (ODA) as outlined by Fukuda at Davos. This British initiative was to be financed by Japan, Britain and the United States, should their legislatures approve. As of mid May, none of their G8 partners had signaled they would join this donors club. But it seemed likely that contributions would come from Germany, Canada and Australia before Toyako's end. In addition, Bush was taking the lead in mobilizing major new money to combat infectious disease.

The strong stress in the summit preparatory process on fulfilling outstanding commitments rather than making new ones, and the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) numbers showing dropping ODA flows, place some restraint where ambitious new commitments, especially those mobilizing money, are concerned. Still, it is worth recalling that a similar restraint dominated in the immediate lead-up to Heiligendamm in 2007, only to be overturned at the last minute by NGOs pressing for more giving and by popularly elected politicians under the glare of the summit's global publicity proving eager to please.

### ***Delivery through Compliance***

On the dimension of delivery, on compliance with commitments, the G8's emphasis on keeping existing commitments suggests that Toyako is likely to perform well, subject to the cautions identified immediately above. Also suggesting caution is the fact that money mobilized — where momentum is concentrated at the moment — has not proven productive in catalyzing compliance in the past (Kirton et al. 2007b; Kirton 2006). Nor has referring implementation to other international organizations and Toyako is heading toward asking the IEA in energy and the UN on climate to help do its work. However, the G8's prospective reliance on the IMF and World Bank to assist with finance and development, and the invitation for the World Bank to attend the summit are promising, for these are the core international organizations (and G7 controlled ones) in the finance and development field. They have proven their compliance boosting potency before (Kirton 2007b, 2006).

### ***Development of Global Governance***

The prospective performance on the development of global governance is also somewhat promising. The MEM-16 formula will be strengthened and Toyako could even produce to a plurilateral summit institution similar to the MEM-16 dedicated to climate change. The Gleneagles Dialogue will be continued in rebranded fashion as the Toyako Dialogue, dedicated to devising a low carbon society. Both legacies will strengthen the principle and practice of a G20, at the level of leaders and ministers alike.

In contrast, there will be no bold moves on the outstanding questions of outreach and expansion. Japan is reluctant and has thus far been increasing outreach at the summit in ways that dilute China's distinctiveness and that could delay and make more difficult any expansion of the G8 toward or into a G13/14.

In regard to civil society, this G8 did well in affirming the multi-stakeholder principle in the host's proclamation at Davos. But beyond there were no new G8-centered civil society institutions that arose in the lead-up to or at the summit itself. With so many invited guests to attend to, the G8 leaders and host would have little time to deal directly with civil society at the summit, especially in ways that repeat Japan's innovation at Okinawa the last time.

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## Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2007

Year	Bayne Grade	Domestic Political Mgmt		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Dev of Global Governance	Attendees	
		% Mem	Ave # Refs	# Days	# State-ments	# of Words	# Refs to Core Values	# Cmts	Compliance	# Bodies Min/Off	# Mem	# Par
1975	A-	N/A	N/A	3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1	4/6	0
1976	D	N/A	N/A	2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0	7	0
1977	B-	N/A	N/A	2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1	8	0
1978	A	N/A	N/A	2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0	8	0
1979	B+	N/A	N/A	2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	½	8	0
1980	C+	N/A	N/A	2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1	TBC	0
1981	C	N/A	N/A	2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0	TBC	0
1982	C	N/A	N/A	3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3	TBC	0
1983	B	N/A	N/A	3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0	TBC	0
1984	C-	N/A	N/A	3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0	TBC	0
1985	E	N/A	N/A	3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2	TBC	0
1986	B+	N/A	N/A	3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1	TBC	0
1987	D	N/A	N/A	3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2	TBC	0
1988	C-	N/A	N/A	3	3	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0	TBC	0
1989	B+	N/A	N/A	3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1	TBC	0
1990	D	N/A	N/A	3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3	TBC	0
1991	B-	N/A	N/A	3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0	TBC	0
1992	D	N/A	N/A	3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1	TBC	1
1993	C+	N/A	N/A	3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2	TBC	1
1994	C	N/A	N/A	3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0	TBC	1
1995	B+	N/A	N/A	3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2	TBC	1
1996	B	40%	1	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3	TBC	5
1997	C-	40%	1	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3	TBC	1
1998	B+	25%	1	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0	TBC	TBC
1999	B+	80%	1.7	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5	TBC	TBC
2000	B	40%	6.5	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4	TBC	TBC
2001	B	33%	1.5	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	½	TBC	TBC
2002	B+	17%	1	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8	TBC	TBC
2003	C	40%	2.5	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5	TBC	TBC
2004	C+	33%	1	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15	TBC	TBC
2005	A-	40%	1	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5	TBC	TBC
2006	N/A	38.8%	1.8	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4	TBC	TBC
2007	N/A	75%*	1	3	8	25,857	651	329	33.0*	0/4	TBC	TBC
2008	N/A	TBC	TBC	3	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	TBC	9	18
Total	N/A	N/A	21	95	189	297,073	1052	2,893	1386.4	12/80	TBC	TBC
Ave. all	B-	40%	1	2.8	5.7	9,002	31.9	87.7	47.8	0.3/2.4	TBC	TBC
Av. cycle 1	B-	U.S., C	US, C	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.5	0.14/0.71	TBC	TBC
Av. Cycle 2	C-	U.S., C	US, C	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.4	0.29/1.14	TBC	TBC
Av. Cycle 3	C+	U.S., C	US, C	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.5	0.58/1.29	TBC	TBC
Av. Cycle 4	B	29.3%	2	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	40.7	0.58/3.57	TBC	TBC
Av. Cycle 5	B-	37.7%	1.5	3	15.3	26,849	177	262	58.0	0.00/7.4	TBC	TBC

**Notes:**

N/A=Not Available; TBC=to be calculated; US=United States; C=Canada

\*Bayne Grade: the 2005 grade of A- is a confirmed grade.

\*Domestic Political Management: % Mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year. Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year.

\*Directional: number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or Chair's Summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.

\*Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2007 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. \*2007 score is Interim score for that year. It is not included in the overall or cycle average.

## Appendix B: 2007 Heiligendamm Compliance Scores

### A. Interim

<u>Commitment Number</u>	<u>Commitment Name</u>	<u>CDN</u>	<u>FRA</u>	<u>GER</u>	<u>ITA</u>	<u>JPN</u>	<u>RUS</u>	<u>UK</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>EU</u>	<u>Average</u>
1	Intellectual Property Protection	-1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0.22
2	Fighting Climate Change	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
3	Energy: Technology	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0.22
4	Energy: Efficiency	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
5	Energy: Diversification	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0.67
6	Raw Materials	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.22
7	Corruption	1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.22
8	Heiligendamm Process	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.22
9	Africa: Debt Relief	0	0	1	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.22
10	Africa: ODA	1	-1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.44
11	Africa: Financial Markets	0	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	0.00
12	Africa: Education	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	1	1	1	0.11
13	Africa: Peace and Security	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.11
14	Africa: Global Fund	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0.44
15	Africa: S & R Education	1	0	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	0.22
16	Africa: Health Systems	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.56
17	Non-Proliferation: Fissile Material	0	-1	0	0	0	-1	0	0	0	-0.22
18	Non-Proliferation: HCOC	-1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.00
19	Regional Security: Darfur	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
20	Counter-Terrorism: Transport Security	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.22
21	Counter-Terrorism: FATF	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	0.67
22	Trade	1	-1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.33
23	Global Partnership	0	0	1	0	-1	1	0	1	0	0.22
<b>Country Average</b>		<b>0.22</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.48</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>0.04</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.61</b>	<b>0.78</b>	<b>0.39</b>	
<b>2007 Interim Compliance Average</b>											<b>0.33</b>
<b>2006 Final Compliance Average</b>		0.60	0.40	0.55	0.05	0.40	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.47
<b>2006 Interim Compliance Average</b>		0.45	0.25	0.45	-0.10	0.30	0.25	0.55	0.35	0.53	0.35

<b>B. Final Number</b>	<b>Commitment Name</b>	<b>Canada</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Germany</b>	<b>Italy</b>	<b>Japan</b>	<b>Russia</b>	<b>UK</b>	<b>US</b>	<b>EU</b>	<b>Average</b>
1	Intellectual Property Protection	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1	0.44
2	Fighting Climate Change	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
3	Energy: Technology	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.44
4	Energy: Efficiency	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	0.89
5	Energy: Diversification	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.78
6	Raw Materials	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.11
7	Corruption	1	1	0	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.33
8	Heiligendamm Dialogue Process	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
9	Africa: Debt Relief	1	0	1	0	-1	0	1	1	0	0.33
10	Africa: ODA	1	-1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.44
11	Africa: Financial Markets	0	1	1	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	0.33
12	Africa: Education	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0.44
13	Africa: Peace and Security	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.44
14	Africa: GFATM	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.67
15	Africa: S & R Education	1	1	0	-1	0	-1	1	1	1	0.33
16	Africa: Health Systems	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0.67
17	Non-proliferation: FMCT	0	0	1	0	1	-1	0	0	0	0.11
18	Non-proliferation: HCOC	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0.56
19	Regional Security: Darfur	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.78
20	Counter-Terrorism: Transport Security	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.22
21	Counter-Terrorism: FATF	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.78
22	Trade	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.56
23	Global Partnership	0	0	1	0	-1	1	0	1	0	0.22
	<b>Country Average</b>	0.65	0.57	0.57	0.17	0.30	0.30	0.70	0.91	0.48	
	<b>2007 Final Compliance Average</b>										0.52
	<b>2006 Final Compliance Average</b>	0.60	0.40	0.55	0.05	0.40	0.55	0.60	0.60	0.58	0.47
	<b>2007 Interim Compliance Average</b>	0.22	0.17	0.48	0.13	0.04	0.17	0.61	0.78	0.39	0.33

## Appendix C: Japan's Built-In Agenda

### A. Multiyear Commitments Due in 2008 (4)

2004-2: To ensure that polio does not reemerge, we will work to ensure the full integration of necessary measures in national health strategies and structures in the post-eradication period through 2008. (*Polio*)

2005-10: We welcome Japan's offer to receive a report at the G8 Summit in 2008. (*Gleneagles Dialogue: Climate Change*)

2006-43: We urgently call for mobilization of financial support and will continue to work collectively and with bilateral and multilateral donors to close the funding gap for 2007-2008, and will continue to work with others towards securing the resources necessary to finish the program and declare our planet polio-free in the near future. (*Polio*)

2006-96: We have instructed our relevant ministers to continue the dialogue on climate change, clean energy and sustainable development and report its outcomes to the G8 summit in 2008. (*Climate Change*).

### B. 2008 Remit Mandates (5)

2007-22: The progress on these pilot plans will be reviewed by the G8 in 2008 (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: IPP*)

2007-30: [To maintain the momentum of that groundbreaking achievement, we] will prepare national reports, with the assistance of the IEA, evaluating G8 member states' efforts to adhere to those principles, for delivery at the 2008 G8 summit (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: Climate change, energy efficiency and energy security*)

2007-55: We will report on the progress achieved in the areas mentioned above at the G8 Summit in 2008 (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: Adapting to Climate Change*)

2007-63: [To this end, we will] report on progress in the policies and measures on energy efficiency outlined below at the G8 summit in 2008 (*Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy; Issue-area: Energy Efficiency*)

2007-141: The G8 Summit in Japan in 2008 will receive an interim report on the progress made and at the G8 Summit in Italy in 2009 a final report on the outcomes of the Dialogue Process will be presented (*Growth and Responsibility in Africa; Issue-area: Heiligendamm Process*)



## Appendix D: Japan's Planned Agenda

Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, World Economic Forum, January 26, 2008

### **A. World Economy**

#### A1. Global Economy

Downward turn in global economy

(Avoid pessimism, add urgency, coordinated action, domestic responses)

#### A2. Financial Markets 21st century style crisis

Sub-prime mortgage problem in the U.S.

(swift response, nip credit crunches from diminished capitalization)

Causes of financial turbulence and medium and long term responses

(Advance G7 finance ministers actions)

#### A3. Reform Japanese Economy

(Advance Market Liberalization)

(Foreign direct investment)

(Trade)

(Financial and capital market liberalization)

#### A4. Energy: "Surge of petroleum prices to record levels"

### **B. Climate Change: "Climate change is top priority"**

#### B1. Post-Kyoto Framework

Targets and Timetables (IPCC): peak 10-20 yrs, cut 50%+ by 2050

(All major emitters participate)

(Fair and equitable emissions target)

(Bottom-up sector approach to energy efficiency per Japan's national target)

(Base year reviewed)

#### B2. International Economic Co-operation

Technology Transfer

Energy Efficiency (global target of +30% by 2020)

Assistance to developing countries (Cool Earth partnership of \$10 bn)

Adaptation assistance

(Multilateral Fund: Japan, U.S., UK ask others)

#### B3. Innovation: Development and Diffusion

Technology development: clean coal, rooftop solar, Green IT

International Framework for collaboration with IEA etc.

(Shift Japan to a low carbon society)

(Cool Earth Promotion Program)

***C. Development and Africa: Poverty and the MDG's***

C1. Health

Safe motherhood and health of children under five

Human resources in health

(Framework for health care system with participation of all)

C2. Water

Effective management of water supply and access

C3. Education

Dakar Education for All goals

(vocational training, secondary and higher education)

C4. Economic Growth

(blueprint for regional wide infrastructure development)

Trade and investment

Agricultural productivity

Peace-building: (African PKO centers to boost Africa's peacekeeping capacity)

***D. Security***

D1. Terrorism

D2. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

***E. G8 System***

E1. Fulfilling Existing Commitments

E2. Participatory Approach: government, business, civil society, academia

Note: (Japan's goals, proposals and initiatives are in parentheses)

## **Appendix E: Japan's Actual Agenda, July 6, 2008**

### **1. World Economy**

- a. Energy Security
- b. Growth, Inflation and Finance
- c. Investment Protectionism
- d. Intellectual Property Rights
- e. Corruption, Corporate Social Responsibility, Natural Resource Management
- f. Trade

### **2. Climate Change and Environment**

- a. Science (Endorse IPCC, singal urgency)
- b. Beyond Kyoto Framework (by 2009, effective, inclusive, binding)
- c. Technology
- d. Forests, Sinks and Biodiversity
- e. Sectoral Approach
- f. Targets: Medium term; Long Term
- g. Technology Transfer
- h. Adaptation (Fund)
- i. Linkages (to Africa, Development, Food, Health)
- j. Negotiation Forum (UN, Gleneagles Dialogue Extension, MEM Role)
- k. Biodiversity
- l. Sustainable Growth, Climate Change, Energy Efficiency
- m. Natural Disasters

### **3. Development and Africa**

- a. Food Security
- b. Health
- c. Water
- d. Education
- e. Africa's G8 Partnership
- f. Development and the Millennium Development Goals

### **4. Political-Security**

- a. Terrorism
- b. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
- c. Nuclear Safety
- d. Global Partnership against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction

- e. North Korea
- f. Afghanistan
- g. Iran
- h. Zimbabwe
- i. The Middle East, Iraq and Lebanon
- j. Haiti
- k. Kosovo
- l. Tibet
- m. Myanmar

### ***5. Summit Reform***

- a. Accountability and Compliance Monitoring
- b. Major Economies Meeting
- c. Gleneagles Dialogue
- d. Heiligendamm Process
- e. Civil Society: Junior Eight

## Appendix F: Sherpa and Ministerial Meetings

### *A. Ministerial Meetings, 1975-2008*

Year	Total	Finance	Foreign	Energy	Trade	Environment	Labour	Terrorism/Justice	Development	Glen-eagles	Science & Tech	G20 Finance
1975	1		1		0						0	0
1976	1		1		0						0	0
1977	1		1		0						0	0
1978	1		1		0						0	0
1979	2		1	1	0						0	0
1980	1		1		0						0	0
1981	2		1		1*						0	0
1982	3		1		2						0	0
1983	3		1		2						0	0
1984	6		2		4						0	0
1985	4		2		2						0	0
1986	3	1			2						0	0
1987	5	4			1						0	0
1988	4	2			2						0	0
1989	4	2			2						0	0
1990	5	3			2						0	0
1991	5	4			1						0	0
1992	7	3			2	2					0	0
1993	4	1	1		2	0					0	0
1994	4	1			1	1	1				0	0
1995	7	2	1		2	1		1			0	0
1996	9	3	1		2	1	1	1			0	0
1997	10	4	1		1	1	1	2			0	0
1998	10	5	2	1	1	1	1	2			0	0
1999	10	4			1	1	1	2			0	1
2000	9	4	1		0	1	1	1			0	1
2001	8	3	1		0	1		2			0	1
2002	11	4	2	1	0	1		1	1		0	1
2003	10	4	1		0	1	1	1	1		0	1
2004	9	4	2		0			2			0	1
2005	14	4	2	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	0	1
2006	11	4	1	1	0	1	1	1		1	0	1
2007	12	4	2		0	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
2008	11	3	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	*
Total	210	73	32	6	33	16	11	20	5	4	1	9

Notes:

Trade: refers to the trade quadrilateral.

\*The US, EC, and Japan met the margins of the July 1981 G7 summit in Ottawa to discuss a proposal that their trade ministers should regularly hold informal TRILATERAL meetings. After this, the Canadians lobbied to be included in the process. Quad officials also met, often on the margins of other meetings. All information comes from Professor Cohn at Simon Fraser University.

G20 Finance: The G20 Finance ministers meeting was created in 1999. The 2008 meeting has yet to be held. It will occur in November of 2008.

The health ministers also met once in 2006.

### ***B. Sherpa/FASS Meetings***

- Sherpas on January 10 in Tokyo
- Sherpas in early April
- FASS May 8-9
- FASS early June
- Sherpas and FASS June 23-25 in Toyako

### ***C. Ministerial Meetings***

- Finance: February 9, Tokyo, April 11, Washington, D. C. and June 13-14, Osaka
- Development: April 5-6, Tokyo
- Labour: May 11-13, Niigata
- Environment: May 24-26, Kobe
- Justice and Home Affairs: June 11-13, Tokyo
- Energy: June 7-8, Amori
- Science and Technology: June 15, Okinawa
- Foreign Affairs: June 26-27, Kyoto
- G20 Environment and Energy Ministers (Gleneagles Dialogue): March 14-16, Chiba
- Tokyo International Conference on African Development IV: May 28-30, Yokohama<sup>14</sup>

### ***D. Official Meetings***

- G8 Health Experts': February 14-15 ,April 9-10 and June 11-12
- International Experts Meeting on Illegal Logging (Second round), March 3-4, Tokyo

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<sup>14</sup> The Tokyo International Conference on African Development is not an actual G8 institution, it just happened to coincide with the summit hosted by Japan in 2008.

## Appendix G: Lead-Up Summitry

	USA	JAP	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	CAN	RUS	EU	G8 + EU	CHI	IND	BRA	MEX	SA	O5	Total
USA	-	2	1	1	1	1	3	2	1	11	1		1	2		4	15
JAP	2	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	9	2				1	3	10
GER	1	1	-				1	2		5	1		1	1		3	8
UK	1	1		-			1			3	1					1	4
FRA	1	1			-		1			3							3
ITA	1	1				-	1			3				1	1		4
CAN	3	1	1	1	1	1	-			7			2		2		9
RUS	2	1	2					-		5	1					1	6
EU	1	1							-	2			1			1	3
G8 + EU	11	9	5	3	3	3	8	5	2	48	6		2	6	2	16	64
CHI	1	2	1	1				1		6	-						6
IND												-					
BRA	1		1							2			-				2
MEX	2		1				2		1	6				-			6
SA		1			1					2					-		2
O5	4	3	3	1	1		2	1	1	16							16
Total	15	10	8	4	4	3	9	6	3	64	6		2	6	2	16	80

Notes: O5 = Outreach Five. Includes leaders bilateral and trilateral meetings that occurred after the G8 Summit in June 2007 and before the G8 Summit in July 2008 and excludes plurilateral summits (Asia-Pacific Economic Forum, September 2007; Association of South-East Asian Nations Plus Three, January 2008; Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, November 2007; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 2008) or other such plurilateral meetings such as the East Asian Summit or La Francophonie.

### *During Summit*

**Russia (Medvedev) and Britain (Brown)** will meet in Japan on the sidelines of the G8 summit.

**Medvedev (Russia)** will hold talks with **Sarkozy (France)** during the G8 summit. Medvedev said he was satisfied with the development of bilateral relations in both economic and humanitarian areas.

Rudd (Australia) planning a separate bilateral visit to **Japan (Fukuda)** after July 7<sup>th</sup>.

Lee (South Korea), *Calderon (Mexico)* and *Singh (India)* will meet in Japan on July 8.

*Hu (China)*, *Lula (Brazil)*, *Singh (India)*, *Calderon (Mexico)* and *Mbeke (South Africa)* are meeting on July 8.

President Lee Myung-bak (South Korea) and **Medvedev (Russia)** agreed to hold a bilateral summit on July 9.

**Bush (US)** and *Singh (India)* will meet on July 9 in Japan.

**Medvedev (Russia), Bush (US)** and Lee (South Korea) will meet in Japan on July 9.

*Singh (India)* plans to meet with *Hu (China)*, **Medvedev (Russia), Bush (US), Calderon (Mexico)**, Lee (South Korea), Yudhoyono (Indonesia), **Fukuda (Japan)** and Rudd (Australia) on the sidelines of the G8 summit.

Australia (Rudd) will visit Indonesia (Yudhoyono) (around the summit, perhaps during).

### ***After Summit***

**Harper (Canada)** is planning a meeting with **Fukuda (Japan)** on July 10.

*Lula da Silva (Brazil)* is planning to go to Indonesia after the summit (before July 12).

**Putin (Russia)** is planning a meeting with **Bush (US)** in Beijing in August on the sidelines of the Olympics.

There is a scheduled trilateral meeting in the fall between **Japan**, South Korea and *China*.

**Medvedev (Russia)** will meet with **Sarkozy (France)** at the Russia-EU summit in France in November.

*Mbeki (South Africa)* is scheduled to pay a visit to *Hu (China)* later this year (in the culmination of the year-long celebrations of the tenth anniversary of diplomatic ties).



## Appendix H: Vulnerabilities and Shocks

### A. Shocks Activating Vulnerabilities

#### 1. Security *None*

- a. War: 0 new invasions, Afghanistan, Iraq ongoing
- b. Terrorism: 0 new attacks on G8 countries
- c. Proliferation: 0 explosions (Iran, North Korea, Syria)
- d. Civil Strife: 0 deaths in G8 countries from food and fuel riots

#### 2. Energy *Demand Driven Price Shock Primarily (cf. 1979, 1990-1, 2006)*

- a. Supply: 2 Nigeria, Iraq v. Saudi Arabia
- b. Price: +100% to almost \$140.00 June =historic highs
- c. Transit: 0 blackouts, pipeline closures in G8

#### 3. Ecology *Small Scale Chronic Shocks in US & Japan*

- a. Nuclear: 1 Japan (0 deaths)
- b. Oil: 0
- c. (Water): 3 U.S. June, Myanmar's May 3 (78,000), Philippines June
- d. Heat (Air): 0
- e. Land: 1 G8 Japan June (12), 1 China's Sichuan May 12 (80,000)
- f. Wildlife: 0

#### 4. Finance *Defaults only at Company Level*

- a. Country: 0 (Iceland, Argentina)
- b. City: 1 California
- c. Company: 3 UK's, U.S.'s Bear Sterns, Germany
- d. Stock market: 7 down, one up (Canada)

#### 5. Health *None (cf SARS 2003)*

- a. Infectious: 0 infecting G8 countries
- c. Chronic: 0 spikes in G8 countries

#### 6. Food *Price Shock Only as in 1970's*

- a. Supply: 0 Famines in G8, several in countries outside

- b. Price: Food Inflation, wheat, rice etc. hit historic highs
- c. Safety:

## B. Annual Average Domestic Crude Oil Prices, 1975-2007

Year	Nominal	Real 2007	Change in Nominal		Change in Real	
1975	\$12.21	\$47.63	+2.86	+31%	+7.86	+20%
1976	\$13.10	\$48.36	+0.89	+07%	+0.73	+02%
1977	\$14.40	\$49.88	+1.30	+10%	+1.52	+03%
1978	\$14.95	\$48.17	+0.55	+04%	-1.71	-03%
1979	\$25.10	\$71.96	+10.15	+68%	+23.79	+49%
1980	\$37.42	\$95.50	+12.65	+49%	+23.54	+33%
1981	\$35.75	\$82.70	-1.67	-04%	-12.8	-13%
1982	\$31.83	\$69.33	-3.92	-11%	-13.37	-16%
1983	\$29.08	\$61.34	-2.75	-09%	-7.99	-12%
1984	\$28.75	\$58.14	-0.33	-01%	-3.20	-05%
1985	\$26.92	\$52.56	-1.83	-06%	-5.58	-10%
1986	\$14.44	\$27.66	*12.48	-46%	-24.90	-47%
1987	\$17.75	\$32.81	+3.31	+23%	+5.15	+19%
1988	\$14.87	\$26.45	-2.88	-16%	-6.36	-19%
1989	\$18.33	\$31.05	+3.46	+23%	+4.60	+17%
1990	\$23.19	\$37.17	+4.86	+27%	+6.12	+20%
1991	\$20.20	\$31.15	-2.99	-13%	-6.02	-16%
1992	\$19.25	\$28.81	-0.95	-05%	-2.34	-08%
1993	\$16.75	\$24.36	-2.50	-13%	-4.45	-15%
1994	\$15.66	\$22.19	-1.09	-07%	-2.17	-09%
1995	\$16.75	\$23.09	+1.09	+07%	+0.90	-04%
1996	\$20.46	\$27.38	+3.71	+22%	+4.29	+19%
1997	\$18.64	\$24.40	-1.82	-09%	-2.98	-11%
1998	\$11.91	\$15.35	-6.73	-37%	-9.05	-37%
1999	\$16.56	\$20.83	+4.65	+39%	+5.48	+36%
2000	\$27.39	\$33.39	+10.83	+65%	+12.56	+60%
2001	\$23.00	\$27.29	-4.39	-16%	-6.10	-18%
2002	\$22.81	\$26.61	-0.19	-01%	-0.68	-02%
2003	\$27.69	\$31.62	+4.88	+21%	+5.01	+19%
2004	\$37.66	\$41.84	+9.97	+36%	+10.22	+32%
2005	\$50.04	\$53.77	+12.38	+33%	+11.93	+29%
2006	\$58.30	\$60.73	+8.26	+17%	+6.96	+13%
2007	\$64.20	\$64.92	+5.90	+10%	+4.19	+07%
2008						

Notes:

Prices are adjusted for inflation to December 2007 prices using the CPI-U. Although the monthly peak occurred in December 1979 the annual peak didn't occur until 1980 since the average of all the monthly prices was higher in 1980. Inflation adjusted prices reached all-time low in 1998 (lower than the price in 1946). Prices are based on historical free market (stripper) prices of Illinois Crude as presented by IOGA . Price controlled prices would be lower during the 1970's but resulted in gas lines and shortages.

### C. Oil Prices Between 2007 and 2008 Summit

Y/M/D	Nominal	Change in Nominal	
07/07/9	72.19	-	-
07/08/14	72.38	+0.19	+0.03%
07/09/07	76.70	+4.32	+06%
07/09/20	83.32	+6.62	+09%
07/09/28	81.66	-1.66	-02%
07/10/15	86.13	+4.47	+06%
07/10/31	94.53	+8.40	+10%
07/11/15	93.43	-1.10	-01%
07/11/23	98.18	+4.75	+05%
07/11/30	88.71	-9.47	-10%
07/12/17	90.63	+1.92	+02%
07/12/27	96.62	+5.99	+07%
07/12/31	95.98	-0.64	-01%
08/01/02	99.62	+3.64	+04%
08/01/15	91.90	-7.72	-08%
08/01/31	91.75	-0.15	-0.02%
08/02/15	95.50	+3.75	+04%
08/02/28	102.59	+7.09	+07%
08/02/29	101.84	-0.75	-01%
08/03/13	110.33	+8.49	+08%
08/03/17	105.68	-4.65	-04%
08/03/31	101.58	-4.10	-04%
08/04/15	113.79	+12.21	+12%
08/04/22	119.37	+5.58	+05%
08/04/30	113.46	-5.91	+05%
08/05/15	124.12	+10.66	+09%
08/05/21	133.17	+9.05	+07%
08/05/30	127.35	-5.82	-04%
08/06/02	127.76	+0.41	+0.03%
08/06/27	140.00		

Notes: 2008 monthly prices come from NYMEX. On May 21, 2008, world oil prices reached a new nominal and real closing high of US\$ 133.17. On June 27, 2008 they reached a new intraday of high of 142.99.

## **Appendix I: Multilateral Organizational Performance**

### **UN Summit Success:**

Rome, June, Food

### **UNSC Resolutions on G8 Issues:**

Zimbabwe Resolution, June 24, 2008

**Functional Agency Action**

### **PSI Summit Success:**

**Saudi Arabia June 2008, Oil**

## Appendix J: Capability

### ***A. Real Historical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Baseline Countries (in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars)***

<b>Country</b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1977</b>	<b>1975</b>
United States	11545.79	9066.90	4750.50	4311.20
Japan	5201.02	4541.27	2422.10	2231.53
Germany	2075.09	1801.93	1179.00	1088.44
United Kingdom	1719.96	1349.44	839.18	797.44
France	2075.09	1801.93	1179.00	1088.44
Italy	1159.75	1026.11	648.48	594.71
Canada	864.80	652.00	373.24	
Russia	398.60	221.90		
Austria	217.08	179.34		
Belgium	255.52	123.03	136.58	
Bulgaria	17.57			
Cyprus	11.42			
Czech Republic	74.20			
Denmark	179.58	149.92	105.81	
Estonia	9.43			
Finland	144.75	110.35		
Greece	146.46	103.77		
Hungary	60.69			
Ireland	133.21	77.35	29.02	
Latvia	13.56			
Lithuania	18.69			
Luxembourg	24.94	16.67	6.45	
Malta	4.09			
Netherlands	404.03	344.46	210.45	
Poland	218.23			
Portugal	111.60	99.21		
Romania	55.21			
Slovakia	28.97			
Slovenia	24.44			
Spain	719.45	517.21		
Sweden	283.82	219.58		
World Total	38866.14	29576.35	15970.10	14652.70
<b>G8 Total</b>	<b>25040.10</b>	<b>20461.48</b>	<b>11391.50</b>	<b>10111.76</b>
<b>G8 as % of World Total</b>	<b>64.43</b>	<b>69.18</b>	<b>71.33</b>	<b>69.01</b>
<b>G8 + EU Total</b>	<b>28197.04</b>	<b>22402.37</b>	<b>11879.81</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>G8 + EU as % of World Total</b>	<b>72.55</b>	<b>75.74</b>	<b>74.39</b>	<b>N/A</b>

*Notes:* The data includes the countries of the European Union represented for the year in question.

*Source:* World Bank World Development Indicators, adjusted to 2000 base and estimated and projected values developed by the Economic Research Service.

**B. Price Watch Indicators**

Date	C\$/US\$	Gold	Oil
2007:			
070709M	95.27	662.50	72.19
070814T	93.75	679.70	72.38
070907F	94.83	709.70	76.70
071001M	100.87	754.10	80.24
071101R	105.12	793.70	93.49
071203M	99.98	794.70	89.31
2008:			
080102W	100.73	860.00	99.62
080201F	100.60	913.50	88.96
080303M	101.18	984.20	102.45
080401T	97.88	887.80	100.98
080501R	98.11	850.90	112.52
2008 June:			
080602M	99.88	897.00	127.76
080616M	97.80	886.30	134.61
080617T	98.32	886.90	134.01
080618W	98.22	893.50	136.68
080619R	98.50	904.20	131.93
080620F	98.31	903.70	134.62
080623M	98.40	887.20	136.74
080624T	98.86	891.60	137.00
080626R	98.71	915.10	139.64
080627F	98.95	931.30	140.21
2008 July			
080702W	98.69	946.50	143.57
080703R	98.16	933.60	145.29
080704F	98.04	930.75	144.10

## Notes:

In January 2002, Canada needed CAD 1.61 to buy a USD.

On October 1, 2007, the CAD reached 1.009 intraday, the highest level since November 22, 1976.

## Appendix K: Common Purpose

### A. Reference to Democratic Principles in Host's Davos Speech

- “market liberalization”
- “I aspire for Japan to contribute to the enhancement of peace around the world as a “peace fostering nation.”
- “Japan will be fostering peace by peaceful means.”
- “Providing assistance for the development efforts of developing countries is an important means to this end.”
- “Peace is a primary prerequisite for development.”
- “Peacebuilding is one of the pillars of Japan’s policies as a “peace fostering nation,” the concept of which I have been promoting.”
- “Japan has already been vigorously working towards cooperation for countries’ rehabilitation and reconstruction.”
- “Furthermore, we will be extending new cooperation to PKO centres around Africa in order to enhance Africa’s own peacekeeping capacities.”
- “You can see that this principle of ‘self-reliance and mutual cooperation’ is exemplified here in very concrete terms, namely that your own peace comes through your own efforts, and Japan supports Africa in its efforts to attain peace.”

### B. Freedom House Scores for Participants in the 2008 G8 Summit

Country	PR	CL	Status	Electoral Process	Political Pluralism and Participation	Functioning of Government	Freedom of Expression and Belief	Associational and Organization Rights
Algeria	6	5	NF	4	4	3	7	6
Australia	1	1	F	12	15	12	16	12
Brazil	2	2	F	11	14	6	15	10
Canada	1	1	F	12	16	12	16	12
China	7	6	NF	0	1	1	4	2
Egypt	7	6	NF	1	4	2	6	2
Ethiopia	5	5	PF	5	5	4	7	3
France	1	1	F	12	15	11	15	12
Germany	1	1	F	12	15	12	15	12
Ghana	1	2	F	12	15	10	14	11
India	2	3	F	11	14	9	13	10
Indonesia	2	3	F	11	13	6	10	9
Italy	1	1	F	12	15	11	15	12
Japan	1	2	F	12	15	10	13	10
Mexico	2	2	F	10	14	9	14	10
Nigeria	4	4	PF	6	9	6	11	7
Russia	6	5	NF	3	5	3	8	4



Senegal	2	3	F	11	13	9	15	10
South Africa	2	2	F	12	14	9	15	12
South Korea	1	2	F	11	15	10	14	12
Tanzania	4	3	PF	6	10	6	11	7
United Kingdom	1	1	F	12	16	12	16	12
United States	1	1	F	11	16	11	16	10

G8 Average	1.625	1.625	7F, 1NF	10.75	14.125	10.25	14.25	10.5
O5 Average	3	3	4F, 1NF	8.8	11.4	6.8	12.2	8.8
Other Participants Average	3.3	3,4	5F, 3PF, 2NF	7.9	10.3	6.8	11.1	7.9
Non-G8 members Average	3.2	3.23	9F, 3PF, 3NF	8.2	10.67	6.8	11.47	8.2
Difference between G8 and non-members	- 1.575	- 1.605	87.5% vs. 60%*	2.55	3.453	3.45	2.78	2.3

Notes:

All numbers come from Freedom House and further information about countries and the methodology can be found at <[www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)>

PR=Political Rights; CL=Civil Liberties; Statuses: F=Free; PF=Partly Free; NF=Not Free

\*Represents number of Free countries over the total number of countries measured.

### Appendix L: Political Control, Capital, Capacity

	Total	Average	USA	JAP	GER	BRI	FRA	ITA	CAN	RUS	EU
LE	20 years and 8 months	2 years and 3-4 months	04/11	05/09	05/09	05/05	07/04-05	08/04	06/01	08/03	04/07
NE			08/11	x09	x09*	x10/06	x12	N/A	x11	12/03	N/A
EC											
LC											
IC											
SC											
LA											
PA											
PP											
IP											
GP											

SE												
ME												
PE												
IE												

LE = Last Election (Year/Month). X=the election must be held by that year. \*=according to predictions.  
 NE = Next Election (rounded in years). If there are no set elections than the last possible date is applied.  
 EC = Executive Control  
 LC = Legislative Control  
 IC = Institutional Control  
 SC = Sub-federal Unit Control (States/Provinces)  
 LA = Leaders approval  
 PA = Governing Party Approval  
 PP = G8 Partner Country Popularity in G8 Countries  
 IP = G8 Priority Issues Popularity  
 GP = G8 Institution's Popularity in Member Countries  
 SE =  
 ME =  
 PE =  
 IE =

**A. Political Control**

A1. Last (Recent and Current) Election: Date from previous election

A2. Next Election: Date

Japan: (0-8 months from May); could come at any time, widely thought it would come just after summit

Canada: (0-19 months from May); October 19, 2009

United States: (8 months from May); November 4, 2008

Germany: Autumn 2009

Britain: Mid 2010

A3. Executive/Party Control of Leader (Coalition/Factions)

A4. Legislative Control

A5. Institutional Control

Central Bank

Subfederal Units

Supra-nationally ceded Policy Areas

**B. Political Capital**

B1. Leaders Popularity (Personal and Party Approval)

Japan:

United States: Historic low

Germany:

Britain: Historic low. In September 2007, Labour stood at 43% to the main opposition Conservatives at 32%. However, following its historic defeat in local election in late April, by May Labour had dropped to 23% — the worst ever since polling had come to Britain in the 1930s — compared to the Conservatives 49% (YouGov poll taken the first week in May showed).

France:

Italy:

Canada:

Russia: Within Russia, a GlobeScan poll from October 31, 2007, to January 25, 2008, found that Russians, in sharp contrast to their fellow G8 citizens (see below), saw Putin as having a positive influence on Russia's foreign relations (86%), quality of life (77%), world peace and security (76%), Russia's energy role (72%), and democracy in Russia (64%) (BBC World Service 2008).

European Union:

B2. G8 Issues' Popularity

B3. G8 Partners' Popularity

B4. G8 Institutions' Popularity

### ***C. Political Capacity***

C1. Summit Experience (SE)

C2. Ministerial Experience (ME)

C3. Professional Experience (PE)

C4. International Experience (I.E)

Appendix M: Constricted, Controlled, Continuous Participation

	LOC	DAY	OUD	OUN	DIV	CIN
1975	LOD	(6+Min)	0	0		
1976	LOD	(7+Min)	0	0		
1977	CAP	(8+Min)	0	0		
1978	CAP					
1979	CAP					
1980	PRO					
1981	LOD					
1982	CAP					
1983	LOD					
1984	CAP					
1985	CAP					
1986	CAP					
1987	PRO					
1988	PRO					
1989	CAP		0 (Dinner)			
1990	PRO					
1991	CAP					
1992	PRO					
1993	CAP					
1994	PRO					
1995	PRO					
1996	PRO					
1997	PRO					
1998	PRO					
1999	PRO					
2000	LOD					
2001	PRO					
2002	LOD					
2003	LOD					
2004	LOD					
2005	LOD					
2006	PRO					
2007	LOD	(9)				
2008	LOD	1 (9)				

LOC = Location: LOD = Lodge, CAP = Capital City, PRO = Provincial City  
 DAY = Days alone at Eight  
 OUD = Days with Outreach Participants  
 OUN = Number of Outreach Participants in Summit  
 DIV = Diversity of Outreach Country Participants  
 CIN = Number of Civil Society Persons Around Summit Site

## Appendix N: Participation

### A. G8 Membership in G8 Summit

1975 United States, Britain, France, Germany  
1975 Japan, Italy  
1976 Canada  
1977 European Community 9  
1981 European Community 10  
1982 Belgium\* (1987, 1993, 2001)  
1986 European Community 12, Netherlands\* (1991, 1997)  
1995 European Union 15  
2002 Spain\*  
2003 Greece\*  
2004 European Union 25, Ireland\*  
2006 Finland\*  
2007 European Union 27

Total Countries = 32 Members: 9 + 6 European Union outside presidencies + European Union 27

## B. Participation of Multilateral Organizations in G8 Summits

UN	7	1996	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2006	2007
World Bank	5	1996	2000	2001		2003	2005		2007
IMF	4	1996				2003	2005		2007
WTO	4	1996	2000	2001			2005		
IEA	3						2005	2006	2007
African Union	3						2005	2006	2007
WHO	2			2001				2006	
IAEA	1							2006	
UNESCO	1							2006	
OECD	1								2007
CIS	1								2007
Total	11								

### C. Participating Countries in G8 Summit

South Africa	9	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Nigeria	8	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
Algeria	8	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
Senegal	8	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005		2007	2008
China	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
India	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Brazil	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Mexico	5				2003		2005	2006	2007	2008
Ghana	4					2004	2005		2007	2008
Egypt	2				2003				2007	
Ethiopia	2						2005			2008
Tanzania	2						2005			2008
Bangladesh	1		2001							
Mali	1		2001							
El Salvador	1		2001							
Morocco <sup>a</sup>	1				2003					
Saudi Arabia	1				2003					
Malaysia	1				2003					
Switzerland	1				2003					
Afghanistan	1					2004				
Bahrain	1					2004				
Iraq	1					2004				
Jordan	1					2004				
Turkey	1					2004				
Yemen	1					2004				
Uganda	1					2004				
Congo <sup>b</sup>	1							2006		
Kazakhstan <sup>c</sup>	1							2006		
Australia	1									2008
Indonesia	1									2008
South Korea	1									2008
Total <sup>d</sup>	35									

- a. Representing the G77.
- b. Representing the African Union.
- c. Representing the Commonwealth of Independent States
- d. Does not include outside presidencies of the European Union.

#### Okinawa 2000 (4): (Average Experience = 1st) (Experience / Number = 0.25)

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (1)

Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1)

Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (1)

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (1)

**Genoa 2001 (4): (Average Experience = 2nd) (Experience / Number = 0.50)**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (2)  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (2)  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (2)  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (2)

**Kananaskis 2002 (4): (Average Experience = 3rd) (Experience / Number = 0.75)**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (3)  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (3)  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (3)  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (3)

**Evian 2003 (13): (Average Experience = 1.8rst) (Experience / Number = 0.14)**

Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt (1)  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria (4)  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (4)  
Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa (4)  
H.M. King Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Chair of the Group of 77 (1)  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (4)  
Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States (1)  
Pascal Couchepin, President of the Swiss Confederation (1)  
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (1)  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (1)  
Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia (1)  
Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia (1)  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (1)

**Sea Island 2004 (12): (Average Experience = 2.3nd) (Experience / Number = 0.19)**

Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan (1)  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria (5)  
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, King of Bahrain (1)  
Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, President of Iraq (1)  
Abdallah II, King of Jordan (1)  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey (1)  
Ali Abdallah Salih, President of Yemen (1)  
John Agyekum Kufour, President of Ghana (1)  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria (5)  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal (5)  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, President of South Africa (5)  
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda (1)

**Gleneagles 2005 (11): (Average Experience = 3.2rd) (Experience / Number = 0.29)**

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria (6)  
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (2)  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (2)  
Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1)  
John Agyekum Kufour, President of the Republic of Ghana (2)  
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (1)  
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States (2)  
Olusegun Obasanjo GCB, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (6)  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal (6)  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa (6)  
Benjamin William Mpkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania (1)

**St. Petersburg 2006 (5): (Average Experience = 3.6rd) (Experience / Number = 0.72)**

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil (3)  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China (3)  
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States (3)  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa (7)  
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India (2)



**Heligendamm 2007 (10): (Average Experience = 4th) (Experience / Number = 0.40)**

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Brazil (4)  
Felipe Calderon Hinojosa, Mexico (1)  
Hu Jintao, China (4)  
Thabo Mbeki, South Africa (8)  
Manmohan Singh, India (3)  
Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, Egypt (2)  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria (7)  
Umaru Yar'Adua, Nigeria (1)  
Abdoulaye Wade, Senegal (7)  
John A. Kufuor, Ghana (3)

Notes:

1. In 2000, the invited participants met with G8 leaders just prior to the summit in Tokyo, rather than at the summit site in Okinawa itself.
2. In 1993, the Japanese invited the leader of Indonesia to Tokyo for a pre-summit meeting, where he met with the Japanese chair and US President Clinton, who flew in early for the event.
3. In 1989, the French President invited to a pre-summit meeting with him the leaders of the following countries: Algeria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cyprus, Gabon, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zimbabwe
4. The number in brackets after each leader indicates the number of summits s/he attended, including the current one.

#### **D. Civil Society Involvement in G8 Summit**

- 1984 The Other Economic Summit conference near summit site
- 1988 G8 Research Group: Conferences, Website (1996-), Compliance Report (1996-)
- 1998 Jubilee 2000 ad hoc coalition meets Tony Blair as host during summit
- 2002 Forum International de Montréal starts global civil society-G8 sherpa meetings
- 2002 Legislative Lower House Speakers annual meeting starts
- 2005 Commission for Africa with multi-stakeholder membership
- 2005 Make Poverty History Campaign, Live 8 Concert engage 1 billion citizens
- 2005 Junior 8 (J8) secondary school students meet leaders during summit
- 2005 Religious Leaders Summit starts
- 2006 Civil 8 formed to advise Russian presidency
- 2006 Media news agencies form Moscow Club to meet with G8 minister annually
- 2007 Academic 8 of university presidents

Includes collective action by G8 bodies aimed at the G8 itself at the time and place of, or as part of the lead up to, of the summit itself. Excludes activity within member countries or lead up lobbying of host and member governments by international bodies representing business, labour, agriculture, etc.

## **Appendix O: Official Levels Bodies Created in 2008**

- 2008 New body to coordinate the activities of G8 nations in Afghanistan
- 2008 Toyako-Dialogue

## **Appendix P: Money Mobilized in 2008**

Climate Change Fund: \$10 billion

Sudan peace building: \$200 million

Safety around Chernobyl: \$470 million