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The Strong Symbolic Performance at the 2024 G7 Special Kyiv Summit
John Kirton, G7 Research Group
February 24, 2024
On February 24, 2024, on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, G7 leaders held a special summit, for the first time in hybrid form in and from the capital city – Kyiv – of a country under the threat of constant Russian attack. The leaders produced a strong performance, due to the surprising attendance of G7 host Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni along with Justin Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, and Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, standing at the side of Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky, and by the G7 leaders' concluding consensus statement with its 36 commitments to support Ukraine for "as long as it takes" to win the war. The picture of the physical presence of G7 leaders and their summit in Kyiv, as much as their promises on paper, showed that the G7 had come a long way to helping Ukraine win its war since its start on February 24, 2022, and that they could and would go all the way to win it in the end.
Four days after the death of imprisoned Russian dissident Alexi Navalny on Thursday, February 16, 2024, the Italian presidency announced that G7 leaders would hold a virtual special summit on Saturday, February 24, focused on support for Ukraine, and held on the second anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. President Zelensky was invited to participate. A joint declaration would appear at the end.
The meeting was scheduled for an hour and a half in the afternoon and would issue a joint statement on Ukraine. It was expected to agree on new sanctions, based on a new package from the EU and US approval of sanctions, as Italy believed Russia was suffering from the G7's economic sanctions (Pascale 2024).
On the morning of February 24, Meloni, von der Leyen, Trudeau, Zelensky and Alexander De Croo, prime minister of Belgium, which holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union, participated in a ceremony at Hostemel Airport to honour those who had fought there two years before. In a speech Meloni emphasized that the Ukrainians who defended the airport "also defended us" and "that this land is a piece of our home, and that we will do our part to defend it" (Meloni 2024).
Attendance at the hybrid G7 summit, starting at 16h00 CET was almost complete. Meloni, Trudeau and von der Leyen arrived on Saturday morning, and only then was their presence announced for security reasons (Anadolu Staff 2024). They were joined by Zelensky. Participating online were all the other G7 leaders except French president Emmanuel Macron, who had to attend an agricultural fair at home to meet protesting French farmers there; France was represented by foreign minister Stéphane Séjourné. As the first G7 summit ever held without all leaders participating, it showed the strong constraint imposed by domestic political dissatisfaction in 2024.
At the summit's end, G7 leaders issued a statement of five pages, 18 paragraphs and 1,813 words. It exclusively addressed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and developments within Russia itself, led by the murder of Navalny just over a week before.
In their statement, G7 leaders affirmed their distinctive foundational missions of protecting and promoting democracy and human rights seven times, both in Ukraine and Russia. Four affirmations were of democracy and three of human rights.
The statement contained 35 precise, future-oriented, politically obligatory commitments (see Appendix A). All addressed Russia's invasion of Ukraine and developments within Russia and the support Russia received from North Korea, Iran and China. This decision-making performance compared with that of the German-hosted G7 summit on February 24, 2022, which produced 52 commitments across 15 subjects, including one on Russia's invasion of Ukraine that day. Kyiv's 36 commitments were also fewer than the 39 produced by the Japanese-hosted G7 summit on February 24, 2023, almost all of which were on Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Kyiv Summit's fewer and more focused commitments were caused by the summit's hybrid format and location in the capital city of a country at war with Russia, vulnerable to a deadly missile attack from Russia at any time. This setting required strong, simple, singularly focused commitments, all about the clear and present danger at hand.
Propelling the Kyiv Summit to this strong performance were the 11 physical shocks, highlighted in the G7 leaders' statement. Eight of those shocks addressed Russia's aggression, brutal attacks, atrocities and threatened use of nuclear weapons. The remaining three referred to the murder of Alexi Navalny.
Anadolu Staff (2024), "Italy's premier to lead G7 leaders' videoconference meeting from Kiev," Anadolu Agency, February 24.
Meloni, Giorgia (2024), "President Meloni's speech at Hostomel airport on second anniversary of Russia's aggression against Ukraine," Italian Government Presidency of the Council of Ministers, February 24.
Pascale, Federica (2024). "Italians increasingly sceptical of EU's positive role in Ukraine war," Euractiv, February 22.
2024V-01 [We the Leaders of the Group of Seven [G7] met today with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to] reaffirm our unwavering support for Ukraine
2024V-02 We will hold those culpable for Navalny's death accountable, including by continuing to impose restrictive measures in response to human rights violations and abuses in Russia and taking other actions.
2024V-03 We will continue to support Ukraine's right to self-defence and reiterate our commitment to Ukraine's long-term security, including by concluding and implementing bilateral security commitments and arrangements, based on the Joint Declaration of Support for Ukraine we endorsed in Vilnius last July.
2024V-04 We are stepping up our security assistance to Ukraine and are increasing our production and delivery capabilities, to assist the country.
2024V-05 We will help Ukraine meet its urgent financing needs,
2024V-06 [We will help Ukraine meet its urgent financing needs,] and assist other vulnerable countries severely affected by the impacts of Russia's war.
2024V-07 We urge the approval of additional support to close Ukraine's remaining budget gap for 2024.
2024V-08 We will continue to work, with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine
2024V-09 [We will continue to work, with the Ukrainian authorities and International Financial Institutions through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine] and by leveraging private investments.
2024V-10 We will never recognise so-called "elections", past and future, held by Russia in the territories of Ukraine, nor their results.
2024V-11 We remain committed to holding those responsible accountable for their atrocities against the people of Ukraine, in line with international law.
2024V-12 We support investigations by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, the Prosecutor-General of Ukraine, and other national prosecutors within their jurisdictions.
2024V-13 Finally, we will continue to support Ukrainian displaced persons and refugees and protect those in need.
2024V-14 We reiterate our support for the Council of Europe Register of Damage for Ukraine.
2024V-15 We will continue to help Ukraine export its grain and agricultural products to the most vulnerable nations, including through the implementation of the Grain Verification Scheme that Ukraine will lead this year.
2024V-16 We will continue to raise the cost of Russia's war, degrade Russia's sources of revenue and impede its efforts to build its war machine, as demonstrated by our recently approved sanctions packages.
2024V-17 We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia and adopting new measures as necessary.
2024V-18 We remain committed to fully implementing and enforcing our sanctions on Russia] and adopting new measures as necessary.
2024V-19 We continue to counter, in close cooperation with third countries, any attempts to evade and circumvent our sanctions and export control measures.
2024V-20 We will impose additional sanctions on companies and individuals in third countries who help Russia acquire weapons or key inputs for weapons.
2024V-21 We will also impose sanctions on those who help Russia acquire tools and other equipment that aid Russian weapons production or military-industrial development.
2024V-22 We will continue to apply significant pressure on Russian revenues from energy and other commodities.
2024V-23 We will continue to take steps to tighten compliance and enforcement of the oil price cap.
2024V-24 While working to maintain supply stability, we will respond to price cap violations, including by imposing additional sanctions measures on those engaged in deceptive practices while transporting Russian oil and against the networks Russia has developed to extract additional revenue from price cap violations.
2024V-25 We will continue taking steps to limit Russia's future energy revenues.
2024V-26 We will continue to impede Russia's development of future energy projects and disrupt its development of alternatives for energy shipping and other services.
2024V-27 We will continue efforts to reduce Russia's revenues from metals.
2024V-28 We will continue to take action against third-country actors who materially support Russia's war including by imposing additional measures on entities, where appropriate, in third countries.
2024V-29 We call on financial institutions to refrain from supporting Russia's war machine and we will take appropriate steps, consistent with our legal systems, to deter this behaviour.
2024V-30 We are determined to dispel any false notion that time is on Russia's side, that destroying infrastructure and livelihoods has no consequences for Russia, or that Russia could prevail by causing Ukraine to fail economically. Russia should not be able to indefinitely delay payment it owes.
2024V-31 We are determined to ensure full accountability and we support Ukraine in obtaining compensation for the loss, injury and damage resulting from Russia's aggression.
2024V-32 We reaffirm that, consistent with our respective legal systems, Russia's sovereign assets in our jurisdictions will remain immobilized until Russia pays for the damage it caused to Ukraine.
2024V-33 We welcome the adoption of the EU legal acts concerning extraordinary revenues of central securities depositories gained from Russia's immobilised sovereign assets and encourage further steps to enable their use, consistent with applicable contractual obligations and in accordance with applicable laws.
2024V-34 We ask our ministers to continue their work and update ahead of the Apulia Summit on all possible avenues by which immobilized Russian sovereign assets could be made use of to support Ukraine, consistent with our respective legal systems and international law.
2024V-35 As we move forward, we continue our support to Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula
2024V-36 [We continue our support to Ukraine in further developing President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula] and commit ourselves to supporting a comprehensive, just and lasting peace consistent with the principles of the UN Charter, international law and respectful of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.
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