

# The G8 Summit Communiqués on Nuclear Energy, 1975-2007

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## Summary of Nuclear Energy References in G8 Summit Communiqués

Year	Total NE Words	% of Overall Words	Total NE Paragraphs	% of Overall Paragraphs	Total Documents with NE	% of Overall Documents	Total Dedicated NE Documents	% of Overall Sections
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	254	9.6	2	4	2	33.3	0	0
1978	129	4.5	1	2	1	50	0	0
1979	280	13.4	6	15.8	1	50	0	0
1980	510	12.9	4	7.3	1	20	0	0
1981	103	3.3	2	3.8	1	33.3	0	0
1982	97	5.5	1	3.7	1	50	0	0
1983	77	3.6	1	2.2	1	50	0	0
1984	79	2.5	1	1.5	1	20	0	0
1985	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	297	8.4	4	8.3	1	25	1	25
1987	31	0.6	1	1.1	1	14.3	0	0
1988	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1989	45	0.6	1	0.7	1	9.1	0	0
1990	222	2.7	5	3.6	3	75	0	0
1991	465	4.7	13	7.2	4	80	0	0
1992	1036	13.9	24	15.1	3	75	0	0
1993	321	6.4	5	6.1	2	66.7	0	0
1994	692	16.7	10	10.4	2	100	0	0
1995	323	2.6	4	1.5	2	50	0	0
1996	802	3.8	6	2.9	2	28.6	0	0
1997	889	4.8	10	3.4	3	50	0	0
1998	473	7.8	3	3.1	1	25	0	0
1999	428	2.9	5	1.7	2	50	0	0
2000	219	1.6	4	1	2	40	0	0
2001	27	0.4	1	0.7	1	10	0	0
2002	827	6.9	18	4.1	1	12.5	0	0
2003	265	1.1	6	4.6	2	11.8	0	0
2004	879	2.1	7	0.9	2	9.1	1	4.5
2005	52	0.2	1	0.1	1	2.7	0	0
2006	3609	7.4	64	6.4	10	40	2	8
2007	3561	10.3	35	6.7	7	58.3	4	33.3
Average	1372.5	5	20.6	4.1	2.5	35.6	0.4	2.2

Note: The chart accounts for all official documents. Only documents with an English version were included in the calculations. Charts are excluded from the calculations.

\*\*"Total NE Words" refers to the number nuclear energy subjects within the official documents for the year specified. The words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis. This number excludes document titles as well as references.

\*\*% of Overall Words" refers to "Total NE Words" as a percentage of the total number of words contained in all official documents for the year specified.

\*\*"Total NE Paragraphs" refers to the number of paragraphs nuclear energy subjects are mentioned within the official documents for the year specified. Each point expressed in the documents is recorded as a separate paragraph.

\*\*% of Overall Paragraphs" refers to "Total NE Paragraphs" as a percentage of the total number of paragraphs within the official documents for the year specified.

\*\*"Total Documents with NE" refers to the number of documents that contain nuclear energy subjects but the document itself is not dedicated to climate change.

\*\*% of Overall Documents" refers to the "Total Documents with NE" as a percentage of the total number of official documents contained in the year specified.

\*\*"Total Dedicated NE Documents" refers to the number of documents that contain a nuclear energy subject in its title.

\*\*% of Overall Sections" refers to "Total Dedicated E Documents" as a percentage of the total number of sections within the official documents for the year specified.

### **Introduction:**

This document is derived from the Leaders' Communiqués and other documents released at the annual G8 Summit since its inception in 1975 at Rambouillet, and it catalogues references to nuclear energy up to and including the 2005 Gleneagles Summit. A list of terms that were included and excluded can be found in Appendix B.

### **The Nuclear Energy Issue Area Defined:**

As an issue area within the G8, nuclear energy is considered one of the four primary component areas of energy. This catalogue focuses on discussion of nuclear power and the need for high safety measures. It excludes discussion of nuclear energy for proliferation means.

### **Coding Rules:**

The unit of analysis is the paragraph/sentence.

Need a direct reference to **nuclear energy** or a cognate term.

Cognate or extended terms can be used without a direct reference to “**nuclear energy**” if they have previously been directly associated together in Summit communiqué history.

## The Nuclear Energy Catalogue:

**1975 (0 Paragraph, 0 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

None.

**1976 (0 Paragraph, 0 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

None.

**1977 (3 Paragraph, 4 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

### *Communiqué:*

We will further conserve energy and increase and diversify energy production, so that we reduce our dependence on oil. We agree on the need to increase **nuclear energy** to help meet the world's energy requirements. We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. We are launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfill these purposes.

### *Appendix to Downing Street Summit Declaration*

#### *ENERGY*

We are committed to national and joint efforts to limit energy demand and to increase and diversify supplies. There will need to be greater exchanges of technology and joint research and development aimed at more efficient energy use, improved recovery and use of coal and other conventional resources, and the development of **new energy sources**.

Increasing reliance will have to be placed on **nuclear energy** to satisfy growing energy requirements and to help **diversify sources of energy**. This should be done with the utmost precaution with respect to the generation and dissemination of material that can be used for nuclear weapons. Our objective is to meet the world's energy needs and to make **peaceful use of nuclear energy** widely available, while avoiding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. We are also agreed that, in order to be effective, nonproliferation policies should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike. To this end, we are undertaking a preliminary analysis to be completed within two months of the best means of advancing these objectives, including the study of terms of reference for international fuel cycle evaluation.

**1978 (1 Paragraph, 5 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

### *Communiqué:*

#### *ENERGY*

The further development of **nuclear energy** is indispensable, and the slippage in the execution of **nuclear power programs** must be reversed. To promote the peaceful use of

**nuclear energy** and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, the **nuclear fuel cycle studies** initiated at the London Summit should be pursued. The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada have expressed their firm intention to continue as reliable suppliers of **nuclear fuel** within the framework of effective **safeguards**. The President intends to use the full powers of his office to prevent any interruption of **enriched uranium supply** and to ensure that existing agreements will be respected. The Prime Minister intends that there shall be no interruption of Canadian **uranium supply** on the basis of effective **safeguards**.

**1979 (6 Paragraph, 7 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

*Communiqué:*

Japan adopts as a 1985 target a level not to exceed the range between 6.3 and 6.9 million barrels a day. Japan will review this target periodically and make it more precise in the light of current developments and growth projections, and do their utmost to reduce oil imports through conservation, rationalization of use and intensive development of **alternative energy sources** in order to move toward lower figures.

These 1985 goals will serve as reference to monitor both energy conservation and the development of **alternative energy sources**.

We need to expand **alternative sources of energy**, especially those which will help to prevent further pollution, particularly increases of carbon dioxide and sulphur oxides in the atmosphere.

Without the expansion of **nuclear power** generating capacity in the coming decades, economic growth and higher employment will be hard to achieve. This must be done under conditions guaranteeing our peoples' safety. We will cooperate to this end. The **International Atomic Energy Agency** can play a key role in this regard.

We reaffirm the understanding reached at the Bonn Summit with respect to the reliable supply of **nuclear fuel** and minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

New technologies in the field of energy are the key to the world's longerterm freedom from fuel crises. Large public and private resources will be required for the development and commercial application of those technologies. We will ensure that these resources are made available. An **International Energy Technology Group** linked to the OECD, IEA and other appropriate international organizations will be created to review the actions being taken or planned domestically by each of our countries, and to report on the need and potential for international collaboration, including financing.

**1980 (4 Paragraph, 12 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

**Communiqué:**

**ENERGY**

We must break the existing link between economic growth and consumption of oil, and we mean to do so in this decade. This strategy requires conserving oil and substantially increasing production and use of **alternative energy sources**. To this end, maximum reliance should be placed on the price mechanism, and domestic prices for oil should take into account representative world prices. Market forces should be supplemented, where appropriate, by effective fiscal incentives and administrative measures. Energy investment will contribute substantially to economic growth and employment.

We welcome the recent decisions of the European Community (EC), the **International Energy Agency (IEA)** and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding the need for longterm structural changes to reduce oil consumption, continuing procedures to monitor progress, the possible use of oil ceilings to deal with tight market conditions, and coordination of stock policies to mitigate the effect of market disruption. We note that the member countries of the **IEA** have agreed that their energy policies should result in their collective 1985 net oil imports being substantially less than their existing 1985 group objective, and that they will quantify the reduction as part of their continuing monitoring efforts. The potential for reduction has been estimated by the **IEA** Secretariat, given existing uncertainties, at around 4 million barrels a day (MBD).

We underline the vital contribution of **nuclear power** to a more secure energy supply. The role of **nuclear energy** has to be increased if world energy needs are to be met. We shall therefore have to expand our **nuclear** generating capacity. We will continue to give the highest priority to ensuring the health and safety of the public and to perfecting methods for dealing with spent fuels and disposal of **nuclear waste**. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of **nuclear fuel** and minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

The studies made by the **International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group**, launched at the London Summit in 1977, are a significant contribution to the use of **nuclear energy**. We welcome their findings with respect to: increasing predictable supplies; the most effective utilization of **uranium sources**, including the development of advanced technologies; and the minimization of proliferation risks, including support of **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** safeguards. We urge all countries to take these findings into account when developing policies and programs for the peaceful use of **nuclear energy**.

We will actively support the recommendations of the **International Energy Technology Group**, proposed at the Tokyo Summit last year, for bringing new energy technologies into commercial use at the earliest feasible time. As far as national programs are concerned, we will by mid1981 adopt a twophased approach; first, listing the numbers and types of commercial scale plants to be constructed in each of our countries by the

mid1980s, and, second, indicating quantitative projections for expanding production by 1990, 1995 and 2000, as a basis for future actions. As far as international programs are concerned, we will join others in creating an international team to promote collaboration among interested nations on specific projects.

***1981 (2 Paragraph, 4 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)***

***Communiqué:***

*ENERGY*

In most of our countries progress in constructing new **nuclear facilities** is slow. We intend in each of our countries to encourage greater public acceptance of **nuclear energy**, and respond to public concerns about safety, health, **nuclear waste management** and nonproliferation. We will further our efforts in the development of advanced technologies, particularly in spent fuel management.

We also intend to see to it that we develop to the fullest possible extent sources of renewable energy such as solar, geothermal and biomass energy. We will work for practical achievements at the forthcoming **United Nations Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy**.

***1982 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)***

***Communiqué:***

*[ENERGY]*

-- The progress we have already made does not diminish the need for continuing efforts to economize on energy, particularly through the price mechanism, and to promote **alternative sources**, including **nuclear energy** and coal, in a longterm perspective. These efforts will enable us further to reduce our vulnerability to interruptions in the supply of energy and instability of prices. Cooperation to develop new energy technologies, and to strengthen our capacity to deal with disruptions, can contribute to our common energy security. We shall also work to strengthen our cooperation with both oilexporting and oilimporting developing countries.

***1983 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)***

***Communiqué:***

We all share the view that more predictability and less volatility in oil prices would be helpful to world economic prospects. We agree that the fall in oil prices in no way diminishes the importance and urgency of efforts to conserve energy, to develop economic **alternative energy sources**, to maintain and, where possible, improve contacts

between oil-exporting and importing countries, and to encourage the growth of indigenous energy production in developing countries which at present lack it.

**1984 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

*Communiqué:*

We have considered the possible implications of a further deterioration of the situation in the Gulf for the supply of oil. We are satisfied that, given the stocks of oil presently available in the world, the availability of **other sources of energy**, and the scope for conservation in the use of energy, adequate supplies could be maintained for a substantial period of time by international cooperation and mutually supportive action. We will continue to act together to that end.

**1985 (0 Paragraph, 0 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

None.

**1986 (4 Paragraph, 9 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

*Statement on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident*

We, the Heads of State or Government of seven major industrial nations and the Representatives of the European Community, have discussed the implications of the accident at the **Chernobyl nuclear power station**. We express our deep sympathy for those affected. We remain ready to extend assistance, in particular medical and technical, as and when requested.

**Nuclear power** is and, properly managed, will continue to be an increasingly widely used source of energy. For each country the maintenance of **safety and security** is an international responsibility, and each country engaged in **nuclear power generation** bears full responsibility for the safety of the design, manufacture, operation and maintenance of its installations. Each of our countries meets exacting **standards**. Each country, furthermore, is responsible for prompt provision of detailed and complete information on **nuclear emergencies and accidents**, in particular those with potential transboundary consequences. Each of our countries accepts that responsibility, and we urge the Government of the Soviet Union, which did not do so in the case of **Chernobyl**, to provide urgently such information, as our [countries] and other countries have requested.

We note with satisfaction the Soviet Union's willingness to undertake discussions this week with the Director-General of the **International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)**. We expect that these discussions will lead to the Soviet Union's participation in the desired post-accident analysis.

We welcome and encourage the work of the **IAEA** in seeking to improve international cooperation on the safety of **nuclear installations**, the handling of **nuclear accidents** and their consequences, and the provision of mutual emergency assistance. Moving forward from the relevant **IAEA** guidelines, we urge the early elaboration of an international convention committing the parties to report and exchange information in the event of **nuclear emergencies or accidents**. This should be done with the least possible delay.

**1987 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

*Communiqué:*

*Environment*

We welcome the important progress achieved since Tokyo, particularly in the **International Atomic Energy Agency**, in enhancing effective international cooperation with regard to safety in the management of **nuclear energy**.

**1988 (0 Paragraph, 0 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

None.

**1989 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

*Communiqué:*

*Environment*

We are committed to maintaining the highest safety standards for **nuclear power plants** and to strengthening international cooperation in safe operation of **power plants** and waste management, and we recognize that **nuclear power** also plays an important role in limiting output of greenhouse gases.

**1990 (5 Paragraph, 7 Sentence, 1 Priority Placement)**

*Communiqué:*

*THE ENVIRONMENT*

To cope with energy-related environmental damage, priority must be given to improvements in energy efficiency and to the development of **alternative energy sources**. For the countries that make such a choice, **nuclear energy** will continue to be an important contributor to our energy supply and can play a significant role in reducing the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. Countries should continue efforts to ensure highest worldwide performance standards for **nuclear** and other energy in order to protect health and the environment, and ensure the highest **safety**.



*Statement on Transnational Issues:*

*Non-Proliferation*

We further endorse the EC's call for all states to apply **IAEA safeguards** on as universal a basis as possible.

We also urge **all nuclear suppliers** to adopt **nuclear export control measures** equivalent to the **Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines**.

We hope that these discussions will contribute to the achievement of as broad a consensus as possible in favor of an equitable and stable non-proliferation regime. Such a regime should be based on an indispensable balance between the non-proliferation of arms and the **development of peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy**.

*Chairman's Statement:*

The Korean peninsula remains an area of sharp concern, especially because the North has yet to sign and implement a **nuclear safeguards agreement**. We welcome the recent talks between North and South Korea and hope they mark a turning point in inter-Korean relations.

**1991 (13 Paragraph, 12 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

*Communiqué:*

*Energy*

As the Gulf crisis showed, the supply and price of oil remain vulnerable to political shocks, which disturb the world economy. But these shocks have been contained by the effective operation of the market, by the welcome increase in supplies by certain oil-exporting countries and by the actions co-ordinated by the **International Energy Agency (IEA)**, particularly the use of stocks. We are committed to strengthen the **IEA's** emergency preparedness and its supporting measures. Since the crisis has led to improved relations between producers and consumers, contacts among all market participants could be further developed to promote communication, transparency and the efficient working of market forces.

In this context, **nuclear power generation** contributes to diversifying energy sources and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. In developing **nuclear power** as an **economic energy source**, it is essential to achieve and maintain the highest available standards of **safety**, including in **waste management**, and to encourage co-operation to this end throughout the world. The safety situation in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union deserves particular attention. This is an urgent problem and we call upon the international community to develop an effective means of coordinating its response.

The commercial development of **renewable energy sources** and their integration with general energy systems should also be encouraged, because of the advantages these sources offer for environmental protection and energy security.

We all intend to take a full part in the initiative of the European Community for the establishment of a **European Energy Charter** on the basis of equal rights and obligations of signatory countries. The aim is to promote free and undistorted energy trade, to enhance security of supply, to protect the environment and to assist economic reform in Central and East European countries and the Soviet Union, especially by creating an open, non-discriminatory regime for commercial energy investment.

#### *Environment*

We call for greater efforts in co-operation in environmental science and technology, in particular:

-the development and diffusion of **energy and environment technologies**, including proposals for innovative technology programmes.

#### *Prime Minister's Statement:*

In the context of Eastern Europe - and more widely - we have discussed environmental challenges and energy. We will all take a full part in the establishment of a **European Energy Charter**.

#### *Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation:*

In the nuclear field, we:

-reaffirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable nonproliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear nonproliferation and the **development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy**;

-call on all other **non-nuclear** weapon states to submit all their **nuclear activities** to **IAEA safeguards**, which are the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime;

Each of us will also work to achieve:

-a strengthened and improved **IAEA safeguards system**;

-new measures in the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** to ensure adequate **export controls** on **dual-use items**.

**1992 (24 Paragraph, 26 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**  
**Communiqué:**

*Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe*

While we recognise the important role **nuclear power** plays in global energy supplies, the safety of Sovietdesign **nuclear power** plants gives cause for great concern. Each State, through its **safety authorities and plant operators**, is itself responsible for the safety of its **nuclear power plants**. The new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe must give high priority to eliminating this danger. These efforts should be part of a market-oriented reform of energy policies encouraging commercial financing for the development of the energy sector.

A special effort should be made to improve the **safety of these plants**. We offer the States concerned our support within the framework of a multilateral programme of action. We look to them to cooperate fully. We call upon other interested States to contribute as well.

The programme of action should comprise immediate measures in the following areas:

- operational **safety** improvements;
- nearterm **technical improvements** to **plants** based on **safety** assessments;
- enhancing **regulatory regimes**.

Such measures can achieve early and significant safety gains.

In addition, the programme of action is to create the basis for longerterm **safety improvements** by the examination of:

- the scope for replacing less safe **plants** by the development of **alternative energy sources** and the more efficient use of energy;
- the potential for **upgrading plants** of more recent design.
- Complementary to this, we will pursue the early completion of a convention on **nuclear safety**.

The programme of action should develop clear priorities, provide coherence to the measures and ensure their earliest implementation. To implement the immediate measures, the existing G-24 coordination mandate on **nuclear safety** should be extended to the new States concerned of the former Soviet Union and at the same time made more effective. We all are prepared to strengthen our bilateral assistance.

In addition, we support the setting up of a supplementary multilateral mechanism, as appropriate, to address immediate **operational safety and technical safety improvement measures** not covered by bilateral programmes. We invite the international community to contribute to the funding. The fund would take account of bilateral funding, be administered by a steering body of donors on the basis of consensus, and be coordinated with and assisted by the G-24 and the EBRD.

Decisions on **upgrading nuclear power plants** of more recent design will require prior clarification of issues concerning **plant safety, energy policy, alternative energy sources** and financing. To establish a suitable basis on which such decisions can be made, we consider the following measures necessary:

-the necessary **safety** studies should be presented without delay;

-together with the competent international organisations, in particular the **IEA**, the World Bank should prepare the required energy studies including **replacement sources of energy** and the cost implications. Based on these studies the World Bank and the EBRD should report as expeditiously as possible on potential financing requirements.

We shall review the progress made in this **action programme** at our meeting in 1993.

***Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership:***

*II.*

We urge countries not yet parties to the NPT to join. We look forward to the early adherence to the NPT as nonnuclear-weapons States of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus as well as the other non-Russian States of the former Soviet Union. We shall continue through bilateral contacts and the International Science and Technology Centres in Moscow and Kiev our efforts to inhibit the spread of expertise on weapons of mass destruction. We attach the highest importance to the establishment in the former Soviet Union of effective **export controls on nuclear materials**, weapons and other sensitive goods and technologies and will offer training and practical assistance to help achieve this.

The world needs the most effective possible action to **safeguard nuclear materials** and to detect and prevent the transfer or the illicit or clandestine production of nuclear weapons. Nuclear cooperation will in future be conditional on adherence to the NPT or an existing equivalent internationally binding agreement as well as on the adoption of fullscope **International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards**, as recently laid down by the **Nuclear Suppliers Group**. The **IAEA** must receive the resources necessary to strengthen the existing safeguards regime and to conduct effective special inspections of undeclared but suspect **nuclear sites** as one means of achieving this. We will support reference by the **IAEA** of unresolved cases of proliferation to the UN Security Council.

We reaffirm our willingness to share the benefits of **peaceful nuclear technology** with all other States, in accordance with our nonproliferation commitments.

We will continue to intensify our cooperation in the area of export controls of sensitive items in the appropriate fora to reduce threats to international security. A major element of this effort is the informal exchange of information to improve and harmonize these **export controls**.

Arms control agreements which have been signed by the former Soviet Union, in particular the START and CFE treaties, must enter into force. The full implementation of the CFE Treaty will create the foundation for the new cooperative security framework in Europe. We welcome the far-reaching follow-on agreement on strategic nuclear weapons concluded by the US and Russia in June as another major step towards a safer, more stable world. Further measures, in particular the unilaterally announced elimination of ground launched short range nuclear weapons by the United States and the former Soviet Union, should be carried out as soon as possible. We support Russia in its efforts to secure the **peaceful use of nuclear materials** resulting from the elimination of nuclear weapons. The Geneva negotiations for a convention on the effective global ban on chemical weapons must be successfully concluded this year. We call on all nations to become original signatories to this convention.

***Chairman's Statement:***

*Korea*

We are concerned about North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programme. The **IAEA Safeguards Agreement** must be fully implemented and an effective bilateral inspection regime must be put into practice.

*Latin America*

The steps Argentina and Brazil have taken to allow full inspection of their **nuclear activities**, and their decision to give effect to the Treaty of Tlateloco and to consider signing the comprehensive **safeguards agreement with the IAEA**, will be conducive to cooperation in this sphere as well.

**1993 (5 Paragraph, 8 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

***Communiqué:***

*Russia and the Other Countries in Transition*

We welcome the progress made in the **nuclear safety program** agreed at the Munich Summit, including the establishment of the multilateral fund, in which we encourage broader participation. Urgent **safety measures**, coordinated through the G24, need to be implemented rapidly to secure real improvements at the **plants** still causing great

concern. The states concerned bear the primary responsibility for respecting the fundamental principles of **nuclear safety**. Independent regulatory authorities should be strengthened and **nuclear safety** must be given higher priority in all the countries concerned, including the early closure of high risk reactors such as **Chernobyl**. We invite the World Bank, together with the **IEA**, to continue the dialogue with each of the countries concerned, and working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, to support them in developing longer term energy strategies. Our aim is to agree as quickly as possible on a framework for coordinated action by all those involved following a countrybycountry approach. We will review the progress made in 1994.

In the light of existing international obligations, we emphasize our concern over the ocean dumping of **radioactive wastes** by Russia.

***Political Declaration: Striving for a More Secure and Humane World :***

Enhanced cooperation is necessary in combatting the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles. In particular, we:

Urge North Korea to retract immediately its decision to withdraw from the NPT, and to fully comply with its nonproliferation obligations, including the implementation of **IAEA** safeguards agreement and the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula;

We also continue our efforts to strengthen the nonproliferation regimes, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, and to establish effective **export controls**. We reiterate the objectives of universal adherence to the NPT as well as the Treaty's indefinite extension in 1995 and nuclear arms reduction. We also call on those countries that have not done so to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and to accede to the Biological Weapons Convention.

**1994 (10 Paragraph, 13 Sentence, 5 Priority Placement)**

***Communiqué:***

*Nuclear safety*

We welcome the progress made in the **nuclear safety programme**, agreed by the Munich and Tokyo summits, concerning the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union.

An effective framework for coordinated action is now in place. The World Bank, working with other lending institutions including the EBRD and the EIB, and with the **IEA**, is helping countries develop long-term energy strategies. Some near-term safety improvements are on the way. More needs to be done and longer-term actions must be carried out. The IFIs are invited according to their mandate to make full use of their lending possibilities for this purpose.

We remain committed to the existing international initiatives to promote an early closure of **high risk reactors**. The closing down of the **Chernobyl nuclear power plant** is an urgent priority.

We are therefore putting forward to the Ukrainian Government an action plan for the closure of **Chernobyl**. This plan will require measures to be taken by the Ukrainian authorities as well as financial contributions from the international community.

The closure of **Chernobyl** would be accompanied by the early completion of three new **reactors** to adequate **safety standards**, by comprehensive reforms in the energy sector, increased energy conservation and the use of other energy sources.

In this context we welcome the contribution by the European Union. As a further step we are ready to provide for the **Action Plan** an initial amount of up to US \$200 million in grants, including a replenishment of the **Nuclear Safety Account** for this purpose. In addition, loans should be provided by the IFIs.

We call on other donors and international financial institutions to join us in supporting this **action plan** and will review progress regularly.

***Chairman's Statement:***

Following the death of Kim Il Sung, we must continue to seek a solution to the problem created by North Korea's decision to withdraw from the **IAEA**. We urge the DPRK to continue to engage the ROK and the international community, including a continuation of the talks with the US and going forward with the scheduled summit with the ROK. We also urge the DPRK to provide total transparency in its **nuclear program** through full and unconditional compliance with its non-proliferation obligations and to remove, once and for all, the suspicions surrounding its **nuclear activities**. We support the renewed efforts to resolve the North Korean **nuclear issue** through dialogue and we stress the importance of the DPRK's ensuring the continuity of **IAEA safeguards** and maintaining the freeze on its **nuclear program**, including no reprocessing spent fuel or **reloading its nuclear reactors**.

Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles is one of the most serious threats to international peace and security. We call upon all States that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states. We declare our unequivocal support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty in 1995. We underline the importance of continuing nuclear arms reduction, and confirm our commitment to achieve universal, verifiable and comprehensive treaties to ban nuclear tests and the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. We reaffirm our commitment for the earliest possible entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and welcome the Special Conference of States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We support full implementation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We agree to cooperate to prevent nuclear smuggling. We assign priority to the problems of anti-personnel landmines, including efforts to curb their indiscriminate use, halt their export, assist in

their clearance worldwide. We shall work together and with others for effective **export controls** to ensure that trade in armaments and sensitive **dual-use goods** is carried out responsibly. We encourage non-proliferation efforts in the Middle East and South Asia.

The meeting has also given us the opportunity for an exchange of views on the reform process in Russia, a historic task that President Yeltsin and the Russian government continue to bring forward with the confirmed support of the international community. President Yeltsin presented Russia's views on global economic and security issues. We intend to cooperate on such topics as transnational crime, money laundering, and **nuclear safety**.

### **1995 (4 Paragraph, 7 Sentence, 1 Priority Placement)**

#### ***Communiqué:***

##### *NUCLEAR SAFETY*

We affirm the importance of improving **nuclear safety** in countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States and welcome efforts and progress made to date. We will continue to support these initiatives.

Recognizing that each country is responsible for the safety of its **nuclear facilities**, we congratulate President Kuchma of Ukraine on his decision to close the **Chernobyl nuclear power plant** by the year 2000. We reaffirm the commitments of support made last year at Naples under the **G-7 Action Plan for Ukraine's Energy Sector**. We are pleased to note the replenishment of the **Nuclear Safety Account** and the commitment of additional bilateral grants for short-term **safety upgrades** and preliminary decommissioning work in anticipation of the closure of **Chernobyl**.

Recognizing the economic and social burden that the closure of **Chernobyl** will place on Ukraine, we [pledge] [will continue] efforts to mobilize international support for appropriate energy production, energy efficiency and **nuclear safety** projects for Ukraine. Any assistance for replacement power for **Chernobyl** will be based on sound economic, environmental and financial criteria. We call upon the World Bank and the EBRD to continue their co-operation with Ukraine in devising a realistic long-term energy strategy, based on the results of the EBRD-funded least-cost investment study, and to increase their financial contribution in support of appropriate energy sector reform and investment. We also call on the World Bank to mobilize private sector support for **non-nuclear energy** and energy conservation.

#### ***Chairman's Statement:***

##### *Arms Control and Disarmament*

We urge all countries to support full implementation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms, and note that Article 26 of the UN Charter calls for "the least diversion for



armaments of the world's human and economic resources". Regional organizations can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We shall work with others for effective and responsible **export controls** on arms and sensitive **dual-use goods and technologies**.

**1996 (6 Paragraph, 12 Sentence, 11 Priority Placement)**

***Communiqué:***

*VII. TOWARD SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY*

We welcome the Moscow Summit declaration relating to Ukraine and the commitment of President KUCHMA to close reactor n° 1 at **Chernobyl** by the end of 1996, in the framework of the program to close the whole **plant** by the year 2000. We reaffirm our commitment to full implementation of the Memorandum concluded with Ukraine, through close cooperation with this country and the international financial institutions. In this regard, we welcome the financial decisions already taken by the international community, and we stress that all parties concerned must respect the agreed agenda of the comprehensive program.

***Chairman's Statement:***

*Global issues*

Major issues need to be treated at a global level. All countries are liable to benefit from more security provided by a strengthened United Nations Organization and by progress made in the field of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament as well as by an efficient struggle against terrorism and transnational organized crime. All countries benefit from the enhancement of democracy and fundamental freedoms throughout the world. Protection of environment, **nuclear safety** and new types of epidemics are common challenges that must be properly handled. All countries are interested in seizing the opportunities provided by the information technologies. In this regard, we are committed to cooperate actively among ourselves and with other partners to deal with these global issues in a spirit of efficacy and solidarity.

*Non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament*

We again call upon all countries to support the continuing operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms which represents an important mechanism for promoting transparency and building confidence among countries, at a global and regional level, and note that Article 26 of the UN Charter calls for "the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources". Regional organizations can help promote transparency and confidence-building measures that reduce excessive stockpiling of conventional weapons. We welcome with satisfaction the arrangement launched at Wassenaar in December 1995 to promote transparency and greater

responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and **dual-use goods and technologies** and will cooperate on its prompt and full implementation. We welcome the results of the first Review Conference of the Treaty on Conventional armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The States Parties on that occasion renewed their commitment to ensure the integrity of the treaty and to fulfill all of its obligations. They committed themselves to launch a process of adaptation of the treaty in order to preserve its viability in the future. We salute the cooperative resolution of the CFE flank issue.

### *Nuclear safety and security*

We welcome with satisfaction the substantial progress made in the field of **nuclear safety and security at the Moscow Summit** in April of this year.

We have taken an important step toward enhancing international cooperation so that the use of **nuclear energy** is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of **nuclear safety**. We reaffirm our commitment, made in Moscow, to the highest internationally recognized **nuclear safety** level. In this regard, we underline that nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to all the principles laid down in the **Convention on Nuclear Safety** and we urge all countries to ratify this **Convention**, as soon as possible, and to participate in the peer review mechanisms. We stress the necessity of further progress in the establishment of relevant domestic legislation and in the enhancement of the international regime of **nuclear liability** as well as in the preparation of an **international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management**. We remain committed to assisting countries in transition in developing efficient and fully **safety-oriented energy policies**.

### *II. Regional situations*

We urge the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to develop the dialogue and cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), this being the only means of achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring a more stable and more secure future for the Korean People. In this context, we support the initiatives taken with a view to initiating a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement on the Korean Peninsula to replace the current Armistice Agreement, including the proposal of the US and the Republic of Korea on 16 April 1996 to convene a four-part meeting. We welcome the efforts being made within the "Agreed Framework" of 21 October 1994, in re-orienting the DPRK **nuclear program** in order to comply with its obligations under the **Non-Proliferation Treaty**. We call upon the DPRK to meet in full its commitments under its safeguards agreement with the **IAEA** and to make full disclosure of the facts concerning the history of its **nuclear program**. We call on the international community to join us in providing political and financial support for the **Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)**.

## 1997 (10 Paragraph, 21 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)

### *Communiqué:*

#### *NUCLEAR SAFETY*

We reaffirm our commitments from the **1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security** to give an absolute priority to **safety** in the use of **nuclear energy**. We note that further substantial progress is still required in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in the Newly Independent States, especially by strengthening regulatory authorities, enhancing **reactor safety** and improving **safety culture**. We consider further joint efforts to this end a major priority. In this regard, we attach the greatest importance to the full implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account** agreements.

We note with satisfaction the entry into force by the **Nuclear Safety Convention** and the preparations now underway for the first review meeting to be held in April 1999. We applaud the rapid progress made in developing the **Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management** and encourage finalization. We welcome the forthcoming adoption of the **Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention** on civil liability for **nuclear damage** and of a new Supplementary Funding Convention. These conventions will facilitate international **safety cooperation** and provide for increased compensation for victims in the event of a **nuclear accident**.

#### *NON-PROLIFERATION, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT*

Since the **Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security**, we have taken important steps to implement the agreed "Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials." We will expand participation in this program to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

#### *EXPORT CONTROL REGIMES*

We underline our support for the arrangements that make up the **international export control regimes**. The Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and, for those who are members, the **Australia Group export control regime**, all contribute critically to the global application and enforcement of international **export control norms**.

### *Foreign Ministers' Progress Report:*

#### *Illicit Nuclear Trafficking*

We commend the work of the Non-Proliferation Experts Group to fulfill the mandate granted to it at Moscow and Lyon to implement the "Program for Preventing and

Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material," agreed to at the April 1996 **Nuclear Safety and Security Summit** in Moscow.

We welcome the progress made in international efforts to develop **nuclear forensics capabilities**, under the auspices of the **IAEA**, as well as through the meetings held by the International Technical Working Group (ITWG).

### *Plutonium Management*

We welcome the conclusions of the group of experts, convened pursuant to the April 1996 **Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security** to examine options and identify possible development of international cooperation for the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Our **experts** concluded that the most timely and technically viable option is the consumption of **plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel in nuclear reactors**, and as a complementary option, the **immobilization of plutonium** in glass or ceramic form mixed with **high-level radioactive waste**. The experts also concluded that interim storage will be required, whatever longer-term management options are selected. These conclusions were also endorsed by the Non-Proliferation Experts Group last November in Paris.

We reiterate the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes. Implementation of all options should include appropriate international verification as soon as it is practicable to do so and stringent **standards of material protection, control, and accountancy**, with the objective of building confidence that surplus weapons plutonium will not again be used for nuclear explosives or diverted to unlawful purposes. In this context, we welcome the progress reported in the work in Vienna on the elaboration of the "**Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium**." We also welcome the progress reported by the United States and Russia on their efforts with the **IAEA** to agree on measures to submit to **IAEA** verification weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defense purposes.

In order to sustain and build upon the momentum generated by these initiatives, developed in the wake of the **Moscow Summit**, the Non-Proliferation Experts Group should begin discussion of possible arrangements for coordinating and implementing **plutonium management** efforts. The Non-Proliferation Experts Group should submit a report to the Heads by next year's Summit in Birmingham.

### *Confronting Global, Economic and Financial Challenges:*

#### *UKRAINE*

We have made significant progress in implementing the 1995 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ukraine on **Chernobyl Closure**. We reaffirm our commitment to assist Ukraine, within the context of the MOU, in mobilizing funds for energy projects to help meet its power needs in 2000 and beyond after **Chernobyl's**

closure. To date, projects have been agreed totaling over \$1 billion. We call upon Ukraine to continue to undertake the reforms necessary for sustainable growth, particularly in its energy sector.

We agreed on the importance of securing the environmental safety of the sarcophagus covering the remains of the destroyed **Chernobyl** reactor. This task is inevitably beyond the resources of Ukraine alone. This is a major challenge for the international community. We have decided to add to the commitments we undertook in the MOU with Ukraine. We endorse the setting up of a multilateral funding mechanism and have agreed that the G-7 will contribute \$300 million over the lifetime of the project. We call upon concerned governments and other donors to join us at a special pledging conference this fall to ensure full implementation of this project.

### **1998 Birmingham (3 Paragraph, 10 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

#### *Communiqué:*

##### *Promoting sustainable growth in the global economy*

A crucial factor in ensuring sustainable development and global growth is an efficient energy market. We therefore endorse the results of our **Energy Ministers' Meeting** in Moscow in April. We shall continue cooperation on energy matters in the G8 framework. We recognise the importance of soundly based political and economic stability in the regions of energy production and transit. With the objective of ensuring reliable, economic, safe and environmentally-sound energy supplies to meet the projected increase in demand, we commit ourselves to encourage the development of energy markets. Liberalisation and restructuring to encourage efficiency and a competitive environment should be supported by transparent and non-discriminatory national legislative and regulatory frameworks with a view to establishing equitable treatment for both government and private sectors as well as domestic and foreign entities. These are essential to attract the new investment which our energy sectors need. We also recognise the importance of international co-operation to develop economically viable international energy transmission networks. We shall pursue this co-operation bilaterally and multilaterally, including within the framework and principles of the **Energy Charter Treaty**.

Considering the new competitive pressures on our electric power sectors, we reaffirm the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to the safe operation of **nuclear power plants** and the achievement of high **safety standards** worldwide, and attach the greatest importance to the full implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account** grant agreements. We reaffirm our commitment to the stated mission of the **Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG)**. We agreed to deepen Russia's role in the activities of the **NSWG**, with a view to eventual full membership in the appropriate circumstances. We acknowledge successful cooperation on the pilot project of the **International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)** and consider it desirable to continue international cooperation for **civil nuclear fusion development**.

## *Non-Proliferation and Export Controls*

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems threatens the security of every nation. Our countries have been in the forefront of efforts to prevent proliferation, and we have worked closely together to support international non-proliferation regimes. We pledge to continue and strengthen this co-operation. As a key element of this co-operation, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure the effective implementation of **export controls**, in keeping with our undertakings within the non-proliferation regimes. We will deny any kind of assistance to programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. To this end, we will where appropriate undertake and encourage the strengthening of laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms. We will likewise enhance amongst ourselves and with other countries our co-operation on **export control, including for instance on the exchange of information**. We will ask our experts to focus on strengthening **export control** implementation. And we will broaden awareness among our industrial and business communities of **export control** requirements.

### **1999 (5 Paragraph, 12 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

#### ***Communiqué:***

##### *X. Tackling Global Challenges*

We renew the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to safety first in the use of **nuclear power** and the achievement of **high safety standards** worldwide. In this regard, we attach great importance to the results of the **Nuclear Safety Convention peer review meeting** and to the **International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe**.

We reaffirm our commitment to strengthen cooperation in the field of **nuclear safety**. We welcome the concerted efforts to address the Year 2000 computer problem ("Millennium Bug") in this area. With regard to the **Nuclear Safety Account**, we continue to attach great importance to full and timely implementation of the grant agreements.

#### ***G7 Statement:***

##### *IV. Nuclear Safety/Ukraine*

We renew our commitment to the successful implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the G7 and Ukraine. We welcome Ukraine's renewed firm commitment to the closure of **Chernobyl** on schedule by the year 2000. Our overriding goal is the closure of the **Chernobyl power plant** by the agreed timetable.

We note that significant progress has been made in carrying out the **Shelter Implementation Plan** to secure the environmental safety of the sarcophagus covering the remains of the destroyed **Chernobyl reactor**. To date, contributions to the **Chernobyl**

**Shelter Fund** total US \$393 million, including US \$50 million from Ukraine. We have agreed that the G7 will help ensure the continued financing and the progress in the work under the **Shelter Implementation Plan**. We call on concerned governments and private-sector donors to join us in this effort. To this end, we plan to hold a pledging conference before the next summit.

We reaffirm our commitment to assist Ukraine, within the context of the MoU, in mobilizing funds for energy projects to help meet its power needs. To date, projects have been agreed totaling over US \$746 million. In addition, in the field of **nuclear safety** US \$485 million have been granted, not including the **Shelter Implementation Plan**. We look to the Government of Ukraine to accelerate the fundamental reforms in the **energy sector**, including improvements in cash collection and privatization, to encourage financially viable investments in power generation and distribution and in energy efficiency. We commend the steady work that has allowed Ukraine, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and EURATOM to enter into the final phase of negotiations on loans to complete two **reactors** at Rivne and Khmelnytsky. We call on the parties to take the necessary steps to provide for an early agreement on loans for safe, cost-effective, and financially and environmentally sound projects.

#### **2000 (4 Paragraph, 8 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

##### ***Communiqué:***

##### *Nuclear Safety*

We renew the commitment we made at the **1996 Moscow Summit** to **safety** first in the use of **nuclear power** and achievement of **high safety standards** world wide. We agreed to continue to co-operate in promoting a **high standard of nuclear safety**. We continue to attach great importance to the full and timely implementation of the **Nuclear Safety Account Grant Agreement**.

##### *Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Control*

Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for **plutonium management** and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to co-ordinate this co-operation. We will expand our co-operation to other interested countries in order to gain the widest possible international support, and will explore the potential for both public and private funding.

##### ***G7 Statement:***

##### *Nuclear Safety/Ukraine*

We welcome the decision taken by President Kuchma to close the **Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP)** on 15 December this year. We continue to co-operate with the

Government of Ukraine in addressing the problems associated with the permanent shutdown of the **Chernobyl NPP**.

We reaffirm our commitment made at the Cologne Summit to continue our support for the **Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP)**. We welcome the results of the Pledging Conference in July to ensure full implementation of the **SIP**. We appreciate the contribution of the non-G7 donors.

**2001 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

***G7 Statement:***

*Nuclear Safety*

We welcome Ukraine's permanent closure of the **Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant** on 15 December 2000, which was a vital accomplishment in support of **nuclear safety**.

**2002 (18 Paragraph, 11 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

***Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction:***

In a major initiative to implement those principles, we have also decided today to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and **nuclear safety issues**. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the **dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines**, the disposition of **fissile materials** and the employment of former weapons scientists. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support **such projects** over the next ten years. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this **Global Partnership**. We have adopted a set of guidelines that will form the basis for the negotiation of specific agreements for new projects, that will apply with immediate effect, to ensure effective and efficient project development, coordination and implementation. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.

*The G8 Global Partnership: Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects*

The G8 will work in partnership, bilaterally and multilaterally, to develop, coordinate, implement and finance, according to their respective means, new or expanded cooperation projects to address (i) non-proliferation, (ii) disarmament, (iii) counter-terrorism and (iv) **nuclear safety** (including environmental) issues, with a view to enhancing strategic stability, consonant with our international security objectives and in support of the multilateral non-proliferation regimes. Each country has primary responsibility for implementing its non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and



nuclear safety obligations and requirements and commits its full cooperation within the Partnership.

Cooperation projects under this initiative will be decided and implemented, taking into account international obligations and domestic laws of participating partners, within appropriate bilateral and multilateral legal frameworks that should, as necessary, include the following elements:

- i. Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;
- ii. The projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
- iii. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
- iv. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
- v. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
- vi. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;
- vii. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
- viii. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
- ix. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.

Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international

security obligations and objectives. Specific bilateral and multilateral project implementation will be coordinated subject to arrangements appropriate to that project, including existing mechanisms.

For the purposes of these guidelines, the phrase "new or expanded cooperation projects" is defined as cooperation projects that will be initiated or enhanced on the basis of this **Global Partnership**. All funds disbursed or released after its announcement would be included in the total of committed resources. A range of financing options, including the option of bilateral debt for program exchanges, will be available to countries that contribute to this **Global Partnership**.

The **Global Partnership's** initial geographic focus will be on projects in Russia, which maintains primary responsibility for implementing its obligations and requirements within the **Partnership**.

In addition, the G8 would be willing to enter into negotiations with any other recipient countries, including those of the Former Soviet Union, prepared to adopt the guidelines, for inclusion in the **Partnership**.

Recognizing that the **Global Partnership** is designed to enhance international security and safety, the G8 invites others to contribute to and join in this initiative.

With respect to **nuclear safety and security**, the partners agreed to establish a new **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group** by the time of our next Summit.

### **2003 (6 Paragraph, 7 Sentence, 4 Priority Placement)**

#### *Chair's Summary:*

##### *Enhancing Sustainable Development*

Nuclear safety: In accordance with our statement at Kananaskis, we established the G8 **Nuclear Safety and Security Group**, and adopted its mandate and the Core Principles shared by each of us, to promote the **safe and secure** use of **civil nuclear technology**.

### *Improving Security*

Non-proliferation: We adopted a Statement on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and endorsed an Action Plan on the prevention of radiological terrorism and the **securing of radioactive sources**.

### *Regional Issues*

North Korea: We addressed the North Korean **nuclear issue** in our Statement on non-proliferation. We support the efforts made by the different parties to seek by **peaceful** means a comprehensive solution to the North Korean **nuclear issue** and to other matters, including unresolved humanitarian problems such as the abductions. We also support the Peace and Prosperity Policy pursued by the Republic of Korea.

### ***Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction: A G8 Action Plan:***

The recent conclusion of the **Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme for the Russian Federation** has demonstrated substantial progress in translating the **Global Partnership** initiative into concrete actions.

Outreach activities have been undertaken to invite and facilitate non-G8 countries to participate and contribute, as a result of which Finland, Norway, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland have indicated their interest in joining the **Global Partnership** as donors.

To expand participation in the **Global Partnership** to interested non-G8 donor countries that are willing to adopt the Kananaskis documents. While still focusing on projects in Russia, we mandate the Chair to enter into preliminary discussions with new or current recipient countries including those of the former Soviet Union that are prepared to adopt the Kananaskis documents, as the Ukraine has already done

### **2004 (7 Paragraph, 22 Sentence, 1 Priority Placement)**

#### ***Chair's Summary:***

We welcomed the increasing strength of the global economy. We agreed it was important to take advantage of the strong global economic environment to implement further reforms to accelerate growth in our countries. We noted the recent pledge by oil producers to increase production. We recognized the need for balanced energy policies, which increase energy supplies and encourage more efficient energy use and conservation, including through **new technologies**.

#### ***G8 Global Partnership Annual Report:***

At the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, G8 Leaders launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, committing to

support projects, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and **nuclear safety** issues. Building on the efforts of the first year of the Partnership, G8 members have taken important steps forward in the past twelve months, guided by the action goals approved by Leaders at Evian in 2003, and can report that substantial progress has been made. This annual report summarizes the results of these efforts, addressing the Evian Action goals and other **Global Partnership** activities.

Implementing frameworks: Some G8 members have in place long-standing implementation frameworks for **Global Partnership** projects. Others, building upon the work of the previous year, have now successfully established the legal basis for specific Global Partnership cooperation with Russia. For example, both Germany and Italy signed agreements with the Russian Federation for cooperation in the areas of **nuclear submarine dismantlement** and chemical weapons destruction. The United Kingdom and the Russia Federation signed an agreement for cooperation in the **nuclear** area. Germany concluded an agreement with the Russian Federation on cooperation in the area of physical protection of **nuclear materials**. New EU Joint Action projects are implemented under the umbrella of bilateral agreements between European Union member states and the Russian Federation. Japan and Russia concluded an implementing agreement for a pilot project to dismantle a Victor III class **nuclear submarine**. Canadian and Russian officials have completed the text of a framework agreement for **Global Partnership** cooperation.

A number of members have used the **Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)** framework agreement as a model for new bilateral agreements, or have referred to the **MNEPR** framework in their agreements. On the other hand, some implementing frameworks have expired and negotiations for others have not been concluded because of differences among the parties.

In Northwest Russia , the United Kingdom has funded the dismantlement of two Oscar class **submarines** and projects to ensure safe and secure spent nuclear fuel management at Andreeva Bay. In November 2003, Germany initiated a project to support the **dismantlement of submarines**, including the refurbishment of the Nerpa shipyard for that purpose and construction of a long-term intermediate storage facility for 120 reactor compartments at Saida Bay . France is considering the support of **nuclear general-purpose submarine dismantlement** and remediation in Gremikha. Canada is poised to sponsor **dismantlement** projects. Italy plans to assist with **dismantlement** following ratification of the negotiated agreement by the parliaments of Italy and the Russian Federation . Norway is funding the dismantlement of two Victor I class **nuclear submarines**. A number of members, including Canada , the European Union, Finland , France , Germany , the Netherlands , Norway , Russia , Sweden , and the United Kingdom are providing substantial contributions for work to be initiated through the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP). In the Pacific Far East, Japan's pilot project, dismantlement of one Victor III class nuclear submarine, will be completed by autumn 2004, with further work to **dismantle other submarines** to follow. In the past year, the United States has funded the **dismantlement** of one strategic **nuclear submarine** and 109 strategic sea-launched ballistic missiles. Russia has committed to

provide about US \$65 million annually for **submarine dismantlement**, rehabilitation of shore-bases and decommissioning of **nuclear-powered service vessels**.

Project coordination: The GPSOG and the GPWG have actively considered coordination of projects under the **Global Partnership** to ensure exchange of information among interested countries for the purposes described in the action plan goal. The guiding principle has been to rely on existing coordination mechanisms, wherever available, rather than create additional expert consultative groups within the G8. In the chemical area, interested experts have been meeting on the margins of the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Where there are no existing bodies for a program area, an effort has been made to identify an effective arrangement. The GPSOG and subsequently the GPWG considered coordination needs with respect to **nuclear submarine dismantlement** and physical protection of **nuclear materials**.

With respect to **nuclear submarine dismantlement**, some members identified a need for more effective coordination of activities and made proposals in this regard. Members have discussed the roles of several organizations where such information can be exchanged, including the Northern Dimension Environmental Program (NDEP) under the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the **IAEA Contact Experts Group**, and the **Council of the Multilateral Environmental Nuclear Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)**. The GPWG will continue to review this matter and ensure effective coordination is undertaken. With increased **Global Partnership** activities in the area of **nuclear physical protection**, consideration is being given to how to facilitate coordination and exchange of information, taking into account the sensitive nature of the sites where projects are undertaken.

#### **2005 (1 Paragraph, 1 Sentence, 0 Priority Placement)**

##### *Chair's Summary:*

##### *Regional Issues and Proliferation*

On Iran we support the efforts of France, Germany and the UK, with the EU, to address through negotiation the concerns about Iran's **nuclear programme**, and expressed once again the importance of Iran combating terrorism, supporting peace in the Middle East and respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.

#### **2006 (64 Paragraph, 83 Sentence, 5 Priority Placement)**

##### *Chair's Summary:*

We met in St.Petersburg for our annual Summit, 15-17 July 2006, to discuss collective approaches to pressing international issues. On July 17 we were joined for our discussion on priority themes of the Russian Presidency (global energy security, development of modern education systems and fight against infectious diseases) as well as globalization,

international trade and Africa by the leaders of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa and by the heads of the African Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States, the **International Energy Agency**, the **International Atomic Energy Agency**, the United Nations, UNESCO, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the World Trade Organization.

### *Global Energy Security*

Those of us who have or are considering plans related to the use of safe and secure **nuclear energy** underlined its important contribution to global energy security.

### *International Security*

We recognize States' rights under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to access to the benefits of **nuclear energy**. We discussed the concrete proposals contained in the Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership** as well as the recent initiative tabled at the IAEA by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for **nuclear fuel**. We agreed to continue to discuss these issues jointly with the IAEA with a view to ensuring that all States that conscientiously fulfill their non-proliferation obligations have guaranteed access to the benefits of the **peaceful** use of **nuclear energy**.

### *Keynote address at European Business Leaders Convention by Matti Vanhanen, president, European Council*

Ratification of the **Energy Charter** by Russia and the conclusion of negotiations on its Transit Protocol would be a welcome and concrete step. The **Energy Charter Treaty** would bring about transparency and dispute settlement mechanisms that would enable mutual confidence and encourage investment, while also introducing long-term stability.

At EU level, we support the extension of internal market principles to our neighbouring countries. An important concrete step in this direction has just been taken with the entry into force of the **Energy Community Treaty** on 1 July. At present, this **Treaty** covers the countries of South-East Europe, and is thus also an important factor in regional integration. However, the objective is to extend the Energy Community to other neighbours of the Union as well.

Diversification of energy sources is essential for energy security. Together with functioning markets, diversification makes energy systems more able to cope with external disruptions. In Finland, we have deliberately built a wide energy mix. We rely on oil, gas, hydroelectric power, wood and peat to name a few. Additional **nuclear power** capacity is being built as we speak. No individual energy source is dominant and our energy system is complemented by an integrated Nordic electricity market.

In the discussion on EU energy policy, one should always keep in mind that the choice of energy sources is a matter for the Member States. This becomes most evident when looking at national policies on **nuclear power**. There is wide agreement that this competence should be kept at the national level in future. However, a strong national competence in energy policy does not mean that the EU has only a marginal role to play. I am convinced that, in energy, we need more Europe, not less. The EU has a crucial role to play in building a real internal market in energy, which should be complemented by ensuring extensive connections to external suppliers as well.

### *Joint Statement by George Bush and Vladimir Putin*

The United States and the Russian Federation believe that strengthening their cooperation in civil **nuclear energy** is in the strategic interests of both our countries. It will serve as an additional assurance of access for other nations to economical and environmentally safe **peaceful nuclear energy**.

### *Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy*

The United States and the Russian Federation are convinced that reliable and sufficient energy supplies are the cornerstone of sustainable economic development and prosperity for all nations, and a necessary condition for maintaining international stability. Today **nuclear energy** is a proven technology for providing reliable electric power without emission of greenhouse gases, and is an essential part of any solution to meet growing energy demand.

We share the view that **nuclear energy** has an essential role in the promotion of energy security, which is an issue of special concern for the leaders of the G-8. Advancing **nuclear energy** will require further development of innovative technologies that reduce the risk of proliferation, provide for safe management of waste, are economically viable, and are environmentally safe.

Being consistent in our approach to assure access to the benefits of **nuclear energy** for all nations complying with their non-proliferation obligations, we have each proposed initiatives on the development of a global **nuclear energy** infrastructure, specifically the Russian proposal to establish a system of international centers to provide **nuclear fuel** services, including **uranium** enrichment, under IAEA safeguards, and the U.S. proposal for the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership** to develop innovative **nuclear** reactor and **fuel** cycle technologies.

Following up on these initiatives, the United States and the Russian Federation intend to work together, actively involving the IAEA, to allow all nations to enjoy the benefits of **nuclear energy** without pursuing uranium enrichment and spent **fuel** reprocessing capabilities.

The United States and the Russian Federation together with four other **nuclear fuel** supplier states have also proposed a concept for reliable access to **nuclear fuel** for consideration and development at the IAEA.

We call upon other countries to join us to facilitate the safe and secure expansion of **nuclear energy** worldwide.

Proceeding from our national interests and common goals, and recognizing the benefits of civil commercial **nuclear trade**, we express our intent to develop bilateral cooperation in the **peaceful** use of **nuclear energy**.

We have directed our Governments to begin negotiations with the purpose of concluding an agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on cooperation in the **peaceful** use of **nuclear energy**.

#### *Countering Nuclear Proliferation*

We will continue to work together to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.

Through our cooperation in the field of nuclear nonproliferation we seek to improve the security of our own peoples and of all others in the world community. In doing so, we are building on the unique historic roles and responsibilities of the United States and the Russian Federation in **nuclear** science and technology, both military and civilian. We are united in our determination to help make the benefits of **nuclear energy** securely available to all for **peaceful** purposes.

#### *Joint Statement by Stephen Harper and Vladimir Putin on Canada-Russia Energy Cooperation*

In taking joint action to enhance global energy security and to address environmental challenges, we will focus on diversification of energy sources, encouraging investment in the energy sector, in addition to energy efficiency, scientific and technological cooperation, renewables and **alternative sources of energy**.

Canada and Russia look forward to the possibility of enhanced civil **nuclear** cooperation and, in this regard, completing arrangements that will help facilitate mutually beneficial trade in **uranium**.

#### *Press Briefing with President Putin*

VP: Today at the press conference with the President of the United States we already said that we are satisfied with how the six-country forum began its work and we consider that this forum must be used to develop common approaches towards resolving this problem. The question consists not in toughening our positions but in uniting them. And as a matter of fact this is the most difficult thing to do but could also be the most effective way to resolve the Iranian **nuclear** question.



## *Global Energy Security*

### *Nuclear Energy*

As we meet on the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the **Chernobyl accident**, we reiterate the commitments made during the **1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security**, and the paramount importance of safety, security and non-proliferation.

Those of us who have or are considering plans relating to the use and/or development of safe and secure **nuclear energy** believe that its development will contribute to global energy security, while simultaneously reducing harmful air pollution and addressing the climate change challenge:

- The development of innovative **nuclear power systems** is considered an important element for efficient and safe **nuclear energy development**. In this respect, we acknowledge the efforts made in the complementary frameworks of the **INPRO** project and the **Generation IV International Forum**.
- Until advanced systems are in place, appropriate interim solutions could be pursued to address back-end fuel cycle issues in accordance with national choices and non-proliferation objectives.
- Benefits will stem from improving the economic viability of **nuclear power**. We recognize that independent effective regulation of **nuclear installations** is essential for the development of infrastructure supporting safe and secure **nuclear energy**.  
We are committed to:
- further reduce the risks associated with the safe use of **nuclear energy**. It must be based on a robust regime for assuring nuclear non-proliferation and a reliable safety and security system for **nuclear materials and facilities**;
- ensure full implementation of the international conventions and treaties in force today which are a prerequisite for a high level of safety and a basis to achieve a **peaceful** and proliferation-resistant nuclear energy use. The responsibility of all nations to support the work of the **IAEA** and all measures to implement these conventions and treaties in these fields is emphasized;
- continue to consider **nuclear safety and security** issues in the **Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)**.

We reaffirm the objective set out in the 2004 G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation to allow reliable access of all countries to **nuclear energy** on a competitive basis, consistent with non-proliferation commitment and standards. Building on that plan, we intend to make additional joint efforts to ensure reliable access to low enriched **uranium** for power **reactor fuel** and spent fuel recycling, including, as appropriate, through a multilateral mechanisms provided that the countries adhere to all relevant international non-proliferation commitments and comply with their obligations.

In this respect, we take note of recent potentially complementary initiatives put forward in the **IAEA** framework regarding multilateral fuel supply assurances, as well as the proposals made by Russia and the U.S., aimed at further development of **peaceful nuclear energy**, in a manner that promotes proliferation resistance of the **nuclear fuel cycle**, including preventing the spread of sensitive **nuclear technologies**.

### ***Statement on Non-Proliferation***

#### *Peaceful use of nuclear energy*

We recall that Article IV of the NPT stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of **nuclear energy** for **peaceful purposes** without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty. We are committed to facilitate the exchange of equipment, materials and information for the **peaceful** use of **nuclear energy**. Full compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations, including safeguards agreements, is an essential condition for such exchange.

An expansion of the **peaceful use of nuclear energy** must be carried forward in a manner consistent with nuclear non-proliferation commitments and standards. In this regard, it is important to develop and implement mechanisms assuring access to **nuclear fuel** related services to states as an alternative to pursuing enrichment and reprocessing activities. In this respect we appreciate the recent potentially complementary Initiative of the President of the Russian Federation on multinational centers to provide **nuclear fuel cycle** services and the Initiative of the President of the United States on the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership** as well as the recent initiative tabled at the **IAEA** by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding a concept for a multilateral mechanism for reliable access to enrichment services for **nuclear fuel**. We will work to elaborate further these initiatives. To further strengthen this common approach we will:

- continue reviewing multinational approaches to the **fuel** cycle, including international centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services, with the **IAEA**, as well as relevant practical, legal and organizational solutions;
- facilitate developing credible international assurances of access to **nuclear fuel** related services; while
- those of us who have or are considering plans relating to use and/or development of safe and secure **nuclear energy** will promote research and development for safer, more efficient, more environmentally friendly and more proliferation resistant **nuclear energy** systems, including relevant technologies of the **nuclear fuel** cycle. Until advanced systems are in place, appropriate interim solutions could be pursued to address back-end **fuel** cycle issues in accordance with national choices and non-proliferation objectives.

### *Enrichment and Reprocessing*

In accordance with approaches agreed upon at the G8 summits at Sea Island and in Gleneagles, we support the development of measures to prevent transfers of sensitive **nuclear equipment, materials and technologies** to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorists' hands.

We will exercise enhanced vigilance with respect to the transfers of **nuclear technology, equipment and material**, whether in the trigger list, in the dual-use list, or unlisted, which could contribute to enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, and will be particularly vigilant with respect to attempts to acquire such **technology, equipment and material** by covert and illicit means.

We agreed at Sea Island that the export of such items should occur only pursuant to criteria consistent with global non-proliferation norms and to those states rigorously committed to these norms. Over the last two years we have made significant progress in the development of such criteria. We welcome the progress noted by the **Nuclear Suppliers Group** and its commitment to work actively with a view to reaching consensus on this issue by 2007.

### *Report on the G8 Global Partnership*

The destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned **nuclear submarines**, employment of former weapons scientists, and disposal of fissile material were identified as priorities at Kananaskis. The Russian Federation considers the first two areas of cooperation as being of primary importance for the implementation of the GP projects in Russia.

### *Dismantlement of nuclear submarines and related work*

In addition to the dismantlement of submarines, the **Global Partnership** projects also addressed the development of infrastructure to ensure **nuclear material** from the dismantlement process is made safe and secure. Key projects underway include: the German-financed construction of a long-term interim storage facility for 150 reactor compartments at Sayda Bay - the operation of the first section of the storage facility will start on July 18, 2006; the rehabilitation of the temporary storage facility for spent **nuclear fuel** at Andreeva Bay funded by the UK, Norway and Sweden; refitting of the **nuclear waste** incinerator in Zvezdochka shipyard funded by France; a multi-use naval vessel for the transport of **nuclear (and related) materials** funded by Italy; and a Spent **Nuclear Fuel** storage facility at the Atomflot site, Murmansk funded by the UK. Canada funded environmental improvements at Zvezdochka.

The parties continue to use successfully the Framework Agreement on a **Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme** in the Russian Federation, which provided the basis for the implementation of the Northern Dimensional Environmental Programme's

(NDEP) "**Nuclear** Window", that includes a number of **nuclear** multilateral and bilateral projects, such as rehabilitation programmes at Gremikha funded by France, the NDEP and the EU.

As of December 1, 2005, the parties have accumulated 70,114 mln. euro in the NDEP's "**Nuclear** Window". Up to now, three contracts have been concluded for the 19,1 mln. euro. The parties are planning to provide up to 150 mln. euro for this Programme by the end of 2008.

#### *Other areas of co-operation*

*Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials:* The G8 Gleneagles Statement and the Sea Island G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation highlighted the importance of addressing the security of **nuclear** materials, equipment and technology as well as **radioactive** sources.

A number of donors have now established programmes with Russia and Ukraine to upgrade the physical protection of and account for **nuclear** materials. These include the US, UK, Germany, Canada, Norway, Sweden, and the EU.

In Ukraine, a further step towards **nuclear** safety has been made with the replenishment of the **Chernobyl Shelter Fund** providing the necessary financial resources for completion of the new shelter. A number of donors are engaged in projects with Ukraine to enhance export control and border security systems to help prevent the illicit trafficking in WMD across national borders.

#### *Report of the Nuclear Safety and Security Group*

Entire section is relevant in terms of nuclear safety and security.

#### *Final Press Briefing with President Putin*

I am convinced that these measures will lead to the formation of a stable and favourable trade and investment environment in the global energy sector. I think that the fact that we have succeeded in agreeing on a formula for the development of **nuclear energy** that has been accepted by everyone is also one of the summit's indisputable achievements. Moreover, we have also held in-depth discussions on assistance measures for countries that are vulnerable in energy terms. Of course, there are no simple solutions in this area and a lot more time and effort are still required from all of us to resolve effectively the energy problems in the developing countries and the poorest countries.

## 2007 (35 Paragraph, 79 Sentence, 2 Priority Placement)

### *Chair's Summary:*

#### *Foreign Policy and Security Issues*

Nuclear Safety and Security: The **Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)** provided technically informed, strategic policy advice on selected **nuclear** safety and **radiation** protection issues, discussed **nuclear** safety improvement programs for operating **Nuclear** Power Plants (e.g. in Armenia, Ukraine), and furthered international activities on the safety and security of **radioactive** sources. The G8 commitments with regard to **Chernobyl** were reaffirmed.

### **Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy**

#### *Energy Diversification*

Diversification of energy sources, markets, transportation routes and means of transport and types of energy is essential to energy security and to a low-carbon energy path. Increasing and varying our sources of energy helps to defuse the risks of disruption from any one source. Increasing the use of **alternative sources of energy** can over time greatly relieve pressure on markets for conventional fossil fuels and reduce the adverse environmental impacts of energy use.

Underlining the importance of energy diversification, and recognising that G8 members will choose different ways to achieve their energy diversity goals, we

- reaffirm our pledge at former summits regarding the **peaceful** use of **nuclear energy**. Those of us who have or are considering plans relating to the use and/or **development of safe and secure nuclear energy** believe that its development will contribute to global energy security, while simultaneously reducing harmful air pollution and addressing the climate change challenge.
- take note of national and international initiatives to go along with the further development of a **peaceful use of nuclear energy** including the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)**, the Russian initiative on multinational centres to provide **nuclear fuel cycle** services, the Six party proposal of a standing mechanism for reliable access to **nuclear fuel**, the Japanese initiative on **IAEA** standby arrangements system for the assurance of **nuclear fuel supply**, and the German initiative for an enrichment centre under the exclusive control of the **IAEA** as well as ongoing debate on other multilateral approaches to a **nuclear fuel cycle** for a reliable fuel supply program, the work of the **International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)**, and advanced nuclear energy research under the Generation IV International Forum (GIF).

We are committed to the paramount importance of safety, security and non proliferation

in using **nuclear power**. We reiterate common interest to continuously improve **nuclear safety, radiation protection, waste management, nuclear security and nuclear liability** in our respective countries, and we call upon all other states to do the same. **IAEA standards** and recommendations form a good basis for the continuous improvement of nuclear safety and security, as well as national **nuclear regulatory systems**. We underline the need for effective national regulatory infrastructures, in particular the importance for national regulatory body to have sufficient authority, independence, and competence. We remain committed to a robust regime for assuring nuclear non-proliferation as well as a reliable safety and security system for **nuclear materials, radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities**. We ensure full implementation of the international conventions and treaties in force today which are a prerequisite for a high level of **nuclear safety** and security as well as a basis to achieve a peaceful and proliferation-resistant nuclear energy use. The responsibility of all nations to support the work of the **IAEA** and all measures to implement these conventions and treaties in these fields is emphasized.

Considering the above mentioned challenges, the **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)** will continue in its work to consider **nuclear safety** and security issues.

In recognition of the **Chernobyl** accident in 1986 we reaffirm our commitments – under former G7/G8 Summit declarations and memoranda of understanding and through **Chernobyl Shelter Funds (CSF) and Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) programmes** – to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the damaged reactor unit site into safe conditions.

***Annex: Summary of G8 Africa Personal Representatives' Joint Progress Report on the G8 Africa Partnership***

*Heiligendamm Statement on Non-Proliferation*

We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as enshrined in Article IV in conformity with all their Treaty obligations. To reduce the proliferation risks associated with the spread of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technology, we welcome the continued discussion by the Nuclear Suppliers Group on mechanisms to strengthen controls on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment, facilities and technology. We regret that they did not reach consensus on this issue by 2007 as called for in St. Petersburg. We urge the NSG to accelerate its work and swiftly reach consensus. We agree to continue to undertake previously agreed actions on the understanding that should the NSG not reach consensus on appropriate criteria by 2008, we will seriously consider alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technologies. We also stress the importance of developing and implementing mechanisms of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle as a possible alternative to pursuing national enrichment and reprocessing activities. Following the IAEA special event in September last year we are now looking forward to the suggestions that the IAEA Director General will be presenting to the IAEA Board of

Governors later this month. In considering the suggestions we will be guided by the criteria of added value to the non-proliferation regime, confidence in the reliability of supply assurances, compatibility with Article IV of the NPT, and the need to avoid any unnecessary interference or disturbance with the functioning of existing commercial markets. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the highest possible non-proliferation, **safety and security** standards for the **peaceful use of nuclear energy** are observed. We appreciate suggested initiatives in the field of multilateral approaches to the **nuclear fuel** cycle, including the Russian initiative on multinational centres to provide **nuclear fuel** cycle services, the US initiative on the **Global Nuclear Energy Partnership**, the Six-Party proposal of a standing mechanism for reliable access to **nuclear fuel**, the Japanese initiative on an **IAEA** standby arrangements system for the assurance of **nuclear fuel** supply, the UK proposal for non-revocable advanced export approval and the German initiative to establish a special territory under the exclusive control of the **IAEA** where enrichment could take place on a commercial basis. We reiterate that participation in any mechanism dealing with multilateral approaches should be carried out on a voluntary basis and should not preclude any state from purchasing **nuclear fuel** cycle services on the existing market, beyond the frameworks of multilateral mechanisms.

We look forward to reinforcing our partnership with India. We note the commitments India has made, and encourage India to take further steps towards integration into the mainstream of strengthening the non-proliferation regime so as to facilitate a more forthcoming approach towards **nuclear** cooperation to address its **energy** requirements, in a manner that enhances and reinforces the global non-proliferation regime.

### ***Report on the Global Partnership***

#### *Dismantlement of Nuclear Submarines and Related Work*

Dismantlement of **nuclear submarines** withdrawn from the Russian Navy is another priority area identified at Kananaskis. This is a complex activity, including transport of the submarines, defuelling, dismantlement and safe storage of the reactor compartments. Substantial progress has been made since 2002, with 69 submarines dismantled, including 21 with foreign assistance from Canada, Japan, Norway, the UK and the US. The activities have mainly taken place in the North West of Russia while they have also taken place in the Russian Far East. In addition to the dismantlement of submarines, the **Global Partnership** projects also addressed the development of infrastructure to ensure **nuclear** material from the dismantlement process is made safe and secure. Key projects underway include: the German-financed construction of a land based long-term interim storage facility at Sayda Bay which became operational in July 2006. In the second phase of the **GP** this project will be extended with the construction of a **radioactive waste** management and storage facility at Sayda Bay. The rehabilitation of the temporary storage facility for spent **nuclear fuel** at Andreeva Bay funded by the Norway, Sweden and the UK; the launching of the rehabilitation of Gremikha former naval base funded by the EU, France and the EBRD; refitting of the **nuclear** waste incinerator in Zvezdochka shipyard funded by France; a multi-use naval vessel for the transport of **nuclear** (and

related) materials funded by Italy; and a Spent Nuclear Fuel storage facility at the Atomflot site, Murmansk funded by the UK. Canada funded environmental improvements at Zvezdochka. The parties continue to use successfully the **Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme** in the Russian Federation, which provided the basis for the implementation of the Northern Dimensional Environmental Programme's (NDEP) "**Nuclear Window**", that includes a number of **nuclear** multilateral and bilateral projects, such as rehabilitation programmes at Gremikha funded by France, the NDEP and the EU.

### *Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials*

The G8 Gleneagles Statement and the Sea Island G8 Action Plan on Non- Proliferation highlighted the importance of addressing the security of **nuclear** materials, equipment and technology as well as **radioactive** sources. A number of donors have now established programmes with Russia and Ukraine to upgrade the physical protection of and account for **nuclear** materials. These include Canada, the EU, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US. There is also increasing cooperation among those engaged in securing **radiological** sources. A number of donors, including Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, the US and the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) are supporting dismantling, storing and replacing some 700 highly **radioactive radioisotopic thermoelectric generators** (RTGs) which have been used to power Russian lighthouses. With Canadian assistance, a Russian "**RTG Master Plan**" has been developed and efforts are under way to increase co-ordination among participating countries **Global Partnership** countries are also cooperating in other spheres. The US is cooperating with Russia and Ukraine on the dismantlement of strategic weapons systems, and enhancing the security of weapons transportation and storage. Some bio-security projects are being implemented by several **Global Partnership** members. The US and Russia, with additional financial support from several other countries, are co-operating on the construction of fossil fuel power plants that, when completed, will allow the permanent closure of the three remaining Russian reactors that are producing weapon-grade **plutonium**. Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the UK have also contributed funds to support these projects. In Ukraine, a further step towards **nuclear safety** has been made with the replenishment of the **Chernobyl Shelter Fund** providing the necessary financial resources for completion of the new shelter. A number of donors are engaged in projects with Ukraine to enhance export control and border security systems to help prevent the illicit trafficking in WMD across national borders.

### *2007 Mid-Term Review & Assessment*

To provide a clear picture of what remains to be done, the 2006 **GP** Annual Report called for a review of the **GP** and its work at this mid-point of its lifespan. The **GP** partners, non-government organizations and scientists thoroughly assessed the main achievements, lessons learned and priorities of the **GP**. The conclusions and recommendations were laid down in the Mid-Term Review and brought to the attention of the summit in Heiligendamm.



## *Global Partnership Review*

### *Main Achievements of the Global Partnership*

During the review process all partners welcomed that Russia has considerably increased its own funding for the **GP** since 2002. While this strengthens the **GP**, the immensity of the tasks identified in Kananaskis fully justifies the **GP's** continued commitments. One of the main qualities of the **GP** is its pluralistic approach. This has enabled it to implement projects in a number of areas of the Kananaskis priorities whilst permitting all partners to follow national priorities or to concentrate on areas in which they have special expertise. In accordance with tasks identified in Kananaskis significant progress has been made in the following areas:

- Dismantling decommissioned **nuclear submarines** and securing and removing the material from them; remediation of former naval bases in order to secure and remove spent **nuclear fuels** and **radioactive waste**;

With these achievements, the **GP** has already become an important force to enhance international **security and safety**. Our work has made the world safer. It has helped overcome the legacy of the Cold War by bringing people and nations together to seek the mutual benefits of enhanced global security through cooperation, and it has created a common understanding of the global importance of the tasks agreed upon in Kananaskis.

### *Lessons Learned*

The major political lesson learned from the **GP** implementation is that the G8 together with other partners have proved and demonstrated their ability to work successfully together to address the topical issues of international security and safety. Partners also managed to resolve problems that emerged in the process of **GP** implementation in a constructive manner and on the basis of mutual respect taking into account the legitimate **security** interests of partners.

Adequate information submission, site access and tax exemption in accordance with the existing legal requirements of donors and recipients were found to be essential for the implementation of projects. While there remains room for improving project implementation also within the **GP** framework, our evaluations have shown that it is possible to overcome the many bureaucratic obstacles to progress by sustaining good working-level relationships and a strong commitment to mutual cooperation and understanding, without compromising requirements for financial probity, **safety standards or national security**. There are many examples for cooperative work on which to draw. It is therefore important to make this broad set of solutions known to all partners, since the options available mean that all donors can find a way of making a contribution, no matter how large or small. Possible solutions include co-financing by donors under the project leadership of one large donor, decentralized cooperation with local representatives or direct contracting with implementing agencies. It is essential to

have the proper legal arrangements in place before embarking on project implementation. Although all partners envisage making the fastest possible progress on their projects, it is acknowledged that it takes time to make the legal arrangements needed to maintain high quality standards. Having appropriate legal arrangements in place, every effort should be made to shorten the time required to conclude specific contracts to start project implementation. Reliable long-term planning is essential and predictable disbursement of funds are essential for successful completion of projects. Thus, making a difference on the ground locally requires the continued commitment of donors and recipients at all levels of government.

### *Future Priorities*

Within the **GP**, significant progress has been made since 2002. At the same time, partners recognize that more needs to be done to enhance effectiveness of cooperation to achieve the **Partnership's** goals. Some partners will also undertake work in areas not fully addressed so far, including **fissile material/plutonium** disposition and other areas such as biosecurity and biosafety. The Russian Federation considers of primary importance for the implementation of the **GP** projects in Russia the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines and chemical weapons destruction. In addition to the work in Russia, the implementation and universalization of the CPPNM, Full Scope Safeguards, the Additional Protocol, UNSCR 1540, the Convention on the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism as well as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism are, without being exhaustive, areas where partners may seek to engage through the **GP**. Partners agreed that maintaining a high level of global security will only be possible by strengthening the weakest links. At Sea Island, partners reaffirmed that they will address proliferation challenges worldwide. Some **GP** nations have already begun to make progress in this area. The **GP** is open to further geographical expansion in accordance with the Kananaskis documents. Taking into account the ongoing focus on projects in Russia, we continue to review the eligibility of other countries, including those from the CIS, to join the **GP**. Formal confirmation of their readiness to meet the conditions established in the Kananaskis documents, as well as detailed information on the projects they would request to be addressed under the **GP** are required.

### *Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group*

At the Kananaskis Summit, the G8 Leaders agreed to establish a **G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)**. The NSSG, responsible to Leaders, will, according to its mandate, provide technically informed, strategic policy advice on issues that could impact safety and security in the **peaceful** use of **nuclear energy**, in close cooperation with multilateral organizations and avoiding duplication of tasks or responsibilities that are being addressed adequately by existing organizations or entities.

We are committed to continue to consider **nuclear safety** and security issues in the **Nuclear Safety and Security Group**. We will continue to develop a common approach to selected **nuclear safety** and **radiation** protection issues and their regulation, by

- Developing a common understanding of internationally acceptable safety and security levels in the fields of **nuclear** installations, **radioactive** sources, decommissioning, **radioactive waste** and spent fuel management facilities in order to benchmark our national practices.

### *Importance of Nuclear Safety and Security*

The G8 are committed to the "**nuclear safety** first" principle, to recognised international accepted principles and best practices and to the highest level of standards in **nuclear safety** and security. We recognise the international conventions and **IAEA** standards form a good basis for the continuous improvement of national **nuclear** regulatory systems and **nuclear safety** as necessary. It is our common interest to maintain and if necessary to improve **nuclear safety**, **radiation** safety, waste management, **nuclear security** and **nuclear liability** in our respective countries, and we call upon all other States to do the same.

### **Nuclear Regulatory Infrastructure**

In view of the continuous safety and security challenges, we will continue to support measures to promote **nuclear (safety and security)** regulatory best practices.

The G8 have made use or intend to make use of the **IAEA "Integrated Regulatory Review Services"** to review and further improve their national regulatory bodies.

### *National Nuclear Safety and Security Infrastructure and Partnerships*

We will promote strong and competent national **nuclear safety and security** infrastructure. We recall that the nations forming the G8 have initiated and monitored major national and international programs to address **nuclear safety and security** needs and to establish partnership relations on these issues. We welcome continued cooperation with relevant international organizations active in this area. Priority actions are:

- Use of the **Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management** and on the **Safety of Radioactive Waste Management** for open and critical peer review and a source for learning about the best safety practices of others;
- Promote utilization of **IAEA** Safety Standards for the modernisation of national safety regulations, to the extent feasible;
- Multinational cooperation in the safety review of **nuclear power plant** designs.

The full implementation of international conventions on **nuclear safety and security**, the commitment to promote **nuclear safety standards and security guidelines** as well as the increased use of integrated review services are important prerequisites for the world's community to establish a global **nuclear safety** and security partnership. We call upon all

states to join, as appropriate, and implement the respective international instruments.

#### *Chernobyl Commitments*

We reaffirm our commitments under former G7 / G8 summit declarations and memoranda of understanding - to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the damaged reactor unit site into safe conditions and to make available safe and reliable facilities at **Chernobyl NPP** site necessary for a safe decommissioning of the shut down **reactor units**. We urge the Government of Ukraine in collaboration with EBRD, to take all necessary measures to assist in timely and efficient implementation of these programmes and projects within the agreed frameworks.

#### *Nuclear Safety of NPP Medzamor, Armenia*

We urge Armenia to undertake further upgrades necessary to ensure that **NPP Medzamor** can operate in a safe manner until it can be shut down and decommissioned.

#### *Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources*

We will continue to support international efforts to enhance controls on **radioactive** sources. We welcome the fact that more than 88 countries have committed to implement the **IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources** and urge all other states to adopt the code. We further note that to date 38 countries have committed to act in a harmonized manner in accordance with the **IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources**, and we encourage all states to support international activities aimed to harmonizing the implementation of provisions of the guidance.

#### *Global Nuclear Safety Network*

We will continue to strengthen the **Global Nuclear Safety and Security Partnership**. We will support the further enhancement of the evolving web-based systems and networks for information exchange and co-operation in **nuclear safety** matters, as implementation of **nuclear conventions**, co-operation on safety standards, and harmonization of safety approaches, exchange of operational experience and resolution of generic **nuclear safety** issues. This evolving global **nuclear safety** network is based on considerable work of international organizations in particular the **IAEA** and **OECD-NEA**. It will substantially contribute to maintain competence and to continuously develop effective protection against **nuclear hazards**. We note the efforts for the collection and dissemination of regulatory information, actions, initiatives and lessons learned as an appropriate means to strengthen the effectiveness of national **nuclear safety and security** regulators.

*Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Response*

At previous summits, we agreed to enhance global controls on **nuclear** and **radioactive** materials and facilities in order to minimize the risk of the malicious use of these materials and facilities. We are implementing those decisions. However, we recognize that we must also enhance as necessary our ability to effectively respond to **nuclear** and **radiological** accidents and incidents if they do occur. We welcome the establishment of the **IAEA** Incident and Emergency Centre and will support the **IAEA** in this work.

**Appendix A:**  
**Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration**

*April 20, 1996*

1. The end of the cold war and the political and economic reforms in Russia have opened a new era in our relationship and have provided the international community with real possibilities for cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety and security. The Moscow meeting is an important step in the realization of these objectives. We are determined, at this summit and beyond, to work together to ensure the safety of nuclear power and to promote greater security for nuclear materials.

2. We are committed to give an absolute priority to safety in the use of nuclear energy. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, it is our shared objective that such a catastrophe cannot reoccur.

We are ready to cooperate among ourselves so that the use of nuclear energy is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Further, we are committed to measures which will enable nuclear power, already a significant contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to exploit it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in meeting future world energy demand consistent with the goal of sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992.

We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain public trust which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy.

3. The security of all nuclear material is an essential part of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In particular, the safe management of fissile material, including material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, is imperative, not least as a safeguard against any risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

4. In the spirit of the decisions adopted during the New York Conference of May 1995 on review and extension of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the Decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we will increase our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament by promoting universal adherence to the NPT, working vigorously to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and through effective and responsible export control measures. We are issuing a separate statement on CTBT. We renew our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

## **Nuclear Safety**

5. Recognizing that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with national governments, it is of the first importance to continue to enhance international collaborative efforts to promote a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

### **Safety of Civilian Nuclear Reactors**

6. Nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to the highest internationally recognized safety level for the siting, design, construction, operation and regulation of nuclear power installations.

7. The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture in each country with nuclear installations is essential to that end.

8. Sustainable nuclear safety also requires a supportive economic and legal environment whereby both operators and national regulatory bodies can fully assume their independent responsibilities.

9. Nuclear safety can also be enhanced by greater international transparency in nuclear power activities, in particular by means of peer reviews, and this should lead to existing reactors which do not meet current safety requirements being brought to an acceptable level of safety or ceasing operation.

10. The adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reaffirms these fundamental safety principles, is a major accomplishment in this field. We urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete internal procedures to join so that the Convention can be brought into force expeditiously certainly before the end of 1996.

11. National efforts have been made in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States to improve nuclear safety levels, often in cooperation with multilateral and bilateral programmes. In this regard, we acknowledge these important efforts to upgrade reactor safety and improve safety culture, but note that further substantial progress is still required. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate fully for this purpose.

### ***Nuclear Liability***

12. An effective nuclear liability regime must assure adequate compensation to victims of, and for damage caused by, nuclear accidents. In addition, to secure the degree of private sector involvement needed to undertake vital safety improvements, the regime should at the same time protect industrial suppliers from unwarranted legal action.

13. The essential principles in this area are the exclusive and strict liability of the operator of the nuclear installations and ensuring needed financial security for adequate compensation.

14. It is essential that countries with nuclear installations that have not yet done so establish an effective regime for liability for nuclear damage corresponding to these principles.

15. It is important to work together on enhancing the international regime of liability for nuclear damage with a view to ensuring that it will attract wide adherence and accommodate any state which may wish to become a party. We encourage the experts to make further progress to this end. In this connection, the reinforcement of regional cooperation is welcomed.

### ***Energy Sector Strategies in Transition Countries***

16. Efficient market-oriented strategies for energy sector reform are essential to promote nuclear safety. This will generate adequate resources for investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, and encourage energy conservation. All countries in transition should pursue such market-oriented reforms and investment strategies based upon least cost planning, giving due regard to nuclear safety and environmental criteria, and to energy efficiency and conservation.

17. The International Financial Institutions have played a leading role in developing market-oriented energy sector reforms and investment plans. Their continued involvement and support is critical to ensure further progress.

### **Nuclear Waste Management**

#### ***International Convention***

18. National authorities must ensure radioactive waste is managed safely and that provisions are made for its proper handling, storage and ultimate disposal. These are essential elements for any nuclear energy programme.

19. The development of the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, based on these principles, is of paramount importance. We call on all countries generating nuclear waste with nuclear installations to participate actively in the preparation of this Convention under the auspices of the IAEA and to encourage its effective finalization and prompt adoption.

#### ***Ocean Dumping***

20. We commit ourselves to ban dumping at sea of radioactive waste and encourage all states to adhere at the earliest possible date to the 1993 amendment of the London Convention.



## **Nuclear Material Security**

### ***Programme on Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material***

21. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material is a public safety and nonproliferation concern. We recognized the importance of this issue at our meetings in Naples and Halifax. As risks continue to exist, we have agreed on, and released, a programme on preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased cooperation among our governments in all aspects of prevention, detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking.

We call on other governments to join us in implementing this programme.

### **Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection**

22. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear materials in their possession and the need to ensure that they are subject to effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. These systems should include regulations, licensing and inspections. We express our support for the IAEA safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected. We underline the need for the urgent strengthening of IAEA capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We note that these measures are also conducive to preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

23. We recognize the importance of continually improving systems and technologies for controlling and protecting nuclear materials. We urge nations to cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally and through the IAEA to ensure that the national systems for controlling nuclear materials remain effective. We are encouraged by the wide array of cooperative projects underway in this field under bilateral and multilateral auspices and pledge to sustain and increase these efforts.

24. We urge ratification by all states of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage the application of the IAEA recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

25. We pledge our support for efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon

States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.

***Safe and Effective Management of Weapons Fissile Material Designated as No Longer Required for Defence Purposes***

26. Major steps have been taken in recent years towards nuclear disarmament. This has created substantial stocks of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is vital, as mentioned above, that these stockpiles are safely managed and eventually transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons and disposed of safely and permanently.

27. The primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material rests with the nuclear weapons states themselves, but other states and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired.

28. We welcome the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, and the cooperation programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other states with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose; we encourage other efforts along these lines.

29. We are determined to identify appropriate strategies for the management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. Options include safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, and conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors. We have agreed to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies. We welcome plans to conduct small-scale technology demonstrations related to these options, including the possibility of establishing pilot projects and plants. We shall convene an international meeting of experts in order to examine available options and identify possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies, bearing in mind technical economic, non-proliferation, environmental and other relevant considerations. The meeting will take place in France by the end of 1996.

30. We recognize the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium and plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

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A background document on "Nuclear Safety", "Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection" and "Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes" is being released separately.

## **Appendix B: Inclusions and Exclusions**

### **List of Subjects Included:**

#### **1977**

- “nuclear energy” (1977 Communiqué)
- “nuclear proliferation” (1977 Communiqué)
- “peaceful use” (1977 Communiqué)
- “dissemination of [nuclear] material” (1977 Energy Appendix)

#### **1978**

- “safeguards” (1978 Communiqué)
- “nuclear power programs” (1978 Communiqué)
- “nuclear fuel cycle studies” (1978 Communiqué)
- “enriched uranium supply” (1978 Communiqué)

#### **1979**

- “International Energy Agency (IEA)” (1979 Communiqué)
- “International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA]” (1979 Communiqué)
- “International Energy Technology Group” (1979 Communiqué)

#### **1980**

- “nuclear generating capacity”
- “nuclear waste” (1980 Communiqué)
- “nuclear fuel”
- “International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group”
- “uranium”
- “International Energy Technology Group”

#### **1981**

- “nuclear facilities”
- “nuclear waste management” (1981 Communiqué)
- “UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy” (1981 Communiqué)

#### **1986**

- “Chernobyl” (1986 Communiqué)
- “nuclear emergencies and accidents” (1986 Communiqué)
- “[nuclear] safety” (1986 Communiqué)
- “[nuclear] standards” (1986 Communiqué)

#### **1989**

- “nuclear power plants” (1989 Communiqué)

## **1990**

- “Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “nuclear export control measures” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)
- “IAEA safeguards” (1990 Statement on Transnational Issues)

## **1991**

- “economic energy source” (1991 Communiqué)
- “European Energy Charter” (1991 Communiqué)
- “United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)
- “dual-use items” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC Non-proliferation)

## **1992**

- “safety authorities and plant operators” (1992 Communiqué)
- “regulatory regimes” (1992 Communiqué)
- “convention on nuclear safety” (1992 Communiqué)
- “action program” (1992 Communiqué)
- “export controls” (1992 Communiqué)

## **1993**

- “nuclear safety program” (1993 Communiqué)
- “radioactive wastes” (1993 Communiqué)

## **1994**

- “high risk reactors” (1994 Communiqué)
- “long-term energy strategies”
- “Nuclear Safety Account” or “Action Plan” (1994 Communiqué)

## **1995**

- “energy sector reform and investment” (1995 Communiqué)
- “non-nuclear energy” (1995 Communiqué)
- “fissile material” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
- “systems of control, accounting and physical security for nuclear materials” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
- “INTERPOL” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
- “Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)
- “Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)” (1995 Chairman’s Statement)

## **1996**

- “1996 Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)
- “nuclear safety” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)

“Convention on Nuclear Safety” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)  
“nuclear liability”  
“international convention on the safety of radioactive waste management”  
“Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization”

### **1997**

“Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention [regarding nuclear damage]” (1997 Communiqué)  
“international export control regimes” (1997 Communiqué)  
“Australia Group export control regime” (1997 Communiqué)  
“export control norms” (1997 Communiqué)  
“nuclear forensics capabilities” (1997 Foreign Ministers’ Progress Report)  
“Guidelines for the Management of Plutonium”

### **1998**

“Energy Charter Treaty” (1998 Communiqué)  
“the Nuclear Safety Working Group (NSWG)” (1998 Communiqué)  
“International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER)” (1998 Communiqué)  
“civil nuclear fusion development” (1998 Communiqué)

### **1999**

“Nuclear Safety Convention peer review meeting” (1999 Communiqué)  
“International Atomic Energy Agency Conference on Strengthening Nuclear Safety in Eastern Europe” (1999 Communiqué)  
“Chernobyl Shelter Fund” or “Shelter Implementation Plan” (1999 G7 Statement)

### **2000**

“Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty” (2000 Communiqué)  
“Global Monitoring System” (2000 Communiqué)  
“plutonium disposition” (2000 Communiqué)

### **2002**

“dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines” (Statement by the G8 Leaders: G8 Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction)

### **2003**

“Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme” (2003 Global Partnership: A G8 Action Plan)

### **2006**

“Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (2006 Chair’s Summary)  
“Energy Community Treaty” (2006 Keynote Address)  
“Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)  
“Additional Protocol” (2006 Joint Statement by Bush and Putin)

“nuclear submarines” (2006 Report on G8 Global Partnership)  
“Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme” (2006 Report on G8 Global Partnership)  
“radioactive” (2006 Report on G8 Global Partnership)  
“INPRO” (2006 Global Energy Security)  
“Generation IV International Forum” (2006 Global Energy Security)  
“Nuclear fuel cycle” (2006 Global Energy Security)

## **2007**

“Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG)” (2007 Chair’s summary)  
“International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO)” (2007 Growth and Responsibility in the World Economy)  
“Framework Agreement on a Multilateral Nuclear Environment Programme” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)  
“radiological” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)  
“radioisotopic thermoelectric generators (RTGs)” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)  
“RTG Master Plan” (2007 Report on the G8 Global Partnership)  
“Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)” (2007 Global Partnership Review)  
“Safety of Radioactive Waste Management” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“nuclear power plant” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“reactor units” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“IAEA Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“Global Nuclear Safety and Security Partnership” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“nuclear conventions” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)  
“nuclear hazards” (2007 Report on the Nuclear Safety and Security Group)

## **List of Subjects Excluded:**

### **1989**

“energy” (References that are not specific to nuclear energy)

### **1991**

“conventional arms transfers” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)  
“biological weapons” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)

“chemical weapons” (1991 Declaration on Conventional Arms Transfers and NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) Non-proliferation)

“CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] treaties” (1991 Political Declaration: Shaping the New Partnership)

**1996**

“somatic cell nuclear transfer” (1996 Communiqué)

“Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty” (1996 Chairman’s Statement)

“Arms Control Agreement” (1996 Decisions Regarding Bosnia Herzegovina)

**1997**

“Chemical Weapons Convention” (1997 Communiqué)

“Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention” (1997 Communiqué)

“weapons of mass destruction” (1997 Communiqué)

**1999**

“[missile] proliferation” (1999 Communiqué)